Taian Ziyang Food Co. v. United States (918 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 2013)

OPINION

RIDGWAY, Judge:

In this consolidated action, the plaintiff Chinese producers and exporters of fresh garlic challenged the final results of the U.S. Department of Commerce’s ninth administrative review of the antidumping duty order covering fresh garlic from the People’s Republic of China. See generally Taian Ziyang Food Co. v. United States, 33 CIT -, 637 F.Supp.2d 1093 (2009) (“Taian Ziyang I ”); Taian Ziyang Food Co. v. United States, 35 CIT -, 783 F.Supp.2d 1292 (2011) (“Taian Ziyang II”).

Taian Ziyang I analyzed each of the 10 issues that the plaintiff Chinese producers raised, sustaining Commerce’s determination as to three of the issues and remanding the remaining seven to the agency for further consideration. See generally Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at-, -, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1100-02, 1166.

Taian Ziyang II reviewed Commerce’s remand determination (the Second Remand Determination), filed pursuant to Taian Ziyang I. See generally Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand (“Second Remand Determination”). As to four of the seven issues addressed therein, there were no objections. Taian Ziyang II sustained the Second Remand Determination as to those four issues, and, upon analysis, remanded the other three to Commerce for further consideration. See generally Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at -, -, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1302, 1343.

Now pending before the court is Commerce’s Third Remand Determination, filed pursuant to Taian Ziyang II. See generally Final Remand Results of Third Redetermination Pursuant to Remand (“Third Remand Determination”). The Domestic Producers (i.e, the Fresh Garlic Producers Association and its four constituent members), defendant-intervenors in this action, challenge the Third Remand Determination as to two of the three issues addressed therein. See generally Defendanb-Intervenors’ Comments on Third Remand Redetermination (“Def.-Ints.’ Brief’); Defendant-intervenors’ Reply to Plaintiffs’ and Defendant’s Response Comments on Third Remand Redetermination (“Def.-Ints.’ Reply Brief’). For their part, the Government and the four GDLSK Plaintiffs — i.e., Zhengzhou Harmoni Spice Co., Ltd. (“Harmoni”), Jinan Yipin Corporation, Ltd. (“Jinan Yipin”), Linshu Dading Private Agricultural Products Co., Ltd. (“Linshu Dading”), and Sunny Import & Export Co., Ltd. (“Sunny”) — urge that the Third Remand Determination be sustained in all respects. See generally Defendant’s Response to Comments Regarding Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand (“Def.’s Response Brief’); GDLSK Plaintiffs’ Response Comments Regarding the Department’s Third Remand Redetermination (“Pis.’ Response Brief’).

Jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2000). For the reasons detailed below, Commerce’s Third Remand Determination is sustained.

I. Background

Seven Chinese producers and exporters of fresh garlic brought this action to contest various aspects of the Final Results of Commerce’s ninth administrative review of the antidumping duty order on fresh garlic from China, which covered the period from November 1, 2002 through October 31, 2003. See generally Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT-, 637 F.Supp.2d 1093; Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 70 Fed.Reg. 34,082 (June 13, 2005) (“Final Results”); Notice of Amended Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review: Garlic from the People’s Republic of China, 70 Fed. Reg. 56,639 (Sept. 28, 2005) (“Amended Final Results”); Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand (“First Remand Determination”).

Taian Ziyang I analyzed each of the 10 issues that the Chinese producers raised, sustaining Commerce’s determination as to three of the issues, and remanding the remaining seven to the agency for further consideration. See generally Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at -, -, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1100-02, 1166. Specifically, Taian Ziyang I sustained Commerce’s use of “adverse facts available” in calculating the dumping margins for Taian Ziyang Food Company, Ltd. (“Ziyang”) and Taian Fook Huat Tong Kee Foodstuffs Co., Ltd. (“FHTK”). See id., 33 CIT at-,-, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1124, 1166. Taian Ziyang I similarly sustained Commerce’s valuation of cold storage (challenged by the GDLSK Plaintiffs), as well as Commerce’s calculation of surrogate financial ratios (challenged by Jinxiang Dong Yun Freezing Storage Co., Ltd. (“Dong Yun”)). See id., 33 CIT at -, -, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1144, 1166. In contrast, Taian Ziyang I remanded for further consideration Commerce’s valuation of certain “factors of production” necessary for the cultivation and export of fresh garlic — in particular, (1) garlic seed, (2) irrigation water, (3) labor, (4) leased land, (5) cardboard packing cartons, (6) plastic jars and lids, and (7) ocean freight. See id., 33 CIT -, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1127, 1133, 1138, 1141, 1151-52, 1157, 1162, 1166.

In its Second Remand Determination, Commerce revalued irrigation expenses, leased land, ocean freight, and labor. See Second Remand Determination at 1-2, 11-16, 16-40, 40-41, 50-53, 60-73, 78-79. On the other hand, Commerce continued to value garlic seed, cardboard packing cartons, and plastic jars and lids as it had in the Final Results. See id. at 1-2, 4-11, 41-46, 46-50, 54-60, 73-76, 76-78. As a result of its reconsideration in the course of the second remand, Commerce recalculated the weighted-average antidumping duty margin for Harmoni as 0.00% (down from 8.79%), for Jinan Yipin as 1.04% (down from 13.21%), for Linshu Dading as 4.34% (down from 7.97%), for Sunny as 4.22% (down from 9.17%), and for Dong Yun as 15.49% (down from 31.26%). See id. at 79; Final Results, 70 Fed.Reg. at 34,085; First Remand Determination at 19. FHTK’s margin remained unchanged at 15.75%. See Second Remand Determination at 79; First Remand Determination at 19.

Commerce’s Second Remand Determination was the subject of Taian Ziyang II. See generally Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at -, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1292. As to four of the seven issues (i.e., the surrogate values for garlic seed, irrigation costs, land lease costs, and ocean freight expenses), there were no objections to the Second Remand Determination, and Commerce’s determinations were sustained. See generally id., 35 CIT at -, -, -, -, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1305, 1308, 1311, 1343 (sustaining Second Remand Determination as to garlic seed, irrigation costs, land lease costs, and ocean freight expenses, respectively). However, the agency’s treatment of the three other issues — i.e., the surrogate value for cardboard packing cartons, the surrogate value for plastic jars and lids, and labor expenses — remained in dispute. In light of the GDLSK Plaintiffs’ arguments and the Government’s request for a voluntary remand, Taian Ziyang II once again remanded to Commerce the issue of labor costs. See generally id., 35 CIT at-, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1310. Similarly, the issues of cardboard packing cartons and plastic jars and lids also were remanded to Commerce yet again. See generally id., 35 CIT at -, -, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1333, 1339 (remanding issues of cardboard packing cartons, and plastic jars and lids, respectively).

In its Third Remand Determination, Commerce has now revised its calculation of the labor rate in accordance with the agency’s new methodology. See Third Remand Determination at 1, 4-11 (relying on Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Non-Market Economies: Valuing the Factor of Production: Labor, 76 Fed.Reg. 36,092 (June 21, 2011); also reconsidering valuation of labor data reflected in surrogate financial ratios, and concluding that no changes are necessary). In addition, to value cardboard packing cartons as well as plastic jars and lids for purposes of the Third Remand Determination, Commerce has implicitly adopted the fundamental reasoning of Taian Ziyang II and has therefore used the domestic Indian price quotes that the GDLSK Plaintiffs had placed on the administrative record, in lieu of the Indian import statistics that the agency had relied on in its prior determinations in this case. See Third Remand Determination at 1, 3-4, 11. As a result of these changes, the Third Remand Determination now calculates the margin for each of the four GDLSK Plaintiffs (i.e., Harmoni, Jinan Yipin, Linshu Dading, and Sunny) to be 0.0%.

Although the Domestic Producers (i.e., the Fresh Garlic Producers Association and its four constituent members) filed no comments on either the draft or final versions of the Second Remand Determination, and although they filed no comments on the draft of the Third Remand Determination which Commerce provided to them, the Domestic Producers nevertheless have filed comments with the court objecting to the Third Remand Determination’s use of price quotes in the valuation of cardboard packing cartons and plastic jars and lids. See Third Remand Determination at 3 (stating that no party filed comments on draft of Third Remand Determination); see generally Def.-Ints.’ Brief; Def.-Ints.’ Reply Brief. Specifically, the Domestic Producers argue that the valuation of cardboard packing cartons and the valuation of plastic jars and lids must be remanded to Commerce for a third time, “with instructions [to] ... provide a reasoned basis for its reliance on the price quotes” and to “identify substantial evidence in support of its determination.” Def.-Ints.’ Brief at 3; Def.-Ints.’ Reply Brief at 2.

In contrast, the Government and the GDLSK Plaintiffs urge that the Third Remand Determination be sustained in all respects. See generally Def.’s Response Brief; Pis.’ Response Brief.

II. Standard of Review

In an action reviewing an antidumping determination by Commerce, the agency’s determination must be upheld except to the extent that it is found to be “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i); see also NMB Singapore Ltd. v. United States, 557 F.3d 1316, 1319 (Fed.Cir.2009). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla”; rather, it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)); see also Mittal Steel Point Lisas Ltd. v. United States, 548 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2008) (same). Moreover, any evaluation of the substantiality of evidence “must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight,” including “contradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn.” Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 44 F.3d 978, 985 (Fed.Cir.1994) (quoting Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 487-88, 71 S.Ct. 456); see also Mittal Steel, 548 F.3d at 1380-81 (same). That said, the mere fact that it may be possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from the record does not prevent Commerce’s determination from being supported by substantial evidence. Am. Silicon Techs, v. United States, 261 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed.Cir.2001); see also Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966).

Finally, while Commerce must explain the bases for its decisions, “its explanations do not have to be perfect.” NMB Singapore, 557 F.3d at 1319. Nevertheless, “the path of Commerce’s decision must be reasonably discernable,” to support judicial review. Id. {citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983)); see generally 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(i)(3)(A) (requiring Commerce to “include in a final determination ... an explanation of the basis for its determination”).

III. Analysis

As Taian Ziyang II explained, dumping occurs when goods are imported into the United States and sold at a price lower than their “normal value,” resulting in material injury (or the threat of material injury) to the U.S. industry. See Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at-, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1299 {citing 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1677(34), 1677b(a)); see generally id., 35 CIT at ——, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1299-1302. The difference between the normal value of the goods and the U.S. price is the “dumping margin.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35). When normal value is compared to the U.S. price and dumping is found, anti-dumping duties equal to the dumping margin are imposed to offset the dumping. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673.

Normal value is typically calculated using either the price in the exporting market {ie., the price in the “home market” where the goods are produced) or the cost of production of the goods, when the exporting country is a market economy country. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1677b. However, where — as here — the exporting country has a non-market economy (“NME”), there is often concern that the factors of production used to produce the goods at issue are under state control, and that home market sales may not be reliable indicators of normal value. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A).

In cases such as this, where Commerce concludes that concerns about the sufficiency or reliability of the available data do not permit the normal value of the goods to be determined in the typical manner, Commerce “determinefs] the normal value of the subject merchandise on the basis of the value of the factors of production,” including “an amount for general expenses and profit plus the cost of containers, coverings, and other expenses.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1); see generally Ningbo Dafa Chem. Fiber Co. v. United States, 580 F.3d 1247, 1250-51 (Fed.Cir.2009) (briefly summarizing “factors of production” methodology). The antidumping statute requires Commerce to value factors of production “based on the best available information regarding the values of such factors” in an appropriate surrogate market economy country — in this case, India. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1) (emphasis added); see also Shakeproof Assembly Components v. United States, 268 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed.Cir.2001); Ningbo, 580 F.3d at 1254 (emphasizing that statute mandates that Commerce “shall” use “best available information” in valuing factors of production).

In determining which data constitute the “best available information,” Commerce generally looks to the criteria set forth in its “Policy Bulletin 04.1,” also known as the “NME Surrogate Country Policy Bulletin.” Policy Bulletin 04.1 explains:

In assessing data and data sources, it is [Commerce’s] stated practice to use investigation or review period-wide price averages, prices specific to the input in question, prices that are net of taxes and import duties, prices that are contemporaneous with the period of investigation or review, and publicly available data.

See Import Administration Policy Bulletin 04.1, “Non-Market Economy Surrogate Country Selection Process,” at “Data Considerations” (March 1, 2004); see also Second Remand Determination at 42 (quoting Policy Bulletin and stating that it reflects agency’s “well-established practice for determining the reliability and appropriateness of surrogate values”).

Within this general framework, the statute “accords Commerce wide discretion in the valuation of factors of production in the application of [the statute’s] guidelines.” See Shakeproof, 268 F.3d at 1381 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Committee v. United States, 618 F.3d 1316, 1320 (Fed.Cir.2010) (same); Nation Ford Chem. Co. v. United States, 166 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed.Cir.1999) (same). Commerce is recognized as the “master of antidumping law.” See Thai Pineapple Public Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.Cir.1999); see also Shakeproof, 268 F.3d at 1381 (acknowledging “Commerce’s special expertise”). And “[t]he process of constructing foreign market value for a producer in a non-market economy country is difficult and necessarily imprecise.” Id.

Nevertheless, Commerce’s discretion is not boundless. In exercising its discretion, Commerce is constrained by the purpose of the antidumping statute, which is “to determine antidumping margins ‘as accurately as possible.’ ” See Shakeproof, 268 F.3d at 1382 (quoting Lasko Metal Products, Inc. v. United States, 43 F.3d 1442, 1446 (Fed.Cir.1994)). And, Commerce’s discretion notwithstanding, “a surrogate value must be as representative of the situation in the [non-market economy] country as is feasible.” See Nation Ford, 166 F.3d at 1377 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, “[i]n determining the valuation of ... factors of production, the critical question is whether the methodology used by Commerce is based on the best available information and establishes antidumping margins as accurately as possible.” See Ningbo, 580 F.3d at 1257 (emphases added) (quoting Shakeproof 268 F.3d at 1382) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In the present case, pursuant to the instructions in Taian Ziyang II, Commerce’s Third Remand Determination reconsidered and revised the surrogate value for labor, as well as the surrogate values for cardboard packing cartons and plastic jars and lids. As discussed in greater detail below, all three revised determinations must be sustained.

A. Surrogate Value for Labor

The antidumping statute provides that, in non-market economy cases such as this, the surrogate data used to calculate the value of factors of production must, to the extent possible, come from market economy countries that are at “a level of economic development comparable to that of the non-market economy country” at issue — in this case, China. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4)(A). The antidumping statute further provides that, in such eases, the surrogate data must, to the extent possible, come from market economy countries that are “significant producers of comparable merchandise.” See id.

For most factors of production, Commerce typically uses values from a single market economy country (known as the “surrogate country” — here, India) that Commerce has determined to be both (a) economically comparable to the non-market economy country in question and (b) a significant producer of the goods at issue. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(2). However, as Taian Ziyang I and Taian Ziyang II explained, Commerce in the past has treated the cost of labor quite differently than other factors of production. See Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at-, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1134; Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at-, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1308; see generally Dorbest Ltd. v. United States, 604 F.3d 1363, 1368 (Fed.Cir.2010).

Concerned about “wide variances in wage rates between comparable economies,” Commerce historically has valued the cost of labor in an NME country case by using a regression-based wage rate “reflective of the observed relationship between wages and national income in a variety of market economy countries.” See Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at -, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1134 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, in the past, “[ujnlike its valuation of other factors of production in [a non-market economy country] case, Commerce [has based] its surrogate wage rate on data from a broad ‘basket’ of countries, and [has] not limit[ed] itself to market economy countries at a level of economic development comparable to the NME country in question.” See id., 33 CIT at-, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1134.

In the Final Results in this case, Commerce calculated the respondent Chinese producers’ labor costs using the agency’s standard regression-based wage rate calculation methodology, as set forth in the agency’s regulations. See Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at-, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1134-35; 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(3). After correcting several clerical errors in the initial calculations in the Final Results (which yielded a surrogate wage rate of $0.93), Commerce’s First Remand Determination recalculated the applicable wage rate for this case at $0.85. See Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at-, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1135.

Relying heavily on Allied Pacific (which held Commerce’s regulation to be inconsistent with the statute), Taian Ziyang I remanded the issue of the valuation of the labor factor of production to Commerce for further consideration. See Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at -, -, -, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1134, 1135-36, 1138; Allied Pacific Food (Dalian) Co. v. United States, 32 CIT 1328, 1351-65, 587 F.Supp.2d 1330, 1351-61 (2008). On remand, Commerce nevertheless continued to use a regression-based methodology, albeit one that was slightly revised. See generally Second Remand Determination at 16-40, 60-73. The resulting calculation produced a surrogate wage rate of $0.77. See id. at 17 n. 18.

In the meantime, however, the Court of Appeals handed down its decision in Dorbest, striking down Commerce’s regulation as inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. See generally Dorbest, 604 F.3d at 1366, 1369-73. The Court of Appeals concluded that the agency’s regulation “improperly require[d] using data from both economically comparable and economically dissimilar countries, and ... improperly use[d] data from both countries that produce comparable merchandise and countries that do not.” See id., 604 F.3d at 1372 (discussing 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(3)). The Government therefore sought a voluntary remand to allow Commerce to recalculate the surrogate value for labor expenses in a manner consistent with Dorbest, which Taian Ziyang II granted. See generally Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at-, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1310.

In the course of the most recent remand, Commerce reconsidered its approach to the calculation of surrogate values for labor expenses, in light of the Court of Appeals’ decision in Dorbest, as well as the decision in Shandong Rongxin. See Third Remand Determination at 4-5; Dorbest, 604 F.3d at 1369-73; Shandong Rongxin Import & Export Co. v. United States, 35 CIT ——,-, 774 F.Supp.2d 1307, 1315-16 (2011). Concluding that “relying on multiple countries to calculate the wage rate is no longer the best approach,” Commerce altered its methodology, to rely on industry-specific labor cost data from the primary surrogate country — in this case, India. See Third Remand Determination at 5; Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Non-Market Economies: Valuing the Factor of Production: Labor, 76 Fed.Reg. 36,092 (June 21, 2011). As the Third Remand Determination observes, such an approach “is fully consistent with how [Commerce] values all other [factors of production], and results in the use of a uniform basis for [factor of production] valuation — a single surrogate country.” Third Remand Determination at 5.

For purposes of the Third Remand Determination here, Commerce relied on 2003 data (as reported in a 2005 publication of the International Labour Organization (“ILO”)), because those data were “the most contemporaneous data that were available” between November 1, 2003 and September 3, 2005 — i.e., “during the conduct of the underlying administrative review.” See Third Remand Determination at 6 (explaining, inter alia, that, on remand, agency placed on the record “additional industry specific labor cost data,” and that agency used labor cost data for India “reported in the ILO Chapter 6A data”).

Specifically, Commerce selected “the industry-specific Indian data that includes ‘Processing and preserving of fruits and vegetables’ (provided under Sub-Classification 15 ‘Manufacture of food products and beverages’ of the International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities (TSIC’) Revision 3 standard).” See Third Remand Determination at 7. Commerce then “converted the hourly labor cost data, which was denominated in Indian Rupees, to U.S. dollars ... based on the exchange rates in effect on the dates of the U.S. sales.” Id. at 6-7. Using that methodology, Commerce calculated a revised labor rate of $0.51 per hour. Id. at 7.

As noted above, neither the GDLSK Plaintiffs nor the Domestic Producers has objected to Commerce’s revised wage rate calculation as set forth in the Third Remand Determination. See Pis.’ Response Brief at 6 (urging court to “affirm Commerce’s Third Remand Determination” in its entirety); Def.-Ints.’ Brief at 2 n. 2 (advising that Domestic Producers “have no comments on the analysis ... regarding the surrogate valuation of labor”); see also Def.’s Response Brief at 11-12 (urging that Commerce’s determination on labor expenses be sustained). Commerce’s determination is accordingly sustained.

B. Surrogate Value for Cardboard Packing Cartons

In the Final Results in this case, Commerce valued the cardboard cartons that are used to pack and ship garlic based on Indian import statistics taken from the World Trade Atlas for the Indian tariff subheading 4819.1001, which covers cartons, boxes, and cases made of corrugated paper and paperboard. See Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at-, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1144. In so doing, the Final Results rejected the other alternative source of data on the record — four domestic Indian price quotes submitted by the GDLSK Plaintiffs, which were obtained within the period of review (and within one week of one another) from four different Indian box vendors in four different cities, for basic cardboard packing cartons like those used by the Chinese producers. See Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at-, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1312. The Final Results rejected the domestic price quotes because they are not considered “publicly available information” and because, according to the Final Results, they were not “representative” (that is, they assertedly did not reflect prices throughout the period of review). See id., 35 CIT at-, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1312; Policy Bulletin 04.1.

As Taian Ziyang I observed, however, although the price quotes are “not without problems,” the Final Results significantly “overstated any potential concerns as to the reliability of the domestic Indian box price quotes that the agency rejected, [and] significantly understated the patent flaws and defects in the Indian import statistics on which the agency relied.” See Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at-,-, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1144, 1151 (emphases omitted). Detailing the numerous problems with Commerce’s calculus, Taian Ziyang I remanded the issue to the agency for further consideration. See generally id., 33 CIT at -, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1144-52.

Commerce’s Second Remand Determination “add[ed] virtually nothing to this case” on the issue of the use of Indian import statistics versus domestic price quotes. See Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at -, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1316; see generally id., 35 CIT at -, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1316-33. As Taian Ziyang II summed up the situation, the Second Remand Determination “[did] little more than rehash the exact same points that were made in the Final Results (and found wanting in [Taian Ziyang I ]).” See id., 35 CIT at-, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1317. Commerce yet again sought to exaggerate the alleged shortcomings of the domestic price quotes, while simultaneously ignoring the obvious (and admitted) problems inherent in the Indian import statistics on which the agency continued to rely. See id., 35 CIT at -, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1316-33.

Noting that Commerce had seemingly chosen “admittedly distorted Indian import statistics over potentially ‘perfect’ price quotes,” Taian Ziyang II held that the Second Remand Determination “failed to adequately explain the agency’s determination that the Indian import statistics constitute^] the ‘best available information’ for use in calculating the surrogate value of basic cardboard packing cartons, in light of the acknowledged infirmities in the import statistics.” See Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at-,-, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1327, 1332. Taian Ziyang II similarly faulted Commerce for failing to “adequately explain[ ] why the Indian import statistics [were] preferable to the domestic price quotes, the other source of information on the existing record.” See id., 35 CIT at -, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1332. Taian Ziyang II further held that “Commerce’s determination that the Indian import statistics constitute the ‘best available information’ (as compared to the domestic price quotes) is not supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record.” See id., 35 CIT at — -, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1332. The issue was therefore remanded once more, and the agency was cautioned not to simply recycle its earlier arguments, because the agency was “unlikely to get another bite at the apple.” See id., 35 CIT at-, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1333.

Commerce’s Third Remand Determination followed. As to the surrogate value for cardboard packing cartons, Commerce implicitly adopted the fundamental reasoning of Taian Ziyang II (and, in turn, Taian Ziyang I). The Third Remand Determination states:

The Court found [in Taian Ziyang II] that Commerce had chosen “admittedly distorted Indian import statistics over potentially ‘perfect’ price quotes.” While the Department disagrees with this conclusion, the Department is cognizant of the Court’s admonition that the Department is not likely to “get another bite of the apple on this issue.” Accordingly, ... the Department has determined, under protest, to use the price quote surrogate values provided on the record by the plaintiffs during the underlying proceeding for this final remand redetermination. Using these price quotes, the surrogate value for cardboard boxes is 44.20 rupees per kilogram (“Rs/kg”)....

Third Remand Determination at 3-4 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 1 (stating that Commerce “has applied, under protest, the price quotes ... to value ... cardboard cartons”); Pis.’ Response Brief at 5-6 (stating that Third Remand Determination “accepted the Court’s well-reasoned and clearly explained findings with respect to the available surrogate values” for cardboard packing cartons); Def.’s Response Brief at 9-11 (explaining that “the Remand Results are consistent with the Court’s holding” in Taian Ziyang II, and that “[i]n light of the Court’s concerns about the import statistics, ... Commerce reasonably adopted plaintiffs’ approach and used the domestic price quotes”).

Arguing that the Third Remand Determination “does not include further analysis or justification for [Commerce’s] reliance on the price quotes submitted by the [GDLSK] Plaintiffs,” the Domestic Producers characterize Commerce’s use of the domestic price quotes as a “capitulation,” and assert that the agency has failed to “provide a reasoned basis for its reliance on the price quotes submitted by the Plaintiffs” and that use of the price quotes is not “supported by substantial evidence.” Def.-Ints.’ Brief at 2-3; see also Def.-Ints.’ Reply Brief at 2-4.

As discussed below, the Domestic Producers failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, and are therefore precluded from raising their arguments in this forum. However, even if their arguments were considered on the merits, the Domestic Producers would not prevail.

1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The Government points out that the draft of the Third Remand Determination that Commerce provided to both the GDLSK Plaintiffs and the Domestic Producers was “materially identical” to the final version of the Third Remand Determination filed with the court, and thus reflected Commerce’s decision to value cardboard packing cartons using the domestic price quotes (rather than the Indian import statistics). See Def.’s Response Brief at 9; see also id. at 5, Tab A (“Draft Results of Third Redetermination Pursuant to Remand”) at 3-4. The Domestic Producers nevertheless failed to file any comments on the draft. See Third Remand Determination at 3 (stating that Commerce received no comments on draft of Third Remand Determination); Def.’s Response Brief at 4-5, 7, 8; Pis.’ Response Brief at 2, 3. The Domestic Producers raised their objections to Commerce’s use of the domestic price quotes for the first time in their opening brief filed with the court commenting on the Third Remand Determination. See Def.-Ints.’ Brief at 2-4; see also Pis.’ Response Brief at 2. The Domestic Producers thus failed to properly exhaust their administrative remedies. See Def.’s Response Brief at 2, 6-9; Pis.’ Response Brief at 2-5.

As a general matter, the doctrine of exhaustion holds that “no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.” Sandvik Steel Co. v. United States, 164 F.3d 596, 599 (Fed.Cir.1998) (quoting McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, it is a well-settled principle of administrative law that “[a] reviewing court usurps the agency’s function when it sets aside [an agency] determination upon a ground not theretofore presented and deprives the [agency] of an opportunity to consider the matter, make its ruling, and state the reasons for its action.” Unemployment Compensation Comm’n of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 155, 67 S.Ct. 245, 91 L.Ed. 136 (1946); see, e.g., Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1185, 1191 (Fed. Cir.1990).

The prescribed avenue for challenging remand results requires that a party first file comments on the draft results at the administrative level, setting forth the party’s objections. See Mittal Steel, 548 F.3d at 1383-84 (holding that party failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not raising issue in comments on draft remand results); AIMCOR v. United States, 141 F.3d 1098, 1111-12 (Fed.Cir. 1998) (same). “If a party does not exhaust available administrative remedies, ‘judicial review of [Commerce’s actions] is inappropriate.’ ” Consol. Bearings Co. v. United States, 348 F.3d 997, 1003 (Fed.Cir.2003) {quoting Sharp Corp. v. United States, 837 F.2d 1058, 1062 (Fed.Cir.1988)). ‘“[T]he [Court of International Trade] generally takes a “strict view” of the requirement that parties exhaust their administrative remedies.’ ” Yangzhou Bestpak Gifts & Crafts Co. v. United States, 716 F.3d 1370, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2013) {quoting Corus Staal BV v. United States, 502 F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed.Cir.2007) (citations omitted)).

Requiring exhaustion even in a discretionary, non jurisdictional context is generally sound policy, because it allows the agency to apply its expertise, to correct its own mistakes, and to compile an adequate record to support judicial review, advancing the dual purposes of protecting agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (discussing two main purposes of doctrine of exhaustion, ie., protecting “administrative agency authority” and promoting judicial economy); Richey v. United States, 322 F.3d 1317, 1326 (Fed.Cir.2003) (same). Accordingly, in actions challenging determinations in antidumping administrative reviews, the Court of International Trade requires litigants to exhaust administrative remedies “where appropriate.” 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d); see also Corus Staal, 502 F.3d at 1379 (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d) “indicates a congressional intent that, absent a strong contrary reason,” court should require exhaustion of administrative remedies); McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) (explaining that, even “where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs”).

In this case, the policy considerations that underpin the doctrine of exhaustion cut squarely against the Domestic Producers. Because the Domestic Producers failed to assert their objections to Commerce’s use of domestic price quotes to value cardboard packing cartons by filing comments on the draft of the Third Remand Determination, the agency was not put on timely notice of the Domestic Producers’ objections. The Domestic Producers thus deprived Commerce of the opportunity to address the Domestic Producers’ concerns (by, for example, elaborating on the agency’s rationale for relying on price quotes, rather than import statistics, to value cardboard packing cartons, and detailing the record evidence supporting the agency’s determination). See Def.’s Response Brief at 7, 8-9; Pis.’ Response Brief at 3-4.

In sum, because the Domestic Producers failed to timely raise their objections at the administrative level, they cannot now be heard to criticize the Third Remand Determination’s use of domestic price quotes to value cardboard packing cartons. By their silence, the Domestic Producers waived their right to press that issue in this forum. See AIMCOR, 141 F.3d at 1111-12.

2. The Sufficiency of Commerce’s Rationale

Even if the Domestic Producers’ challenges to the Third Remand Determination’s valuation of cardboard packing cartons were not barred by the doctrine of exhaustion, they would nevertheless gain no purchase.

The Domestic Producers first contest the sufficiency of Commerce’s rationale, asserting that the Third Remand Determination lacks “a reasoned basis for [the agency’s] reliance on the price quotes submitted by the [GDLSK] Plaintiffs” in lieu of the Indian import statistics used in the agency’s previous determinations. Def.Ints.’ Brief at 3; see generally id. at 2-4; Def.-Ints.’ Reply Brief at 2-4. The Domestic Producers point to the summary nature of the section of the Third Remand Determination that addresses the valuation of cardboard packing cartons, contrasting the relative brevity of that section with Commerce’s “lengthy discussion and analysis” of the agency’s revised wage rate methodology. See Def.-Ints.’ Brief at 2-3. The Domestic Producers argue that the court’s “comprehensive and detailed opinion[s]” in this matter “set out an analytical framework for the agency.” See Def.Ints.’ Reply Brief at 3. But, according to the Domestic Producers, “[r]ather than undertaking this analysis,” Commerce effectively abdicated its decisionmaking role, stating “simply” that it had “determined, under protest, to use the price quote surrogate values provided on the record.” See id. (quoting Third Remand Determination at 3); see also id. at 3-4.

As the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has explained, the requirement that an agency articulate the rationale for its determinations “is inherent in the doctrine of judicial review which places only limited discretion in the reviewing court.” WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1156 (D.C.Cir.1969). However, even where an agency’s findings “could have been more explicit” and its analysis of the reasons for its findings “could have been more detailed,” judicial review “does not demand expansive discussion or rigid adherence to [any] specific formula.” Nucor Corp. v. United States, 414 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed.Cir.2005). “[B]usy agency staffs are not expected to dot ‘i’s’ and cross ‘t’s.’ ” WAIT Radio, 418 F.2d at 1156. In evaluating the sufficiency of an agency’s rationale, courts “recognize the presumption of regularity” and “adhere to ‘salutary principles of judicial restraint.’ ” Id. (citing and quoting Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 379 F.2d 453, 460, 463 (D.C.Cir.1967)). Thus, there is no “quantifiable formula for deciding when an agency ... has crossed the line from the tolerably terse to the intolerably mute.” Id., 418 F.2d at 1157. “Courts are indulgent toward administrative action to the extent of affirming [a determination] where the agency’s path can be ‘discerned’ even if the [determination] ‘leaves much to be desired.’ ” Id., 418 F.2d at 1156 (quoting Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 595, 65 S.Ct. 829, 89 L.Ed. 1206 (1945)).

The agency determination at issue here may be “tolerably terse”; but it cannot be said to be “intolerably mute.” It is true that — as the Domestic Producers contend — the Third Remand Determination “did not state in so many words” that Commerce was adopting the rationale set forth in Taian Ziyang I and Taian Ziyang II. See Nucor Corp., 414 F.3d at 1339. That is nevertheless “the plain import” of Commerce’s statement. Id. As the GDLSK Plaintiffs explain, Commerce “fully explained its decision when it referenced Taian Ziyang II and then stated it had determined ‘to use the price quote surrogate values provided on the record by the plaintiffs.’ ” Pis.’ Response Brief at 5; see also id. at 5-6 (stating that Third Remand Determination “accepted the Court’s well-reasoned and clearly explained findings with respect to the available surrogate values” for cardboard packing cartons); Def.’s Response Brief at 9-11 (same). “Where an agency has not made a particular determination explicitly, the agency’s ruling nonetheless may be sustained as long as ‘the path of the agency may be reasonably discerned.’ ” Nucor Corp., 414 F.3d at 1339 (quoting Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A. v. United States, 810 F.2d 1137, 1139 (Fed.Cir.1987), quoting Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286, 95 S.Ct. 438, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974)) (emphasis added); see also Wheatland Tube Co. v. Dongbu Steel Co., 161 F.3d 1365, 1369-70 (Fed.Cir.1998) (stating that “[a]n explicit explanation is not necessary ... where the agency’s decisional path is reasonably discernible”; “Although Commerce did not explain [its rationale] directly ..., its decisional path ... is readily apparent”) (emphasis added). In this case — as in Nucor — “the agency’s path is clear, even though it did not set forth its conclusion ... explicitly.” Nucor Corp., 414 F.3d at 1339.

To be sure, Commerce’s reasoning in the section of the Third Remand Determination on cardboard packing cartons “is not a paragon of clarity.” See Bowman Transportation, 419 U.S. at 290, 95 S.Ct. 438. Had Commerce spelled out its rationale “in a more considered manner ..., [judicial] review would have been greatly facilitated” — and it is possible that the need for such review might even have been obviated entirely. Id. And yet, “[w]hile a more substantial explanation from Commerce might have been helpful to [the court] or preferable to [the Domestic Producers], its absence ... is not grounds for [reversal],” where — as here — it is possible to “reasonably discern the path of Commerce’s decision.” NMB Singapore, 557 F.3d at 1323.

This is not a case where it is necessary to try to “guess” at the reasoning underlying Commerce’s determination. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196— 97, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) (stating that “[i]t will not do for a court to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying the agency’s action”); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C.Cir.1970) (explaining that court “must not be left to guess as to the agency’s findings or reasons”). The Domestic Producers do not profess to harbor any doubts as to Commerce’s rationale for adopting the domestic price quotes to value cardboard packing cartons. Nor could the Domestic Producers credibly make such a claim. The Domestic Producers’ argument thus seeks to elevate form over substance.

Moreover, this is not a case where the court is improperly “supplying] a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given.” See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856 {citing Chenery, 332 U.S. at 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575). Quite to the contrary, it is Commerce that has implicitly adopted — and incorporated by reference into the Third Remand Determination — the court’s analysis of the relative merits of the Indian import statistics and the domestic price quotes, as set forth in detail in Taian Ziyang I and Taian Ziyang II. See Third Remand Determination at 3-4; see generally Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at-, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1144-52; Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at-, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1311-33.

Nor is this a case where the record would admit of multiple possible rationales for the agency’s action. See Rogers Radio Communications Services, Inc. v. FCC, 751 F.2d 408, 418 (D.C.Cir.1985) (remanding issue to agency where, inter alia, record revealed several potential bases for agency’s action, leaving court “unable to clearly discern the agency’s path”). As summarized in section III.B.3 below, and as set forth in greater detail in Taian Ziyang I and Taian Ziyang II, the administrative record on this issue reflects candid admissions by Commerce as to at least two significant flaws in the Indian import statistics that the agency previously used to value cardboard packing cartons, while — at the same time — the record is utterly devoid of evidence that the domestic price quotes are in any way unreliable. Accordingly, particularly when the Third Remand Determination is read in the context of the administrative record as a whole, there is zero uncertainty concerning the bases for Commerce’s ultimate decision to rely on the domestic price quotes (rather than the import statistics).

Under these circumstances, it would serve little purpose to remand this action to seek to compel Commerce to expressly state that which the Third Remand Determination indisputably implies. The Domestic Producers’ challenge to the sufficiency of Commerce’s rationale for use of the domestic price quotes must be rejected.

3. The Substantiality of the Evidence

Apart from their challenge to the sufficiency of Commerce’s rationale for using the domestic price quotes to value cardboard packing cartons (discussed immediately above), the Domestic Producers also argue that the agency’s decision to use the price quotes is not supported by substantial evidence. See Def.-Ints.’ Brief at 3-4; Def.-Ints.’ Reply Brief at 2, 4. The Domestic Producers fare no better on this claim. See generally Pis.’ Response Brief at 5-6; Def.’s Response Brief at 9-11.

As summarized below, and as set forth at length and in exhaustive detail in Taian Ziyang I and Taian Ziyang II, the record evidence — viewed through the lens of Commerce’s criteria in Policy Bulletin 04.1 — weighs solidly in favor of the price quotes. See Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at -, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1144-52 (analyzing merits of domestic price quotes versus Indian import statistics for valuation of cardboard packing cartons); Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at-, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1311-33 (same); section III, supra (in the introductory section, discussing criteria established in Policy Bulletin 04.1, including “product specificity,” “contemporaneity,” “representativeness,” and “public availability,” in addition to whether prices are “net of taxes and import duties”).

As Taian Ziyang II explained, of the five criteria set forth in Policy Bulletin 04.1, “product specificity” logically must be the most important. See Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at-, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1330. And it is undisputed that, as discussed in Taian Ziyang I and Taian Ziyang II, the four domestic price quotes on the record of this proceeding are highly “specific to the input in question” — that is, the cardboard packing cartons actually used by the Chinese producers. See Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at-,-, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1144, 1152; Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at-, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1312; see also Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at-, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1151.

The undisputed record evidence similarly establishes that the four domestic price quotes are, in the words of Policy Bulletin 04.1, fully “contemporaneous with the period of ... review.” See Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at -, - & n. 57, -, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1144, 1145 & n. 57, 1146; Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at-, -, -, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1312, 1316-17, 1326.

In its determinations in this proceeding prior to the Third Remand Determination, the reservations expressed by Commerce have focused exclusively on the “representativeness” and “public availability” of the price quotes. See Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at-, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1145-47; Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at-,-,-, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1312, 1316, 1318-23. But, as documented in Taian Ziyang I and Taian Ziyang II, those concerns lacked any basis in the evidence on the record of this proceeding.

Like “contemporaneity,” Commerce’s “representativeness” criterion relates to the timing of price information. In contrast to the contemporaneity criterion (which concerns whether the price information is from within the review period at issue), the focus of the representativeness criterion is on whether the information reflects “review period-wide price averages,” rather than prices for a more limited period of time. See Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at-, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1145; Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at -, -, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1312-13, 1320. Commerce’s concern about price quotes for a more limited period of time — like the price quotes at issue here, which were all dated within a week of one another — is the possibility that the pricing information may be distorted (and therefore unreliable) due to “temporary market fluctuations.” See Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at -, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1145; Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at -, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1312-13. However, as Taian Ziyang I and Taian Ziyang II noted, the administrative record in this proceeding is barren of any evidence whatsoever that might suggest that prices for cardboard packing cartons are subject to any significant volatility. See Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at -, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1146; Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at-n. 28, • — -, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1321 n. 28, 1321-23

The record is equally definitive on “public availability.” As Taian Ziyang I observed, there is room for debate as to the precise meaning of “public availability.” See generally Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at -, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1146. But there is no question that the focus of Commerce’s concern about information that is not publicly available is the potential for manipulation. See id., 33 CIT at -, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1146; Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at-,-, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1312, 1318. And it is undisputed that there is not even a scintilla of evidence on the record here to suggest that the four price quotes are in any way the product of manipulation or distortion, or tainted by collusion. No evidence whatsoever. See Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at-, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1146-47; Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at -,-, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1312, 1318.

The record evidence favoring use of the Indian import statistics pales by comparison to the evidence supporting the domestic price quotes. It is true that the import statistics are publicly available information. And it is similarly undisputed that the import statistics are both contemporaneous and representative as well. On the other hand, the record evidence on product specificity — the most important of Commerce’s criteria — is damning.

In short, it is undisputed that the import statistics on the record are plagued by two serious infirmities. First, because the scope of the tariff heading on which the statistics are based is very broad, the values reflected in the import statistics are inflated by the inclusion of (unknown, potentially vast) quantities of more expensive gift, specialty, and other types of non-packing boxes that bear no resemblance to the basic cardboard packing cartons that the Chinese producers use to pack and ship garlic. See Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at-,-, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1149, 1151; Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at-, -, -, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1314, 1323-24, 1326-27. And, second, although garlic producers source their packing cartons domestically, the import statistics include freight charges; and such charges — particularly charges for transportation by air— only further distort (i.e., inflate) the values reflected in the import statistics. See Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at-n. 61,-, -, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1148 n. 61, 1149, 1150-51; Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at -, -, -, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1315, 1324-25, 1326-27.

Surveying the state of the administrative record (as outlined above), Taian Ziyang II put it bluntly: “[I]n contrast to the Indian import statistics (which are admittedly ‘imperfect’), there is no affirmative evidence that the domestic price quotes are in any way ‘imperfect.’ ” See Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at -, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1327. In other words, while the record evidence indisputably establishes that the values reflected in the Indian import statistics are (at least to some extent) inflated and thus do not accurately reflect the cardboard packing cartons at issue, there is no record evidence — absolutely none — to indicate that the domestic price quotes are in any way distorted or otherwise inaccurate.

The bottom line is that, to the extent that Commerce has a general policy that privileges the use of import statistics over price quotes due to concerns about the reliability of the latter, the agency’s skepticism may well be justified, and — all other things being equal — its policy would be entitled to great weight and would likely carry the day. See generally Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at-, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1145. But, given the facts of this specific case, all things are decidedly not equal.

Commerce’s determination on the valuation of cardboard packing cartons in this action must be grounded in the evidence on this record. And the evidence on domestic price quotes versus import statistics is not in equipoise. While neither the Domestic Producers nor Commerce ever adduced even an iota of actual evidence to impeach the accuracy and reliability of the domestic price quotes, Commerce itself has candidly conceded that the values reflected in the import statistics are inflated. See, e.g., Second Remand Determination at 75 (admitting that “the [import statistics] do not perfectly represent the inputs of the GDLSK [Plaintiffs] because the Indian import data include [1] specialty boxes, and [2] boxes transported by air”).

Under these circumstances, Commerce’s decision in the Third Remand Determination to value cardboard packing cartons using the domestic price quotes (rather than the Indian import statistics) is plainly supported by substantial evidence. Commerce’s decision therefore must be sustained.

C. Surrogate Value for Plastic Jars and Lids

In the Final Results in this case, Commerce valued plastic jars and lids using a surrogate value derived from World Trade Atlas statistics for imports into India under two broad “basket” provisions of the Indian tariff system — specifically, subheading 3923.3000 (covering “carboys, bottles, flasks and similar plastic items”) and subheading 3923.5000 (covering “stoppers, lids, caps and other closures of plastics”). See Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at-, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1333. As with the Final Results on cardboard packing cartons, the Final Results on plastic jars and lids found the use of Indian import statistics preferable to four domestic price quotes submitted by the GDLSK Plaintiffs, which were obtained from three different Indian vendors in three different cities and are for jars and lids comparable to those used by the Chinese producers here. See id., 35 CIT at-, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1333.

In rejecting the domestic price quotes, the Final Results cited concerns about the “public availability” of the price quotes, as well as their “contemporaneity,” and their “representativeness.” See Taian Ziyang I, 33 CIT at-, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1153-54. Taian Ziyang I analyzed all of the grounds cited in the Final Results as a basis for rejecting the price quotes, and found each of them wanting. See id., 33 CIT at -, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1153-54. Taian Ziyang I acknowledged that “[n]o doubt the various concerns ... outlined in the Final Results diminish, at least to some limited extent, the utility of the domestic Indian price quotes for jars and lids.” See id., 33 CIT at -, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1154. However, Taian Ziyang I concluded that the Final Results failed to adequately analyze the relative merits of the domestic price quotes and the seemingly much more seriously flawed Indian import statistics on which the Final Results relied, and therefore remanded the issue to Commerce for further consideration. See id., 33 CIT at -, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1157.

Much like the Second Remand Determination’s treatment of cardboard packing cartons (discussed above), the Second Remand Determination’s treatment of plastic jars and lids “[did] virtually nothing to advance the ball” on the use of Indian import statistics versus domestic price quotes. See Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at -, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1336; see generally id., 35 CIT at -, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1336-39. Commerce continued to overstate the alleged problems with the domestic quotes and, at the same time, continued to downplay the obvious (and admitted) problems inherent in the Indian import statistics on which the agency continued to rely. See id., 35 CIT at -, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1338-39.

Observing that the Second Remand Determination seemingly had once again chosen “admittedly distorted Indian import statistics over potentially ‘perfect’ price quotes,” Taian Ziyang II held that the Second Remand Determination failed to adequately explain the agency’s determination that the Indian import statistics constituted the “best available information” for use in calculating the surrogate value of plastic jars and lids, in light of the admitted infirmities in the import statistics. See Taian Ziyang II, 35 CIT at -, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1339. Taian Ziyang II similarly criticized Commerce for failing to adequately explain why the Indian import statistics were preferable to the domestic price quotes, the other source of information on the record. See id., 35 CIT at -, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1339. Taian Ziyang II further held that “the Second Remand Determination’s conclusions that the Indian import statistics are ‘sufficiently specific’ and constitute the ‘best available information’ for use in valuing plastic jars and lids are unexplained, are not rational, and lack any sound basis in the existing administrative record, and therefore cannot be sustained.” See id., 35 CIT at-, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1339. The issue was therefore remanded once again, and— as it had with cardboard packing cartons— Taian Ziyang II advised Commerce to use the remand wisely, because a fourth remand was unlikely. See id., 35 CIT at -, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1339.

In its Third Remand Determination, Commerce reversed course (as it did vis-avis the valuation of cardboard packing cartons), and used the domestic price quotes — rather than Indian import statistics — to value plastic jars and lids. Commerce explained:

The Court found [in Taian Ziyang II] that Commerce had chosen “admittedly distorted Indian import statistics over potentially ‘perfect’ price . quotes.” While the Department disagrees with this conclusion, the Department is cognizant of the Court’s admonition that the Department is not likely to “get another bite of the apple on this issue.” Accordingly, ... the Department has determined, under protest, to use the price quote surrogate values provided on the record by the plaintiffs during the underlying proceeding for this final remand redetermination. Using these price quotes, ... the surrogate value used for plastic jars and lids is 179.14 Rs/kg [rupees per kilogram].

Third Remand Determination at 3-4 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 1 (stating that Commerce “has applied, under protest, the price quotes ... to value ... plastic jars and lids”); Pis.’ Response Brief at 5-6 (stating that Third Remand Determination “accepted the Court’s well-reasoned and clearly explained findings with respect to the available surrogate values” for plastic jars and lids); Def.’s Response Brief at 9-11 (explaining that “the Remand Results are consistent with the Court’s holding” in Taian Ziyang II, and that “[i]n light of the Court’s concerns about the import statistics, .,. Commerce reasonably adopted plaintiffs’ approach and used the domestic price quotes”).

The Domestic Producers’ attack on the Third Remand Determination’s treatment of the valuation of plastic jars and lids parallels the Domestic Producers’ challenge to the valuation of cardboard packing cartons.' Specifically, asserting that the Third Remand Determination “does not include further analysis or justification for [Commerce’s] reliance on the price quotes submitted by the [GDLSK] Plaintiffs,” the Domestic Producers contend that Commerce “has essentially (and i