Solis v. A-1 Mortgage Corp. (934 F. Supp. 2d 778, 2013)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CONTI, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Pending before the court is a motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 88) filed by plaintiff Hilda Solis, Secretary of the United States Department of Labor (the “Secretary”), against defendant Gregory Makozy (“defendant”). This action arises from defendant’s involvement with A-l Mortgage Corporation (“A-l”), a mortgage brokerage firm. Defendant’s wife, Maria Makozy (“Mrs. Makozy”), was the president of A-l. In this case, the Secretary alleges that defendant willfully violated the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.'' (“FLSA”), by failing to pay employees of A-l the requisite minimum wage, failing to pay employees overtime compensation, and failing to maintain accurate records of employees’ hours. The Secretary seeks back wages, liquidated damages, and injunctive relief.

The Secretary argues that the affidavits of former A-l employees, together with payroll checks issued by the company, demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to whether the FLSA applies to defendant and whether . he committed the alleged violations. Defendant responds that summary judgment would be improper largely because his own affidavit, coupled with Mrs. Makozy’s testimony in her deposition in the present case as well as in a prior civil matter, contradicts the Secretary’s assertions. Defendant contends that genuine issues of material fact remain about whether he is an “employer” within the meaning of the FLSA; whether he violated the FLSA’s minimum wage, overtime, and recordkeeping provisions; whether he did so willfully; whether he is liable for unpaid wages and liquidated damages; and whether injunctive relief is warranted.

Because defendant failed to provide sufficient evidence relating to his denials, the court concludes that no genuine disputes exist. The Secretary’s motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED.

II. Factual Background

A-l, one of the original defendants in this case, was a mortgage brokerage firm located in Cranberry Township, Pennsylvania, and licensed by the Pennsylvania State Department of Banking. (Joint Concise Statement (“JCS”) (ECF No. 98) ¶¶ 1-2.) A-l generated sales leads through radio, TV, and Internet advertisements and provided them to its loan officers. (JCS ¶ 6.) The company’s telemarketer would follow up by telephone with these potential customers, including some in Maryland and Florida, asking them to refinance their loans. (Id. ¶ 7.) Throughout the period of time relevant to this action, A-l’s annual dollar volume of sales exceeded $500,000. (Id. ¶ 5.)

Mrs. Makozy was A-l’s president, sole corporate officer, and sole shareholder. (Id. ¶¶3-4.) Defendant’s degree of involvement in the management of the business is the subject of the instant motion. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 8.) While the Secretary claims that it was actually defendant who managed A-l, defendant asserts that Mrs. Makozy managed A-l’s day-to-day operations and that he.merely assisted “as necessary” as a “consultant.” (Id. ¶¶ 4, 8.)

Mrs. Makozy described defendant as a “consultant.” (Id. ¶¶ 4, 13.) When defense counsel inquired about the basis for this characterization during a 2010 deposition, Mrs. Makozy responded:

Q. Was there some other reason that Mr. Makozy was acting as a consultant instead of as an employee of A-l?

A. He was a consultant, he was never an employee of A-l.

Q. And why was that?

A. Because he was not an employee.

(Maria Makozy Dep., Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Material Pacts, App’x (“Def.’s App’x”) D (ECF No. 94-4) at 33.) In a previous civil action, Mrs. Makozy testified that defendant “assisted]” her in the operation of A-l. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 12.) She permitted defendant to use the title of “manager” and left him in charge when she was not in the office. (Id. ¶ 4.)

In the course of his duties at A-l, defendant interviewed prospective employees and made recommendations to Mrs. Makozy about whom to hire and fire. (Id. ¶ 9, 14-15.) Mrs. Makozy testified in a deposition that defendant met with A-l’s accountants and advertising vendors; apprised the employees about A-l’s dress code, their work hours, start times, and the duration of the work day; called in employees’ hours to ADP for payroll purposes; handled vacation requests; and trained employees in the use of the company’s mortgage origination software. (JCS ¶ 8.) Mrs. Makozy acknowledged that defendant had the ability to write checks and, even if he did not personally sign them, he had at least theoretical authority to do so because he was listed as an authorized signer on A-l’s bank account. (JCS ¶¶ 8, 35; Makozy Dep., Def.’s App’x D at 45, 50-51.)

A-l’s employees approached defendant with questions and work-related issues, which he attempted to resolve. (JCS ¶ 11.) Although defendant claims that Mrs. Makozy managed A-l’s daily operations, several of the company’s former employees reported that he set their work hours and the loan officers’ commission rates and quotas. (Id. ¶ 10.) According to Mrs. Makozy, she set the terms of their compensation, while defendant discussed them with the employees. (Makozy Dep., Def.’s App’x D at 56-57.) The employees maintain, and defendant denies, that they only conferred with Mrs. Makozy if they needed her help with a title issue. (JCS ¶ 16.)

Between December 2, 2001 and November 23, 2003, the Pittsburgh District Office of the Wage and Hour Division (“Wage Hour”) of the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”), investigated A-l’s compliance with the FLSA. (Id. ¶ 19.) As a result, Wage Hour determined that A-l failed to pay its twenty-three loan officers, who worked purely on commission, a minimum wage and time and one-half for any overtime hours. (Id. ¶ 20.) Wage Hour concluded that A-l did not accurately record the hours its employees actually worked and did not observe regular pay dates. (Id. ¶ 21.) On April 10, 2004, Mrs. Makozy and defendant, who was then Al’s general manager, entered into a stipulation with the Secretary’s representative in which A-l agreed to pay all back wages and to comply with the FLSA in the future. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 22.)

Wage Hour investigated A-l again between November 30, 2003 and July 11, 2004. (Id. ¶ 23.) This, investigation revealed that A-l paid employees for their work weeks after they performed it via backdated checks and failed to record accurately the employees’ hours and the commission payments they earned. (Id. ¶¶ 25-26.) Wage Hour concluded that A-l failed to comply with the FLSA’s requirements after the first investigation and subsequently failed to pay its employees at least minimum wage for all the hours they worked. (Id. ¶ 24.) On December 22, 2004, a consent judgment was entered, imposing civil penalties on the Makozys and enjoining them from further violating the FLSA and withholding back wages. (Id. ¶ 27.) Mrs. Makozy signed the consent agreement as an authorized officer of the corporation, and defendant signed as a “consultant.” (Id. ¶ 28.)

Wage Hour’s third investigation of A-l’s compliance with the FLSA’s minimum wage, overtime, and recordkeeping provisions, conducted between October 1, 2005 and May 30, 2008, gave rise to the present action. (Id. ¶ 29.) Wage Hour’s investigator, Polly Lupean (“Lupean”), concluded that A-l failed to pay twenty-one of its employees the minimum wage for all the hours they worked each week. (Id. ¶ 30.) Lupean also found that twenty loan officers were paid strictly on commission and were not guaranteed a .minimum wage. (Id. ¶ 31.) Loan officers Don Noland (“Noland”) and Jeremy Wells (“Wells”) stated in their declarations that they never received ADP payroll checks at all. (JCS ¶ 39; see also (Noland Deck, Pk’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. ■ J., App’x (“Pk’s App’x”) P (ECF No. 89-3) ¶25; Wells Deck, Pk’s App’x R (ECF No. 89-3) ¶22.)) Secretary Jessica Hollenberger (“Hollenberger”) was not paid at all for the eight hours she worked on her last day at A-l. (JCS ¶ 31-32.)

Defendant denies that these employees were not paid for all the hours they worked. (Id. ¶¶ 30-32.) With the exception of Hollenberger, for which defendant cites his own affidavit, he bases these denials on Lupean “disregarding” the A-l time sheets indicating that the employees had, in fact, worked forty hours per week. (Id.) Lupean, however, determined based upon her interviews with A-l’s employees that those time sheets had been falsified. (Id. ¶¶ 31-32.)

Lupean found that, while A-l’s employees were issued biweekly payroll checks, defendant withheld payroll checks owed to some loan officers, including Jennifer Stuber (“Stuber”) and Deborah Stadelmyer (“Stadelmyer”), without changing the checks’ issue dates, until the officers closed a loan. (JCS ¶¶ 33-34; see also Stuber Deck, Pk’s App’x Q (ECF No. 89-3) ¶ 26; Stadelmyer Deck, Pk’s Reply Br., Supp. App’x (“Pk’s Supp. App’x”) T (ECF No. 96-1) ¶¶ 29-30.) Lupean concluded that these loan officers were only paid minimum wage checks when their loans closed and funded, and they were owed a commission. (JCS ¶ 35, 41.) The loan officers’ declarations state that those who did not close loans during a pay period were not paid during that period. (Id. ¶ 38, 40.) According to loan officer Joseph Gentry (“Gentry”), defendant told him that, if the DOL contacted him, he should report that he had “no complaints” and was paid biweekly, even though he .was paid only when he closed a loan. (Id. ¶ 58.) Defendant, citing his own affidavit, denies these allegations and claims that he lacked the authority to, and did not, issue checks to A-l’s employees. (Id. ¶¶ 33-35, 40-41, 59.)

The Secretary alleges that, as a result of A-l’s practice of withholding checks, some A-l employees went weeks or months without being paid. (Id. ¶ 41.) In support of this contention, the Secretary cites ADP payroll and A-l commission checks that corroborate the employees’ declarations. (Id. ¶¶ 43, 45, 47, 49.)- For example, while ADP payroll checks issued to loan officer Vincent Ciminera (“Ciminera”) were dated August 31, 2007, September 14, 2007, September 28, 2007, and October 12, 2007; the check processing date stamped on the back of the checks indicates that they were not deposited until October 31, 2007, the same date an A-l commission check dated October 31, 2007 was deposited. (Id. ¶¶ 42-43.) Similarly, ADP payroll checks purport on their faces to have been issued to Gentry on July 20, 2007, August 17, 2007, August 31, 2007, and September 14, 2007, but the processing date shows that they were not deposited until October 16, 2007, which was the same date an A-l commission check dated October 15, 2007 was deposited. (Id. ¶¶ 44-45.) Two ADP checks appear to have been issued to loan officer Paul Minutello (“Minutello”) on January 6 and 20, 2006. (Id. ¶ 48.) The check processing date stamped on the back of the checks, however, shows that they were not deposited until March 20, 2006, more than ten weeks later, at the same time Minutello deposited an A-l commission check dated March 13, 2006. (Id. ¶ 49.) Finally, an ADP payroll check purporting to have been issued to loan officer Andrew Hetes (“Hetes”) on August 31, 2007 was not, according to the processing date, deposited until September 14, 2007, at the same time an A-l commission check dated September 12, 2007 was deposited. (Id. ¶¶ 46-47.) In their declarations, the employees explained that they typically deposited any checks they received from A-l, whether ADP payroll checks or A-l commission checks, within three days of receiving them, and one week at the latest. (Id. ¶¶'36-37, 47, 49.)

Defendant denies that the employees’ paychecks were withheld. (Id. ¶¶ 43, 45, 47, 49.) He argues that Lupean did not account for checks for which copies of the front and back were not provided and did not verify the timing of the employees’ deposits. (Id.) Defendant maintains that he was not responsible for issuing A-l’s checks, and he argues that an employee’s failure to deposit a check until a given date does not necessarily mean that the check was not, in fact, issued to the employee in a timely fashion. (Id.)

The Secretary alleges that, when the loan officers worked more than forty hours per week, defendant did not pay them at all for the hours worked in excess of forty, let alone at time and one-half their regular pay rate. (Id. ¶ 50.) The Secretary claims that defendant told A-l’s loan officers not to record more than forty hours per week, regardless of how many hours they actually worked. (Id. ¶ 51.) The Secretary asserts that defendant instructed the loan officers to indicate on their time sheets that they took one-hour lunch breaks, whether or not they actually did, and not to indicate that they worked late or on weekends. (Id. ¶ 52.)

To support these claims, the Secretary cites the declarations of several A-l employees. Minutello, who ■ stated that he regularly exceeded forty hours of work per week, reported that defendant returned a time sheet that accurately reflected his hours worked and instructed him not to show more than forty hours per week in the future. (Id. ¶ 53.) Defendant told Minutello to change his start times to “make [his time sheet] look more authentic.” (Id. ¶ 54.) Gentry stated, while he did not record his hours at all while he was employed at A-l, in early May 2008, after Wage Hour commenced its most recent investigation, defendant asked him to return to the office to complete backdated time sheets that did not accurately reflect the hourá he actually worked. (JCS ¶ 58; Gentry Deck, Pl.’s Supp. App’x J (ECF No. 96-1) ¶¶ 18, 27-30.) Hetes, Noland, and Wells also" did not keep time records while working at A-l. (JCS ¶¶ 57.) Ciminera reported that he did not record his hours worked after filling out one or two time sheets when he first began working for A-l. (Id. ¶ 56.) According to Stuber, defendant told her that the DOL required that her time sheets show that she took a lunch break, even though she usually ate at her desk. (Id. ¶ 55, 60.)

Defendant denies these allegations, again claiming that Lupean “disregarded” employee time sheets showing that they worked forty hours per week. (Id. ¶¶ 50-57.) The Secretary relies upon Lupean’s determination, based upon her interviews of A-l’s employees, that those time sheets had been falsified. (Id.) During its investigation, Wage Hour calculated that the back wages A-l owed to twenty-one former employees for unpaid minimum wages and overtime totaled $68,272.11. (Id. ¶ 61.) Defendant denies . that any back wages are due and argues that, even if they were, Wage Hour’s calculation was incorrect because Lupean based her calculation upon interviews and did not verify the amounts. (Id.) Lupean, however, explained that because she believed defendant falsified the time sheets — and keeping track of employees’ hours is the employer’s responsibility under the FLSA— “there would be nothing else to review” to verify the employees’ actual hours worked. (Lupean Dep., Def.’s App’x C (ECF No. 94-3) at 38-39.)

III. Standard of Review

. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides, in relevant part:

(a) Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment. A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense — or the part of each claim or defense — on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is -no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.

(c) Procedures.

(1) Supporting Factual Positions. A

party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c)(l)(A)-(B).

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”

Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir.2007) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).

An issue of material fact is in genuine dispute if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir.2007) (“A genuine issue is present when a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all of the record evidence, could rationally find in favor of the non-moving party in light of his burden of proof.”) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548).

“[W]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

In deciding a summary judgment motion, a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. Doe v. Cnty. of Centre, PA, 242 F.3d 437, 446 (3d Cir.2001); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 130 (3d Cir.2001); Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir.1999). A court must not engage in credibility determinations at the summary judgment stage. Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 643 n. 3 (3d Cir.1998).

IV. Discussion

At issue • in the present motion are FLSA provisions relating to compensation, recordkeeping, and damages. Specifically, the Secretary argues that defendant violated (1) the FLSA’s minimum wage requirement, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2006) (“ § 6”); (2) the FLSA provision mandating time-and-one-half compensation for overtime hours worked, 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2006) (“§ 7”); and (3) the FLSA requirement that employers keep accurate records of their employees’ hours and compensation, 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (2006) (“§ 11(c)”). The Secretary argues that these violations were willful and that this court should award back wages, liquidated damages, and injunctive relief.

Defendant contends that the FLSA’s provisions do not apply to him because he is not, in fact, an “employer” within the meaning of the statute. Defendant also denies having violated §§ 6, 7, and 11(c), as well as any willfulness or liability for damages.

A. “Employer”

Before the court can address whether, as a matter of law, defendant violated the FLSA, it must first settle the preliminary matter of whether or not defendant is subject to its provisions at all. The Secretary contends, and defendant denies, that he is an “employer” within the meaning of the FLSA.

1. Defining “Employer” for FLSA Purposes

There is no dispute that A-l was the employer of the employees in issue. The question presented is whether defendant may also be classified as an employer of those employees. It is clear that “[a] ‘single individual may stand in the relation of an employee to two or more employers at the same time under the [FLSA].’ ” In re Enterprise Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Empl. Practices Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 467 (3d Cir.2012) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b)). The FLSA provides in pertinent part, that an employer “includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee....” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (“§ 3”) (emphasis added). Courts have interpreted § 3’s terms broadly in order to better effectuate the statute’s sweeping remedial objectives. See, e.g., Dole v. Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.1991); Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 190, 194 (5th Cir.1983) (referencing “the firmly-established guidon that the FLSA must be liberally construed to effectuate Congress’ remedial intent”), abrogated on other grounds, McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 108 S.Ct. 1677, 100 L.Ed.2d 115 (1988); Bonnette v. Ca. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir.1983), abrogated on other grounds, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized this broad approach to the definition of an employer under the FLSA. In In re Enterprise, the court identified a number of decisions in which the United States Supreme Court used expansive language to describe the term “employer” used in § 3. In re Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 467-68. The courts of appeals referred to the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement in Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326, 112 S.Ct. 1344, 117 L.Ed.2d 581 (1992), that Congress defined “employer” “expansively” and explained that the definition of “employer” had been called “ ‘the broadest definition that has ever been included in any one act.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360 n. 3, 363, 65 S.Ct. 295, 89 L.Ed. 301 (1945) (referring to Senator Black’s remarks on the Senate floor)).

Because of the breadth of the FLSA, the employer need not necessarily have “[ujltimate control” for an employer-employee relationship to exist; “even ‘indirect control’ may be sufficient. Id. at 468. In other words, the alleged employer must exercise ‘significant control.’ ” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir.1982)). Other courts have interpreted the term “employer” broadly enough to hold a corporation’s managers liable in their individual capacities despite the corporation’s bankruptcy. See Boucher v. Shaw, 572 F.3d 1087, 1093-94 (9th Cir.2009); Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1511 (1st Cir.1983); Chung v. New Silver Palace Rest., Inc., 246 F.Supp.2d 220, 226 (S.D.N.Y.2002).

As noted, whether an employer-employee relationship existed between A-l and the affected loan officers is not at issue for the purposes of the matter at hand; rather the Secretary argues that defendant is also an employer of the employees in issue for FLSA purposes in his individual capacity. Individuals acting in a supervisory capacity may be liable in their individual capacities as an employer under the FLSA. See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. and Parole, 667 F.3d 408 (3d Cir.2012) (discussing an individual supervisor’s liability as an employer under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., noting the definition of “employer in that act is “materially identical to that in FLSA....”). • In Haybarger, the court of appeals found an individual supervisor could be an employer because the FLSA would permit such individual liability. Id. at 417. The court referred to the language in the FMLA, which defines employer and is virtually identical to the language in the FLSA, and noted:

Having concluded that an individual supervisor at a public agency may be held hable under the FMLA, we must next determine whether there exists a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether [the supervisor] was Haybarger’s employer under the FMLA. We return to the FMLA’s statutory language, which states that an “employer”' includes “any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to any of the employees of such employer.” § 2611(b)(A)(H)(1). We believe this language means that an individual is subject to FMLA liability when he or she exercises “supervisory authority over the complaining employee and was responsible in whole or part for the alleged violation” while acting in the employer’s interest. Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir.1987) (discussing individual liability under the FLSA’s analogous definition of an “employer”). As the Fifth Circuit explained in interpreting the FLSA’s analogous employer provision, an individual supervisor has adequate authority over the complaining employee when the supervisor “independently exercise[s] control over the work situation.” Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir.1984) (quoting Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 190, 195 (5th Cir.1983)); see also Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 195, 94 S.Ct. 427, 38 L.Ed.2d 406 (1973) (holding that a company exercising “substantial control of the terms and conditions of the work” of the employees is an employer under the FLSA).

Id.

2. The Enterprise Test

In In re Enterprise, 683 F.3d 462, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently developed a test to determine “whether a defendant is a plaintiffs ‘employer’ within the meaning of that term under the FLSA.” Id. at 468. .There, the court was faced with the question whether a parent company was a joint employer of the assistant managers employed by certain of its subsidiaries, which primarily rent and sell vehicles to the public under the Enterprise name. Id. at 464-65. The defendant parent company moved for summary judgment on the ground that, because it was not a joint employer within the meaning of the FLSA, it could not be liable under the statute. Id. at 466-67. The district court granted the parent company’s motion, and the assistant managers-appealed. Id. at 466-67.

On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Id. at 471. In formulating a new test for determining joint employer status, the court looked primarily to the tests used by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470, and this court in Lewis v. Vollmer of America, No. 05-1632, 2008 WL 355607 (W.D.Pa. Feb. 7, 2008). In re Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 468-70. As a result of this “melding,” the court of appeals set forth the “Enterprise test,” which consists of four factors:

1) the alleged employer’s authority to hire and fire the relevant employees; 2) the alleged employer’s authority to promulgate work rules and assignments and to set the employees’ conditions of employment: compensation, benefits, and work schedules, including the rate and method of payment; 3) the alleged employer’s involvement in day-to-day employee supervision, including employee discipline; and 4) the alleged employer’s actual control of employee records, such as payroll, insurance, or taxes.

Id. at 469. These factors, the court of appeals reasoned, “reflect the facts that will generally be most relevant in a joint employment context.” Id.

The court cautioned, however, that “these factors do not.constitute an exhaustive list of all potentially relevant facts, and should not be blindly applied.” Id. (emphasis in original). That is, the Enterprise factors are not necessarily the “sole considerations” that enter into a determination of joint employer status. Id. at 469-70. “[Ojther indicia of ‘significant control’” may be considered along with the four factors delineated above. Id. at 470. In fact, “all factors ... are to be considered and weighed in deciding whether a joint employer status has been found” in a given case. Id. (accepting the argument that additional factors such as the corporate structure and nature of the business in which the parties were engaged should be considered). This built-in flexibility dovetails with the court of appeals’ pragmatic approach in developing a new test “consistent with those considerations of the real world where such additional economic concerns are prominent,” as well as the court’s awareness that a joint employment determination requires “the total employment situation and the economic realities of the work relationship” to be taken into account. Id. at 469-70.

3. Applying the Enterprise Factors

Remaining cognizant of the summary judgment standard declared by the United States Supreme Court — the court will apply the Enterprise test to the facts of this case. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769 (2007) (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87,106 S.Ct. 1348).

a. Authority to Hire and Fire Employees

The first factor a court must examine when applying the Enterprise test to determine whether someone is an employer is “the alleged employer’s authority to hire and fire the relevant employees.” In re Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 469. In the present case, defendant played an important role in these personnel decisions by conducting interviews and consulting with Mrs. Makozy about whom to hire and terminate or, as Lupean testified, “did all the hiring/firing” at A-l. (Lupean Dep., Def.’s App’x C at 60.)

Although defendant denies that he had the authority to make the ultimate hiring decisions, a review of the record reveals that fourteen former A-l employees attested in their signed declarations that defendant hired them. (Carpenter Deck, PL’s App’x G (ECF No. 89-3) ¶ 2; Giminera Decl., PL’s App’x H (ECF No. 89-3) ¶ 2; Cipra Decl., PL’s App’x I ¶ 2; Gentry Decl., PL’s Supp. App’x J ¶ 2; Henderson Decl., PL’s App’x K (ECF No. 89-3) ¶2; Hetes Decl., PL’s App’x L ¶ 2; Lewis Decl., PL’s App’x M ¶ 2; McClain Decl., PL’s App’x N (ECF No. 89-3) ¶ 2; Minutello Decl., PL’s App’x 0 ¶ 2; Noland Decl., PL’s App’x P ¶ 2; Stuber Decl., PL’s App’x Q ¶ 2; Wells Decl., PL’s App’x R ¶ 2; Horan Decl., PL’s Supp. App’x S (ECF No. 96-1) ¶ 2; Stadelmyer Decl., PL’s Supp. App’x 1^2.))

At the summary judgment stage, the nonmovant’s evidence must be accepted as true. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (“The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”). With this in mind, the court accepts that defendant himself did not have the ultimate authority to make A-l’s hiring decisions. The role he played in the hiring process, however, was significant. It is undisputed that defendant personally interviewed employees, and his conduct during the interviews convinced fourteen employees that he had hired them. In any case, defendant made hiring recommendations to Mrs. Makozy.

At the very least, defendant interviewed prospective employees and advised Mrs. Makozy about which candidates to hire; in' this way, he played an important role in the hiring process. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit described one alleged employer as “involved in ... the hiring of employees,” but made no mention of whether he had the ultimate decision-making authority. U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Cole Enterprises, Inc., 62 F.3d 775, 778 (6th Cir.1995) (emphasis added). This analysis comports with the statement of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in In re Enterprise that “[ultimate control is not necessarily required.” In re Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 468.

The record indicates that defendant had some degree of influence over A-l’s firing decisions. Mrs. Makozy acknowledged that defendant had the authority to recommend that employees be disciplined, and Minutello stated in his signed affidavit that defendant fired him via a voicemail message. (Makozy Dep., Def.’s App’x D at 56; Minutello- Deck, PL’s App’x 0 ¶ 7.) The District Court for the Southern District of New York in Yu G. Ke v. Saigon Grill, Inc., 595 F.Supp.2d 240 (S.D.N.Y.2008), found that similar conduct with respect to termination — one alleged employer “occasionally” fired employees — was an indicator of employer status for FLSA purposes. Id. at 265.

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to defendant, his degree of control over A-l’s hiring and termination decisions was significant even if he lacked the final say over them or, as Lupean testified, “did all the hiring/firing.” (Lupean Dep., Def.’s App’x C at 60.) “[S]ignificant control” is sufficient to establish employer status; ultimate control is not required. In re Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 468.

b. Authority to Promulgate Work Rules and Assignments and Set Conditions of Employment

The second Enterprise factor is “the alleged employer’s authority to promulgate work rules and assignments and to set the employees’ conditions of employment: compensation, benefits, and work schedules, including the rate and method of payment.” Id. at 469.

Because the record indicates that A-l’s employees tended to work independently and did not require much additional instruction once they had been trained, the record is relatively sparse on the subject of who formulated the corporation’s policies and who assigned sales leads to specific employees. More importantly with respect to this factor, however, defendant admitted to assisting the employees with any job-related concerns and issues. Defendant trained new A-l loan officers on the use of mortgage origination software and communicated policy information, such as the requirements of the employee dress code, to the employees. See Reich v. Circle C Invs., Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 329 (5th Cir.1993) (affirming the district court’s finding of employer liability under the FLSA where, among other things, the alleged employer gave the employees specific instructions and informed them via inter-office memorandum about fines for violating company rules).

Like alleged employers found to be liable under the FLSA in other court decisions, defendant was heavily involved in coordinating and determining employees’ schedules. See Martin v. Selker Brothers, Inc., 949 F.2d 1286, 1294 (3d Cir.1991) (finding “pervasive ... control over the day-to-day operations” where, among other factors, the alleged employers regularly visited gas stations for the purpose of overseeing them); Saigon Grill, 595 F.Supp.2d at 265 (one defendant, a restaurant owner’s wife, controlled assigned work hours and controlled the employees’ schedule). Like the defendants in Selker Brothers and Saigon Grill, defendant handled A-l scheduling issues such as vacations and dealt with the employees’ hours, their start times, and the lengths of their workdays. The record contains no evidence to the contrary.

Defendant’s conduct also evidenced substantial control over the employees’ compensation and A-l’s finances in general. Mrs. Makozy testified that he was an authorized signer on at least one of A-l’s bank accounts and that he at least had the authority to write out the employees’ paychecks. (Makozy Dep., Def.’s App’x D at 45.) The record indicates that defendant personally distributed employees’ payroll and commission checks to them. (Makozy Dep., Def.’s App’x D at 144-50.) See Saigon Grill, 595 F.Supp.2d at 265 (finding a restaurant owner’s wife and another man tasked with managing two of the company’s four restaurants to be employers for FLSA purposes in part because they actually paid the restaurant’s employees their wages).

Even though defendant states that he did not personally sign employees’ checks on A-l’s behalf, the record demonstrates that he was listed as a signer on the corporation’s bank accounts and had authority to write out some company checks and to distribute the payroll and commission checks. Even if defendant did not have the authority to determine the employees’ compensation, the court in Saigon Grill following a trial found a defendant who did not determine the employees’ pay rates and workdays liable as an employer within the meaning of the FLSA because he nonetheless “exercised significant managerial authority in operating” two restaurants. Saigon Grill, 595 F.Supp.2d at 246, 265. Here, the Secretary adduced evidence of defendant’s authority to coordinate and determine work schedules and to control distribution of the payroll and commission cheeks. ■ No evidence to the contrary was introduced by defendant and a reasonable jury could not find in defendant’s favor with respect to this factor,

c. Involvement in Day-to-Day Supervision

The third Enterprise factor is “the alleged employer’s involvement in day-today employee supervision, including employee discipline.” In her deposition, Lupean testified that “what I know is that [defendant] was involved in the day-to-day operation of A-l.” (Lupean Dep., Defi’s App’x C at 60.) This type of involvement may entail, for example, substantial control of operations and employment conditions, including supervising employees. See, e.g., Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 195, 94 S.Ct. 427, 38 L.Ed.2d 406 (1973) (factoring employee supervision into a finding of “substantial control”).

In Selker Brothers, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found “control over the day-to-day operations” where, among other factors, the alleged employers regularly visited gas stations for the purpose of overseeing them. Selker Brothers, 949 F.2d at 1294. In another decision, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that a defendant, the'.brother of the president and sole shareholder of the company alleged to have violated the FLSA, was an “employer” for FLSA purposes in part because he instructed the employees about the job’s requirements and duties, and the employees reported to him in his brother’s absence. Chao v. Vidtape, Inc., 196 F.Supp.2d 281, 291 (E.D.N.Y.2002), aff'd as modified, 66 Fed.Appx. 261 (2d Cir.2003).

In Saigon Grill, 595 F.Supp.2d at 265, the court held that the restaurant owner’s wife was an employer under FLSA § 3 largely because she monitored the employees’ performance and imposed discipline, including occasionally terminating employees. Id. at 265. Another defendant in the same case also faced liability as an employer on the grounds that he “exercised significant managerial authority in operating” two of the restaurants and had the authority to discipline employees, even though he did not determine the employees’ pay rates and workdays; the court called the case against that defendant “a closer one.” Id. at 246, 265.

In the present case, the record’s undisputed facts about defendant’s supervisory role are consistent with the courts’ holdings in the decisions cited above. Like the brother of the corporation’s president and sole shareholder in Vidtape, defendant here ran the A-l office in Mrs. Makozy’s absence. As in Saigon Grill, the record indicates that defendant had some degree of influence over A-l’s firing and discipline decisions. Mrs. Makozy acknowledged that defendant had the authority to recommend that employees be disciplined. (Makozy Dep., Def.’s App’x D at 56.)

Like the scenario in Selker Brothers in which the alleged employer regularly visited the service stations, defendant regularly interacted with A-l’s loan officers. He admitted to talking with them about and helping them to solve any problems or issues that arose in the course of their work. With respect to the loan officers’ typical duties, he served as their primary contact person; in fact, many of the employees claim that he was their sole contact. (Carpenter Deck, Pk’s App’x G ¶¶ 4-5; Ciminera Deck, Pk’s App’x H ¶¶3-7; Cipra Deck, Pk’s App’x I ¶ 11; Henderson Deck, Pk’s App’x K ¶¶ 5-6; Hetes Deck, Pk’s App’x L ¶ 9; Minutello Deck, Pk’s App’x O ¶ 9; Noland Deck, Pk’s App’x P ¶ 5; Horan Deck, Pk’s Supp. App’x S ¶ 6; Stadelmyer Deck, Pk’s Supp. App’x T ¶ 6.) With the exception of “title issues” that arose in the course of their- duties, the record reflects that the loan officers had little contact with Mrs. Makozy. (Ciminera Deck, Pk’s App’x H ¶ 10; Cipra Deck, Pk’s App’x I ¶ 13; Henderson Deck, Pk’s App’x K ¶7; Hetes Deck, Pk’s App’x L ¶ 10; Minutello Deck, Pk’s App’x 0 ¶ 10; Noland Deck, Pk’s App’x P ¶ 6; Horan Deck, Pk’s Supp. App’x S ¶ 7; Stadelmyer Deck, Pk’s Supp. App’x T ¶ 7.) The interactions between defendant and the loan officers, as opposed to the interactions between Mrs. Makozy and the loan officers, were disproportionate in both frequency and substance. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to defendant, it contains nothing to contradict the conclusion that it was defendant himself, and not Mrs. Makozy, who was the loan officers’ supervisor. Taken as a whole, the record contains ample evidence to support Lupean’s conclusion that defendant “was involved in the day-to-day operation of A-l” in a supervisory capacity, and there is no affirmative evidence to the contrary. (Lupean Dep., Def.’s App’x C at 60.)

d. Control of Employee Records

The fourth Enterprise factor is “the alleged employer’s actual control of employee records, such as payroll, insurance, or taxes.” In re Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 469. The record does not reveal the details of who controlled A-l’s tax or insurance records, but it does demonstrate that defendant had control over employee records— in particular, time sheets. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of individual liability under the FLSA where, among other duties, the alleged employer was responsible for maintaining employment records. Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1001-02, 1012 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc). Like that defendant, defendant had some control over A-l’s employment records, as he communicated to employees that they were required to fill out time sheets. (Makozy Dep., Def.’s App’x D at 60.)

Several A-l employees testified that defendant instructed them not to record their hours accurately, much like the defendant in Circle C Investments who directed one of the employees not to keep certain payroll records. (Cipra Deck, Pk’s App’x I ¶ 34; Henderson Deck, Pk’s App’x K ¶¶ 24-26; Minutello Deck, Pk’s App’x O ¶ 32; Stuber Deck, Pk’s App’x Q ¶ 21; Stadelmyer Deck, Pk’s Supp. App’x T ¶ 25.) Mrs. Makozy’s deposition testimony also indicated that defendant would call Al’s payroll in to ADP. (Makozy Dep., Def.’s App’x D at 61.) Finally, there is no evidence that is contrary to defendant having control over the time sheets, and he did not attempt to argue in his brief with respect to the recordkeeping issue that he was not responsible for time sheets.

e. Other Factors

In In re Enterprise, the court of appeals explicitly stated that the factors discussed above “do not constitute an exhaustive list.” In re Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 469. The determination about whether joint employer status exists must take other factors into account where necessary for “a consideration of the total employment situation and the economic realities of the work relationship.” Id. Here, two such factors include defendant’s dealings with A-l’s vendors and his disputed job title. With respect to the first, Mrs. Makozy’s unextracted deposition testimony considered as a whole, provided and cited by defendant, reveals that defendant served as the primary contact between A-l and several of its vendors, including accountants and advertisers, which tends to indicate “significant control” over the corporation’s operations. (Makozy Dep., Def.’s App’x D at 41-44.)

Second, the parties devote considerable effort in their briefs and in the JCS to the question of defendant’s job title. His title, however, represents just one consideration, in addition to those detailed above, in the determination whether, as a matter of law, he had “significant control” over Al’s daily operations and its employees’ employment terms and conditions. See Dole v. Simpson, 784 F.Supp. 538, 547 (S.D.Ind. 1991) (explaining that, in determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists for FLSA purposes, what matters is the “substance of a person’s control, not the title the person holds.”) Irrespective of whether he used the title of “manager” or “independent contractor” or was the corporation’s ultimate decision maker, the record demonstrates that defendant exerted significant control over A-l’s daily operations by “assisting” Mrs. Makozy in running the company, just as one of the defendants in Saigon Grill “assisted] [the restaurant’s owners] in performing managerial functions.” Saigon Grill, 595 F.Supp.2d at 246. After all, the standard for finding an employer-employee relationship within the meaning of § 3 is one of “significant control,” not “[ultimate control.” In re Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 468.

f. Factor Balancing

In the final stage of the Enterprise test, the court must balance the factors discussed above in order to determine whether defendant is a joint employer within the meaning of the FLSA. The first factor, authority over hiring and firing, is not entirely conclusive because the record does not indicate that defendant did possess the ultimate authority to make those decisions. He is not, however, required to have ultimate authority; there are many other factors to consider, and only significant control is required. Overall, because defendant did play a significant role in Al’s hiring and firing decisions, this factor tips in favor of finding that he is a joint employer.

In terms of the second factor, the authority to promulgate rules and assignments and set conditions of employment, whether defendant assigned work and promulgated rules received little attention in the record. He possessed, however, a significant degree of control over the A-l employees’ terms and conditions of employment, particularly with respect to financial matters such as personally distributing pay checks to A-l employees and being almost entirely • responsible for scheduling for individual employees and A-l’s staffing needs. This factor weighs in favor of defendant’s status as a joint employer'.

The third factor involves a determination of the degree of supervision the alleged employer exercises on a day-to-day basis. Here, the record reflects that defendant regularly interacted with the loan officers in order to assist them with work-related problems and issues, had at least some influence over the decision to discipline employees, and acknowledged that he was in charge of the office in Mrs: Makozy’s absence. Because this conduct is consistent with a supervisory role, this factor weighs in favor of the determination that defendant was an employer under § 3.

The fourth factor inquiry revolves around whether the alleged employer had control over employee records. Here, it is undisputed that defendant had responsibility for the employees’ time sheets and called the payroll into the appropriate vendor. For this reason, this factor also weighs in favor of a finding that defendant was an employer for § 3 purposes.

In addition to those listed above, two other factors, the -nature of defendant’s contact with A-l’s vendors, as well as his job title, are relevant to the determination whether defendant is a joint employer within the meaning of the FLSA. The record contains uncontested evidence that defendant met with A-l’s advertising and accounting vendors, and Mrs. Matey’s testimony leads to the conclusion that he, in fact, sexrved as the primary point of contact for these vendors, which weighs in favor of defendant’s status as an employer. Finally, the job title he used is not determinative of whether or not he was an employer, as the inquiry properly focuses on the substance of the control he exerted rather than the title he used. For this reason, even though defendant refers to himself as a “consultant” in the pleadings and briefing relevant to this action and the record supports that he did in fact use that title, the substance of his conduct in relation to A-l’s employees is strongly indicative of a supervisory role. These factors also weigh in favor of the determination that defendant was an employer under § 3.

As discussed above, the first factor is at least neutral and more likely favors the Secretary. What the record is not conclusive about whether or not defendant actually had the authority to hire and fire employees, it does reflect that defendant had significant control over those decisions. All the other factors weigh in favor of his joint employer status.

4. The Enterprise Factors and the Summary Judgment Standard

The court of appeals in In re Enterprise took care to explain the test’s applicability in the context of the summary judgment standard. Summary judgment may be granted if “the evidence ... so favors the [movant] that we conclude no reasonable juror could find” otherwise. See In re Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 471. The court of appeals emphasized, however, that a single factor that is either neutral or weighs against the determination that a party is an employer for § 3 purposes will not suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id.

In fact, the court of appeals reiterated its statement that a single factor is generally insufficient three times in the opinion. The court first “point[ed] out also that the one aspect of the District Court’s analysis where the District Court found an Enterprise factor to be neutral cannot affect the balance of the district Court’s reasoned conclusions, with which we agree, and cannot defeat summary judgment.” Id. at 470-71 (citing decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits standing for the propositions, respectively, that a single factor will defeat summary judgment only if it changes the entire balance, and that even two factors will not suffice in the face of numerous other significant factors).

The court of appeals explained that “[w]hen a legal standard requires the balancing of multiple factors, as it does in this case, summary judgment may still' be appropriate even if not all of the factors favor one party — this is just such a case.” Id. at 471. Finally, after concluding that no reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant, the court reiterated that summary judgment was warranted “even though one factor may have been deemed to favor the plaintiffs or been found to be neutral.” Id.

The same is true of the present case. While the record indicates that defendant had significant influence over A-l’s hiring and firing decisions, his joint employer status was less conclusive with respect to this factor, i.e., whether the alleged employer has the authority to hire and fire. Even if ultimate ability to hire or fire was required, this factor would be somewhat “neutral” and that neutrality would not offset the ultimate conclusion: the evidence is so one-sided in favor of the Secretary that no reasonable juror could find that defendant is not an employer within the meaning of § 3.

When the court of appeals balanced the factors detailed above in In re Enterprise, it affirmed the district court’s grant of the defendant parent company’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that it was not a joint employer for § 3 purposes. Id. at 471. The facts of that case, however, are readily distinguishable from those of the present case. There, the parent company did not supervise or discipline employees, and it did not control employee records. Id. In the present matter, on the other hand, there' is ample evidence that defendant played a supervisory role, possessed the authority to discipline employees, and was responsible from maintaining the employees’ time sheets. The court of appeals’ “conclusion ... is bolstered by the readily apparent fact that Enterprise Holdings exercised no control, let alone significant control, over the assistant managers.” Id. (emphasis in original). In the present case, however, the record reveals that the opposite is true; defendant exercised significant control over A-l’s employees.

Viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, the record contains ample evir denee that defendant had at least some influence over A-l’s hiring and firing decisions and had significant control over its work rules, assignments, and conditions of employment; day-to-day supervision; and employment records. Balancing these factors indicates that defendant was an employer as a matter of law. The Secretary has demonstrated that no reasonable jury could find otherwise, and defendant’s evidence is insufficient to oppose that conclusion. Because no-genuine dispute exists about whether defendant is an “employer” within the meaning of FLSA § 3, the court will grant the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment on that issue.

B. The FLSA’s Minimum Wage Provisions

Section 6 of the FLSA requires that “[ejvery employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce ... or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce” a specified minimum hourly wage. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2006). For FLSA purposes, this obligation is met when the employer has paid, and the employee has received, the wages “finally and unconditionally.” 29 C.F.R. § 531.35. The employee must actually receive the minimum wages; merely altering records to indicate that the employee was paid is insufficient. Olson v. Superior Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 765 F.2d 1570, 1578-79 (11th Cir.1985).

While § 6 is silent on the issue of time of payment, courts have consistently recognized the FLSA’s implicit requirement that employees’ wages be promptly paid. Mathis v. About Your Smile, P.C., CIV.A. 02-CV-597, 2002 WL 1878894 at *2 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 14, 2002); Rogers v. City of Troy, N.Y., 148 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir.1998) (recognizing that “it is clear that the FLSA requires wages to be paid in a timely fashion”); Biggs v. Wilson, 1 F.3d 1537, 1539-40 (9th Cir.1993) (refusing to treat late payment differently from nonpayment for FLSA purposes).

Courts have, depending on the circumstances, taken slightly different approaches toward the length of time at which delayed wages are deemed “unpaid,” thus violating § 6. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for example, has interpreted the prompt payment requirement strictly, explaining that “[t]he only logical point that wages become “unpaid” is when they are not paid at the time work has been done, the minimum wage is due, and wages are ordinarily paid — on payday.” Biggs, 1 F.3d at 1540-42 (holding that two-week delay in payment in response to legislative mandate to withhold payment violated the FLSA). In Rogers, however, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declined to take such a bright-line approach where the facts of the case involved a legitimate change to the employees’ pay schedule that resulted in a delay of a few days. Rogers, 148 F.3d at 61. Instead, the court carved out an exception in which § 6 was not violated under those circumstances because it did “not result in an unreasonable delay in payment.” Id. The Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit’s approach more closely resembles Biggs’ bright-line rule than Rogers’ exception. See Selker Bros., 949 F.2d at 1299 (explaining that liability for liquidated damages may lie where employees do not receive their wages “at the time they were due”); Dunlop v. State of N.J., 522 F.2d 504, 512 (3d Cir.1975) (recognizing FLSA’s “immediacy of payment” requirement), vacated on other grounds sub nom. New Jersey v. Usery, 427 U.S. 909, 96 S.Ct. 3196, 49 L.Ed.2d 1202 (1976). Other courts note that the employee must receive “at least minimum wage on payday.” Mathis, 2002 WL 1878894 at *2.

The Rogers exception does not apply under the facts of the present case, in which defendant adduces no evidence of a bona fide business reason for the alleged delays in payment of the employees’ minimum wages. In fact, defendant denies that the employees’ paychecks were ever withheld at all. The Secretary, however, provides evidence to the contrary in the form of ADP payroll records and checks, commission checks issued by A-l, and the declarations of former A-l employees. On their faces, the payroll records and checks purport to have been issued according to a bi-weekly pay schedule. The Secretary argues, however, that defendant in fact withheld these checks until the employees earned commissions upon closing loans, at which time the employees cashed the payroll and commission checks together. This, the Secretary claims, explains why the bank processing dates stamped on the payroll checks fall between two and ten weeks after their issue dates, but coincide with the dates on the commission checks. The Secretary offers the declarations of ten A-l employees to further support these claims. These employees claim they were only paid when they closed a loan, and several stated that they generally cashed their payroll and commission checks within one or two days of receiving them. As a result, some loan officers went between two and ten weeks without receiving pay, and two, Noland and Wells, claim that they never received ADP payroll checks at all.

“A court should find for the moving party ‘if the pleadings, depositions ... and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir.2001) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505). Here, the Secretary has supported her allegations that defendant violated § 6 with specific facts and evidence, including the checks and records discussed above and sworn declarations based upon employees’ personal knowledge.

The moving party need not produce evidence to disprove the opponent’s claim but does carry the burden to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. If the movant has produced evidence in support of summary judgment, then the opponent may not rest on the allegations set forth in its pleadings but must counter with evidence that demonstrates a genuine issue of fact. This, in turn, requires the opponent to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1362-63 (3d Cir.1992) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548). Because the Secretary, as the moving party, made a showing that there is no genuine issue about whether defendant violated § 6, defendant “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” but “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the ... pleading.” Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232 (internal citations omitted).

In his attempt to rebut the Secretary’s allegations that he violated the FLSA’s minimum wage provisions, defendant relies upon his own affidavit, which denies the Secretary’s averments. In paragraph 8 of. the affidavit, defendant declares:

Furthermore, during the course of my consulting with A-l Mortgage, all employees were paid in full for all hours that they worked, and payment was issued on a bi-weekly basis. I am not aware of any employee who in fact did not receive full payment for the hours that they [sic] worked, and the checks of the employees were not withheld for any reason from the employees.

(Gregory Makozy Aff., Def.’s App’x B (ECF No. 94-2) ¶ 8.) This averment, however, is not enough to defeat the Secretary’s motion. “To survive summary judgment, a party must present more than just ‘bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions’ to show the existence of a genuine issue.” Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir.2005) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that “conclusory, self-serving affidavits” will not suffice. See, e.g., Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 608 (3d Cir.2002).

Faced with similar affidavits, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in Hurd v. Williams, 755 F.2d 306 (3d Cir.1985), that they were insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact because they were based on the affiant’s “opini