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CORRECTED OPINION GRANTING THE GOVERNMENT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT COLLEEN McMAHON, District Judge. INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs in these consolidated actions have filed Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests with the federal Government in order to obtain disclosure of information relating to a particular tactic that is admittedly being employed in the so-called “War on Terror” — the targeted killing of persons deemed to have ties to terrorism, some of whom may be American citizens. Most of what is sought in the facially overbroad request filed by the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) was properly withheld pursuant to one or more properly-invoked exemptions that Congress wrote into the FOIA statute to guard against the disclosure of highly confidential and operational information — if, indeed, the Government has acknowledged that any such documents exist. Thornier issues are raised by two much narrower requests, filed by reporters from The New York Times. Broadly speaking, they seek disclosure of the precise legal justification for the Administration’s conclusion that it is lawful for employees or contractors of the United States Government to target for killing persons, including specifically United States citizens, who are suspected of ties to A-Qaeda or other terrorist groups. Documents responsive to these requests would also be responsive to portions of the ACLU’s request. The FOIA requests here in issue implicate serious issues about the limits on the power of the Executive Branch under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and about whether we are indeed a nation of laws, not of men. The Administration has engaged in public discussion of the legality of targeted killing, even of citizens, but in cryptic and imprecise ways, generally without citing to any statute or court decision that justifies its conclusions. More fulsome disclosure of the legal reasoning on which the Administration relies to justify the targeted killing of individuals, including United States citizens, far from any recognizable “hot” field of battle, would allow for intelligent discussion and assessment of a tactic that (like torture before it) remains hotly debated. It might also help the public understand the scope of the ill-defined yet vast and seemingly ever-growing exercise in which we have been engaged for well over a decade, at great cost in lives, treasure, and (at least in the minds of some) personal liberty. However, this Court is constrained by law, and under the law, I can only conclude that the Government has not violated FOIA by refusing to turn over the documents sought in the FOIA requests, and so cannot be compelled by this court of law to explain in detail the reasons why its actions do not violate the Constitution and laws of the United States. The Aice-inWonderland nature of this pronouncement is not lost on me; but after careful and extensive consideration, I find myself stuck in a paradoxical situation in which I cannot solve a problem because of contradictory constraints and rules — a veritable Catch-22. I can find no way around the thicket of laws and precedents that effectively allow the Executive Branch of our Government to proclaim as perfectly lawful certain actions that seem on their face incompatible with our Constitution and laws, while keeping the reasons for its conclusion a secret. But under the law as I understand it to have developed, the Government’s motion for summary judgment must be granted, and the cross-motions by the ACLU and the Times denied, except in one limited respect. Final rulings on that discrete issue must abide further information from the Government. This opinion will deal only with matters that have been disclosed on the public record. The Government has submitted material to the Court ex parte and for in camera review. It is necessary to discuss certain issues relating to this classified material in order to complete the reasoning that underlies this opinion. That discussion is the subject of a separate, classified Appendix to this opinion, which is being filed under seal and is not available to Plaintiffs’ counsel. In crafting that Appendix, the Court has done its best to anticipate the arguments that Plaintiffs would have made in response to the Government’s classified arguments. THE FOIA REQUESTS 1. The New York Times’ FOIA Requests A. The Shane Request On June 11, 2010, Times reporter Scott Shane (“Shane”) addressed a FOIA request to the Department of Justice’s (“DoJ”) Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) seeking the following: ... copies of all Office of Legal Counsel opinions or memoranda since 2001 that address the legal status of targeted killing, assassination, or killing of people suspected of ties to Al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups by employees or contractors of the United States government. This would include legal advice on these topics to the military, the Central Intelligence Agency or other intelligence agencies. It would include the legal status of killing with missiles fired from drone aircraft or any other means. (Declaration of John E. Bies (“Bies Decl.”), Ex. A.) As a member of the news media, Shane sought expedited processing of his request. (Id.) On October 27, 2011, OLC denied Shane’s request. (Id., Ex. B.) Citing FOIA Exemptions 1, 3, and 5, OLC withheld all responsive records pertaining to the Department of Defense (“DoD”). (Id.) Citing the same exemptions, OLC provided Shane with a so-called Glomar response, Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724 (D.C.Cir.1981); Phillippi v. CIA 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C.Cir.1976); that is, the OLC refused either to confirm or deny the existence of responsive records “because the very fact of the existence or nonexistence of such documents is itself classified, protected from disclosure by statute, and privileged.” (Id.) On November 4, 2011, the Times appealed OLC’s denial to the Director of DoJ’s Office of Information Policy (“OIP”). (Declaration of Nabiha Syed (“Syed Decl.”), Ex. E.) OIP did not respond within twenty days, as required by Section 552(a)(6)(h) of FOIA. (Id. ¶8.) B. The Savage Request On October 7, 2011, Times reporter Charlie Savage (“Savage”) submitted a similar FOIA request to OLC seeking the following: ... a copy of all Office of Legal Counsel memorandums analyzing the circumstances under which it would be lawful for United States armed forces or intelligence community assets to target for killing a United States citizen who is deemed to be a terrorist. (Bies Deck, Ex. C.) Savage sought expedited processing of his request in light of his status as a reporter and the “pressing public interest” generated by “the recent death in Yemen of Anwar Al-Awlaki, a United States citizen who has been accused of being an ‘operational’ terrorist with the group Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.” (Id.) On October 27, 2011, citing FOIA Exemptions 1, 3, and 5, OLC denied Savage’s request, providing him with a blanket Glomar response. (Id., Ex. D.) The Times appealed this denial to the Director of OIP on November 7, 2011. (Syed Deck, Ex. E.) Once again OIP did not respond within twenty days, as required by Section 552(a)(6)(ii) of FOIA. (Id., ¶8.) Shane, Savage, and the Times (together, the “Times Plaintiffs”) filed suit on December 20,2011. II. The ACLU’s FOIA Request On October 19, 2011, the ACLU addressed a FOIA request to various components of DoJ and DoD, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”). (Bies Deck, Ex. E.) The request seeks six categories of documents created after September 11, 2001 (see Annex I for the full contents of the ACLU’s request): 1. Records pertaining to the legal basis in domestic, foreign, and international law upon which U.S. citizens can be subjected to targeted killings. 2. Records pertaining to the process by which U.S. citizens can be designated for targeted killings, including who is authorized to make such determinations and what evidence is needed to support them. 3. Records pertaining1 to the legal basis in domestic, foreign, and international law upon which the targeted killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki was authorized and upon which he was killed, including discussions of: a. The domestic-law prohibitions on murder, assassination, and excessive use of force; b. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause; c. International-law prohibitions on extrajudicial killing; d. The Treason Clause; e. The legal basis authorizing the CIA, JSOC, or other U.S. Government entities to carry out the targeted killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki; f. The Government’s understanding of “imminence of harm” in the case of Anwar Al-Awlaki; and g. Any requirement that the U.S. Government first attempt to capture Anwar Al-Awlaki before killing him. 4. Records pertaining to the factual basis for the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki. 5. All records pertaining to the factual basis for the targeted killing of Samir Khan. 6. All records pertaining to the factual basis for the targeted killing of Abdulrahman Al-Awlaki. (Id. at 5-6.) The ACLU, like the Times, asked for expedited processing of its request. (Id. at 7-9.) On November 14, 2011, citing FOIA Exemptions 1, 3, and 5, OLC denied the ACLU’s request, providing it with a blanket Glomar response. (Id., Ex. F.) The ACLU appealed this denial, to no avail. (ACLU Memo, in Support/Opp’n. at 5.) The ACLU filed suit on February 1, 2012. III. Subsequent Modification of Initial Responses Since these cases were filed, senior executive branch officials have publicly addressed “significant legal and policy issues pertaining to U.S. counterterrorism operations and the potential use of lethal force by the U.S. government against senior operational leaders of al-Qa’ida or associate forces who have U.S. citizenship.” (Declaration of John Bennett (“Bennett Deck”), ¶ 17.) Those public statements will be discussed fulsomely below. For the moment, it is enough to say that, as a result of these statements, the Government decided it was in a position to modify its previous responses to Plaintiffs’ requests. The modification consisted, in essence, of admitting that various agencies had documents pertaining to those speeches and other public comments, including: (1) the text of a March 5, 2012 speech delivered by Attorney General Eric Holder at Northwestern University School of Law (the “Northwestern Speech”) (Declaration of Douglas R. Hibbard (“Hibbard Decl.”), Ex. E(OIP)); (2) the text of a February 22, 2012 “Dean’s Lecture” delivered by DoD General Counsel Jeh Johnson at Yale Law School (the “Yale Dean’s Lecture”) (Declaration of Robert R. Neller (“Neller Decl.”), Ex. I(DoD)); and (3) a set of talking points “prepared for the use of the Attorney General and others in addressing hypothetical questions about An-war al-Aulaqi’s death” (Hibbard Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. C). At the same time, OLC (Bies Decl., Ex. I), DoD (Neller Decl., Ex. J), and OIP (Hibbard Decl., Ex. F) produced three Vaughn indices, listing unclassified documents that were being withheld by OLC, DoD, and OIP pursuant to the deliberative, attorney-client, and/or presidential communications privileges enshrined in FOIA Exemption 5. The CIA, which was also a recipient of the ACLU’s FOIA request, acknowledged that it had a “general interest” in (1) “the legal basis ... upon which U.S. citizens can be subjected to targeted killing” and (2) “the process by which U.S. citizens can be designated for targeted killing.” (Bennett Decl. ¶ 27.) The Agency also identified two documents in its records that reflected this “general interest” and were responsive to the ACLU’s request: (1) the text of the Northwestern speech and (2) the text of an April 30, 2012 speech entitled “The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy,” which was delivered by Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counter-terrorism John 0. Brennan at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (the “Ethics and Efficacy Speech”). (Id.) None of these disclosures added anything to the public record. Although it was not the recipient of either the Savage or the Shane requests, the CIA revealed that it was asking OLC, on its behalf, to assert a Glomar response with respect to certain documents that, if they existed in CIA or other agency files, would implicate “CIA equities.” (Bennett Decl. ¶¶ 61-62.) The CIA carved out a limited exception to its Glomar response to the Shane request; it represented that it had in its files no legal opinions responsive to the request that addressed CIA involvement in the operation that resulted in the death of Osama Bin Laden. (Id. at ¶ 64) However, DoD and OLC admitted the existence of one classified legal opinion that was not listed on either agency’s Vaughn index; this document is “responsive to the Shane and Savage requests.” (Bies Decl. ¶ 30; Neller Decl. ¶ 17.) The OLC represents that its opinion “contains confidential legal advice to the Attorney General, for his use in interagency deliberations, regarding a potential military operation in a foreign country,” (Bies Decl. ¶ 30.), and so excepts to disclosure of the document. DoD also excepts to disclosure of this document (though it was apparently not prepared for or directed to the Defense Department), on the ground that the legal opinion contains “information about military operations, intelligence sources and methods, foreign government information, foreign relations, and foreign activities.” (Neller Decl. ¶ 17.) The document (which I shall refer to as the “OLC-DoD Memo”) was withheld as classified and privileged pursuant to Exemptions 1, 3, and 5. (Bies Decl. ¶¶ 30, 38, 45; Neller Decl. ¶ 17.) Finally, the Government partially superseded its original Glomar responses (neither confirming nor denying that any responsive documents exist) with so-called “No Number, No List” responses pursuant to Exemptions 1 and 3. These are responses in which the agencies admitted that responsive records existed, but would not provide any information about the number or nature of those records, on the grounds that such identifying information was itself classified. (See Declaration of John F. Hackett (“Hackett Decl.”), ¶¶ 21-28(DoJ); Bies Deck, ¶ 38(OLC); Neller Deck, ¶¶ 25-26(DoD); Bennett Deck, ¶¶ 27-37(CIA); Hibbard Deck, ¶ 8(OIP). The No Number, No List responses apply to both the ACLU and the Times ’ requests. As noted above, the CIA has maintained its Glomar response to the Shane and Savage requests, so its No Number, No List response is necessarily limited. (See Bennett Deck ¶¶ 61-65.) HISTORY BEHIND THE FOIA REQUESTS AT ISSUE HERE Following the destruction of the World Trade Center and the targeting of the Pentagon by a group of terrorists affiliated with the organization known as Al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001, Congress passed a resolution entitled “Authorization for the Use of Military Force” (“AUMF”), which empowers the President “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). Ever since, the United States has been engaged in an exercise known colloquially as the “War on Terror,” which is dedicated principally to the eradication of Al-Qaeda. The primary field of battle in that war has been Afghanistan, where Al-Qaeda was sheltered and nurtured for many years, and from which the group’s now-dead leader, Osama Bin Laden, ordered and directed the 9/11 mission. The United States military has been engaged in that country since the fall of 2001 and continues its combat mission to this day. However, as part of that same effort, the United States has pursued members of Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups elsewhere in the world, both in the adjacent country of Pakistan and far from any “hot” battlefield. In recent years, it has targeted a number of such individuals for death and killed them, using both armed forces and unpiloted, remotely controlled precision aircraft known as “drones.” The Obama Administration has publicly admitted that the Government is engaged in such operations: So let me say it as simply as I can. Yes, in full accordance with the law — and in order to prevent terrorist attacks on the United States and to save American lives — the United States Government conducts targeted strikes against specific al-Qa’ida terrorists, sometimes using remotely piloted aircraft, often referred to publicly as drones. John 0. Brennan, Ethics and Efficacy Speech (Apr. 30, 2012). Al-Qaeda operative Anwar Al-Awlaki was killed in late 2011. Speaking on September 30, 2011, the day of Al-Awlaki’s death, at the “Change of Office” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Ceremony in Fort Myer, Virginia, President Obama described Al-Awlaki as follows: Awlaki was the leader of external operations for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In that role, he took the lead in planning and directing efforts to murder innocent Americans. He directed the failed attempt to blow up an airplane on Christmas Day in 2009. He directed the failed attempt to blow up U.S. cargo planes in 2010. And he repeatedly called on individuals in the United States and around the globe to kill innocent men, women and children to advance a murderous agenda. At the time of his death, Al-Awlaki was not in or near the field of battle in Afghanistan, where active military operations were taking place. He was located about 1500 miles from Afghanistan, in Yemen, a country with which the United States is not at war (indeed, which the United States counts as an ally). Killed with Al-Awlaki was an individual named Samir Khan. Al-Awlaki’s teenaged son, Abdulrahman Al-Awlaki, was killed in a separate strike in Yemen, on October 14, 2011. Al-Awlaki, his son, and Khan were all United States citizens. The President and the Secretary of Defense (who was formerly the CIA Director) have publicly acknowledged that the United States in fact had a role in Al-Awlaki’s death. Neither the President nor the Secretary of Defense has identified precisely who (other than the President) was involved in Al-Awlaki’s death, including what agencies or departments may have participated in the operation that killed him or how they were involved; neither have they provided any operational details of the killings. The Court is unaware of any public statements by named, current executive branch officials that discuss or acknowledge responsibility for, or participation in, the killings of Khan or Al-Awlaki’s son. The various public statements that have been made about the Al-Awlaki killing, and about targeted killings generally, will be discussed in detail later. They reveal (or seem to reveal) that the decision to target.a United States citizen for death is made by the President on the recommendation of senior Government officials — although the identity of the officials who made any such recommendation (if one was made) with respect to Al-Awlaki, Khan, or the child has not been publicly revealed. According to the Attorney General of the United States and other senior Executive Branch officials, these decisions are made pursuant to a process that is constitutionally and statutorily compliant. In particular, Government officials insist that a United States citizen can be targeted by the Executive Branch and still be accorded due process of law. The Government’s vociferous insistence that its decisions to kill United States citizens are lawful, and most especially its references to due process, may seem odd in the context of war — although there is and long has been robust debate about what to call the anti-Al-Qaeda operation, and whether anti-terrorist operations in countries other than Afghanistan and adjacent territory in Pakistan can fairly or legally be classified as a war. See, e.g., Mark V. Vlasic, Assassination and Targeted Killing—A Historical and PosT-Bin Laden Legal Analysis, 43 Geo. J. Int’l L. 259 (2012); Afsheen John Radsan & Richard Murphy,' The Evolution of Law and Policy for CIA Targeted Killing, 5 J. Nat’l Security L. & Pol’y 439 (2012); Laurie R. Blank, Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and Counterterrorism: Understanding the Parameters of the Zone of Conflict, 39 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1 (2010). However, even if there were no such debate, it is not surprising that the Government feels somewhat defensive. Some Americans question the power of the Executive to make a unilateral and unreviewable decision to kill an American citizen who is not actively engaged in armed combat operations against this country. Their concern rests on the text of the Constitution and several federal statutes, and is of a piece with concerns harbored by the Framers of - our unique form of Government. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY CONCERNS ABOUT TARGETED KILLINGS As they gathered to draft a Constitution for their newly liberated country, the Founders — fresh from a war of independence from the rule of a King they styled a tyrant — were fearful of concentrating power in the hands of any single person or institution, and most particularly in the executive. That concern was described by James Madison in Federalist No. 17 (1788): The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.... The magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of himself ... administer justice in person, though he has the appointment of those who do administer it. Madison’s statements echoed those of the great French philosopher Montesquieu, who wrote, in his seminal work The Spirit of the Laws (1748): “Were [the power of judging] joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor.” The Framers took steps to address their fear in the document they drafted. In particular, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no person shall be “deprived of life ... without due process of law.” The words “due process of law” are not further defined in the Constitution, or in the Bill of Rights. However, “The first, central, and largely uncontroversial meaning of ‘due process of law,’ the meaning established in Magna Charta and applied vigorously by Coke against the first two Stuart Kings, was that the executive may not ... restrain the liberty of a person within the realm without legal authority arising either from established common law or from statute. In other words, executive decrees are not ‘law.’ ” Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 Yale L.J. 1672, 1782 (2012). In the early days of the Republic, the United States Supreme Court endorsed this understanding: “The words ‘due process of law,’ were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words, ‘by the law of the land,’ in Magna Charta,” Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276, 18 How. 272, 15 L.Ed. 372 (1855). Outside the criminal law context, the phrase has come to mean that no person can be aggrieved by action of the Government without first being given notice of the proposed action and an opportunity to be heard: An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). When a person is accused of committing a crime, and the Government has the power, upon conviction, to deprive him of life or liberty, the particular rights enumerated in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments (ranging from the right to indictment to the right to counsel) are recognized as setting the minimum guarantee of the Due Process Clause. To at least one Founder, Alexander Hamilton, “the words ‘due process’ have a precise technical import, and are only applicable to the process and proceedings of the courts of justice.” Alexander Hamilton, Remarks on an Act for Regulating Elections, New York Assembly, 6 Feb. 1787, in 4 Papers of Alexander Hamilton 34, 35 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962). As due process in the context of regulatory action extends to actions taken by the Executive Branch, rather than the courts, it would seem that the narrow Hamiltonian view of “due process” has long since been rejected. However, the concept of due process of law has never been understood to apply to combatants on the battlefield actively engaged in armed combat against the United States. Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004) (“[T]he law of war and the realities of combat may render [military detention of enemy combatants] both necessary and appropriate, and our due process analysis need not blink at those realities.”) (O’Connor, J.). Indeed, during the American Civil War, hundreds of thousands of persons recognized by the United States Government as American citizens, who were engaged in armed rebellion against the country, were killed in battle without any suggestion that their due process rights were being violated. The activities in which Al-Awlaki is alleged to have engaged violate United States law. Specifically, they constitute treason as defined in the Constitution (Art. 3, Section 3) and 18 U.S.C. § 2381, which provide: Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort with the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years, and fined under this title.... If the War on Terror is indeed a war declared by Congress pursuant to its constitutional power, and if Al-Awlaki was a combatant in that war, then he was a traitor. Even if he was not a combatant levying war against his country, but instead gave aid and comfort to enemies of the United States (such as Al-Qaeda), he was a traitor. Indeed, Al-Awlaki could arguably have committed treason if all he did was encourage others to engage in attacks on the United States; it was settled during and after World War II that activities like broadcasting messages that gave aid and comfort to an enemy of the United States (by, for example, encouraging soldiers to desert, or telling them that their cause was lost) were treasonable. See, e.g., D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir.1951); Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C.Cir.1950); Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir.1948). And if Al-Awlaki was actually planning some sort of attack on the United States or its facilities or citizens, he was a traitor. The Framers — who were themselves susceptible to being hanged as traitors by the King of England during the Revolutionary War — were as leery of accusations of treason as they were of concentrating power in the hands of a single person or institution. As a result, the Constitution accords special protections to those accused of this most heinous of capital crimes; Article 3, Sec. 3 sets the procedural safeguard that, “No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.” Interestingly, the Treason Clause appears in the Article of the Constitution concerning the Judiciary' — -not in Article 2, which defines the powers of the Executive Branch. This suggests that the Founders contemplated that traitors would be dealt with by the courts of law, not by unilateral action of the Executive. As no less' a constitutional authority than Justice Antonin Scalia noted, in his dissenting opinion in Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554, 124 S.Ct. 2633, ‘Where the Government accuses a citizen of waging war against it, our constitutional tradition has been to prosecute him in federal court for treason or some other crime.” See also Carlton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 863 (2006). Assuming arguendo that in certain circumstances the Executive power extends to killing without trial a citizen who, while not actively engaged in. armed combat against the United States, has engaged or is engaging in treasonous acts, it is still subject to any constraints legislated by Congress. One such constraint might be found in 18 U.S.C. § 1119, which is entitied “Foreign murder of United States nationals.” This law, passed in 1994, makes it a crime for a “national of the United States” to “kill[] or attempt[] to kill a national of the United States while such national is outside the United States but within the jurisdiction of another country.” The statute contains no exemption for the President (who is, obviously, a national of the United States) or anyone acting at his direction. At least one commentator has suggested that the targeted killing of Al-Awlaki (assuming it was perpetrated by the Government) constituted a violation of the foreign murder statute. Philip Dore, Greenlighting American Citizens: Proceed with Caution, 72 La. L. Rev. 255 (2011). There are even statutory constraints on the President’s ability to authorize covert activity. 50 U.S.C. § 413b, the post-World War II statute that allows the President to authorize covert operations after making certain findings, provides in no uncertain terms that such a finding “may not authorize any action that would violate the Constitution or any statute of the United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 413b(a)(5). Presidential authorization does not and cannot legitimize covert action that violates the constitution and laws of this nation. So there are indeed legitimate reasons, historical and legal, to question the legality of killings unilaterally authorized by the Executive that take place otherwise than on a “hot” field of battle. Which is not to say that the matter is straightforward. It is not. The literal language of the Fifth Amendment, the Treason Clause, and the cited statutes notwithstanding, the Administration obviously believes that it acted lawfully in connection with the killing of Al-Awlaki (and, presumably, of Khan and the child). It has gone so far as to mount an extensive public relations campaign in order to convince the public that its conclusions are correct. PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY SENIOR OFFICIALS ABOUT TARGETED KILLINGS Plaintiffs have brought to the Court’s attention at least two dozen public statements made by senior executive branch officials with respect to the Government’s targeted killing program. Plaintiffs’ vigilance is unsurprising. Because the records that Plaintiffs seek are largely classified, their case consists largely of the argument that, by making these statements, the Administration has waived the right to rely on FOIA exemptions for classified and privileged materials. Accordingly, the Court finds it fitting to discuss at some length the most significant of them. I. State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh: American Society of International Law On March 25, 2010, State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh addressed the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law in Washington, DC. With respect to the subject of targeted killings, Mr. Koh pledged the Obama Administration’s commitment to carrying out such operations in accordance with “all applicable law, including the laws of war.” He also emphasized that such operations do not constitute unlawful extrajudicial killings or assassinations because “a state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not required to provide targets with legal process before the state may use lethal force.” Mr. Koh assured the audience that the Government’s “procedures and practices for identifying lawful targets are extremely robust.” He announced that the principles of distinction and proportionality enshrined in the law of war are not mere window dressing, but are “implemented rigorously throughout the planning and execution of lethal operations to ensure that such operations are conducted in accordance with all applicable law.” II. President Barack Obama: Google + Hangout On January 30, 2012, President Obama took part in a so-called “Google + Hangout,” in which he fielded questions from online participants. In response to a question about the Government’s targeted killing program, President Obama, like Mr. Koh, did not deny that such a program existed. Instead, he emphasized that the Government is “very careful in terms of how it’s been applied” and does not carry out such operations “willy-nilly.” Instead, the program is a “targeted, focused effort at people who are on a list of active terrorists who are trying to go in and harm Americans, hit American facilities, American bases, and so on.” President Obama urged that the program is “kept on a very tight leash” and is not “a bunch of folks in a room somewhere just making decisions.” Rather, it is “part and parcel of our overall authority when it comes to battling al-Qaeda. It is not something that is being used beyond that.” He insisted that the Government was “judicious” in its use of drones. Finally, President Obama emphasized that the Government’s “ability to respect the sovereignty of other countries and to limit our incursions into somebody else’s territory is enhanced by the fact that we are able to pinpoint strike an al-Qaeda operative in a place where the capacities of that military and that country may not be able to get to them.” III. DoD General Counsel Jeh Johnson: The Yale Dean’s Lecture On February 22, 2012, DoD General Counsel Jeh Johnson delivered the Dean’s Lecture at the Yale Law School. The purpose of the speech was to summarize “some of the basic legal principles that form the basis for the U.S. military’s counterterrorism efforts against Al-Qaeda and its associated forces.” The speech identified six such principles. First, Mr. Johnson noted that “in the conflict against an unconventional enemy such as al Qaeda, we must consistently apply conventional legal principles” — e.g., “the law of armed conflict, including applicable provisions of the Geneva Conventions and customary international law, core principles of distinction and proportionality, historic precedent, and traditional principles of [domestic] statutory construction.” Second, Mr. Johnson asserted that the “bedrock of the military’s domestic legal authority” in the conflict against al-Qaeda and associated forces remains the AUMF, which was passed by Congress immediately following the attacks of September 11, 2001. Mr. Johnson emphasized that neither the AUMF nor the term “associated forces” is “open-ended.” He insisted that the AUMF “does not authorize military force against anyone the Executive labels a ‘terrorist.’ ” Instead, “it encompasses only those groups or people with a link to the terrorist attacks on 9/11, or associated forces.” He defined an associated force as an (1) “organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside al Qaeda” who is (2) “a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.” Third, Mr. Johnson noted that the AUMF does not restrict the use of force to the “hot” battlefields of Afghanistan. Rather, the “AUMF authorized the use of necessary and appropriate force against the organizations and persons connected to the September 11th attacks — al Qaeda and, the Taliban — without a geographic limitation.” However, “International legal principles, including respect for a state’s sovereignty and the laws of war, impose important limits on our ability to act unilaterally, and on the way in which we can use force in foreign territories.” Fourth, explicitly echoing Mr. Koh’s comments on targeted killing, Mr. Johnson stated that, under “well-settled legal principles, lethal force against a valid military objective, in an armed conflict, is consistent with the law of war and does not, by definition, constitute an ‘assassination.’ ” Fifth, citing Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) and Hamdi, Mr. Johnson posited that “belligerents who also happen to be U.S. citizens do not enjoy immunity where non-citizen belligerents are valid military objectives.” Sixth, Mr. Johnson argued that “targeting decisions are not appropriate for submission to a court” because “they are core functions of the Executive Branch, and often require real-time decisions based on an evolving intelligence picture that only the Executive Branch may timely possess.” IV. Attorney General Eric Holder: The Northwestern Speech The most fulsome discussion to date of the legal basis for the Government’s targeted killing program is Attorney General Holder’s Northwestern Speech' on March 5, 2012. (Hibbard Deck. Ex. E.) The public statements that preceded this speech contain bits and pieces of the presentation that the Attorney General made at Northwestern, so in essence, the Northwestern Speech is Plaintiffs’ case. The relevant passages of the Northwestern Speech are dedicated to supporting the Government’s conclusion that, under the appropriate conditions, it is lawful for the Government to “us[e] lethal force in a foreign country, targeted against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al Qaeda or associated forces, and who is actively engaged in planning to kill Americans.” The Attorney General noted that “Based on generations-old legal principles and Supreme Court decisions handed down during World War II, as well as during this current conflict, it’s clear that United States citizenship alone does not make such individuals immune from being targeted.” Nevertheless, where United States citizens are concerned, there are certain “constitutional considerations” in play, “the most relevant [of which] is the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” “[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that the Due Process Clause ... mandates procedural safeguards that depend on specific circumstances.” The Attorney General then invoked the Supreme Court’s “balancing approach, [which] weights] the private interest that will be affected against the interest the government is trying to protect, and the burdens the government would face in providing additional process,” also noting that ‘Where national security operations are at stake, due process takes into account the realities of combat.” Without explicitly tying it to the concept of due process of law, the Attorney General then laid out the three-part test that the Government employs in making the determination that a United States citizen may be targeted for death: First, the individual must pose an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States. Second, capture must not be feasible. Third, the operation to kill the individual must be conducted in a manner consistent with the law of war. With respect to the imminence requirement, the Government’s analysis “incorporates considerations of the relevant window of opportunity to act, the possible harm that missing the window would cause to civilians, and the likelihood of heading off future disastrous attacks against the United State's.” Because terrorist organizations do not operate like conventional military forces, and tend to strike without warning, “the Constitution does not require the President to delay action until some theoretical end-stage of planning— when the precise time, place, and manner of an attack become clear.” With respect to the requirement that capturing the plotter be unfeasible, the analysis is “fact-specific,” and often “time-sensitive.” “It may depend on, among other things, whether capture can be accomplished in the window of time available to prevent an attack and without undue risk to civilians or to U.S. personnel.” With respect to the law of war requirement, the Government ensures that any use of lethal force complies with four governing principles: necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity. Under the principle of necessity, the target must have “definite military value.” The principle of distinction dictates that only “lawful targets” (e.g., combatants, civilians directly participating in hostilities, and military objectives) may be “targeted intentionally.” A military operation comports with the principle of proportionality if “the anticipated collateral damage [is] not ... excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage.” Finally, in accordance with the principle of humanity, the Government may only use weapons that “will not inflict unnecessary suffering.” The Northwestern Speech also mentions that there are limitations imposed by international law that constrain the Government’s ability to act unilaterally abroad, such as the principle of territorial sovereignty. However, “the use of force in foreign territory would be consistent with ... international legal principles if conducted, for example, with the consent of the nation involved — or after a determination that the nation is unable or unwilling to deal effectively with a threat to the United States.” The Northwestern Speech also summarizes the Government’s argument for why targeted killings of U.S. citizens do not constitute “assassinations.” The argument boils down to a syllogism: assassinations are unlawful killings; the killings at issue here are not unlawful, therefore they cannot possibly be assassinations. What makes it lawful to engage in the targeted killing of U.S. citizens abroad is apparently a combination of: (1) Congressional authorization “to use all necessary and appropriate force against [Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces]” in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001 (emphasis added); (2) the right under international law to “take action against enemy belligerents” in times of armed conflict; (3) the President’s power under the Constitution “to protect the nation from any imminent threat of violent attack;” and (4) the inherent right of national self-defense enshrined in international law. Finally, the Northwestern Speech explains that the “due process” guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment does not equate to “judicial process.” Mr. Holder admitted that, “The Constitution’s guarantee of due process is ironclad, and it is essential — but, as a recent court decision makes clear, it does not require judicial approval before the President may use force abroad against a senior operational leader of a foreign terrorist organization with which the United States is at war — even if that individual happens to be a U.S. citizen.” Holder did not identify which recent court decisions so held. Nor did he explain exactly what process was given to the victims of targeted killings at locations far from “hot” battlefields, other than Executive consideration of the factors discussed above (i.e., the individual is believed to pose an “imminent threat” to the country and cannot feasibly be captured). Y. Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John 0. Brennan: The Ethics and Efficacy Speech On April 30, 2012, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counter-terrorism John 0. Brennan delivered the Ethics and Efficacy Address at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. Mr. Brennan began the relevant portion of his remarks by stating plainly that “Yes, in full accordance with the law — and in order to prevent terrorist attacks on the United States and to save American lives — the United States Government conducts targeted strikes against specific alQa’ida terrorists, sometimes using remotely piloted aircraft, often referred to publicly as drones.” Mr. Brennan identified the purpose of his speech as, per President Obama’s instructions, “to be more open with the American people about these efforts.” Explicitly echoing the Attorney General, Mr. Koh, and Mr. Johnson, Mr. Brennan also asserted the legality of targeted strikes as a matter of both domestic and international law. He argued that Article II of the Constitution and the AUMF empowered the President to engage in targeted drone strikes against “those nations, organizations, and individuals responsible for 9/11.” Under international law, such operations would be consistent with the “inherent right of national self-defense,” including when conducted “outside of an active battlefield, at least when the country involved consents or is unable or unwilling to take action against the threat.” Mr. Brennan also argued that targeted strikes are ethical under the law of war. Like the Attorney General, Mr. Brennan emphasized that drone strikes comport with the fundamental law of war principles of necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity. SPECIFIC PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THE KILLING OF ANWAR AL-AWLAKI The speeches discussed above deal with targeted killings generally in the context of the War on Terror. The ACLU Plaintiffs have also called the Court’s attention to a number of public statements made by President Obama and Secretary of Defense (and former Director of the CIA) Leon Panetta that address the killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki. Anwar Al-Awlaki was killed on September 30, 2011. Approximately a year and a half earlier, on March 26, 2010, then-CIA Director Panetta was quoted in a Wall Street Journal article, saying that “[Anwar Al-Awlaki is] clearly someone we’re looking for.... There isn’t any question that he’s one of the individuals we’re focusing on.” (Wicker Deck, Ex. 21.) The day Al-Awlaki was killed, the Armed Forces Press Service, a component of DoD, published an item on the DoD website with the headline “Panetta: Awlaki Airstrike Shows U.S.-Yemeni Cooperation.” (Wicker Deck, Ex. 14.) The article was based on a press conference that had been held earlier in the day, at which Secretary Panetta stated: Well, this has been a bad year for terrorists. You know, we — we just have seen a major blow — another major blow to al-Qaida, someone who was truly an operational arm of al-Qaida in this node of Yemen. And, you know, we had always had tremendous concern that after getting bin Laden, that someone like Awlaki was a primary target because of his continuing efforts to plan attacks against the United States.... As far as the operational elements here, I’m not going to speak to those except to say that we’ve been working with the Yemenis over a long period of time to be able to target Awlaki, and I want to congratulate them on their efforts, their intelligence assistance, their operational assistance to get this job done. (Wicker Deck, Ex. 22.) President Obama also addressed the killing of Al-Awlaki on September 30. Speaking at the “Change of Office” Ceremony for the outgoing and incoming Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Obama stated that the killing of Al-Awlaki was a “significant milestone” and “a tribute to our intelligence community.” (Normand Deck, Ex. H.) A few weeks later, President Obama appeared on “The Tonight Show with Jay Leno” on October 25 and was asked about Anwar Al-Awlaki. The President replied that Al-Awlaki “was probably the most important al Qaeda threat that was out there after bin Laden was taken out, and it was important that, working with the Yemenis, we were able to remove him from the field.” (Wicker Deck, Ex. 5) (emphasis added.) In January 2012, Secretary Panetta appeared on the CBS program “60 Minutes,” where he was again asked to discuss Al-Awlaki’s killing and the legal basis for it. (Wicker Deck ¶ 14.) The interviewer, Scott Pelley (“Pelley”), said to Secretary Panetta, “You killed Ai-Awlaki”; Secretary Panetta nodded affirmatively. (Id.) Pelley then engaged in the following exchange with Secretary Panetta about the legal authority to kill U.S. citizens suspected of being terrorists: Pelley: So it’s the requirement of the administration under the current legal understanding that the President has to make that declaration? Secretary Panetta: That is correct. Pelley: Not you? Secretary Panetta: That’s correct. Pelley: Only the President can decide? Secretary Panetta: Well, it’s a recommendation we make, it’s a recommendation the CIA director makes in my prior role, but in the end when it comes to going after someone like that, the President of the United States has to sign off. (Id.) DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review Summary judgment is the typical means for disposing of cases challenging a Government’s agency’s FOIA response. See Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Marine Corps., No. 00 Civ. 2387, 2003 WL 26121134, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2003) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); McGehee v. CIA 697 F.2d 1095, 1101 (D.C.Cir.1983); Founding Church of Scientology v. NSA 610 F.2d 824, 836 (D.C.Cir.1979); Nat'l Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183, 186 (D.C.Cir.1973)). A party is entitled to summary judgment when there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact” and the undisputed facts warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). A district court reviews the agency’s FOIA determination de novo. Wilner v. NSA 592 F.3d 60, 69 (2d Cir.2009); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). Exemptions are to be narrowly construed. See Halpern v. F.B.I., 181 F.3d 279, 287 (2d Cir.1999). All doubts as to the applicability pf the asserted FOIA exemption are to be resolved in favor of disclosure. Wilner, 592 F.3d at 69. Summary judgment in the agency’s favor is appropriate where: the affidavits describe the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith. Ultimately, an agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears logical or plausible. Wilner, 592 F.3d at 73 (quoting Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 862 (D.C.Cir.2009)). An agency resisting disclosure of records responsive to a FOIA request bears the burden of demonstrating that the asserted FOIA exemption applies. Wilner v. NSA, 592 F.3d 60, 68-69 (2d Cir.2009). However, “Affidavits or declarations ... giving reasonably detailed explanations why any withheld documents fall within an exemption are sufficient to sustain the agency’s burden.” Carney v. Dep’t of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir.1994). In the national security context, agency declarations are entitled to substantial deference. See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 179, 105 S.Ct. 1881, 85 L.Ed.2d 173 (1985); ACLU v. Dep’t of Justice, 681 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir.2012) (the “Waterboarding Case ”). Deference to the Government’s explanations does not, however, mean acquiescence. ACLU v. Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, No. 10 Civ. 4419, 2011 WL 5563520, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2011) (quoting Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 30 (D.C.Cir.1998)) (“ODNI”). Courts have rejected Government affidavits for being vague and conclusory and reading like “bureaucratic double-talk.” See Halpern, 181 F.3d at 293; see also generally ODNI, 2011 WL 5563520. Understanding that a district court should endeavor “to create as complete a public record as is possible,” ODNI, 2011 WL 5563520, at *12 (quoting Phillippi, 546 F.2d at 1013), FOIA nonetheless empowers a district court to conduct in camera review of documents withheld pursuant to a FOIA exemption. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). A district court may also conduct in camera review of classified affidavits when national security is at issue. See ODNI, 2011 WL 5563520, at *12, Courts have found in camera review to be appropriate in cases involving all three of the FOIA exemptions at issue here. See, e.g., The New York Times Co. v. Dep’t of Justice, 872 F.Supp.2d 309 (S.D.N.Y.2012) (the “Patriot Act Case ”) (Exemptions 1 and 3); Brennan Ctr. for Justice v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 09 Civ. 8756, 2011 WL 4001146, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011) aff'd in part, rev’d in part, and remanded by 697 F.3d 184 (2d Cir.2012) (Exemption 5). However, where the response comes from the CIA, in camera review of documents is discouraged; 50 U.S.C. § 431(f)(2) directs that, “the court shall, to the fullest extent practicable, determine issues of fact based on sworn written submissions of the parties.” The Court notes that in camera review “is not a substitute for the government’s burden of proof.” Halpern, 181 F.3d at 295 (quoting Church of Scientology v. Dep’t of the Army, 611 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir.1980)). FOIA also provides that “Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this subsection.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). Accordingly, the agency must provide “a detailed justification for [its] decision that non-exempt material is not segregable.” Mead Data Central v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 261 (D.C.Cir.1977); accord Nat’l Immigration Project of the Nat’l Lawyers Guild v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 842 F.Supp.2d 720, 725 n. 5 (S.D.N.Y.2012). The agency is entitled to a presumption that it complied with its obligation to disclose reasonably segregable material. Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Service, 494 F.3d 1106, 1117 (D.C.Cir.2007); accord Ferrigno v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 09 Civ. 5878, 2011 WL 1345168, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2011). A district court “must make specific findings of segregability regarding the documents to be withheld” before ruling that an asserted FOIA exemption is applicable. Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d at 1116; accord Ferrigno, 2011 WL 1345168, at *10. Non-exempt portions of a document may only be withheld if they are “inextricably intertwined” with the exempt portions. Inner City Press/Cmty. on the Move v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 463 F.3d 239, 249 n. 10 (2d Cir.2006); Sussman, 494 F.3d at 1116; Patriot Act Case, 872 F.Supp.2d at 317-18. It is within the district court’s discretion to conduct in camera of a withheld document to review the Government’s segregability decisions. See, e.g., Ferrigno, 2011 WL 1345168, at *10-11. II. The Government Conducted An Adequate Search for Responsive Documents As part of their challenge to the Government’s response to their requests, plaintiffs allege that the Government conducted a less than adequate search for responsive documents. I reject this challenge. An agency can show that it has conducted an adequate search for records responsive to a FOIA request by demonstrating, through affidavits or declarations, that it has conducted “a search ... reasonably calculated to discover the requested documents.” Grand Cent. P’ship, Inc. v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 489 (2d Cir.1999); see also Weisberg v. Dep’t of Justice, 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C.Cir.1983). The agency need not show that it “actually uncovered every document extant.” Grand Cent. P’ship, 166 F.3d at 489. Nor is the agency required to search every record system; it need only search those systems in which it believes responsive records are likely to be located. Amnesty Int’l USA v. CIA 728 F.Supp.2d 479, 497 (S.D.N.Y.2010). The Second Circuit has noted that: to establish the adequacy of a search, agency affidavits must be relatively detailed and nonconclusory, and submitted in good faith .... affidavits submitted by an agency are accorded a presumption of good faith. This presumption cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims about the existence and discover-ability of other documents.... [I]n order to justify discovery once the agency has satisfied its burden, the plaintiff must make a showing of bad faith on the part of the agency sufficient to impugn the agency’s affidavits or declarations. Grand Cent. P’ship, at 489-90 (internal citation, quotation marks, and editing omitted). A “reasonably detailed” affidavit should set forth the search terms used, describe the type of search conducted, and indicate that all files likely containing responsive records were searched. Oglesby v. Dep’t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C.Cir.1990). “Even if these conditions are met the requester may nonetheless produce countervailing evidence, and if the sufficiency of the agency’s identification or retrieval procedure is genuinely in issue, summary judgment is not in order.” Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C, Inc. v. NSA, 610 F.2d 824, 836 (D.C.Cir.1979). In this case, the Government’s explanation of its searches can be found in the following declarations: 1. OLC (DoJ): Bies Declaration, ¶¶ 18-28. 2. OIP (DoJ): Hibbard Declaration, ¶¶ 7-34. 3. DoD: Neller Declaration, ¶¶ 9-10. 4. CIA: Classified Bennett Declaration. The court has reviewed these explanations and concludes that the searches by the responding agencies comported with their statutory obligations. ÍII. The FOIA Responses Were Legally Compliant The responding agencies invoke three separate exemptions to excuse their refusal to produce any documents responsive to the FOIA requests other than the speeches and public statements that have been discussed-above. EXEMPTION 1 Exemption 1 to FOIA exempts from disclosure records that are “(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive Order.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). Section 1.1(a) of Executive Order (“E.O.”) 13526 (the relevant executive order in this case) establishes the following criteria for the classification of national security information: Information may be originally classified under the terms of this order only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) an original classification authority is classifying the information; (2) the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government; (3) the information falls within one or more of the categories of information listed in section 1.4 of this order; and (4) the original classification authority determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism, and the original classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage. Section 1.4 of E.O. 13526 provides that: Information shall not be considered for classification unless its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security in accordance with section 1.2 of this order, and it pertains to one or more of the following: (a) military plans, weapons systems, or operations; (b) foreign government information; (c) intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology; (d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources; (e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security; (f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; (g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security; or (h)the development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction. Se