United States v. Reyes-Vencomo (866 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 2012)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES O. BROWNING, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion and Memorandum Brief to Suppress Evidence Recovered From the Defendants’ [sic] Vehicle and Post-Arrest Statements of the Defendant, filed November 30, 2011 (Doc. 31)(“Motion to Suppress”). The Court held an evidentiary hearing on January 27, 2012. The primary issues are: (i) whether Defendant Julio Reyes-Vencomo’s continued detention, after providing officers his vehicle registration and proof of insurance, constituted an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (ii) whether Taos, New Mexico Police Officer Virgil Vigil’s request for Reyes-Vencomo’s Social Security number exceeded the lawful scope of the traffic stop; and (in) whether the inventory search was valid. The Court will deny the Motion to Suppress. The Court finds that law enforcement officers lawfully detained Reyes-Vencomo to investigate and confirm his identity. The request for Reyes-Vencomo’s Social Security number did not exceed the lawful scope of the traffic stop, because Reyes-Vencomo could not provide his driver’s license and the officer was attempting to confirm his identity. Furthermore, the inventory search was conducted in compliance with standardized police procedures for a non-investigatory purpose.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the Court state its essential findings on the record when deciding a motion that involves factual issues. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(d) (“When factual issues are involved in deciding a [pretrial] motion, the court must state its essential findings on the record.”). The findings of fact in this Memorandum Opinion and Order are the Court’s essential findings for rule 12(d)’s purposes. The Court makes these findings under the authority of rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which requires a judge to decide preliminary questions relating to the admissibility of evidence, including the legality of a search or seizure, and the voluntariness of an individual’s confession or consent to search. See United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1269-70 (10th Cir. 1982). In deciding such preliminary questions, the other rules of evidence, except those with respect to privileges, do not bind the Court. See Fed.R.Evid.l04(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible. In so deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege.”). Thus, the Court may consider hearsay in ruling on a motion to suppress. See United States v. Garcia, 324 Fed.Appx. 705, 708 (10th Cir.2009)(unpub lished)(recognizing that it was not necessary to “resolve whether Crawford’s protection of an accused’s Sixth Amendment confrontation right applies to suppression hearings,” but indicating that Tenth Circuit precedent prior to Crawford v. Washington does not provide such protection); United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d at 1269; United States v. Christy, 810 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1223 (D.N.M.2011)(Browning, J.)(“Thus, the Court may consider hearsay in ruling on a motion to suppress.”); United States v. Hernandez, 778 F.Supp.2d 1211, 1226 (D.N.M.2011)(Browning, J.)(concluding “that Crawford v. Washington does not apply to detention hearings”).

1. On August 9, 2011, Vigil and Police Trainee Officer Stephen Ortega stopped Reyes-Vencomo while Reyes-Vencomo was operating his motor vehicle near his home in Taos. See Transcript of Hearing at 13:2-19 (January 27, 2012)(Torrez, Vigil)(“Tr.”).

2. Vigil and Ortega stopped ReyesVencomo and executed a traffic stop, because they observed Reyes-Vencomo failing to stop at a stop sign, and exceeding the posted speed limit. See Tr. at 13:2-19 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 82:15-83:2 (Torrez, Ortega); State of New Mexico Uniform Traffic Citation for Failing to Complete a Stop (dated August 10, 2011)(Govt’s Ex. 2 at hearing)(“Stop Sign Citation”); State of New Mexico Uniform Traffic Citation for Going 40 Miles Per Hour in a 25 Miles per Hour Zone (dated August 10, 2011)(Govt’s Ex. 3 at hearing)(“Speeding Citation”).

3. This traffic stop was Ortega’s first stop where he would make contact with the driver. See Tr. at 14:13-19 (Torrez, Vigil).

4. While investigating the driver, Ortega, accompanied by Vigil, approached Reyes-Vencomo’s vehicle and, pursuant to standard police procedure, asked ReyesVencomo for his driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. See Tr. at 15:18-9 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 83:16-21 (Torrez, Ortega); Grand Jury Testimony of Virgil Vigil at 5:17-23 (VigilXGovt’s Ex. 6 at hearing)(“Vigil GJ Testimony”).

5. Reyes-Vencomo provided the officers with his vehicle registration information and proof of insurance on the vehicle, informed the officers where he lived, and gave his full name, but indicated that he did not have a driver’s license or identification. See Tr. at 17:19-28 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 85:22-86:7 (Torrez, Ortega); State of New Mexico Uniform Traffic Citation for Driver Unable to Provide Driver’s License (dated August 10, 2011)(Govt’s Ex. 1 at hearing)(“License Citation”).

6. Vigil then asked Reyes-Vencomo to provide some form of identification, his name, date of birth, and Social Security number to verify Reyes-Vencomo’s identity. See Tr. at 18:8-20 (Torrez, Vigil).

7. Reyes-Vencomo then provided the officers with his date of birth and produced a Social Security card, giving it to Vigil. See Tr. at 18:24-19:8 (Torrez, Vigil); Vigil Incident Narrative at 1 (Def.’s Ex. A at hearing)(“Vigil Report”); New Mexico it Reyes, No. M-53-FR201100149, Statement of Probable Cause, dated August 11, 2011 (Def.’s Ex. B at hearing)(“Probable Cause”); Ortega Incident Narrative at 1 (Def.’s Ex. C at hearing)(“Ortega Report”).

8. Vigil noted that the card’s coloring and writing did not appear to be correct, and suspected that the card was fake. See Tr. at 19:12-19 (Torrez, Vigil); Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1; Ortega Report at 1.

9. Vigil then stated to Reyes-Vencomo that he was not free to leave, as he was going to “run” — conduct a computer-assisted check on — the Social Security card. Tr. at 19:4-8 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 37:17-23 (Juarez, Vigil).

10. Vigil contacted dispatch and initiated a records check of the Social Security number that Reyes-Vencomo provided. See Tr. at 19:25-20:1 (Torrez, Vigil); Tr. at 38:11-14 (Juarez, Vigil); Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1.

11. The officers ran the card, and it could not be confirmed as a valid card. See Tr. at 20:2-3 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 38:15-17 (Juarez, Vigil); Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1; Ortega Report at 1.

12. Dispatch informed Vigil .that no record existed matching the Social Security number that Reyes-Vencomo provided. See Tr. at 20:2-3 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 38:15-17 (Juarez, Vigil); Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1; Ortega Report at 1.

13. Vigil then returned to Reyes-Vencomo’s vehicle and asked him where he got his Social Security Card, to which ReyesVencomo responded that he had received it in New Mexico, through the mail. See Tr. at 20:4-13 (Torrez, Vigil).

14. This answer set off a “red flag” for Vigil, because Vigil knew that an individual has to personally retrieve his or her Social Security card. Tr. at 20:13-14 (Vigil).

15. Vigil informed Reyes-Vencomo that he was going to detain him for further investigation, as he believed that ReyesVencomo was in possession of a fraudulent Social Security card. See Tr. at 20:15-20

(Torrez, Vigil); id. at 38:18-39:2 (Juarez, Vigil).

16. Reyes-Vencomo became frustrated and, without the officers’ prompting, exited his vehicle. See Tr. at 20:21-23 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 33:2-33:9 (Juarez, Vigil); id. at 86:11-17 (Torrez, Ortega); Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1; Ortega Report at l.

17. As Reyes-Vencomo was exiting the truck, Vigil noticed a large machete in the vehicle’s cab and informed Reyes-Vencomo that he would be temporarily detained outside of the vehicle for officer safety. See Tr. at 21:6-18 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 39:20^40:4 (Juarez, Vigil); id. at 58:14 (Torrez, Holfelder); Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1; Ortega Report at 1.

18. Vigil was attempting to escort Reyes-Vencomo to his police vehicle when Reyes-Vencomo’s cellular telephone began to ring. See Tr. at 22:3-12 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 86:24-87:6 (Torrez, Ortega); Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1; Ortega Report at 1.

19. For officer safety, Vigil instructed Reyes-Vencomo not to reach into his pock^ ets, but Reyes-Vencomo ignored the order and attempted to retrieve the telephone from his pocket. See Tr. at 22:8-23:3 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 74:11-17 (Torrez, Reyes-Vencomo); id. at 87:12-20 (Torrez, Ortega); Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1; Ortega Report at l.

20. In response to Reyes-Vencomo’s attempt to put his hands in his pockets, Vigil tried to physically restrain ReyesVencomo, and both Vigil and Reyes-Vencomo fell to the ground. See Tr. at 23:4-12 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 87:16-22 (Torrez, Ortega); Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1; Ortega Report at 1.

21. Reyes-Vencomo’s telephone and wallet fell out of his pocket, and remained on the ground while Vigil attempted to gain control of Reyes-Vencomo. See Tr. at 23:14-25 (Torrez, Vigil);Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1; Ortega Report at 1.

22. The Social Security card, which Vigil had retained, also fell to the ground. See Tr. at 23:14-20 (Torrez, Vigil); Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1; Ortega Report at 1.

23. Reyes-Vencomo’s wife, Shirley Reyes, then arrived on the scene and, contrary to Vigil’s directions, picked up Reyes-Vencomo’s suspect Social Security card, tore it into pieces, and stuffed them into her shirt and mouth. See Tr. at 24:12-25:3 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 75:15-18 (Torrez, Reyes-Vencomo); id. at 88:25-89:14 (Torrez, Ortega); Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1; Ortega Report at 1.

24. Vigil had previously met S. Reyes, but had not previously met Reyes-Vencomo. See Tr. at 36:6-17 (Juarez, Vigil).

25. Simultaneously, Reyes-Vencomo continued to resist Vigil’s attempt to restrain him and head-butted Vigil in the nose as he was attempting to place ReyesVencomo in the back of the police unit. See Tr. at 25:4-19 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 89:23-90:10 (Torrez, Ortega); Vigil Report at 1; Probable Cause at 1; Ortega Report at 1.

26. While awaiting backup, the officers placed Reyes-Vencomo and his wife under arrest. See Tr. at 26:9-27:12 (Torrez, Vigil); id. at 90:11-18 (Torrez, Ortega).

27. Reyes-Vencomo and S. Reyes were both placed in police vehicles. See Tr. at 90:15-22 (Torrez, Ortega).

28. Vigil issued citations to Reyes-Vencomo for: (i) driving without a driver’s license, under N.M.S.A.1978, § 66-5-2; (ii) failing to come to a complete stop, under N.M.S.A.1978, § 66-8-116; and (in) and driving forty miles per hour in a twenty-five miles-per-hour zone, under N.M.S.A. 1978, § 66-7-301. See Tr. at 27:20-28:10 (Torrez, Vigil); Stop Sign Citation at 1; Speeding Citation at 1; License Citation at 1.

29. Vigil advised the other officers at the scene that a tow truck should be called. See Tr. at 43:9-10 (Torrez, Vigil).

30. Taos Police Department Policy provides:

1. When the operator of a vehicle is arrested and there is no one immediately available whom they want to take charge of the vehicle, it will be towed. This decision shall be noted in the narrative of the report, which is completed.

2. In the event the vehicle is towed, the adopted procedures for tow rotation will be followed.

3. A vehicle inventory will be completed and attached to any associated reports. If there is an Offense/Incident report completed, place the case number on the top right corner of the inventory.

Taos Police Department Towing Policy at 4-5 (Govt’s Ex. 5 at hearing).

31. Pursuant to standard police procedure, Taos Police Department officers conducted a search of Reyes-Vencomo’s vehicle before towing and inventoried the items in the vehicle. See Tr. at 53:24-56:7 (Torrez, Holfelder); Taos Police Department Towing Policy at 5; Taos Police Department Towing Authorization and Inventory at l(Govt’s Ex. 4 at hearing)(‘Tnventory”).

32. When Detective Barry Holfelder, the officer who conducted the search of Reyes-Vencomo’s vehicle, arrived, the only individuals at the scene were two sheriffs deputies, five Taos police officers, and Reyes-Vencomo, who was in the back of a police vehicle. See Tr. at 63:2-14 (Juarez, Holfelder); id. at 55:8-19 (Torrez, Holfelder).

33. Holfelder arrived at the scene between 12:30 p.m. and 12:35 p.m., and the traffic stop took place “quite awhile” before he arrived. Tr. at 50:22-23 (Torrez, Holfelder).

34. Holfelder understood the “immediately available” requirement in the Taos Police Department Towing Policy to refer to another vehicle occupant or an individual traveling in tandem with the stopped vehicle. See Tr. at 55:16-23 (Torrez, Holfelder).

35. The purpose of the Taos Police Department Towing Policy is to remove the vehicle from the roadway, to inventory the items within the vehicle to protect the Taos Police Department and the Town of Taos, and to provide a document noting what the vehicle held at the time that it was towed. See Tr. at 53:24-54:10 (Torrez, Holfelder).

36. The Taos Police Department Towing Policy is a uniform standardized policy to do a complete inventory search of a vehicle when a vehicle will be towed, because the owner is under arrest and no one is immediately available to take possession of the vehicle. See Tr. at 53:24-54:10 (Torrez, Holfelder); Taos Police Department Towing Policy at 4-5.

37. Holfelder noticed that a young woman, whom he believes was Reyes-Vencomo’s stepdaughter, arrived some point after he began his inventory search. See Tr. at 63:17-18 (Juarez, Holfelder); id. at 65:25-11 (Torrez, Holfelder).

38. Holfelder testified that he saw Gutierrez having a conversation with Vigil through the driver’s door of Reyes-Vencomo’s vehicle. See Tr. at 66:3-11 (Torrez, Holfelder)

39. At some point after the tow truck had been called, Betty Gonzales and Claudia Gutierrez, S. Reyes’ daughter, asked Vigil whether they could drive Reyes-Vencomo’s truck home. See Tr. at 43:16-44:7 (Juarez, Vigil).

40. Vigil left the scene, because paramedics advised that he proceed to the hospital for X-rays. See Tr. at 30:8-11 (Torrez, Vigil); Vigil Report at 1-2; Probable Cause at 1-2.

41. Holfelder was not aware that anyone had offered to drive the vehicle to Reyes-Vencomo’s home. See Tr. at 51:14-18 (Torrez, Holfelder).

42. After his arrest, Reyes-Vencomo was placed in the back of a locked police car, with the windows rolled up, and made no contact with anyone at the scene. See Tr. at 55:2-57:4 (Torrez, Holfelder); id. at 90:15-91:3 (Torrez, Ortega).

43. Holfelder and Ortega found and inventoried two boxes of ammunition and two handguns. See Tr. at 58:4-60:2 (Torrez, Holfelder).

44. Reyes-Veneomo is a citizen of Mexico and is unlawfully present in the United States. See Tr. at 78:6-10 (Torrez, ReyesVencomo).

45. Vigil and Ortega prepared narrative summaries of their encounter with Reyes-Vencomo, but did not note the decision to tow. See Tr. at 32:16-18 (Juarez, Vigil); id. at 64:22-65:4 (Juarez, Holfelder); id. at 91:20-22 (Juarez, Ortega); Vigil Report at 1; Ortega Report at 1.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 27, 2011, a federal grand jury in the District of New Mexico returned an indictment against Reyes-Vencomo, charging him with being an Alien in Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5)(A) and 924(a)(2). See Doc. 16. On October 6, 2011, Reyes-Vencomo appeared for arraignment and entered a not guilty plea. See Magistrate Clerk’s Minutes of Arraignment at 1, filed October 6, 2011 (Doc. 21).

On November 30, 2011, Reyes-Vencomo filed a motion to suppress certain evidence, specifically the firearms and ammunition he is accused of possessing and any statements he made to law enforcement officers. See Motion to Suppress at 1. ReyesVeneomo moves the Court to suppress all evidence recovered from his motor vehicle and all post-arrest statements that he made to law enforcement in connection with and as a result of his arrest on August 9, 2011. See Motion to Suppress at 1. He asserts that he was unconstitutionally detained after Vigil and Ortega pulled him over for running a stop sign. See Motion to Suppress at 3. Reyes-Vencomo asserts that, under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Court must determine: (i) whether the traffic stop was justified and supported by a reasonable suspicion; and (ii) whether the officers’ actions during the detention were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the stop. See Motion to Suppress at 3 (citing United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 945 (10th Cir.1997)). Reyes-Vencomo represents that the officers in this case have stated that they executed a traffic stop of ReyesVencomo because they observed him going through a stop sign without coming to a full stop. See Motion to Suppress at 4. He contends that, when the investigation of a traffic offense is complete, a driver must be allowed to proceed without further delay or additional questioning, unless an officer acquires an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion of illegal activity. See Motion to Suppress at 5. Reyes-Vencomo asserts that the officers here had no such suspicion and that his continued detention violated his constitutional rights. See Motion to Suppress at 5.

Reyes-Vencomo argues that his involuntary detention never ceased, because Vigil never concluded the investigation of the traffic offense despite the lack of reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. See Motion to Suppress at 6. He asserts that he had already provided sufficient identification, and that Vigil had no right to request his Social Security number or card. See Motion to Suppress at 6-7. Reyes-Vencomo further contends that the officers’ questions exceeded the scope of a lawful stop under New Mexico and federal law. See Motion to Suppress at 7. He argues that Vigil and Ortega were bound by New Mexico law as Taos police officers making a stop in New Mexico, and that he is entitled to the protections of New Mexico law. See Motion to Suppress at 7. He asserts that the Court should honor his protections against unreasonable searches and seizures as established under New Mexico law. See Motion to Suppress at 8.

On December 19, 2011, Plaintiff United States of America timely filed, pursuant to rule 45(c) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and rule 5(b)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, its Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. 40)(“Response”). The United States characterizes Reyes-Vencomo’s Motion to Suppress as advancing two arguments: (i) that his continued detention after providing officers with his vehicle registration and proof of insurance constituted an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment; and (ii) that Vigil’s request for Reyes-Vencomo’s Social Security number exceeded the lawful scope of the traffic stop. See Response at 4.

The United States argues that the traffic stop, detention, and arrest of ReyesVencomo was based on reasonable. suspicion and probable cause that he was engaged in criminal activity. See Response at 4. The United States asserts that the initial traffic stop was based on an observed traffic violation, because ReyesVencomo failed to come to a complete stop at a stop sign. See Response at 5. It contends that the continued Reyes-Vencomo’s detention was based on probable cause that he was driving without a valid driver’s license. See Response at 5. The United States argues that requesting identification and running a check for warrants is lawful under such circumstances. See Response at 5. The United States asserts that Reyes-Vencomo had no driver’s license and was driving the vehicle in violation of N.M.S.A.1978, § 66-5-2. See Response at 5. It argues that Vigil had probable cause to arrest Reyes-Vencomo and that an officer may arrest a defendant for a misdemeanor if a crime occurs in the officer’s presence. See Response at 5. The United States asserts that New Mexico law requires persons to identify themselves when a law enforcement officer asks them to do so. See Response at 6 (citing N.M.S.A.1978, § 30-22-3). It argues that Vigil asked Reyes-Vencomo for his Social Security number, because Reyes-Vencomo had indicated he had no other form of identification and that Vigil was trying to determine, consistent with state law, who Reyes-Vencomo was. See Response at 6. The United States contends that Vigil had á reasonable suspicion that Reyes-Vencomo was concealing his identity in violation of N.M.S.A.1978, § 30-2-3, which provides that:

Concealing identity consists of concealing one’s true name.or identity, or disguising oneself with intent to obstruct the due execution of the law or with intent to intimidate, hinder or interrupt any public officer or any other person in a legal performance of his duty or the exercise of his rights under the laws of the United States or this state.

Whoever commits concealing identity is guilty of a petty misdemeanor.

Response at 6-7 (quoting N.M.S.A.1978, § 30-2-3). It asserts that an officer may question a detainee during a stop to dispel or confirm his or her suspicions and that, through his questioning, Vigil was able to confirm his suspicions about Reyes-Vencomo’s identity. See Response at 7. It argues that, when Reyes-Vencomo failed to produce a valid identifying document, Vigil had reasonable suspicion that Reyes-Vencomo might not be who he stated he was. See Response at 7. The United States further asserts that, when dispatch informed Vigil that there was no record of the Social Security number Reyes-Vencomo gave, Vigil had probable cause to believe that Reyes-Vencomo was concealing his identity. See Response at 7.

With respect to the inventory search, the United States asserts that a law enforcement agency may conduct an inventory search of an automobile.to protect the owner’s property while it remains in police custody. See Response at 8. The United States represents that, to fit within the inventory exception to the warrant requirement, a search must: (i) be conducted in accordance with standard criteria ensuring that the inventory process is not used as a subterfuge; and (ii) it is conducted on the basis of something other than suspicion of criminal 'activity. See Response at 8 (citing Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)). It argues that impoundment is reasonable when the driver of a vehicle cannot lawfully operate it and there is no third person who can immediately take custody of the car.'' See Response at 9 (citing United States v. Haro-Salcedo, 107 F.3d 769, 771 (10th Cir.1997)). The United States contends that, because ReyesVencomo and his wife were under arrest, the officers’ caretaking responsibilities justified impoundment of Reyes-Vencomo’s vehicle. See Response at 9. It asserts that the inventory search was conducted in conformity with a standardized procedure and was not a “general rummaging for evidence.” Response at 9.

Finally, the United States argues that the Fourth Amendment permits officers to make a protective search of a vehicle which may contain a weapon. See Response at 9. The United States asserts that the machete, which Vigil observed'inside the vehicle, constituted probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained weapons. See Response at 10. It argues that a protective sweep of the vehicle was thus permissible under the Fourth Amendment. See Response at 10.

On January 2, 2012, Reyes-Vencomo filed his Reply to Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Motion to Suppress Evidence Recovered from the Defendants’ [sic] Vehicle and Post-Arrest Statements of the Defendant. See Doc. 41 (“Reply”). Reyes-Vencomo asserts that the officers could only detain and release him pursuant to N.M.S.A.1978, §§ 66-8-122 and 66-8-123 for the traffic infraction or for driving without a license. See Reply at 3. ReyesVencomo cites State v. Bricker, 139 N.M. 513, 134 P.3d 800 (Ct.App.2006), which he asserts clarifies the interplay between those statutes and the ability of an officer to arrest based upon those statutes. See Reply at 3. He also argues that the officers never stated that they were concerned whether Reyes-Vencomo was concealing his true identity and that their concern was with the Social Security card. See Reply at 3. Reyes-Vencomo further asserts that the officers did not cite him for concealing his identity. See Reply at 4.

With respect to the search, Reyes-Vencomo asserts that the inventory search violated his rights, because the officers had no occasion to arrest him in the first place and, therefore, no basis to impound his vehicles. See Reply at 4. He also contends that, at the time the search was conducted, he was restrained and in the back of a police unit. See Reply at 4. Reyes-Vencomo asserts that, because he no longer presented a danger, the protective search was invalid under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). See Reply at 5.

The Court held an evidentiary hearing on January 27, 2012. In opening remarks, Reyes-Vencomo asserted that it is the United States’ burden to show that the warrantless search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Tr. at 4:7-11 (Juarez). Reyes-Vencomo stated that he does not contest that the initial stop was valid. See Tr. at 4:13-15 (Juarez). Reyes-Vencomo suggested that, the moment Vigil asked Reyes-Vencomo for his Social Security information, he ventured into the realm of trying to enforce federal immigration Jaw, which he has no jurisdiction to enforce. See Tr. at 4:21-5:2 (Juarez). Reyes-Vencomo argued that, whether Vigil asked for his Social Security number or card, both are beyond the scope of the traffic stop. See Tr. at 5:3-7 (Juarez). Reyes-Vencomo further asserted that there was not a valid investigatory search. See Tr. at 5:20-23 (Juarez). He represented that this case presents a novel question of law that should be certified to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit: that when the United States relies on an administrative search, all the laws of the state, including laws relating to arrest, should apply to that search because there is an administrative purpose and the search does not rely on the Fourth Amendment. See Tr. at 6:7-14 (Juarez).

In its opening remarks, the United States asserted that it would not address whether Reyes-Vencomo has presented a novel question of law, because that question was not raised in the briefing. See Tr. at 6:19-22 (Torrez). The United States argued that this case involves a “run-of-the-mill” traffic stop and that, when Reyes-Vencomo indicated that he did not have a driver’s license, the officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity under N.M.S.A.1978, § 66-5-16. See Tr. at 7:3-6 (Torrez). The United States represented that the Court addressed a similar issue in United States v. Jacquez, 409 F.Supp.2d 1286 (D.N.M.2005)(Browning, J.). See Tr. at 7:7-9 (Torrez). It argued that, when a driver is stopped for a traffic violation and indicates that he is without a driver’s license, that alone gives an officer reasonable, articulable suspicion and authorizes further investigation. See Tr. at 7:9-16 (Torrez). The Court then heard testimony from Vigil, Holfelder, Reyes-Vencomo, and Ortega.

Reyes-Vencomo argued that this case is about a Social Security card. See Tr. at 98:8-11 (Juarez). He asserted that the testimony is clear that there was a traffic stop and that, when asked for his Social Security information, he produced one. See Tr. at 98:11-25 (Juarez). He contended that the traffic stop then went awry, but that all of the documents surrounding the truck are legitimate. See Tr. at 99:1-2 (Juarez). Reyes-Vencomo asserted that Vigil has consistently testified that the only reason he detained Reyes-Vencomo was to further investigate the Social Security information. See Tr. at 99:15-18 (Juarez). He argued that, at that moment, Vigil exceeded the scope of the stop, violating his rights, and illegally detaining him from that moment onward. See Tr. at 99:23-100:1 (Juarez). Reyes-Vencomo contended that he could not be arrested for driving without a licenses and cited Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001), for support. See Tr. at 100:2-5 (Juarez). He represented that' the Supreme Court of the United States, in At-water v. City of Lago Vista, held that, if a crime has been committed, even if it is a misdemeanor offense, an officer may validly arrest an individual under the Fourth Amendment. See Tr. at 100:10-14 (Juarez). Reyes-Vencomo argued that, under N.M.S.A.1978, § 66-5-16, driving without a license is not a criminal offense and, thus, is not a violation for which he can be arrested. See Tr. at 100:15-20 (Juarez). He also asserted that using a false Social Security card as identification during a traffic stop is not a crime, or at least not one for which that Vigil could arrest him. See Tr. at 100:22-101:4 (Juarez). ReyesVencomo also argued that his resistance of an unlawful arrest could not provide the officers with a separate basis to arrest him. See Tr. at 101:4-15 (Juarez).

With respect to the inventory search, Reyes-Vencomo asserted that two people were immediately available to drive the truck back to his house and that Vigil admitted this fact. See Tr. at 101: 19-21 (Juarez). He argued that Vigil knew Gonzales and Gutierrez. See Tr. at 101:22-102:3 (Juarez). Reyes-Vencomo additionally argued that both women asked Vigil whether they could drive the truck home, such that, under the Taos Police Department policy, someone was immediately available to take the vehicle. See Tr. at 102:5-9 (Juarez). Reyes-Vencomo asserted that the only way to establish whether someone is immediately available to take the vehicle is to ask, and Holfelder had no contact with him. See Tr. at 102:10-103:1 (Juarez). Moreover, Reyes-Vencomo contended that no officer noted in their report that no one was available to take the vehicle as required under the Taos policy. See Tr. at 103:1-7 (Juarez). Reyes-Vencomo argued that, even if the Court finds that the arrest was valid, the Court should grant the Motion to Suppress, because of the failure to follow the proper inventory-search procedure. See Tr. at 103:8-14 (Juarez).

The Court asked Reyes-Vencomo whether it would need to make a credibility determination to resolve the issues before it. See Tr. at 103:20-24 (Court). Reyes-Vencomo responded that he did not believe that the Court would need to make a credibility determination with respect to the inventory search question, because Vigil admitted that he recognized Gutierrez as S. Reyes’ daughter and that she asked to take the vehicle home. See Tr. at 104:1-7 (Juarez).

The United States represented that the Court needs to answer four questions: (i) whether an officer may detain a driver following a failure to produce a driver’s license; (ii) whether an officer may ask a driver for a Social Security number in the absence of a driver’s license; (in) whether an officer may detain a defendant for officer safety in the presénce of a knife or weapon; and (iv) whether, following a lawful arrest, law enforcement officers may conduct an inventory search of the defendant’s vehicle before having it towed. See Tr. at 104:17-105:4 (Torrez).

The United States contended that the Court addressed the first question in United States v. Jacquez. See Tr. at 105:5-9 (Torrez). It asserted that the Court found that an officer could lawfully detain an individual driving without a license based on that violation. See Tr. at 105:24-106:4 (Torrez). The United States submitted that it did not need to go beyond the Court’s ruling in that case on the question of detention. See Tr. at 106:5-7 (Torrez). The United States further asserted that the Tenth Circuit precedent, established in United States v. Galindo-Gonzales, 142 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir.1998), and United States v. Zubia-Melendez, 263 F.3d 1155, 1161 (10th Cir.2001), supports the Court’s decision in United States v. Jacquez. See Tr. at 106:7-11 (Torrez). The Court asked for the United States’ response to ReyesVencomo’s argument that NMSA 1978, § 66-5-16 does not have an enforcement provision. See Tr. at 106:12-14 (Court). The United States responded that there are two provisions in the vehicle code which reference unlicensed drivers, but noted that another provision in the New Mexico traffic code states that violations that are not otherwise penalized are considered misdemeanors. See Tr. at 106:23-107:1 (Torrez)(citing N.M.S.A.1978, § 66-8-7). It asserted that Reyes-Vencomo has cited State v. Bricker, in which the Court of Appeals of New Mexico reached important conclusions about the interplay between the Constitution of the United States and the New Mexico Constitution. See Tr. at 107:2-8 (Torrez). The United States represented that State v. Bricker excluded evidence where an unlawful arrest took place under Article II, section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution, but noted that the Court of Appeals of New Mexico specifically found that the same analysis would not apply under the Fourth Amendment. See Tr. at 107:9-13 (Torrez). The United States asserted that, in State v. Slayton, 147 N.M. 340, 223 P.3d 337 (2009), the Supreme Court of New Mexico found that, under the Fourth Amendment, the constitutional reasonableness of a custodial arrest is measured by whether probable cause existed for the arrest and cited Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008), for the proposition that an arrest is lawful, under the Constitution of the United States, when the officer has probable cause to believe than an individual has committed even a minor crime in his presence. See Tr. at 107:13-108:2 (Torrez). The United States further asserted that, in Virginia v. Moore, Justice Scalia, speaking for the Court, held that police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they arrested a motorist they believed to be violating Virginia law, even though, under Virginia law, the motorist would have ordinarily been issued a summons rather than arrested. See Tr. at 108:3-12 (Torrez). It argued that, under the Fourth Amendment and Virginia v. Moore, it makes no difference that, under New Mexico law, the officer should have written a citation, rather than arrested Reyes-Vencomo, for driving without a license. See Tr. at 108:13-22 (Torrez).

The United States contended that driving without a license is a misdemeanor and that Vigil could have arrested Reyes-Vencomo for that offense, without violating the Fourth Amendment, when Reyes-Vencomo stated that he did not have a license. See Tr. at 108:23-109:2 (Torrez). It argued that Vigil asked Reyes-Vencomo for his Social Security number to try to confirm his identity. See Tr. at 109:3-7 (Torrez). The United States asserted that, when Reyes-Vencomo gave Vigil a false Social Security card, the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, that being a violation of N.M.S.A.1978, § 30-22-3, concealing identity from an officer. See Tr. at 109:7-11 (Torrez). It represented that State v. Andrews, 123 N.M. 95, 934 P.2d 289 (Ct.App.1997), is instructive, because there the Court of Appeals of New Mexico stated that name is synonymous with identity and details that, when officers are unable to obtain a valid driver’s license, they could for a date of birth as well as Social Security number. See Tr. at 109:19-22 (Torrez). The United States asserted that State v. Andrews held that failure to provide information contained in a driver’s license falls within the scope of the concealing identity statute. See Tr. at 109:23-110:3 (Torrez). It argued that State v. Andrews related to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975), which establishes that an officer may question and detain an individual to confirm or dispel his suspicions. See Tr. at 110:4-7 (Torrez). The United States contended that Vigil was within his rights to investigate two offenses: (i) driving without a license; and (ii) an inability to verify identity. See Tr. at 110:8-12 (Torrez). The United States argued that the encounter then escalated, because of Reyes-Vencomo’s behavior, and that Reyes-Vencomo’s credibility is something that the Court should closely scrutinize. See Tr. at 110:13-111:4 (Torrez)

The Court noted that the United States was not arguing that this encounter was consensual. See Tr. at 111:7-8 (Court). The United States agreed that it was not making that argument. See Tr. at 111:9 (Torrez). The Court then asked the United States at what point it believes an arrest occurred. See Tr. at 111:10-11 (Court). The United States responded that Reyes-Vencomo was detained, but not arrested, up until the moment his cellular telephone began ringing, when Vigil issued the order not to answer the cellular telephone, and when Reyes-Vencomo began to resist. See Tr. at 111:12-21 (Torrez). The Court asked whether the United States was asserting that the encounter was still an investigative stop when Vigil began taking him to the police vehicle. See Tr. at 111:22-24 (Court). The United States asserted that it was an investigative stop and a detention, but not a “full-blown” arrest, until Vigil issued the order and ReyesVencomo resisted the order. Tr. at 111:24-112:7 (Torrez). The Court asked for what offense Vigil had probable cause to arrest Reyes-Vencomo at that point. See Tr. at 112:8-9 (Court). The United States responded that the officers had probable cause to arrest him for resisting arrest because he disobeyed a lawful command given for officer safety. See Tr. at 112:10-19 (Torrez). The United States asserted that the officers did not know for what Reyes-Vencomo was reaching in his pocket. See Tr. at 112:19 (Torrez). The United States suggested that the Court should decline Reyes-Vencomo’s invitation to hold that he had a right to resist the arrest, because it was an unlawful arrest. See Tr. at 113:13-19 (Torrez). It argued that Reyes-Vencomo does not have that right; his right is to appear before a court to redress that violation. See Tr. at 113:19-114:2 (Torrez).

With respect to the second question, the United States asserted that it was unable to find, either in Reyes-Vencomo’s briefings or in its own research, any federal or state statute that prohibits a law enforcement officer from requesting a Social Security number or card. See Tr. at 114:5-11 (Torrez). The United States argued that the closest case that Vencomo-Reyes cites in his briefing is People v. Farley, 20 Cal.App.3d 1032, 98 Cal.Rptr. 89 (1971), which states that a Social Security card is not for identification, because it contains no description or information concerning the holder. See Tr. at 114:13-18 (Torrez). The United States pointed the Court to State v. Chapman, 127 N.M. 721, 986 P.2d 1122 (Ct.App.1999), which holds that an officer may investigate matters unrelated to the stop if the officer has reasonable suspicion. See Tr. at 114:21-115:4 (Torrez). It asserted that, when Reyes-Vencomo indicated that he did not have a driver’s license, the officers had independent evidence to support his continued detention. See Tr. at 115:9-15 (Torrez).

The United States then moved to the next two questions it posed. The United States asserted that an officer has the right to detain a driver for officer safety when in the presence of a weapon, when the driver is agitated, and when the driver is unable to identify himself. See Tr. at 115:16-19 (Torrez). The United States contended that Reyes-Vencomo has cited no authority establishing that an officer could not detain a driver in those circumstances. See Tr. at 115:19-116:2 (Torrez). With respect to the inventory search, the United States argued that an inventory search must be conducted in accordance with standard criteria and for a purposes other than investigation of criminal activity. See Tr. at 116:4-9 (Torrez). The United States asserted that Reyes-Vencomo never told the officers that he wished for Gutierrez or Gonzales to take his vehicle to his home. See Tr. at 116:16-117:5 (Torrez). It argued that the officers should not have to wait to see who might show up to take possession of an arrested individual’s vehicle. See Tr. at 117:21-118:1 (Torrez). The United States asserted that Gutierrez and Gonzales showed up at some point, but that the tow truck had already been called and, if the inventory was already underway, then the bell had already rung, because the officers had found the weapons. See Tr. at 118:1-6 (Torrez). It contended that the officers acted in good faith, because, when they began the inventory search, no person was immediately available at the scene. See Tr. at 118:7-13 (Torrez). The United States asserted that the officers were under no obligation to wait to see if anyone would become available and that the inventory search was conducted according to policy. See Tr. at 118:14-25 (Torrez).

Reyes-Vencomo reiterated that it is the United States’ burden to establish that the defendant’s rights were not violated. See Tr. at 119:11-12 (Juarez). He emphasized that Gutierrez and Gonzales were at the scene before the tow truck arrived. See Tr. at 119:13-18 (Juarez). He asserted that the United States did not pursue that line of questioning with its witness. See Tr. at 119:21-23 (Juarez). Reyes-Vencomo argued that the officers were supposed to reflect whether someone is available to take possession of the vehicle and that none of the police reports contain a reference to that policy. See Tr. at 119:24-120:6 (Juarez). He contended that the United States failed to meet the inventory search exception. See Tr. at 120:7-9 (Juarez). Reyes-Vencomo asserted that Atwater v. City of Lago Vista and Virginia v. Moore stand for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment is paramount when analyzing an arrest, and that it is important for the Court to look closely at whether a violation of N.M.S.A.1978, §§ 66-5-16 or 66-5-2 is a crime. See Tr. at 120:9-16 (Juarez). He argued that, if violations of those statutes are not crimes, then the arrest was invalid under the Fourth Amendment, because Atwater v. City of Lago Vista and Virginia v. Moore provide that an officer may arrest an individual for any petty offense, so long as that offense is a crime. See Tr. at 120:19-25 (Juarez). Reyes-Vencomo contended that there is no crime here and that those provisions are mere policy statements without a penalty. See Tr. at 121:1-10 (Juarez). He asserted that it would be nice to believe that Vigil was investigating identity concealment, but that the testimony did not support such a suggestion. See Tr. at 121:11-16 (Juarez). Reyes-Vencomo contended that, for whatever reason, Vigil became fixated with the fraudulent Social Security card and detained him. See Tr. at 121:16-22 (Juarez). He argued that the question is not where the arrest occurred, but when the detention exceeded the scope of the stop. See Tr. at 121:22-24 (Juarez). He asserted that the detention occurred when Vigil decided to “run” his Social Security card. Tr. at 122:1-2 (Juarez). Reyes-Vencomo stated that his insurance and registration were recognized as valid documents, but that the Social Security number was not a valid number. See Tr. at 122:2-6 (Juarez). He argued that Vigil then grabbed him by the arm and escorted him to the police vehicle, because he wanted to further investigate the Social Security number. See Tr. at 122:6-12 (Juarez). He contended that there was no crime at this point and that Vigil was not concerned that he was concealing his identity, because Vigil knows S. Reyes. See Tr. at 122:12-20 (Juarez).

RELEVANT FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const, amend. TV. For Fourth Amendment purposes, the Supreme Court has identified- three categories of police-citizen encounters: (i) consensual encounters, which are not considered “seizures” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore need not be supported by suspicion of criminal wrongdoing; (ii) investigative stops, in which an officer may briefly detain a person based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; and (iii) arrests, which are justified only if the officer has probable cause to believe that the subject has committed a crime. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-36, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991); Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir.2000)(citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)).

1. Investigative Detentions and Reasonable Suspicion.

An encounter that is not consensual may nevertheless be constitutional as an investigative detention. An investigative detention occurs when an officer stops and briefly detains a person “in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information.” Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d at 1186 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)). Inasmuch as such brief investigative detentions are not consensual, they constitute a seizure and must meet two distinct requirements to be “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. First, the officer “must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d at 1186 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). Second, the investigative detention that follows the stop must be “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances” which justified the stop in the first place, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, because the Fourth Amendment imposes “limitations on both the length of the detention and the manner in which it is carried out,” United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1229 (10th Cir.2001)(en banc).

“For reasonable suspicion to exist, an officer ‘need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct;’ he or she simply must possess ‘some minimal level of objective justification’ for making the stop.” United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129, 1134 (10th Cir.2009)(quoting United States v. Vercher, 358 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir.2004)). This standard is met by information “falling ‘considerably short’ of a preponderance standard.” United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d at 1134. A police/citizen encounter that goes beyond the limits of a stop under Terry v. Ohio is an arrest which must be supported by probable cause or consent to be valid. See United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir.1993)(“An encounter between police and an individual which goes beyond the limits of a Terry stop, however, may be constitutionally justified only by probable cause or consent.”).

An officer may “stop and frisk” an individual under the Fourth Amendment if a reasonably prudent person “in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868. “The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868. A frisk “must ... be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868. In evaluating the validity of the stop-and-frisk, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991).

These stop-and-frisk principles apply with equal weight to motorists and to pedestrians. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050-51, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). The Tenth Circuit has adopted the doctrine in Terry v. Ohio for an investigative detention — “stop”— and for a protective search — “frisk.”

Terry has come to stand for two distinct propositions — an investigative detention (‘stop’) in which a police officer, for the purpose of investigation, may briefly detain a person on less than probable cause, ... and a protective search (‘frisk’) which permits an officer, in the course of an investigative detention, to conduct a limited search for weapons for his or her own protection.

United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1557 (10th Cir.1993) (citations omitted). The legal standard is whether a “stop and frisk” is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. King, 990 F.2d at 1557.

In United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir.2004), the Tenth Circuit held that an officer had reasonable suspicion to continue questioning and to frisk a suspect after: (i) the officer had responded to a call from a citizen who gave his telephone number, and gave a detailed and accurate description of possible criminal activity and of the suspect; (ii) the contact occurred in Albuquerque’s highest-crime area; and (iii) the suspect displayed nervous behavior. See 364 F.3d at 1194. The Tenth Circuit noted that the officer’s experience' and training allowed him to make inferences, based on a combination of the surrounding circumstances, that criminal activity was afoot. See United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d at 1194. (“His suspicions were particularized to [the suspect], and were based on how his training and experience taught him to interpret a number of objectively reasonable details.”). While many of the factors that the Tenth Circuit considered did not, without more, give rise to reasonable suspicion, the combination of circumstances was sufficient. See United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d at 1193 (noting that the district court had erred, because “[a]ll of these factors, mitigating and aggravating, should have been analyzed as part of the totality of the circumstances faced by [the officer] at the inception of the detention”).

In United States v. Ceballos, 355 Fed.Appx. 226 (10th Cir.2009)(unpublished), the police officer observed a young girl walking down the street at night. See 355 Fed.Appx. at 227-28. A truck pulled up alongside the girl, the driver of the truck and the girl spoke briefly, then the truck drove ahead and the girl continued on her walk. See United States v. Ceballos, 355 Fed.Appx. at 228. Rather than leave, however, the truck drove ahead and parked with its lights off at a dark spot on the road by which the girl would have to walk. See United States v. Ceballos, 355 Fed.Appx. at 228. The officer spoke to the girl, who seemed unconcerned and told him that the man in the truck had asked only if she needed a ride; she had refused. See United States v. Ceballos, 355 Fed.Appx. at 228. Not investigating any particular crime or suspected-crime, and admittedly acting on a “hunch,” the officer turned on his emergency lights and pulled up behind the truck. United States v. Ceballos, 355 Fed.Appx. at 228. Upon talking to Ceballos, the officer discovered that Ceballos’ breath smelled of alcohol, he did not have a driver’s license, and he had a gun and other items in his vehicle. See United States v. Ceballos, 355 Fed.Appx. at 228. The Tenth Circuit found that the facts available to the officer would have led a reasonable officer to conclude that reasonable suspicion existed, and that the officer’s “subjective characterization of his actions is irrelevant.” United States v. Ceballos, 355 Fed.Appx. at 229. The Tenth Circuit explained:

A review of the totality of the circumstances shows Gallegos was not acting on an unparticularized hunch; during his testimony he articulated specific facts that caused him to suspect Ceballos intended to assault or abduct the teenage pedestrian. Specifically, at the time Gallegos initiated the traffic stop, he had observed Ceballos slow his vehicle as he passed a teenage girl walking alone late at night. He then observed Ceballos alter his route by making a U-turn and following the girl down a narrow, nearly deserted residential street. Ceballos pulled alongside the girl, who he did not know, and asked her if she wanted a ride. She refused, telling him she lived up the street. Ceballos then drove further down the road, pulled into a driveway as if to turn around and return to the main road, but instead backed out and drove a few feet further east, in the same direction the girl was walking. He parked in a dark location and turned off his lights.

We agree with the Government that Officer Gallegos had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Ceballos. Ceballos showed an interest in a teenage girl he did not know, to the point that he changed his route to follow her down a dark street, offered her a ride, and then parked where the girl would be required to walk past him as she continued to her home. The facts found by the district court, viewed in totality, amply support the constitutionality of the investigative detention.

United States v. Ceballos, 355 Fed.Appx. at 228-30. The Tenth Circuit did not require the officer to identify the particular crime of which he she had reasonable suspicion, or even to acknowledge that he had reasonable suspicion. The Tenth Circuit was content to find that a reasonable officer would have reasonable suspicion that “Ceballos intended to assault or abduct the teenage pedestrian.” United States v. Ceballos, 355 Fed.Appx. at 229. The Tenth Circuit demanded only that an officer have facts from which a reasonable officer could form a reasonable suspicion that criminal conduct was occurring or was about to occur. See United States v. Ceballos, 355 Fed.Appx. at 229.

2. Traffic Stop.

“A traffic stop is a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Harmon, 785 F.Supp.2d 1146, 1158 (D.N.M.2011)(Browning, J.)(quoting United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1220). Courts

assess the reasonableness of a routine traffic stop under the principles laid out for investigative detentions in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 ... (1968), considering “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified it in the first place.”

United States v. Wilson, 96 Fed.Appx. 640, 643 (10th Cir.2004)(unpublished). “A traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.” United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir.1995). See United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129, 1134 (10th Cir.2009). Whether the police officer making the stop had any other motivation for the stopping the vehicle is irrelevant. See United States v. Cervine, 347 F.3d 865, 870 (10th Cir.2003); United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 787; United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir.1998). The Terry v. Ohio framework applies whether the traffic stop is based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Harmon, 785 F.Supp.2d at 1158. A court must examine “both the length of the detention and the manner in which it was carried out,” United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1230, “keeping in mind that an officer may extend the duration and scope of the initial detention based on ‘an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that illegal activity has occurred or is occurring,’ ” United States v. Wilson, 96 Fed.Appx. at 643 (quoting United States v. Caro, 248 F.3d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir.2001)). “When the stop is extended based on reasonable suspicion, the further detention must, like the original traffic stop, ‘be temporary, lasting no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the [further detention], and the scope of the [further] detention must be carefully tailored' to its underlying justification.’ ” United States v. Wilson, 96 Fed.Appx. at 644 (alterations originalXquoting United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 945 (10th Cir.1997)).

Requesting the driver’s identification and running a check for warrants is unlawful under some circumstances. In United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985), the Supreme Court held that, where a defendant was stopped in response to a “wanted flyer” from another department, it was proper for the police to check his identification. 469 U.S. at 232, 105 S.Ct. 675. In the context of a traffic stop, the Tenth Circuit has “consistently held”: “An officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver’s license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, 1483 (10th Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 787. See also United States v. Hunter, 663 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir.2011); United States v. Kelly, No. 10-2057, 2010 WL 5173599, at'*11 (D.N.M. Nov. 17, 2010)(Browning, J.)(finding that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated where police officer asked for the defendant’s license, registration, and proof of insurance).

3. Arrests.

A seizure that exceeds the investigative detention’s limited scope or duration may nevertheless be justified as an arrest. An arrest is a seizure that is “characterized by highly intrusive or lengthy search or detention.” Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d at 1186 (quoting United States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1363 (10th Cir.1984)). The general rule is that “the use of firearms, handcuffs, and other forceful techniques” is sufficiently intrusive to signal that a person has been placed under arrest. United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1052-53 (10th Cir.1994). See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). The use of handcuffs, however, does not always elevate a detention into an arrest. See United States v. Albert, 579 F.3d 1188, 1195 (10th Cir.2009). Inasmuch as an arrest exceeds an investigative stop’s limited scope or duration, probable cause must support the arrest.

“Probable cause to arrest exists only when the ‘facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge, and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.’ ” United States v. Valenzuela, 365 F.3d 892, 896-97 (10th Cir.2004)(quoting United States v. Edwards, 632 F.3d 633, 639 (10th Cir.2001))(citing Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959)). Although “[p]robable cause does not require facts sufficient for a finding of guilt ..., it does require more than mere suspicion.” United States v. Morris, 247 F.3d 1080, 1088 (10th Cir.2001)(internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has made the following distinction between reasonable suspicion, which is sufficient for an investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and probable cause, which is required before an arrest can be made:

Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information