Bruner-McMahon v. Hinshaw (846 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 2012)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KATHRYN H. VRATIL, District Judge.

The administrator of the estate and the children of Terry Albert Bruner, a former inmate at the Sedgwick County Adult Detention Facility in Wichita, Kansas, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recover money damages for the violation of Bruner’s rights under the Eighth Amendment. In particular, plaintiffs allege that various individuals associated with Sedgwick County, Kansas (the “Sedgwick County Defendants”) and ConMed, Inc. (the “Con-Med Defendants”) were deliberately indifferent to Bruner’s serious medical needs. This matter is before the Court on Con-Med Defendants’ Joint Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. # 269) and the Sedgwick County Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. #270), both filed September 23, 2011. For reasons stated below, the Court sustains the summary judgment motion of the ConMed Defendants in its entirety. The Court sustains the summary judgment motion of the Sedgwick County Defendants as to all claims and defendants except the claims of Tera Bruner-McMahon, as administrator of Bruner’s estate, against Marque Jame-son and Mary Staton.

Summary Judgment Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving parties are entitled to, judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d 1535, 1538-39 (10th Cir.1993). A factual dispute is “material” only if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A “genuine” factual dispute requires more than a mere scin tilla of evidence. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Hicks v. City of Watonga, 942 F.2d 737, 743 (10th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that genuine issues remain for trial as to those dispositive matters for which she carries the burden of proof. Applied Genetics Int’l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir.1990); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir.1991). The nonmoving party may not rest on its pleadings but must set forth specific facts. Applied Genetics, 912 F.2d at 1241.

The Court views the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Deepwater Invs., Ltd. v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 938 F.2d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir.1991). It may grant summary judgment if the nonmoving party’s evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In response to a motion for summary judgment, a party cannot rely on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on suspicion, and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope that something will turn up at trial. Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir.1988). Essentially, the inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Factual Background

Plaintiffs have attempted to controvert nearly all of defendants’ facts, but most of plaintiffs’ responses are insufficient for one or more of the following reasons:

1. Many of plaintiffs’ responses do not specifically address the substance of the matter asserted. Plaintiffs repeatedly state that they deny the factual statement “in the manner and form alleged,” see, e.g., Response To Sedgwick County Defendants’ Statement Of Facts ¶¶ 4-6, 9-12, 14-19; Response to ConMed Defendants’ Statement Of Facts ¶¶ 2-15, 17-27, without attempting to explain any deficiency in the manner and form of the statement or what portion of defendants’ statement of fact that they admit and what portion that they deny. Plaintiffs also attempt to controvert many facts with (1) the exact same summary of the case without explaining how that summary relates to the specific fact alleged or (2) references to numerous additional facts without explaining how the additional facts relate to the specific fact alleged. Plaintiffs’ attempt to controvert facts in this manner is insufficient under D. Kan. Rule 56.1, which provides that all material facts set forth in the movant’s statement shall be deemed admitted unless “specifically controverted” by the opposing party. Vasquez v. Ybarra, 150 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1160 (D.Kan.2001) (citing Gullickson v. Sw. Airlines Pilots’ Ass’n, 87 F.3d 1176, 1183 (10th Cir.1996)). Under D. Kan. Rule 56.1(e) and basic principles of persuasion, a responding party has a duty to fairly meet the substance of the matter asserted.

2. Plaintiffs attempt to controvert nearly every fact including facts to which they already stipulated. Pretrial Order (Doc. #294) at 3-4; see, e.g., Response To Sedgwick County Defendants’ Statement Of Facts (Doc. # 283) ¶¶ 4-6, Response to ConMed Defendants’ Statement Of Facts (Doc. # 285) ¶¶ 2, 5, 25. Plaintiffs do not explain how they contest the stipulated facts.

3. In support of several of their additional statements of fact, plaintiffs include lengthy factual assertions with no references to the factual record. See Plaintiffs’ Additional Facts To ConMed Motion For Summary Judgment (Doc. #285) ¶¶ 44, 45, 46. Under D. Kan. Rule 56.1(b), all factual statements shall refer with particularity to those portions of record on which the non-movant relies. D. Kan. Rule 56.1(b); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1) and (3); see United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir.1991) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”); Boldridge v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 05-4055-SAC, 2007 WL 1299197, at *2 (D.Kan. May 2, 2007) (duty of parties contesting motion for summary judgment to direct court to places in record where evidence exists to support their positions); Murray v. Edwards Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept., 453 F.Supp.2d 1280, 1285 (D.Kan.2006) (court will not consider non-movant’s re quested factual findings that do not include citations to admissible evidence).

4. Plaintiffs attempt to controvert many facts by arguing that they are “incomplete.” See, e.g., Response To Sedgwick County Defendants’ Statement Of Facts (Doc. # 283) ¶¶ 5, 6, 10, 11, 16-19; Response To ConMed Defendants’ Statement Of Facts (Doc. # 285) ¶¶ 3, 5-27. Such responses are insufficient to controvert the alleged fact and do not comply with Rule 56(c), Fed. R.Civ.P., or D. Kan. Rule 56.1(b) and (e). See Mondaine v. Am. Drug Stores, Inc., 408 F.Supp.2d 1169, 1176 (D.Kan.2006).

The Court has no desire to make “technical minefields” of summary judgment proceedings, but neither can it countenance laxness in the proper and timely presentation of proof. Orsi v. Kirkwood, 999 F.2d 86, 92 (4th Cir.1993). Despite the deficiencies in plaintiffs’ responses to defendants’ factual statements, where the information was readily available in the summary judgment record of nearly 2000 pages, the Court has gone beyond plaintiffs’ citations to the record in an attempt to properly set forth the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiffs and to determine whether genuine issues of material fact preclude the entry of summary judgment for defendants.

The following material facts are uncontroverted, deemed admitted or, where controverted, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the non-movants.

Robert Hinshaw is the current Sheriff of Sedgwick County and has held that position since December of 2008. During Bruner’s incarceration from November of 2007 to March of 2008, Gary Steed was Sheriff of Sedgwick County and Hinshaw was the Undersheriff. During that same period, ConMed Healthcare Management, Inc. (“ConMed”) contracted to operate the medical and mental health clinic at the Sedgwick County Adult Detention Facility (“Sedgwick Jail”) in Wichita, Kansas. ConMed agreed to provide or pay for medical services for Sedgwick inmates whether they were housed at the Sedgwick Jail or at other correctional facilities throughout Kansas.

On November 5, 2007, Bruner was incarcerated in the Sedgwick Jail. On November 6, 2007, during a medical screening with a ConMed employee, Bruner signed an Inmate Medical Screening Report which stated that he fully understood what he must do to receive medical treatment at the Sedgwick Jail. Bruner also signed a medical intake form which stated in part as follows;

Emergency Care: Notify booking deputy immediately of emergency medical needs.

Non-Emergencies — Sick Call Procedure: Upon transfer to general population, inmate may sign up with the POD deputy to be seen during normal sick call hours Monday through Friday. Inmates can sign up for Sick Call at breakfast time Monday through Friday. [Sedgwick Jail] inmates can also push an intercom button in their cells to communicate with the POD deputy to request medical care.

On November 8, 2007, Bruner transferred to the Stanton County jail in Johnson, Kansas, some 260 miles from the Sedgwick Jail. Despite the transfer, because Bruner still was technically a Sedgwick County inmate, ConMed remained responsible for his medical care.

On March 4, 2008, after a report from another inmate that Bruner was ill, two Stanton County jailers, Jared Nichols and Carol Sheppard, checked on Bruner, who was in bed. Bruner appeared ill and stated that he did not feel well. The next morning, an inmate again reported that Bruner was sick, that he had bloody stools and that he was not eating. When Nichols and Sheppard went to check on Bruner and bring him breakfast, he told them that he did not want to eat and that he was sick and had the flu. Bruner looked uncomfortable and appeared to have the flu. Nichols and Sheppard concluded that Bruner needed immediate medical attention. Nichols thought Bruner looked like he had the flu, but did not look like he was in pain, and did not seem to be that sick. Nichols asked Bruner if he had bloody stools, and how long he had not been eating, but Bruner would not answer him. Nichols asked Bruner if he was sick enough to see a doctor, and Bruner said “no.” Bruner did not appear to be confused, but did seem irritated. Bruner told Nichols in no uncertain terms that he did not want to go back to Sedgwick County. Nichols and Sheppard decided to call the medical clinic at the Sedgwick Jail to report Bruner’s condition and to arrange to have Bruner transported back to the Sedgwick Jail.

At about 8:00 a.m. on March 5, Sheppard called Ted Gibson, a corporal at the Sedgwick Jail who was assigned to population control that day, and reported that Bruner appeared to be sick and in need of immediate medical attention. Sheppard stated that Bruner had not been eating and reportedly had blood in his urine or stools. Sheppard told Gibson that other inmates said Bruner was ill, but Bruner had said nothing because he did not want to return to the Sedgwick Jail. Gibson told Sheppard to call ConMed and ask whether Bruner could be put on the next transport back to the Sedgwick Jail.

Immediately thereafter, at approximately 8:15 a.m., Sheppard called ConMed and talked with a nurse, Joyce Beyrle. Sheppard told Beyrle that he had a Sedgwick inmate who was weak, not eating meals for two days and had blood in his stools. Beyrle recorded notes of her conversation with Sheppard in Bruner’s medical chart. Sheppard did not tell Beyrle that Bruner needed immediate medical attention. Likewise, Sheppard did not tell Beyrle that it was urgent, emergent or routine. Beyrle did not review Bruner’s medical chart or attempt to look up his medical history. She presented Bruner’s information to William Wondra, a physician assistant, who told her to have Bruner brought back to the Sedgwick Jail to see a clinician the next day. He did not recommend that Bruner be sent to a local hospital in Stanton County because his condition was not presented as an emergent situation. See Beyrle Depo. at 49. In presenting information to the physician assistant, Beyrle normally gives him the inmate’s medical chart in emergency situations only. Beyrle told Wondra that Bruner would be scheduled to see Fletcher the following day. Beyrle advised Sheppard that they would get Bruner transported back to Sedgwick ASAP.

A few minutes later, Beyrle called Gibson and told him that Bruner needed to be transported back to the Sedgwick Jail. Gibson asked Beyrle if Bruner could be brought back the following day in the transport van. Beyrle said yes. Beyrle did not tell Gibson about ConMed’s plan of action, when ConMed wanted to see Bruner or whether ConMed wanted to see Bruner at all. Although Gibson did not discuss exactly when Bruner would be transported back to the Sedgwick Jail, Beyrle expected that Bruner would arrive the next day, March 6. As the population deputy, Gibson decided when an inmate would be transported back to the Sedgwick Jail.

Beyrle documented in Bruner’s chart that he was to be scheduled to be seen by a clinician and a nurse on Thursday, March 6, which meant Bruner should have appeared on the clinician’s schedule as well as the nurse’s schedule for that day. At approximately 8:42 a.m. on March 5, Amy Rodman-Riggs, a ConMed employee, scheduled Bruner for a medical appointment with a physician- assistant on March 6 at 9:10 a.m. ConMed did not schedule appointments after 5:00 p.m. The transport van rarely arrived back at Sedgwick (from Stanton County and other jails) before 5:00 p.m. Unless an inmate arrived at the Sedgwick Jail before 5:00 p.m., that inmate would not be seen by medical staff until at least the following business day.

Gibson arranged for Bruner to be transported back to the Sedgwick Jail the next day, March 6, on the regular transport van. When ConMed directs the transport officer to have an inmate returned to the Sedgwick Jail for medical care, no policy requires the transport officer to inform anyone at the Sedgwick Jail that the inmate is coming back for medical care or otherwise document that the inmate is returning for medical attention. In addition, the transport and other officers do not follow up to determine whether the inmate has actually arrived back at the Sedgwick Jail or whether the inmate has actually received medical treatment. Once an inmate arrives for medical care, the inmate checks back in through booking and is reassigned a housing location based on classification. Deputies do not conduct any additional medical screening or ask why the inmate is returning.

Nichols was not aware that Bruner ate anything on Wednesday, March 5. The next morning, March 6, Bruner appeared to still have the flu and looked uncomfortable. In the early morning on March 6, Nichols told Bruner that he was being transferred back to the Sedgwick Jail. Bruner said that he did not want to go back. Nichols and Sheppard thought Bruner looked about the same. At 11:56 а. m. on March 6, Sedgwick County Sheriff Deputies Elton Bowman and Dana Hoffman picked up Bruner at the Stanton County jail. Bruner was so weak that Stanton County jailers had to carry him to the transport van. Bruner arrived back at the Sedgwick Jail at 5:00 p.m. Deputies logged Bruner’s name into the computer in the booking area at 5:43 p.m.

The Trip Sheet shows that Bruner was being returned for “medical.” Bowman testified that he would put the Trip Sheet in a file box in the transportation office once he was back at the Sedgwick Jail. Of the 21 inmates who were transported to or from Sedgwick Jail that day, Bruner was the only one transported for a medical reason. Normally, when an inmate is transported to the Sedgwick Jail, some sort of medical contact or screening occurs as parting of the booking process. Despite the fact that the Trip Sheet indicated that Bruner was being returned for “medical,” deputies conducted no type of medical screening. The Sedgwick Jail did not have a medical screening process for an inmate who returned for medical care from an out-of-county facility.

From 7:00 a.m. to 11:30 p.m. on March б, 2008, Charles Fletcher was working as a physician assistant in the clinic. Fletcher did not know why Bruner was on the schedule to be seen that day, and he did not typically try to get information on inmates on his schedule before the scheduled appointment or try to figure out why an inmate scheduled for sick call did not show up. Fletcher testified that typically the last time he would look at his schedule would be just before 5:00 p.m. At about 8:06 p.m. on March 6, Cassie (Leu) Looka, a certified medication aide, changed Bruner’s scheduled medical examination to a physician chart review on March 9 at 8:00 a.m. Looka did not talk to Fletcher about Bruner. Bruner stayed in the booking area until he arrived at his assigned cell in POD 1 at approximately 4:15 a.m. on March 7. Bruner did not have a cellmate.

POD 1 is a protective custody area for inmates who are not placed in general population. At all times, the POD deputy or a relief deputy remains in a POD booth which has a closed door, glass windows and a private bathroom. The booth is in the middle of the POD, which allows the deputy to see the various sections of the POD and the inmates in the day rooms, as well as inmates who are moving or standing by the window in their cell doors. From the booth, a deputy cannot hear inmates coughing or vomiting in their cells. Inmates can communicate with a deputy in the booth by intercoms when they are in their cells or through slots in the booth’s glass when they are in the POD day rooms.

Deputies supervise inmates in POD 1 indirectly and generally allow them at their will to stay in their cells or remain outside of their cells for much of the day in common day rooms. Inmates may eat food that they purchase through commissary in their cells. Except when an inmate is entering or exiting the cell, deputies keep cell doors closed and locked. The POD deputy generally unlocks cell doors remotely from the booth.

Several times during a shift, a POD deputy or relief deputy conducts physical checks or rounds of inmates. During these rounds, the deputy looks in the window of each cell} observes each inmate, and verifies that the inmate is breathing. The deputies determine whether the inmate is present and alive, not whether the inmate has signs of illness or sickness.

ConMed had normal sick call hours on weekdays only. Each weekday, inmates could sign up for sick call after breakfast at the end of the third shift (appx. 6:30 a.m.) or they could tell the POD deputy directly of their medical need. By intercom announcement, the POD deputy reminded inmates to sign up for sick call. In addition to sick call hours, jail officers could ask the clinic at any time to see an inmate for a medical concern. Inmates could also complete “Kite” forms, available in the POD, to make requests including requests for medical treatment. By policy, jail personnel had to respond to Kites on the day which they were submitted. From March 6 to March 10, Bruner did not sign up for sick call, complete a Kite or ask any employee of the Sedgwick Jail for medical treatment or help.

From information on the computer, POD deputies could determine if an inmate had a scheduled medical appointment as well as the date and time of the appointment. If an inmate had a scheduled appointment, deputies were not authorized to send the inmate to the clinic before Con-Med personnel called for the inmate. Deputies could call ConMed to expedite an appointment or issue a Code 1. If an inmate had a medical appointment and Con-Med did not call for the inmate, no policy or procedure required the deputies to follow up on the missed appointment.

In 2008, the Sheriff policy required that inmates receive necessary medical care without delay. Deputies were expected to use their common sense when responding to an inmate request or known need for medical attention. If an inmate appeared ill or the deputy otherwise recognized the need for medical attention, but no emergency was apparent, the deputy would (1) advise the inmate to place his name on sick call, (2) contact a supervisor for instruction and/or (3) call ConMed. In the event of an apparent emergency, the deputy could call a Code 1, an emergency radio code alerting ConMed to respond immediately. Absent exceptional circumstances, deputies were not to provide medical care. Instead, they relied on clinic staff to make decisions concerning medical care. Deputies were subject to discipline if they (1) did not address an inmate request for medical attention, (2) did not allow an inmate to sign up for sick call or (3) failed to take appropriate action where the necessity of medical attention was apparent. For privacy reasons and consistent with federal privacy law, deputies did not have access to inmate medical records.

POD deputies did not know that Bruner had returned to the Sedgwick Jail for a medical examination. Lisa M. Perez, Lisa R. Price, Rachel M. Gaines, Timothy McMahon, Bobby L. Hines and Abdul Smith worked as the POD 1 deputies from 11:00 p.m. on March 6 to 7:00 a.m. on March 9. None of these deputies recalled Bruner. If he had appeared ill or someone had reported that he was ill, they would have noted that fact on the computerized daily activity log (“DAL”). Because they did not make any such notations in the DALs, all of these deputies concluded that Bruner did not appear ill during their shifts and that they received no report that Bruner was ill.

From 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on March 9, Mark B. Cook was the POD 1 deputy. At some point between 7:30 a.m. and 10:30 a.m., and shortly after Cook announced that inmates could take showers, Bruner rang the intercom in his cell and asked Cook to open the cell. Cook unlocked the cell and Bruner came out in his long underwear and started walking toward the showers. Cook thought this was strange because he had just announced that inmates needed to be in their jumpsuits to leave their cells. Cook told Bruner to return to his cell and put his jumpsuit on. Bruner slowly returned to his cell and closed the door behind him. Cook then spoke with inmate Calvin L. Williams who told Cook that Bruner just stared and looked around at people, and that he had not eaten or come out of his cell since he had moved into POD 1. Cook verified that Bruner had moved to POD 1 on March 7.

A few minutes later, Bruner rang the intercom again. Bruner was standing at his cell door window and it appeared that he did not have his jumpsuit on. Cook told him again to put his jumpsuit on. Cook asked Bruner if he had been eating. Bruner said that he had not been eating and that he had not been feeling well. Cook logged this in his DAL at about 10:32 a.m.

Cook did not offer to call the clinic for Bruner, did not ask him whether he wanted to see a doctor, and did not remind him that he had the right to seek medical attention. Even though Bruner said he did not feel well, Cook did not pay special attention to him. Bruner never asked Cook to see a doctor or to go to the clinic. Bruner was able to respond to Cook’s directions, answer and make intercom calls, dress himself and discuss how he had been and was feeling. Bruner did not appear ill to Cook. Cook did not believe that Bruner needed medical care, had any kind of emergency medical condition or had a condition that would prevent him from telling Cook if he needed medical attention. Cook thought that as a grown man, Bruner could sign up for sick call. Cook admitted that after deputies pull the sign up sheet around 6:30 a.m. each day, an inmate must wait until the following morning to sign up for sick call.

Bruner finally put on his jumpsuit and Cook unlocked his cell. Bruner slowly went into the day room and just stared into space. When Cook asked him if he was doing OK, he replied yes. Cook thought that another inmate was bullying Bruner for his food. Before lunch, Cook unsuccessfully tried to contact his supervisor, Sergeant Faustino Martinez, by radio to discuss how to address this issue. Coo.k did not note his attempt to contact Martinez in his DAL. In his DAL, however, Cook noted that he spoke to Martinez at 9:33 a.m. about another inmate. Cook does not recall why he did not speak to Martinez about Bruner at that time because he believes that he already knew by 7:30 a.m. that Bruner reportedly had not been eating.

Cook made sure that Bruner got a tray of food at lunch and confirmed that Bruner ate his lunch. Cook assumed that Bruner was fine because he saw Bruner watching TV and visiting with other inmates in the POD day room that afternoon. At approximately 1:52 p.m., medical personnel were in POD 1, but Cook did not alert them to Bruner. At the end of his shift at 3:00 p.m., Cook reported to Daniel Safarik, the POD deputy on duty for the next shift, his observations of Bruner. He told Safarik to “keep an eye on [Bruner], to watch him, to see if anything was going on.” Martinez did not review Cook’s DAL on March 9.

From 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. on March 9, Safarik was the POD 1 deputy. Safarik testified that he did not recall Bruner and that if Bruner had appeared ill or someone had reported that he was ill, he would have noted that fact on the DAL. Safarik concluded that Bruner did not appear ill during his shift and that he received no report that Bruner was ill. In his DAL, Safarik did not refer to Cook’s request to keep an eye on Bruner or record any observations of Bruner’s behavior.

Physicians usually did rounds on weekdays only. No physician reviewed Bruner’s chart on Sunday, March 9, as scheduled.

From 11:00 p.m. on March 9 to 7:00 am. on March 10, Lisa Williams was the POD 1 deputy. Williams testified that she did not recall Bruner and that if Bruner had appeared ill or someone had reported that he was ill, she would have noted that fact on the DAL. Williams concluded that Bruner did not appear ill during her shift and that she received no report that Bruner was ill. Williams was previously a licenced certified nurse’s assistant (“CNA”), as well as a former volunteer emergency medical technician (“EMT”). Williams was well aware that a person who has not eaten for several days could be seriously ill. She admitted that if Bruner was awake and throwing up, she would have been able to observe that fact when she did her rounds. Williams performed two or three physical rounds during her shift. Williams admitted that if an inmate reported that he had not been eating for several days and that he was not feeling well, she would either report it to her sergeant or tell the inmate to sign up for sick call.

Sergeants at the Sedgwick Jail generally supervised about eight deputies. The sergeants made rounds to the multiple PODs and were required to review DAL entries made by deputies on their shifts. Sergeants Wayne Brown, Rhonda Freeman, Gerald Pewewardy, Jared Schecter and Robert Taylor were on duty from 7:00 am. on March 7 through 7:00 am. on March 10. The sergeants did not know Bruner’s medical history, did not have access to his medical records, and did not know that he had been brought back from Stanton County or for what reason. Sergeants Brown, Freeman, Pewewardy, Schecter and Taylor do not recall personally observing Bruner. They conclude that they did not observe that Bruner was ill and that they received no report that he was ill.

From 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on March 10, Mary Staton was the POD 1 deputy. Staton was also trained as a CNA and had worked previously as a nurse’s aid. She conducted a headcount at the beginning of her shift and looked into each inmate’s cell. She does not recall seeing or hearing anything unusual in Bruner’s cell. At approximately 7:15 a.m., Staton saw Bruner come out of his cell for linen exchange, but he did not have his linens. Bruner appeared confused. Staton sent him back into his cell to retrieve the linens. She unlocked the cell door several times, but each time Bruner would open his cell door and then shut it without entering his cell.

Between 7:20 a.m. and 7:50 a.m., Staton asked Marque Jameson and Michael Murphy, who were roving deputies, to put Bruner back into his cell. Jameson and Murphy helped Bruner walk to his cell. Staton saw that Bruner went into his cell without incident. Jameson and Murphy noticed, however, that even though Bruner complied with their orders, he appeared in a daze and was acting strange and moving extremely slowly. Bruner did not appear to be in pain or distress. Staton, Jameson and Murphy believed that Bruner had a mental health condition and did not need emergency care from a medical provider. Staton did not suspect any physical health issue. Jameson and Murphy understood that Staton, who was the deputy in charge of POD 1 at that time, would address the matter. Bruner apparently stayed in his cell the rest of the morning and did not ask to get out.

At some point between 7:15 a.m. and 10:25 a.m., inmate Brad Snider told Staton that Bruner had not eaten since he arrived in POD 1. Staton looked up when Bruner came to the POD and noted that he had returned to the Sedgwick Jail from out of county on March 6. She continued to believe that Bruner’s unusual actions and failure to eat were a result of a mental condition. She did not suspect that Bruner was physically ill or that he needed emergency care. Staton did not log her interaction with Snider in her DAL.

At approximately 10:25 a.m. on March 10, Staton told Martinez, her supervisor, about Bruner’s behavior and that an inmate had reported that Bruner had not eaten for three days. Martinez instructed Staton to contact ConMed for a mental health check. Staton called Andrea Skelton, LMSW (Licensed Master Social Worker), a mental health worker at Con-Med, who told Staton that she could see Bruner when they did rounds that afternoon. Staton believed that it was a mental health issue. Staton did not request that Bruner be seen immediately and she did not log these events in her DAL. Martinez told Staton to monitor whether Bruner ate his lunch.

At 11:50 a.m. on March 10, lunch was distributed to the inmates. Staton determined that Bruner did not eat his lunch. Staton entered this fact in her DAL and also entered it into Bruner’s computer “inmate log” as a warning. She did not believe that Bruner needed emergency care, but thought that his apparent refusal to eat should be addressed. Staton contacted Martinez and reported that Bruner had not eaten his lunch. Staton also reported that Bruner did not come out his cell for lunch and appeared depressed and antisocial. Martinez notified Lisa Armstrong, R.N., a ConMed mental health nurse, and requested a “courtesy check” on Bruner when she did her rounds. Inmate Bamideld Ogunbiyi also reported to Staton that Bruner had not eaten for days. At this point, Staton did not know if Bruner’s symptoms were the result of a mental or medical problem.

Staton intended to “keep an eye” on Bruner until mental health performed its afternoon rounds, but she did not make any effort to check on Bruner until several inmates advised Staton at 2:00 p.m. that Bruner was lying on the floor of his cell and not moving. Staton called Jameson to check on Bruner. At 2:11 p.m., Jame-son found Bruner in his cell, lying on the floor in a pile of trash, curled up in the fetal position. Where he was located in the cell, no one outside the cell could see him unless he or she was standing at the cell door. Bruner appeared to be in a daze. Again, he did not appear to be in pain or distress. He was trying or struggling to get up. Jameson picked him up and placed him in his bunk. Staton could not see Bruner from the booth, but Jame-son told her that Bruner was “not doing good” and that something was wrong with him. Jameson did not tell Staton that Bruner needed emergency care. Jameson understood that Staton was addressing the matter. Jameson left the POD at 2:20 p.m. Staton continued to think that Bruner had a mental health issue and did not need emergency care. Staton contacted Martinez and told him that mental health personnel had not yet arrived in the POD. Martinez told Staton that he would again contact ConMed mental health personnel. At approximately 2:45 p.m., Martinez contacted Skelton. Martinez told Skelton of Bruner’s behavior and asked to have someone check on him.

On weekdays, a mental health evaluator and a registered nurse conducted daily rounds. At approximately 3:00 p.m. on March 10, during their daily mental health rounds, Armstrong and Skelton arrived at Bruner’s cell. They thought that Bruner appeared to be “very sick” and in need of medical attention. Armstrong did a quick mental health assessment and a quick physical assessment on Bruner and knew something was not right. Bruner was very sweaty, lethargic, weak, warm to the touch, not oriented and unresponsive to cues: he simply grunted and moaned. Bruner was sitting on his bunk with his knees up and he was hunched over. Armstrong had to physically pick up his head to check his pupils. Staton reported to Skelton that Bruner had been unresponsive for a few hours. See Skelton Depo. at 22^24 (deputy in booth reported that Bruner had been unresponsive for a few hours and that they were not sure if he was having symptoms of a mental or medical problem). Armstrong and Skelton thought that it was obvious that the physician assistant needed to evaluate Bruner immediately. Armstrong went to the POD booth, called the clinic and requested that someone bring a wheelchair immediately to pick up Bruner so the physician assistant could evaluate him. Deputies brought a wheelchair, put Bruner into the chair and wheeled him out of the POD at 3:26 p.m.

When Bruner arrived at the clinic, Lisa Tolan, LPN, evaluated him. She took his vitals and noted that he was unalert, unresponsive to painful stimuli and unable to ambulate. She noted his history of Hepatitis C, cirrhosis of the liver and possible tuberculosis. She further noted moderate skin jaundice, warm skin, turgor and slow capillary refills. She notified Fletcher who gave verbal orders to set up an IV, draw labs and test Bruner’s stool for blood. Labs were drawn at 4:10 p.m.

At 5:20 p.m., Sharon Nelson, RN, saw Bruner and noted his condition. At 5:30 p.m., Fletcher saw Bruner, conducted a rectal exam and noted his condition. Minutes later, Fletcher ordered IV fluids. Fletcher testified that he suspected Bruner was experiencing liver failure, and that fluids would help him. Between 6:00 p.m. and 6:50 p.m.,' Nelson saw Bruner two additional times and noted her observations and actions.

At approximately 9:01 p.m., Fletcher reviewed the lab results and noted that Bruner’s white blood cell count was high. Fletcher ordered IV antibiotics and to transfer Bruner to a local hospital. At 9:39 p.m., EMS personnel transported Bruner to the hospital.

Two days later, on March 12, 2008, Bruner died in the hospital. Plaintiffs’ forensic pathology expert, Dr. Werner Spitz, opined that as a result of untreated sclerosis of the liver, Bruner suffered a prolonged process of dying, which included brain swelling. Bruner’s brain swelling manifested through physical symptoms such as difficulty walking, confusion and inability to eat. These symptoms began on March 5 and progressed until he died on March 12. As a result of liver sclerosis, toxic substances accumulated in Bruner’s liver and blood which significantly suppressed his immune system. As his brain swelled, the brain stem was compressed and pushed onto the respiratory center, causing difficulty breathing. As a result of his impaired breathing, Bruner developed meningitis. Bacterial meningitis is a treatable condition that often responds to IV antibiotic therapy. When medical personnel gave Bruner antibiotics at approximately 9:20 p.m. on March 10, it was too late to prevent his death. If medical personnel had provided IV antibiotics about six hours earlier, Bruner probably would have survived.

Plaintiffs’ infectious disease expert, Dr. Steven Hosea, opined that Bruner was “salvageable” until shortly after mental health personnel evaluated him at approximately 3:00 p.m. on March 10. Dr. Hosea opined that Bruner had exhibited symptoms of pneumococcal meningitis for some period before his death. Dr. Hosea testified, however, that the first signs of meningitis can be quite general and may consist of headache, high fever, fatigue and irritability or signs of a common cold or flu. Pneumococcal meningitis can be fatal even if treated. According to Dr. Hosea, even if Bruner had received treatment in a more timely manner, he had a significant risk of a poor outcome.

Kendra (Maechtlen) Wolff, the ConMed Health Services Administrator, did not learn about the events concerning Bruner until after he was in the hospital. Alicia Mefford, the ConMed Director of Nursing, worked on March 6 and March 10, 2008, but she did not render any medical care to Bruner. No one told Mefford about Bruner’s condition on March 10.

Analysis

The Sedgwick County Defendants argue that Bruner’s children cannot assert a Section 1983 claim on their own behalf for denial of their father’s constitutional rights. A civil rights action “must be based on the violation of plaintiffs personal rights, and not the rights of someone else.” Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 497 (10th Cir.1990). The proper federal remedy in a Section 1983 case is a survival action brought by the estate of the victim. Berry v. Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1506-07 (10th Cir.1990); Payne v. McKune, No. 06-3010-JWL, 2007 WL 60941, at *3 (D.Kan. Apr. 4, 2007). Because plaintiffs have not alleged or shown that defendants’ alleged conduct was directed at them, the Court sustains defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to the claims by Bruner’s children. See Kelly v. Rockefeller, 69 Fed.Appx. 414, 416 (10th Cir.2003) (plaintiff lacked standing to bring mother’s civil rights claims); Teufel v. United States, 5 F.3d 547 (Table), 1993 WL 345530, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 26, 1993) (independent, nonderivative constitutional claim from injury to family can only arise if impermissible conduct directed at plaintiffs protected relationship with victim); Trujillo v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 768 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir.1985) (rejecting wrongful death claim by mother and daughter of victim where no showing that jailers directed activity toward familial relationship with intent to interfere with that relationship); Williams v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, No. 08-2631-KHV, 2009 WL 1313253, at *2 n. 6 (D.Kan. May 12, 2009) (plaintiff lacked standing to assert civil rights action on behalf of sons). But cf. Lowery v. Cnty. of Riley, No. 04-3101-JTM, 2005 WL 1242376, *10 (D.Kan. May 25, 2005) (claim for loss of familial association asserted by daughter of victim sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss).

Under Section 1983, a defendant sued in an individual capacity may be subject to personal liability and/or supervisory liability. Personal liability “under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.” Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1163 (10th Cir.2011); Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423 (10th Cir.1997). On the other hand, supervisory liability allows a plaintiff to impose liability upon a defendant-supervisor who creates, promulgates, or implements a policy which subjects, or causes to be subjected that plaintiff to the deprivation of any rights secured by the Constitution. Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir.2010), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2150, 179 L.Ed.2d 935 (2011).

I. Personal Liability Claims Against Employees Of Sedgwick Jail

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they are deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041, 101 S.Ct. 1759, 68 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981). Deliberate indifference may be proven by showing that prison officials intentionally denied, delayed access to or interfered with an inmate’s necessary medical care. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05, 97 S.Ct. 285; Jones v. Hannigan, 959 F.Supp. 1400, 1406 (D.Kan.1997); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-37, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (prison officials act with deliberate indifference to inmate’s health if they know that he faces substantial risk of serious harm, and disregard that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it).

The test for deliberate indifference includes both an objective and a subjective component. Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir.2000). The objective component of the deliberate indifference standard requires a sufficiently serious deprivation that results in the denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981)). Defendants concede that in light of Bruner’s death, plaintiffs can satisfy the objective component. Defendants maintain, however, that they are entitled to summary judgment on the subjective component of plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference claims.

To satisfy the subjective component, plaintiffs must present evidence that each defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970; Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir.2006); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir.1996). This standard is not satisfied by proof of negligence or constructive notice of medical need. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, 841, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Under the subjective component, the relevant question is “were the symptoms such that a prison employee knew the risk to the prisoner and chose (recklessly) to disregard it?” Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 753 (10th Cir.2005). The prison official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also draw the inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Plaintiffs must show that a prison official disregarded the specific risk of harm actually claimed. Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1089 (10th Cir.2009); see Estate of Hooker v. Walsh, 22 F.3d 995, 1000 (10th Cir.1994) (plaintiffs required to show deliberate indifference to specific risk of suicide, not merely general .risk of intoxication).

A reasonable jury may conclude that a prison official subjectively knew of the substantial risk of harm by circumstantial evidence or “from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, 114 S.Ct. 1970). An obvious risk, however, cannot conclusively show that the prison official subjectively knew of the substantial risk of harm because “a prison official may show that the obvious escaped him.” Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n. 8, 114 S.Ct. 1970); Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 313 (6th Cir.2005) (genuine issue of material fact as to deliberate indifference can be based on strong showing of objective component). In addition, “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844, 114 S.Ct. 1970. On the other hand, a prison official does not escape liability if' the evidence shows that “he merely refused to verify underlying facts that he strongly suspected to be true, or declined to confirm inferences of risk that he strongly suspected to exist.” Id. at 843 n. 8, 114 S.Ct. 1970.

Under these standards, even a brief delay in providing medical care may constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment where prison personnel delay care in a life-threatening situation or where it is apparent that delay would exacerbate the prisoner’s medical problems. Hunt v. Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir.1999); see Mata, 427 F.3d at 755; see also Rutherford v. Med. Dep’t of Dep’t of Corr., 76 Fed.Appx. 893, 902 (10th Cir. 2003) (inmate stated claim for deliberate indifference where medical staff disregarded complaints about severe pain, prescribed exercise and physical therapy that worsened condition without first performing tests or examination, delayed referring him to doctor, allowed orders for referrals to expire, and failed to schedule prescribed tests, surgery and follow-up care); Sealock, 218 F.3d at 1210 (delay of several hours in taking inmate with chest pains to hospital violated Eighth Amendment); Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150, 1154-55 (6th Cir.1991) (prisoner who suffers pain needlessly when relief is readily available may state claim for deliberate indifference); Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1538 (11th Cir.) (few hours delay in treating inmate’s broken foot could render defendants liable), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 928, 110 S.Ct. 2624, 110 L.Ed.2d 645 (1990); Lewis v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173, 1183 (7th Cir.1985) (15-minute delay in treating cardiac arrest may violate Eighth Amendment).

All of the individual defendants argue that plaintiffs have not presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that they knew that Bruner had a risk of a fatal medical condition and chose to disregard it. As to all of the individuals associated with the Sedgwick Jail, plaintiffs argue that “since at least March 5, 2008, Bruner’s deteriorating physical condition was obvious to his fellow inmates and, likewise, would have been obvious to any of the deputies who were working on POD 1 from March 7, 2008 through March 10, 2008.” Doc. #283 at 11-16. Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Bruner’s condition was obvious to Stanton County jailers, but they have not presented similar competent evidence with respect to Sedgwick Jail personnel. Sedgwick Jail inmate Uhls states that at some point, he told the officers that Bruner was not eating and that he was coughing and throwing up. Uhls Affidavit (Doc. # 283-21) at 1. Uhls states that later he and other inmates raised these same issues with two or three officers with no response. Id. Uhls does not identify or specify when he and other inmates made these reports. Moreover, Uhls does not state that Bruner’s condition was obvious to any of the specific defendants named in this action.

From March 6 through 10, 2008, numerous individuals associated with the Sedgwick Jail had contact with Bruner or supervisory responsibility over officers who had contact with him. Unfortunately, no one at the Sedgwick Jail summoned medical attention until 3:00 p.m. on March 10. As to most of the individual defendants, plaintiffs have not offered sufficient evidence to show that defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Bruner’s health. Bruner himself apparently did not recognize the seriousness of his medical condition. On March 5, 2008, Bruner told a Stanton County jailer that he had the flu, but that he was not sick enough to see a doctor. On March 9, 2008, when Cook asked Bruner if he was okay, he replied yes. In addition, from March 5 to 10, 2008, Bruner did not sign up for sick call, complete a Kite or ask any employee of the Sedgwick Jail for any type of assistance or medical care.

The Court addresses the personal liability claims against the Sedgwick County Defendants in turn.

A. Ted Gibson

Plaintiffs argue that Gibson, who was assigned to population control at the Sedgwick Jail on March 5, should have arranged to have Bruner transported immediately back to the Sedgwick Jail. Based on Sheppard’s initial report of Bruner’s condition, Gibson told Sheppard to call ConMed and ask whether Bruner could be put on the next transport back to the Sedgwick Jail. Although Gibson was responsible to determine when an inmate would be transported back to the Sedgwick Jail, he specifically asked Beyrle on March 5 if Bruner could be brought back the following day in the transport van. Beyrle said yes. Beyrle did not tell Gibson about ConMed’s plan of action, when ConMed wanted to see Bruner or whether ConMed wanted to see Bruner at all. Gibson thought that if Bruner’s condition was an obvious emergency, Sheppard would not have suggested that Bruner return to the Sedgwick Jail and would have instead had a local medical facility in Stanton County examine and treat Bruner. Plaintiffs present no evidence that Gibson had any idea that by scheduling Bruner to be transported on March 6 rather than March 5, he was exposing Bruner to a substantial risk of serious harm. The Court therefore sustains defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Gibson.

B. POD Deputies Perez, Price, Gaines, McMahon, Hines And Smith

Perez, Price, Gaines, McMahon, Hines and Smith worked as the POD 1 deputies from 11:00 p.m. on March 6 to 7:00 a.m. on March 9. All of these deputies testified that they did not recall Bruner and that if he had appeared ill or if someone had reported that he was ill, they would have noted that fact on the computer DAL. Because they did not make any such notations, all of these deputies concluded that Bruner did not appear ill during their shifts and that they received no report that he was ill.

Plaintiffs argue that Perez, Price, Gaines, McMahon, Hines and Smith “should have observed the same signs of a serious medical condition as the inmates and the Stanton deputies did,” Plaintiffs’ Memorandum In Opposition (Doc. # 283) at 24-28, but they present no specific evidence that they did so. Plaintiffs note that inmate Uhls observed that from Bruner’s arrival until officers took him to the clinic on March 10, Bruner was coughing and vomiting. No evidence suggests that Bruner was doing so, however, when these POD deputies observed him. Inside the booth, the POD deputy could not hear inmates coughing or vomiting in their cells.

Beyrle, a ConMed nurse, testified that if Bruner was having medical problems, the deputies on duty would have known of this fact based either on their personal observations while performing rounds or possibly from Bruner or other inmate reports of his condition. Beyrle did not testify (1) that Bruner exhibited symptoms continuously, (2) how often deputies made rounds to check on inmates or (3) whether she examined the specifics of any inmate reports. Her belief that someone should have observed that Bruner had medical problems may be sufficient to prove negligence by someone, but it is insufficient to show that any particular deputy in fact observed such problems or received an inmate report that Bruner needed medical attention. Plaintiffs essentially argue that these deputies had constructive notice that Bruner was ill, but such notice does not establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (official’s failure to alleviate significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot be condemned as infliction of punishment).

Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that any inmate reported that Bruner was ill during the shifts of Perez, Price, Gaines, McMahon, Hines and Smith. Uhls states that he and other inmates told at least two or three deputies that Bruner was not eating, and that he had been coughing and vomiting, but that deputies made no effort to obtain medical care for Bruner. Uhls does not specify the inmates who reported this information, the deputies who received the reports or the date and time of the reports. No POD deputy who worked from Bruner’s arrival on March 5 through 7:00 a.m. on March 9 recalled any complaints. Absent speculation, a reasonable jury could not conclude that Perez, Price, Gaines, McMahon, Hines or Smith knew that Bruner faced a substantial risk of serious harm and chose to ignore it. The Court therefore sustains defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to these six defendants.

C. POD Deputy Mark Cook

From 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on March 9, Cook was the POD 1 deputy. During his shift, Cook observed Bruner acting strangely. After Cook received an inmate report that Bruner just stared and looked around at people, and that he had not eaten or come out of his cell since he had moved into POD 1, Cook asked Bruner if he had been eating. Bruner said no and that he had not been feeling well. Cook logged this in his DAL at about 10:32 a.m. Later, when Cook observed Bruner moving slowly and just staring into space, Cook asked him if he was doing okay, and Bruner replied yes.

Plaintiffs note that despite Cook’s observation of Bruner, and Bruner’s own statements that he was not feeling well, Cook did not call the clinic, did not ask Bruner whether he wanted to see a doctor or remind him that he had the right to seek medical attention. In retrospect,- Bruner’s condition was extremely serious, but plaintiffs have not established a genuine issue of material fact that his observable symptoms and comments conveyed to Cook the seriousness of his medical condition. In light of Cook’s observation and interaction with Bruner, he felt that another inmate was bullying Bruner for his food. To address his concern, Cook personally gave Bruner a tray of food at lunch and confirmed that Bruner ate his food. That afternoon, Cook observed Burner watching TV and visiting with other inmates in the POD day room. At the end of his shift, Cook reported to Safarik, the POD deputy on duty for the next shift, his observations of Bruner. He told Safarik to “keep an eye on [Bruner], to watch him, to see if anything was going on.” No reasonable jury could find that Cook was deliberately indifferent to a risk of substantial harm to Bruner.

Plaintiffs note that Lieutenant Moore later recommended that Cook be reprimanded and placed on probation for his failure to set forth details in his DAL about (1) whether Bruner actually ate his lunch on March 9, (2) Cook’s attempt to contact Martinez during the morning of March 9 and (3) his interaction with Bruner during the morning of March 9. The lack of detail in Cook’s DAL, however, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact whether Cook knew of a serious risk to Bruner’s health and chose to disregard it. In particular, Cook thought that Bruner was not eating because he was being bullied. Cook attempted to address this issue by personally giving Bruner a tray of food and confirming that he ate his lunch. Cook thought to the extent Bruner had a medical issue, it was not an emergency and that Bruner was capable of signing up for the next sick call. Plaintiffs have not created a genuine issue of material fact that Cook knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Bruner’s health. The Court therefore sustains defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Cook.

D. POD Deputy Daniel Safarik

From 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. on March 9, Safarik was the POD 1 deputy. Plaintiffs note that in his DAL, Safarik did not record (1) whether Bruner ate dinner that evening, (2) that Cook asked Safarik to keep an eye on Bruner or (3) that Bruner was coughing and vomiting repeatedly. See Doc. # 283 at 80. As explained above, the POD deputy primarily works in a booth and cannot hear inmates coughing or vomiting in their cells. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that Safarik personally observed or received any report that Bruner was seriously ill. Indeed, Safarik testified that he did not recall Bruner and that if Bruner had appeared ill or someone had reported that he was ill, he would have noted that fact on the DAL. Safarik concluded that Bruner did not appear ill during his shift and that he received no report that Bruner was ill. Cook did ask Safarik to keep an eye on Bruner, but no evidence suggests that Safarik did not in fact do so. The fact that Safarik did not record Cook’s statement or his own observations of Bruner is insufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Safarik knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Bruner’s health. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Accord ingly, the Court sustains defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Safarik.

E. POD Deputy Lisa Williams

From 11:00 p.m. on March 9 to 7:00 a.m. on March 10, Williams was the POD 1 deputy. Plaintiffs note that Williams did not report in her DAL that (1) Bruner did not eat breakfast that morning, (2) Bruner was coughing and vomiting repeatedly or (3) Bruner needed medical attention. See Doc. #283 at 81. Again, plaintiffs have presented no evidence which suggests that Williams personally observed or was aware of any of these alleged facts. Williams testified that she did not recall Bruner and that if Bruner had appeared ill or someone had reported that he was ill, she would have noted that fact on the DAL. Williams concluded that Bruner did not appear ill during her shift and that she received no report that Bruner was ill. Williams performed two or three physical rounds during her shift, but plaintiffs have presented no evidence that she observed anything unusual about Bruner during her rounds. Because plaintiffs have not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that Williams knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Bruner’s health, the Court sustains defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Williams.

F. Sergeants Pewewardy, Brown, Schecter, Freeman And Taylor

Plaintiffs argue that Bruner’s deteriorating physical condition would have been obvious to Sergeants Pewewardy, Brown, Schecter, Freeman and Taylor, and that these individuals or their subordinates “should have observed the same signs of a serious medical condition as the inmates and the Stanton deputies did.” Plaintiffs’ Memorandum In Opposition (Doc. #283) at 74. Plaintiffs’ argument that sergeants “should have observed” certain signs is insufficient to show deliberate indifference to Bruner’s medical needs. Plaintiffs do not present specific evidence that these sergeants or their subordinates saw symptoms of a serious medical condition or received inmate reports of such symptoms. The Court therefore sustains defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Pewewardy, Brown, Schecter, Freeman and Taylor.

G. POD Deputy Mary Staton

At approximately 7:15 a.m., Staton saw that Bruner appeared confused. Sta-ton sent him back to his cell to retrieve his linens. She unlocked the cell door several times, but each time Bruner would open his cell door and then shut it without entering his cell. She had to call two roving deputies to escort Bruner back to his cell. Before 10:25 a.m., inmate Snider reported that Bruner had not eaten since he arrived in POD 1. Staton noted that Bruner had arrived four days earlier. Staton told her supervisor, Martinez, about Bruner’s behavior and said that an inmate had reported that Bruner had not eaten for three days. At around noon, Staton determined that Bruner again did not eat his lunch. Inmate Ogunbiyi also reported to Staton that Bruner had not eaten for days. Sta-ton also learned around noon that Bruner was unresponsive. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, it was obvious to Staton that Bruner faced a risk of a serious medical condition and she chose to disregard that risk. Instead of addressing that immediate potential medical risk, Staton waited some three hours for mental health personnel. At 2:00 p.m., several inmates advised Staton that Bruner was lying on the floor of his cell and not moving. Instead of notifying the clinic of the immediate need for a medical (or mental health) evaluation, Staton asked Jame-son to ch