Full opinion text
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The Constitution sets forth qualifications for membership in the Congress of the United States. Article I, §2, cl. 2, which applies to the House of Representatives, provides: “No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.” Article I, §3, cl. 3, which applies to the Senate, similarly provides: “No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.” Today’s cases present a challenge to an amendment to the Arkansas State Constitution that prohibits the name of an otherwise-eligible candidate for Congress from appearing on the general election ballot if that candidate has already served three terms in the House of Representatives or two terms in the Senate. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the amendment violates the Federal Constitution. We agree with that holding. Such a state-imposed restriction is contrary to the “fundamental principle of our representative democracy,” embodied in the Constitution, that “the people should choose whom they please to govern them.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 547 (1969) (internal quotation marks omitted). Allowing individual States to adopt their own qualifications for congressional service would be inconsistent with the Framers’ vision of a uniform National Legislature representing the people of the United States. If the qualifications set forth in the text of the Constitution are to be changed, that text must be amended. I At the general election on November 3, 1992, the voters of Arkansas adopted Amendment 73 to their State Constitution. Proposed as a “Term Limitation Amendment,” its preamble stated: “The people of Arkansas find and declare that elected officials who remain in office too long become preoccupied with reelection and ignore their duties as representatives of the people. Entrenched incumbency has reduced voter participation and has led to an electoral system that is less free, less competitive, and less representative than the system established by the Founding Fathers. Therefore, the people of Arkansas, exercising their reserved powers, herein limit the terms of elected officials.” The limitations in Amendment 73 apply to three categories of elected officials. Section 1 provides that no elected official in the executive branch of the state government may serve more than two 4-year terms. Section 2 applies to the legislative branch of the state government; it provides that no member of the Arkansas House of Representatives may serve more than three 2-year terms and no member of the Arkansas Senate may serve more than two 4-year terms. Section 3, the provision at issue in these cases, applies to the Arkansas Congressional Delegation. It provides: “(a) Any person having been elected to three or more terms as a member of the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas shall not be certified as a candidate and shall not be eligible to have his/her name placed on the ballot for election to the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas. “(b) Any person having been elected to two or more terms as a member of the United States Senate from Arkansas shall not be certified as a candidate and shall not be eligible to have his/her name placed on the ballot for election to the United States Senate from Arkansas.” Amendment 73 states that it is self-executing and shall apply to all persons seeking election after January 1, 1993. On November 13, 1992, respondent Bobbie Hill, on behalf of herself, similarly situated Arkansas “citizens, residents, taxpayers and registered voters,” and the League of Women Voters of Arkansas, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Pulaski County, Arkansas, seeking a declaratory judgment that §3 of Amendment 73 is “unconstitutional and void.” Her complaint named as defendants then-Governor Clinton, other state officers, the Republican Party of Arkansas, and the Democratic Party of Arkansas. The State of Arkansas, through its Attorney General, petitioner Winston Bryant, intervened as a party defendant in support of the amendment. Several proponents of the amendment also intervened, including petitioner U. S. Term Limits, Inc. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Circuit Court held that §3 of Amendment 73 violated Article I of the Federal Constitution. With respect to that holding, in a 5-to-2 decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. U S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 316 Ark. 251, 872 S. W. 2d 349, 351 (1994). Writing for a plurality of three justices, Justice Robert L. Brown concluded that the congressional restrictions in Amendment 73 are unconstitutional because the States have no authority “to change, add to, or diminish” the requirements for congressional service enumerated in the Qualifications Clauses. Id., at 265, 872 S. W. 2d, at 356. He noted: “If there is one watchword for representation of the various states in Congress, it is uniformity. Federal legislators speak to national issues that affect the citizens of every state. . . . The uniformity in qualifications mandated in Article 1 provides the tenor and the fabric for representation in the Congress. Piecemeal restrictions by State would fly in the face of that order.” Ibid. Justice Brown’s plurality opinion also rejected the argument that Amendment 73 is “merely a ballot access amendment,” concluding that “[t]he intent and the effect of Amendment 73 are to disqualify congressional incumbents from further service.” Id., at 265-266, 872 S. W. 2d, at 356-357. Justice Brown considered the possibilities that an excluded candidate might run for Congress as a write-in candidate or be appointed to fill a vacancy to be “glimmers of opportunity . . . [that] are faint indeed — so faint in our judgment that they cannot salvage Amendment 73 from constitutional attack.” Id., at 266, 872 S. W. 2d, at 357. In separate opinions, Justice Dudley and Justice Gerald P. Brown agreed that Amendment 73 violates the Federal Constitution. Two justices dissented from the federal constitutional holding. Justice Hays started from “the premise that all political authority resides in the people, limited only by those provisions of the federal or state constitutions specifically to the contrary.” Id., at 281, 872 S. W. 2d, at 367. Because his examination of the text and history of the Qualifications Clauses convinced him that the Constitution contains no express or implicit restriction on the States’ ability to impose additional qualifications on candidates for Congress, Justice Hays concluded that § 3 is constitutional. Special Chief Justice Cracraft, drawing a distinction between a measure that “impose[s] an absolute bar on incumbent succession” and a measure that “merely makes it more difficult for an incumbent to be elected,” id., at 284, 872 S. W. 2d, at 368, concluded that Amendment 73 does not even implicate the Qualifications Clauses, and instead is merely a permissible ballot access restriction. The State of Arkansas, by its Attorney General, and the intervenors petitioned for writs of certiorari. Because of the importance of the issues, we granted both petitions and consolidated the cases for argument. See 512 U. S. 1218 (1994). We now affirm. II As the opinions of the Arkansas Supreme Court suggest, the constitutionality of Amendment 73 depends critically on the resolution of two distinct issues. The first is whether the Constitution forbids States to add to or alter the qualifications specifically enumerated in the Constitution. The second is, if the Constitution does so forbid, whether the fact that Amendment 73 is formulated as a ballot access restriction rather than as an outright disqualification is of constitutional significance. Our resolution of these issues draws upon our prior resolution of a related but distinct issue: whether Congress has the power to add to or alter the qualifications of its Members. Twenty-six years ago, in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486 (1969), we reviewed the history and text of the Qualifications Clauses in a case involving an attempted exclusion of a duly elected Member of Congress. The principal issue was whether the power granted to each House in Art. I, § 5, cl. 1, to judge the “Qualifications of its own Members” includes the power to impose qualifications other than those set forth in the text of the Constitution. In an opinion by Chief Justice Warren for eight Members of the Court, we held that it does not. Because of the obvious importance of the issue, the Court’s review of the history and meaning of the relevant constitutional text was especially thorough. We therefore begin our analysis today with a full statement of what we decided in that case. The Issue in Powell In November 1966, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was elected from a District in New York to serve in the United States House of Representatives for the 90th Congress. Allegations that he had engaged in serious misconduct while serving as a committee chairman during the 89th Congress led to the appointment of a Select Committee to determine his eligibility to take his seat. That committee found that Powell met the age, citizenship, and residency requirements set forth in Art. I, § 2, cl. 2. The committee also found, however, that Powell had wrongfully diverted House funds for the use of others and himself and had made false reports on expenditures of foreign currency. Based on those findings, the House after debate adopted House Resolution 278, excluding Powell from membership in the House, and declared his seat vacant. See 395 U. S., at 489-493. Powell and several voters of the district from which he had been elected filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the House Resolution was invalid because Art. I, §2, cl. 2, sets forth the exclusive qualifications for House membership. We ultimately accepted that contention, concluding that the House of Representatives has no “authority to exclude any person, duly elected by his constituents, who meets all the requirements for membership expressly prescribed in the Constitution.” 395 U. S., at 522 (emphasis in original); see also id., at 547. In reaching that conclusion, we undertook a detailed historical review to determine the intent of the Framers. Though recognizing that the Constitutional Convention debates themselves were inconclusive, see id., at 532, we determined that the “relevant historical materials” reveal that Congress has no power to alter the qualifications in the text of the Constitution, id., at 522. Powell’s Reliance on History We started our analysis in Powell by examining the British experience with qualifications for membership in Parliament, focusing in particular on the experience of John Wilkes. While serving as a member of Parliament, Wilkes had published an attack on a peace treaty with France. This literary endeavor earned Wilkes a conviction for seditious libel and a 22-month prison sentence. In addition, Parliament declared Wilkes ineligible for membership and ordered him expelled. Despite (or perhaps because of) these difficulties, Wilkes was reelected several times. Parliament, however, persisted in its refusal to seat him. After several years of Wilkes’ efforts, the House of Commons voted to expunge the resolutions that had expelled Wilkes and had declared him ineligible, labeling those prior actions “‘subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this kingdom.’” Id., at 528, quoting 22 Parliamentary History of England 1411 (1782) (Parl. Hist. Eng.). After reviewing Wilkes’ “long and bitter struggle for the right of the British electorate to be represented by men of their own choice,” 395 U. S., at 528, we concluded in Powell that “on the eve of the Constitutional Convention, English precedent stood for the proposition that ‘the law of the land had regulated the qualifications of members to serve in parliament’ and those qualifications were ‘not occasional but fixed.’” Ibid., quoting 16 Parl. Hist. Eng. 589, 590 (1769). Against this historical background, we viewed the Convention debates as manifesting the Framers’ intent that the qualifications in the Constitution be fixed and exclusive. We found particularly revealing the debate concerning a proposal made by the Committee of Detail that would have given Congress the power to add property qualifications. James Madison argued that such a power would vest “‘an improper & dangerous power in the Legislature,’ ” by which the Legislature “‘can by degrees subvert the Constitution.’” 395 U. S., at 533-534, quoting 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 249-250 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (hereinafter Farrand). Madison continued: “‘A Republic may be converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy as well by limiting the number capable of being elected, as the number authorised to elect.’ ” 395 U. S., at 534, quoting 2 Farrand 250. We expressly noted that the “parallel between Madison’s arguments and those made in Wilkes’ behalf is striking.” 395 U. S., at 534. The Framers further revealed their concerns about congressional abuse of power when Gouverneur Morris suggested modifying the proposal of the Committee of Detail to grant Congress unfettered power to add qualifications. We noted that Hugh Williamson “expressed concern that if a majority of the legislature should happen to be ‘composed of any particular description of men, of lawyers for example, ... the future elections might be secured to their own body.’ ” Id., at 535, quoting 2 Farrand 250. We noted, too, that Madison emphasized the British Parliament’s attempts to regulate qualifications, and that he observed: “ ‘[T]he abuse they had made of it was a lesson worthy of our attention.’ ” 395 U. S., at 535, quoting 2 Farrand 250. We found significant that the Convention rejected both Morris’ modification and the Committee’s proposal. We also recognized in Powell that the post-Convention ratification debates confirmed that the Framers understood the qualifications in the Constitution to be fixed and unalterable by Congress. For example, we noted that in response to the antifederalist charge that the new Constitution favored the wealthy and well born, Alexander Hamilton wrote: “‘The truth is that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference apprehended but by prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect or be elected. But this forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national government. . . . The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the legislature.’” 395 U. S., at 539, quoting The Federalist No. 60, p. 371 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis added) (hereinafter The Federalist). We thus attached special significance to “Hamilton’s express reliance on the immutability of the qualifications set forth in the Constitution.” 395 U. S., at 540. Moreover, we reviewed the debates at the state conventions and found that they “also demonstrate the Framers’ understanding that the qualifications for members of Congress had been fixed in the Constitution.” Ibid.; see, e. g., id., at 541, citing 3 Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 8 (J. Elliot ed. 1863) (hereinafter Elliot’s Debates) (Wilson Carey Nicholas, Virginia). The exercise by Congress of its power to judge the qualifications of its Members further confirmed this understanding. We concluded that, during the first 100 years of its existence, “Congress strictly limited its power to judge the qualifications of its members to those enumerated in the Constitution.” 395 U. S., at 542. As this elaborate summary reveals, our historical analysis in Powell was both detailed and persuasive. We thus conclude now, as we did in Powell, that history shows that, with respect to Congress, the Framers intended the Constitution to establish fixed qualifications. Powell’s Reliance on Democratic Principles In Powell, of course, we did not rely solely on an analysis of the historical evidence, but instead complemented that analysis with “an examination of the basic principles of our democratic system.” Id., at 548. We noted that allowing Congress to impose additional qualifications would violate that “fundamental principle of our representative democracy . . . ‘that the people should choose whom they please to govern them.’” Id., at 547, quoting 2 Elliot’s Debates 257 (A. Hamilton, New York). Our opinion made clear that this broad principle incorporated at least two fundamental ideas. First, we emphasized the egalitarian concept that the opportunity to be elected was open to all. We noted in particular Madison’s statement in The Federalist that “ ‘[u]nder these reasonable limitations [enumerated in the Constitution], the door of this part of the federal government is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith.’ ” Powell, 395 U. S., at 540, n. 74, quoting The Federalist No. 52, at 326. Similarly, we noted that Wilson Carey Nicholas defended the Constitution against the charge that it “violated democratic principles” by arguing: “ ‘It has ever been considered a great security to liberty, that very few should be excluded from the right of being chosen to the legislature. This Constitution has amply attended to this idea. We find no qualifications required except those of age and residence.’ ” 395 U. S., at 541, quoting 3 Elliot’s Debates 8. Second, we recognized the critical postulate that sovereignty is vested in the people, and that sovereignty confers on the people the right to choose freely their representatives to the National Government. For example, we noted that “Robert Livingston . . . endorsed this same fundamental principle: ‘The people are the best judges who ought to represent .them. To dictate and control them, to tell them whom they shall not elect, is to abridge their natural rights.’” 395 U. S., at 541, n. 76, quoting 2 Elliot’s Debates 292-293. Similarly, we observed that “[b]efore the New York convention ..., Hamilton emphasized: ‘The true principle of a republic is, that the people should choose whom they please to govern them. Representation is imperfect in proportion as the current of popular favor is checked. This great source of free government, popular election, should be perfectly pure, and the most unbounded liberty allowed.’” 395 U. S., at 540-541, quoting 2 Elliot’s Debates 257. Quoting from the statement made in 1807 by the Chairman of the House Committee on Elections, we noted that “restrictions upon the people to choose their own representatives must be limited to those ‘absolutely necessary for the safety of the society.’” 395 U. S., at 543, quoting 17 Annals of Cong. 874 (1807). Thus, in Powell, we agreed with the sentiment expressed on. behalf of Wilkes’ admission to Parliament: “ ‘That the right of the electors to be represented by men of their own choice, was so essential for the preservation of all their other rights, that it ought to be considered as one of the most sacred parts of our constitution.’” 395 U. S., at 534, n. 65, quoting 16 Parl. Hist. Eng. 589-590 (1769). Powell thus establishes two important propositions: first, that the “relevant historical materials” compel the conclusion that, at least with respect to qualifications imposed by Congress, the Framers intended the qualifications listed in the Constitution to be exclusive; and second, that that conclusion is equally compelled by an understanding of the “fundamental principle of our representative democracy . . . ‘that the people should choose whom they please to govern them.’” 395 U. S., at 547. Powell’s Holding Petitioners argue somewhat half-heartedly that the narrow holding in Powell, which involved the power of the House to exclude a Member pursuant to Art. I, § 5, does not control the more general question whether Congress has the power to add qualifications. Powell, however, is not susceptible to such a narrow reading. Our conclusion that Congress may not alter or add to the qualifications in the Constitution was integral to our analysis and outcome. See, e. g., id., at 540 (noting “Framers’ understanding that the qualifications for members of Congress had been fixed in the Constitution”). Only two Terms ago we confirmed this understanding of Powell in Nixon v. United States, 506 U. S. 224 (1993). After noting that the three qualifications for membership specified in Art. I, § 2, are of “a precise, limited nature” and “unalterable by the legislature,” we explained: “Our conclusion in Powell was based on the fixed meaning of ‘[qualifications’ set forth in Art. I, § 2. The claim by the House that its power to ‘be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members’ was a textual commitment of unreviewable authority was defeated by the existence of this separate provision specifying the only qualifications which might be imposed for House membership.” Id., at 237. Unsurprisingly, the state courts and lower federal courts have similarly concluded that Powell conclusively resolved the issue whether Congress has the power to impose additional qualifications. See, e. g., Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F. 2d 1523, 1528 (CA9 1983) (“In Powell . . . , the Supreme Court accepted this restrictive view of the Qualifications Clause— at least as applied to Congress”); Michel v. Anderson, 14 F. 3d 623 (CADC 1994) (citing Nixon’s description of Powell’s holding); Stumpf v. Lau, 108 Nev. 826, 830, 839 P. 2d 120, 122 (1992) (citing Powell for the proposition that “[n]ot even Congress has the power to alter qualifications for these constitutional federal officers”). In sum, after examining Powell’s historical analysis and its articulation of the “basic principles of our democratic system,” we reaffirm that the qualifications for service in Congress set forth in the text of the Constitution are “fixed,” at least in the sense that they may not be supplemented by Congress. Ill Our reaffirmation of Powell does not necessarily resolve the specific questions presented in these cases. For petitioners argue that whatever the constitutionality of additional qualifications for membership imposed by Congress, the historical and textual materials discussed in Powell do not support the conclusion that the Constitution prohibits additional qualifications imposed by States. In the absence of such a constitutional prohibition, petitioners argue, the Tenth Amendment and the principle of reserved powers require that States be allowed to add such qualifications. Before addressing these arguments, we find it appropriate to take note of the striking unanimity among the courts that have considered the issue. None of the overwhelming array of briefs submitted by the parties and amici has called to our attention even a single case in which a state court or federal court has approved of a State’s addition of qualifications for a Member of Congress. To the contrary, an impressive number of courts have determined that States lack the authority to add qualifications. See, e. g., Chandler v. Howell, 104 Wash. 99, 175 P. 569 (1918); Eckwall v. Stadelman, 146 Ore. 439, 446, 30 P. 2d 1037, 1040 (1934); Stockton v. McFarland, 56 Ariz. 138, 144, 106 P. 2d 328, 330 (1940); State ex rel. Johnson v. Crane, 65 Wyo. 189, 197 P. 2d 864 (1948); Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F. Supp. 729, 731 (N. M. 1972); Stack v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 1295, 1297-1298 (ND Fla. 1970); Buckingham v. State, 42 Del. 405, 35 A. 2d 903, 905 (1944); Stumpf v. Lau, 108 Nev. 826, 830, 839 P. 2d 120, 123 (1992); Danielson v. Fitzsimmons, 232 Minn. 149, 151, 44 N. W. 2d 484, 486 (1950); In re Opinion of Judges, 79 S. D. 585, 587, 116 N. W. 2d 233, 234 (1962). Courts have struck down state-imposed qualifications in the form of term limits, see, e. g., Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068, 1081 (WD Wash. 1994); Stumpf v. Lau, 108 Nev., at 830, 839 P. 2d, at 123, district residency requirements, see, e. g., Hellmann v. Collier, 217 Md. 93, 100, 141 A. 2d 908, 911 (1958); Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F. Supp., at 731; Exon v. Tiemann, 279 F. Supp. 609, 613 (Neb. 1968); State ex rel. Chavez v. Evans, 79 N. M. 578, 581, 446 P. 2d 445, 448 (1968) (per curiam), loyalty oath requirements, see, e. g., Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177, 199, 76 A. 2d 332, 341, appeal dism’d, 340 U. S. 881 (1950); In re O’Connor, 173 Misc. 419, 421, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 758, 760 (Super. Ct. 1940), and restrictions on those convicted of felonies, see, e. g., Application of Ferguson, 57 Misc. 2d 1041, 1043, 294 N. Y. S. 2d 174, 176 (Super. Ct. 1968); Danielson v. Fitzsimmons, 232 Minn., at 151, 44 N. W. 2d, at 486; State ex rel. Eaton v. Schmahl, 140 Minn. 219, 220, 167 N. W. 481 (1918) (per curiam). Prior to Powell, the commentators were similarly unanimous. See, e. g., 1W. Blackstone, Commentaries, Appendix 213 (S. Tucker ed. 1803) (“[TJhese provisions, as they require qualifications which the constitution does not, may possibly be found to be nugatory”); 1 Story § 627 (each Member of Congress is “an officer of the union, deriving his powers and qualifications from the constitution, and neither created by, dependent upon, nor controllable by, the states”); 1 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 228, n. a (3d ed. 1836) (“[TJhe objections to the existence of any such power [on the part of the States to add qualifications are] . . . too palpable and weighty to admit of any discussion”); G. McCrary, American Law of Elections § 322 (4th ed. 1897) (“It is not competent for any State to add to or in any manner change the qualifications for a Federal office, as prescribed by the Constitution or laws of the United States”); T. Cooley, General Principles of Constitutional Law 268 (2d ed. 1891) (“The Constitution and laws of the United States determine what shall be the qualifications for federal offices, and state constitutions and laws can neither add to nor take away from them”); C. Burdick, Law of the American Constitution 160 (1922) (“It is clearly the intention of the Constitution that all persons not disqualified by the terms of that instrument should be eligible to the federal office of Representative”); id., at 165 (“It is as clear that States have no more right to add to the constitutional qualifications of Senators than they have to add to those for Representatives”); Warren 422 (“The elimination of all power in Congress to fix qualifications clearly left the provisions of the Constitution itself as the sole source of qualifications”). This impressive and uniform body of judicial decisions and learned commentary indicates that the obstacles confronting petitioners are formidable indeed. Petitioners argue that the Constitution contains no express prohibition against state-added qualifications, and that Amendment 73 is therefore an appropriate exercise of a State’s reserved power to place additional restrictions on the choices that its own voters may make. We disagree for two independent reasons. First, we conclude that the power to add qualifications is not within the “original powers” of the States, and thus is not reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. Second, even if States possessed some original power in this area, we conclude that the Framers intended the Constitution to be the exclusive source of qualifications for Members of Congress, and that the Framers thereby “divested” States of any power to add qualifications. The “plan of the convention” as illuminated by the historical materials, our opinions, and the text of the Tenth Amendment draws a basic distinction between the powers of the newly created Federal Government and the powers retained by the pre-existing sovereign States. As Chief Justice Marshall explained, “it was neither necessary nor proper to define the powers retained by the States. These powers proceed, not from the people of America, but from the people of the several States; and remain, after the adoption of the constitution, what they were before, except so far as they may be abridged by that instrument.” Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 193 (1819). This classic statement by the Chief Justice endorsed Hamilton’s reasoning in The Federalist No. 32 that the plan of the Constitutional Convention did not contemplate “[a]n entire consolidation of the States into one complete national sovereignty,” but only a partial consolidation in which “the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States.” The Federalist No. 32, at 198. The text of the Tenth Amendment unambiguously confirms this principle: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” As we have frequently noted, “[t]he States unquestionably do retain a significant measure of sovereign authority. They do so, however, only to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government.” Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 549 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 155-156 (1992). Source of the Power Contrary to petitioners’ assertions, the power to add qualifications is not part of the original powers of sovereignty that the Tenth Amendment reserved to the States. Petitioners’ Tenth Amendment argument misconceives the nature of the right at issue because that Amendment could only “reserve” that which existed before. As Justice Story recognized, “the states can exercise no powers whatsoever, which exclusively spring out of the existence of the national government, which the constitution does not delegate to them. ... No state can say, that it has reserved, what it never possessed.” 1 Story §627. Justice Story’s position thus echoes that of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). In McCulloch, the Court rejected the argument that the Constitution’s silence on the subject of state power to tax corporations chartered by Congress implies that the States have “reserved” power to tax such federal instrumentalities. As Chief Justice Marshall pointed out, an “original right to tax” such federal entities “never existed, and the question whether it has been surrendered, cannot arise.” Id., at 430. See also Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 46 (1868). In language that presaged Justice Story’s argument, Chief Justice Marshall concluded: “This opinion does not deprive the States of any resources which they originally possessed.” 4 Wheat., at 436. With respect to setting qualifications for service in Congress, no such right existed before the Constitution was ratified. The contrary argument overlooks the revolutionary character of the Government that the Framers conceived. Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the States had joined together under the Articles of Confederation. In that system, “the States retained most of their sovereignty, like independent nations bound together only by treaties.” Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1, 9 (1964). After the Constitutional Convention convened, the Framers were presented with, and eventually adopted a variation of, “a plan not merely to amend the Articles of Confederation but to create an entirely new National Government with a National Executive, National Judiciary, and a National Legislature.” Id., at 10. In adopting that plan, the Framers envisioned a uniform national system, rejecting the notion that the Nation was a collection of States, and instead creating a direct link between the National Government and the people of the United States. See, e. g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 791 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“The Constitution . . . permitted] direct contact between the National Government and the individual citizen”). In that National Government, representatives owe primary allegiance not to the people of a State, but to the people of the Nation. As Justice Story observed, each Member of Congress is “an officer of the union, deriving his powers and qualifications from the constitution, and neither created by, dependent upon, nor controllable by, the states. .. . Those officers owe their existence and functions to the united voice of the whole, not of a portion, of the people.” 1 Story §627. Representatives and Senators are as much officers of the entire Union as is the President. States thus “have just as much right, and no more, to prescribe new qualifications for a representative, as they have for a president.... It is no original prerogative of state power to appoint a representative, a senator, or president for the union.” Ibid. We believe that the Constitution reflects the Framers’ general agreement with the approach later articulated by Justice Story. For example, Art. I, §5, cl. 1, provides: “Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members.” The text of the Constitution thus gives the representatives of all the people the final say in judging the qualifications of the representatives of any one State. For this reason, the dissent falters when it states that “the people of Georgia have no say over whom the people of Massachusetts select to represent them in Congress.” Post, at 859. Two other sections of the Constitution further support our view of the Framers’ vision. First, consistent with Story’s view, the Constitution provides that the salaries of representatives should “be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States,” Art. I, § 6, rather than by individual States. The salary provisions reflect the view that representatives owe their allegiance to the people, and not to the States. Second, the provisions governing elections reveal the Framers’ understanding that powers over the election of federal officers had to be delegated to, rather than reserved by, the States. It is surely no coincidence that the context of federal elections provides one of the few areas in which the Constitution expressly requires action by the States, namely that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.” Art. I, §4, cl. 1. This duty parallels the duty under Article II that “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors.” Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. These Clauses are express delegations of power to the States to act with respect to federal elections. This conclusion is consistent with our previous recognition that, in certain limited contexts, the power to regulate the incidents of the federal system is not a reserved power of the States, but rather is delegated by the Constitution. Thus, we have noted that “[w]hile, in a loose sense, the right to vote for representatives in Congress is sometimes spoken of as a right derived from the states, . . . this statement is true only in the sense that the states are authorized by the Constitution, to legislate on the subject as provided by § 2 of Art. I.” United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 315 (1941). Cf. Hawke v. Smith, No. 1, 253 U. S. 221, 230 (1920) (“[T]he power to ratify a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution has its source in the Federal Constitution. The act of ratification by the State derives its authority from the Federal Constitution to which the State and its people have alike assented”). In short, as the Framers recognized, electing representatives to the National Legislature was a new right, arising from the Constitution itself. The Tenth Amendment thus provides no basis for concluding that the States possess reserved power to add qualifications to those that are fixed in the Constitution. Instead, any state power to set the qualifications for membership in Congress must derive not from the reserved powers of state sovereignty, but rather from the delegated powers of national sovereignty. In the absence of any constitutional delegation to the States of power to add qualifications to those enumerated in the Constitution, such a power does not exist. The Preclusion of State Power Even if we believed that States possessed as part of their original powers some control over congressional qualifications, the text and structure of the Constitution, the relevant historical materials, and, most importantly, the “basic principles of our democratic system” all demonstrate that the Qualifications Clauses were intended to preclude the States from exercising any such power and to fix as exclusive the qualifications in the Constitution. Much of the historical analysis was undertaken by the Court in Powell. See supra, at 789-793. There is, however, additional historical evidence that pertains directly to the power of the States. That evidence, though perhaps not as extensive as that reviewed in Powell, leads unavoidably to the conclusion that the States lack the power to add qualifications. The Convention and Ratification Debates The available affirmative evidence indicates the Framers’ intent that States have no role in the setting of qualifications. In Federalist Paper No. 52, dealing with the House of Representatives, Madison addressed the “qualifications of the electors and the elected.” The Federalist No. 52, at 325. Madison first noted the difficulty in achieving uniformity in the qualifications for electors, which resulted in the Framers’ decision to require only that the qualifications for federal electors be the same as those for state electors. Madison argued that such a decision “must be satisfactory to every State, because it is comfortable to the standard already established, or which may be established, by the State itself.” Id., at 326. Madison then explicitly contrasted the state control over the qualifications of electors with the lack of state control over the qualifications of the elected: “The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and properly defined by the State constitutions, and being at the same time more susceptible of uniformity, have been very properly considered and regulated by the convention. A representative of the United States must be of the age of twenty-five years; must have been seven years a citizen of the United States; must, at the time of his election be an inhabitant of the State he is to represent; and, during the time of his service must be in no office under the United States. Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the federal government is open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith.” Ibid. Madison emphasized this same idea in The Federalist No. 57: “Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people.” The Federalist No. 57, at 351 (emphasis added). The provisions in the Constitution governing federal elections confirm the Framers’ intent that States lack power to add qualifications. The Framers feared that the diverse interests of the States would undermine the National Legislature, and thus they adopted provisions intended to minimize the possibility of state interference with federal elections. For example, to prevent discrimination against federal electors, the Framers required in Art. I, § 2, cl. 1, that the qualifications for federal electors be the same as those for state electors. As Madison noted, allowing States to differentiate between the qualifications for state and federal electors “would have rendered too dependent on the State governments that branch of the federal government which ought to be dependent on the people alone.” The Federalist No. 52, at 326. Similarly, in Art. I, §4, cl. 1, though giving the States the freedom to regulate the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections,” the Framers created a safeguard against state abuse by giving Congress the power to “by Law make or alter such Regulations.” The Convention debates make clear that the Framers’ overriding concern was the potential for States’ abuse of the power to set the “Times, Places and Manner” of elections. Madison noted that “[i]t was impossible to foresee all the abuses that might be made of the discretionary power.” 2 Farrand 240. Gouverneur Morris feared that “the States might make false returns and then make no provisions for new elections.” Id., at 241. When Charles Pinckney and John. Rutledge moved to strike the congressional safeguard, the motion was soundly defeated. Id., at 240-241. As Hamilton later noted: “Nothing can be more evident than that an exclusive power of regulating elections for the national government, in the hands of the State legislatures, would leave the existence of the Union entirely at their mercy.” The Federalist No. 59, at 363. See also ibid, (one justification for Times, Places and Manner Clause is that “[i]f we are in a humor to presume abuses of power, it is as fair to presume them on the part of the State governments as on the part of the general government”). The Framers’ discussion of the salary of representatives reveals similar concerns. When the issue was first raised, Madison argued that congressional compensation should be fixed in the Constitution, rather than left to state legislatures, because otherwise “it would create an improper dependence.” 1 Farrand 216. George Mason agreed, noting that “the parsimony of the States might reduce the provision so low that... the question would be not who were most fit to be chosen, but who were most willing to serve.” Ibid. When the issue was later reopened, Nathaniel Gorham stated that he “wished not to refer the matter to the State Legislatures who were always paring down salaries in such a manner as to keep out of offices men most capable of executing the functions of them.” Id., at 372. Edmund Randolph agreed that “[i]f the States were to pay the members of the National] Legislature, a dependence would be created that would vitiate the whole System.” Ibid. Rufus King “urged the danger of creating a dependence on the States,” ibid., and Hamilton noted that “[t]hose who pay are the masters of those who are paid,” id., at 373. The Convention ultimately agreed to vest in Congress the power to set its own compensation. See Art. I, § 6. In light of the Framers’ evident concern that States would try to undermine the National Government, they could not have intended States to have the power to set qualifications. Indeed, one of the more anomalous consequences of petitioners’ argument is that it accepts federal supremacy over the procedural aspects of determining the times, places, and manner of elections while allowing the States carte blanche with respect to the substantive qualifications for membership in Congress. The dissent nevertheless contends that the Framers’ distrust of the States with respect to elections does not preclude the people of the States from adopting eligibility requirements to help narrow their own choices. See post, at 888-889. As the dissent concedes, post, at 893, however, the Framers were unquestionably concerned that the States would simply not hold elections for federal officers, and therefore the Framers gave Congress the power to “make or alter” state election regulations. Yet under the dissent’s approach, the States could achieve exactly the same result by simply setting qualifications for federal office sufficiently high that no one could meet those qualifications. In our view, it is inconceivable that the Framers would provide a specific constitutional provision to ensure that federal elections would be held while at the same time allowing States to render those elections meaningless by simply ensuring' that no candidate could be qualified for office. Given the Framers’ wariness over the potential for state abuse, we must conclude that the specification of fixed qualifications in the constitutional text was intended to prescribe uniform rules that would preclude modification by either Congress or the States. We find further evidence of the Framers’ intent in Art. I, § 5, cl. 1, which provides: “Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members.” That Art. I, §5, vests a federal tribunal with ultimate authority to judge a Member’s qualifications is fully consistent with the understanding that those qualifications are fixed in the Federal Constitution, but not with the understanding that they can be altered by the States. If the States had the right to prescribe additional qualifications— such as property, educational, or professional qualifications— for their own representatives, state law would provide the standard for judging a Member’s eligibility. As we concluded in Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875), federal questions are generally answered finally by federal tribunals because rights which depend on federal law “should be the same everywhere” and “their construction should be uniform.” Id., at 632. The judging of questions concerning rights which depend on state law is not, however, normally assigned to federal tribunals. See id., at 636. The Constitution’s provision for each House to be the judge of its own qualifications thus provides further evidence that the Framers believed that the primary source of those qualifications would be federal law. We also find compelling the complete absence in the ratification debates of any assertion that States had the power to add qualifications. In those debates, the question whether to require term limits, or “rotation,” was a major source of controversy. The draft of the Constitution that was submitted for ratification contained no provision for rotation. In arguments that echo in the preamble to Arkansas’ Amendment 73, opponents of ratification condemned the absence of a rotation requirement, noting that “there is no doubt that senators will hold their office perpetually; and in this situation, they must of necessity lose their dependence, and their attachments to the people.” Even proponents of ratification expressed concern about the “abandonment in every instance of the necessity of rotation in office.” At several ratification conventions, participants proposed amendments that would have required rotation. The Federalists’ responses to those criticisms and proposals addressed the merits of the issue, arguing that rotation was incompatible with the people’s right to choose. As we noted above, Robert Livingston argued: “The people are the best judges who ought to represent them. To dictate and control them, to tell them whom they shall not elect, is to abridge their natural rights. This rotation is an absurd species of ostracism.” 2 Elliot’s Debates 292-293. Similarly, Hamilton argued that the representatives’ need for reelection rather than mandatory rotation was the more effective way to keep representatives responsive to the people, because “[w]hen a man knows he must quit his station, let his merit be what it may, he will turn his attention chiefly to his own emolument.” Id., at 320. Regardless of which side has the better of the debate over rotation, it is most striking that nowhere in the extensive ratification debates have we found any statement by either a proponent or an opponent of rotation that the draft constitution would permit States to require rotation for the representatives of their own citizens. If the participants in the debate had believed that the States retained the authority to impose term limits, it is inconceivable that the Federalists would not have made this obvious response to the arguments of the pro-rotation forces. The absence in an otherwise freewheeling debate of any suggestion that States had the power to impose additional qualifications unquestionably reflects the Framers’ common understanding that States lacked that power. In short, if it had been assumed that States could add additional qualifications, that assumption would have provided the basis for a powerful rebuttal to the arguments being advanced. The failure of intelligent and experienced advocates to utilize this argument must reflect a general agreement that its premise was unsound, and that the power to add qualifications was one that the Constitution denied the States. Congressional Experience Congress’ subsequent experience with state-imposed qualifications provides further evidence of the general consensus on the lack of state power in this area. In Powell, we examined that experience and noted that during the first 100 years of its existence, “Congress strictly limited its power to judge the qualifications of its members to those enumerated in the Constitution.” 395 U. S., at 542. Congress first confronted the issue in 1807 when it faced a challenge to the qualifications of William McCreery, a Representative from Maryland who allegedly did not satisfy a residency requirement imposed by that State. In recommending that Mc-Creery be seated, the Report of the House Committee on Elections noted: “ ‘The committee proceeded to examine the Constitution, with relation to the case submitted to them, and find that qualifications of members are therein determined, without reserving any authority to the State Legislatures to change, add to, or diminish those qualifications; and that, by that instrument, Congress is constituted the sole judge of the qualifications prescribed by it, and are obliged to decide agreeably to the Constitutional rules Powell, 395 U. S., at 542, quoting 17 Annals of Cong. 871 (1807) (emphasis added). The Chairman of the House Committee on Elections elaborated during debate: “ ‘The Committee of Elections considered the qualifications of members to have been unalterably determined by the Federal Convention, unless changed by an authority equal to that which framed the Constitution at first; that neither the State nor the Federal Legislatures are vested with authority to add to those qualifications, so as to change them.’ ” Powell, 395 U. S., at 542-543, quoting from 17 Annals of Cong. 872 (1807). As we noted in Powell, the congressional debate over the committee’s recommendation tended to focus on the “narrow issue of the power of the States to add to the standing qualifications set forth in the Constitution,” 395 U. S., at 543. The whole House, however, did not vote on the committee’s Report, and instead voted only on a simple resolution: “Resolved, That William McCreery is entitled to his seat in this House.” 17 Annals of Cong. 1238 (1807). That resolution passed by a vote of 89 to 18. Ibid. Though the House Debate may be inconclusive, commentators at the time apparently viewed the seating of McCreery as confirmation of the States’ lack of power to add qualifications. For example, in a letter to Joseph Cabell, Thomas Jefferson noted the argument that “to add new qualifications to those of the Constitution would be as much an alteration as to detract from them”; he then added: “And so I think the House of Representatives of Congress decided in some case; I believe that of a member from Baltimore.” Letter of Jan. 31, 1814, to Joseph C. Cabell, in 14 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 82 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904). Similarly, for over 150 years prior to Powell, commentators viewed the seating of McCreery as an expression of the view of the House that States could not add to the qualifications established in the Constitution. Thus, for example, referring to the McCreery debates, one commentator noted, “By the decision in this case, [and that in another contested election], it seems to have been settled that the States have not a right to require qualifications from members, different from, or in addition to, those prescribed by the constitution.” Cases of Contested Elections in Congress 171 (M. Clarke & D. Hall eds. 1834) (emphasis in original). Other commentators viewed the incident similarly. See, e. g., G. Paschal, The Constitution of the United States 66 (1876) (citing McCreery to support the proposition that “[t]he Constitution having fixed the qualifications of members, no additional qualifications can rightfully be required by the States”) (emphasis in original); G. McCrary, American Law of Elections §323 (4th ed. 1897) (citing McCreery and stating “A state law requiring that a Representative in Congress shall reside in a particular town and country within the district from which he is chosen is unconstitutional and void”); W. Sutherland, Notes on the Constitution of the United States 40 (1904) (citing McCreery to support statement that “[tjhis clause fixes the qualifications of members so far as state action is concerned, and no additional qualifications can be required by the state”); C. Burdick, Law of the American Constitution 160 (1922) (citing McCreery to support the proposition that state-imposed “limitations have been held ... not to be effective”). Finally, it is clear that in Powell we viewed the seating of McCreery as the House’s acknowledgment that the qualifications in the Constitution were fixed. See 395 U. S., at 542-543. The Senate experience with state-imposed qualifications further supports our conclusions. In 1887, for example, the Senate seated Charles Faulkner of West Virginia, despite the fact that a provision of the West Virginia Constitution purported to render him ineligible to serve. The Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections unanimously concluded that “no State can prescribe any qualification to the office of United States Senator in addition to those declared in the Constitution of the United States.” S. Rep. No. 1, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1887). The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration reached the same conclusion in 1964 when faced with a challenge to Pierre Salinger, who had been appointed to serve as Senator from California. See S. Rep. No. 1381, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (“It is well settled that the qualifications established by the U. S. Constitution for the office of U. S. Senator are exclusive, and a State cannot, by constitutional or statutory provisions, add to or enlarge upon those qualifications”). We recognize, as we did in Powell, that “congressional practice has been erratic” and that the precedential value of congressional exclusion cases is “quite limited.” Powell, 395 U. S., at 545-546. Nevertheless, those incidents lend support to the result we reach today. Democratic Principles Our conclusion that States lack the power to impose qualifications vindicates the same “fundamental principle of our representative democracy” that we recognized in Powell, namely, that “the people should choose whom they please to govern them.” Id., at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted). As we noted earlier, the Powell Court recognized that an egalitarian ideal — that election to the National Legislature should be open to all people of merit — provided a critical foundation for the constitutional structure. This egalitarian theme echoes throughout the constitutional debates. In The Federalist No. 57, for example, Madison wrote: “Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people.” The Federalist No. 57, at 351. Similarly, hoping to persuade voters in New York that the Constitution should be ratified, John Stevens, Jr., wrote: “[N]o Government, that has ever yet existed in the world, affords so ample a field, to individuals of all ranks, for the display of political talents and abilities.... No man who has real merit, let his situation be what it will, need despair.” 1 Bailyn 487, 492. And Timothy Pickering noted that, “while several of the state constitutions prescribe certain degrees of property as indispensable qualifications for offices, this which is proposed for the U. S. throws the door wide open for the entrance of every man who enjoys the confidence of his fellow citizens.” Letter from T. Pickering to C. Tilling-hast (Dec. 24,1787), 1 Bailyn 289,290 (emphasis in original). Additional qualifications pose the same obstacle to open elections whatever their source. The egalitarian ideal, so valued by the Framers, is thus compromised to the same degree by additional qualifications imposed by States as by those imposed by Congress. Similarly, we believe that state-imposed qualifications, as much as congressionally imposed qualifications, would undermine the second critical idea recognized in Powell: that an aspect of sovereignty is the right of the people to vote for whom they wish. Again, the source of the qualification is of little moment in assessing the qualification’s restrictive impact. Finally, state-imposed restrictions, unlike the congressionally imposed restrictions at issue in Powell, violate a third idea central to this basic principle: that the right to choose representatives belongs not to the States, but to the people. From the start, the Framers recognized that the “great and radical vice” of the Articles of Confederation was “the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of whom they consist.” The Federalist No. 15, at 108 (Hamilton). Thus the Framers, in perhaps their most important contribution, conceived of a Federal Government directly responsible to the people, possessed of direct power over the people, and chosen directly, not by States, but by the people. See, e. g., supra, at 802-804. The Framers implemented this ideal most clearly in the provision, extant from the beginning of the Republic, that calls for the Members of the House of Representatives to be “chosen every second Year by the People of the several States.” Art. I, §2, cl. 1. Following the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, this ideal was extended to elections for the Senate. The Congress of the United States, therefore, is not a confederation of nations in which separate sovereigns are represented by appointed delegates, but is instead a body composed of representatives of the people. As Chief Justice John Marshall observed: “The government of the Union, then, ... is, emphatically, and truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., at 404-405. Ours is a “government of the people, by the people, for the people.” A. Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (1863). The Framers deemed this principle critical when they discussed qualifications. For example, during the debates on residency requirements, Morris noted that in the House, “the people at large, not the States, are represented.” 2 Farrand 217 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). Similarly, George Read noted that the Framers “were forming a Nati[ona]l Gov[ernmen]t and such a regulation would correspond little with the idea that we were one people.” Ibid, (emphasis in original). James Wilson “enforced the same consi