Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER COGAN, District Judge. This litigation is a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), as well as a certified wage and hour class action under the laws of 14 states. Currently before the Court are three motions: (1) plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, (2) defendants’ motion for summary judgment and/or decertification of the class and collective actions, and (3) plaintiffs’ motion to amend the definition of the certified classes. For the reasons set forth below: (1) plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is denied, (2) defendants’ motion for summary judgment and/or decertification of the class and collective actions is granted in part and denied in part, and (3) plaintiffs’ motion to amend the definition of the certified classes is denied. BACKGROUND Defendant Roto-Rooter Services Co. (“RRSC”) operates Roto-Rooter, a business which provides plumbing repair and maintenance services to residential and commercial customers. Defendant Chemed Corp. (“Chemed”) is the indirect parent corporation of RRSC. Roto-Rooter has 50 branches, approximately 110 company-owned service locations, and employs over 1,600 technicians nationwide. Plaintiffs are employed as technicians for Roto-Rooter. They provided drain cleaning and plumbing services for Roto-Rooter’s customers and are compensated on a commission basis. The commissions that technicians received were based on the amounts they collected or billed, as well as the type of work they performed, less certain costs, such as outside labor and insurance surcharges. Plaintiffs allege that a number of RotoRooter policies violated the FLSA and the wage and hour laws of the states in which they worked. They assert three categories of claims. First, plaintiffs claim that Roto-Rooter required them to bear business expenses that had the effect of bringing their wages below the applicable minimum wage. This category of claims is labeled as the “Business Expense Claims.” Second, plaintiffs allege that Roto-Rooter failed to compensate them for all hours they worked, including time shaved from their actual working hours and time spent at “turn-in.” “Turn-in” is a weekly process during which technicians review their time records for accuracy and submit records of their expenses, receipts, and money orders for that week. This category of claims is labeled as the “Uncompensated Hours Claims.” Third, plaintiffs allege that Roto-Rooter violated state law by taking deductions from plaintiffs’ wages for call-back work for warranty service. This category of claims is labeled as the “Illegal Deductions Claims.” In June 2010, the Court certified a FLSA collective action on the Business Expense and Uncompensated Hours Claims. Subsequently, in a Memorandum Decision and Order dated June 16, 2011, 275 F.R.D. 99 (E.D.N.Y.2011) (the “Class Certification Order”), the Court certified 14 state law class actions for liability purposes only based on the three categories of claims. Since then, the Court has amended or modified the definitions of several classes. At the time the instant motions were filed, 432 plaintiffs, representing approximately 48 branches in 25 states, had opted-in to assert FLSA claims. Notice of the certified class actions was sent to approximately 1,971 current and former Roto-Rooter technicians. At the time the instant motions were filed, 3 technicians had opted not to participate in this litigation. Further, the parties designated 39 technicians, including all of the named plaintiffs and several opt-in plaintiffs, as “Discovery Plaintiffs” for purposes of representative discovery. Additional facts relevant to the instant motions will be set forth in greater detail below, as they relate to each of the motions and arguments at issue. DISCUSSION Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment on four grounds, namely: (1) that defendants’ policy of shifting expenses to plaintiffs violates the FLSA and state minimum wage laws when it has the effect of bringing earnings below the applicable minimum wage; (2) that defendants violated their record-keeping duties under the FLSA; (3) that defendants’ taking of wage deductions for warranty call-back, work violates state laws regulating wage deductions; and (4) that plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated damages under the FLSA for defendants’ alleged minimum wage violations. Separately, defendants have moved for decertification or dismissal of the Business Expense, Uncompensated Hours, and Illegal Deductions Claims. Finally, defendants move for summary judgment on all claims against Chemed, arguing that it cannot be liable because it was not plaintiffs’ employer. I. The Summary Judgment Standard A court may grant summary judgment if the moving party shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “In deciding whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to an element essential to a party’s case, the court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve ambiguities and draw reasonable inferences against the moving party.” Abramson v. Pataki, 278 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, in order “[t]o survive summary judgment ... the non-moving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Reiseck v. Universal Commc’ns of Miami, No. 06 Civ. 777, 2012 WL 3642375, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2012) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355 n. 11, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). However, “[cjonclusory allegations, conjecture, and speculation ... are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact[,]” Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir.1998), and the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. II. Chemed’s Liability In their summary judgment motion, defendants argue that the claims against Chemed should be dismissed because there is no evidence that Chemed acted as plaintiffs’ employer under the FLSA and the applicable state labor laws. Only an “employer” may be liable under the FLSA, Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs., Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999), which defines “employer” to include “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee[J” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). The Supreme Court has noted the “expansiveness” of the FLSA’s definition of “employer.” Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 195, 94 S.Ct. 427, 431, 38 L.Ed.2d 406 (1973). See also Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir.1984) (observing that the FLSA is a “remedial” statute, “written in the broadest possible terms so that” its provisions “would have the -widest possible impact in the national economy.”). The relevant states use definitions of “employer” that are similar to the FLSA definition. In determining whether an entity can be considered an “employer,” “the overarching concern is whether the alleged employer possessed the power to control the workers in question, with an eye to the ‘economic reality’ presented by the facts of each case.” Herman, 172 F.3d at 139 (internal citations omitted). Courts applying the “economic reality” test consider “whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained employment records.” Reiseck, 2012 WL 3642375, at *3 (quoting Carter, 735 F.2d at 12). These factors are not exhaustive and no single factor is determinative. Rather, the test “encompasses the totality of the circumstances.” Herman, 172 F.3d at 139. Further, “[o]fficers and owners that do not directly supervise workers may nonetheless be deemed employers under the FLSA where ‘the individual has overall operational control of the corporation, possesses an ownership interest in it, controls significant functions of the business, or determines the employees’ salaries and makes hiring decisions.” Reiseck, 2012 WL 3642375, at *3 (quoting Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 255 F.Supp.2d 184, 192 (S.D.N.Y.2003)). Defendants do not contest that RRSC was plaintiffs’ employer. Indeed, defendants point to a number of RRSC’s employment policies in their motion. Instead, defendants argue that Chemed cannot be considered an “employer” for liability purposes because it is merely RRSC’s indirect parent company and the record demonstrates that Chemed was not involved in RRSC’s day-to-day business operations, particularly with regard to compensation and time-keeping. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, claim that Chemed and RRSC “are two nominally separate entities that are actually part of a single integrated enterprise.” They rely on the “single employer” or “integrated employer” doctrine, which provides that “[t]o prevail in an employment action against a defendant who is not the plaintiffs direct employer, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant is part of an ‘integrated enterprise’ with the employer, thus making one liable for the illegal acts of the other.” Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 341 (2d Cir. 2000). See also Addison v. Reitman Blacktop, Inc., 283 F.R.D. 74, 84 (E.D.N.Y.2011) (applying the “integrated employer” doctrine in a FLSA case). The “integrated employer” doctrine applies in “extraordinary circumstances” where plaintiff demonstrates “sufficient indicia of an interrelationship between the immediate corporate employer and the affiliated corporation to justify the belief on the part of an aggrieved employee that the affiliated corporation is jointly responsible for the acts of the immediate employer.” Herman v. Blockbuster Entm’t Grp., 18 F.Supp.2d 304, 308 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (quoting Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1337 (6th Cir.1983)). in determining whether an integrated enterprise exists, courts consider “(1) interrelation of operations, (2) centralized control of labor relations, (3) common management, and (4) common ownership or financial control.” Reiseck, 2012 WL 3642375, at *4 (quoting Cook v. Arrowsmith Shelburne Inc., 69 F.3d 1235, 1240 (2d Cir.1995)). Although no single factor is required or determinative, “control of labor relations is the central concern.” Murray v. Miner, 74 F.3d 402, 404 (2d Cir.1996). “The ‘integrated enterprise’ analysis ultimately focuses upon whether the parent corporation was the final decision-maker with regard to the employment issue underlying the litigation.” Takacs v. Hahn Auto. Corp., No. C-3-95-404, 1999 WL 33117265, at *4 (S.D.Ohio Jan. 4, 1999). Although plaintiffs point to a num-' ber of ways in which RRSC and Chemed cooperate and interact, they do not cite sufficient evidence to raise a fact issue for the jury concerning Chemed’s status as an “employer.” First, with regard to the “economic reality” test, there is no dispute that Chemed did not hire, terminate, or discipline Roto-Rooter technicians or their supervisors. Although Chemed made recommendations concerning certain compensation policies, RRSC held ultimate decision-making authority over compensation and time-keeping policies for technicians. Additionally, plaintiffs have not proffered any evidence suggesting that Chemed ex-ercised control over technicians’ work schedules or employment conditions. See Gorey v. Manheim Servs. Corp., 788 F.Supp.2d 200, 210 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (dismissing corporate parents under the “economic reality” theory where there was no evidence that the parents hired or fired plaintiffs, or controlled their work schedules, employment conditions, or rate of pay). Second, with regard to the “integrated employer” doctrine, plaintiffs have not adduced sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Chemed exercised “control of labor relations” so as to make it a single, integrated enterprise with RRSC. Plaintiffs attempt to create a fact issue by citing a statement on the investor relations page of Chemed’s website to argue that “Chemed’s main business purpose is RRSC’s — to provide plumbing and drain cleaning repair and maintenance services to residential and commercial markets through RRSC.” But this is plainly a selective reading that ignores Chemed’s ownership of a healthcare business. Based on this record, a jury could not reasonably infer that Chemed and RRSC have coextensive business purposes. Although plaintiffs point to the fact that RRSC employees are required to abide by Chemed’s business ethics and information security policies, those policies have nothing to do with the employment matters at issue in this litigation. Nor can plaintiffs raise a jury issue based on the fact that RRSC and Chemed share a number of high-level managers. The law is clear that “the mere existence of common management and ownership are not sufficient to justify treating a parent corporation and its subsidiary as a single employer.” Meng v. Ipanema Shoe Corp., 73 F.Supp.2d 392, 403 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (quoting Lusk v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 129 F.3d 773, 778 (5th Cir.1997)). Plaintiffs’ arguments based on the services which Chemed provided to RRSC are also unavailing. There is nothing remarkable about the fact that Chemed and RRSC employees participate in common savings and retirement plans. See, e.g., Duffy v. Drake Beam Morin, No. 96 Civ. 5606, 1998 WL 252063, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1998) (“that Harcourt General administers the pension and benefit plans for its subsidiaries, including DBM, is hardly uncommon, nor is it proof that Harcourt General made the employment decisions at issue here.”). Nor does the fact that Chemed audited RRSC suggest that Chemed was responsible for the employment decisions at issue in this litigation, especially since Chemed had an obligation under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to conduct audits and monitor for fraud. See generally Gonzalez v. HCA, Inc., No. 1:10—00577, 2011 WL 3793651, at *13 (M.D.Tenn. Aug. 25, 2011) (“Whatever administrative functions HCA management provides as the parent corporation, the [other defendants, including subsidiaries] decide and implement the pay and scheduling policies.”) At the end of the day, plaintiff can only rely on a handful of facts to suggest that Chemed and RRSC are an integrated enterprise, namely that Chemed and RRSC have offices in the same building and that Chemed issued the check for damages when RRSC was found liable in a previous labor action. But these facts do not imply that Chemed was “the final decision-maker with regard to the employment issue underlying the litigation.” Takacs, 1999 WL 33117265, at *4. In comparison to defendants’ evidence that Chemed was not involved in RRSC’s employment decisions, the facts relied on by plaintiffs amount to nothing more than a “scintilla of evidence” in support of their claim that Chemed is plaintiffs’ employer, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512, and are inadequate to raise a fact issue for the jury to decide. Therefore, the Court grants defendants’ summary judgment on Chemed’s status as an “employer” and dismisses the claims against Chemed in the FLSA and state law actions. III. State-Specific Issues A. The Business Expense and Uncompensated Hours Claims Under Hawaii Law Defendants argue that plaintiffs may not assert their Business Expense Claims for periods after July 24, 2009 or any claims for Uncompensated Hours under Hawaii law because of peculiar features of that state’s labor law. Under Haw.Rev.Stat. § 387-1, an employee gets the benefit of either the FLSA or the Hawaii minimum wage and overtime provisions, whichever are better, but if they are the same, then the FLSA applies. The class period for the Hawaii state law class is February 25, 2004 to the present. Throughout that entire period, both Hawaii law and the FLSA have prescribed that overtime must be paid for workweeks in excess of 40 hours. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1); Haw.Rev.Stat. § 387-3(a). See also In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., 490 F.Supp.2d 1091, 1129 (D.Nev.2007) (noting that, pursuant to § 387-1 “unless the FLSA sets a longer workweek than Hawaii law, § 387-3 does not apply to any employee otherwise covered by the FLSA” and holding that because “ § 387-3 does not provide a shorter maximum work week, the FLSA applies and § 387-3 does not.”). Although Hawaii’s minimum wage was higher than the FLSA minimum wage prior to July 24, 2009, as of that date both minimum wages were set at $7.25 an hour. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1), with Haw.Rev.Stat. § 387-2. In response, plaintiffs argue that they asserted their Business Expense and Uncompensated Hours Claims under Chapter 388 of the Hawaii Wage and Hour Law, in addition to Chapter 387, and that § 387-1’s restriction on the definition of “employee” does not apply to claims brought under Chapter 388. See Haw. Rev.Stat. § 388-1. Plaintiffs rely on § 388-2(a) which requires employers to “pay all wages due to the employer’s employees” on regular semimonthly paydays. Plaintiffs’ argument is unavailing. The Court agrees with defendants that § 388-2(a) “addresses only when wages are payable, not whether they are payable.” Indeed, Chapter 388 governs the payment of wages and compensation, not what those wages should be. The gravamen of plaintiffs’ Business Expense and Uncompensated Hours Claims is not a complaint about the manner in which their wages were paid, but is, instead, that defendants did not pay them what they were due — an issue covered by Chapter 387. Plaintiffs have not cited any provision of Chapter 388 that governs the minimum wage or overtime compensation due to plaintiffs and the Court is not aware of any. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Hawaii state law class’s Business Expense Claims for periods after July 24, 2009 and its Uncompensated Hours Claims. B. The Business Expense and Uncompensated Hours Claims Under Indiana Law Like Hawaii, Indiana’s Minimum Wage Law also limits the scope of its coverage through the use of definitions. But Indiana law focuses on the definition of “employer,” rather than “employee.” The Indiana Minimum Wage Law explicitly excludes from its definition of “employer” “any employer who is subject to the minimum wage provisions of the [FLSA].” Ind. Code. Ann. § 22-2-2-3. Courts have commented that “[o]ne of the main effects of this provision in Indiana Law is the exclusion of large employers from the purview of state law.” Bailey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. IP 00-1398-C-B/S, 2001 WL 1155149, at *2 (S.D.Ind. Sept. 29, 2001). See also Parker v. Schilli Transp., 686 N.E.2d 845, 850 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (“because [defendant] was an employer within the meaning of the [FLSA] and is subject to that statute, it is not an ‘employer’ for purposes of the [Indiana] Wage Law, and [plaintiffs] claim [for unpaid overtime under Indiana law] fails.”). Plaintiffs appear to concede that their claims cannot succeed under Indiana’s Minimum Wage Law because of § 22-2-2-3 and argue instead that they should be allowed to amend their complaint to assert the Business Expense and Uncompensated Hours Claims under Indiana’s Wage Payment Statute, § 22-2-5-1, et seq., which does not contain the same limitation on the definition of “employer.” It is axiomatic that a court “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). According to the Supreme Court: In the absence of any apparent or declared reason — such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of . allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. — the leave sought should, as the rules require, be “freely given.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). Here, although the Indiana Wage Payment Statute bears facial similarity to the provision of Hawaii’s law governing the frequency with which wages are paid, Indiana law is clear that “the Wage Payment Statute governs both the frequency and amount an employer must pay its employee.” St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Steele, 766 N.E.2d 699, 703 (Ind.2002). Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment would not, therefore, be futile. See generally Ellis v. Chao, 336 F.3d 114, 127 (2d Cir.2003) (“leave to amend a complaint need not be granted when amendment would be futile”). Although “[a] motion to amend a complaint is particularly disfavored where the amendment is proposed in response to a summary judgment motion[,]” Williams v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of N.Y., No. 96 Civ. 6695, 2000 WL 343897, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2000), the most important consideration in determining whether to allow amendment is prejudice to the opposing party. See AEP Energy Servs. Gas Holding Co. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 626 F.3d 699, 725 (2d Cir.2010) (“The rule in this Circuit has been to allow a party to amend its pleadings in the absence of a showing by the nonmovant of prejudice or bad faith.”). Although plaintiffs certainly should have brought their claims under the correct statute in the first instance or in their three amended complaints, defendants have made no showing of prejudice or bad faith. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, have persuaded the Court that their amended claims would be “mere variations” on the dismissed claims and would require no additional discovery. Therefore, the Court grants plaintiffs leave to amend in order to assert' claims under § 22-2-5-1, et seq. and denies defendants’ motion as to this claim as moot. C. California Plaintiffs’ Claims Defendants have moved for summary judgment on certain categories of claims asserted by California technicians. The categories overlap to some extent. 1. The California Business Expense Claims Defendants request summary judgment on the FLSA and state Business Expense Claims for California technicians for claims covering the period after January 14, 2008. Defendants claim that “[pjlaintiffs have not identified ... a single week after January 14, 2008 in which a California technician contends he incurred business-related expenses that had the effect of bringing his wages below the minimum wage.” The Court’s examination of the evidence has likewise not revealed any weeks after January 14, 2008 for which a California technician failed to earn the minimum wage because of incurred business expenses. Plaintiffs fail to respond to this argument. The law is clear that, on summary judgment, “the burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’ — that is pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Pepsico, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir.2002). “At the summary judgment stage, a nonmoving party must offer some hard evidence showing that its version of the events is not wholly fanciful.” Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). At this stage, “[t]he time has come” for plaintiffs “to put up or shut up.” Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir.2000). Plaintiffs have not carried.their burden. To the extent that there is evidence on the record, that evidence suggests that Roto-Rooter’s business expense policy did not cause California minimum wage violations during this period. Defendants cite a January 14, 2008 Roto-Rooter memorandum “Pay Considerations Unique to California” (the “California Memo”), which was to be implemented immediately. The California Memo states that “[i]n most cases” Roto-Rooter will provide technicians with their van. Further, defendants cite the testimony of plaintiff Castillo, the California class representative, that Roto-Rooter paid for his van and van-related expenses during the post-January 14, 2008 period. The California Memo also provides that certain technicians “are to be provided with uniforms, safety equipment, and all other equipment necessary for them to perform their jobs at Roto-Rooter’s expense and without deduction to the technician.” The California Memo emphasizes the absence of evidence to support plaintiffs’ claims. Therefore, the Court grants defendants summary judgment on this issue and dismisses the California FLSA and state Business Expense Claims for dates after January 14, 2008. 2. The California Illegal Deductions Claims Defendants seek summary judgment on the California Illegal Deductions Claims for dates after January 14, 2008. Defendants rely on the California Memo which states that “[c]ommissioned employees should not be charged for call backs,” the absence of a call-back provision in the handbook for California employees, and testimony from plaintiffs that, in California, Roto-Rooter stopped making adjustments to commissions for call-backs and began paying technicians an hourly rate for their call-back work. Plaintiffs concede that their California Illegal Deductions Claims for this period cannot succeed. Accordingly, the Court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this issue and dismisses the California Illegal Deductions Claims for dates after January 14, 2008. 3. The Ita Release The third category of California claims involves claims that, defendants argue, were released pursuant to the settlement of a separate class action. In 2007, a group of California Roto-Rooter technicians brought a class action captioned Ita v. Roto-Rooter Services Company in California state court, asserting state law claims. The Ita plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that RRSC: (1) “failed to pay Plaintiffs overtime wages for any and all work performed in excess of 8 hours per day and/or for any and all work performed in excess of 40 hours per week”; (2) “required Plaintiffs to expend their own monies to conduct their employers’ business” and to shoulder ... business expenditures which should have been borne by their employer”; and (3) “made various deductions from Plaintiffs’ wages for certain items, including ... customers callbacks[.]” On August 6, 2008, the Ita court certified the class action and approved the settlement. The settling plaintiff class encompassed all persons who are or were employed by [RRSC] as plumbers, sewer and drain technicians or employees [and] combination plumbing/sewer and drain technicians or employees ... whether hourly-paid or commissioned, and with or without expenses, at any time from April 24, 2003 to May 19, 2008, the class period, in the State of California. No one requested to opt-out of the Ita settlement and the court ordered that “each Class Member shall be deemed to have released defendants for any and all claims regarding the allegations of unpaid reimbursements and wages, interest and penalties through the date of entry of this Order.” Pursuant to the settlement agreement that the Ita court approved, the members of the Ita class released RRSC, its “parent companies” and “affiliated companies” from: all claims demands, rights, liabilities, and causes of action of every nature and description whatsoever arising out of, relating to, or in connection with the causes of action asserted in the Complaint, including, without limitation, any and all claims for alleged failure to pay overtime, waiting time, travel time, call back, missed meal and rest breaks, on-call time, charges for replacement of tools and equipment and time expended in call back due to customer complaint and other similar deductions from wages[.] Defendants rely on the fact that the Ita complaint contained claims concerning “failure to pay overtime,” “business expenditures which should have been borne by their employer,” and “deductions from Plaintiffs’ wages for certain items, including ... deductions for ... customer call-backs” to argue that .members of the California class who were employed on or before May 19, 2008 are barred from asserting claims for any period prior to August 6, 2008. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, distinguish Ita from this action' by pointing out that (1) the business expense claim in Ita was not alleged to have caused a minimum wage violation and (2) the failure to pay overtime claim in Ita did not encompass allegations that Roto-Rooter failed to compensate technicians for their “turn-in” time. Moreover, plaintiffs urge a narrower reading of the Ita release, arguing that the release only applies to claims related to the particular legal claims asserted in the Ita complaint. Neither side is entirely correct. First, even though the Ita complaint did not contain specific allegations regarding “turn-in” time, it did allege that RotoRooter failed to compensate technicians for “time spent doing other company business for Defendant Roto-Rooter, during which time Plaintiffs were under the supervision and control of Defendant RotoRooter.” Thus, despite plaintiffs’ argument, the Ita complaint encompassed their “turn-in” claims. Second, the release encompasses “claims ... arising out' of, relating to, or in connection with the causes of action asserted in the Complaint.” While plaintiffs argue that the term “cause of action” should mean the specific legal claims alleged in the complaint, California law supports a broader reading. “[T]he ‘cause of action’ is based upon the harm suffered, as opposed to the particular theory asserted by the litigant.... Even where there are multiple legal theories upon which recovery might be predicated, one injury gives rise to only one claim for relief.” Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers’ Mutual Ins. Co., 5 Cal.4th 854, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 691, 855 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Cal.1993) (emphasis in original). “The ‘cause of action’ is to be distinguished from the ‘remedy’ and the ‘relief sought, for a plaintiff may frequently be entitled to several species of remedy for the enforcement of a right.’ ” Id. (quoting Big Boy Drilling Corp. v. Rankin, 213 Cal. 646, 649, 3 P.2d 13 (1931)). See also Villacres v. ABM Indus., Inc., 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 576, 117 Csd.Rptr.3d 398 (Cal.Ct.App.2010) (describing, in the res judicata context, “cause of action” as based upon the harm suffered “regardless of the specific remedy sought or the legal theory (common law or statutory) advanced”). It is, therefore, of no moment that the Ita complaint did not assert claims under the FLSA or the specific causes of action alleged here and the Ita release is applicable to plaintiffs’ claims prior to August 6, 2008. There are two exceptions. First, California technicians hired after May 19, 2008 do not fall within the scope of the Ita release. The second exception is plaintiffs’ minimum wage claims. Plaintiffs are correct that the Ita complaint contains no allegations of minimum wage violations under federal or California law. Although the Ita plaintiffs did assert a claim for Roto-Rooter’s failure to indemnify its employees for business expenses under the California Labor Code, that claim is not simply a separate theory or remedy for the same right as a minimum wage claim. Two distinct rights are at issue: an employee’s right not to bear his employer’s business expenses and an employee’s right to earn a minimum wage. There was no “cause of action” for a minimum wage violation in Ita and, consequently, the Ita release does not bar plaintiffs’ minimum wage claims here. A Summary Since the above holdings overlap, some clarification as to which claims asserted by California plaintiffs have been dismissed and which survive is appropriate. • California plaintiffs’ FLSA and state law Business Expense Claims are dismissed for the period after January 14, 2008. The FLSA and state law Business Expense Claims otherwise survive. • California plaintiffs’ FLSA and state law Uncompensated Hours Claims are dismissed for the period prior to the August 6, 2008, because of the Ita release, except that claims asserted by California technicians hired after May 19, 2008 fall outside the scope of the Ita release and survive. The FLSA and state law Uncompensated Hours Claims otherwise survive. • California plaintiffs’ Illegal Deductions Claims are dismissed in their entirety, both because of plaintiffs’ consent (for the period after January 14, 2008) and because of the Ita release (for the earlier period). IV. The Illegal Deductions Claims The parties have cross-moved for summary judgment on the state law-based Illegal Deductions Clams. Plaintiffs claim that Roto-Rooter provides its customers with a warranty on certain work performed by its technicians, typically six months for residential services and three months for commercial services. If RotoRooter needs to provide additional service on work under warranty, it often does not charge the customer for the additional work. Although Roto-Rooter attempts to send the same technician to do the warranty work as did the original work, if that technician is not available, Roto-Rooter typically deducts the commission paid to the technician for the original work and pays it to the technician who performed the warranty work through a process known as a call-back. Roto-Rooter’s systems track call-backs. They can be deducted from either a technician’s commissions or their non-commission earnings. The call-back policy is companywide, but does not apply in California or Hawaii. According to Roto-Rooter’s February 2008 Company Handbook, callbacks may be made because “all commissions are considered advances until the warranty period runs.” The call-back policy, however, predates 2008. Plaintiffs allege that the call-back practice violates state law prohibitions on deductions from wages, including wages earned on a commission basis, and seek summary judgment on these grounds. Defendants argue that call-backs do not constitute illegal wage deductions because commissions are advances, not earned wages, and, even if the commissions are considered earned wages, call-back deductions are allowed under certain states’ laws because the technicians in those states authorized the deductions in writing. Indeed, as this Court has previously held, “[i]f the reversals are found to be part of the calculation of the final wage, then no class member has a claim because, by definition, there has been no ‘wage deduction.’ ” See Class Certification Order, at 25. Thus, as plaintiffs put it, “the First issue to be decided ... is whether the callback process ... constitutes a wage deduction or is simply the calculation of the final commission.” The parties rely on competing documents in arguing over whether the callbacks constitute wage deductions or part of the calculation of final wages. Plaintiffs rely on the Service Technicians Compensation Agreement (“TCA”), a contract that technicians enter into with Roto-Rooter when hired. The TCA provides that: Roto-Rooter pays service technicians commissions and reimburses for substantiated expenses. The commissions are based upon the amounts collected or billed (authorized) depending on the type of work done, LESS any sales, excise or other taxes; any special job costs such as permits, helpers, and outside labor; and any special charges for each job such as insurance surcharges that the company may deem necessary and may impose from time to time., Becausé, under the TCA, commissions are calculated based on the “amounts collected and billed less certain items like taxes,” these items are known to Roto-Rooter at the end of each week, and technicians are paid on a weekly basis, plaintiffs argue that commissions are earned weekly. Further, nothing in the TCA characterizes the commissions as advances or includes callbacks as part of calculating the commissions. Defendants first criticize plaintiffs’ reliance on the TCA. They argue that nothing in the TCA establishes when technicians earn their wages. Instead, defendants rely on RRSC’s Reversal of Commission Policy which has been contained in the Roto-Rooter Employee Handbook since February 2008. The Policy states that “[bjecause commissions are subject to adjustments ... all commissions are considered advances until the invoice is paid and the warranty period expires.” Since February 2008, when technicians receive their weekly timesheets, they are required to acknowledge and approve the adjustments to their commissions or raise concerns with their supervisors. Further, technicians, including 28 of the 39 Discovery Plaintiffs, signed acknowledgments stating that they “understand that it is my responsibility to read and comply with the policies contained in the Handbook” and that they have “full access to the Handbook, which is readily available ... in a public place at my work location.” Standing alone, however, the Reversal of Commission Policy in the Employee Handbook cannot demonstrate as a matter of law that the commissions were advances for several reasons. First, the Policy was only written in February 2008. Technicians hired prior to that date could not have read the Policy until it was included in the Employee Handbook, although RRSC apparently had an ongoing practice concerning call-backs from at least March 2004. Further, technicians are only required to acknowledge that they have access to the Employee Handbook, not that they have read it. And, perhaps most importantly, the Employee Handbopk itself contains the explicit disclaimer that “The Handbook is neither a contract of employment nor a legal document.” Nevertheless, defendants argue that it is immaterial whether or not the Employee Handbook is a binding contract because “the core inquiry under the laws of each Class State[] is whether there was an understanding between RRSC and plaintiffs that commission payments were advances.” According to this position, even if the Employee Handbook does not itself establish that the commissions are advances, it is evidence of the understanding held by RRSC and the technicians concerning the nature of the commissions. In support, defendants cite a number of cases from different class states in which non-contractual employment policies are used by courts to determine when a commission is fully earned. Plaintiffs attempt to foreclose defendants’ approach by arguing that ’ any agreement (explicit or implicit) that technicians’ commissions are advances would be void as contrary to public policy because that agreement has the effect of driving technicians’ compensation below minimum wage. See Cary Oil Co., Inc. v. MG Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 230 F.Supp.2d 439, 451 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (“it is well established that contracts that offend the underlying purpose of a statute are unenforceable”). Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the law is correct. But plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate, in support of their summary judgment motion, that the call-back policy actually causes minimum wage violations. Defendants have presented evidence that Roto-Rooter has a policy of bumping-up technician earnings when commissions alone are insufficient to meet minimum wage obligations for a particular workweek. As defendants point out, the Department of Labor approved a similar policy in a 1981 opinion letter. Plaintiffs claim that this policy either does not work or is not followed, but plaintiffs have failed to show a single instance where the imposition of a call-back alone brought a technician’s wages below the minimum wage for the week. Consequently, plaintiffs have not persuaded the Court that defendants’ interpretation is barred by public policy. Under the law of all of the class states, the question of when a commission is earned is answered by examining the relevant employment contract. Although the TCA at no point says that technician’s commissions are advances, it is also silent on when commissions are earned. The parties quibble over whether the TCA is a “fully integrated agreement” and whether the Employee Handbook’s provisions may be “grafted” on to the TCA. But the parties overlook the plain language of the TCA, which provides that “commissions are based upon the amounts collected or billed (authorized) depending on the type of work done, LESS ... any special charges for each job such as insurance surcharges that the company may deem necessary and may impose from time to time.” (emphasis added). In other words, when they sign the TCA, the technicians expressly authorize Roto-Rooter to take additional deductions from their commissions relating to certain jobs as it deems necessary. Roto-Rooter’s call-back policy falls within this broad grant of authority. The Employee Handbook does not need to be “grafted” on to the TCA nor does it need to be a separate contract because the TCA allowed Roto-Rooter to issue policies regarding deductions from commissions. See, e.g., Graff v. Enodis Corp., No. 02 Civ. 5922, 2003 WL 1702026, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2003) (interpreting a policy bulletin provided by the employer as a contract “concerning the method of calculating commissions”). See also Kaplan v. Capital Co. of Am., 298 A.D.2d 110, 111, 747 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1st Dep’t 2002) (“Although the handbook asserted that the policies and benefits contained therein were not intended to be contractual and were subject to change at any time, this provision was plainly not intended to render the handbook wholly nugatory.”). Plaintiffs argue that, unlike deductions for call-backs, all the enumerated items in the TCA that can reduce a technician’s commissions are known to Roto-Rooter by the end of the given workweek and RotoRooter pays the technician at that time. That may very well be the case, but the TCA also contains a savings clause which demonstrates that these enumerated deductions are not the only deductions that are permitted. Moreover, Roto-Rooter did not impose the call-back policy on technicians without notice. The parties agree that the policy pre-dated the February 2008 Employee Handbook. Most plaintiffs signed that they “understand it is my responsibility to read and comply with the policies in the Handbook” and that they have “fall access to the Handbook which is readily available ... in a public place at my work location.” Call-back adjustments were disclosed to technicians on a weekly basis throughout the relevant period and, since February 2008, technicians’ weekly time listings have contained an authorization by which-the technician assents “to the terms of Roto-Rooter’s OPCC adjustment system,” which encompasses the callback practice. Having established that technicians’ commissions are advances rather than earned wages, the question remains whether Roto-Rooter’s call-back policy violates the applicable state laws. There are nine remaining states for which plaintiffs assert their Illegal Deductions Clams. Under the laws of all nine states, only deductions from earned wages are actionable. Therefore, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the Illegal Deductions Clams is denied. Defendants’ motion on this issue is granted and the Illegal Deductions Clams are dismissed. V. The Business Expense Claims Plaintiffs assert that Roto-Rooter technicians are required to bear certain job expenses, specifically: (1) the- cost of acquiring a work van; (2) van operation costs, including gas, tolls, registration, parking, and insurance; (3) van maintenance costs; (4) the cost of acquiring tools used for the job; (5) the costs of job equipment, such as cables; and (6) the cost of parts which technicians are required to purchase. Plaintiffs claim that Roto-Rooter imposes strict requirements on the technician’s work van, including signage requirements, and forbids use of the van for non-work purposes. In calculating the commission to pay a technician, Roto-Rooter adds a premium of 15% of the amount the technician collected or billed to cover expenses. According to plaintiffs, Roto-Rooter makes no attempt to ensure that the commissions, plus the premium, cover all of the expenses they actually incur. Further, as a matter of payroll policy, Roto-Rooter allows technicians to divide their weekly commissions into “wages” and “expense reimbursements.” Plaintiffs characterize this policy as an “accounting gimmick” done for tax purposes that has no effect on how much technicians are paid. Technicians could not, however, shift commissions to expenses if it made it appear that the technician did not earn minimum wage that week. Therefore, plaintiffs claim that, if a technician’s expenses for a given week ¿qualed his total commission earnings, he could not designate all of his commissions as expense reimbursement. Although the technician only broke even for that week, he had to leave enough commissions in the “wage” category to suggest that he earned minimum wage. If expenses could not be shifted because of this rule, they would be carried over to a later pay period. Plaintiffs cite the example of one technician, L'eVoid Bradley. For one week in April 2009, Bradley incurred $1,098.35 in work expenses, but he was only paid $516.20. According to plaintiffs, Bradley should have been paid $1,361.02, which would have encompassed his expenses and an additional $267.67 to raise his earnings to the minimum wage level. Instead, Bradley’s expenses were deferred, according to plaintiffs, in order to conceal that “[i]n effect, Bradley paid $582.15 to work for Roto-Rooter that week.” Plaintiffs claim that the class representative plaintiffs received less than the minimum wage for approximately 5% of the-weeks that they worked. On the basis of this conduct, plaintiffs seek summary judgment “that Roto-Rooter’s policy of shifting its business expenses, including the cost of the van itself, onto Plaintiffs is a violation of the FLSA and state minimum wage laws where the expenses have the effect of bringing the earnings below the established minimum wage.” In essence, plaintiffs seek summary judgment that Roto-Rooter’s business expense policy is unlawful. Additionally, plaintiffs claim that defendants failed to comply with their obligation to “maintain and preserve payroll or other records containing” information on “[tjotal ... deductions from wages paid each pay period.” 29 C.F.R. § 516.2(a)(10). Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the Business Expense Claims classes should be decertified because no minimum wage violations were reported for certain discovery plaintiffs and because there are individualized inquiries. Defendants oppose plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion by attempting’to raise a number of purported fact issues concerning whether certain expenses ' can properly be considered business expenses and how those expenses are incurred. The parties generally do not dispute the applicable law. A “minimum wage must be paid free and clear of any deductions or kickbacks to the employerf.]” Teoba v. Trugreen Landcare LLC, 769 F.Supp.2d 175, 180 (W.D.N.Y.2011). According to regulations adopted under the FLSA: Whether in cash or in facilities, “wages” cannot be considered to have been paid by the employer and received by the employee unless they are paid finally and unconditionally or “free and clear.” The wage requirements of the Act will not be met where the employee “kicks-back” directly or indirectly to the employer or to another person for the employer’s benefit the whole or part of the wage delivered to the employee. This is true whether the “kick-back” is made in cash or in other than cash. For example, if it is a requirement of the employer that the employee must provide tools of the trade which will be used in or are specifically required for the performance of the employer’s particular work, there would be a violation of the Act in any workweek when the cost of such tools purchased by the employee cuts into the minimum or overtime wages required to be paid him under the Act. 29 C.F.R. § 531.35. See also Arriaga v. Florida Pac. Farms, 305 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir.2002) (“there is no legal difference between deducting a cost directly from the worker’s wages and shifting a cost, which they could not deduct, for the employee to bear.”). Since the purpose of the minimum wage laws is to provide workers with a minimum standard of living, see generally 29 U.S.C. § 202, employer-provided food and lodging may be deducted from wages, but items for “primarily for the benefit or convenience of the employer,” like tools of the trade, may not be deducted. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 531.3(d) with § 531.29. A. Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motion According to plaintiffs, “the only question on summary judgment is which of the many expenses that Roto-Rooter requires its Technicians to bear are properly considered to be “primarily for the benefit or convenience of the employer.” Defendants, however, raise a number of challenges which the Court addresses in turn. First, defendants contend that Roto-Rooter need not reimburse plaintiffs for all their van-related expenses, but only those incurred on Roto-Rooter’s behalf. Defendants highlight the testimony of certain plaintiffs, including LeVoid Bradley, that they used their vans for personal reasons while employed by Roto-Rooter and argue that expenses related to personal use, including gas, tolls, depreciation, and maintenance should not be considered in determining the proper minimum wage payment. Further, defendants point out that, under the law, they are not responsible for technicians’ commuting expenses, see 29 C.F.R. § 531.32(a), and maintain that these expenses must be accounted for separately. These incidental personal uses, however, pale in comparison to the abundant evidence that suggests that technicians’ van-related costs were primarily for the benefit of Roto-Rooter. Technicians are required to purchase a particular kind of van and equip it a certain way. The vans must carry Roto-Rooter signage and RotoRooter receives about 10% of its business from customers who saw a Roto-Rooter van. Technicians are not permitted to use the van for personal reasons and the smell of the plumbing equipment kept in the van makes other uses impractical. These facts suggest that the technicians’ vans are “tools of the trade.” See Lin v. Benihana Nat’l Corp., 755 F.Supp.2d 504, 511 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“Vehicles ... are considered ‘tools of the trade’ if employees are required to possess and utilize them in the course of their employment.”) More importantly, the fact that the technicians made incidental personal use of the vans does not imply that van-related expenses were not primarily for Roto-Rooter’s benefit. See Marshall v. Sam Dell’s Dodge Corp., 451 F.Supp. 294, 304 (N.D.N.Y.1978) (concluding that “demonstration cars” were “furnished primarily for the benefit of’ the employer, despite the fact that employees could drive the cars for personal reasons); Brennan v. Modern Chevrolet Co., 363 F.Supp. 327, 333 (N.D.Tex.1973) (finding that demonstration cars were “furnished [to] these salesmen primarily for the benefit of the defendant-employer” even though approximately 90% of the miles driven were for the salesmen’s personal use). Further, Roto-Rooter did not pro-rate their reimbursement of van-related expenses for personal use when reporting these expenses to the IRS. See id. (considering the tax treatment of a furnished automobile in determining that it was primarily furnished for the employer’s benefit). Thus, as “tools of the trade,” technicians’ van-related expenses may not reduce their wages below the minimum wage. See Lin, 755 F.Supp.2d at 511-12 (“employers can require employees to bear the costs of acquiring and maintaining tools of the trade so long as those costs, when deducted from the employees’ weeMy wages, do not reduce their wage to below the required minimum.”). Further, Roto-Rooter recognizes a category of expenses, known as “substantiated expenses,” which are business-related expenses for which Roto-Rooter provides tax deductions to its technicians. According to Roto-Rooter policy, tools, supplies, tolls, gasoline, van repair and maintenance, the outside purchase or lease of a van, and the outside purchase of van, insurance, among other items, are considered “substantiated expenses” when supported by detailed expense receipts. This policy establishes, fairly conclusively, that at least “substantiated expenses” constitute business expenses that may not cut into the minimum wage. Second, defendants argue that RotoRooter does not need to reimburse a technician for his business expens.es in a single week because the technician does not necessarily incur the entire cost of . the expense in a single week. Although certain expenses like parking and -tolls may be properly accounted for during the week in which they are incurred, defendants argue that larger expenses, such as financing the purchase of a van, are incurred over a period of time. For example, according to defendants, a technician’s monthly-van finance or lease payments are “not incurred in the week payment is, made[,]” instead the expense “is reasonably spread across a one-month period, and RRSC accounts for such expenses in this manner.” Defendants also suggest that the cost of an expensive replacement van part, like a fuel pump, may be amortized over the life of that part. But, as plaintiffs correctly point out, defendants have not presented any authority to show that their accounting theory is consistent with the FLSA (or the law of any relevant state), nor is the Court aware of any. To the contrary, the FLSA consistently ties the minimum wage inquiry to an individual work week. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 531.35 (providing that there would be a violation of the FLSA “in any workweek when the cost of such tools purchased by the employee cuts into the minimum ... wages required to be paid him under the [FLSA]”). And the policy behind the minimum wage laws — the maintenance of a minimum standard of living for workers — would be vitiated if the period for expense reimbursement were tied to the period during which the employer receives the benefit of the expense, rather than the period in which the employee incurs the expense. But defendants’ final argument is their most compelling. Defendants argue that the law does not require them to reimburse technicians for their actual expenses. Instead, they only need to provide a- reasonable approximation of employee expenses in order to comply with the minimum wage laws. Defendants rely on cases addressing the reimbursement of pizza delivery drivers for their transportation expenses. In Wass v. NPC Int’l Inc., 688 F.Supp.2d 1282, 1285-86 (D.Kan.2010), the court reasoned that § 531.35, which prohibits employers from making employees bear business expenses that cut into the minimum wage, indirectly incorporates language from 29 C.F.R. § 778.217, which governs the calculation of an employee’s regular rate for overtime purposes. Under § 778.217(b), the “actual or reasonably approximate amount” of a variety of employee business expenses “will not be regarded as part of the employee’s regular rate” for overtime purposes. The Wass court concluded that this language, read in conjunction with §, 531.35 meant that “the applicable regulations ... permit an employer to approximate reasonably the amount of an employee’s vehicle expenses without affecting the amount of the employee’s wages for purposes of the federal minimum wage law.” 688 F.Supp.2d at 1286. See also Barrow v. WKRP Mgmt, LLC, No. 09-cv-1613, 2011 WL 2174496, at *5 (D.Colo. June 3, 2011) (“Defendants correctly argue that they did not have to reimburse Plaintiff for his actual expenses, but could approximate Plaintiffs vehicle related expenses in setting his reimbursement rate.”) Plaintiffs challenge defendants’ reliance on these cases, arguing that § 778.217 only addresses overtime compensation and, thus, the cases are inapposite. Since overtime regulations address different policy concerns than minimum wage regulations, there is some force to plaintiffs’ argument, but, as defendants correctly observe, the Wass line of cases does address an employer’s obligation to pay the minimum wage. And defendants have put forward evidence that, even though Roto-Rooter reimburses, a technician for his “substantiated expenses,” it also incorporates a premium of 15% into a technician’s commissions and that this premium is intended to cover technicians’ work-related expenses, including their van costs. Thus, defendants have created a fact issue as to whether they have satisfied their minimum wage obligations by reasonably approximating a technician’s expenses. Whether the 15% premium represents a reasonable approximation of expenses, especially when viewed in light of Roto-Rooter’s substantiated expenses policy, is an issue for the jury to determine. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the Business Expense Claims is denied. Two other holdings flow from this ruling. First, plaintiffs have asked the Court to grant them summary judgment and hold that Roto-Rooter violated its record-keeping obligations under the FLSA by failing to keep records of all employees’ business-related expenses. Defendants admit that Roto-Rooter did not keep records of all employee-related expenses but argue that it had no obligation to do so, especially since not all technicians submitted all of their expense receipts. The Court agrees with defendants. The authority cited by plaintiffs establishes that the obligation to keep employee records extends to keeping records of deductions from wages, not keeping records of employee expenses. See 29 C.F.R. § 516.2(a)(10) (addressing “[t]otal additions to or deductions from wages”). Although “there is no legal difference between deducting a cost directly from the worker’s wages and shifting a cost, which they could not deduct, for the employee to bear[,]” Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1236, it would not make sense for the FLSA to impose on an employer the obligation to keep a record when control over that record is exercised by the employee, rather than the employer. Second, plaintiffs ask the Court to grant summary judgment on their entitlement to FLSA liquidated damages on their FLSA Business Expense Claim. If the Court had found as a matter of law that defendants were liable for the FLSA Business Expense Claim, summary judgment on liquidated damages might be appropriate. But liability has not yet been determined, which is, of course, a prerequisite for any award of liquidated damages. See Wong v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 749 F.Supp.2d 1009, 1020-21 (N.D.Cal.2010) (finding “the question of entitlement of an award of liquidated damages [to be] premature” where plaintiffs had not carried their summary judgment burden). Accordingly, the Court denies plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the FLSA liquidated damages issue as premature. B. Defendants’ Motion to Decertify Defendants ask the Court to decertify the Business Expense Claims classes and FLSA collective action. Defendants argue that, even if all of plaintiffs’ expenses were for Roto-Rooter’s benefit and incurred during the weeks contended, plaintiffs have failed to show on a class-wide basis that these expenses caused plaintiffs’ earnings to fall below the minimum wage. According to defendants, plaintiffs have only demonstrated a violation for one technician (Bradley), in one week of employment, and have no proof that such violations were widespread, other than Exhibit D to their own interrogatory responses which is not admissible evidence. See generally Gilmore v. Macy’s Retail Holdings, Civ. No. 06-3020, 2009 WL 140518, at *9 (D.N.J. Jan. 20, 2009) (“a litigant may not introduce statements from its own answers to interrogatories ... as evidence because such answers typically constitute hearsay when used in this manner.”). Additionally, defendants contend that Exhibit D fails to show any