Austin v. Redford Township Police Department (859 F. Supp. 2d 883, 2011)

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 2011-09-30

Citations

Full opinion text

ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, OVERRULING DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS, GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND CONTINUING ORDER OF REFERENCE FOR PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS

DAVID M. LAWSON, District Judge.

This case is before the Court on the defendants’ objections to a report filed by Magistrate Judge Paul J. Komives recommending that the defendants’ motions for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part. The plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in this case alleging that the defendants used excessive force and engaged in ethnic intimidation when they used a Taser multiple times when they arrested the plaintiff after he sped through a construction zone in Redford Township and refused to stop his car when the police tried to pull him over. Pro bono counsel was appointed for the plaintiff, and the Court entered an order referring the case to Judge Komives to conduct all pretrial matters, after which the defendants filed their motion. Judge Komives filed his report on July 18, 2011, 2011 WL 4583792. The defendants filed timely objections and the plaintiff filed a reply. After reviewing the submissions and conducting a de novo review of the motions, responses, report of the magistrate judge, and objections, the Court agrees with the recommended disposition of the motion. The matter will be referred again to the magistrate judge to ready it for trial.

The magistrate judge summarized the facts and procedural history of the case, which need not be repeated here. The magistrate judge concluded that the plaintiff properly pleaded a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against the individual defendants. Any doubt that the defendants were on notice of the plaintiffs claim is put to rest by the fact that the defendants denied the allegations regarding each officer’s conduct; asserted a defense of qualified immunity, which is only applicable to claims against individuals; and engaged in extensive discovery on this issue.

The magistrate judge concluded that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether defendant Riley’s initial deployment of the Taser was objectively reasonable. The magistrate judge also concluded that a jury could find that defendant Riley’s second (and potentially third) use of the Taser was unreasonable because the Taser was deployed after the plaintiff had fallen back into the car or was on the ground. He concluded that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether, and to what extent, the plaintiff was resisting or threatening the officers when defendant Riley deployed the Taser the second and potentially third time.

The defendants argue that Pauli’s use of the dog was reasonable because he saw the plaintiff begin to arise even after being stunned by the Taser, and because he was worried that the plaintiff was planning to retrieve the gun he had thrown out the window. The magistrate concluded that defendant Pauli was not entitled to summary judgment because the video contradicted the defendants’ account of events, leaving a genuine issue of material fact as to whether, and to what extent, the plaintiff was resisting. See Vathekan v. Prince George’s Cnty., 154 F.3d 173, 178 (4th Cir.1998) (“An attack by an unreasonably deployed police dog in the course of a seizure is a Fourth Amendment excessive force violation.”).

The record is clear that Austin was handcuffed and seated in the back of the police car when Morgan tasered him. The only justification for Morgan’s use of the Taser was Austin’s failure to place his feet in the car. The magistrate judge, citing Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 901 (6th Cir.2004) and Kijowski v. City of Niles, 372 Fed.Appx. 595, 600 (6th Cir.2010) (“[A] stun gun inflicts a painful and frightening blow, which temporarily paralyzes the large muscles of the body, rendering the victim helpless. Absent some compelling justification — such as the potential escape of a dangerous criminal or the threat of immediate harm — the use of such a weapon on a nonresistant person is unreasonable.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)), concluded that a reasonable jury could conclude that Morgan’s use of the Taser to obtain compliance with his order after Austin was subdued and handcuffed was not objectively reasonable.

The magistrate judge recommended that the Court find that defendant Riley is entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds with respect to his initial deployment of the Taser because the law regarding use of a Taser to incapacitate a suspect who has not yet been subdued is insufficiently clear to have put defendant Riley on notice that his initial deployment of the Taser was unlawful. The magistrate noted that at the time of Austin’s arrest, only four courts of appeals had addressed the initial use of a Taser to subdue a resistant suspect, each of which found that it did not constitute excessive force. Report and Recommendation at 21 (citing Mattos v. Agarano, 590 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir.2010) (discussing Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir.2004); Hinton v. City of Elwood, Kan., 997 F.2d 774, 781-82 (10th Cir.1993); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1044-45 (6th Cir.1992)); Caldwell v. Moore, 968 F.2d 595, 600 (6th Cir.1992)). The plaintiff does not object to that part of the report. A party’s failure to file objections to the report and recommendation waives any further right to appeal. Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir.1987). Likewise, the failure to object to an unfavorable portion of the magistrate judge’s report releases the Court from its duty to independently review the issue. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 152, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985). Therefore, the Court will adopt that part of the report.

However, the magistrate judge recommended that the Court find that the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds with respect to Riley’s subsequent use of the Taser, defendant Pauli’s use of the dog, or defendant Morgan’s use of the Taser because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Austin, reveals that he posed no significant threat to the officers once he was on the ground, and the law regarding the use of force against a subdued suspect was clearly established. Report and Recommendation at 19-20 (citing Harris v. City of Circleville, 583 F.3d 356, 367 (6th Cir.2009) (citing cases)); see also Meirthew v. Amore, 417 Fed.Appx. 494, 499 (6th Cir.2011) (“[Pjrior opinions clearly establish that it is unreasonable to use significant force on a restrained subject, even if some level of passive resistance is presented.”).

The magistrate judge recommended that the Court construe the claim against the police department as one against the Redford Township because it is the real party in interest. Report and Recommendation at 22 n. 6 (citing Haverstick Enterprises, Inc. v. Financial Federal Credit, Inc., 32 F.3d 989, 992 n. 1 (6th Cir.1994)) (“A suit against a city police department in Michigan is one against the city itself, because the city is the real party in interest”). Nevertheless, the magistrate judge recommended that the Court find that the Redford Township Police Department is entitled to summary judgment on both the plaintiffs’ failure to train claim and his general policy and custom claim. With respect to his failure to train claim, the magistrate judge concluded that the plaintiff failed to show a deliberate indifference because he has not pointed to similar incidents suggesting that the Township knew of and disregarded any inadequacies in their training program, nor does he point to any evidence suggesting the training was inadequate. The plaintiff’s only evidence — defendant Morgan’s statement in the police car that he deployed the Taser based on the plaintiffs “[fjailure to comply to verbal command, sir — my training.... I ask you, I told you, that’s all I need, thank you,” Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 15, Morgan Video at 21:17:19-25 — shows, at most, that Morgan was inadequately trained or misunderstood his training.

The magistrate judge also concluded that the plaintiff’s argument that the police department’s “Less than Lethal Use of Force Policy,” which authorizes the use of a Taser in certain circumstances, was the moving force behind the constitutional violation was meritless because the plaintiff pointed to nothing that showed the policy was in fact the moving force.

The plaintiff has not objected to those parts of the report, and they will be adopted.

Finally, the magistrate judge recommended granting the Township summary judgment with respect to the ethnic intimidation claim because the Township does not fall under the definition of “person” in the Michigan Penal Code. Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.147b(l), therefore, is inapplicable to the Township. The plaintiff did not object.

However, the magistrate judge recommended denying the individual defendants summary judgment on that claim because: (1) Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.147b(3) provides for a civil cause of action; (2) there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether any of the defendants’ actions were taken with the specific intent to harass or intimidate the plaintiff on the basis of his race; (3) the plaintiff has offered evidence that the individual defendants committed underlying criminal offenses, namely assault and battery and misconduct in office.

Objections to a report and recommendation are reviewed de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Sixth Circuit has stated that “[ojverly general objections do not satisfy the objection requirement.” Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 725 (6th Cir.2006). “The objections must be clear enough to enable the district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.” Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir.1995). ‘“[OJbjections disputing] the correctness of the magistrate’s recommendation but failfing] to specify the findings ... believed [to be] in error’ are too general.” Spencer, 449 F.3d at 725 (quoting Miller, 50 F.3d at 380).

The defendants filed the following objections:

1. Officer Riley’s deployment of the Taser was objectively reasonable.

2. Defendant Pauli’s use of the police dog was objectively reasonable.

3. Defendant Morgan’s use of the Taser was objectively reasonable.

4. Defendant Officer Riley is entitled to qualified immunity.

5. Defendant Officer Pauli is entitled to qualified immunity.

6. Defendant Officer Morgan is entitled to qualified immunity.

7. Plaintiff has failed to establish a claim of ethnic intimidation against the individual defendants.

A. Whether Riley’s deployment of Taser was objectively reasonable

The defendants argue that the magistrate judge incorrectly weighed the severity of the plaintiff’s crime. Although he was initially pulled over for speeding, he fled, committing the more serious offense of fleeing and eluding a police officer. The defendants also argue that Officer Riley correctly saw the plaintiff as a threat because he raised an arm in an aggressive manner when defendant Riley approached and the plaintiffs handgun was close by. The defendants argue that Riley’s repeated use of the Taser was justified because the plaintiff refused to comply with the officer’s commands, had attempted to evade arrest, and demonstrated a willingness to use force when he reversed his vehicle causing it to strike Riley’s police car.

The defendants’ arguments do not address the magistrate judge’s analysis. The magistrate judge recommended that Riley be denied summary judgment for his second and potentially third use of the Taser because Austin was arguably subdued and did not pose a safety or flight risk. The defendants’ arguments fail to dispute any of the magistrate judge’s conclusion in this regard. Therefore, the defendants’ first objection is overruled.

B. Whether defendant Pauli’s use of the police dog was objectively reasonable

The defendants argue that the evidence shows that the plaintiff, a very large man, was within three or four feet of a handgun, and that the Taser had no effect on the plaintiff. Defendant Pauli, they argue, perceived a threat to the safety of Officer Riley and deployed the police dog to subdue the plaintiff. The defendants’ argument might have merit if the defendants’ version of events was not blatantly contradicted by the video evidence. The video shows that Austin was not stepping forward toward defendant Riley or his handgun. Rather, he stood still, with his hands raised, and exchanged words with defendant Riley. The magistrate judge’s conclusion clearly is correct. Therefore, the defendants’ second objection is overruled.

C. Whether defendant Morgan’s use of the Taser was objectively reasonable

The defendants argue that the Court has addressed similar situations before and found the use of a Taser to be reasonable citing Alexander v. City of Shelby Twp., No. 07-14741, 2009 WL 3241974 (E.D.Mich. Oct. 8, 2009) (“Officer Wylie deployed the taser only after repeated requests were not obeyed and with the knowledge that Plaintiff had shown a belligerent attitude, threatening officers, following his arrest. Moreover, the parties do not dispute that Officer Wylie used the Taser only once to force compliance and that the contact was not disabling as Plaintiff immediately climbed into the patrol car after being Tased. While it is clear that the gratuitous use of force on a suspect who has already been subdued and placed in handcuffs is unconstitutional, this is not such a case: the single use of a Taser cannot be compared to the repeated or prolonged uses of non-deadly force found gratuitous in other contexts.”); and DeVoe v. Rebant, No. 05-71863, 2006 WL 334297 (E.D.Mich. Feb. 13, 2006) (“Attempting to physically force Mr. DeVoe into the vehicle likely would have escalated the situation into a physical struggle in which Mr. DeVoe or the officers could have been seriously injured.”). The defendants argue that defendant Morgan can be heard on the audio from the officer’s in-car video telling the plaintiff to “stop resisting.” Morgan Video at 21:12:58.

The Court will overrule the defendants’ objection because Alexander and DeVoe are not controlling authority, and even if they were, their application to the present case is questionable because the facts are very different. Unlike Alexander and DeVoe, where the tased individuals were belligerent and refused to enter the police car, the plaintiff was already seated in the police car. He was intoxicated and had just been tased twice and bitten by a police dog, and was not resisting. The magistrate correctly concluded that a jury could find that Morgan’s use of the Taser was objectively unreasonable.

D. The qualified immunity objections

The defendants’ fourth objection does not challenge the magistrate’s conclusion that the law concerning the use of Tasers on subdued suspects is clearly established. Rather, the defendants argue that defendant Riley could have made a reasonable mistake about his personal safety and the amount of force necessary in arresting the plaintiff. Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff posed a threat, granting defendant Riley qualified immunity is inappropriate. Bouggess v. Mattingly, 482 F.3d 886, 896 (6th Cir.2007) (‘When the legal question of immunity is completely dependent upon which view of the facts is accepted by the jury, the jury- becomes the final arbiter of a claim of immunity.”). Therefore, the defendants’ fourth objection is overruled.

The defendants’ fifth objection concerning defendant Pauli’s use of a police dog also does not challenge the magistrate judge’s conclusion that the law concerning the use of a police dog on a subdued suspect is clearly established. The defendants only argue that defendant Pauli may have made a reasonable mistake as to his personal safety and the amount of force necessary. The fact that defendant Pauli may have violated a clearly established constitutional right necessarily means that defendant Pauli is not entitled to qualified immunity. Therefore, the defendants’ fifth objection is overruled.

In their sixth objection, the defendants argue that the law surrounding the use of force on handcuffed individuals who refuse to comply with officers’ commands to enter a police vehicle is not clearly established, and therefore, it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer that using a Taser to get the plaintiff to put his feet into the patrol car was unlawful.

“For a right to be clearly established, ‘[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what [she] is doing violates that right.’” Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir.2003) (quoting Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir.1992)); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (describing the Court’s inquiry as “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted”); cf. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (noting that the right must be sufficiently particularized to allow a reasonable official to understand that she is violating the right). However, the Supreme Court has clarified that neither a decision of the Court nor an extreme level of factual specificity is necessary in every instance to give fair warning. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 268, 271, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997); see also Gould v. Symons, 275 F.Supp.2d 843, 848 (E.D.Mich.2003). The Supreme Court has observed that “officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). “The fact that the law may have been unclear, or even hotly disputed, at the margins does not afford state actors immunity from suit where their actions violate the heartland of the constitutional guarantee, as that guarantee was understood at the time of the violation.” Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 867 (6th Cir.1997).

“[T]he right to be free from excessive force is a clearly established Fourth Amendment right.” Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 902 (6th Cir.2004). Additionally, it is clearly established that “a gratuitous use of force on a suspect that has already been subdued violates the Fourth Amendment.” Williams v. City of Taylor, No. 09-13891, 2011 WL 1869592, at *3 (E.D.Mich. May 16, 2011) (citing Roberts v. Manigold, 240 Fed.Appx. 675, 677 (6th Cir.2007) (finding jury question where record supported a finding that plaintiff was “completely pinned” by a 225-pound officer, a former U of M football player, when the officer’s partner continued to Taser the plaintiff); Baker v. City of Hamilton, 471 F.3d 601, 607 (6th Cir.2006)); see also Kijowski v. City of Niles, 372 Fed.Appx. 595, 599-600 (6th Cir.2010) (deploying Taser on suspect who was not resisting is objectively unreasonable); Grawey v. Drury, 567 F.3d 302, 311 (6th Cir.2009) (concluding use of pepper spray on compliant suspect who has not been told he is under arrest and is not handcuffed is objectively unreasonable). The gratuitous or excessive use of a Taser violates a clearly established constitutional right. Landis v. Baker, 297 Fed.Appx. 453, 463 (6th Cir.2008).

Defendant Morgan used his Taser on Austin roughly thirty seconds after giving Austin the first order to put his feet in the police car. The Court finds that both common sense and decency dictate that the continued application of physical force on a disoriented and unresisting subject, who has been subdued, handcuffed, and placed in a police car, without providing him adequate time to comply is clearly a violation of the suspect’s right to be free from excessive force. Therefore, the defendants’ sixth objection is overruled.

E. Ethnic Intimidation Objection

The defendants merely argue that the Michigan Legislature did not intend the ethnic intimidation statute to apply to situations where the police were enforcing the law in apprehending a criminal suspect. The defendants do not address the magistrate judge’s reasoning concerning the specific intent and underlying criminal act requirements. The defendants’ seventh objection, therefore, is overruled.

F. Conclusion

The Court agrees with the magistrate judge and finds that his determination of the issues in the defendants’ motion was correct. Therefore, the Court will adopt the report and recommendation.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge [dkt. # 40] is ADOPTED.

It is further ORDERED that the defendants’ objections to the report and recommendation [dkt. # 41] are OVERRULED.

It is further ORDERED that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment [dkt. # 30] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

It is further ORDERED that the plaintiffs section 1983 and state law ethnic intimidation claims against Redford Township and the plaintiffs section 1983 excessive force claim against defendant Riley based on Riley’s first use of a Taser are DISMISSED. The summary judgment motion is DENIED in all other respects.

It is further ORDERED that the matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Paul J. Komives under the previous reference order [dkt. # 4] to ready the matter for trial, and to conduct a trial if the parties consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (docket #30)

PAUL J. KOMIVES, United States Magistrate Judge.

Table of Contents

I. RECOMMENDATION.....................................................892

II. REPORT.................................................................892

A. Procedural History.....................................................892

B. Legal Standard........................................................892

C. Factual Background....................................................894

D. Fourth Amendment Claims Against the Individual Officers..................895

1. Sufficiency of Plaintiffs Pleading.....................................895

2. Legal Standard.....................................................897

3. Analysis...........................................................898

a. Defendant Riley’s Initial and Subsequent Deployment of the Taser .......................................................898

b. Defendant Pauli’s Use of the Police Dog...........................899

c. Defendant Morgan’s Use of the Taser.............................900

4. Qualified Immunity.................................................900

a. Legal Standard.................................................900

b. Analysis.......................................................901

E. Municipal Liability Claim................................................903

1. Legal Standard.....................................................903

2. Analysis...........................................................904

F. Ethnic Intimidation Claim...............................................908

1. Individual Defendants...............................................908

2. The Township......................................................910

G. Conclusion............................................................911

III. NOTICE TO PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS.........................911

I. RECOMMENDATION:

The Court should grant in part and deny in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the Court should grant summary judgment to defendants on plaintiffs § 1983 and state law ethnic intimidation claims against Redford Township and plaintiffs § 1983 excessive force claim against defendant Riley based on Riley’s first use of a Taser. The Court should deny summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs remaining § 1983 excessive force claims against defendants Riley, Pauli, and Morgan.

II. REPORT:

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Charles Fitzgerald Austin commenced this action on July 29, 2008, by filing a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After pro bono counsel was appointed for plaintiff, he filed through counsel an amended complaint. Plaintiffs amended complaint names as defendants the Redford Township Police Department (“the Department”) and three officers employed by the Department-Kevin G. Riley, Timothy L. Pauli, and John M. Morgan. Plaintiffs amended complaint alleges that the individual defendants used excessive force in effectuating his arrest, including deploying Tasers and police dog which bit him. The amended complaint asserts a municipal liability claim against the Department based on the individual officers’ use of excessive force (Count I), and a state law claim of ethnic intimidation pursuant to Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.147b against the Department and the individual defendants.

The matter is currently before the Court on defendants’ motion for summary judgment, filed on November 29, 2010. Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because: (1) the Department is not a proper party; (2) even if plaintiff had properly named the Township as a defendant, there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the alleged constitutional violation was caused by a policy or custom of the Township; (3) even if plaintiffs complaint can be read as asserting an excessive force claim against the individual officers, their use of force was objectively reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment; (4) the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; and (5) plaintiff has failed to establish a claim of ethnic intimidation under Michigan law. Plaintiff filed a response to defendants’ motion on December 20, 2010. Plaintiff contests each of the arguments raised by defendants, and also asks for leave to amend the complaint should the Court determine that he failed to properly allege excessive force claims against the Township and the individual defendants. Defendants filed a reply on January 3, 2011.

B. Legal Standard

Under Rule 56, summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Hedrick v. Western Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 451 (6th Cir.2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). “A fact is material only if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit.” Hedrick, 355 F.3d at 451-52 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant as well as draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor. See Sutherland v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 613 (6th Cir.2003); Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir.2003). “The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to an essential element of the non-moving party’s case.” Hedrick, 355 F.3d at 451 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). To meet this burden, the moving party need not produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Rather, “the burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’ — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to particular parts of materials in the record ... or ... showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.”). “Once the moving party satisfies its burden, ‘the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue.’ ” Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir.2001) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

To create a genuine issue of material fact, however, the non-movant must do more than present some evidence on a disputed issue. As the Supreme Court has explained: “There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the [non-movant’s] evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. (citations omitted); see Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Thus, “[t]he existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position will not be sufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party.” Sutherland, 344 F.3d at 613.

In support of their motion, defendants have submitted videotapes taken from the in-car cameras in the cars of the three individual defendants. See Def.s’ Br., Exs. 13-15 [hereinafter referred to, respectively, as “Riley Video,” “Pauli Video,” and “Morgan Video”]. While, as noted above, the Court must take the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, “[t]here is ... an added wrinkle in this case: existence in the record of a videotape capturing the events in question.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). In these circumstances, the Court must also “view[] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Id. at 381, 127 S.Ct. 1769; see also, Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir.2008) (“[W]here, as here, the record contains an unchallenged videotape capturing the events in question, we must only credit the plaintiffs version of the facts to the extent it is not contradicted by the videotape.”).

C. Factual Background

Taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the record before the Court establishes the following. On August 5, 2005, at approximately 9:20 p.m., defendant Riley observed a vehicle driven by plaintiff traveling at approximately 65 miles per hour in a construction zone on Telegraph Road. Rather than pulling over, plaintiff fled, and Riley initiated a pursuit. During the course of the chase, plaintiff traveled at a high rate of speed weaving through traffic, including through residential areas and construction zones, ran stop signs and red lights, and at one point traveled the wrong way on Telegraph Road. After running into a dead end, plaintiff put his car in reverse, striking defendant Riley’s vehicle. Plaintiff then pulled into a driveway and stopped. Defendant Riley followed, stopping directly behind plaintiff. See Def.s’ Br., Ex. 1 (Riley Incident Report); Riley Video, at 21:17:48-21:24:28. By this point in time, a number of other police officers had joined the pursuit, including defendants Pauli and Morgan. See Pauli Video, at 21:03:51-21:07:11; Morgan Video, 21:05:25-21:10:57. After he came to a stop, plaintiff threw his handgun out the window of the car. See Def.’s Br., Ex. 1; PL’s Br., Ex. 2, Dep. Tr. of Charles Austin, at 32-33 [hereinafter “PL’s Dep.”]; Riley Video, at 21:24:29-21:24:32. Defendant Pauli, a K-9 officer, arrived immediately after Riley, and defendant Morgan arrived shortly thereafter. After stopping and throwing his handgun through the window, plaintiff exited the car. The Riley video shows the sequence of events which followed. Riley approached plaintiff holding his Taser drawn. At the same time, defendant Pauli approached with his police dog. See Riley Video, at 21:24:36. The video shows plaintiff raising one hand in the air, with his palm open. The video also shows Riley and plaintiff exchanging some words. Defendant Riley then fires his Taser, striking plaintiff. Plaintiff falls back into his car, at which time defendant Pauli is seen pointing at plaintiff, which causes his dog to jump onto plaintiff. Pauli removes the dog, and the officers, now joined by a third officer, pull plaintiff out of the car and onto the ground. See Riley Video, at 21:24:36-21:24:46. The officers then restrain plaintiff on the ground to handcuff him and secure the scene. See Riley Video, at 21:24:46-21:28:22.

While these events are clear from the video, the parties do dispute some particulars which are not apparent from the video and the inferences to be drawn from the video. For his part, plaintiff contends that he complied with defendant Riley’s verbal commands and did not take any aggressive action, see PL’s Dep., at 36; that some officers at the scene referred to letting the K9 Unit get some “nigger blood,” see id. at 36-37; that the K9 unit was deployed on him three times, including once when he was already on the ground, at which point he was bitten in the neck; see id. at 56-57; and that Riley deployed the Taser on him a third time while he was pinned on the ground by another officer, see id. at 39. Defendants, on the other hand, contend that plaintiff did not comply with Riley’s commands to remain still and raised his hands in an aggressive manner, see Defi’s Br., Ex. 2, Dep. Tr. of Kevin G. Riley, at 20-21 [hereinafter “Riley Dep.”]; the police dog was deployed only once, grabbing hold of plaintiffs forearm, and immediately called back, see Def.’s Br., Ex. 2, Pauli Incident Report, at 2; Ex. 5, Dep. Tr. of Timothy Lee Pauli, at 15-16 [hereinafter “Pauli Dep.”]; and that the Taser was deployed only twice, the second time when plaintiff attempted to get up from the ground, see Def.s’ Br., Ex. 1, Riley Incident Report, at 3; Ex. 3, Pauli Incident Report, at 2; Riley Dep. at 13-15.

While plaintiff was on the ground, he complained that the cuffs are too tight and that he is unable to breath. One officer responded that plaintiff could breath just fine, as he was talking. The officer checked plaintiffs handcuffs, noting that he could place a finger between the cuffs and plaintiffs wrists. Plaintiff was warned to stop fighting the officers and moving around, or he would be shocked again with the Taser. See Morgan Video, at 21:12:25-21:15:45. Plaintiff was then escorted to defendant Morgan’s car. Plaintiff sat in the rear seat, but refused to put his legs in the car as commanded to do so by defendant Morgan. Defendant Morgan warned plaintiff that he would shock plaintiff with the Taser if he did not comply and put his legs into the car, and sparked the Taser. When plaintiff still failed to comply, defendant Morgan administered a “drive stun” of the Taser to plaintiffs sternum. A second drive stun was administered, at which point plaintiff complied and placed his legs into the vehicle. See Morgan Video, at 21:16:20-21:17:00; Def.s’ Br., Ex. 7, Morgan Incident Report, at 2. Plaintiff was transported to the Redford Police Department, where he was charged with fleeing and eluding a police officer, operating a vehicle while intoxicated, and carrying a concealed weapon. Plaintiff eventually pleaded no contest to the fleeing and eluding and driving while intoxicated charges, and was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. See Pl.’s Dep., at 63-64.

D. Fourth Amendment Claims Against the Individual Officers

Defendants first contend that they are entitled to summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs excessive force claims. Defendants contend that an excessive force claim has not been properly pleaded against the individual officers. They also contend that even if such a claim has been properly pleaded, there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether their use of force was reasonable. Finally, they contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The Court should conclude that plaintiff has properly pleaded a Fourth Amendment claim against the individual officers, and that the individual defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on that claim.

1. Sufficiency of Plaintiffs Pleading

Defendants first contend that plaintiff has not properly pleaded a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against the individual defendants. The Court should disagree.

Plaintiffs amended complaint alleges all of the facts which give rise to plaintiffs excessive force claim. See Amended Compl., ¶¶ 9-37. The amended complaint also explicitly alleges that the “Redford Township Police Officers used excessive force against Austin during his arrest,” id., ¶ 42, that this use of force “was not objectively reasonable under the circumstances,” id., ¶ 44, and that the use of force violated the Fourth Amendment, see id., ¶ 45. It is true that these latter allegations are made within a count (Count I) titled “Municipal Liability for Use of Excessive Force (Against the Redford Township Police Department),” but this does not render the complaint insufficient to state a Fourth Amendment claim against the individual defendants. Rule 8 requires that a complaint provide nothing more than “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Importantly, “[i]n a complaint, it is not only unnecessary to spell out each legal theory to be relied on, it is also unnecessary to separate each distinct legal theory into a separate count.” Patriarca v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 639 F.Supp. 1193, 1198 (D.R.I.1986); see also, 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1219, at 277-78 (3d ed. 2004) (“The federal rules effectively abolish the restrictive theory of the pleadings doctrine, making it clear that it is unnecessary to set out a legal theory for the plaintiffs claim for relief.”).

Rather, as the Supreme Court has explained Rule 8 requires only that the complaint contain a “ ‘short and plain statement of the claims’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)), overruled in part on other grounds, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-63, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Here, there is no doubt that the individual defendants have had fair notice of plaintiffs claims; defendants’ answer to the amended complaint denies the allegations made regarding the conduct of the individual officers, and asserts a defense of qualified immunity, a defense which is applicable only to claims against individual defendants in a § 1983 suit. See Everson v. Board of Educ. of the Sch. Dist. of the City of Highland Park, 123 Fed.Appx. 221, 228 n. 5 (6th Cir.2005). Further, plaintiffs municipal liability claim is derivative of his claim against the individual officers, and success on the municipal liability claim requires plaintiff to first establish that the individual defendants violated his constitutional rights. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992) (explaining that “proper analysis requires us to separate two different issues when a § 1983 claim is asserted against a municipality: (1) whether plaintiffs harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether the city is responsible for that violation.”); City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986) (per curiam) (“If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of unconstitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.”). Finally, the parties have engaged in extensive discovery on this issue, and have fully addressed the validity of a Fourth Amendment claim against the individual defendants.

Because (a) plaintiffs complaint provides a short and plain statement of a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against the individual defendants, (b) the individual defendants have fully litigated the issue, and (c) Rule 8 directs that “[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e), the Court should conclude that plaintiff has properly pleaded a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against the individual defendants. See generally, Conley, 355 U.S. at 48, 78 S.Ct. 99 (“The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.”).

2. Legal Standard

The Fourth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), the Supreme Court held that all claims that police officers used excessive force should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. In analyzing such a claim, the court should apply a standard of objective reasonableness. Id. at 395-96, 109 S.Ct. 1865. This test

requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.

Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865; see also, Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 236 (6th Cir.2007). Reasonableness “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. “Because the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application, ‘its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.’ ” Bell v. Porter, 739 F.Supp.2d 1005, 1010-11 (W.D.Mich.2010) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865). In addition to the underlying historical facts of what happened during the arrest, determination of which is of course a jury question, “[wjhether the amount of force used was reasonable is usually a question of fact to be determined by the jury.” Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 806 (9th Cir.1994); see also, Dominguez v. Metropolitan Miami-Dade County, 167 Fed.Appx. 147, 150 (11th Cir.2006); Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 290 (3d Cir.1999); Trethewey v. Stimac, No. 2:08-CV-12156, 2010 WL 3583082, at *4 (E.D.Mich. Aug. 9, 2010) (Komives, M.J.), magistrate judge’s report adopted, 2010 WL 3583049 (E.D.Mich. Sept. 9, 2010) (Rosen, J.), aff'd, 431 Fed.Appx. 432 (6th Cir.2011). Thus, summary judgment is appropriate only “where the plaintiff fails to offer any evidence that the officer used force or if, accepting the plaintiffs version of events, no reasonable jury could conclude that the officer’s use of force was unreasonable.” Trethewey, 2010 WL 3583082, at *4 (citing Landy v. Irizarry, 884 F.Supp. 788, 798 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (citing cases)); see also, Abraham, 183 F.3d at 290; Ferraresso v. Town of Granby, 646 F.Supp.2d 296, 306 (D.Conn.2009).

3. Analysis

Plaintiff contends that the individual defendants used excessive force in three respects. First, plaintiff asserts that defendant Riley’s repeated use of the Taser on him was excessive. Second, he argues that defendant Pauli’s use of the police dog constituted excessive force. Third, he contends that Officer Morgan’s use of the Taser while he was seated in the police car was excessive. “In the Sixth Circuit, courts faced with an excessive force case that involves several uses of force must analyze the claims separately.” Landis v. Galarneau, 687 F.Supp.2d 672, 678 (E.D.Mich.2009) (Murphy, J.) (citing Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 364 F.3d 763, 772 (6th Cir.2004)).

a. Defendant Riley’s Initial and Subsequent Deployment of the Taser

Here, there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether defendant Riley’s initial deployment of the Taser was objectively reasonable. Looking to the Graham factors, a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant Riley’s use of the Taser was objectively unreasonable. First, the initial crime resulting in the arrest was not a violent crime. To be sure, plaintiff engaged in a dangerous flight from the police, but the initial reason for the pursuit was plaintiffs violation of the traffic laws, and the officers do not contend that they had any basis other than the flight to conclude that plaintiff would be violent. Second, at the time the force was deployed, the chase had ended, and plaintiff had no visible means of escape. Further, there remain genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether plaintiff was resisting arrest or otherwise threatening the officers. The Riley video shows plaintiff raising one arm, with his palm open clearly indicating that he was not holding a weapon in that hand. Plaintiff did not make any obviously threatening gestures, although his arm gesture may have been threatening to an objectively reasonable officer based on what words were exchanged. Because there is no audio, however, the tape does not show whether plaintiffs conduct and words together were threatening. Nor does it appear that at this point, once the chase had ended, plaintiff was attempting to flee the officers on foot. Further, although defendants Riley and Pauli testified that they feared plaintiff was attempting to get his gun, the objective reasonableness of this fear remains a disputed issue of fact in light of the facts that it is not clear how far away the gun was or whether plaintiff ever stepped in the direction of the gun, as well as the fact that the officers had seen plaintiff voluntarily throw the gun from the car. Indeed, the video shows that although plaintiff exited his car, after he did so he did not take any steps toward defendant Riley. See Riley Video, at 21:24:36-38; rather, as Riley and the police dog approached, immediately before the Taser was fired, plaintiff actually took a step backward toward his car. See id. at 21:24:36-37. Likewise, although the defendants contend that plaintiff was resisting arrest, there remain genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether plaintiff was in fact resisting at the time the Taser was deployed and, if so, to what extent. Finally, the amount of force used was significant. In light of these disputed issues of material fact, a jury could conclude that defendant Riley’s use of the Taser was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. See Lee v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, 596 F.Supp.2d 1101, 1117 (M.D.Tenn. 2009); Perach v. Lee, No. 08-13754, 2009 WL 3190414, at *6 (E.D.Mich. Sept. 30, 2009) (Cook, J.); Michaels v. City of Ver million, 539 F.Supp.2d 975, 986-87 (N.D.Ohio 2008).

More importantly, there is evidence in the record that defendant Riley shocked plaintiff with the Taser a second and possibly a third time, after plaintiff had fallen back into the car or was on the ground. Even if his first shock of plaintiff was reasonable, there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that defendant Riley’s repeated use of the Taser was objectively unreasonable. See Cyrus v. Town of Mukwonago, 624 F.3d 856, 863 (7th Cir.2010); Kijowski v. City of Niles, 372 Fed.Appx. 595, 600 (6th Cir.2010); Roberts v. Manigold, 240 Fed.Appx. 675, 676, 678 (6th Cir.2007); Yarnell v. Mendez, 509 F.Supp.2d 421, 432 (D.Del.2007). Although defendants contend that plaintiff was still resisting when he was on the ground, they do not contend that he was physically aggressive, such as by biting, hitting, or kicking. Cf. Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 777 (10th Cir.1993) (use of Taser objectively reasonable even though plaintiff was on the ground with officers on top of him, where plaintiff was kicking, punching, and biting the officers). In any event, there remain genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether, and if so to what extent, plaintiff was resisting or threatening the officers when Riley repeatedly deployed the Taser.

In short, “[i]t is the province of the jury to assess the credibility of the evidence, and if the jury accepts [plaintiffs] account, it could fairly conclude that to apply a Taser in the situation here presented would constitute the use of excessive force.” Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 500 (8th Cir.2009). Accordingly, the Court should conclude that defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this excessive force claim.

b. Defendant Pauli’s Use of the Police Dog

Defendants also contend that defendant Pauli’s use of the police dog was objectively reasonable because Pauli had seen plaintiff get stunned with Riley’s Taser yet start to get back up out of the car, and because Pauli was worried that plaintiff was attempting to reach the gun he had thrown out of the car. * For the same reasons that defendants are not entitled to summary judgment with respect to defendant Riley’s use of the Taser, defendants are not entitled to summary judgment with respect to this use of force. Defendant Pauli testified that he deployed the police dog because plaintiff was taking a step toward the firearm and because he saw that the first use of the Taser had no effect on plaintiff. See Paul Dep. Tr., at 16-17. However, as explained above, the video shows that plaintiff did not take a step toward Riley, but actually stepped backward' as Riley and the police dog approached. See Riley Video, at 21:24:35-37. Further, defendant Pauli’s testimony that he deployed the dog because the Taser had no effect on plaintiff is belied by the video, which shows that dog approaching plaintiff before the Taser was fired, - and Pauli apparently commanding the dog to seize plaintiff immediately after the Taser was fired and as plaintiff was still falling backward into his car. See id. at 21:24:38-41.

It is well established that “[a]n attack by an unreasonably deployed police dog in the course of a seizure is a Fourth Amendment excessive force violation.” Vathekan v. Prince George’s County, 154 F.3d 173, 178 (4th Cir.1998); see also, Campbell v. City of Springsboro, Ohio, 788 F.Supp.2d 637, 665-66 (S.D.Ohio 2011). As noted above, there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether and to what extent plaintiff was resisting or threatening the officers. Further, the video appears to show plaintiff standing still or moving backward immediately before the dog was deployed, and the dog was deployed immediately after the Taser had been fired and as plaintiff was falling backward into the car, raising an issue of fact as to whether Pauli could have reasonably believed that the Taser did not end the perceived threat posed by plaintiff. Finally, there is no evidence that Pauli gave a verbal warning to plaintiff that he would deploy the dog. Taken together, these facts, if resolved in plaintiffs favor by a jury, could support a finding that defendant Pauli’s use of the police dog was not objectively reasonable. See Vathekan, 154 F.3d at 178-79; Campbell, 788 F.Supp.2d at 668-72; Morella v. City of Bakersfield, No. 1:09-cv-00453, 2010 WL 3386465, at *8 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 26, 2010); Dickinson v. City of Kent, No. C 06-1215, 2007 WL 1830744, at *3-*5 (W.D. Wash. June 25, 2007); Blake v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 6652, 2007 WL 1975570, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2007). Accordingly, the Court should conclude that defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

c. Defendant Morgan’s Use of the Taser

Likewise, the Court should conclude that there remains a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether defendant Morgan’s use of the Taser was objectively reasonable. With respect to this use of force, the record is clear that plaintiff was handcuffed and seated in the back of the police car. The only justification for the use of the Taser was plaintiffs failure to comply with defendant Morgan’s order to place his feet in the car. There is no evidence that, at this point in time, plaintiff posed a threat to the officers or a risk of flight. Rather, the use of the Taser was solely as a means of obtaining compliance. It is well established that “the use of nonlethal, temporarily incapacitating devices on a suspect who is already handcuffed and no longer poses a threat to the safety of the officers or others constitutes excessive force.” Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 901 (6th Cir.2004); see also, Kijowski, 372 Fed.Appx. at 600 (“Absent some compelling justification— such as the potential escape of a dangerous criminal or the threat of immediate harm — the use of such a weapon on a nonresistant person is unreasonable.”). In light of this law, a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant Morgan’s use of the Taser to obtain compliance with his verbal command, while plaintiff was subdued and in handcuffs, was objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court should conclude that defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

4. Qualified Immunity

Defendants also contend that summary judgment is warranted because they are entitled to qualified immunity. The Court should conclude that defendant Riley is entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds with respect to his initial deployment of the Taser, but that he is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds with respect to his subsequent use of the Taser. The Court should also conclude that defendants Pauli and Morgan are not entitled to qualified immunity.

a. Legal Standard

“Under § 1983 ..., a plaintiff may seek money damages from government officials who have violated her constitutional or statutory rights. But to ensure that fear of liability will not unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties, the officials may claim qualified immunity; so long as they have not violated a clearly established right, they are shielded from personal liability.” Camreta v. Greene, — U.S.-,---, 131 S.Ct. 2020, 2030-31, 179 L.Ed.2d 1118 (2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). Thus, “[qjualified immunity shields an officer from suit when she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) (per curiam). The inquiry into whether a particular right is clearly established “ ‘must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’ ” Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)).

In the Fourth Amendment excessive force context, Graham’s clear establishment of the general proposition that objectively unreasonable use of force violates the Fourth Amendment “is not enough” to defeat qualified immunity. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Rather, the question is whether “the contours” of the broader Fourth Amendment right are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. The question, in other words, “is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id.; see also, Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199—200, 125 S.Ct. 596. In order to find that an officer’s use of force violated clearly established rights, it is not necessary that “the very action in question has previously been held unlawful.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (internal quotation omitted). Rather, what is required is that “in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness ... be apparent.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “[A]n action’s unlawfulness can be apparent from direct holdings, from specific examples described as prohibited, or from the general reasoning that a court employs.” Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir.2003) (citing Hope, 536 U.S. at 740-41, 122 S.Ct. 2508); see also, Grawey v. Drury, 567 F.3d 302, 313-14 (6th Cir.2009).

At the summary judgment stage, any subsidiary facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the question of whether the officer violated clearly established law is determined by reference to the facts as so viewed. See Champion, 380 F.3d at 900 (“[WJhere the legal question of qualified immunity turns upon which version of the facts one accepts, the jury, not the judge, must determine liability.”); Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 426 (6th Cir.1988).. In other words, “the nonmoving party is given the benefit of all relevant inferences at the summary judgment stage, and if a genuine dispute exists concerning predicate facts material to the qualified immunity issue, the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on that ground.” Smithson v. Aldrich, 235 F.3d 1058, 1061 (8th Cir.2000) (internal quotation omitted); cf. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998) (in resolving qualified immunity issue at the pleading stage, “the court must determine whether, assuming the truth of the plaintiffs allegations, the official’s conduct violated clearly established law.”).

b. Analysis

After applying these standards, the Court should conclude that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to defendant Riley’s subsequent uses of the Taser, defendant Pauli’s use of the police dog, or defendant Morgan’s use of the Taser. As noted above, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a jury could conclude that at the time of each of these events plaintiff was not a threat to the officers or others. Evidence in the record suggests that after plaintiff was initially shocked by Riley’s Taser, he had fallen into his car and no longer posed a threat to the officers necessitating the use of substantial force, i.e., the Taser and the police dog. Likewise, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff suggests that plaintiff posed no significant threat to the officers once he was on the ground. Finally, it is undisputed that plaintiff was handcuffed and sitting in defendant Morgan’s car at the time Morgan deployed the Taser. The law is sufficiently clearly established that a reasonable officer would recognize that deploying significant force such as a Taser or police dog constitutes excessive force in such circumstances. As the Sixth Circuit has explained, “there undoubtedly is a clearly established legal norm precluding the use of violent physical force against a criminal suspect who already has been subdued and does not present a danger to himself or others.” Harris v. City of Circleville, 583 F.3d 356, 367 (6th Cir.2009) (citing cases); see also, Merithew v. Amore, 417 Fed.Appx. 494, 499 (6th Cir.2011) (“[P]rior opinions clearly establish that it is unreasonable to use significant force on a restrained subject, even if some level of passive resistance is presented.”). This law was clearly established at the time of the events in question here. See, e.g., Bultema v. Benzie County, 146 Fed.Appx. 28, 37 (6th Cir.2005); Champion, 380 F.3d at 90