Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, District Judge. On October 29, 2010, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) and New York law, Mkubwa Matthews and Zambena Allan (“plaintiffs”) filed this action against the City of New York (“the City”) and individual defendants Sergeant Louis Marino, Police Officers Matthew Granahan, Kenneth Miller, and Vitali, and two unidentified members of the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), John Doe and Richard Roe (the “Individual Defendants,” together with the City, the “defendants”). Plaintiffs assert constitutional claims pursuant to Section 1983 against the Individual Defendants for unreasonable search and seizure, false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, excessive force, and failure to intervene, a Monell claim against the City for the same constitutional violations, and analogous claims under New York law. Presently before the court is defendants’ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Having reviewed the parties’ submissions and the relevant case law, for the reasons discussed below, defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part. BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from plaintiffs’ complaint (see ECF No. 1, Complaint (“Compl.”)) and are accepted as true for the purposes of this motion, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving plaintiffs. LaFaro v. New York Cardiothoracic Group, PLLC, 570 F.3d 471, 475-76 (2d Cir.2009). I. Statement of Facts A. The Assault of Plaintiff Allan On December 20, 2007, Matthews and his younger brother Alan attended a birthday party at Secrets Restaurant Bar & Lounge (“Secrets”) in Kings County, New York. (Compl. ¶ 29.) Before entering Secrets at approximately 1:00 AM, both plaintiffs were frisked for weapons. (Id. ¶¶ 29-30.) A few hours later, approximately fifteen unknown male patrons at Secrets robbed and attacked Alan, attempting to steal a gold chain worn around his neck. (Id. ¶¶ 31-32.) The assailants brutally assaulted Alan, repeatedly kicking, stomping, and punching him. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 33.) As a result of being badly beaten, Alan lost consciousness and defecated on himself, his eyes were swollen almost shut, his head was injured, and his nose and lips were bleeding. (Id. ¶¶ 34-35.) Additionally, Alan had cuts on his chest and his shirt was ripped and had kick marks on it. (Id. ¶ 35.) During the assault, Matthews did not know that Alan was being attacked because the beating occurred in a different area of Secrets from where the birthday party was held. (Id. ¶ 38.) Ater learning of the assault, Matthews came to Alan’s assistance and asked whether he was okay. (Id. ¶ 40.) Appearing dazed, Alan was unable to speak and was slipping in and out of consciousness. (Id. ¶ 41.) Three friends from the birthday party offered to drive plaintiffs a short distance to Kings County Hospital (the “Hospital”) in their vehicle, which the friends then drove to the entrance of Secrets to pick up the plaintiffs. (Id. ¶¶ 42-43.) Matthews and one of the friends helped Alan to the vehicle because Alan had trouble walking without assistance due to his injuries. (Id. ¶ 43.) In the interim, the Individual Defendants had arrived at Secrets in response to 911 calls reporting that a group of individuals had assaulted a Secrets patron and, “upon information and belief,” that those individuals then fired gunshots into the air outside of the establishment. (Id. ¶¶ 45-46.) Upon arrival, the Individual Defendants observed that Alan was a badly injured assault and robbery victim and that he had defecated on himself. (Id. ¶ 48.) The Individual Defendants also observed Matthews assisting his injured brother into their friends’ vehicle. (Id. ¶ 49.) The Individual Defendants did not see a bulge that could have been a weapon in the waistband of Matthews’ pants because his pants fit tightly and could not have concealed a weapon in the waistband. (Id. ¶ 51.) Moreover, the Individual Defendants did not hear plaintiffs say anything indicating that they were carrying a weapon. (Id. ¶ 52.) B.The Traffic Stop of Plaintiffs With plaintiffs in the vehicle, plaintiffs’ friends drove away from Secrets towards the Hospital, but the Individual Defendants stopped the vehicle en route to the Hospital. (Id. ¶¶ 53-56.) When one of the Individual Defendants approached the vehicle and demanded the driver’s license and registration, the driver requested an explanation for the traffic stop. (Id. ¶¶ 57-58.) The officer refused to explain the purpose of the traffic stop, and again requested the driver’s license and registration. (Id. ¶ 59.) The driver then complied with the officer’s repeated request to provide her license and registration. (Id. ¶¶ 59-60.) Thereafter, without explanation, the Individual Defendants ordered all of the vehicle occupants, including plaintiffs, to exit the vehicle. (Id. ¶ 61.) After the occupants had exited the vehicle, the Individual Defendants asked Matthews their destination, and Matthews explained that they were taking Allan to the Hospital for medical treatment after his assault. (Id. ¶¶ 62-64.) Although the Individual Defendants observed Allan’s injuries and knew he required medical assistance, they further detained plaintiffs and searched the vehicle without the occupants’ consent. (Id. ¶¶ 65-66.) The search revealed a gun inside the pocket of a jacket located in the vehicle. (Id. ¶ 67.) The Individual Defendants knew that the jacket and gun belonged to one of plaintiffs’ friends, and not to plaintiffs. (Id. ¶ 68.) Nevertheless, the Individual Defendants arrested all five of the vehicle occupants and transported them to the 77th Precinct. (Id. ¶¶ 69-70.) In effecting the arrests, the Individual Defendants “brutally handcuffed” plaintiffs, causing pain and numbness to plaintiffs’ wrists. (Id. ¶¶ 91, 97.) Plaintiffs asked the Individual Defendants to loosen the handcuffs, but they refused. (Id. ¶ 92.) C. The Coerced Confession At the 77th Precinct, the Individual Defendants denied Matthews’ requests to release Allan so that he could go to the Hospital and obtain medical attention. (Id. ¶¶ 75-76.) Although Matthews informed the Individual Defendants that the gun was not his and that he did not know who possessed it, the Individual Defendants attempted to coerce Matthews into signing a written confession by withholding medical treatment from his brother Allan. (Id. ¶¶ 74-75.) The Individual Defendants told all five arrestees that they would not be released and Allan would not receive medical attention until one of them signed a written confession admitting to possession of the gun. (Id. ¶ 71.) Because the individual who possessed the gun failed to confess, Matthews capitulated to police coercion and signed a written confession so that Allan could receive medical assistance. (Id. ¶¶ 72-74, 77-78.) At approximately 9:25 AM on December 20, 2007, approximately thirty minutes after Matthews signed a false confession, Allan and the three other vehicle occupants were released from custody. (Id. ¶¶ 79-80.) After his release, Allan sought medical treatment at the Hospital and was diagnosed with several ailments, including a detached retina from head trauma. (Id. ¶ 81.) D. The Prosecution of Plaintiff Matthews Matthews was subsequently charged with Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second and Third Degrees. (Id. ¶ 82.) The Individual Defendants provided false information to the Assistant District Attorney, the Grand Jury, and during suppression hearings to justify the stop and search of the vehicle occupied by plaintiffs and to explain Matthews’ arrest. (Id. ¶¶ 84-85.) Each of the Individual Defendants had a different version of the events occurring after they arrived at Secrets on the night of the arrest. (Id. ¶ 47.) Based on the Individual Defendants’ fabricated testimony, however, the Grand Jury indicted Matthews. (Id. ¶ 86.) Moreover, at a Mapp, Dunaway, and Huntley hearing on May 18 and 20, 2010, defendants Granahan, Miller, and Marino testified falsely about the stop, seizure, and search of the vehicle occupied by plaintiffs. (Id. ¶ 88.) On July 27, 2010, the charges against Matthews were dismissed, due to the inconsistent false statements made by the Individual Defendants. (Id. ¶ 89.) Before the charges were dismissed, Matthews had appeared in court on approximately nine occasions. (Id. ¶ 90.) E. Other Relevant Allegations From the time of the initial traffic stop on December 20, 2007 to the dismissal of Matthews’ charges on July 27, 2010, the Individual Defendants observed each other violate plaintiffs’ rights under the United States Constitution and did nothing to prevent the constitutional violations. (Id. ¶ 93.) Individual defendant Sergeant Marino has a history of police misconduct involving substantiated allegations of dishonesty. (Id. ¶ 99.) Specifically, the City and NYPD suspended Marino for thirty days and placed him on modified duty for three years because he failed to report and was untruthful about an incident where a friend and fellow police officer shot an individual. (Id. ¶ 101.) Although the City and its policy makers were aware of Mari-no’s prior misconduct, he nevertheless was promoted to sergeant and was given the supervisory responsibility to ensure that police officers adhere to police procedure, state law, and constitutional law. (Id. ¶ 100.) Finally, plaintiffs allege that the NYPD has a policy, practice, or custom (1) to search vehicles and apartments without probable cause, (2) to arrest all occupants of a vehicle or apartment regardless of whether the police have reason to believe weapons or contraband belong to a particular individual, and (3) to create false versions of events to justify their actions. (Id. ¶¶ 103-06.) F. Plaintiffs’ Claims On October 29, 2010, plaintiffs filed the instant complaint asserting constitutional claims pursuant to Section 1983 against the Individual Defendants for unreasonable search and seizure, false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, excessive force, and failure to intervene, and a Monell claim against the City for the same constitutional violations. Additionally, plaintiffs assert analogous claims under New York law against the Individual Defendants for false arrest and malicious prosecution, and against the City under the doctrine of respondeat superior. (Compl. ¶¶ 112, 114, 117, 123, 130.) Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of the Individual Defendants’ conduct, plaintiffs sustained “physical pain and suffering, as well as psychological and emotional trauma,” feared for their safety, and suffered humiliation. (Id. ¶¶ 98, 128.) Plaintiffs seek $2 million in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages, as well as costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. (Id. at 22.) G. The Instant Motion Defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings seeks the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims on the grounds that (1) plaintiffs fail to state a claim for each cause of action, (2) defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, and (3) the state law claims should be dismissed because plaintiffs failed to file a Notice of Claim and Allan failed to file suit within the statute of limitations. (See ECF No. 35-5, Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (“Defs. Mem.”) at 1-2, 19.) Plaintiffs filed an opposition brief to defendants’ motion (see ECF No. 33, Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (“Pis. Opp’n”)), and defendants filed a reply brief (see ECF No. 36, Defendants’ Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of their Motion to Dismiss (“Defs. Reply”)). DISCUSSION II. Standard for Judgment on the Pleadings In deciding a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, courts apply the same standard as that applicable to a motion to dismiss, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. LaFaro, 570 F.3d at 475-76. To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the “complaint must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”; “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. 1937. III. The Section 1983 Claims The plaintiffs bring claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged deprivation of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. In relevant part, Section 1983 provides that: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ..., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.... 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) the challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person who was acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States.” Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir.1999). The defendants do not appear to dispute that, at all relevant times, the Individual Defendants were acting under color of state law as NYPD employees. (See Compl. ¶¶ 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, 22.) Rather, defendants contend that plaintiffs fail to state a plausible cause of action for each of their constitutional and state law claims, or, in the alternative, that the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (Defs. Mem. at 1-2.) Each of plaintiffs’ constitutional claims under Section 1983 will be discussed in turn. A. Unreasonable Search and Seizure The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures....” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “An investigatory stop is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if supported by reasonable suspicion, and a warrantless search of a car is valid if based on probable cause.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) (citation omitted) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (investigatory stop); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991) (warrantless automobile search)). Plaintiffs allege that the Individual Defendants initially subjected them to an unreasonable search and seizure from the time of the traffic stop until the discovery of the firearm. (Compl. ¶¶ 107-08; Pls. Opp’n at 7-10.) Defendants argue that reasonable suspicion existed for the traffic stop, but do not appear to oppose plaintiffs’ argument that the Individual Defendants lacked probable cause for the vehicle search. (Defs. Reply 1-3.) 1. Reasonable Suspicion for the Terry Stop “Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, “the police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868). Such a detention is known as a Terry stop and requires that “the officer [have] a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause.” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.3d 207, 212 (2d Cir.2006). “The principal components of a determination of reasonable suspicion or probable cause will be the events which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable cause.” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657; see also Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000) (“The reasonableness of official suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew before they conducted their [seizure].”). While “[a]rticulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’ mean is not possible,” the Supreme Court has “described reasonable suspicion simply as ‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity....” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695-96, 116 S.Ct. 1657 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). Further, “the proper inquiry is not whether each fact considered in isolation denotes unlawful behavior, but whether all the facts taken together support a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.” United States v. Lee, 916 F.2d 814, 820 (2d Cir.1990); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (stating that courts must look at the “totality of the circumstances” when making reasonable-suspicion determinations). The court evaluates the totality of the facts from the perspective of a trained and experienced officer. See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.Ct. 690. When the Individual Defendants pulled over the vehicle, they seized plaintiffs within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Whren, 517 U.S. at 809-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769. Indeed, the parties do not dispute that the traffic stop constituted a Terry stop requiring reasonable suspicion. Rather, defendants argue that reasonable suspicion supported the Terry stop (see Defs. Reply at 1-3), and plaintiffs, in opposition, argue that “defendants lacked articulable facts that created grounds for reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity.” (Pls. Opp’n at 10.) The issue before the court, therefore, is whether plaintiffs state a plausible claim that the Individual Defendants lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the Terry stop. The court finds that plaintiffs’ claim for unreasonable seizure is supported by the allegations of the complaint and is plausible on its face. Specifically, the Individual Defendants observed that Allan required medical treatment after suffering an assault and witnessed Matthews helping him into their friends’ waiting car. The Individual Defendants did not, however, see plaintiffs perform any activity, gesture, or threat that might indicate they possessed guns, or would or did engage in criminal activity. Although Individual Defendants could have “believe[d] that plaintiffs had in fact been involved in some sort of criminal activity related to the [violent] incident” at Secrets (Defs. Reply at 3), such speculation, by itself, is insufficient evidence of reasonable suspicion for purposes of a Rule 12(c) motion to dismiss. Moreover, the Individual Defendants observed plaintiffs exit Secrets, enter the waiting car, and drive away, permitting plaintiffs to leave the scene. Given that Allan required assistance in walking to the car, the Individual Defendants likely had ample opportunity to approach and detain plaintiffs at Secrets if they had reasonable suspicion that plaintiffs were engaging in criminal activity. Although the limited shift in time and space would not negate reasonable suspicion if it existed before plaintiffs left Secrets, see Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dept., 840 F.2d 1139, 1144 (3d Cir.1988), it does support plaintiffs’ claim that the Individual Defendants permitted them to leave Secrets unimpeded due to a lack of reasonable suspicion to detain them (see Compl. ¶ 53). Accordingly, accepting as true plaintiffs’ allegations and drawing all inferences in plaintiffs’ favor, the time lapse between the assault at Secrets and the traffic stop en route to the Hospital — during which there was no activity or conduct by plaintiffs or their friends that would give rise to reasonable suspicion — also weighs against a finding of reasonable suspicion for the Terry stop. 2. Probable Cause for the Vehicle Search Given that the Individual Defendants lacked reasonable suspicion for the Terry stop, they also lacked probable cause for the automobile search. See United States v. Navas, 597 F.3d 492, 497 (2d Cir.2010) (“[L]aw enforcement [may] conduct a warrantless search of a readily mobile vehicle where there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.”). Based on plaintiffs’ allegations, the Individual Defendants did not observe any suspicious conduct by plaintiffs or the other vehicle occupants or learn any new information between plaintiffs’ departure from Secrets and the traffic stop. Consequently, the facts do not reflect any intervening circumstances after the unlawful traffic stop that support a finding of probable cause to search the vehicle; thus the search was plausibly unreasonable. Accordingly, plaintiffs allege facts that plausibly support a claim pursuant to Section 1983 for unreasonable search of the vehicle and seizure of the plaintiffs by defendants prior to the gun discovery. 3. Damages for Unreasonable Search and Seizure Under Section 1983, “[victims of unreasonable searches or seizures may recover damages directly related to the invasion of their privacy — including (where appropriate) damages for physical injury, property damage, injury to reputation, etc.; but such victims cannot be compensated for injuries that result from the discovery of incriminating evidence and consequent criminal prosecution.” Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir.1999). Indeed, “[t]he fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine ... is inapplicable to civil § 1983 actions.” Id. at 145. Thus, plaintiffs must allege damages attributable to the claims for unreasonable search and seizure to recover under Section 1983. Compare Davenport v. County of Suffolk, No. 99-CV-3088, 2007 WL 608125, at *2, *5-7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2007) (holding that damages from alleged unreasonable stop and seizure prior to arrest were compensable where Section 1983 plaintiff alleged he suffered “humiliation, ridicule, disgrace, and embarrassment, and has sustained substantial expense, and significant physical, emotion, and mental anguish, including substantial attorney fee’s [sic]”), with Townes, 176 F.3d at 145 (holding that the only actionable Fourth Amendment right for which the Section 1983 plaintiff could recover damages was for a suspicion-less taxi cab stop and the associated search and seizure of his person, “which alone might at most support slight or nominal damages,” and that plaintiff could not recover for his subsequent prosecution, conviction, and incarceration). If plaintiffs ultimately prove their claim for unreasonable search and seizure, they are entitled only to damages resulting directly from the invasion of privacy and not from the discovery of the firearm and the ensuing arrests and prosecution of Matthews. Here, plaintiffs adequately allege damages attributable to the detention during the initial vehicle stop and search, including psychological and emotional trauma, restriction of liberty, fear for their safety, physical pain and suffering, and humiliation. (Compl. ¶¶ 98, 128.) Accordingly, plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim under Section 1988 for damages stemming from an unreasonable stop, search, and seizure prior to the discovery of the gun and their arrests. See Davenport, 2007 WL 608125, at *7 (“[S]uch damages are clearly available to [plaintiff] if he can prove that a Fourth Amendment violation of his rights occurred during the initial stop and search of his person prior to arrest. Under Second Circuit law, [plaintiff] is entitled to a trial even if he is only able to recover slight or nominal damages.” (citing Townes, 176 F.3d at 146)). 4. Qualified Immunity In the alternative, defendants argue that the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiffs’ claims for unreasonable search and seizure because “reasonable officers could disagree as to whether there was reasonable suspicion to conduct such an investigatory stop.” (Defs. Reply at 6.) “Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages as a result of their performance of discretionary functions, and serves to protect government officials from the burdens of costly, but insubstantial, lawsuits.” Hartline v. Gallo, 546 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). As qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, the defendants bear the burden of proof. Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 149 (2d Cir.2012). In order to deny qualified immunity to a government official, a court must find both that (1) the plaintiff has alleged facts that comprise a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) that the violated constitutional right was “clearly established” at the time of the official’s alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that a federal court may use “discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand”). Moreover, “ ‘[e]ven where the law is ‘clearly established’ and the scope of an official’s permissible conduct is ‘clearly defined,’ the qualified immunity defense also protects an official if it was ‘objectively reasonable’ for him at the time of the challenged action to believe his acts were lawful.’ ” Taravella v. Town of Wolcott, 599 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 169-70 (2d Cir.2007)). “That is, officers are entitled to qualified immunity if ‘officers of reasonable competence could disagree’ as to legality of their action.” Felmine v. City of New York, No. 09-CV-3768, 2011 WL 4543268, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)). The objective reasonableness inquiry of whether the shield of qualified immunity applies to a defendant’s conduct is a mixed question of law and fact. Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir.2004). First, as stated above, plaintiffs allege a plausible claim for unreasonable search and seizure. Second, “the law was clearly established that [plaintiffs] had a constitutional right to be free from arrest without probable cause, as well as a constitutional right to be free from unreasonably prolonged or intrusive investigative detention.” Gilles v. Repicky, 511 F.3d 239, 247 (2d Cir.2007) (reversing district court’s grant of qualified immunity because the officer did not demonstrate an objectively reasonable belief that he was not violating plaintiffs clearly established constitutional rights); see also Kuriakose v. City of Mt. Vernon, 41 F.Supp.2d 460, 469 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (“[T]he law on investigative stops was clearly established at the time of plaintiffs stop, and the officers should have known that such a stop required reasonable suspicion”); Signorile v. City of New York, 887 F.Supp. 403, 412 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (“[C]learly established as constitutional rights are the prerogatives not to be arrested or searched, other than in a frisk grounded in reasonable suspicion, without probable cause.”). At this stage, for purposes of deciding defendants’ motion, the facts alleged do not support a finding that it was “objectively reasonable” for the Individual Defendants to believe there was reasonable suspicion for the investigatory stop and probable cause for the vehicle search. Indeed, on the facts alleged by plaintiffs, a reasonably competent officer would not believe he had reasonable suspicion to stop and search a vehicle transporting an injured assault victim to a hospital to obtain medical care. Accordingly, the Individual Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiffs’ unreasonable search and seizure claim at this time. B. False Arrest and Imprisonment A Section 1983 claim for false arrest sounding in the Fourth Amendment is “substantially the same” as a claim for false arrest under New York law. Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir.1996)). Under New York law, the torts of false arrest and false imprisonment are “synonymous,” Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir.1991), and the elements of a false imprisonment claim are: “(1) the defendant intended to confine [the plaintiff], (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Jocks, 316 F.3d at 134-35 (internal quotation marks omitted). The existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes a “complete defense” to an action for false arrest, whether that action is brought under Section 1983 or state law. Amore v. Novarro, 624 F.3d 522, 536 (2d Cir.2010). 1. The Applicability of the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine Although the Individual Defendants plausibly lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop and probable cause for the search that led to the discovery of the firearm (see supra Section III A), it does not follow that the Individual Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs. See Townes, 176 F.3d at 145-46. Plaintiffs’ theory of liability amounts to a civil version of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine for excluding evidence in criminal proceedings. As noted above, however, the Second Circuit has held “that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine may not be invoked to support a § 1983 civil action, because the doctrine ‘is an evidentiary rule that operates in the context of criminal procedure ... and as such has generally been held to apply only in criminal trials.’ ” Lawrence v. City Cadillac, No. 10 Civ. 3324, 2010 WL 5174209, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2010) (quoting Townes, 176 F.3d at 145); see also Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 91 n. 16 (2d Cir.2007) (noting that “the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine cannot be invoked to support a section 1983 claim” for false arrest). Because the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is unavailable for Section 1983 claimants, the firearm seized by the Individual Defendants pursuant to the allegedly unlawful traffic stop and search may provide probable cause for plaintiffs’ arrest for purposes of their false arrest and imprisonment claims. See, e.g., Lawrence, 2010 WL 5174209, at *5 (finding that the “the legality of the traffic stop does not impact plaintiffs claim for false arrest”). 2. The Statutory Automobile Presumption of Constructive Firearm Possession Under New York Penal Law § 265.15(3), the existence of a firearm in an automobile creates a permissive — not mandatory — presumption that all occupants of the vehicle have common constructive possession of the firearm, absent specific exceptions (the “Automobile Presumption”). County Ct. of Ulster Cnty., N.Y. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 162-63, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979) (holding the statute constitutional as applied as a permissive presumption). The Automobile Presumption does not apply if (1) the firearm is found on an occupant’s person; (2) the vehicle is lawfully operated as a taxi, in which instance the duly licensed driver is not subject to the presumption; or (3) an occupant has in his possession a valid license to have and carry a firearm. N.Y. Penal Law § 265.15(3). It is well-settled under New York law that the Automobile Presumption may provide probable cause for the arrest of all occupants of a vehicle. See People v. Ayen, 55 A.D.3d 1305, 864 N.Y.S.2d 591, 593 (N.Y.App.Div. 4th Dept.2008) (finding a “legitimate basis for the arrest pursuant to the [A]utomobile [P]resumption” where the defendant was in another person’s vehicle and the police found a gun in the vehicle, despite defendant’s contention that the gun belonged to the vehicle’s owner); People v. Williams, 17 A.D.3d 1043, 794 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 (N.Y.App.Div. 4th Dept. 2005) (finding probable cause for vehicle occupant’s arrest pursuant to the Automobile Presumption where police officers observed a handgun in plain view on a minivan seat); People v. Gordon, 282 A.D.2d 868, 725 N.Y.S.2d 423, 425 (N.Y.App. Div.3d Dept.2001) (affirming denial of motion to suppress because the Automobile Presumption “provided probable cause for defendant’s arrest”); People v. Miller, 237 A.D.2d 535, 655 N.Y.S.2d 579, 579 (N.Y.App.Div.2d Dept.1997) (finding that, pursuant to the Automobile Presumption, police officers had probable cause to arrest the occupants of a vehicle upon discovering the butt of a gun sticking out from under the driver’s seat). Moreover, the Automobile Presumption “may apply regardless of the length of time an occupant is in a vehicle or whether an occupant knows about the presence of the gun.” Gomez-Kadawid v. Kirkpatrick, No. 08 Civ. 5819, 2011 WL 2581838, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2011) (Report and Recommendation) (citing People v. Terry, 148 A.D.2d 478, 538 N.Y.S.2d 626, 627 (N.Y.App.Div.2d Dept.1989)), adopted by 2011 WL 2581835 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2011). Defendants argue that the Automobile Presumption provided probable cause for the Individual Defendants to arrest all vehicle occupants, including plaintiffs. (Defs. Mem. at 7-8.) Plaintiffs argue in response that the Individual Defendants did not have probable cause for the arrest because they allegedly knew of other circumstances, including that the jacket and the gun did not belong to plaintiffs (Compl. ¶ 68), that should have negated the Automobile Presumption (Pis. Opp’n at 12-18). In essence, plaintiffs argue that police officers must evaluate the totality of the circumstances before applying the Automobile Presumption. (Id. at 12-17, 20.) Here, the circumstances under which the firearm was discovered in the vehicle do not provide a basis to apply any of the statutory exceptions to the Automobile Presumption. Although the firearm was discovered within a personal effect, a jacket pocket, the jacket was located in the vehicle and was not being worn or claimed by any of the occupants, who had exited the vehicle before the discovery of the firearm. The permissive nature of the Automobile Presumption allows, but does not require, a jury to infer possession. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157, 99 S.Ct. 2213; People v. Lemmons, 40 N.Y.2d 505, 511-12, 387 N.Y.S.2d 97, 354 N.E.2d 836 (N.Y.1976). Likewise, contrary to plaintiffs’ position (see Pis. Opp’n at 18-20), police officers may consider exculpatory factors when contemplating arrest pursuant to the Automobile Presumption, but the statutory language does not require police officers to evaluate the totality of circumstances. Indeed, such a requirement goes against the legislative policy choice behind a statutory presumption seeking to ease the burden of establishing probable cause or constructive possession in complex circumstances reflecting common possession. See Lemmons, 40 N.Y.2d at 509-10, 387 N.Y.S.2d 97, 354 N.E.2d 836 (describing the history underlying the Automobile Presumption as an effort to resolve difficulties in proving possession of weapons hidden in occupied automobiles). Therefore, requiring an antecedent totality of the circumstances test would, in essence, displace the statutory presumption and circumvent its purpose. See id. at 511, 387 N.Y.S.2d 97, 354 N.E.2d 836 (“[T]he placement of a weapon in a handbag does not necessarily indicate that the owner of a handbag is in sole and exclusive possession of the weapon.... To hold that merely because the weapons were found in a briefcase, handbag, shopping bag or carton the presumption is nullified would defeat the legislative intent and render the statute nugatory.”); see also Allen, 442 U.S. at 165 n. 27, 99 S.Ct. 2213 (“Legislative judgments such as this one [underlying the Automobile Presumption] deserve respect in assessing the constitutionality of evidentiary presumptions”). In light of the foregoing and because plaintiffs allege that none of the vehicle occupants admitted to possessing the firearm, the Individual Defendants acted within their discretion by arresting all vehicle occupants pursuant to the Automobile Presumption. Moreover, the circumstances presented here would not dictate that a reasonable officer must exculpate plaintiffs from common constructive possession, given that none of the occupants claimed sole possession of the gun. Even if, as plaintiffs allege, the Individual Defendants knew the jacket and gun did not belong to either of the plaintiffs (Compl. ¶ 68), this information would not require the Individual Defendants to exculpate plaintiffs from common possession. See Gray v. Babbie, No. 94 CV 5123, 1998 WL 178824, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 1998) (“‘[T]he mere fact that the handbag that contained the contraband belonged to the female co-defendant did not establish that the co-defendant was in sole and exclusive possession of the handbag at the time it was recovered by the police.’ ” (quoting People v. Gray, 201 A.D.2d 582, 607 N.Y.S.2d 736, 737 (N.Y.App.Div.2d Dep’t 1994))). The jacket containing the gun was located in the cabin of the vehicle and appears to have been equally accessible to all vehicle occupants, including plaintiffs. See Lemmons, 40 N.Y.2d at 511, 387 N.Y.S.2d 97, 354 N.E.2d 836 (finding that guns found in a handbag on the floor of a vehicle constituted sufficient evidence of common possession pursuant to the Automobile Presumption to sustain defendants’ convictions for possession of a dangerous weapon). Indeed, accepting as true that neither the vehicle nor the jacket belonged to plaintiffs, a reasonable officer may believe that any of the occupants including plaintiffs possessed the gun, carried it into the vehicle, and hid it in someone else’s jacket pocket before exiting the vehicle. The court also finds no merit in plaintiffs’ argument that the Individual Defendants could not have reasonably believed Allan had the capacity to exercise dominion over the firearm because he had been seriously injured, could barely stand or open his eyes, and could not talk. (Pis. Opp’n at 15, 17.) Even accepting as true that Allan may have temporarily lost the ability to handle or use the firearm effectively or at all due to his injuries, Allan’s condition does not fall under one of the three statutory exceptions to the Automobile Presumption and does not eliminate the possibility that he constructively possessed the firearm. The fact that Allan was entitled to medical treatment before interrogation does not dictate that he is entitled to exculpation due to his injuries. In summary, once the firearm was discovered and remained unclaimed, the Individual Defendants had probable cause to arrest all vehicle occupants, including plaintiffs, and plaintiffs cannot defeat defendants’ motion with conclusory allegations that, inter alia, the Individual Defendants “knew that the jacket and gun did not belong to plaintiffs.” (See Compl. ¶¶ 68, 74; Pls. Opp’n at 15-18); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (“[T]he allegations are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true.”). Accordingly, the court dismisses plaintiffs’ claims for false arrest and imprisonment because probable cause constitutes a complete defense. Amore, 624 F.3d at 536. Likewise, plaintiffs’ New York law claim for false arrest also fails on the merits. See Jocks, 316 F.3d at 134. 3. Constitutionality of the Automobile Presumption As Applied to the Instant Case In the alternative, plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the Automobile Presumption as applied to them, arguing that police officers cannot use the presumption to arrest all vehicle occupants without considering the totality of the circumstances. (Pls. Opp’n at 18-21.) In support of their argument, plaintiffs contend that the Supreme Court analyzed the surrounding circumstances when deciding that the Automobile Presumption was constitutional as applied in Allen. (Id.) In Allen, however, the Supreme Court considered whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a defendant’s conviction and held that the Automobile Presumption was constitutional as a permissive inference for a jury to accept or reject — in light of the evidence — in finding a defendant guilty of gun possession. 442 U.S. at 160-64, 99 S.Ct. 2213 (denying habeas corpus relief for petitioner appealing the conviction affirmed in Lemmons, 40 N.Y.2d 505, 387 N.Y.S.2d 97, 354 N.E.2d 836). Consequently, that decision considered the distinct inquiry as to the propriety of a jury instruction regarding the circumstances under which a jury could find a defendant guilty of gun possession when applied to the evidence presented, and, if anything, weakens plaintiffs’ argument because the circumstances of that case are factually comparable to the case at bar after drawing all inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. As in Allen, where the police discovered two guns inside a handbag belonging to one occupant but accessible to the three other occupants, 442 U.S. at 143-44, 163, 99 S.Ct. 2213, the Individual Defendants permissibly presumed constructive common possession after discovering a gun in a jacket accessible to the other occupants. Therefore, plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge has no merit because the Supreme Court has found the Automobile Presumption constitutional as applied to factually comparable circumstances. Id.; see also Bellavia v. Fogg, 613 F.2d 369, 371-72, 374 n. 7 (2d Cir.1979) (holding that a “nearly identical” automobile presumption for drug possession was constitutional when applied to a case in which undercover officers recovered drugs from a vehicle occupied by defendant). 4. Qualified Immunity In the alternative, defendants argue that the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from the false arrest claim because they were “objectively reasonable” in believing all vehicle occupants constructively possessed the firearm pursuant to the Automobile Presumption, given that no one admitted to ownership. (Defs. Mem. at 17.) Qualified immunity from a false arrest claim can be established through “arguable probable cause,” which exists “if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.” Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “even if an officer is mistaken, and the arrestee did not commit the crime, the officer will not be held liable if he acted reasonably and in good faith.” Washpon v. Parr, 561 F.Supp.2d 394, 403 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (citing Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir.1994)). Moreover, an officer may reasonably believe that his conduct is lawful unless “pre-existing law sufficiently foreshadows the direction it will take such that government officials have reasonable notice of the illegality of their actions.” Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 478-79 (2d Cir.1995); Khan v. Ryan, 145 F.Supp.2d 280, 285 (E.D.N.Y.2001). In the instant case, the Individual Defendants had, at a minimum, “arguable probable cause” to arrest plaintiffs after discovering the firearm, given that a fair reading of N.Y. Penal Law § 265.15(3) and the relevant case law provided that police officers may arrest all vehicle occupants after discovering a firearm in the vehicle, absent the applicability of any of the statutory exceptions. Accordingly, even if the court did not already find that probable cause to arrest existed pursuant to the Automobile Presumption and that the presumption is constitutional as applied to the facts presented here, the Individual Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity with regard to plaintiffs’ false arrest claim. C. Malicious Prosecution A malicious prosecution action implicates the Fourth Amendment constitutional right “to be free of unreasonable seizure of the person — ie., the right to be free of unreasonable or unwarranted restraints on personal liberty.” Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir.1995). In order to prevail on a Section 1983 claim against a state actor for malicious prosecution, “a plaintiff must show a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment and must establish the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under state law.” Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 160-61 (2d Cir.2010) (citations omitted). To establish a malicious prosecution claim under New York law, “a plaintiff must prove (1) the initiation or continuation of a criminal proceeding against plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in plaintiffs favor; (3) lack of probable cause for commencing the proceeding; and (4) actual malice as a motivation for defendant’s actions.” Id. at 161. In the context of a malicious prosecution claim, the element of malice consists of “a wrong or improper motive, something other than a desire to see the ends of justice served.” Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 573 (2d Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). The absence of probable cause raises an inference of malice sufficient for a claim of malicious prosecution to withstand summary judgment. Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir.1997). Probable cause, however, is a complete defense to a claim of malicious prosecution, and a grand jury indictment “creates a presumption of probable cause that may only be rebutted by evidence that the indictment was procured by ‘fraud, perjury, the suppression of evidence or other police conduct undertaken in bad faith.’ ” Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir.2003). Notwithstanding, “[t]he plaintiff may not satisfy his burden ‘with mere ‘conjecture’ and ‘surmise’ that his indictment was procured as a result of conduct undertaken by the defendants in bad faith.’” Felmine, 2011 WL 4543268, at *12 (quoting Savino, 331 F.3d at 73). Moreover, “the alleged fabrication [by police] must be both material, ie., ‘likely to influence a jury’s decision,’ and ‘the legally cognizable’ cause of the post-arraignment deprivation of liberty.” Richardson v. City of New York, No. 02 CV 3651, 2006 WL 2792768, at *7 & n. 4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2006) (citation omitted). Liberally construing plaintiffs’ complaint, the core allegations underlying Matthews’ claim are that the Individual Defendants: (1) commenced a prosecution against Matthews using an intentionally coerced false confession; (2) provided false information to the Grand Jury to justify the traffic stop, search of the vehicle, and the belief that Matthews possessed the gun; and (3) testified falsely at pretrial hearings to prevent suppression of the gun. (Compl. ¶¶ 73, 78, 82, 84-88.) In response, defendants argue that the malicious prosecution claim should be dismissed because plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts to satisfy two elements of the claim: improper motive (malice) and absence of probable cause to prosecute Matthews. (Defs. Mem. at 9-12.) Even if plaintiffs’ complaint alleged more than mere conclusory assertions of false testimony prompted by the Individual Defendants’ malicious intent, that claim must fail because the Individual Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity for any claims arising from their allegedly false testimony. 1. Absolute Immunity under Section 1983 for Grand Jury and Pretrial Hearing Testimony The Supreme Court has held that trial witnesses, including police officers, have absolute immunity with respect to any Section 1983 claims arising from that testimony, even if it is alleged that such testimony was perjured. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335-36, 341-46, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (affirming dismissal of Section 1983 claims arising from police officers’ perjured testimony during a criminal trial). More recently, the Supreme Court clarified that the absolute immunity from Section 1983 claims for trial witnesses, including police officers, applies “with equal force” to grand jury witnesses, even if falsified information or perjury is alleged. Rehberg v. Paulk, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1505-07, 182 L.Ed.2d 593 (2012); see Jovanovic v. City of New York, No. 10-4398-cv, 2012 WL 2331171, at *2 (2d Cir. June 20, 2012) (summary order) (noting that Rehberg extends Briscoe’s absolute immunity from Section 1983 claims to grand jury testimony). The rationale behind this rule of absolute immunity is that potential civil liability is not needed to deter false testimony before the grand jury or at trial because other sanctions — such as a prosecution for perjury, which is a serious criminal offense — provide a sufficient deterrent. Rehberg, 132 S.Ct. at 1505. Furthermore, the Second Circuit has extended absolute immunity from Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims to “police officers who testify at adversarial pretrial proceedings.” Daloia v. Rose, 849 F.2d 74, 75-76 (2d Cir.1988) (holding that NYPD officers have absolute immunity from liability in an action under Section 1983 based on the officers’ allegedly perjured testimony at a pretrial suppression hearing). Notwithstanding plaintiffs’ allegations of falsified testimony, the Individual Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for their testimony before the Grand Jury and at the suppression hearings. See Rehberg, 132 S.Ct. at 1505-06 (grand jury testimony); Daloia, 849 F.2d at 75-76 (adversarial pretrial hearing testimony). Consequently, Matthews’ Section 1983 claims for malicious prosecution based on allegedly false grand jury and pretrial hearing testimony fail as a matter of law. See Jones v. Dalton, 867 F.Supp.2d 572, 583-84 (D.N.J.2012) (dismissing malicious prosecution claim on summary judgment and holding that “[a]b-solute immunity prohibits [plaintiff] from rebutting th[e] presumption [of probable cause that attaches to his indictment] with evidence that [defendant] made misrepresentations to the grand jury).” (citing Rehberg, 132 S.Ct. at 1506); Hayes v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 853 F.Supp.2d 400, 422 (S.D.N.Y.2012) (granting summary judgment on Section 1983 claim in favor of defendant police officers that allegedly committed perjury at plaintiffs suppression hearing because defendants “are absolutely immune from any liability based on the testimony they provided” at the suppression hearing citing Daloia, 849 F.2d at 75). Accordingly, Matthews’ malicious prosecution claim is dismissed in part, insofar as it is based on the Individual Defendants’ grand jury testimony and pretrial hearing testimony. 2. Malicious Prosecution Claim for Commencing Prosecution with a Coerced Confession Plaintiffs allege that the Individual Defendants intentionally coerced a false confession from Matthews by withholding medical treatment from his brother Allan, and then initiated and maintained a prosecution against Matthews by knowingly providing the false confession to prosecutors. (Compl. ¶¶ 71-79, 82; Pis. Opp’n at 22-24.) Defendants assert a complete defense of probable cause to prosecute based on Matthews’ arrest and subsequent grand jury indictment, and further argue that plaintiffs cannot satisfy the element of malice. (Defs. Mem. at 9-12.) “When a police officer creates false information likely to influence a jury’s decision and forwards that information to prosecutors, ... the harm occasioned by such an unconscionable action is redressable in an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 130 (reversing grant of summary judgment on Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim where “a jury could find that [defendant] played a role in initiating the prosecution by preparing the alleged false confession and forwarding it to prosecutors”). Moreover, a police officer may not reasonably rely on a known coerced confession as lawful grounds for probable cause. See id. (“No arrest, no matter how lawful or objectively reasonable, gives an arresting officer or his fellow officers license to deliberately manufacture false evidence against an arrestee.”); Niemann v. Whalen, 911 F.Supp. 656, 668-69 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (finding that “the issue of whether [defendants] coerced plaintiffs confession is material to resolving the issue of probable cause” for plaintiffs arrest), aff'd, 107 F.3d 3 (2d Cir.1997); see also Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.8d 790, 800 (10th Cir.2008) (affirming denial of qualified immunity on malicious prosecution claim because, if statements to police officers were indeed involuntary, “the officers who carried out the alleged coercion could not reasonably rest their determination of probable cause upon those statements”). Accepting as true the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint, the Individual Defendants intentionally coerced Matthews’ confession by taking advantage of Allan’s seriously injured condition and the familial relationship between Allan and Matthews. Moreover, the Individual Defendants then knowingly used the false confession to initiate and maintain the prosecution of Matthews, clearly violating his constitutional rights. Because the Individual Defendants could not reasonably rely on a known coerced confession to initiate and maintain a prosecution, Niemann, 911 F.Supp. at 668-69, they lacked probable cause to prosecute. If proven at trial, these allegations, which are quite serious, would certainly be sufficient to sustain a Section 1983 claim based on the alleged coerced confession. Defendants’ contention that Matthew’s arrest and grand jury indictment create a presumption of probable cause is unavailing because, for purposes of the instant motion, plaintiffs’ complaint adequately pleads allegations of bad faith police coercion and use of the resulting false confession to initiate a prosecution. In addition, the alleged coerced confession was almost certain to persuade the grand jury to indict Matthews, satisfying the materiality requirement. See Richardson, 2006 WL 2792768, at *5-7 (denying summary judgment where “jury could reasonably infer that [one officer] knowingly misidentified him and that [a second officer] fabricated the evidence that [plaintiff] was in possession of the pre-recorded buy money,” and “that as a result [plaintiff] was indicted and prosecuted”). Given that plaintiffs plausibly allege the absence of probable cause in initiating and continuing the prosecution of Matthews, malice may be inferred. See Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 131. Accordingly, Matthews states a plausible malicious prosecution claim that the Individual Defendants unconstitutionally commenced a prosecution against him using a known coerced confession. 3. Qualified Immunity In the alternative, defendants claim qualified immunity from the malicious prosecution claim. (Defs. Mem. at 16.) It is clearly established, however, “that a coerced confession could not constitutionally be used against a defendant in a criminal case.” Higazy, 505 F.3d at 173. “Qualified immunity is unavailable where ... the action violates an accused’s clearly established constitutional rights, and no reasonably competent police officer could believe otherwise.” Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 130 (denying qualified immunity where defendants forwarded a known false confession to prosecutors). Accordingly, based on the facts alleged, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because no reasonable officer could believe that coercing a confession from an accused by withholding medical treatment from an injured family member and using the coerced confession to prosecute the accused is constitutional. D. Excessive Force Plaintiffs allege that, in violation of plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights, the Individual Defendants: (1) “brutally handcuffed plaintiffs, causing them pain and numbness to their wrists” and (2) refused to loosen the handcuffs upon plaintiffs’ request. (Compl. ¶¶ 91-92, 110.) Defendants argue that these allegations are insufficient to sustain a claim that unreasonable force was used or that plaintiffs suffered any real injuries beyond pain. (Defs. Mem. at 13.) 1. The Standard for Excessive Force An excessive force claim under Section 1983 is governed by the “objective reasonableness” standard of the Fourth Amendment. Graham, 490 U.S. at 399, 109 S.Ct. 1865. The reasonableness inquiry evaluates the degree of force necessary to effectuate an arrest in light of the specific factual circumstances, including “whether the suspect poses a threat, resists, or attempts to evade arrest, and the severity of the crime at issue.” Esmont v. City of New York, 371 F.Supp.2d 202, 214 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865). “Frequently, a reasonable arrest involves handcuffing the suspect, and to be effective handcuffs must be tight enough to prevent the arrestee’s hands from slipping out.” Id. To assess the reasonableness of the handcuffing, a court must also consider whether “1) the handcuffs were unreasonably tight; 2) the defendants ignored the arrestee’s pleas that the handcuffs were too tight; and 3) the degree of injury to the wrists.” Id. at 215. 2. The Injury Requirement There is a consensus among courts in the Second Circuit that “tight handcuffing does not constitute excessive force unless it causes some injury beyond temporary discomfort.” Lynch v. City of Mt. Vernon, 567 F.Supp.2d 459, 468 (S.D.N.Y.2008); see Drummond v. Castro, 522 F.Supp.2d 667, 679 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendants where plaintiff alleged no injury, but only that “he was handcuffed tightly”). “Placing handcuffs on an arrestee tight enough to cause nerve damage may, however, constitute excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Esmont, 371 F.Supp.2d at 214-15; Simpson v. Saroff, 741 F.Supp. 1073, 1078 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (“Since [plaintiff] alleges a punched stomach, swollen and bleeding wrists from the tight handcuffs, as well as a faintly detectable scar on her left wrist, her complaint is sufficient to allege a § 1983 claim.”). Moreover, “the Second Circuit has held that even minor injuries, including scrapes and bruises, can support an excessive-force claim.” Richardson v. Providence, No. 09-CV-4647, 2011 WL 3701887, at *7 n. 3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011) (citing Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 109-10 (2d Cir.2004) (reversing grant of summary judgment on excessive force claim where plaintiff was shoved into a police car and suffered pain, bumps, scrapes, bruises, and post-concussive syndrome); Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 923-24 (2d Cir.1987) (affirming denial of summary judgment on excessive force claim where plaintiff suffered bruising that lasted a couple weeks and for which she did not seek medical treatment)). The determination of whether tight handcuffing that causes pain and numbness satisfies the injury requirement may be presented in a motion for summary judgment. Compare Lucky v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ.1983, 2004 WL 2088557, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sep