Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION GREGG COSTA, District Judge. Broad-based participation in the political process is crucial to governmental legitimacy and the proper functioning of our constitutional system. See The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison); see also Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969) (“Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of representative government.”). The most elementary form of political participation is voting; thus, the right to vote is “a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). But, in order to vote, one must first be registered, and many citizens are not registered. This problem has been tackled on many fronts; governmental actors and private citizens alike have spent much time and treasure attempting to increase the number of Americans who are registered to vote. One of the primary means by which individuals have been able to help their fellow Americans register is what is commonly known as the voter registration drive. Voter registration drives have played a vital role in increasing participation in the political process. This is especially true in minority communities with historically lower rates of voter registration. Census figures indicate that a significant percentage of African-Americans and Hispanics voting in the last presidential election registered through voter registration drives and other third-party voter registration activities. This case concerns Texas’s heavy regulation of third-party voter registration activity. For more than two decades, Texas has required those seeking to receive applications from prospective voters to be appointed volunteer deputy registrars CVDRs’). During the 2011 legislative session, the Governor signed two bills that imposed a number of additional requirements. The new laws restricted non-Texans from becoming VDRs, required VDRs to undergo training, and banned certain forms of compensation for voter registration activities. The result is that Texas now imposes more burdensome regulations on those engaging in third-party voter registration than the vast majority of, if not all, other states. Two organizations involved in national voter registration efforts filed this lawsuit and now seek a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of a number of the Texas laws regulating voter registration drives. They contend that the federal National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”) preempts some of the laws. Others, they maintain, violate the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and association and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process. In reviewing these challenges, the Court first holds that Plaintiffs have standing to bring the eight claims on which they requested preliminary relief against both named defendants — the Texas Secretary of State and the Galveston County Registrar. Then, having reviewed the applicable statutes and case law, as well as the briefing and the evidence presented at a lengthy injunction hearing, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiffs have met the demanding standards for a preliminary injunction on five of the eight challenges on which they seek preliminary relief. They are entitled to a preliminary injunction on two of their preemption challenges, those brought against the Photocopying Prohibition and the Personal Delivery Requirement, and on three of their First Amendment challenges, those brought against the In-State Restriction, the County Limitation, and part of the Compensation Prohibition. I. Background A. Procedural History Plaintiffs are the nonprofit organization Project Vote, its affiliate, Voting for America (together, the “Organizational Plaintiffs”), and Galveston County residents Brad Richey and Penelope McFadden. In May 2011, after the enactment of the new laws regulating voter registration drives, the Organizational Plaintiffs sent a letter requesting the Secretary of State to clarify Texas’s interpretation of both the new laws and the preexisting scheme. After receiving a response, Plaintiffs filed suit in February 2012 challenging (1) the constitutionality and enforceability of ten regulations that the Texas Election Code imposes on the third-party voter registration process; (2) Galveston County’s alleged unlawful enforcement of Texas’s photo identification requirement for voters prior to the proper preclearanee of that law under the Voting Rights Act; and (3) Galveston County’s alleged failure to follow state law requiring notice to voters before suspending their registration. Defendants are Hope Andrade, sued in her official capacity as the Texas Secretary of State (the “Secretary”), and Cheryl Johnson, sued in her official capacity as the Galveston County Tax Assessor and Voter Registrar. The Organizational Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to immediately bar enforcement of most, but not all, of the Texas voter registration laws they contend are either unconstitutional or preempted. They did not seek preliminary relief on the claims in their complaint that are specific to Galveston County enforcement practices. In addition to disputing the merits of the case, both Andrade and Johnson contend that the Organizational Plaintiffs lack standing to sue them. B. The Organizational Plaintiffs The Organizational Plaintiffs are national nonpartisan organizations dedicated to helping citizens become registered to vote and to encouraging eligible voters to vote. The Organizational Plaintiffs work to accomplish their mission through nonpartisan political advocacy, educational outreach, and, most notably, voter registration drives. The drives are primarily aimed at registering voters from demographic groups — particularly the African — American and Latino communities— with a history of underrepresentation in the political process. While the Organizational Plaintiffs sometimes conduct drives by themselves, more often they provide funding, instruction, and training to “partner” organizations, typically local nonprofit or civic groups selected from the geographic area or demographic group targeted for a drive. The same basic methods are followed in each drive. The Organizational Plaintiffs will provide funding to a local partner organization. Then, using that funding, the partner organization will hire temporary employees from the target community to serve as canvassers. These canvassers are paid a flat or hourly wage to go to high traffic locations, such as grocery stores and public transit stations, and attempt to register other citizens to vote. The canvassers encourage passersby to register, assist those who agree to register in filling out their applications, and collect the applications for delivery. Once the applications are collected, the canvassers return them to their supervisors. The supervisors then perform quality analysis and control checks by reviewing the applications for completeness and signs of fraud. After-wards, they photocopy or scan all nonconfidential parts of the applications for tracking purposes and mail the applications to the appropriate state or county registrar. After submitting the applications, the partner organizations coordinate with the Organizational Plaintiffs to inspect the relevant voter rolls and registration records. They do this by examining the rolls to determine whether the applicants were actually registered as new voters. Once this information is gathered, it is used in two ways. First, the applicants who were added to the rolls are contacted and encouraged to actually vote. Second, for those applicants who were not added to the rolls, the Organizational Plaintiffs and their partners seek to determine if the applications were rejected for a legitimate reason, such as a correct determination that an applicant was not eligible to register under state law or that an applicant provided incorrect information. Rejected applicants may be contacted to re-register if it is determined that they are eligible. If the Organizational Plaintiffs determine that the government has rejected an application for an improper reason, they may seek to remedy the situation through demand requests, public pressure, or legal action. Although the Organizational Plaintiffs rarely canvass potential voters themselves, they have primary control over each registration drive. As the executive director of Project Vote testified, the Organizational Plaintiffs’ employees often train the managers and supervisors of their partner organizations by helping them assist applicants in the field, a process that requires the employees to directly handle voter registration applications. See Preliminary Inj. Hr’g Tr. 23-24, June 11, 2012, ECF No. 62. The Organizational Plaintiffs’ employees identify areas to send canvassers, provide remedial training to canvassers who collect inadequate numbers of applications or who collect incomplete applications, review completed applications for signs of fraud, and handle phone calls from members of the public or local law enforcement. See id. at 23-26, 130-32. In addition, the Organizational Plaintiffs’ employees make hiring and termination decisions. See id. at 144-45. The Organizational Plaintiffs condition their grants of funding on retaining control over all staffing decisions. Id. C. The Texas Volunteer Deputy Registrar Regime 1. The Appointment Requirement The Organizational Plaintiffs contend that the Texas Election Code’s comprehensive regulation of third-party registration activities prevents them from conducting effective drives in the state. Most of the challenged statutes regulate the activities of VDRs, whom county registrars are required to appoint if certain qualifications are met. See Tex. Elec.Code Ann. §§ 13.031(a), 13.032. The provision governing the appointment of VDRs reads as follows: § 13.031(a). Appointment; Term (a) To encourage voter registration, the registrar shall appoint as deputy registrars persons who volunteer to serve. (b) In this code, “volunteer deputy registrar” means a deputy registrar appointed under this section. (c) Volunteer deputy registrars serve for terms expiring December 31 of even-numbered years. (d) To be eligible for appointment as a volunteer deputy registrar, a person must: (1) be 18 years of age or older; (2) not have been finally convicted of a felony or, if so convicted, must have: (A) fully discharged the person’s sentence, including any term of incarceration, parole, or supervision, or completed a period of probation ordered by any court; (B) or been pardoned or otherwise released from the resulting disability to vote; and (3) meet the requirements to be a qualified voter under Section 11.002 except that the person is not required to be a registered voter. (4) not have been finally convicted of an offense under Section 32.51, Penal Code. (e) A volunteer deputy registrar appointed under this section may not receive another person’s registration application until the deputy registrar has completed training developed under Section 13.047. At the time of appointment, the voter registrar shall provide information about the times and places at which training is offered. Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 13.031. The linchpin of the Texas regime, which the parties refer to as the “Appointment Requirement,” is that only those who have been appointed VDRs may accept or deliver a third party’s voter registration application. Given that most of the challenges in this case are premised on this understanding that a person who has not been appointed a VDR is prohibited from handling third-party applications, it is noteworthy that the Election Code does not contain such an express prohibition. Instead, the Secretary interprets the prohibition to arise by implication. The Secretary argues that this implied prohibition arises from the VDR appointment scheme itself. What would be the purpose of the appointment process, as well as the numerous regulations that flow from the appointment scheme, if anybody could accept and deliver applications? Another argument derives from the text of the Election Code, which grants the power to handle applications to two specific types of third parties: VDRs and “agents.” Although applicants must generally submit their applications to the appropriate county registrar “by personal delivery or by mail,” they are also allowed to submit their applications to a VDR or agent for third-party delivery to the county registrar. Id. §§ 13.002(a), 13.003(a), 13.038. In the Secretary’s view, this is an exclusive grant of power. Only an applicant’s spouse, parent, or child may be then-agent; thus, third parties who are not related to a particular applicant may only handle applications if appointed a VDR. Id. § 13.003(b). Moreover, it is a crime for a person to “purport to act” as a VDR if the person lacks an effective VDR appointment. Id. § 13.044. There is one other wrinkle, however. Although the Secretary reads section 13.038 as an exclusive grant of power to VDRs to handle completed applications, she nonetheless contends that any person may distribute blank applications to potential applicants. See Def. Andrade’s Mot. to Dismiss 29, EOF No. 13-2; Preliminary Inj. Hr’g Tr. 110-11, June 11, 2012; Pis.’ Ex. 6, Texas Volunteer Deputy Registrar Guide. As the Organizational Plaintiffs point out, this flies in the face of the plain text of section 13.038, which states that a VDR “may distribute voter registration application forms throughout the county and receive registration applications submitted to the deputy in person.” Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 13.038; Preliminary Inj. Hr’g Tr. 428-29, June 12, 2012, ECF No. 63. If the section is to be read as an exclusive grant of power to VDRs, consistency would seem to require reading it as an exclusive grant on both the distribution and collection elements. No Texas court has interpreted these provisions. Because this Court “lack[s] competence to rule definitively on the meaning of state legislation,” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 48, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997), it must accept any “narrowing construction or practice to which the law is fairly susceptible.” City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 770 n. 11, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) (citations omitted); cf. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring) (stating that when the constitutionality of a federal law is challenged, a court must “first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided”) (citation omitted). The narrowing construction that has been offered is the Secretary’s argument that section 13.038 exclusively grants VDRs the power to accept, handle, and deliver filled-out applications, but allows any person to distribute blank applications. Bearing in mind that Plaintiffs do not request preliminary relief from the Appointment Requirement itself, this Court will assume at this stage of the litigation that the Election Code only forbids third parties from accepting, handling, or delivering a prospective voter’s application without first being appointed VDRs. 2. The VDR Scheme Once individuals become VDRs, a comprehensive set of regulations governs their activity. Some of these regulations have been in place since 1987, but the 2011 letter that the Secretary sent the Organizational Plaintiffs clarified how stringently the state interprets these provisions. First, VDRs must carry signed certificates of appointment that contain their full names and residential addresses, and they must present these certificates as identification to any applicants who request to see them. Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 13.033. Second, when VDRs accept applications, they must review them for completeness while the applicants are present and return them to the applicants if they are unsigned or lack required information. Id. § 13.039. If a county registrar determines that a VDR has “failed to adequately review” an application for completeness, that county registrar may terminate the VDR’s appointment. Id. § 13.036(b). Third, as made clear by the 2011 letter the Secretary sent to the Organizational Plaintiffs, VDRs may only accept applications from residents of the county in which they were appointed. See id. § 13.038; Pis.’ Ex. 1, Letter from Ann McGeehan to Niyati Shah 4 (May 13, 2011). Fourth, VDRs must personally deliver to the county registrar all applications submitted to them within five days of receipt. Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 13.042(a)-(b). VDRs may not mail applications to the county registrar. Id.; Pis.’ Ex. 1, Letter from Ann McGeehan to Niyati Shah 5. Any VDR who fails to personally deliver an application within five days is subject to a criminal penalty. Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 13.043(a). Fifth, VDRs may not photocopy applications that they have collected, even if the copies redact all confidential information. See id. § 13.038; Pis.’ Ex. 1, Letter from Ann McGeehan to Niyati Shah 6. Bills enacted during the 2011 legislative session imposed additional requirements on VDRs. Now, only Texas residents are allowed to be VDRs. See Tex. Elec.Code Ann. §§ 11.002(a)(5), 13.031(d)(3). And, once appointed, VDRs may not accept or deliver applications without first completing a training program approved by the Secretary and implemented by the county registrar who appointed them. See id. §§ 13.031(e), 13.047. The new 2011 law additionally included another provision that affects VDRs but also applies more broadly to others involved in voter registration activities even if they are not accepting or delivering applications. That provision prohibits “compensating] another person based on the number of voter registrations that the other person successfully facilitates”; “present[ing] another person with a quota of voter registrations to facilitate as a condition of payment or employment”; and “engaging] in another practice that causes another person’s compensation from or employment status with the person to be dependent on the number of voter registrations that the other person facilitates.” Id. § 13.008(a)(l)-(3). Accepting compensation for any of the above activities is also illegal. Id. § 13.008(a)(4). Any violation of the provision is a Class A misdemeanor. Id. § 13.008(b). Moreover, if the person who violates the provision is an entity, the entity’s officers, directors, and agents can be punished for the offense. Id. § 13.008(c). All told, the Texas regime is restrictive — and uniquely so. This is true in multiple ways. Only one other state of which either the parties or this Court are aware — Wisconsin, which is a very different animal because it allows same-day registration and thus is exempt from the mandates of the NVRA — requires individual canvassers to be appointed or registered with the government at the local level as Texas does. See Pis.’ Comparative Statement Regarding State Voter Registration Laws 2-3, ECF No. 58; Def. Andrade’s Postsubmission Br. 6-8, ECF No. 60. Most other states do not even have an appointment process at a statewide level. A number of states allow but do not require canvassers to be appointed or registered as deputy registrars. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev.Stat. Ann. § 16-131 (allowing county recorders both to appoint deputy registrars and to distribute blank applications to “groups and individuals that request forms for conducting voter registration drives”). And a smattering of states require the person or entity overseeing a registration drive to register. See, e.g., Cal. Elec.Code § 2159.5 (requiring any person or entity that pays others to conduct third-party voter registration activities to maintain a list of all employees and to make that list available to the California Secretary of State on demand); Colo.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1-2-701(1) (requiring voter registration drive organizers to file a statement of intent and designate the drive’s agent); DeLCode Ann. tit. 15, § 2060 (requiring entities conducting organized voter registration drives to register with the state and provide the name and contact information of a responsible person). One requires paid canvassers meeting a certain threshold of applications to register with the state. See Mo.Rev.Stat. § 115.205 (requiring registration with the Missouri Secretary of State of any person paid for soliciting more than ten voter registration applications). Moreover, canvasser appointment and registration requirements aside, many states do not place any restrictions on how registration drives may be run or how canvassers may work. Some states’ laws do contain prohibitions on voter registration activities that are similar to — albeit less expansive than — the prohibitions in the Texas Election Code. See, e.g., Colo. Rev.Stat. Ann. § 1-2-703(4) (banning the payment of compensation “based on the number of voter registration applications ... distribute^] or collect[ed]” but not restricting the use of voter registration quotas or other types of performance-based pay and employment actions); Del. Code Ann. tit. 15, § 2061 (requiring training for individuals participating in voter registration drives, but doing so on a statewide rather than county-by-county basis). And other states’ laws previously contained strict prohibitions that federal courts have since struck down. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 97.0575(3)(a) (2011), invalidated by League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Browning, 863 F.Supp.2d 1155 (N.D.Fla.2012) (requiring voter registration organizations, on penalty of fine, to deliver all applications collected within 48 hours of the moment of receipt); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. §§ 3503.19, 3599.11 (2006), invalidated by Project Vote v. Blackwell, 455 F.Supp.2d 694 (N.D.Ohio 2006) (requiring any person who registered another person to vote to deliver that person’s application directly to the appropriate state office, without the application going through the hands of any intermediates). Yet, especially when viewed against the background of unrestricted third-party voter registration activity that prevails in most states, the Texas Election Code’s requirements stand out. While other states may restrict an activity here or prescribe a regulation there, no other state of which this Court is aware has gone as far as Texas in creating a regulatory web that controls so many aspects of third-party voter registration activity. D. The Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Plaintiffs allege that these pervasive requirements, alone and in combination, render their voter registration practices illegal. Claiming that the provisions are preempted by federal law, run afoul of the First or Fourteenth Amendments, or both, Plaintiffs seek preliminary relief from the following parts of the Election Code: • The Photocopying Prohibition. Section 13.038, as interpreted by the Secretary, prohibits VDRs from photocopying applications they receive and submit, even for tracking purposes. • The Personal Delivery Requirement. Section 13.042 requires that VDRs deliver applications to the appropriate county registrars in person. It forbids VDRs from mailing these applications. • The In-State Restriction. Sections 13.031(d)(3) and 11.002(a)(5) together have the effect of prohibiting non-Texas residents from serving as VDRs. • The County Limitation. Defendants interpret Section 13.038 to prohibit VDRs from accepting applications from residents of counties other than the county in which the VDRs are appointed. • The Compensation Prohibition. Section 13.008 criminalizes a number of compensation practices, including “compensating] another person based on the number of voter registrations that the other person successfully facilitates,” “presenting] another person with a quota of voter registrations to facilitate as a condition of payment or employment,” and “engaging] in another practice that causes another person’s compensation from or employment status with the person to be dependent on the number of voter registrations that the other person facilitates.” • The Completeness Requirement. Section 13.039(a) requires VDRs to examine applications for completeness in the presence of the applicant, and section 13.036(b) allows for the termination of the appointment of any VDR who fails to “adequately review” an application. Moreover, section 18.039(b) requires VDRs to return incomplete applications to applicants for completion. • The Training Requirement. Section 13.031(e) requires VDRs to undergo training approved by the state and administered by the county registrars pursuant to section 13.047. • The Identification Requirement. Section 13.033 requires VDRs to carry with them a certificate of appointment that contains their full name and residential address, and to produce the certificate for inspection to any applicant who requests to view it. E. The Evidentiary Hearing On May 24, 2012, before evidence was taken or argument heard on Plaintiffs’ motion, this case was reassigned to this Court. The Court discussed outstanding motions with counsel in a telephone conference on June 5, 2012. The next week, during a day-and-a-half hearing, the Court took extensive evidence and heard argument on the preliminary injunction claims as well as on Defendants’ separate motions to dismiss for lack of standing. Plaintiffs presented the testimony of five witnesses: Mr. Michael Slater, the executive director of Project Vote; Dr. Denise Rousseau, an expert in behavioral and organizational psychology from Carnegie Mellon University; Ms. Esthelle Holmes and Ms. May Mitchell, two VDRs from Galveston County; and former Governor Mark White, who signed the Election Code into law in 1985 and who, during his tenure in the 1970s as Secretary of State, was responsible for enforcing Texas’s election laws. Plaintiffs also presented thirty-two exhibits and the declarations of two other witnesses. The Secretary presented no witnesses or exhibits. Johnson presented the testimony of herself and Dominique Allen, the senior Voter Registration Specialist in the Galveston County Registrar’s office. Johnson also introduced two exhibits. II. Standing Defendants filed motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing as a matter of standing law that they are not proper parties to this suit. These motions challenge this Court’s jurisdiction and therefore must be addressed before considering the Organizational Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. This Court finds that, with respect to the eight claims on which they have requested preliminary relief, the Organizational Plaintiffs have standing to sue both Defendants. Defendants’ motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) are therefore denied with respect to those claims. Plaintiffs must show that they satisfy the trifecta of standing: injury in fact, causation, and redressability. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). As to the first requirement, that of injury in fact, the Organizational Plaintiffs allege that the Election Code makes it impossible for them to conduct voter registration drives and achieve their desired level of voter registration activity because it dramatically increases the administrative costs of conducting registration drives and bans them from using many common compensation and employment practices with their paid canvassers. Pis.’ First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 58, 59, ECF No. 8. The Organizational Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants’ refusal to disclose voter registration records and the ban on photocopying voter registration applications “frustrates and hampers” their ability to register voters. Id. at ¶ 68. Defendants do not seriously dispute that the Organizational Plaintiffs have established the existence of a judicially cognizable injury in fact. See Def. Andrade’s Mot. to Dismiss 9; Def. Johnson’s Am. Mot. to Dismiss 9, ECF No. 22. This Court agrees that, 'with respect to each claim on which they request preliminary relief, the Organizational Plaintiffs have fulfilled their duty on this first prong of the standing analysis. Defendants do, however, strongly dispute that Plaintiffs have met the causation and redressability requirements. Under Lujan, causation is present only if the Plaintiffs can show that their injuries are “fairly traceable” to Defendants and not “the result of the independent action of some third party.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citation and internal punctuation omitted). Redressability is only satisfied if it is “likely” that Plaintiffs’ injuries will be “redressed by a favorable decision” against Defendants. Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citation omitted). Unlike the common standing challenge in which a defendant argues that litigation cannot vindicate the plaintiffs interests as a general matter, see, e.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40-46, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976), neither Defendant claims that the federal courts are unable to provide adequate relief in this type of case. Instead, each claims that she is not the proper party and instead points the finger at the other: the Secretary argues that Plaintiffs only have standing to sue Johnson and other county registrars, while Johnson argues that Plaintiffs only have standing to sue the Secretary. See, e.g., Def. Johnson’s Am. Mot. to Dismiss 11; Preliminary Inj. Hr’g Tr. 390, June 12, 2012. The Court therefore analyzes Plaintiffs’ standing against each Defendant in turn. A. Secretary of State Andrade The Secretary argues that she is not the cause of Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries because the Election Code delegates enforcement power to county registrars like Johnson. See Def. Andrade’s Mot. to Dismiss 9-13. She also argues that enjoining her would not redress Plaintiffs’ injuries because she has no direct authority to control the actions of the county registrars. See id. Although the Secretary acknowledges that she is the official who interprets the Election Code and provides guidance on enforcement to the registrars of all 254 Texas counties, she contends that her authority is only persuasive, and that she is powerless to stop county registrars from disobeying her. Preliminary Inj. Hr’g Tr. 390-92, June 12, 2012. The Secretary thus argues that only Johnson — and the 253 other Texas county registrars, who were not named as parties' — -are proper defendants in this type of suit. Id. at 390. The Secretary’s argument is at odds with numerous cases in which plaintiffs have sued secretaries of state when challenging voter registration laws even though states commonly delegate voter registration responsibilities to county officials. In most of these cases, the secretaries did not even raise the argument that only county officials could be sued. In the two courts of appeals cases in which secretaries of state did raise the argument, the courts rejected it. See Harkless, 545 F.3d at 451-55 (finding standing to sue the Ohio Secretary of State); see also United States v. Missouri, 535 F.3d 844, 846 n. 1 (8th Cir.2008) (finding that the Missouri Secretary of State was the proper party to be sued under the NVRA even though enforcement power was delegated to local officials). The Sixth and Eighth Circuits relied primarily on Ohio’s and Missouri’s designations of their secretaries of state as the officials charged with administering the NVRA even though state law delegated enforcement powers to local county authorities. See Harkless, 545 F.3d at 452 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-8); Missouri, 535 F.3d at 846 n. 1 (same). Texas has likewise designated the Secretary as the state official responsible for administering the NVRA. Tex. Elee.Code Ann. § 31.001(a). The Harkless Court’s analysis of the standing issue is compelling with respect to the claimed violations of the NVRA, but this case also involves constitutional challenges divorced from the Secretary’s status as the NVRA designee. Recent Fifth Circuit cases on causation and redressability provide the standards for analyzing that issue. The first is Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir.2001) (en banc), in which a group of doctors filed suit against the Louisiana Governor and Attorney General to challenge Louisiana’s creation of a private cause of action against persons who perform abortions. Id. at 409. The Secretary relies heavily on Okpalobi, which found no standing because the Louisiana Governor and Attorney General had absolutely no power to prevent a private plaintiff from filing suit under the Louisiana statute. Id. at 426-27 (opinion of Jolly, J.); id. at 429 (Higginbotham, J., concurring); id. at 432-33 (Benavides, J., concurring). But a subsequent Fifth Circuit decision involving the same Louisiana statute provides a closer analogy to this case. See K.P. v. LeBlanc, 627 F.3d 115 (5th Cir.2010). In LeBlanc, a former patient filed an administrative claim for damages with the Louisiana Patients’ Compensation Fund Oversight Board against the physicians who had performed her abortion. Id. at 119-20. Under Louisiana law, physicians could enroll in the Compensation Fund in order to have their medical malpractice liability capped. Id. at 119. Patients seeking malpractice damages could file administrative claims with the Board, which had the power to either refuse the claims or convene a medical review panel to consider their merit. Id. In LeBlanc, the Board refused the patient’s claim on the ground that the Louisiana statute barred doctors from capping their liability for claims arising from abortion procedures. Id. at 120. The former patient then sued the doctors asserting the cause of action created by the statute challenged in Okpalobi. Id. The doctors responded by suing the Board to enjoin the statute on its face and as it had been applied to forbid them from participating in the Compensation Fund. Id. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of standing, citing Okpalobi for the proposition that the Board lacked enforcement power with respect to the private cause of action. Id. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Id. at 119. In doing so, it recognized that the Board had no power to enforce the Louisiana statute creating the private cause of action. Id. at 123. However, it distinguished Okpalobi by noting that, unlike the Louisiana Governor or Attorney General, the Board could take some action that affected the statute’s application. See id. at 123-24. The Board, the Fifth Circuit noted, could still refuse administrative claims for payment or convene medical review panels to consider claims, even though it could not stop patients from bringing tort actions in state court. Id. The Fifth Circuit “acknowledge^] that the Board is far from the sole participant in the application of the challenged statute” but nonetheless held that the statute “impact[ed] the Board’s actions sufficiently to confer standing on the[ ] Plaintiffs.” Id. at 123. The Fifth Circuit noted that a “plaintiff satisfies the redressability requirement when he shows that a favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury to himself. He need not show that a favorable decision will relieve his every injury.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 243 n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982)). Because the Board could “unilaterally preclude the Plaintiffs from claiming the benefits of limited liability” and “ha[d] definite responsibilities relating to the application of [the Louisiana statute],” the physicians had standing to sue. Id. at 123-24. Another post-Okpalobi case’s summary of redressability law indicates an even lower threshold. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 495 F.3d 151 (5th Cir.2007). In Abbott, the Fifth Circuit endorsed Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992), as establishing the rule that redressability is satisfied when nonparty actors can be expected to amend their conduct in response to a court declaration against a party. Abbott, 495 F.3d at 159-60 n. 19. The plaintiffs in Franklin had challenged the system by which the federal government allocated, for voter registration purposes, the home states of federal employees serving overseas. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 790-91, 112 S.Ct. 2767. They filed suit against the President, the Secretary of Commerce, the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives, and Census Bureau officials. Id. at 790, 112 S.Ct. 2767. Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion held that the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries would be redressable solely by a declaration against the Secretary of Commerce even though the Secretary of Commerce could not directly enforce a court order and had no authority to order the other officials to enforce the law. Id. at 803, 112 S.Ct. 2767. In so holding, Justice O’Connor stated: The Secretary certainly has an interest in defending her policy determinations ...; even though she cannot herself [enforce the law by] changing] the reapportionment, she has an interest in litigating its accuracy____ [W]e may assume it is substantially likely that the President and other executive and congressional officials would abide by an authoritative interpretation of the ... statute and constitutional provision by the District Court, even though they would not be directly bound by such a determination. Id. Thus, under Okpalobi, causation and redressability will not exist if a governmental defendant has no “duty or ability to do anything” about the enforcement of the challenged law. Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 427 (emphasis in original). But LeBlanc makes clear that causation and redressability will exist when a defendant has “definite responsibilities relating to the application of’ the challenged law. LeBlanc, 627 F.3d at 124; see also 13A Charles Alan Wright et al. Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531.6 (3d ed. 2008) (“The Court has said that standing does not require a plaintiff to show that a decree can remedy his every injury. Some measure of relief suffices.”). And Abbott, applying Franklin, clarifies that redressability will exist if a declaration against a governmental defendant without enforcement power is reasonably likely to cause nonparties with enforcement power to obey the court’s order. Abbott, 495 F.3d at 159-60 & n. 19; see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169-71, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (finding that redressability was satisfied where the plaintiffs sought to have a Fish and Wildlife Service advisory opinion set aside because such advisory opinions were often followed by the agencies that directly caused plaintiffs’ injuries). With these rules in hand, the standing analysis requires the Court to determine what powers of enforcement the Secretary possesses. The Secretary’s powers under Texas law are certainly not exhaustive, but they are nonetheless expansive — indeed, they are far more expansive than those of the Board in LeBlanc or the Commerce Secretary in Franklin. The Secretary is given the authority and mandate to “obtain 'and maintain uniformity in the application, operation, and interpretation” of election laws in Texas, and pursuant to that authority she promulgates binding regulations and nonbinding election law opinions. Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 31.003. She must “assist and advise all election authorities with regard to the application, operation, and interpretation” of the election laws, and “may take appropriate action to protect the voting rights of the citizens of [Texas] from abuse by the authorities administering the state’s electoral processes.” Id. §§ 31.004(a), 31.005(a). Where she “determines that a person performing official functions in the administration of any part of the electoral processes is exercising the powers vested in that person in a manner that impedes the free exercise of a citizen’s voting rights,” she “may order the person to correct the offending conduct.” Id. § 31.005(b). And although she may not be able to directly order a county voting registrar to follow state law in other instances, the Secretary admitted in this Court that — through the Texas Attorney General — she can still bring a suit in her name to obtain a writ of mandamus against any county official who refuses to follow her interpretations of the voting laws. Preliminary Inj. Hr’g Tr. 395-96, June 12, 2012; see also Def. Andrade’s Mot. to Dismiss 10. Finally, the Secretary can withhold certain state funds from county registrars who refuse to follow the regulations that she has promulgated in the Texas Administrative Code, one of which requires VDRs to personally deliver certain voter registration applications in compliance with the deadlines in section 13.042 of the Election Code. See 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 81.4 (2002). The Secretary’s authority more than satisfies LeBlanc’s requirement that she have “definite responsibilities relating to the application of’ the Election Code. LeBlanc, 627 F.3d at 124. She is therefore a proper party to this suit. Even if the Secretary’s powers were limited to interpretation, Franklin — viewed in light of the Secretary’s admissions and the evidence presented to this Court — would also require this conclusion. If the Secretary were to be enjoined, most — if not all — Texas county registrars are likely to amend their conduct in response to the injunction. Defendant Johnson testified that the Secretary was “absolutely essential” to the operation of voter registration procedures in her office, and that she had no choice but to obey the Secretary’s “restrictions.” Preliminary Inj. Hr’g Tr. 352, June 12, 2012. Governor White testified that, during his tenure as Secretary of State in the 1970s, he was able to use the persuasive power of his office to convince several recalcitrant county registrars to follow the law. Id. at 304-07. And during the hearing, the Secretary admitted that at least some county registrars follow the progress of lawsuits against the Secretary and seek updates from her about how the rulings in those suits affect their conduct. Id. at 399MfiO. Lujan’s, requirements that the Organizational Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries be “fairly traceable” to the Secretary and “likely” to be redressed by an injunction against her are satisfied. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The Organizational Plaintiffs have standing in their suit against the Secretary. B. County Registrar Johnson The analysis of the Organizational Plaintiffs’ standing to sue Johnson is straightforward. Johnson argues that she is not the cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries because she is required to enforce the laws enacted by the Texas Legislature and the interpretations and regulations promulgated by the Secretary, whatever those may be. See Def. Johnson’s Am. Mot. to Dismiss 11-12; Preliminary Inj. Hr’g Tr. 352, June 12, 2012. Johnson further argues that Plaintiffs’ injuries will not be redressed by enjoining her because an injunction would not affect the Election Code’s statewide enforcement. Thus, Johnson’s view, which she has repeated throughout this litigation, is that her role is ministerial and that she is an unwitting and powerless spectator to the Organizational Plaintiffs’ real dispute against the state. See Def. Johnson’s Am. Mot. to Dismiss 11; Preliminary Inj. Hr’g Tr. 458-59, June 12, 2012. While it is true that Johnson had nothing to do with enacting the Election Code, is not involved in the promulgation of statewide regulations interpreting it, and cannot enforce it outside Galveston County, Texas law designates her as the governmental official who is directly responsible for Galveston County’s enforcement of many of the provisions challenged in this suit. As quick reference to well-known Supreme Court cases illustrates, constitutional challenges are often brought against local entities or officials enforcing statewide laws they played no role in creating. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) (challenging a state law criminalizing abortion by bringing suit against the district attorney of Dallas County, Texas); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963) (challenging a state law requiring the reading of Bible verses in public schools by bringing suit against the school district of Abington Township, Pennsylvania). Texas law designates county tax assessors like Johnson as the voter registrars for their counties. Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 12.001. As the voter registrar, she is directly responsible for the appointment and training of VDRs and the enforcement of all the VDR regulations. See Tex. Elec. Code Ann. §§ 13.031, 13.036, 13.047. And county tax assessors like Johnson are also directly involved in the decision of whether to release county voter registration records pursuant to demands made under the NVRA. See Pis.’ Ex. 3, Letter from Vince Ryan, Harris Cnty. Att’y, to the Hon. Greg Abbott (Dec. 7, 2010). Because Johnson enforces the laws that the Organizational Plaintiffs contend cause them injury, an injunction against her would directly redress that alleged injury. See City of Herriman v. Bell, 590 F.3d 1176, 1182 (10th Cir.2010) (holding, in response to a nearly identical standing argument from a local elections clerk with similarly ministerial duties, that standing was satisfied because the defendant was “the official responsible for running the local ... election, and may yet be subject to future federal court restrictions”). Both the Secretary and Johnson have a designated role to play in the interpretation and enforcement of the Election Code, and both are proper parties to any suit seeking to challenge its validity and enjoin its enforcement. Plaintiffs have amply demonstrated their standing to sue both Defendants. Defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of standing are denied. III. Plaintiffs’ Motion for A Preliminary Injunction With the jurisdictional question settled, the Court now turns to Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. To prevail at this early stage of the litigation, Plaintiffs must show “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued, (3) that the threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweighs any harm that will result if the injunction is granted, and (4) that the grant of an injunction will not disserve the public interest.” Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 595 (5th Cir.2011) (citation omitted). A. First Factor-Substantial Likelihood of Success 1. Preemption Challenges a. Preemption Under the Elections Clause Of the eight regulations at issue in the preliminary injunction stage, Plaintiffs argue that the federal NVRA preempts the following five: (i) the Photocopying Prohibition; (ii) the Personal Delivery Requirement; (iii) the County Limitation; (iv) the Training Requirement; and (v) the Completeness Requirement. This Court finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are substantially likely to succeed in their preemption challenges to the Photocopying Prohibition and the Personal Delivery Requirement. Preemption challenges usually derive from the Supremacy Clause. But when preemption challenges are brought against state election laws, the Elections Clause of the Constitution governs. See Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69, 118 S.Ct. 464, 139 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997); see also, e.g., Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 390-92 (9th Cir.2012) (en banc); Harkless, 545 F.3d at 454; Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 793-94 (7th Cir.1995). The Elections Clause states that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” U.S. Const, art. I, § 4, cl. 1. It “invests the States with responsibility for the mechanics of congressional elections ... but only so far as Congress declines to preempt state legislative choices.” Foster, 522 U.S. at 69, 118 S.Ct. 464. When Congress acts to regulate federal elections, its “regulations ... are paramount to those made by the State legislature^]; and if they conflict therewith, the latter, so far as the conflict extends, ceases to be operative.” Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 384, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1879). Although it is clear that the Elections Clause grants Congress the power to override state election laws regulating federal elections, case law says little about the proper standard to apply when analyzing Elections Clause preemption. The Fifth Circuit’s guidance on this matter is limited to a brief statement that state and federal law must “directly conflict” in order for Elections Clause preemption to occur. Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Bomer, 199 F.3d 773, 775 (5th Cir.2000). Neither the Supreme Court nor the Fifth Circuit have ruled whether Elections Clause preemption law contains the Supremacy Clause’s “presumption against preemption,” see Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996), its “plain statement” rule, see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991), or its requirement that a reviewing court attempt to reconcile conflicting federal and state law before preempting, see Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76-77, 129 S.Ct. 538, 172 L.Ed.2d 398 (2008). However, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have spoken convincingly on these matters. In the recently decided Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383 (9th Cir.2012) (en banc), the en banc Ninth Circuit discussed the standard for Election Clause preemption in the context of a challenge to Arizona’s Proposition 200. That proposition required voter registration applicants to present proof of U.S. citizenship when registering to vote. Id. at 387. The plaintiffs in that suit claimed that the proof-of-citizenship requirement conflicted with the NVRA’s requirement that states accept applications submitted using the “federal form,” the content of which the NVRA prescribes and limits. Id. at 390; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg-2(a)(2), 1973gg-4, 1973gg-7. The Ninth Circuit agreed and held that Proposition 200’s proof-of-citizenship requirement was preempted as applied to the federal form. Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 403. Judge Ikuta’s opinion rejected Arizona’s argument that the Supremacy Clause’s presumption against preemption and plain statement rule should apply. It noted that, when analyzing preemption under the Supremacy Clause, courts must act with great hesitation before preempting in order to preserve the “delicate balance” between the states and the federal government. See id. at 392 (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395). This, it said, was because the Supremacy Clause addressed preemption “in areas within the states’ historic police powers.” See id.; see also Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (“[The Supremacy Clause’s] plain statement rule is nothing more than an acknowledgement that the States retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.”). Judge Ikuta contrasted the domain of the Supremacy Clause with that of the Elections Clause, which expressly “committed” federal election procedures “to the exclusive control of Congress.” Gonzalez, 677 F.3d at 391 (quoting Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554, 66 S.Ct. 1198, 90 L.Ed. 1432 (1946)). Because the Elections Clause governs “only an area in which the states have no inherent or reserved power: the regulation of federal elections,” the presumption against preemption and plain statement rule did not apply. Id. at 392 (citing U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 804-05, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995)); accord Harkless, 545 F.3d at 454 (holding that the presumption against preemption and the plain statement rule are inapplicable in the Elections Clause analysis). Thus, the Elections Clause requires a more searching preemption analysis than that allowed under the Supremacy Clause. The Court notes, however, that the full extent of the distinction between Elections Clause preemption and Supremacy Clause preemption need not be resolved at this time. The challenged provisions “directly conflict” with the mandates of the NVRA; for now, that is all that is required to determine that Plaintiffs are substantially likely to succeed on the merits of the two claims which the Court now addresses. Bomer, 199 F.3d at 775. b. The Photocopying Prohibition The Texas Election Code states that “[a] volunteer deputy registrar may distribute voter registration application forms throughout the county and receive registration applications submitted to the deputy in person.” Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 13.038. The Secretary contends that section 13.038 is an exclusive grant of power to VDRs, and that, because VDRs are limited to distributing and collecting applications for delivery, they may not make copies of the applications they collect, particularly given the confidentiality requirements of section 13.004. See Tex. Elec. Code Ann. §§ 13.004, 13.038; Pis.’ Ex. 1, Letter from Ann McGeehan to Niyati Shah 6. The Organizational Plaintiffs contend that the following NVRA provision, titled “Public disclosure of voter registration activities,” preempts the prohibition on photocopying: Each State shall maintain for at least 2 years and shall make available for public inspection and, where available, photocopying at a reasonable cost, all records concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters, except to the extent that such records relate to a declination to register to vote or to the identity of a voter registration agency through which any particular voter is registered. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i). The Secretary defends the Photocopying Prohibition on the grounds that (1) voter registration applications are not “records concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters” subject to public disclosure under the NVRA; and (2) even if voter registration applications are subject to public disclosure, privacy interests counsel against letting Plaintiffs photocopy the applications. See Def. Andrade’s Mot. to Dismiss 14-20; Pis.’ Ex. 1, Letter from Ann McGeehan to Niyati Shah 6. A recent appellate decision demonstrates that the Organizational Plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of prevailing on this challenge. Three days after the conclusion of the preliminary injunction hearing, the Fourth Circuit found in favor of the same Organizational Plaintiffs in a similar challenge. See Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long, 682 F.3d 331 (4th Cir.2012). In Long, the Organizational Plaintiffs challenged the Virginia State Board of Elections’s contention that rejected voter registration applications in the custody of a local registrar did not need to be released under the NVRA’s public disclosure provision. See id. at 333-34. The Board made arguments that were essentially identical to the Secretary’s two defenses. See id. at 335-40. The Long court held that completed voter registration applications are records within the meaning of the NVRA’s public disclosure provision, and that these records could not be withheld in order to protect voter privacy. Id. at 340. Judge Wilkinson’s opinion first noted the purposes of the NVRA: to “increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote”; to “enhance[] the participation of eligible citizens as voters”; to “protect the integrity of the electoral process”; and to “ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained.” Id. at 334 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(b)). In support of these goals, the Long court recognized that the NVRA’s public disclosure requirement “embodies Congress’s conviction that Americans who are eligible under law to vote have every right to exercise their franchise, a right that must not be sacrificed to administrative chicanery, oversights, or inefficiencies.” Id. at 334-35. Turning to the statute itself, the Long court conducted a thorough textual analysis and concluded that the NVRA’s public disclosure requirement “unmistakably encompasses completed voter registration applications.” Id. at 335-36. Then, the court rejected the Board’s privacy arguments, noting that the Organizational Plaintiffs had only requested nonconfidential information (i.e., copies of applications with Social Security numbers redacted). Id. at 338-40. In doing so, the court stated that “[i]t is not the province of this court ... to strike the proper balance between transparency and voter privacy.... Congress has already answered the question by enacting [section 1973gg-6(i) ], which plainly requires disclosure of completed voter registration applications.” Id. at 339. This Court agrees with the statutory analysis in Judge Wilkinson’s opinion and adopts it in full. But Long dealt with voter registration applications already in the custody of the appropriate registrar. In this case, the Organizational Plaintiffs do ask for access to such records in their complaint, though they have not asked for preliminary relief on that issue. But their instant challenge, on which they have requested preliminary relief, is to the prohibition on copying applications that have not yet been submitted to governmental custody. Is the outcome any different for applications that are in the custody of a VDR but have not yet been submitted to the county registrar? For a number of reasons, the answer is no. First, the entire premise of the Texas VDR scheme is that a completed application in the hands of a VDR is in the government’s constructive possession. VDRs are deputized as government agents when they collect applications. See Tex. Elec.Code Ann. § 13.031; Def. Andrade’s Mot. to Dismiss 29 (“[R]eceiving and processing the application is a governmental obligation.”). Moreover, VDRs’ behavior is heavily regulated. They must turn a submitted application in to the county registrar within five days, on pain of criminal prosecution. See Tex. Elec.Code Ann. §§ 13.042-13.043. As the Secretary has said, “Texas law assumes that the state has the ability to protect that application by regulating how it is handled until it is in the hands of the local registrar.” Def. Andrade’s Briefing on First Amendment 2, ECF No. 55. In any event, the NVRA requires states to make available even those applications that are not in their actual custody. Congress did not require states to “release” or “turn over” records. Those words would have indicated that public disclosure was limited to records in the state’s physical possession. But the words chosen, “make available,” are more open-ended. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i). States have the power to “make available” for photocopying even those applications they do not possess simply by granting VDRs the legal authority to make photocopies. And it would be an absurd result to forbid private parties from copying applications before finally submitting them. Regardless of who physically holds a completed application, it is still a “record” because it contains vital information and is a critical piece in the puzzle of determining whether the voter registration rolls are correct. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i). It makes no sense to forbid someone who has collected a voter registration application from copyi