Hescott v. City of Saginaw (894 F. Supp. 2d 977, 2012)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING COUNTS I, II, V, VI, VII WITH PREJUDICE, DISMISSING COUNT III IN PART WITH PREJUDICE AND AMENDING THE SCHEDULING ORDER

THOMAS L. LUDINGTON, District Judge.

On July 18, 2009, the City of Saginaw demolished a residence owned by Plaintiffs located at 1002 Webber Street in the City of Saginaw. The Plaintiffs, John Hescott and Benjamin Hescott, bring this action against the Defendants, City of Saginaw (“the City”), John Stemple, Scott Crofoot, Gregory Barton and Rohde Bros. Excavating, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging violations of the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Michigan, various Michigan statutes, and the Michigan common law. Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law with regard to all of the claims set forth in Plaintiffs’ Complaint except Count IV alleging an inverse condemnation claim against the City. ECF No. 11.

Oral argument was heard on Defendants’ motion on March 21, 2012. For the reasons provided herein, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ motion. Plaintiffs, however, have not responded to Defendants’ arguments on the state law claims, contending that the Court must first affirmatively exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Indeed, when Defendants removed both the federal and state law claims, the Court had supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because the state law claims are related to the federal claims and the Court has not declined jurisdiction. Supplemental briefing from Plaintiffs is thus necessary on these issues.

I. Facts

Plaintiff Hescott purchased a house located at 1002 Webber Street in Saginaw in 2001. Hescott lived in the house for several years before moving to Flint. Id. at 8, 17. After moving, he leased the two-family dwelling to tenants. When Hescott purchased the house it was in poor condition. He needed to make many repairs to bring it up to code. ECF No. 18 Exs. A at 9, B. In 2007, he spent approximately $10,000 to replace the roof and install seamless gutters. The City’s code enforcement history demonstrates that Hescott promptly responded to any code violations and fixed any problems. ECF No. 18 Ex. C at 008-10. The code enforcement history also reflects that the enforcement officers had John Hescott’s current telephone number and had contacted him at that phone number in the past. Id.

Hescott is a member of the United States Armed Forces. He is a Chief Warrant Officer, 4th Class, helicopter pilot. He was first deployed to Afghanistan in 2003. He was again deployed to Afghanistan in 2006 for 18 months. He spent May 31 to June 30, 2009 in Iraq and Afghanistan and served another 13 months on active duty in Afghanistan in 2011-2012. He returned to the United States in May 2012. In 2008, Hescott tried to sell the house when he was relocated to the Fort Rucker Aviation base in Ozark, Alabama. Hescott was unable to sell the house and took it off the market. John and his wife also maintain a home on Bray Road in Flint, Michigan. Plaintiff Benjamin Hescott, John’s son, is included on the deed to the house but is a “silent partner basically” according to John. ECF No. 11 Ex. H at 31. Benjamin Hescott lives in Howell, Michigan.

On July 11, 2009, Hescott traveled to Michigan while on leave from the army and inspected the Saginaw house. He discovered that the basement wall on the west side of the house was damaged. Hescott testified that the house did not look any worse in the pictures the City took one week later on July 18, 2009 when they demolished it. ECF No. 18 Ex. A at 75. After discovering the damage, on July 12, 2009, Hescott called his usual assistants, Shawn Taylor and Josh Weather-wax, to fix the foundation wall. Neither Taylor nor Weatherwax are licensed builders. According to Hescott, he asked them to investigate the damage, tell him whether it could be fixed, the amount of money required to fix the damages and whether it was safe to wait several weeks to do the work. Hescott believed that Weatherwax and Taylor investigated the damage sometime between July 13 and July 16, 2009. ECF No. 18 Ex. at 79. Hescott called Weatherwax on or about Friday, July 17, 2009 to get a report on the house. He also asked whether they felt safe working in the house because Hescott could not return to Michigan until August and wanted to assist with the repairs. ECF No. 18 Ex. at 58-59.

The assistants determined that the problem could be fixed. ECF No. 18 Ex. E at 40. Taylor concluded that they could use steel beams to support the house while they fixed the wall. Id. Both assistants testified that they were not concerned for their safety while in the house. ECF No. 18 Ex. E at 35; Ex. F at 30-32. The assistants determined that temporary supports could be installed and once installed, they could fix the wall that had fallen into the basement. Weatherwax thought that it looked like the wall opposite to the failed wall likely failed in the past and was similarly fixed. ECF No. 18 Ex. F at 33, 53. Taylor estimated that the foundation wall could have been repaired within one or two days. ECF No. 18 Ex. E at 59. He believed that the house would be fine in the interim between his visit and the target repair date. Id. at 62-63.

Defendant Scott Crofoot is the City’s Dangerous Building Inspector. His position is funded through federal Community Block Grant Funds. ECF No. 18 Ex. G at 30. Defendant John Stemple is the Chief Inspector. Crofoot and Stemple are part of the City’s Community Development Department. Odail Thoms is the chief executive of the Department. The City received almost $3,000,000 .during the relevant time period to demolish property within the City. ECF No. 18 Ex. H.

At 12:19 p.m. on Saturday, July 18, 2009, City Police Officer Ian Wenger responded to a call from Central Dispatch regarding a suspicious situation at 1002 Webber. While checking for noises coming from the house based on a call from an unknown person to Central Dispatch, Officer Wenger observed that the basement wall of the building had collapsed inside. Because of the condition of the structure, Officer Wenger contacted “code enforcement” for the City. Officer Wenger explained that he called code enforcement “[bjecause the basement wall had fallen in and it appeared to be in a condition which would pose a hazard to somebody.” ECF No. 11 Ex. A at 14. Officer Wenger was concerned with the possibility of the structure falling down or people accessing the building from the collapsed basement.

As a result of Officer Wenger’s observations at 1002 Webber, John Stemple, the Chief Inspector for the City who was in Traverse City at the time, was contacted by Central Dispatch. Stemple testified that he was advised that an officer had responded to a call at 1002 Webber and that the officer reported that there were children playing in the vicinity of the house and that it appeared unsafe. Being out of town at the time, Stemple contacted Scott Crofoot, the City’s Dangerous Buildings Inspector, to respond to the scene. Scott Crofoot testified that Stemple told him that the police had called; that there had been a call about a disturbance; and that when the officer responded, he found a collapsed basement wall. ECF No. 11 Ex. C at 41.

Scott Crofoot arrived on the scene at 12:45 p.m. Upon arrival, Crofoot observed that the west wall had collapsed into the basement and, looking at the back wall and front comer, the house appeared to have rotated. Crofoot also heard the house creaking. While he was on the scene, Crofoot had to escort two 6 to 8 year old boys, who were playing on the front porch of 1002 Webber, back to their home next door. After assessing the situation, Scott Crofoot contacted John Stemple and described the deterioration of the foundation and the shifted building to him. Stemple advised Scott Crofoot to contact the Fire Marshal, Greg Barton, and to then make a decision about the action to be taken. Under the City’s Dangerous Buildings Ordinance, the Fire Marshal can authorize an emergency demolition.

Scott Crofoot contacted Greg Barton and advised him that he was on scene at 1002 Webber and that one of the walls had collapsed. Greg Barton arrived on scene at 1:48 p.m. Crofoot and Barton entered the basement of the house and Crofoot took pictures of the interior of the basement. Crofoot explained that he and Barton were in the basement for only 2 to 3 minutes because they did not feel safe inside the home. Barton did not want to continue past the basement stairway. Scott Crofoot and Greg Barton together made the determination that the house should be demolished. Crofoot summarized the reasons for the emergency demolition as follows:

[I]f just the foundation had collapsed, it probably wouldn’t have needed to come down; but there were other contributing factors. First of all, the house had rotated on its axis. It had rotated. It would have been — it rotated counterclockwise. There were three support beams in the — excuse me — one support beam with three support posts under it. Two of those support posts were rotted and only had a small portion of their base actually sitting on concrete. The rest had rotted away. The beam above them was rotted and cracked.

ECF No. 11 Ex. C at 27-28. Scott Crofoot further explained the rationale for an emergency demolition of the house as follows:

My concern was that it wouldn’t stay standing through the night after seeing the condition of the main beam, hearing the creaking that was going on with the light wind outside, and in concurrence with the fire marshal who did not want to send firefighters in if there was a fire in the future because of the danger of the building or the weakness of the west wall, the foundation had collapsed.

The walls on the first and second floor above that had started to drop and were deflecting outward, and I didn’t believe it was going to stay. I didn’t believe it would stay up through the night.

ECF No. 11 Ex. C at 73.

Having found children playing on the front porch of the house when he arrived, Scott Crofoot was concerned about the safety of children in the area if the house collapsed. ECF No. 11 Ex. C at 85. Fire Marshal Greg Barton agreed that there was a great possibility that the building would collapse at any time. ECF No. 11 Ex. D at 20-21. He explained his safety concerns as follows:

The building is open and accessible now with the collapse of this side on the west side of the building. We had kids on bicycles down Webber and Van Etten— Van Etten. The fact that someone could go inside the structure was my primary concern.

ECF No. 11 Ex. D at 25. Fire Marshal Barton concurred with Crofoot that this was an emergency situation under the City’s Dangerous Buildings Ordinance. ECF No. 11 Ex. D at 18-19. Section 151.120 of the City’s Dangerous Buildings Ordinance (§ 151.110 et seq of the City’s Administrative Code) provides:

§ 151.120 EMERGENCY CASES.

In cases where there is evidence of an immediate and serious danger to the public safety or health unless a dangerous building or structure as defined in this subchapter is immediately demolished or otherwise made safe, the Chief Inspector shall report such facts to the City Manager who may cause the immediate repair or demolition of such dangerous building or structure. Determination of immediate and serious danger to the public safety or health shall be determined by the Chief Inspector and/or others such as the City Fire Marshal. Further, under the provisions of Section 2.201(b) of the Uniform Fire Code, as adopted and amended by the City, the Fire Marshal may declare a building unsafe and order its repair, rehabilitation, or demolition. Under the provisions of this subchapter, the Fire Marshal may order or direct the Chief Inspector to proceed under the emergency provisions of this section or may do so himself or herself. Situations which may lead to the immediate potential for injury, death, spread of disease or infection, or for property or structural damage shall indicate an immediate and serious danger to the public safety or health. The potential for harm to emergency personnel who may have to re-enter such structures in the course of their duties may also be used to determine immediate and serious danger to public safety or health. The costs of such emergency repair or demolition shall be collected in the manner as provided for in § 33.26.

ECF No. 11 Ex. E § 151.120. The vast majority of the emergency demolitions that Barton has authorized have been fire related. ECF No. 18 Ex. I at 52-55. Barton did not consider boarding up the windows, fencing off the area, stabilizing the structure or repair instead of demolition.

Having made the determination that the property was an immediate and serious danger to the public safety, Scott Crofoot contacted Rohde Bros., the contractor with whom the City has a contract to perform demolition services, to demolish the house. He also contacted Consumers Energy to disconnect the gas lines. The demolition occurred in the afternoon on July 18, 2009. The City did not notify the owners of the property either before or after the demolition because the City does not require that notification be provided in emergency situations. ECF No. 11 Ex. C at 25,38,91; Ex. Bat 91; Ex. E § 151.120. In non-emergency situations, the City’s Dangerous Buildings Ordinance provides for written notice to the owner of record and the right to a hearing before demolition takes place. ECF No. 11 Ex. E §§ 151.113-.118. The City likewise did not have a policy to provide any post-deprivation notice. ECF No. 18 Ex. J at 91.

The demolished house and its contents remained on the property until Monday July 20, 2009, because the landfill was closed during the weekend. An inventory of salvageable items was not made. Rohde Brothers later re-entered the property to complete the final grade, and Crofoot returned on October 13, 2009 to inspect the final grade.

Plaintiffs deny that the house was an immediate and serious danger to the public safety, but do not dispute that one of the foundation walls had collapsed. Plaintiffs believe that the City could have safely delayed the demolition to alert Plaintiffs of the concerns in order to arrange for an immediate repair. Plaintiffs subsequently obtained a structural engineering report which concluded that if the house had collapsed, it was unlikely that the collapse would have injured another property. ECF No. 18 Ex. K.

II. Standard of Review

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the movant shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party asserting that a fact cannot be proven or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(B). The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion, and identifying where to look in the record for relevant facts “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden then shifts to the opposing party who must “set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If the opposing party fails to raise genuine issues of fact and the record indicates the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court shall grant summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The party opposing the motion may not “rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant’s denial of a disputed fact” but must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, or other factual material showing “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. Discussion

A. Plaintiffs’ Federal Constitutional Claims Against the City

Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges three separate federal constitutional claims against the City: (1) violation of procedural due process; (2) violation of substantive due process; and (3) violation of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiffs characterize their Fourth Amendment claim as alleging two separate violations: (1) when the City demolished Plaintiffs’ house without their consent or a court order and (2) when the City completed destroying the house and its contents by disposing of it in a landfill without Plaintiffs’ consent or a court order. Defendants argue that the City is entitled to summary judgment as to each of these claims which are addressed separately below. To the extent Plaintiffs seeks punitive damages against the City for these alleged constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Defendants contend that any such claims should also be dismissed because a municipality is immune from punitive damages under § 1983. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981).

The liability of counties and other municipal entities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Under Monell, if an “action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort,” then the municipality is liable as the wrongdoer. Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018. “To succeed on a municipal liability claim, a plaintiff must establish that his or her constitutional rights were violated and that a policy or custom of the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the deprivation of the plaintiffs rights.” Miller v. Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 254-55 (6th Cir.2010). Local governmental units may only be held liable when “action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature causes a constitutional tort,” and not on the basis of respondeat superi- or. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018. In this regard, a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. Under Monell, there are several avenues available for a plaintiff to prove the existence of a municipal policy, including: (1) a formally promulgated policy; (2) a well settled custom or usage; and (3) a final decision by a municipal policymaker. Id. In this particular case, however, the Plaintiffs cannot establish a viable claim under any of the available theories.

A policy “implies a course of action consciously chosen from among various alternatives.” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985). The clearest type of policy is one formally embodied in a “policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated” by the municipality’s lawmaking body. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018. These municipal policies are typically intended to “establish fixed plans of action to be followed under similar circumstances consistently and over time.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). Municipal policy need not be a written ordinance; it may be a “statement” or “decision” by a high-ranking official, such as a sheriff or prosecutor, “whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by an official who “possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 482, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (imposing municipal liability as a result of the county prosecutor’s decision). The requirement that a municipality’s wrongful actions be a “policy” is not meant to distinguish isolated incidents from general rules of conduct promulgated by city officials but to distinguish the injuries for which the government entity is responsible under § 1983 from those injuries for which the government should not be held accountable. Meyers v. City of Cincinnati, 14 F.3d 1115, 1117 (6th Cir.1994).

1. Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment Violation Claim

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ...” U.S. Const, amend. IV. Defendants acknowledge that the destruction of property is a meaningful interference with an individual’s property interests and is, therefore, considered a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984). However, in order to be actionable, the seizure must be unreasonable. Soldal v. Cook, 506 U.S. 56, 71, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992). Reasonableness is a “predominantly objective inquiry.” City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000). The reasonableness determination must reflect a careful balancing of governmental and private interests. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 71, 113 S.Ct. 538.

There are two limited exceptions to the “objective standard for reasonableness” rule: special-need situations and administrative search cases where “actual motivations” do matter. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080-81, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A judicial warrant and probable cause are not needed where the search or seizure is justified by “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” such as the need to deter drug use in public schools, Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted), or the need to assure that railroad employees engaged in train operations are not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989); and where the search or seizure is in execution of an administrative warrant authorizing, for example, an inspection of fire-damaged premises to determine the cause, Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294, 104 S.Ct. 641, 78 L.Ed.2d 477 (1984) (plurality opinion), or an inspection of residential premises to assure compliance with a housing code, Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 535-38, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967).

a. Demolition of Plaintiffs’ House

Defendants argue that in a non-law enforcement “special needs” context, such as the demolition of a dangerous building in this case, a warrant is not always necessary. Rather, the court must assess the reasonableness of the City’s actions by balancing the governmental interest and the private interests at stake. Defendants contend that the City’s Ordinance properly balances those interests by allowing demolitions without obtaining a demolition order only in limited situations where there is an immediate and serious danger to the public safety and thus meets Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Plaintiffs, however, contend that reliance on the Ordinance alone requires a higher level of scrutiny than objective reasonableness, but the legal authority offered does not appear to support this contention. Plaintiffs also contend that the Ordinance does not properly balance the relevant interests at stake because the City’s enforcement policy lacks any protection for private property and the possessory interests at stake.

Under the “special needs” doctrine, the Supreme Court has recognized that a warrantless, suspicionless search may be justified “when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). If a “special need” is identified, then the “reasonableness” of the search or seizure must be evaluated, balancing the gravity of the public interests, the degree to which the intrusion advances the public interests, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426-27, 124 S.Ct. 885, 157 L.Ed.2d 843 (2004). The special-needs test is thus a more stringent test, adding a threshold step to the totality-of-the-circumstances test and requiring the court to first identify some “special need beyond the normal need for law enforcement” before undertaking a balancing of interests between the government’s special need against the individual’s privacy interests. Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 426 (6th Cir.2008). Here, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ house was inspected and demolished because city officials had determined that the deteriorating and exposed structure presented an immediate and serious danger to the public safety, and that the seizure was justified by the Ordinance which was passed to address the City’s “special needs.” United States v. Carnes, 309 F.3d 950, 960 (6th Cir.2002) (emphasizing that where the government claims that special needs justified a search and seizure based on reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause, “a court must look to the ‘actual motivations’ of the individual officers”). There is no evidence that the proffered motivations are pretextual, even if, as Plaintiffs’ suggest, their determination was incorrect. Plaintiffs also question whether anyone other than Crofoot witnessed children playing on the property or heard creaking in the house, but questioning confirmation of his observations is insufficient to establish pretext when Crofoot’s determination that the house needed to be demolished was affirmed by Fire Marshal Barton. However, because the “special needs” test aims to balance the interests of law enforcement against privacy rights, and this case does not present an issue of law enforcement, the Court is hesitant to extend the special needs doctrine to what could be categorized as a “takings” case where no criminal conduct or administrative warrant is implicated.

Assuming the warrant requirement applies, Defendants argue that exigent circumstances provide an exception to the warrant requirement, even for searches and seizures inside a home which would otherwise be presumptively unreasonable. See United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1513 (6th Cir.1996). Exigent circumstances are situations where real, immediate, and serious consequences will certainly occur if action is postponed to wait for a warrant. United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497, 503 (6th Cir.2003). The exigent circumstances exception relies on the premise that the existence of an emergency situation, demanding urgent action, may excuse the failure to procure a warrant. United States v. Radka, 904 F.2d 357, 361 (6th Cir.1990); see also Rohrig, 98 F.3d at 1517 (“[T]he cases finding exigent circumstances uniformly cite the need for prompt action by government personnel, and conclude that delay to secure a warrant would be unacceptable under the circumstances.”).

One recognized exigency is the “risk of danger” exigency which applies to situations involving the need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury either of police officers or of others. Williams, 354 F.3d at 503, 505. This usually applies where there are warrantless entries into buildings in cases where the state is acting in something other than a traditional law enforcement capacity. Id. at 503. For example, entry to a building to fight a fire does not require a warrant. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978). As the Sixth Circuit explained in Rohrig, 98 F.3d at 1516, the Supreme Court in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967), there is a limit to the cases holding that warrants are required for administrative searches, specifically in emergency situations. (“Since our holding emphasizes the controlling standard of reasonableness, nothing we say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even without a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations.”). The Camara Court also made clear that “the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated.” Camara, 387 U.S. at 537, 87 S.Ct. 1727.

In reviewing whether exigent circumstances were present, the Court must consider the “totality of the circumstances and the inherent necessities of the situation at the time.” Rohrig, 98 F.3d at 1511 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The relevant factors to be considered in determining whether “exigent circumstances” exist are (1) whether immediate government action was required, (2) whether the governmental interest was sufficiently compelling to justify a warrantless intrusion, and (3) whether the citizen’s expectation of privacy was diminished in some way. Rohrig, 98 F.3d at 1521. In this case, Defendants contend that the City’s Ordinance requires there to be exigent circumstances in the form of an “immediate and serious danger to the public safety” before the individual Defendants in this case were authorized to seize Plaintiffs’ property through an emergency demolition. Thus, consistent with the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, Defendants argue that the Ordinance itself requires that there be a need for immediate government action before an emergency demolition take place.

The Ordinance also requires there be a compelling governmental interest in the form of a danger to the public safety and emergency personnel. In Rohrig, the police officers sought to restore the neighbor’s peaceful enjoyment of their homes and neighborhood by entering the defendant’s home for the purpose of locating and abating a nuisance. 98 F.3d at 1521. The court concluded that “the importance of preserving our communities” was not so insignificant that it could never serve as justification for a warrantless entry into a home, even if the absence of life-or death circumstances. Id. at 1521-22. In this case, Defendants assert that the governmental interest was significantly more compelling than in Rohrig because it involved the safety of the public and emergency personnel. Although the Ordinance does not specifically address the third factor, Defendants note that courts have not required a diminished expectation of privacy before finding exigent circumstances to exist. Rather, that factor has been used as part of a balancing test such that exigent circumstances will more likely be found where the traditional privacy of the home has been compromised in some way. Rohrig, 98 F.3d at 1518. Defendants emphasize that this case does not involve the traditional privacy of the home. 1002 Webber was not Plaintiffs’ residence. It was a rental property that had been vacant since late 2007 or early 2008. EOF No. 11 Ex. H at 27. Further, Plaintiff John Hescott was aware that the foundation wall had collapsed and was open to entry but left the home in that condition without taking any immediate action to prevent entry. Thus, Defendants contend that any expectation of privacy was significantly diminished.

Plaintiffs construe Defendants’ argument as being that the Ordinance provides irrefutable proof that an exigent circumstance existed but contends that it is not “irrefutable proof’ that exigent circumstances existed. Plaintiffs also contend that some of the terms in the Ordinance such as “may lead to potential injury” do not require that any certain danger actually exist and invites unreasonable seizures of property that pose no real danger. Additionally, because the Ordinance provides for demolition or repair of a property with a potential safety threat but provides no guidance to determine which procedure should be used, Plaintiffs argue that repair should be the reasonably chosen course of action. Without an order, consent or warrant authorizing an entry or seizure, “the government must shoulder the heavy burden of justifying any warrantless entry into a private home”. Rohrig, 98 F.3d at 1522. Plaintiffs emphasize that the only evidence that the City has offered to satisfy its heavy burden that exigent circumstances justified its interference with the Plaintiffs’ possessory rights is the language of its Ordinance. Plaintiffs also argue that the fact that City officials followed the policy and directive of the ordinance is not irrefutable evidence that their actions were objectively reasonable. The deposition testimony of the City’s employees demonstrates only that it was more expedient and cheaper to interfere with the Plaintiffs’ possessory rights than take other less drastic and available measures. ECF No. 18 Ex. G at 87-88, Ex. J at 15-16,79. Plaintiffs urge the Court to require the City to do more than rely on its Ordinance to rebut the presumption that their non-consensual entry was unreasonable.

Defendants reply that exigent circumstances do not require absolute certainty that harm will occur, but instead requires a risk of danger and a need for prompt action by government personnel such that delay to secure a warrant would be unacceptable under the circumstances. Rohrig, 98 F.3d at 1517. The City’s Ordinance instructs government personnel that there must be an immediate potential for death or injury before determining that exigent circumstances justify taking a property through demolition. The standard for exigent circumstances is an objective one and asks whether the state actors had an objectively reasonable basis for believing that exigent circumstances existed. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 398-99, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006). Defendants argue that here, the City officials objectively believed that there was an immediate risk of injury or death and that exigent circumstances existed for demolishing Plaintiffs’ house.

Defendants note that the City’s Ordinance makes clear that the Ordinance addresses only those situations where there is an immediate potential for injury, death, etc. It is the immediacy of the required action and the seriousness of the potential harm that justifies the warrantless seizure. The City’s Ordinance requires a determination by a designated City official that there is a immediate risk of injury, death or spread of disease before an emergency demolition is authorized. Therefore, Defendants submit that the City’s Ordinance does not violate the Fourth Amendment, and Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim against the City based on the July 18, 2009 demolition should be dismissed.

The Court concludes that exigent circumstances justified the emergency demolition. This requirement is reasonable and balances the governmental and private interests at stake. The City had no custom, policy, ordinance or regulation that was the “direct causal link” between the action taken by the individual Defendants’ and the alleged deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights; if a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, it occurred because the individual Defendants acted in a manner inconsistent with the City’s Ordinance by demolishing Plaintiffs’ property in the absence of truly exigent circumstances. However, the City officials have articulated their objective belief that there was an immediate risk of injury or death to establish that exigent circumstances did exist to justify demolishing Plaintiffs’ house. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ expectation of privacy was diminished because the house was open to the public by virtue of the collapsed wall that Plaintiffs were aware of yet did not make repairs or otherwise close the residence off. The City is thus not responsible for a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

b. Removal of the Demolished Home and Its Contents

Plaintiffs request in their response that the Court grant summary judgment in their favor on the City’s removal and disposal of the house and its effects and any other subsequent non-consensual and warrantless entries to grade the lot. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509-11, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (concluding that firefighters’ subsequent warrantless entries after leaving the scene of the fire violated the Fourth Amendment); Jacob v. West Bloomfield, 531 F.3d 385, 392 (6th Cir.2008) (noting that the government cannot invade a home’s curtilage area without a warrant). Because a party cannot request this type of relief in a response brief, Plaintiffs’ request must be denied.

Defendants argue that the removal of the home and its contents was not a separate Fourth Amendment violation because once the property was demolished there remained no protected privacy interest in the house and its contents. Under Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992), however, seizures as opposed to searches do not implicate privacy interests. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ property had already been effectively “seized” on July 18, 2009. The City’s entry onto the property and later removal of the debris to the landfill was thus nothing more than a continuation of the same seizure. “Once the act of taking the property is complete, the seizure has ended and the Fourth Amendment no longer applies.” Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 351 (6th Cir.1999). Moreover, even if removal of the debris pile containing the residents’ personal property is considered a separate seizure, Defendants submit that it had, at most, a de minimus impact on any protected property interest such that the warrantless seizure was reasonable. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984).

The re-entry onto the property two days later to remove the debris, which included Plaintiffs contents, aluminum siding, wood, pipes, and other materials, constitutes a warrantless, non-consensual seizure that was not a continuation of the same initial seizure. In Jacobsen, the Court noted that where the seizure was lawful at its inception but later the temporary deprivation of possessory interest is converted into a permanent one, the court is required to “balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” 466 U.S. at 124-25, 104 S.Ct. 1652 (concluding that the destruction of the powder during the course of the field test was reasonable because the interests justifying the procedure were substantial and the safeguards of a warrant would only minimally advance Fourth Amendment interests). The initial deprivation had been completed, and despite the fact that the house had been demolished, Defendants nonetheless re-entered Plaintiffs’ property to remove what they characterize as debris, but what Plaintiffs considered valuable housing materials even in the demolished state. Summary judgment in Defendants’ favor is not justified.

Plaintiffs also take issue with the warrantless entry onto Plaintiffs’ land for the final grade and/or final grade inspection that took place in October 2009. Defendants contend that it is clear that there was no expectation of privacy at that time; the property was simply a pile of rubble and a vacant lot. Further, Defendants assert, Plaintiffs do not claim that any property was seized in October 2009. Plaintiffs do not advance any cases supporting the proposition that the mere entry onto land alone, where there was no search and no seizure, constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation. Moreover, Defendant emphasizes the curtilage case relied on by Plaintiffs, Jacob v. Twp. of West Bloomfield, 531 F.3d 385 (6th Cir.2008), is inapposite. In Jacob, the defendants entered the plaintiffs property to inspect and determine whether the plaintiff remained out of compliance with a land use ordinance — the continuing violation of which involved the threat of criminal sanctions. The Court’s finding of a Fourth Amendment violation was based upon the plaintiffs privacy interest. The Court explained that in determining whether a part of a home’s curtilage is protected by the Fourth Amendment, the ultimate question is “whether the area harbors the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.” Jacob, 531 F.3d at 389. The Court further found that the entry was akin to conducting a criminal investigation because of the criminal sanctions at issue. Id. at 390-91.

In this case, by contrast, the October 2009 entry onto the property was neither an administrative nor a criminal search of the property. The grade inspection at the conclusion was necessary only to approve the payment of the contractors who performed the demolition. ECF No. 11 Ex. C at 75-76. It was not related to an administrative or criminal investigation. Further, as Defendants note, a vacant lot is not an area that harbors the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life in order to provide Fourth Amendment protections if the entry is characterized as a search of the property. Defendants’ need to enter the property is insufficient to qualify as a Fourth Amendment search or seizure under the law because no dwelling remained and there was no search conducted.

2. Plaintiffs Due Process Violation Claim

Defendants do not dispute that an official policy of the City in the form of the City’s “Emergency Cases” section of the Dangerous Buildings Ordinance was the moving force behind the alleged injury in this case, i.e., the demolition of the house located at 1002 Webber. However, Defendants contend that the Due Process Clause was not implicated in this case because Plaintiffs have an adequate post-deprivation remedy in the form of their inverse condemnation action under state law.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. As a general rule, the process that is due before the state may deprive an owner of property includes notice to the owner prior to the deprivation and an opportunity for a predeprivation hearing. Harris v. City of Akron, 20 F.3d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir.1994). However, the Supreme Court has recognized an exception to this general rule where the situation necessitates quick action or makes efforts to provide meaningful pre-deprivation process impracticable, so long as the State provides adequate post-deprivation procedure. In some situations, a state may satisfy procedural due process by providing “some meaningful means by which to assess the propriety of the State’s action at some time after the initial taking.” Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). When the situation necessitates “quick action” by the state or makes efforts to provide a meaningful predeprivation process impracticable, the persons acting under state authority may proceed without violating the property owner’s rights so long as the state provides an adequate post-deprivation procedure. Id. Such a procedure satisfies the “fundamental requirement of due process” of an opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Id. at 540, 101 S.Ct. 1908 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)).

Under the rule in Parrott, as applied by Harris, supra, Defendants argue that the fact that the City did not provide Plaintiffs with prior notice and an opportunity for a pre-deprivation hearing is insufficient to establish a violation of due process because the State provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. In Harris, the defendant city had a similar ordinance that allowed the demolition of dangerous buildings without notice in emergency situation. The plaintiff in Harris alleged that the defendants followed the procedure in the city code but in their haste to demolish his building, they found an emergency when none actually existed, and thus followed the wrong procedure. Harris, 20 F.3d at 1403. Like the City’s ordinance in this ease, the ordinance at issue in Harris required notice and an opportunity to be heard in non-emergency situations. Id. The Sixth Circuit concluded that use of the emergency procedure without prior notice to the owner did not violate due process because the state provided a meaningful post-deprivation process. Id. at 1404-05. In so holding, the Court found that it was immaterial whether the city was actually correct in determining that an emergency existed before demolishing the building. Id. at 1404. Because of the threat to public safety and the fact that “the state provided a meaningful postdeprivation process to determine the propriety of the demolition decision,” the requirements of due process were satisfied. Id. at 1404-05. The post-deprivation process provided by the State in Harris was a state law claim for inverse condemnation. Id. at 1401.

Defendants note that in Fruman v. City of Detroit, 1 F.Supp.2d 665, 674 (E.D.Mich.1998), the Court acknowledged the conclusion from Parratt that, in some cases, “either the necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticability of providing any meaningful predeprivation process, when coupled with the availability of some meaningful means by which to assess the propriety of the State’s action at some time after the initial taking, can satisfy the requirements of due process.” (Citation and quotation omitted). However, in Fruman, unlike this case, there was no claim of emergency or impracticability. Rather, the defendant city in Fruman demolished the building after sending notices of hearings and/or demolition by certified mail to a vacant address with knowledge of the property owner’s current address and without having received any receipts acknowledging receipt of the notices. Id. at 669.

Here, the City’s Ordinance only allows for emergency demolitions without notice or hearing in cases where there is an “immediate and serious danger to the public safety.” ECF No. 11 Ex. E § 151.120. In non-emergency situations, the Ordinance requires notice and hearing before demolitions take place. ECF No. 11 Ex. E §§ 151.113 to 151.118. Defendants emphasize that when an immediate and serious danger to the public safety exists, quick action is required and it is not practical to wait for a pre-deprivation process to run its course. In this case, the City demolished the property on the same day it had notice of the danger. Under the holding of Harris, supra, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot establish a due process violation simply by contending that the City was incorrect in determining that an emergency was present and demolition was necessary. Like in Harris, “[a]n erroneous determination that no emergency existed would have resulted in the very threat to the public that the code was intended to prevent” and “Hollowing the nonemergency procedures of [the Ordinance] would have left the emergency untreated and the public exposed to the resulting danger.” Harris, 20 F.3d at 1404.

Plaintiffs clarify that their due process claim is based on the City’s failure to provide them with either pre or post deprivation notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard — not that the City failed to compensate them for the destruction of their property. Plaintiffs emphasize that their right to due process is distinct from their right to just compensation under the Michigan Constitution.

An inverse condemnation claim arises directly from the self-executing character of the Just Compensation Clause. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, California, 482 U.S. 304, 315-16, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987). The existence of a state inverse condemnation remedy renders unripe a regulatory takings claim under the Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause because of the nature of the constitutional right. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194-95, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985). The Just Compensation Clause does not proscribe the taking of property but only uncompensated takings. Id. at 193, 195 n. 134, 105 S.Ct. 3108 (relying on a self-described “imperfect” analogy to Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981) for the plaintiffs second ripeness test). -The analogy to Parratt was imperfect because that case did not apply to situations “in which the deprivation of property is effected pursuant to an established state policy or procedure, and the State could provide predeprivation process. Unlike the Due Process Clause, however, the Just Compensation Clause has never been held to require pre-taking process or compensation.” Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195 & n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3108. The Court explained that “[t]he nature of the constitutional right, therefore, requires that a property owner utilize procedures for obtaining compensation before bringing a § 1983 action.” Id. at 195, n. 13., 105 S.Ct. 3108 In other words, a plaintiff could not establish for § 1983 purposes the violation of the federal constitutional right to just compensation unless no right to, or adequate procedure for, obtaining just compensation for regulatory takings existed under state law.

Plaintiffs contend, however, that the existence of an inverse condemnation claim does not obviate a due process claim. Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 543, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 161 L.Ed.2d 876 (2005), held in relevant part that the payment of just compensation could not obviate a due process violation. Id. (concluding that no amount of compensation can authorize an arbitrary or unreasonable deprivation of property). If the government fails to afford the requisite due process procedures, there is no self-executing right to compensation under the Due Process Clause. In contrast, Section 1983 provides the compensatory remedy for due process deprivations. See e.g., San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 658 n. 23, 101 S.Ct. 1287, 67 L.Ed.2d 551 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Section 1983 provides a cause of action for damages when application of a regulation violates the Due Process rather than the Just Compensation clause).

Plaintiffs submit that their state inverse condemnation claim, which is asserted only under the state constitution, does not subsume the Plaintiffs’ federal due process claim. In Soldal, supra, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the Due Process Clause provided the only remedy for the seizure in that case. The Court concluded that there was no basis for “doling out constitutional protections in such fashion. Certain wrongs effect more than a single right and, accordingly, can implicate more than one of the Constitution’s commands.” 506 U.S. at 70, 113 S.Ct. 538. When such multiple violations are alleged, the Court advised not to identify, as a preliminary matter, the claims “dominant” character but to examine each constitutional provision in turn. Id. at 70, 113 S.Ct. 538.

Plaintiffs note that the City relied on Harris v. City of Akron, 20 F.3d 1396 (6th Cir.1994) for the proposition that an inverse condemnation claim could remedy a due process violation but contend this reliance is erroneous. In Kruse v. Village of Chagrin Falls, 74 F.3d 694, 699 (6th Cir.1996) the court explained that its statement in Harris regarding the availability of an inverse condemnation remedy was dicta because the plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed its Just Compensation Clause taking claim. Moreover, Lingle and not the earlier decided Harris is the controlling authority on the issue.

Additionally, Plaintiffs believe that the City wrongly construes Jones v. Powell, 462 Mich. 329, 612 N.W.2d 423 (2000), which instead demonstrates that Michigan provides no adequate post deprivation remedy for Federal or State due process violations. The court in Jones did not hold that a citizen cannot state a claim for a due process violation under the Michigan Constitution but instead concluded that it would not infer a cause of action for a damage remedy against municipalities or their employees under the State Constitution’s Due Process Clause because Section 1983 provided an adequate remedy. Id. at 335-36, 612 N.W.2d 423. The court explained that it had only inferred such a compensatory remedy under the State Constitution when no other remedy, such as an Section 1983 claim, existed. Id. at 333, 612 N.W.2d 423. Plaintiffs believe that the correct conclusion, based on the holding in Jones, is that they have no compensation remedy for Federal Due Process violations under State law and therefore Section 1983 provides the only compensatory remedy for a Federal Due Process violation. Defendants instead interpret Jones as concluding that a plaintiff is unable to pursue a due process violation where a state inverse condemnation remedy is available under the Michigan Constitution, which Plaintiffs contend is incorrect.

Plaintiffs are not suggesting that the City must provide pre-deprivation notice and hearing when truly exigent circumstances exist. Plaintiffs’ position is that the City should provide pre-deprivation notice if feasible and must provide full post-deprivation process. “[S]ummary administrative action may be justified in some emergency situations” even if the act deprives a person of a substantial property interest. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 299-300, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981). In Hodel, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (1976 ed. Supp. III), permitted the Secretary of the Interior to issue an emergency cessation order without a prior hearing when an urgent situation as defined under the Act existed. The court held that the Act’s emergency cessation orders did not violate the Due Process Clause because the statutory scheme provided property owners with “prompt and adequate” post-deprivation review to challenge the order. Id. at 303, 101 S.Ct. 2352. The Court held that the relevant question was not whether the immediate cessation order should have been issued “but whether the statutory procedure itself is incapable of affording due process.” Id. at 302, 101 S.Ct. 2352.

In Flatford, infra, the plaintiff sued the city and other officials after an emergency eviction from a rental unit. The issue in the building official’s interlocutory immunity appeal was whether the building official was liable for damages under Section 1983 because the official failed to provide the plaintiff with “any process before or after the eviction.” Id. at 167. The court first held that the Parrott “adequate state remedy” rule that applies to random and unauthorized acts did not apply when officials act according to established procedures. When officials act according to established procedures, the governing body can anticipate that those procedures could result in the deprivation of rights that the due process clause protects. Id. at 168. Moreover, even if exigent circumstances could relieve a municipality from providing predeprivation process, such circumstances do not relieve the municipality from providing meaningful post-deprivation process. Id. at 169. The Flatford court reasoned:

The requirement of an immediate and meaningful post deprivation process becomes even more important in view of the license which qualified immunity essentially allows public officials when they make judgments affecting the health and safety of our citizens under perceived exigent circumstances. Even though we recognize that these judgments may be mistaken, the opportunity of an administrative hearing assures that fairness will quickly prevail and the constitutional rights, if mistakenly curtailed, will be immediately restored. Without the assurance of immediate review, qualified immunity may be wrongly perceived as an open invitation for public officials to ignore fundamental rights without any fear of censure. This is most certainly not our intended message

Id.

In this case, Plaintiffs argue that the City could have anticipated that it might destroy property without providing any pre-deprivation notice or hearing. Even if an emergency existed that prevented the City from providing any notice or hearing before demolishing the Plaintiffs’ house and disposing of its contents, that did not relieve the City from providing a “prompt and adequate” post-deprivation hearing from which the Plaintiffs could have sought judicial review. See Hodel, supra, at 303, 101 S.Ct. 2352. Thus, the City’s policy itself violates the Due Process Clause because it fails to provide any procedural protections either before or after the predictable deprivation of property rights.

The City has a pre-deprivation process that permits a citizen to contest the validity of a determination that demolition is required. Ordinance Section 151.114, Notice and Order to Show Cause; ECF No. 18 Ex. J at 12-15. Plaintiffs believe that the City has not adequately explained why it does not provide a similar post deprivation hearing when an alleged emergency prevents prior review of the demolition order. According to John Stemple, the Chief Inspector, the City did not hold many such pre-deprivation hearings because of the expense. Id. at 15. Even if a house violated code, the City would not issue a notice to show cause why a house should not be demolished if the City had no general budget funds for the demolition. Id. at 15-16.

Plaintiffs assert that the timeline establishes that pre-deprivation notice was not impossible or impractical. Barton and Crofoot had approximately a three-hour window to call Plaintiffs and advise them that they intended to demolish the house. Crofoot testified that he could not call Plaintiffs, not because there was no time, but because it was a Saturday, the records office was closed, and it is not City policy to make a phone call in that situation. ECF No. 18 Ex. G at 88. Moreover, he testified that even if he had time in an emergency demolition, he would not call a property owner because it is not the City’s policy to make such calls either before or after an emergency demolition. Id. at 38, 88-89, 91. Crofoot also testified that the City does not give any person post-deprivation notice because of time constraints. Id. at 38-39. He testified that he has no time because he “has to get other files done, so they can be released for demolition; or I will lose the [grant] money.” Id. at 38-39. The City, moreover, would not have provided any pre-deprivation notice even if it were possible because it is not City policy to provide pre- or post deprivation notice in “emergency” demolition situations. The City’s objectively unreasonable policies, Plaintiffs argue, cannot protect it or the individual actors from liability because the City’s policy reflects a willful and deliberate disregard for its citize