Citations
- 896 F. Supp. 2d 1242
Full opinion text
OPINION
RIDGWAY, Judge:
In this action, the plaintiffs — three foreign producers of certain coated paper, and two U.S. importers of that merchandise (hereinafter, the “Foreign Producers”) — contest the unanimous final determination of the U.S. International Trade Commission (“Commission” or “ITC”) that imports of such coated paper that are sold in the United States for less than fair market value and subsidized by the Governments of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) and Indonesia posed a threat of material injury to the U.S. domestic industry. See Complaint ¶ 1; Certain Coated Paper Suitable for High-Quality Print Graphics Using Sheet-Fed Presses from China and Indonesia, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-470-471 and 731-TA-1169-1170 (Final), USITC Pub. 4192 at 1 (Nov. 2010). The Commission’s determination led the U.S. Department of Commerce to issue antidumping and countervailing duty orders covering imports of the subject merchandise from the PRC and from Indonesia.
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment on the Agency-Record. In that motion, the Foreign Producers assert that the Commission’s affirmative final threat of material injury determination is not supported by substantial evidence, and is otherwise not in accordance with law. See generally Respondent Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Their Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record (“Pis.’ Brief’); Respondent Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record (“Pis.’ Reply Brief’).
The Commission and Defendant-Intervenors — three domestic producers of coated paper, and a labor union (hereinafter the “Domestic Producers”) — oppose the Foreign Producers’ motion and maintain that the Commission’s determination should be sustained in all respects. See generally Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion of Plaintiffs for Judgment on the Agency Record (“Def.’s Brief’); Defendant-Intervenors’ Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record (“Def.Ints.’ Brief’).
Jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2006). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record must be denied.
I. Background
The nation’s international trade laws require that antidumping and countervailing duties be imposed upon imported merchandise in cases of dumping (i.e., where merchandise “is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than ... fair value”) and in cases where the merchandise is the product of an improper subsidy (ie., where “a countervailable subsidy is being provided with respect to the ... merchandise”) — but only when the dumping or subsidies result in “material injury or the threat of material injury” to a domestic industry. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673.
In cases where dumping is alleged, the U.S. Department of Commerce is charged with determining whether the imported merchandise “is being, or is likely to be” dumped. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(l). Similarly, where prohibited subsidies are alleged, Commerce determines whether the imported merchandise is the beneficiary of a “countervailable subsidy.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(a)(l).
In both antidumping and countervailing duty cases, the role of the Commission, in turn, is to make the requisite “injury” determination — that is, to determine whether the alleged dumping or subsidies result in “material injury or the threat of material injury” to the domestic industry at issue. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b)(l), 1673d(b)(l). Material injury is defined as “harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A).
To make an affirmative determination of material injury, the Commission must conclude that imports are having an adverse impact on the domestic industry at present. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C). In contrast, to reach an affirmative determination of threat of material injury, the Commission must conclude (in relevant part) that “further dumped or subsidized imports are imminent” and that “material injury by reason of imports would occur unless an [antidumping or countervailing duty] order is issued....” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(ii). In reaching a determination on “threat of material injury,” the Commission is to analyze certain statutory threat factors before making its final decision. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(i) (listing threat factors). Whether evaluating “material injury” or “threat of material injury,” the Commission must consider the effect of the volume of imports on the domestic industry, the effect of imports on domestic prices, and whether there is likely injury to the domestic industry caused by imports. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(7)(B)(i), 1677(7)(F)(i).
The record of the agency proceeding here documents the Commission’s consideration of the domestic industry’s allegations of “material injury” and “threat of material injury” in both the antidumping and countervailing duty investigations, covering the period January 2007 through June 2010 (the “period of investigation”). The Commission organized its final views by separately addressing volume, price effects, and the impact of the subject imports. See Final Views at 26-39. As to each topic, the Commission first considered the allegations of present material injury, then the threat of material injury. See Final Views at 26-39.
Ultimately, based on the record compiled before it, the Commission reached a negative final determination on “material injury,” concluding that there was no present material injury to the domestic coated paper industry. See Final Views at 26. However, the Commission concluded that — in light of its findings on likely subject import volume, likely price effects, and the likely impact of subject imports on the domestic industry — imports of coated paper from the PRC and Indonesia would increase in the imminent future and that material injury due to such imports would occur absent imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties. Final Views at 38-39. The Commission therefore reached an affirmative final determination on “threat of material injury,” concluding— unanimously — that imports of coated paper from the PRC and Indonesia threatened the domestic industry. See Certain Coated Paper Suitable For High-Quality Print Graphics Using Sheet-Fed Presses From China and Indonesia: Determinations, 75 Fed.Reg. 70,289 (ITC Nov. 17, 2010); see also Final Views at 3.
The Commission’s affirmative determination on threat of material injury led to the issuance of antidumping and countervailing duty orders by Commerce. See n. 3, supra.
This action followed.
II. Standard, of Review
In reviewing a challenge to a final determination, the Commission’s determination must be upheld unless it is “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477-78, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)); see also Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966) (defining “substantial evidence” as “something less than the weight of the evidence”).
“[A] party challenging the Commission’s determination under the substantial evidence standard ‘has chosen a course with a high barrier to reversal.’ ” Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1352, 1358 (Fed.Cir.2006) (quoting Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd. v. United States, 275 F.3d 1056, 1060 (Fed.Cir.2001)). That party “bears the burden of proving the evidence [is] inadequate.” Micron Tech., Inc. v. United States, 117 F.3d 1386, 1397 (Fed.Cir.1997).
It is, of course, true that any evaluation of the substantiality of evidence “must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight,” including “contradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn.” Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 44 F.3d 978, 985 (Fed.Cir.1994) (quoting Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 487-88, 71 S.Ct. 456); see also Mittal Steel Point Lisas Ltd. v. United States, 548 F.3d 1375, 1380-81 (Fed.Cir.2008) (same). However, the mere fact that it may be possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from the record does not prevent the agency’s determination from being supported by substantial evidence. Am. Silicon Techs. v. United States, 261 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed.Cir.2001); see also Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. at 620.
In short, “[i]t is not the function of a court to decide that, were it the Commission, it would have made the same decision on the basis of the evidence.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 750 F.2d 927, 936 (Fed.Cir.1984). The court’s role is “limited to deciding whether the Commission’s decision is unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
And “when the totality of the evidence does not illuminate a black-and-white answer to a disputed issue, it is the role of the expert factfinder — here the majority of the Presidentially-appointed, Senate-approved Commissioners — to decide which side’s evidence to believe.” Nippon Steel Corp., 458 F.3d at 1359. “So long as there is adequate basis in support of the Commission’s choice of evidentiary weight, the Court of International Trade ..., reviewing under the substantial evidence standard, must defer to the Commission.” Id.
III. Analysis
As discussed above, the Commission’s responsibility in antidumping and countervailing duty investigations is to determine whether the domestic industry in question is being “materially injured or is threatened with material injury” by reason of imports. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(b)(l), 1673d(b)(l); see generally section I, supra.
In determining whether a domestic industry is threatened with material injury by reason of imports of specified merchandise, the Commission is directed to consider, “among other relevant economic factors,” nine enumerated statutory threat factors:
(I) if a countervailable subsidy is involved, such information as may be presented to [the Commission] by [Commerce] as to the nature of the subsidy ..., and whether imports of the subject merchandise are likely to increase,
(II) any existing unused production capacity or imminent, substantial increase in production capacity in the exporting country indicating the likelihood of substantially increased imports of the subject merchandise into the United States, taking into account the availability of other export markets to absorb any additional exports,
(III) a significant rate of increase of the volume or market penetration of imports of the subject merchandise indicating the likelihood of substantially increased imports,
(IV) whether imports of the subject merchandise are entering at prices that are likely to have a significant depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices, and are likely to increase demand for further imports,
(V) inventories of the subject merchandise,
(VI) the potential for product-shifting if production facilities in the foreign country, which can be used to produce the subject merchandise, are currently being used to produce other products,
(VII) in any investigation ... [involving] imports of both a raw agricultural product ... and any product processed from such raw agricultural product, the likelihood that there will be increased imports, by reason of product shifting, if there is an affirmative determination by the Commission ... with respect to either the raw agricultural product or the processed agricultural product (but not both),
(VIII) the actual and potential negative effects on the existing development and production efforts of the domestic industry, including efforts to develop a derivative or more advanced version of the domestic like product, and
(IX) any other demonstrable adverse trends that indicate the probability that there is likely to be material injury by reason of imports (or sale for importation) of the subject merchandise (whether or not it is actually being imported at the time).
The Foreign Producers’ threshold attack on the Commission’s threat of injury determination is their claim that the Commission erred in basing its determination principally on a subset of the nine statutory threat factors — specifically, factors (II), (III), (IV), and (IX). Pis.’ Brief at 8-9. The Foreign Producers contend that — because the Commission did not specifically discuss all nine factors — the Commission’s determination is “not in accordance with the law.” Pis.’ Brief at 8-9.
The Foreign Producers misinterpret the requirements of 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(i). Pis.’ Brief at 7-9. In a threat of material injury determination, the Commission is required to consider the nine specifically enumerated factors in assessing the possible threat of imminent injury to the U.S. industry, to the extent that is appropriate. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(i). In its determination here, the Commission focused its analysis principally on four of the nine statutory factors. See Final Views at 21-22 n. 126, 81 n. 201.
As the Commission noted, statutory threat factor (VII) is not applicable, because no imports of agricultural products were involved. Final Views at 21-22 n. 126; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(i)(VH). Surely the Foreign Producers do not contend that the Commission was required to engage in an extended discussion of factor (VII). Statutory threat factor (VIII) also is not applicable. There is no suggestion that the domestic industry is currently engaging in, or will imminently engage in, any efforts to “develop a derivative or more advanced version of the domestic like product.” Final Views at 21-22 n. 126; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(i)(VIII).
As for the remaining statutory threat factors, it is true that factors (I), (V), and (VI) were not as thoroughly addressed in the Commission’s final views as factors (II), (III), (IV), and (IX). Pis.’ Brief at 8-9. However, the extent of the Commission’s discussion of any particular factor does not, in itself, render the Commission’s determination not lawful. Moreover, the Foreign Producers have not established that the factors that the Commission discussed “only in passing” are so significant to the analysis as to “seriously undermine[ ] [the Commission’s] reasoning and conclusions.” Altx, Inc. v. United States, 25 CIT 1100, 1117-18, 167 F.Supp.2d 1353, 1374 (2001).
As the Court of Appeals has underscored, “the Commission need only discuss ‘material issues of law or fact.’ ” Timken U.S. Corp. v. United States, 421 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed.Cir.2005) (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Mirror Mfrs. v. United States, 12 CIT 771, 780, 696 F.Supp. 642, 649 (1988)); see also Metallverken Nederland B.V. v. United States, 13 CIT 1013, 1035, 728 F.Supp. 730, 746 (1989) (“[T]here is no requirement that an affirmative determination be based upon an affirmative finding as to all the factors.”). Even more to the point, the Court of Appeals has held that the Commission is entitled to “use its sound discretion in determining the weight to afford these and all other factors.” Suramerica, 44 F.3d at 984. Nothing cited by the Foreign Producers suggests an abuse of that discretion here. See Metallverken, 13 CIT at 1029, 728 F.Supp. at 742 (affirming Commission’s threat of material injury determination based on less than nine factors); see also Goss Graphics Sys., Inc. v. United States, 216 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed.Cir.2000) (same).
The bulk of the Foreign Producers’ arguments target the Commission’s findings on statutory threat factors (II), (III), (IV), and (IX) — the factors that the Commission addressed in greater detail. The Foreign Producers claim that the Commission did not properly address these four factors and that, as such, the Commission’s affirmative final threat of injury determination improperly rested on “mere speculation and conjecture” and on findings that are otherwise “not supported by substantial evidence on the record.” Pis.’ Brief at 8.
As discussed in further detail below, the Foreign Producers’ arguments are without merit.
A. The Commission’s Analysis of the Volume of Imports Statutory Threat Factors (II) and (III)
In a threat of material injury analysis, the Commission is required to analyze the significance of likely future increases in the volume or market share of imports in the U.S. market, and whether such increases indicate a likely substantial growth in imports into the United States. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(i)(III). In addition, the Commission must consider any increase in foreign producers’ capacity and the likelihood that such an increase would give rise to future substantial growth in the volume of imports into the United States. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(i)(II).
In the instant case, the Commission found the capacity to produce coated paper likely to increase in both Indonesia and the PRC. Final Views at 28. With respect to Chinese capacity, the Commission noted that the parties agreed that capacity would increase between 2010 and 2011, but disagreed as to the extent of the projected increase. Final Views at 28. Further, the Commission found that the subject producers were likely to utilize the additional capacity to increase shipments to the United States. Final Views at 28. Throughout the investigation period, APP — the predominant exporter of coated paper in both the PRC and Indonesia, and the entity that represented and was affiliated with individual subject producers such as plaintiffs here — aggressively sought to increase exports to the United States. Final Views at 3, 24, 28-29. For example, in 2008, APP lost Unisource (a leading U.S. distributor) as a source for U.S. distribution. Shortly thereafter, APP established its own distributor, Eagle Ridge Paper, to retain and increase its presence in the U.S. market. Final Views at 24, 29. Record evidence also established that exporters could readily increase their U.S. market share due to their familiarity with the distribution network and the prevalence of spot market sales. Final Views at 28-29.
Finally, the Commission considered the historic increase in the volume and market penetration of the subject imports from 2007 to 2009. Final Views at 27. Specifically, the Commission found that, in 2009, APP’s loss of its major distributor was offset by increased sales to other accounts. Final Views at 29-30. The Commission similarly found that subject imports generally continued to increase even after APP lost its certification from the Forest Stewardship Council (“FSC”) in November 2007. Final Views at 30.
In addition, the Commission found that, due to significant increases in production capacity, Chinese and Indonesian producers of coated paper had both the ability and the incentive to increase exports of subject merchandise to the United States in the imminent future. Final Views at 30. Accordingly, the Commission concluded that, absent the imposition of antidumping and countervailing duty orders, the increases in volume of imports of coated paper from the PRC and Indonesia that occurred during the period of investigation were likely to continue. Final Views at 27.
The Foreign Producers challenge the Commission’s finding on Chinese production capacity, claiming that the finding is based on speculation and fails to meet the substantial evidence standard. See Pis.’ Brief at 10-17. The Foreign Producers also dispute the factual basis for the Commission’s conclusion that increases in the volume and market penetration of subject imports in the United States were significant and would likely lead to substantial growth in imports into the United States. See Pis.’ Brief at 18-26.
1. Production Capacity
Under the statute, the Commission was required to assess any latent capacity to produce coated paper in the PRC, the possibility of substantially increased imports to the United States, and the availability of other export markets to absorb any additional exports. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(i)(II). The Commission found that the evidence of production capacity in the PRC during the period of investigation and projections as to future capacity indicated a threat to the U.S. domestic industry. See Final Views at 28-30.
The Foreign Producers do not dispute that Chinese production capacity will increase within the imminent future. See Pis.’ Brief at 10-11. Rather, the Foreign Producers take issue with the projected additional capacity and the Commission’s determination that such additional capacity was substantial and likely to increase imports into the United States. Pis.’ Brief at 11.
a. Chinese Production Capacity
The Commission found a significant imminent increase in the Chinese manufacturers’ production capacity that would likely lead to a substantial increase in actual production. Final Views at 28 n. 181. In its analysis, the Commission relied on Resource Information Systems Inc. (“RISI”) projections of future Chinese consumption of coated paper and capacity to produce coated paper. Final Views at 28 n. 181.
In its analysis, however, the Commission did not use RISI’s projected capacity utilization rate of approximately 93%. See Staff Report at II — 8. Instead, the Commission used a projected capacity utilization rate derived from the Chinese producers’ questionnaire responses. See Staff Report at II — 8, VII-7 (Table VII-2). Responding Chinese producers projected a capacity utilization rate of 99.2% of total production capacity in 2010 and 99.3% in 2011. Staff Report at II — 8. Because 99.2% and 99.3% roughly equal 100%, the Commission concluded that Chinese manufacturers’ future actual production of coated paper would roughly equal the manufacturers’ future production capacity. Based on the RISI projections for consumption and production capacity, as well as a projected capacity utilization rate of essentially 100%, the Commission concluded that there would be approximately 900,000 metric tons of additional Chinese coated paper that would not be absorbed by the Chinese domestic market. Final Views at 28 n. 181.
The Foreign Producers contend that the Commission should have used RISI’s lower projected capacity utilization rate, rather than the rate derived from the Chinese producers’ questionnaire responses. Pis.’ Brief at 12. The Foreign Producers emphasize that the Commission relied on RISI data to support most of its analysis, and charge that the Commission selectively “cherry picked” the questionnaire data here to support its production capacity determination. Pis.’ Brief at 12; Pis.’ Reply Brief at 5.
As a general principle, however, the Commission has the discretion to rely on questionnaire data in circumstances such as these, so long as the Commission does not act arbitrarily. Int’l Imaging Materials, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 30 CIT 1181, 1187, 2006 WL 270156 (2006) (citing Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. United States, 17 CIT 798, 799, 1993 WL 327837 (1993), aff'd, 26 F.3d 139 (Fed.Cir.1994)) (“Although the ITC is permitted to make varying determinations based on the facts of each case, it may not act arbitrarily.... [T]he ITC must present a ‘reviewable, reasoned basis’ for its determinations.”).
Here, according to the Commission, RISI’s data were based on a category of paper products “somewhat broader than the paper defined by Commerce’s scope.” Final Views at 28 n. 181. In contrast, the scope of the data collected by the questionnaire responses was within the parameters of the industry as defined by Commerce for this investigation. The Commission thus provided adequate support for the “choices made among various potentially acceptable alternatives” in its decision to rely on questionnaire data. Int’l Imaging Materials, Inc., 30 CIT at 1187 (citation omitted); see also Nippon Steel Corp., 458 F.3d at 1351 (quoting Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 477-78, 71 S.Ct. 456 (explaining that a reviewing court must determine whether there exists “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the] conclusion”)).
The Foreign Producers claim that historical production capacity utilization rates provide “contrary evidence” establishing the Chinese producers’ capacity utilization rate to have been about 93%. See Pis.’ Brief at 12. It is true that the evidence prior to the first half of (“interim”) 2010 shows a lower capacity utilization rate than that used by the Commission. See Staff Report at VII-7. However, data reported from the first half of 2010 (the most recent period for which historical data was reported) show the same capacity utilization rate used by the Commission — 99%. Def.’s Brief at 21-22; see also Staff Report at VII-7 (Table VII-2). The most recent historical data thus support the Commission’s use of a 99% capacity utilization rate. See Staff Report at VII-7 (Table VII-2). The Foreign Producers’ challenges cannot carry the day.
b. & c. Other Export Markets
After determining the likely increase in Chinese production capacity and the additional production volume that would result therefrom, the Commission analyzed whether additional production was likely to substantially increase imports into the United States. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(i)(II). In so doing, the Commission is directed to consider export markets other than the United States and the ability of those markets to absorb any additional exports from the foreign producers’ increased production capacity. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(i)(II).
Here, the Foreign Producers challenge the Commission’s analysis as based on an assumption that a substantial proportion of the additional capacity projected in the PRC would be directed to the United States. Pis.’ Brief at 14. According to the Foreign Producers, the Commission’s determination failed to consider the possibility that the increase in Chinese-made subject merchandise would displace imports into the PRC and the Chinese manufacturers’ potential to increase sales in the Asian market. See Pis.’ Brief at 13-17.
i. Chinese Market
The Foreign Producers claim that the Commission’s production capacity analysis did not address “substantial record evidence that Chinese producers were capturing a larger and larger share of the Chinese market in excess of consumption growth.” Pis.’ Brief at 14. The Foreign Producers cite evidence of Chinese producers allegedly increasing their share of the Chinese market. Pis.’ Brief at 14. The Foreign Producers also refer to Chinese customs data which, according to the Foreign Producers, show a “steady rate of decline” in imports of coated paper into the PRC “since at least 2005.” Pis.’ Brief at 14. The Foreign Producers point to these facts as proof that Chinese producers are not concerned about increasing their presence in the U.S. market. Pis.’ Brief at 14.
But the Foreign Producers’ arguments are not borne out by the Chinese customs data. Those data merely depict decreasing imports of coated paper into the PRC. See Pis.’ Brief at 14 (explaining Chinese customs data). The data do not constitute substantial evidence that Chinese producers of coated paper were capturing a larger share of the Chinese market. This is especially true in light of the Commission’s staff report, which shows the Chinese producers’ share of the Chinese market as constant. See Conf. Staff Report at VII-10 (Table VII-2). In addition, the record documents the percentage of shipments that Chinese producers directed to the home market as decreasing during the period of investigation. The Foreign Producers’ argument thus consists of little more than speculation based on decreased imports into the PRC. Absent concrete, direct evidence that the Chinese producers were increasing their share of the Chinese market, the Foreign Producers gain no traction against the Commission’s findings and determination.
ii. Asian Markets
The Foreign Producers further contend that the Commission’s determination that increased Chinese production would be directed to the United States did not adequately address opportunities for Chinese producers in the Asian regional market. See Pis.’ Brief at 15. Specifically, the Foreign Producers argue that the Commission erred in not accounting for the potential for Chinese exports to displace third-country imports into the Asian region. Pis.’ Brief at 16.
According to the Foreign Producers, data from 2007 to 2009 indicate that 95% of Chinese exports of subject merchandise went to countries other than the United States. See Pis.’ Brief at 16. The Foreign Producers also cite to data showing that Chinese exports to the United States increased at a slower pace than exports to other markets during the same period of time. See Pis.’ Brief at 16. The Foreign Producers claim that this evidence casts into doubt the Commission’s conclusion that Chinese exports would target the U.S. market. Pis.’ Brief at 16. The Foreign Producers conclude that the Commission’s determination was unlawful, because — according to the 'Foreign Producers — the Commission failed to properly analyze “other export markets.” Pis.’ Brief at 15 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(i)(II)).
The data cited by the Foreign Producers do not, per se, undermine the Commission’s conclusion that Chinese producers would target the U.S. market. In its analysis, the Commission gave great weight to Chinese producers’ concerted efforts to target the U.S. market. See Final Views at 29-30. As discussed elsewhere herein, the evidence of those efforts included APP’s own efforts to establish a distribution network in the United States. See section III.A.2.b.ii, infra; n. 12, supra. Moreover, the Commission’s analysis of “other export markets” found no evidence that the growth in consumption in the rest of Asia would be able to absorb the excess Chinese production. Final Views at 28 n. 181.
Similarly unavailing is the Foreign Producers’ claim that the Commission ignored the potential for Chinese exports to displace third-country imports into Asia. See Pis.’ Brief at 16-17. The Foreign Producers highlight an article by a RISI economist, opining on the vulnerability of non-Asian imports to displacement by Chinese imports. See Pis.’ Brief at 17. As previously discussed (see n. 19, supra), however, a single article such as this is entitled to limited weight, particularly given the contrary record evidence and the very substantial discretion that is afforded the Commission. Moreover, record data squarely contradict the Foreign Producers’ assertions that Chinese producers were increasing their focus on Asian markets. Def.’s Brief at 22. The questionnaire data, for example, indicate that the percentage of the Chinese producers’ shipments to Asian markets was constant, and showed no increase from 2007 to 2009. Def.’s Brief at 22 (citing Conf. Staff Report at vn-io).
Aside from one article by a RISI economist, the Foreign Producers proffered no affirmative evidence to establish that Chinese producers have taken any significant steps to increase their presence in the Asian market. The Foreign Producers’ arguments must therefore be rejected.
2. Volume and Market Penetration
As part of its threat of material injury analysis, the Commission is required to consider the effect of any significant rate of increase in import volume or market penetration of subject imports in the U.S. market. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(i)(III). In its affirmative final determination in this case, the Commission found the increase in imports of coated paper from the PRC and Indonesia during the period of investigation to be significant, both on an absolute basis and relative to apparent U.S. production and consumption. Final Views at 27. The quantity of imports increased by more than 15,000 short tons from 2008 to 2009, despite a 21.3% decline in U.S. consumption over the same period. Final Views at 27 n. 172. The Commission relied on these trends, together with evidence of the Chinese producers’ interest in the U.S. market, in reaching its affirmative determination. See Final Views at 30-31.
The Foreign Producers claim that the Commission failed to explain why it concluded that the increases in import volume and market share were significant. Pis.’ Brief at 18; see section III.A.2.a, infra. Further, the Foreign Producers argue that the Commission ignored affirmative evidence refuting its predictions that the rates of increase gave rise to a “likelihood of substantially increased imports” into the United States. Pis.’ Brief at 18-26; see section III.A.2.b, infra.
a. Significant Rate of Increase of Future Volume or Market Penetration of Imports
The Foreign Producers protest the Commission’s conclusion that the increased rates of import volume and market penetration found were significant. Final Views at 26-27; Pis.’ Brief at 19. The Foreign Producers dispute the Commission’s methodology, and, in addition, assert that the Commission’s ultimate finding of a “significant” rate of increase was not supported by substantial evidence. Pis.’ Brief at 19-21.
i. Commission Methodology
In its determination of the “significance” of the rates of increase, the Commission acknowledged that imports from the PRC and Indonesia declined during the first half of 2010. Final Views at 27. The Commission found that the sharp decline in subject import volume began in March 2010 — the month in which Commerce issued its preliminary countervailing duty determination, and thus imposed provisional duties on subject imports. Final Views at 27, 29 n. 191. The Foreign Producers themselves acknowledge that the interim 2010 declines in the volume of subject imports were due to the pending trade cases. Pis.’ Brief at 21; see also Final Views at 27.
Under the statutory scheme, the Commission is authorized to accord less weight to data for the period following the commencement of a trade investigation, if the Commission finds that changes in the volume, price effects, and impact of the subject imports are attributable to the pendency of an investigation. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(I). Here, the Commission invoked and applied that provision of the statute to justify discounting the 2010 data in the underlying investigation. See Final Views at 27 n. 174.
The Foreign Producers claim that — instead of merely reducing the weight accorded it — the Commission effectively ignored the 2010 data, in disregard of 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(I). Pis.’ Brief at 21-22. Specifically, the Foreign Producers allege that the Commission failed to compare data from the second half of 2010 to the first half of 2009, and did not account for the drop in volume of subject imports in the first half of 2010 as compared to the second half of 2009. Pis.’ Brief at 21-22.
The Foreign Producers’ claim is unfounded. The Commission collected and compiled data for 2010, included the data in the staff report and its tables, and discussed the data in the Commission’s final views. See, e.g., Final Views at 27, 29-30; see generally Staff Report. In its determination, the Commission took note of the steep decline in import volume after March 2010, and concluded that the decline (and other such developments) were attributable to the pending trade cases. Final Views at 30. Accordingly, the Commission did not ignore 2010 data. Rather, the Commission considered the data, but then discounted its value due to the pending trade investigations, in accordance with the applicable statute. “Courts have repeatedly recognized that the initiation of antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings can create an artificially low demand for subject imports, thereby distorting post-petition data compiled by the Commission.” Statement of Administrative Action, Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“SAA”), H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, Vol. 1, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4186 (1994); see, e.g., USX Corp. v. Unit ed States, 11 CIT 82, 88, 655 F.Supp. 487, 492 (1987) (same); Rhone Poulenc, S.A. v. United States, 8 CIT 47, 53, 592 F.Supp. 1318, 1324 (1984) (“[T]he antidumping order, operating as a strong corrective or deterrent can be presumed to distort the meaningfulness of observable data regarding present conduct in the United States market.”) (citations omitted).
As a result of the pending investigations, the Commission made a reasonable decision — well within its discretion, and, indeed, expressly contemplated by statute— to accord less weight to data for 2010. See Wieland Werke, AG v. United States, 13 CIT 561, 576, 718 F.Supp. 50, 61 (1989) (“[T]he Commission acted reasonably in gathering the data, identifying its inherent weaknesses, and tempering its reliance on the data”); see also Corus Staal BV v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 27 CIT 459, 470, 2003 WL 1475045 (2003), aff'd, 85 Fed.Appx. 772 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“The Commission, having found that changes in subject import volume, price effects, and impact were related to the pendency of the investigation, acted within its discretion in discounting post-petition data”) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(I)). The Foreign Producers’ claims that the Commission simply ignored the 2010 data have no foundation in fact.
The Foreign Producers’ argument that the Commission should have used semiannual trends in its investigation is similarly without merit. Pis.’ Brief at 21. There is no requirement that the Commission base its findings on semi-annual data. See Altx, Inc. v. United States, 26 CIT 1425, 1437 (2002), aff'd, 370 F.3d 1108 (Fed.Cir.2004) (citing Copperweld Corp. v. United States, 12 CIT 148, 161, 682 F.Supp. 552, 565 (1988)). Indeed, the Commission “typically” uses year-over-year data in its injury analysis. Def.’s Brief at 15; see also Nitrogen Solutions Fair Trade Comm. v. United States, 29 CIT 86, 97, 358 F.Supp.2d 1314, 1325 (2005); Steel Auth. of India v. United States, 25 CIT 472, 477,146 F.Supp.2d 900, 907 (2001) (Commission’s general practice is “to conduct an annual analysis of the volume and effects of imports over the period of investigation”); Asociacion de Productores de Salmon y Trucha de Chile AG v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 26 CIT 29, 37-38, 180 F.Supp.2d 1360, 1370 (2002) (“[T]he yearly trend analysis is a permissible method.”). The Commission’s choice to use year-over-year trends thus was also reasonable, and well within its considerable discretion; and the Foreign Producers’ argument to the contrary must fail.
ii. Significance of Rate of Increase Found by the Commission
The Commission determined that the 3.8% increase in volume of subject imports and the 4.4% increase in subject import market share during the period of investigation were significant. Final Views at 27. The Foreign Producers dispute the Commission’s finding as to the “significance” of the increases found. Pis.’ Brief at 20. In particular, the Foreign Producers claim that the Commission ignored the relevance of the 4.8% increase in market share that the domestic industry experienced during the period of investigation. Pis.’ Brief at 20. According to the Foreign Producers, the Commission thus lacks substantial evidence to support its conclusion. Pis.’ Brief at 20.
The Commission’s analysis expressly acknowledged the increase in the domestic industry’s share of the U.S. market. But the Commission nevertheless found the increase in volume of subject imports and the increase in subject import market share to be significant. In reaching that conclusion, the Commission analyzed both the volume of subject imports and market share, in light of industry trends.
The Commission found, for example, that substantial imports were already present in the U.S. market at the beginning of the period of investigation, and had continued to increase. Final Views at 27. Moreover, U.S. consumption of coated paper was substantially declining during the period of investigation, yet the subject imports still were able to increase their share of the U.S. market. Final Views at 26, 30. In fact, from 2007 to 2009, subject imports were “the only source of increased volume into the U.S. market ... as both the volumes of the domestic industry’s U.S. shipments and that of non-subject imports declined.” Final Views at 26-27. Specifically, towards the end of the period of investigation, subject import volume increased each month from late 2008 through January 2009. Final Views at 27 n. 172. In comparing the increase in subject imports to domestic production, the Commission found that the ratio of subject imports to U.S. production had steadily increased from 20.5% in 2007 to 24.8% in 2009. Final Views at 26.
In short, although the domestic industry was able to increase its market share during the period of investigation, the Commission acknowledged the increase and explained — by reference to numerous trends and indicators in the U.S. industry — why the increases in subject import volume and market share were significant. Final Views at 26-27. The Foreign Producers’ challenge to the sufficiency of the Commission’s explanation therefore must be rejected.
b. Likelihood of Substantially Increased Imports
In addition to determining the significance of the rate of increase, the Commission also must determine whether a rate of increase in imports or market share that has been found to be significant “indieat[es] [a] likelihood of substantially increased imports” into the United States. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(i)(III). In its determination in this case, the Commission relied on evidence demonstrating the attractiveness of the U.S. market to foreign producers and on evidence of APP’s intention to increase its presence in the U.S. market. Final Views at 28-30. The Commission also took into account APP’s loss of certification by the Forest Stewardship Council (“FSC”), and concluded that it would not be an impediment to APP’s ability to increase imports into the United States in the imminent future. Final Views at 30-31.
The Foreign Producers raise three major challenges to the Commission’s determination. Each is addressed below,
i. The Attractiveness of the U.S. Market
The Foreign Producers argue that the Commission’s price effects determination incorrectly inferred that higher U.S. prices would “pull more subject imports” into the United States. Pis.’ Brief at 22-23. The Foreign Producers claim that such an inference is illogical in light of the higher average unit value in the U.S. from 2007 to 2009, which, according to the Foreign Producers, did not pull more subject imports into the United States. Pis.’ Brief at 22. The Foreign Producers assert that it is therefore “pure speculation” to conclude that higher prices would pull additional imports into the United States in the imminent future. Pis.’ Brief at 22.
But the Foreign Producers’ argument is premised on a misunderstanding of the Commission’s position. The Commission relied on the U.S. market’s relatively high prices to establish the attractiveness of the U.S. market to Chinese producers. Final Views at 30. The Commission explained that the United States is a highly attractive market for coated paper producers from the PRC and Indonesia not only because of its higher prices, but also because of its large size and its relative openness, as well as Chinese producers’ familiarity with the U.S. market. Final Views at 30. The Commission considered the attractiveness of the U.S. market when it concluded that subject producers “have both the ability and the incentive to increase exports of subject merchandise.” Final Views at 30.
Contrary to the Foreign Producers’ assertions, the Commission never drew the inference that the Foreign Producers contend would have been erroneous. The Foreign Producers’ claim therefore has no basis in fact.
ii. Foreign Producer’s Behavior
The Foreign Producers also contest the Commission’s assessment of APP’s failed relationship with Unisource. Pis.’ Brief at 23-24. In finding a likelihood of substantially increased imports into the United States, the Commission cited evidence of APP’s “continuing pattern of behavior” reflecting an interest in increasing its presence in the U.S. market. Final Views at 28-29. This evidence included an affidavit attesting that — after APP lost its account with a major U.S. distributor (¿a, Uni-source) — APP made a significant investment to establish its own U.S. distribution network, Eagle Ridge Paper (“Eagle Ridge”), in order to maintain and enhance its profile in the U.S. market. See Final Views at 28-29.
The Foreign Producers contend that the Commission’s analysis lacks “a solid foundation based on ‘currently available evidence,’ ” and they argue that the analysis fails to draw “logical assumptions and extrapolations flowing from that evidence.” Pis.’ Brief at 23 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 750 F.2d at 933-34). The Foreign Producers assert that APP’s failed contract with Unisource undermines the Commission’s findings, because — according to the Foreign Producers — the turn of events reflects a “failed effort,” rather than a likelihood of substantially increased imports. Pis.’ Brief at 23-24.
Anticipating the Foreign Producers’ argument, the Commission acknowledged that, taken in isolation, APP’s loss of its account with Unisource and other developments “may tend to weigh against a finding of imminent increased import volumes.” Final Views at 29-30. However, as the Commission further explained, the evidence indicates that APP’s loss of business “did not result in a substantial reduction in the volume of overall subject imports.” Final Views at 29-30. Moreover, the loss of business eventually led to APP’s successful establishment of a new channel of distribution in the U.S. See Final Views at 29.
Given that the Foreign Producers provided no direct evidence of APP’s intent, the Commission had little choice but “to rely on circumstantial evidence from which to infer likely intent.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 750 F.2d at 933-34. The Commission’s conclusion, based on an affidavit describing APP’s actions, was rational and supported by substantial record evidence.
iii. FSC Certification
Finally, the Foreign Producers challenge the Commission’s conclusion that APP’s ability to import into the United States would not be hindered by its lack of certification by the Forest Stewardship Council (“FSC”). Pis.’ Brief at 24. In its final determination, the Commission concluded that APP’s 2007 loss of FSC certification would not adversely affect its capacity to increase future imports into the United States. Final Views at 30. The Commission based that conclusion principally on the increasing levels of subject imports into the United States from the PRC even after APP lost its FSC certification. See Final Views at 30.
The Foreign Producers argue that APP’s past ability to import into the United States notwithstanding its loss of FSC certification does not necessarily mean that the loss will not affect its prospects in the future. Pis.’ Brief at 25. The Foreign Producers proffered evidence in an attempt to show that FSC certification may become an important factor for purchasers in the future. Pis.’ Brief at 24-25.
It is black letter law, however, that Commission findings “will not be overturned merely because the plaintiff ‘is able to produce evidence ... in support of its own contentions and in opposition to the evidence supporting the agency’s determination.’” Torrington Co. v. United States, 14 CIT 507, 514, 745 F.Supp. 718, 723 (1990), aff'd, 938 F.2d 1276 (Fed.Cir.1991) (quoting Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 11 CIT 710, 755, 673 F.Supp. 454, 490 (1987)). To be sure, the Foreign Producers proffered evidence that contradicts evidence relied upon by the Commission. However, the production of contrary evidence alone cannot upset a Commission determination. Moreover, levels of subject imports were not the sole evidence that the Commission cited to support its conclusion. Questionnaire data cited in the Commission’s staff report reference only a single response in which “environmental attributes” were listed as a factor in purchasing decisions. Conf. Staff Report at 11-23.
As discussed above, it is improper for a court to substitute its judgment for that of the Commission. See, e.g., Torrington Co. v. United States, 16 CIT 220, 226, 790 F.Supp. 1161, 1167 (1992), aff'd, 991 F.2d 809 (Fed.Cir.1993) (“[I]t is not the Court’s function to decide that it would have made another decision on the basis of the evidence.”) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 750 F.2d at 936). Here, the Commission’s assessment of the impact of FSC certification on imports is adequately supported by the record, and any necessary weighing of the evidence falls within the Commission’s domain.
The Foreign Producers’ challenges to the Commission’s findings as to statutory factors (II) and (III) therefore cannot be sustained.
B. The Commission’s Analysis of Effects on Prices Statutory Threat Factor (TV)
With respect to the price effects of future imports, Congress has instructed the Commission to consider whether “imports of the subject merchandise are entering [the United States] at prices that are likely to have a significant depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices, and are likely to increase demand for other imports.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(i)(IV).
Here, the Commission concluded that imports from the PRC and Indonesia would likely have “significant adverse effects on [U.S.] prices in the imminent future.” Final Views at 34-35. In reaching its conclusion, the Commission noted an apparent relationship between declining prices for imports from the PRC and Indonesia beginning in the fourth quarter of 2008 and declining prices for the domestic like product in early 2009. Final Views at 32. The Commission concluded that these relationships, together with significant underselling by importers of coated paper from the PRC and Indonesia, demonstrated that “subject imports depressed domestic prices at least to some extent for part of the period under examination.” Final Views at 33.
Nevertheless, the Commission did not find significant present price depression or suppression of domestic prices, because it could not ascertain whether the imports at issue contributed significantly to the adverse price effects that occurred throughout the remainder of the period of investigation. Final Views at 33. The Commission’s inability to determine whether the effect of imports on domestic prices was significant was in light of two other market factors that contributed to the adverse effects on domestic prices, particularly in later 2009 — specifically, the significant declines in consumption in the U.S. market and the “black liquor tax credit,” which effectively lowered domestic producers’ input costs. Final Views at 33.
In contrast, the Commission’s threat of material injury analysis found that market factors other than the subject imports would not have the same price suppressing or depressing effects in the imminent future that they had during the period of investigation. Final Views at 34. [[Confidential Data Deleted]] in domestic U.S. consumption in [[Confidential Data Deleted]] were projected to be modest compared to the 14.7% drop in U.S. consumption between 2008 and 2009. See Final Views at 27; see also Conf. Final Views at 48, 44. In addition, the black liquor tax expired in 2009 and was unlikely to be renewed in the imminent future. See Final Views at 34-35. The Commission evaluated these likely changes in conditions of competition while taking into account the likely continued increases in subject import volume and the predominant underselling by imports from the PRC and Indonesia. Final Views at 35. In light of these evaluations, the Commission found that the causal relationship between falling domestic prices and increased volumes of subject imports sold at lower prices, observed during late 2008 and early 2009, would likely be reestablished. Final Views at 34. The Commission therefore concluded that the subject imports would likely have significant adverse price effects in the imminent future. Final Views at 35.
The Foreign Producers raise three challenges to the Commission’s finding as to the subject imports’ adverse effects on domestic pricing. See Pis.’ Brief at 26-36. First, the Foreign Producers claim that the Commission’s finding is not supported by substantial evidence. See Pis.’ Brief at 27-32; section III.B.l, infra. Second, the Foreign Producers argue that the Commission failed to address two of their arguments from the underlying investigation, which the Foreign Producers claim undercut the Commission’s finding. See Pis.’ Brief at 32-83; section III.B.2, infra. Finally, the Foreign Producers dispute the Commission’s price effects findings as contrary to law, asserting that the Commission failed to take into account “other relevant economic factors.” See Pis.’ Brief at 33-36; section III.B.3, infra. Each of these challenges is addressed, in turn, below.
1. Substantial Evidence Determination
To determine the likely future effects of import prices on the U.S. market, the Commission analyzed, among other factors, the level of underselling by importers in the United States. See Final Views at 31, 34. In its analysis, the Commission found predominant underselling by importers of coated paper from the PRC and Indonesia during the period of investigation, when the imports at issue undersold the domestic like product in 48 out of 58 comparisons. Final Views at 31.
The Foreign Producers do not dispute the fact that subject imports undersold domestic like products during the period of investigation. Pis.’ Brief at 28. Instead, the Foreign Producers claim that the Commission’s findings on underselling failed to explain the Commission’s greater reliance on 2009 data, relative to data for 2010. According to the Foreign Producers, 2009 data was inappropriate due to the effects of recession. Pis.’ Brief at 28-29. The Foreign Producers also argue that the Commission did not adequately explain how the absence of market factors — which depressed prices in 2009 — will affect future domestic prices. Pis.’ Brief at 28-29. Absent such explanation and justification, the Foreign Producers contend that the Commission’s affirmative threat of injury determination is not supported by substantial evidence.
The Foreign Producers’ challenge to the Commission’s reliance on 2009 data is unfounded. Contrary to the Foreign Producers’ assertions, the Commission explained its decision to give greater weight to data from 2009 (as compared to data for 2010). The Commission noted that the 2010 pricing data demonstrated uncharacteristic changes after provisional duties were imposed on subject imports as a result of Commerce’s affirmative preliminary determinations. Final Views at 27, 37. Those uncharacteristic changes are documented in the Commission’s staff report, which presented data for 2009 and 2010 collected from questionnaire responses. See Conf. Staff Report at V-9, V-12, V-20 (Tables V-l, V-4, V-7). The 2009 data — unlike the 2010 data — reflected trends comparable to data from 2007 and 2008.
For example, the data documented the quantity of imports sharply dropping and prices [[Confidential Data Deleted]] in 2010. See Conf. Staff Report at V-9, V-12, V-20 (Tables V-l, V-4, V-7). In addition, the staff report reflected [[Confidential Data Deleted]] underselling by Chinese imports in the United States through 2009, followed by a [[Confidential Data Deleted]] in underselling in 2010. See Staff Report at V-10 (Table V-7); see also Final Views at 27 n. 174 (noting that Commerce’s preliminary determination issued on March 9, 2010). Even though 2009 was marked by a recession, the Commission’s explanation — supported by the record — refutes any suggestion that it was error for the Commission to rely on data from 2009. As indicated in the Commission’s final views, the trends from 2009 corresponded more closely to past trends than those from 2010. The Foreign Producers’ assertion that the Commission failed to explain why 2009 data is more relevant than 2010 data is therefore without merit. Pis.’ Brief at 28-29.
Moreover, as discussed above, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(I) supports the Commission’s decision to give reduced weight to data collected after the commencement of the trade investigations. See section III. A.2.a.i, supra; Corus Staal BV v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 27 CIT 459, 470, 2003 WL 1475045 (2003), aff'd, 85 Fed.Appx. 772 (Fed.Cir.2004) (“The Commission, having found that changes in subject import volume, price effects, and impact were related to the pendency of the investigations, acted within its discretion in discounting post-petition data.”) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(I)); see also Nucor Corp. v. United States, 414 F.3d 1331, 1336 (Fed.Cir.2005) (“[I]t was reasonable for the Commission to interpret the statutory language to permit it to accord different weight to imports during different portions of the period of investigation depending on the facts of each.”). The Commission’s reliance on 2009 data thus does not render its determination unsupported by substantial evidence. The Commission not only provided a reasonable explanation for its decision, but also acted within its statutory authority in according less weight to the data from 2010. See American Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994, 1004 (Fed.Cir.1986) (explaining that court’s role is to ascertain whether there was a “sufficiently reasonable” basis for determination).
Similarly unavailing is the Foreign Producers’ challenge to the Commission’s conclusion as to the future impact of certain market factors on domestic prices. In its determination, the Commission found that import volume would become a “key factor” in domestic prices in the absence of market factors that depressed prices in 2009. Final Views at 34. The Foreign Producers counter that “simple logic” suggests that, with the disappearance of the market factors that depressed domestic prices during the period of investigation (i.e., decreasing consumption and increasing pulp production due to the black liquor tax credit), domestic prices will increase. Pis.’ Brief at 29-30. The Foreign Producers further assert that this “simple logic” refutes the Commission’s conclusion that future imports will have a negative effect on domestic prices. Pis.’ Brief at 29-30. According to the Foreign Producers, the Commission failed to set forth a “reasoned explanation” for its conclusion, rendering its determination unsupported by substantial evidence. Pls.’ Brief at 31 (citing U.S. Steel Group v. United States, 25 CIT 1046, 1047, 162 F.Supp.2d 676, 678 (2001)).
In its determination, the Commission explained that domestic prices are not expected to increase notwithstanding the absence of the 2009 market factors. Final Views at 34-35. The Commission reasoned that the projected U.S. demand for coated paper will be insufficient to absorb the likely increased imports of coated paper from the PRC and Indonesia at less than fair market value. Final Views at 34-35. Accordingly, domestic competition would be likely to increase. Final Views at 34. The Commission concluded that, in such a climate, subject imports would continue to undersell domestic like products through aggressive pricing to gain market share in the United States and, in doing so, would significantly affect domestic prices. See Final Views at 33-34 (establishing that underselling by subject imports will “likely increase the attractiveness of those imports to domestic purchasers”).
The Commission also noted that unfairly priced subject imports led domestic prices downward in late 2008 and 2009. Final Views at 34. The questionnaire responses received by the Commission support the Commission’s conclusion, reporting price as “an important consideration in purchasing decisions.” Final Views at 3