Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. (877 F. Supp. 2d 838, 2012)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

LUCY H. KOH, District Judge.

Plaintiff Apple, Inc. (“Apple”) brings this motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Defendants Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Electronics America, Inc., and Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC (collectively, “Samsung”) from “making, using, offering to sell, or selling within the United States, or importing into the United States” Samsung’s Galaxy Nexus smartphone. See PL’s Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 10 (“Mot.”). Although Apple’s Complaint asserts a total of eight patents and identifies seventeen accused products, Apple moves to preliminarily enjoin only the Galaxy Nexus smartphone, and moves to do so only on the basis of four patents: (1) U.S. Patent No. 8,086,604 (“the '604 Patent”); (2) U.S. Patent No. 5,946,647 (“the '647 Patent”); (3) U.S. Patent No. 8,046,721 (“the '721 Patent”); and (4) U.S. Patent No. 8,074,172 (“the '172 Patent”). The Court held a hearing on this motion on June 7, 2012. Having considered the parties’ submissions, argument, and the relevant law, and for the reasons discussed herein, Apple’s motion to preliminarily enjoin the Galaxy Nexus is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Both in the United States and globally, Apple and Samsung have established themselves as fierce competitors in the smartphone market and fierce adversaries in the courtroom. This particular lawsuit, filed by Apple against Samsung on February 8, 2012, is but one action in a worldwide constellation of litigation between the two companies. See Compl., ECF No. 1; Joint Case Management Statement 8-10, Apr. 25, 2012, ECF No. 141 at 8-10 (identifying over 40 related cases between the parties); Mot. at 6. Indeed, this Court is presiding over another lawsuit, Apple v. Samsung (“Apple I”), No. 11-cv-01846 (N.D.Cal. filed Apr. 15, 2011), in which Apple previously moved to preliminarily enjoin three earlier Samsung smartphone models (Samsung’s Galaxy S 4G, Infuse 4G, and Droid Charge), as well as the Samsung Galaxy Tab 10.1 tablet, based on alleged infringement of various Apple design and utility patents. In a May 14, 2011 ruling, the Federal Circuit affirmed this Court’s denial of Apple’s motion to enjoin the three smartphones, but vacated the portion of the Court’s decision regarding the Samsung Galaxy Tab 10.1 tablet, and remanded for further proceedings. See Apple v. Samsung, 678 F.3d 1314 (Fed.Cir.2012). Samsung petitioned for rehearing and rehearing en banc, which was denied on June 19, 2012. On remand, the Court granted the motion for a preliminary injunction on June 26, 2012.

The instant preliminary injunction motion, filed alongside the Complaint on February 8, 2012, seeks to enjoin Samsung’s Galaxy Nexus smartphone, which was released in the U.S. in December 2011. Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. Prelim. Inj. (“Opp’n”) at 2. At the time this motion was briefed, the Galaxy Nexus was the latest in Samsung’s Galaxy line of Android-based smart-phones, the first of which was released in 2009. Opp’n at 2; Decl. of Christopher Vellturo (“Vellturo Decl.”) ¶9 & Ex. 19. Android is a free, open-source mobile software platform developed by Google, Inc. (“Google”) that any developer can use to create applications for mobile devices, and that any handset manufacturer can install on a device. Opp’n at 2. Galaxy Nexus is the first smartphone to run Android version 4.0, an operating system called “Ice Cream Sandwich,” and is the first Android smartphone that will allow the phone to be interoperable with other Android-based devices, including those running the Ice Cream Sandwich operating system. Vellturo Decl. ¶ 9. The version of Ice Cream Sandwich installed on the Galaxy Nexus is designed by Google. Decl. of Sangbong Lee (“Sangbong Lee Decl.”) ¶¶ 3-4.

Apple accuses the Galaxy Nexus of infringing four patents: (1) the '604 Patent, titled “Universal Interface for Retrieval of Information in a Computer System,” which generally describes a “unified search” feature; (2) the '647 Patent, titled “System and Method for Performing an Action on a Structure in Computer-Generated Data,” which generally describes a “links for structures” feature; (3) the '721 Patent, titled “Unlocking a Device by Performing Gestures on an Unlock Image,” which generally describes a “slide to unlock” feature; and (4) the '172 Patent, titled “Method, System, and Graphical User Interface for Providing Word Recommendations,” which generally describes a “word recommendations” or “auto correct” feature.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Although the Patent Act authorizes district courts to grant injunctions to prevent the infringement of patent rights, the owner of a valid and infringed patent is not entitled to an injunction as a matter of right. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006) (a federal court “may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable” (emphases added)); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391-92, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006). Rather, “the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts,” and “such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity.” eBay, 547 U.S. at 394, 126 S.Ct. 1837. The rule enunciated in eBay is as applicable to preliminary injunctions as it is to permanent injunctions. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n. 12, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987) (“The standard for a preliminary injunction is essentially the same as for a permanent injunction with the exception that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits rather than actual success.”). Therefore, “[t]he grant or denial of a preliminary injunction under 35 U.S.C. § 283 is within the sound discretion of the district court.” Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed.Cir.2006) (citing Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, 239 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed.Cir.2001)).

In light of the longstanding principles of equity that govern any request for injunctive relief, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that: (1) it is likely to succeed on the merits of the underlying litigation; (2) it is likely to suffer immediate, irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities weighs in its favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008); Abbott Labs., 452 F.3d at 1334 (citing Polymer Techs., Inc. v. Bridwell, 103 F.3d 970, 973 (Fed.Cir.1996)). “[N]o one factor, taken individually, is necessarily dispositive.” Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 951, 953 (Fed.Cir.1990). Rather, “the district court must weigh and measure each factor against the other factors and against the form and magnitude of the relief requested.” Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 (Fed.Cir.1988). Both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have cautioned that because a preliminary injunction is granted before the defendant has had an opportunity to fully defend itself at trial, “a preliminary injunction is a drastic and extraordinary remedy that is not to be routinely granted.” Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed.Cir.1998) (citing Nutrition 21 v. United States, 930 F.2d 867, 869 (Fed.Cir.1991); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Grip-Pak, 906 F.2d 679, 683 (Fed.Cir.1990)); see Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 171 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008) (“A preliminary injunction is an ‘extraordinary and drastic remedy’ ” that “is never awarded as of right.”) (quoting 11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948, at 129 (2d ed.1995)). Indeed, “a preliminary injunction ... should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972, 117 S.Ct. 1865, 138 L.Ed.2d 162 (1997) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Winter, 555 U.S. at 22, 129 S.Ct. 365.

To establish a likelihood of success on the merits of its patent infringement claims, Apple must show that it will likely prove at trial that the Galaxy Nexus infringes “one or more claims of the patents-in-suit,” and must furthermore show that “at least one of those same allegedly infringed claims will also likely withstand the validity challenges presented” by Samsung. Amazon.com, 239 F.3d at 1351; accord Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed.Cir.2009). In assessing whether Apple has shown a likelihood of success on the merits, the Court views the evidence “in light of the burdens and presumptions that will inhere at trial.” Titan Tire, 566 F.3d at 1376 (citing Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 429, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006)). Thus, with respect to infringement, Apple bears the burden of showing that it will likely prove at trial “by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more claims of the patent[s] read on the accused device literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.” Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1310 (Fed.Cir.2005); see also SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1123 (Fed.Cir.1985) (en banc). The parties’ burdens with respect to validity are somewhat different. Because a patent enjoys the same presumption of validity during preliminary injunction proceedings as it does at other stages of litigation, the initial burden of production is on Samsung, the alleged infringer, to come forward with evidence of invalidity. Titan Tire, 566 F.3d at 1377. If Samsung successfully does so, then Apple “has the burden of responding with contrary evidence, which of course may include analysis and argument,” and “persuading] the court that, despite the challenge presented to validity, [Apple] nevertheless is likely to succeed at trial on the validity issue.” Id. If, “after weighting] the evidence both for and against validity that is available at this preliminary stage in the proceedings ... the trial court concludes there is a ‘substantial question’ concerning the validity of the patent, ... it necessarily follows that the patentee has not succeeded in showing it is likely to succeed at trial on the merits of the validity issue.” Id. at 1379. In other words, “[a] preliminary injunction should not issue if an alleged infringer raises a substantial question regarding either infringement or validity, i.e., the alleged infringer asserts an infringement or invalidity defense that the patentee has not shown lacks substantial merit.” AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 633 F.3d 1042, 1050 (Fed.Cir.2010).

III. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

Samsung moves to strike the Reply Declaration of Dr. Christopher Vellturo (“Vellturo Reply Decl.”). See ECF No. 196. Samsung argues that this is new evidence that exceeds the scope of permissible rebuttal of Samsung’s opposition, and furthermore that Apple failed to timely produce Dr. Vellturo for deposition. Id. at 2-3. Apple responds that: (1) Samsung’s objection is untimely under Civil Local Rule 7-3(d)(1); (2) Dr. Vellturo’s Reply Declaration is responsive to Samsung’s arguments in opposition, and the attached exhibits are largely Samsung documents produced during discovery; and (3) Samsung could have sought an earlier deposition date for Dr. Vellturo but instead delayed, and in any event Samsung has been at least equally uncooperative in producing its witnesses for deposition. See ECF No. 200 at 1-3.

As a general rule, new evidence presented in reply should not be considered without giving the non-movant an opportunity to respond. See Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir.1996) (“[W]here new evidence is presented in a reply to a motion for summary judgment, the district court should not consider the new evidence without giving the non-movant an opportunity to respond.” (alteration and citation omitted)). After reviewing the declarations, evidence, and arguments at issue in Samsung’s objections, however, the Court finds that the evidence presented by Apple in Dr. Vellturo’s Reply Declaration is not “new,” but rather appropriately responsive to arguments and evidence raised by Samsung in its opposition papers, in particular. In particular, the evidence is offered in rebuttal to Samsung’s argument that Apple is unlikely to be irreparably harmed absent an injunction. Moreover, the vast majority of exhibits attached to the Vellturo Reply Declaration are Samsung’s own documents, which were produced during discovery. Accordingly, Samsung’s objection is OVERRULED.

On June 1, 2012, and June 4, 2012, without seeking leave of the Court, Samsung filed two additional declarations in support of its opposition to Apple’s motion for a preliminary injunction. See ECF Nos. 195, 198. Apple objects to these two submissions as untimely and in violation of Civil Local. Rule 7-3(d), which prohibits the filing of “additional memoranda, papers or letters” after a reply is filed, absent leave of the Court. See ECF No. 206 at 1. Because Samsung filed these two untimely declarations without leave of the Court, Apple’s objection is SUSTAINED.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

To establish a likelihood of success on the merits, “a patentee ... ‘must demonstrate that it will likely prove infringement of one or more claims of the patents-in-suit, and that at least one of those same allegedly infringed claims will also likely withstand the validity challenges presented by the accused infringer.’ ” AstraZeneca, 633 F.3d at 1050 (quoting Amazon.com, 239 F.3d at 1351). For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that Apple has shown that the '604 Patent, '647 Patent, '721 Patent, and '172 Patent are likely valid and infringed.

1. U.S. Patent No. 8,086,604 (Unified Search)

U.S. Patent No. 8,086,604 (“the '604 Patent”), entitled “Universal Interface for Retrieval of Information in a Computer System,” was filed on December 1, 2004, and issued to Apple on December 27, 2011, as a continuation of U.S. Patent No. 6,847,959, which was filed on January 5, 2000. '604 Patent; Decl. of Dr. Nathaniel Polish Concerning U.S. Patent No. 8,086,604 (“Polish Decl.”) ¶ 38.

The '604 Patent is directed to a universal computer interface that allows a user quickly to retrieve different types of desired information located on any of the various storage media accessible to the user’s computer system, including both the computer’s hard drive and the Internet, using a single, unified search interface. More specifically, the '604 Patent is directed to “a universal interface which uses a plurality of heuristic algorithms to identify an item of information (e.g., document, application or Internet web page) in response to at least one information descriptor.” '604 Patent 1:18-21.

The invention disclosed in the '604 Patent overcomes two different problems in the prior art, both relating to a computer user’s need to quickly search for desired information. First, prior art did not provide for a single interface allowing a computer user to search for desired information across different types of information storage systems. Id. at 2:9-13. For example, some computer operating systems provided interfaces for searching for files stored locally on a computer. Meanwhile, web browser applications enabled a user to utilize search engines provided by various websites. However, there had been no combination of desktop find routines that presented a single interface allowing a user to search simultaneously across different types of information storage systems. See id. Thus, a user had to access a different interface to search for different types of information depending on that information’s stored location.

Second, the prior art lacked sufficient search criteria to effectively filter information available, often yielding long and cumbersome keyword-based search results. Id. at 1:40-45; id. at 1:60-2:4. The inventors of the '604 Patent identified a need for technology that “allows the computer to help the user determine such additional criteria or to automatically provide additional criteria, so that search results have a higher percentage of items that are of interest to the user.” Id. at 2:1-4. Prior to the '604 Patent, “there [had been] no program which [was] able to process the user’s input and then determine, using many different factors, including use of the Internet, the intent of the user as to the file to be retrieved.” Id. at 2:14-17. To that end, the '604 Patent is directed to a universal computer interface that employs a plurality of “heuristic algorithms” to help filter the user’s searches across multiple information storage systems and to display only the most relevant search results, thereby making a user’s search more efficient and personalized.

In one preferred embodiment, the '604 system relies on a “retrieval manager” component that receives search terms from the user, either in the form of text or speech, and dispatches that input to a plurality of “plug-in modules.” See id. at 4:1-12 & Fig. 2. Each of these modules has an associated heuristic search algorithm, which the module employs to locate information within the module’s respective area of search that is responsive to the user’s input. See id. at 4:24-25. For instance, one module may be configured to search the titles of local documents that pertain to the search terms. Another module may be configured to index and search the contents of locally stored files for relevant matches. A third module may search a list of the most recently accessed files, applications, and web sites. A fourth module may employ a search engine to locate Internet web pages whose content matches the user’s search terms. See id. at 4:15-23. The results from the modules are returned to the retrieval manager, which in turn presents the results to the user, potentially after employing an additional heuristic to determine which results are most relevant. See id. at 4:26-30. The '604 system enables searching to occur on portions of the user’s input as they are received, potentially returning relevant results before the user has entered the complete search terms. See id. at 6:55-7:5; id. at 10:17-22.

Apple accuses Samsung’s Galaxy Nexus phones of infringing claims 6 and 19 of the '604 Patent by enabling a user to perform searches across multiple information sources, using a variety of heuristic algorithms, with a single interface. The accused feature in the Galaxy Nexus is the Google Quick Search Box (“QSB”). Polish Decl. ¶¶ 13, 49-76; id. Ex. 3. Claim 6 of the '604 Patent recites:

An apparatus for locating information in a network, comprising:

an interface module configured to receive an inputted information descriptor from a user-input device;

a plurality of heuristic modules configured to search for information that corresponds to the received information descriptor, wherein:

each heuristic module corresponds to a respective area of search and employs a different, predetermined heuristic algorithm corresponding to said respective area, and

the search areas include storage media accessible by the apparatus; and

a display module configured to display one or more candidate items of information located by the plurality of heuristic modules on a display device.

'604 Patent 8:26-41. Claim 19 of the '604 Patent recites:

The apparatus of claim 6, wherein the interface module is configured to receive portions of the information descriptor as the portions are being inputted, and

wherein the heuristic modules are configured to search for information that corresponds to the portions of the information descriptor as the portions are being received.

Id. at 10:17-22. The '604 Patent has not previously been asserted in any litigation, nor has it been previously construed by any court or adjudicator. Polish Deck ¶ 48.

a. Infringement

Determining patent infringement involves a two-step process. Claim construction is the first step, wherein the court resolves any disputes regarding the meaning and scope of the claim terms, “and when necessary [explains] what the patentee covered by the claims, for use in the determination of infringement.” U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed.Cir.1997). Claim construction is a question of law to be determined by the court. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). In the second step, the trier of fact must “determine[ ] whether every claim limitation, or its equivalent, is found in the accused device.” Roche Palo Alto LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed.Cir.2008) (citation omitted).

i. Claim Construction

Here, the parties disagree as to the meaning of two claim terms that appear in claims 6 and 19: (1) “each” of a plurality of heuristic modules; and (2) “heuristic algorithm.” Where the parties dispute the scope of a claim term, the court has a duty to construe the term. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1361-62 (Fed.Cir.2008). A claim term is generally given its “ordinary and customary meaning,” that is, “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed.Cir.2005) (en banc). In construing disputed terms, the court looks first to the claims themselves, read in context, for “[i]t is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’ ” Id. at 1312 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed.Cir.2004)). Importantly, however, “the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id. at 1313; see also Markman, 52 F.3d at 979 (claims must be read “in view of the specification, of which they are a part”). Because the specification must contain a description of the invention sufficiently clear “to teach and enable those of skill in the art to make and use the invention,” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323, the specification is “ ‘always highly relevant’ ” and “ ‘[u]sually [ ] dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term,’ ” id. at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996)); accord Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed.Cir.2011).

The court should also consider, if it is in evidence, the patent’s prosecution history, which consists of the complete record of proceedings before the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) and includes the prior art references cited during the examination. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. Although the prosecution history is generally less useful than the specification for claim construction, the prosecution history nevertheless “can often inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it otherwise would be.” Id. (internal citations omitted). For example, “where the patentee has unequivocally disavowed a certain meaning to obtain his patent, the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer attaches and narrows the ordinary meaning of the claim congruent with the scope of the surrender.” Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2003).

Finally, the court is also authorized to consider extrinsic evidence in construing claims, such as “expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. While the court may look to sources extrinsic to the patent and prosecution history, such evidence is considered “less significant than the intrinsic record” and “less reliable than the patent and its prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317-18 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, while extrinsic evidence may be useful in claim construction, ultimately “it is unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of patent claim scope unless considered in the context of the intrinsic evidence.” Id. at 1319. Any expert testimony “ ‘that is clearly at odds with the claim construction mandated by the claims themselves, the written description, and the prosecution history’ ” will be significantly discounted. Id. at 1318 (quoting Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed.Cir.1998)).

(a) “each” of a plurality of heuristic modules

The parties disagree as to the scope of the limitation that the apparatus must comprise “a plurality of heuristic modules ... wherein: each heuristic module corresponds to a respective area of search and employs a different, predetermined heuristic algorithm,” which appears in independent claim 6 and, by incorporation, dependent claim 19 of the '604 Patent. '604 Patent 8:30-35; see id. at 10:17-22. Samsung argues that this claim limitation should be construed as requiring that, “however many heuristic modules there are, each one must use a different algorithm,” i.e., “every algorithm must be different.” Opp’n at 9 (citing Deck of Dr. Jaime Carbonell (“Carbonell Deck”) ¶ 98); id. at 10. Under Samsung’s proposed construction, the limitation is satisfied only if every heuristic module employs a different heuristic search algorithm from the other modules. Id.

Apple, by contrast, rejects the notion that “each” in this context means “every.” Instead, Apple argues that the term “each” must be read in reference to the preceding phrase, “a plurality of heuristic modules,” such that the claim requires only that each of a plurality of heuristic modules (i.e., at least two) uses a different heuristic algorithm. Under Apple’s proposed construction, the limitation is satisfied so long as “each of at least two modules (i.e., a plurality) employs a different algorithm, regardless of what additional ones do.” Pl.’s Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. Prelim. Inj. (“Reply”) at 2.

Applying the basic principles of claim construction described above to this disputed claim term, the Court concludes that the claim language and specification support Apple’s proposed construction, and that Samsung has pointed to no prosecution-disclaimer or other evidence that warrants a contrary construction. The claim language recites an apparatus comprising, among other things, “a plurality of heuristic modules.” '604 Patent 8:26-30. The term “plurality” means “at least two.” ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 346 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed.Cir.2003); see York Prods., Inc. v. Cent. Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1996) (“The term means, simply ‘the state of being plural.’ ”). Claim 6 imposes a further limitation on the “plurality of heuristic modules,” requiring that “each heuristic module ... employs a different, predetermined heuristic algorithm.” Id. 8:33-35. Thus, the claim language supports Apple’s argument that the “each” requirement modifies “plurality of heuristic modules.” Consistent with Federal Circuit precedent, “each” of “a plurality of heuristic modules” means “each of at least two modules,” not “each of every module.” See ResQNet, 346 F.3d at 1382 (construing “each of a plurality of fields” to mean “each of at least two fields,” not “every field”).

Furthermore, “comprising” indicates an open-ended transition term that “is well understood to mean ‘including but not limited to.’ ” CIAS Inc. v. Alliance Gaming Corp., 504 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed.Cir.2007). The use of the term “comprising” in claim 6 signifies that the claim “ ‘does not exclude additional, unrecited elements or method steps.’ ” Id. (quoting Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1327-28 (Fed.Cir.1999)). Thus, the Court agrees with Apple that the presence of additional, identical heuristic algorithms, beyond the required two different heuristic algorithms, does not remove an accused device from the scope of the '604 Patent. In light of the plaili meaning of “each” as used in claim 6, the Court finds inapposite Samsung’s citation to Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 264 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2001), for the proposition that the accused device cannot include additional elements inconsistent with the claim limitations. See Opp’n at 12. Here, the presence of additional, non-unique heuristic algorithms beyond the requisite two different ones is not inconsistent with the limitations of claim 6, because claim 6 requires only that “each of at least two” heuristic modules employ different heuristic algorithms, not that “every” heuristic module employ a different heuristic algorithm.

Samsung argues that the specification does, in fact, support its proposed construction, pointing to a disclosed embodiment wherein “[t]he heuristic of each plug-in module is different.” '604 Patent 5:13-14. The Court disagrees. It is a well-established principle of claim construction that “[w]hen consulting the specification to clarify the meaning of claim terms, courts must not import limitations into the claims from the specification.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2010) (citing Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed.Cir.2009)). Courts must not limit the broader claim language to a disclosed preferred embodiment “unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope using ‘words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.’ ” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed.Cir.2002)). Here, Apple has manifested no clear intention to limit the claim scope to the second embodiment disclosed in the specification. To the contrary, the specification elsewhere describes an embodiment comprised of “a plurality of plug-in modules 221-22n,” wherein “[e]ach plug-in module has an associated heuristic which it employs to locate information that corresponds to the user input.” '604 Patent 4:12-15 (emphasis added). Had the inventors intended to require not simply an associated heuristic, but a different heuristic algorithm for every plug-in module, they knew how to and would have so specified. Indeed, Apple’s statements during prosecution of the '604 Patent confirm that the portion of the specification on which Samsung focuses is but “one embodiment,” and not an exhaustive or delimiting description of the claim scope. See Carbonell Decl. Ex. EE [Oct. 23, 2007 Remarks] at 11 (Apple describing the invention as disclosing “a plurality of plug-in modules 221-22n, each plug-in module having an associated heuristic algorithm ...,” and then explaining that “[i]n one embodiment, the heuristic algorithm of each plug-in module is different”).

Finally, Samsung has cited nothing from the prosecution history that contradicts the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim term, as analyzed above, or that otherwise supports Samsung’s position. Samsung relies on two Federal Circuit cases, In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262 (Fed.Cir.2009), and Board of Regents v. BENQ America Corp., 533 F.3d 1362 (Fed.Cir.2008), but both cases are readily distinguishable. In In re Skvorecz, the Federal Circuit reversed an anticipation rejection by the PTO upon finding that the applicant had argued for a narrow claim scope, requiring “each wire leg” of a wire chafing stand to have a laterally displacing offset. 580 F.3d at 1267-68. In Board of Regents, the prosecution history narrowly defined the claim term “each- preprogrammed code” in order to overcome anticipation by the prior art. 533 F.3d at 1373. The Federal Circuit held that the Board could not then “rely on the word ‘comprising’ to broaden the scope of a claim phrase that was limited during prosecution so as to gain allowance of the patent.” Id.

Here, by contrast, Samsung has adduced no evidence that Apple argued for a narrow claim scope during prosecution that would preclude the broad construction apparent on the face of the patent. Samsung argued at the June 7, 2012 hearing that Apple distinguished U.S. Patent No. 7,020,670 to Andreoli, et al. (“Andreoli”) during prosecution on the basis of the “each” limitation. June 7, 2012 Hr’g Tr. (“Tr.”) at 27:12-28:2. Samsung points to an excerpt from Apple’s response to an Office Action dated July 23, 2007, in which Apple argued to the PTO that “Andreoli does not describe, however, that each of the local and remote search operations employ a different heuristic algorithm to search an associated relevant area of search for information that corresponds to the search request, in accordance with amended claim 1.” Carbonell Decl. Ex. EE [Oct. 23, 2007 Remarks] at 13. The following sentence, however, provides the context for Apple’s prosecution statement: “That is, the algorithms described in Andreoli and referenced by the Office go to the formation of the search request and not to how the local and remote search operations employed by the processor perform a search of the repositories on the network.” Id. This contextual sentence, as well as the context provided by Apple’s other comments in response to various Office Actions, in which Apple discusses at length Andreoli’s failure to disclose a plurality of heuristic as opposed to merely logical algorithms, makes clear that Apple was not distinguishing Andreoli based on the narrow construction of “each” that Samsung advocates. See generally Carbonell Decl. Ex. EE. Thus, as in ResQNet, “[the] prosecution record evinces no ‘clear and unmistakable’ disavowal of claim scope that would compel a result different than the claim language.” ResQNet, 346 F.3d at 1383 (citing Omega Eng’g, 334 F.3d at 1326).

Accordingly, this Court construes “a plurality of heuristic modules ... wherein: each” in claim 6 and dependent claim 19 of the '604 Patent to mean “each of at least two heuristic modules” and not “each of every heuristic module.”

(b) “heuristic algorithm”

Although the parties do not specifically brief claim construction of the terms “heuristic” or “heuristic algorithm,” which.appear in claim 6 and, by incorporation, dependent claim 19, Samsung insists that the parties’ understanding of this important claim term diverges and that construction is therefore necessary. Samsung argues that a “heuristic” “has to be based on some human judgment or human knowledge.” Tr. at 30:14-15. Thus, under Samsung’s proposed construction, a “heuristic algorithm” is “limited to algorithms that employ a ‘rule of thumb’ or some prior specific human knowledge, or one of several items of human judgment embedded in the algorithm.” Carbonell Decl. ¶ 84. Apple has been less than clear as to how, exactly, it defines “heuristic.” Apple’s expert Dr. Nathaniel Polish (“Dr. Polish”) does not set forth a claim construction analysis, but he at times appears to use the term as meaning something that “attempt[s] to get the searcher what she is looking for within [its] particular area of search.” Reply Decl. of Dr. Nathaniel Polish (“Polish Reply Deck”) ¶ 43; but see Deck of Daniel C. Posner (“Posner Deck”) Ex. 3 [Polish Dep.] at 50:7-24 (explaining that he applied an understanding of “heuristic algorithm” as “a rule of thumb or an algorithm that would give you a result that would help you towards your answer”). When pressed at the hearing for its proposed construction of “heuristic,” Apple responded that it is “a rule of thumb ... it’s a best guess of what the result is.” Tr. at 32:4-8; see also id. at 35:3-5 (defining a “heuristic algorithm” as “an algorithm that is designed to provide the best guess, based on the information, of what the user is looking for”). To the extent the parties appear to disagree as to the scope of this claim term, the Court has a duty to construe it. See O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1361-62.

The term “heuristic algorithm” appears frequently throughout the claim terms and the remainder of the specification. Claim 6 recites: “a plurality of heuristic modules configured to search for information that corresponds to the received information descriptor, wherein: each heuristic module corresponds to a respective area of search and employs a different, predetermined heuristic algorithm corresponding to said respective area.” '604 Patent 8:30-35. It is a bedrock principle of claim construction that “[c]laims must be ‘interpreted with an eye toward giving effect to all terms in the claim.’ ” Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP, 616 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed.Cir.2010) (quoting Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 950 (Fed.Cir.2006)). Applying that principle to claim 6, it is apparent that “heuristic module” and “heuristic algorithm” correspond to different requirements. Thus, to the extent Apple implies that any search algorithm employed within a respective area of search is heuristic simply by virtue of its association with a corresponding “heuristic module,” the Court declines to adopt a construction of “heuristic algorithm” that would render the “heuristic” modifier superfluous. See id.; Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, Inc., 214 F.3d 1302, 1305-07 (Fed.Cir.2000) (refusing to adopt a claim construction that would render claim language superfluous). In other words, a module is not “heuristic” simply because it employs a “heuristic algorithm,” nor is an algorithm “heuristic” simply because it is employed by a “heuristic module.”

However, the Court is still left with the task of construing “heuristic algorithm.” The specification is not particularly illuminating in this regard. In the Detailed Description of the Invention, the inventors describe their invention as “a universal interface in which user inputs are received and provided to a plurality of separate heuristic algorithms to locate at least one item of information.” '604 Patent 3:26-29. The specification goes on to explain that an information retrieval manager dispatches the user input to a plurality of plug-in modules, each of which has an associated heuristic for searching within its respective search area. Id. at 4:11-15, 4:24-25. Once the modules have obtained search results responsive to the user input, the modules send the results back to the retrieval manager, which may then employ additional global heuristics to determine what results to provide to the user. See id. at 3:26-30, 5:54-56. Although the specification refers frequently to the use of “heuristics” to conduct the searches within each module’s search area, the specification does not provide further explanation as to how “heuristics” is defined.

The Court therefore turns next to the file history. During prosecution of the '604 Patent, there were five sets of amendments to claim 6. See Carbonell Decl. Ex. EE. Of particular importance are Apple’s arguments to the Examiner that prior art U.S. Patent No. 7,020,670 to Andreoli et al. (“Andreoli”) does not anticipate because Andreoli fails to disclose a plurality of modules, each of which employs a “different heuristic algorithm.” See generally Carbonell Decl. Ex. EE. In response to the Office Action dated July 23, 2007 rejecting all then-pending claims, Apple distinguished Andreoli based on Andreoli’s use of logical, “constraint satisfaction algorithm[s],” rather than heuristic algorithms. Carbonell Decl. Ex. EE [Oct. 23, 2007 Remarks] at 13. Apple clearly disavowed Andreoli’s way of processing search requests, namely “formulating the requests using logic as a common language. In particular, Andreoli describes using logic fragments, called ‘feature constraints,’ and efficient constraint solving algorithms.” Id. Ex. EE [Oct. 23, 2007 Remarks] at 12-13 (citation omitted). In response to an Office Action dated January 25, 2008, rejecting all then-pending claims, Apple again emphasized the use of different heuristic algorithms and argued that the algorithms disclosed in Andreoli differed only logically, not heuristieally:

[Constraint satisfaction algorithms used by the brokers are based on the same search request and feature constraints. But these algorithms only logically differ from one another — not heuristieally. As such, each broker does not employ “a different heuristic algorithm” for each repository searched. Therefore, Andreoli does not teach or suggest Applicant’s claimed “plurality of heuristic modules ... employing] a different heuristic algorithm corresponding to said respective area to search.”

Carbonell Decl. Ex. EE [Apr. 23, 2008 Remarks] at 8 (second alteration in original) (emphases omitted). In light of Apple’s assertion that Andreoli does not anticipate because its method is based on “ ‘classical logic’ in which constraints are ‘algorithmically decidable,’ ” the Court cannot adopt a construction of “heuristic algorithm” that would encompass purely constraint satisfaction algorithms. See Carbonell Decl. Ex. EE [December 11, 2008 Remarks] at 10-11.

Beyond that narrow distinction, however, it appears that Apple advocated for, and the Examiner accepted, a broad construction of the term “heuristic algorithm.” In support of a broad meaning, Apple offered a variety of dictionary definitions of “heuristic,” which “include, for example, ‘using or arrived at by a process of trial and error rather than set rules,’ ‘used to describe a computer program that can modify itself in response to the user,’ and ‘a helpful procedure for arriving at a solution but not necessarily a proof.’ ” Id. (citing Microsoft Corporation, Encarta World English Dictionary (1999)) (emphasis in original). Apple also argued to the examiner that:

a “heuristic” is [a] “‘rule of thumb,’ based on domain knowledge from a particular application, that gives guidance in the solution of a problem. Unlike algorithms, heuristics cannot have proven performance bounds owing to their open-ended dependence on specific application knowledge; an example is ‘if the sky is cloudy then carry an umbrella.’ Heuristics may thus be very valuable most of the time but their results or performance cannot be guaranteed.”

Id. (citing John Dantith, A Dictionary of Computing (2004)). Ordinarily, “the rule that a court will give a claim term the full range of its ordinary meaning does not mean that the term will presumptively receive its broadest dictionary definition or the aggregate of multiple dictionary definitions.” Free Motion Fitness, Inc. v. Cybex Int'l Inc., 423 F.3d 1343, 1348-49 (Fed.Cir.2005) (internal citations omitted). Nonetheless, the dictionary definitions offered here are not extrinsic evidence but rather are part of the intrinsic record. Thus, Apple’s reliance on broad dictionary definitions, even while distinguishing the '604 Patented invention from Andreoli, carries considerable weight.

Although Samsung argues that a heuristic algorithm may require “some pri- or specific human knowledge, or one of several items of human judgment embedded in the algorithm,” Carbonell Decl. ¶ 84, the Court finds no support for this construction in the intrinsic record or otherwise. Given that both parties appear to agree that a heuristic algorithm is one that employs a “rule of thumb,” for purposes of ruling on the pending motion, the Court construes “heuristic algorithm” to mean “a search algorithm that employs some ‘rule of thumb’ and does not consist solely of constraint satisfaction parameters.”

ii. Literal Infringement

Having determined the scope of the asserted patent claims, the Court must next determine whether the claims read on the accused product. To prove infringement, Apple points to a screen capture of the Google Quick Search Box on the Galaxy Nexus where, upon entry of a search term, the user is presented with search results from a number of different search areas, including the Internet, contacts stored on the phone, and recently visited websites. Mot. at 13. In support of its claim of infringement, Apple produces the declaration of its expert, Dr. Polish, who opines that the Quick Search Box satisfies every limitation of and thus infringes claims 6 and 19 of the '604 Patent. Polish Deck ¶¶ 13, 49-76; id. Ex. 3; see Polish Reply Deck ¶¶ 30-57. The parties dispute only whether the Quick Search Box satisfies the following limitation: that the apparatus contain “a plurality of heuristic modules ... wherein: each heuristic module corresponds to a respective area of search and employs a different, predetermined heuristic algorithm corresponding to said respective area.” '604 Patent 8:30-35; see Opp’n at 11-12.

Because the Court adopts Apple’s construction of the claim term “each,” the Court rejects Samsung’s argument that the Quick Search Box does not infringe because Apple failed to analyze five of the eight search modules. See Opp’n at 12. For the same reason, Samsung’s argument that five of the eight search modules on the Quick Search Box (ApplieationsProvider, Books, Browser, Music, and Videos) [Redacted], and therefore all use the same algorithm, is unavailing. See Opp’n at 13 (citing Deck of Bjorn Bringert (“Bringert Deck”) ¶ 7). Under the Court’s construction of “each,” the Quick Search Box feature can infringe claims 6 and 19 of the '604 Patent so long as at least two heuristic modules each employ a different heuristic algorithm, even if other heuristic modules employ non-unique heuristic algorithms. Thus, Samsung’s only remaining non-infringement argument is that Apple has failed to identify even two different “heuristic algorithms” corresponding to two different heuristic modules.

Apple’s expert Dr. Nathaniel Polish identifies eight different default search areas of-the Quick Search Box that he asserts are the requisite “heuristic modules”: (1) Google: Google Search suggestions; (2) Apps: Names of installed applications; (3) Books: Books in your library; (4) Browser: Bookmarks and web history; (5) Messaging: Text in your message; (6) Music: Artists, albums and tracks; (7) People: Names of your contacts; and (8) Videos: Rented movies. See Polish Deck ¶ 61. Dr. Polish’s infringement analysis focuses on only three of these eight modules: (1) Google search; (2) People; and (3) Browser history. Dr. Polish asserts that these three search modules satisfy the disputed limitation of claim 6 because they “map exactly to the examples in the patent specification.” Polish Reply Deck ¶ 21; see also Polish Deck ¶ 66. Specifically, Apple asserts that “the Browser module ... implements the heuristic module described in the patent specification as ‘[a] third module 223 [that] can maintain a list of the files, applications and web sites which were most recently accessed, and search this list for a match.’ The People module ... implements the heuristic module described in the patent specification as ‘[a] second module 222 [that] may index and search the contents of files on the local and/or network storage volumes.’ Lastly, the Google module ... implements the heuristic module described in the patent specification as, [y]et another module [that] might employ a search engine to locate Internet web pages which match the user input.’ ” Polish Reply Decl. ¶ 22 (alterations in original) (quoting '604 Patent 4:17-23). Apple further asserts that the Galaxy Nexus infringes every element of claim 19 of the '604 Patent because the Quick Search Box begins to provide search results as the user’s information descriptor is incrementally inputted. See Polish Deck ¶ 76.

The Court agrees with Samsung that Apple cannot rely on the mere fact that, for example, the Browser module “can maintain a list of the files, applications and web sites which were most recently accessed, and search this list for a match.” Polish Reply Deck ¶ 22. As discussed above in the Court’s claim construction analysis, the sheer fact that the Browser module “searches] this list for a match” reveals nothing about how it searches, i.e., whether it searches heuristically or not. As Apple’s own expert admits, it is possible to search a “heuristic module” in a non-heuristic manner. See Posner Deck Ex. E [Polish Dep.] at 106:19-25. Samsung argues that, even as to the three modules Dr. Polish analyzed, Dr. Polish failed to identify that any of them employed heuristic algorithms, and he failed to identify any differences between the algorithms employed. See Carbonell Deck ¶¶ 99-108. The Court therefore considers the infringement evidence presented by both parties with respect to each of the three modules in dispute.

With respect to the “Google” search module, Apple’s expert Dr. Polish asserts that the Google Search Suggestions module utilizes-the Google search engine to generate results, and that the Google search module employs a different, predetermined heuristic algorithm than the one employed by the People or Browser modules. Polish Deck ¶¶ 65-66. Samsung’s expert Dr. Carbonell effectively conceded during his deposition that the Google and People modules use different algorithms. Dr. Carbonell explained that, although he had not seen the algorithm internal to the Google search module because such code is proprietary to Google, he “believe[d]” that the Google and People modules employed different algorithms “because the people list of contacts is much smaller and more restricted [than the Google module].” Polish Reply Deck Ex. 2 [Carbonell Dep.] at 138:20-139:8.

Apple’s burden, however, is to establish that the Google and People search algorithms are not only different, but different and heuristic. In support of its assertion that the Google module employs a heuristic algorithm, Apple points to various excerpts from Dr. Carbonell’s deposition that Apple views as conceding as much, claiming that “Dr. Carbonell testified that Internet search engine results are heuristic.” Polish Reply Deck ¶ 52. While Apple’s characterization of Dr. Carbonell’s testimony appears compelling on its face, it misconstrues the factual record. The relevant portion of Dr. Carbonell’s testimony concerns only the algorithms employed by AltaVista, Lycos, and Yahoo! in the 1990s. Polish Reply Deck Ex. 2 at 251:10-22. Moreover, Samsung’s expert does not opine on whether the Google search module employs a heuristic algorithm, and during his deposition, he refused to comment on the algorithm employed by Google due to his lack of personal knowledge. See Carbonell Deck ¶ 106; Polish Reply Deck Ex. 2 [Carbonell Dep.] at 136:10-137:1. The source code used by the remote Google servers to generate responses is “proprietary to Google and kept confidential; it is not part of Ice Cream Sandwich and it is not available in the Android Open Source Project,” which perhaps explains why neither party’s expert was able to analyze the Google search engine source code for purposes of this motion. Bringert Decl. ¶ 6.

While one could perhaps infer that the Google search engine likewise employs heuristics from Dr. Carbonell’s testimony about the heuristic mechanisms of other Internet search engines in the 1990s, Apple has offered no corroborating evidence that would raise such an inference above the level of mere speculation. Neither Samsung’s expert nor Apple has established any relationship between the search algorithms used in AltaVista, Lycos, and Yahoo! in the 1990s, and the search algorithm used in the Google search engine today. Apple’s own expert offers no testimony based on personal knowledge of Google’s search engine, nor does he even offer testimony on search engines generally from which an inference about Google’s search algorithms could be drawn. See Posner Decl. Ex. E at 111:15-20 (“Q: Do you know what the algorithm is that corresponds to the search area of Google Search suggestions? A: I’d have to look at the code. Sitting here, I can’t — I can’t lay out for you what it is.”). “[I]t is well settled that an expert’s unsupported conclusion on the ultimate issue of infringement is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact.” Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. N. Telecom Ltd., 216 F.3d 1042, 1046 (Fed.Cir.2000) (citation omitted). “A party may not avoid that rule by simply framing the expert’s conclusion as an assertion that a particular critical claim limitation is found in the accused device.” Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Huntsman Polymers Corp., 157 F.3d 866, 876 (Fed.Cir.1998)). Applying the burdens that would inhere at trial, the Court cannot say that Apple has shown a likelihood of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Google module on the Quick Search Box employs a heuristic algorithm.

With respect to the “People” search module, Samsung submits a declaration from Google software engineer Bjorn Bringert, who explains that the People [Redacted]. Bringert Decl. ¶ 7. Dr. Carbonell examined portions of the publicly available Android 4.0 source code associated with the People search module, and stated his opinion that the [Redacted], “do[es] not incorporate a rule of thumb or any particular human knowledge specific to the problem or the data or to the user,” and thus is not heuristic. Carbonell Decl. ¶¶ 105-07. Relying on Dr. Carbonell’s analysis, Samsung argues that the People module does not employ a heuristic algorithm, and thus Apple cannot prove infringement.

Apple provides compelling rebuttal evidence and argument. Samsung’s expert admitted that he limited his review of the code simply to the use of [Redacted] and did not look at the specific code internal to the [Redacted] algorithm in order to determine its actual implementation on the Galaxy Nexus. Polish Reply Decl. ¶ 46; id. Ex. 2 [Carbonell Dep.] at 140:18-141:13. Samsung’s expert further conceded that a logical algorithm, such [Redacted], “could be used as part of a heuristic algorithm” if a heuristic were added to it. Id. Ex. 2 at 142:12-143:10. Meanwhile, Apple’s expert Dr. Polish reviewed the source code for the People module and found that, as implemented with the SuggestionProvider Java interface required for all applications on the Galaxy Nexus, the People module does perform a heuristic search. Polish Reply Decl. ¶ 47. Specifically, the People module heuristically ranks search results based on the user’s past interactions, ranking contacts that the user has selected in the past three days, followed by contacts that the user has selected in the past thirty days, above all other contacts that might respond to the user’s search query. Polish Reply Decl. ¶¶ 47-51; id. Ex. 7 at 1-3. Samsung’s own expert agreed that a search that ranked results based on past user selection would be heuristic. See Polish Reply Decl. Ex. 2 at 86:20-87:4. Thus, the Court finds Apple has shown that the People module searches heuristically.

Finally, with respect to the “Browser” search module, Mr. Bringert explains that the Browser application performs [Redacted], Bringert Decl. ¶ 7. The algorithm used in the Browser application is therefore different from the algorithm used in the People module. Nonetheless, Dr. Carbonell examined portions of the publicly available Android 4.0 source code associated with the Browser search module, and stated his opinion that the [Redacted] employed by the Browser search module “do[es] not incorporate a rule of thumb or any particular human knowledge specific to the problem or the data or to the user,” and thus is not heuristic. Carbonell Decl. ¶¶ 105-07.

Apple’s rebuttal evidence and argument with regard to the Browser module is not as strong as it is with regard to the People module. Nonetheless, Apple does present the relevant portion of the Browser module source code and explains that the operative SQLiteDatabase.query() method “builds the SQL query using a particular set of heuristics,” and then orders the query results based on date last visited. See Polish Reply Decl. Ex. 7 at 4-5. The Court finds that, based on its broad construction of the term “heuristic algorithm,” the [Redacted] as employed by the Browser module satisfies the “heuristic algorithm” limitation. Returning results based on date last visited is not strictly a “constraint satisfaction” parameter. Rather, by ordering results based on the user’s most recently visited sites, the Browser search algorithm employs a rule of thumb that the user is more likely searching for a recently visited site than a site bookmarked long ago. Furthermore, the Browser search algorithm employs this sorting heuristic based solely on the user’s past conduct, i.e., sites that the user has most recently chosen to visit. Samsung’s expert agreed that “[i]f the system were to store information about prior user preferences, such as the user having selected some results and having not selected other results, ... [and] that precedent — that information was then compiled into the future selection process, [then] [t]hat would use human judgment” and would be heuristic. Polish Reply Decl. Ex. 2 [Carbonell Dep.] at 86:20-87:4. Thus, even under Samsung’s narrower construction requiring “human judgment” — which the Court has rejected — the Browser search algorithm is arguably heuristic. Based on the evidence available at this time, the Court concludes that the Browser search algorithm is not purely a constraint satisfaction algorithm but rather employs a rule of thumb to find the results most likely of interest to the user.

In sum, the Court finds that Apple has shown that the People and Browser modules likely employ different heuristic algorithms. Thus, even though Apple has not shown that the Google module also employs a heuristic algorithm, Apple has shown that the Quick Search Box on the Galaxy Nexus likely has at least two heuristic modules employing two different, predetermined heuristic algorithms. The sole disputed limitation is therefore satisfied. Accordingly, the Court finds that Apple has shown that the Galaxy Nexus likely infringes the '604 Patent.

b. Invalidity Based on Anticipation and Obviousness

The presumptive validity of the '604 Patent can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See 35 U.S.C. § 282; Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 1281 (Fed.Cir.2005) (citation omitted). A patent claim is invalid by reason of anticipation if “the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). A claim is anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102, and thus invalid, “if each and every limitation is found either expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed.Cir.2006). To anticipate, the prior art reference must also “enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make the invention without undue experimentation.” Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 670 F.3d 1171, 1184 (Fed.Cir.2012) (citation omitted).

Samsung argues that claims 6 and 19 of the '604 Patent are invalid as anticipated by two different prior art references: (1) the Wide Area Information Server (“WAIS”) system, published no later than 1994; and (2) U.S. Patent No. 6,005,565 to Legall (“Legall” or “the '565 Patent”), titled “Integrated Search of Electronic Program Guide, Internet and Other Information Resources.” Having considered the WAIS and Legall reference and the parties’ arguments, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that Apple has met its burden regarding the validity of the '604 patent.