Ritchie v. Coldwater Community Schools (947 F. Supp. 2d 791, 2013)

OPINION

GORDON J. QUIST, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff, Randal Ritchie, has sued various defendants in these consolidated cases based primarily on four 2010 incidents, three of which occurred during Coldwater Community Schools board meetings and the fourth of which occurred on school property. In his initial Complaint in case number l:ll-CV-530, Ritchie sued Cold-water Community Schools (School District), the Coldwater Community School Board (School Board), current and former School Board members, the current School District Superintendent, and the former School District Superintendent, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Ritchie’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and a state law claim for violation of the Michigan Open Meetings Act (OMA), M.C.L. § 15.261 et seq. Thereafter, Ritchie amended his Complaint twice, omitting certain claims and adding others. In addition, the parties stipulated to dismiss most of the School Board members. On July 11, 2012, 2012 WL 2862037, the Court entered an Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 12(c).

Following the Court’s rulings and additional stipulated dismissals, the following claims and Defendants remain in case number l:ll-CV-530: (1) Count I, alleging that School Board President Robin Iveson, former Superintendent David Disler, and the School Board violated Ritchie’s First Amendment rights by cutting him off during the public comment portion of the May 24, 2010 School Board meeting; (2) Count II, alleging that Disler and the School Board interfered with Ritchie’s First Amendment right to attend the July 12, 2010 School Board meeting by approving a police officer’s June 11, 2010 verbal order banning Ritchie from the Administrative Services Center; (3) Counts III and IV against current Superintendent Tina Kerr and the School Board, alleging that they violated Ritchie’s First Amendment rights by causing police officers to forcibly remove him from School Board meetings on September 27, 2010, and October 25, 2010; and (4) Counts VI and IX against the School Board and Iveson, respectively, alleging OMA violations.

In case number 1:11-CV-616, Ritchie initially sued the City of Coldwater and Corporal Mark Miller. Ritchie subsequently amended his Complaint to add Corporal Patricia Johnson, Officer Nicholas Thornton, and Officer Eastmead as Defendants. In Count I of his Amended Complaint, Ritchie alleges that Corporal Miller—the police officer who issued the June 11, 2010 verbal order—violated Rit-chie’s fundamental right to travel and his First Amendment rights. In Count II, Rit-chie alleges that the City violated his First Amendment rights by adopting the trespassing ordinance that the officers applied in removing and arresting Ritchie, and by ratifying Corporal Miller’s verbal order. In Count III, Ritchie alleges that the City violated his Fourth Amendment rights as a result of the arrests at the September 27 and October 25 School Board meetings. In Counts IV and V, Ritchie alleges that Officers Thornton and Eastmead and Corporal Johnson violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights by removing him from the School Board meetings and arresting him. In Count VII, Ritchie alleges state law claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution against Officers Thornton and Eastmead and Corporal Johnson. Finally, in Count VIII, Ritchie requests a declaratory judgment that Ordinance 660.03 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

Defendants in both cases have filed Motions for Summary Judgment requesting dismissal of all of Ritchie’s claims. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant both motions in part and deny them in part.

II. Facts

A. Ritchie Complains to the Coldwa-ter School District

Ritchie resides in Branch County, Michigan, and within the Coldwater Community Schools school district. Ritchie’s children attended schools within the School District until the fall of 2010.

On April 22, 2010, Ritchie’s daughter, who was in the Fourth grade at Jefferson Elementary School, told Ritchie that her teacher, Mrs. Renner, had pulled or tugged on her hair, causing her pain, as the class was preparing to take a math test. (Ritchie Dep. at 54-55, Coldwater Defs.’ Br. Supp. Mot. Ex. A.) The following day, Ritchie took his daughter to the Cold-water Police Department (CPD) to report the hair-pulling incident as an assault and battery. (Id. at 67; Incident/Investigation Report, Pl.’s 530 Resp. Br. Ex. 6.) Ritchie spoke with Sgt. VandenHout, who interviewed Ritchie’s daughter. Sgt. VandenH-out thereafter interviewed Mrs. Renner and the school principal, Doug Bower. At Sgt. VandenHout’s request, Mr. Bower interviewed three students in Mrs. Renner’s class who sat near Ritchie’s daughter, but none of them saw Mrs. Renner do anything to Ritchie’s daughter. (Id. at 4-5.) Sgt. VandenHout concluded that there was no evidence to support the complaint and advised Ritchie to pursue the matter with the school. (Id. at 5; Ritchie Dep. at 69.) Based on Sgt. VandenHout’s report, the School District declined to take any action against Mrs. Renner.

Dissatisfied with Sgt. VandenHout’s investigation, Ritchie pursued his complaint through other avenues outside the CPD, including the Michigan State Police, the Branch County Sheriffs Department, and Child Protective Services, but all declined to investigate. (Id. at 82, 84.) Ritchie also pursued the matter with the Branch County Prosecutor’s office, which declined to pursue charges but advised Ritchie to take his concerns to the School Board or other agencies. (Ritchie Aff. ¶ 21, Pl.’s 530 Resp. Br. Ex. 9.)

In the weeks following the incident, Rit-chie made numerous visits to Mr. Bower at Jefferson Elementary and to Interim School District Superintendent David Dis-ler at the Administration Services Center (ASC), demanding that they suspend Mrs. Renner and/or remove her from the classroom. (Bower Aff. ¶¶ 7, 13, 15, 18, School Dist. Defs.’ Br. Supp. Ex. C.; Disler Aff. ¶¶ 4, School Dist. Defs.’ Br. Supp. Ex. G.) Each time, Ritchie followed his standard practice of recording the conversation with a concealed electronic recording device without the other party’s knowledge. (Rit-chie Dep. at 84-85.) In a meeting with Mr. Bower on April 23, 2010, Ritchie demanded that his daughter be pulled from Mrs. Renner’s class and placed with another teacher. Although Mr. Bower accommodated Ritchie’s request, a day or two later Ritchie changed his mind and demanded that his daughter be placed back in Mrs. Renner’s classroom and that Rit-chie be allowed to sit in and observe Mrs. Renner. (Id. at 96.) Mr. Bower declined Ritchie’s request to sit in Mrs. Renner’s class, but apparently agreed to return Rit-chie’s daughter to Mrs. Renner’s classroom. (Bower Aff. ¶ 8.) The next day, however, Ritchie and his wife, Nisha, met with Mr. Bower and requested that their daughter be placed back in the other teacher’s class. (Ritchie Dep. at 99.)

On April 26, Ritchie accompanied his daughter on a school field trip. During the lunch break, a bus driver complained to Ritchie that Mrs. Renner.had denied lunch to a student who forgot to bring a lunch from home. (Ritchie Aff. ¶ 5.) Rit-chie found the student, who was then eating a lunch she had received from someone else, and asked the student and her paraprofessional questions about how Mrs. Renner denied the student a lunch. (Id. ¶ 9.) Later that day, Ritchie reported the lunch incident to the Michigan State Police, who, in turn, advised Mr. Bower that they did not intend to pursue Ritchie’s complaint against Mrs. Renner. (Bower Aff. ¶ 14; Ritchie Aff. ¶ 9.) In a meeting the following day, Mr. Bower reminded Ritchie that he should avoid Mrs. Renner. (Bower Aff. ¶ 13.) On May 7, 2010, Dislér notified Richie that he was to limit his contact with school employees to Pete Ro-govich—Legg Middle School Assistant Principal—Mr. Bower, and Disler. (Letter from Disler to Ritchie of 5/7/10, Pl.’s 530 Resp. Br. Ex. 15;)

In early May, Ritchie sought out other parents who had concerns about Mrs. Ren-ner. During a conversation with Scott Etoll on May 1, 2010, Mr. Etoll told Rit-chie about how Etoll had once used force against a teacher who was beating his brother. (Ritchie Dep. at 114-15.) In response, Ritchie commented that there was a time in this country when a person could shoot someone who had hurt his child and the community would back him. (Id. at 113.) A few days later, the Etolls reported to Mr. Bower that Ritchie had been to their home on two occasions trying to enlist the Etolls to make claims against Mrs. Renner, that Ritchie had told them that he owned guns and knew how to use them, that Ritchie would not leave until they ordered him to do so, and that Ritchie appeared aggravated or aggressive. (Bower Aff. ¶ 20.) Mr. Etoll also told Mr. Bower about Ritchie’s statement about a person shooting someone who harmed his child, although Mr. Etoll apparently said that Ritchie had referred to shooting a teacher. (Id.) Mr. Bower conveyed this information to Disler, who in turn contacted the police and requested that they conduct a risk/threat assessment of Ritchie. (Ritchie Aff. ¶ 15.) Subsequently, CPD Deputy Director Mark Bartell interviewed Ritchie. (Ritchie Aff. ¶ 17.) Deputy Director Bartell found Ritchie’s answers “logical.” (Bartell Dep. at 59, School Dist. Defs.’ Br. Ex. E.) Bartell did not conclude that Ritchie presented a threat or safety concern. (Ritchie Aff. ¶ 17.)

B. May 24, 2010 School Board Meeting

In mid-May, School Board President Robin Iveson gave Ritchie permission to speak at the May 19, 2010 School Board meeting for up to five minutes, as permitted by School Board policy. Ritchie attended the meeting but chose not to speak because the meeting was limited to a specific issue. (Ritchie Dep. at 147-49.)

Ritchie and his wife both spoke during the regular School Board meeting on May 24, 2010. Prior to the meeting, Mrs. Ren-ner, through her husband, requested that if Ritchie made any complaints or charges about Mrs. Renner during the public comment time, the School Board pursue the matter in a closed session as authorized by the OMA. See M.C.L. § 15.268(a) (permitting a public body to meet in closed session to consider charges brought against a public officer, employee, or staff member if such person requests a closed session). During the meeting, Ritchie’s wife, Nisha, addressed the School Board about the incident involving her daughter and complained about the investigation by Mr. Bower and Disler and how the School District had treated Ritchie in response to his complaints. (Pl.’s 530 Resp. Br. Ex. 13.) As Nisha was commenting about the risk assessment that Disler had requested the CPD to perform, Iveson interrupted and stated that the OMA and board policy required that Nisha’s allegations be addressed in a closed session because Mrs. Renner had requested that complaints against her be addressed in a closed session. A few speakers later, Ritchie addressed the School Board. Initially, Rit-chie attempted to play a secretly recorded audio recording of his conversations with Disler and Mr. Bower. Disler and Iveson told Ritchie to stop the recording shortly after Ritchie began to play it. Disler told Ritchie that the recording was inaudible, that his use of the recording was inappropriate, and that Ritchie should speak if he had something to say. Without mentioning Mrs. Renner by name, Ritchie then complained about Disler’s refusal to investigate his complaint about Mrs. Renner. Shortly thereafter, Iveson interrupted Rit-chie and told him that the OMA and board rules required that his allegations be addressed in a closed session because the employee involved in his allegations had requested a closed meeting. Ritchie denied making any allegation about Mrs. Renner or that his comments were in tandem with his wife’s comments. Ritchie and Disler then argued about whether Rit-chie’s comments concerned an employee, after which Ritchie explained that his comments concerned Disler’s handling of his complaint. Ritchie attempted to continue his comments, but Iveson cut him off and invoked a closed session. Ritchie then walked away from the podium and Disler responded to Ritchie’s comments. After Disler finished his comments, Ritchie returned to the podium and finished speaking. (Id.)

C. June 11 Incident and its Aftermath

On Friday, June 11, 2010, Ritchie went to the School District’s Administrative Services Center (ASC) to obtain some documents in connection with a School Board meeting scheduled for June 14, 2010. Rit-chie had made arrangements to pick up the documents at the end of the day to allow the staff time to prepare the requested copies. Ritchie arrived at the ASC at approximately 4:15 p.m.—fifteen minutes before the office closed. (Ritchie Dep. at 175.) Shortly after Ritchie arrived, Disler informed Ritchie that the office was closing and that he would have to return on Monday get the documents. When Disler refused Ritchie’s demand for the documents, Ritchie called the CPD to complain that Disler was violating Ritchie’s rights under the OMA. (Id. at 178.) Ritchie then left the building.

Ritchie began to drive away but turned around when he saw a CPD officer drive into the ASC parking lot. (Id. at 180, 342.) Ritchie exited his truck and had a conversation with the CPD officer, Corporal Miller. Corporal Miller told Ritchie that the issue of obtaining documents was not a police matter and that the matter was finished. (Id. at 183.) As Ritchie was leaving, Corporal Miller called Ritchie back and told him to stop making these calls to the police. Eventually, Corporal Miller told Ritchie that he was free to go, but Ritchie responded that he did not want to leave. (Id.) Corporal Miller then asked Disler, who was standing nearby, whether Disler wanted Ritchie on the school property, to which Disler responded “no.” (Id. at 187-88.) Hearing Disler’s response, Ritchie turned to leave. Corporal Miller followed Ritchie, telling him to leave the property. When Ritchie responded that he did not hear what Corporal Miller said, Corporal Miller told Ritchie to leave the property and never return. Ritchie asked Corporal Miller whether his instruction was a police order, and Corporal Miller responded that it was. (Id. at 184-85, 188, 190; Disler Dep. at 119-20, Pl.’s 616 Resp. Br. Ex. 3.) Ritchie then left the property.

Following the June 11 incident, Corporal Miller sent an email to other CPD officers notifying them that Ritchie had been “trespassed” from the ASC and that Ritchie was subject to arrest for trespassing if he entered the property. (Email from Miller to CPD of June 12, 2010, Pl.’s 530 Resp. Br. Ex. 22.) Corporal Miller noted that Disler had given the trespass order on behalf of the School District. (Id.) Consistent with Corporal Miller’s order to Rit-chie, on June 18, 2010, Disler notified School Board members that Ritchie was prohibited from entering the ASC building, which effectively precluded Ritchie from attending the July 12, 2010 School Board meeting at the ASC. (Disler June 18, 2010 Mem., Pl.’s 530 Resp. Br. Ex. 23.)

Ritchie attended the open portion of the School Board meeting on June 14, 2009, which was held at an elementary school. Ritchie spoke during the public comment portion of the meeting without incident. Ritchie did not attend the monthly School Board meeting on July 12, 2010 at the ASC because of the police order threatening him with arrest if he entered the ASC. (Ritchie Aff. ¶ 33.)

On August 4, 2010, Ritchie met with Dr. Tina Kerr, who became the new Superintendent on July 1, 2010. Prior to the meeting, Kerr contacted Deputy Director Bartell of the CPD to inform him that she had invited Ritchie to the ASC for a meeting. Kerr advised Deputy Director Bartell that she would notify him if Ritchie’s current restrictions would be altered in the future. (PL’s 530 Resp. Br. Ex. 24.) During the meeting, Kerr lifted the ban on Ritchie’s access to the ASC. (Ritchie Aff. ¶ 35.) Subsequently, Ritchie attended the monthly School Board meeting held on August 23, 2010 at the ASC. Ritchie spoke during the public comment portion of the meeting without incident. (Id. ¶ 36.) On August 25, 2010, Kerr sent Ritchie a letter advising him that he was not permitted on school property without prior permission from Kerr. (Letter from Kerr to Ritchie of 8/25/10, Pl.’s 530 Resp. Br. Ex. 27.) However, Kerr acknowledged that Ritchie was permitted to attend School Board meetings. (Id.)

D. September 27 and October 25, 2010 School Board Meetings

On September 7, 2010—the first day of school—Ritchie picketed near Jefferson Elementary School, but off school property. (Ritchie Aff. ¶ 39.) As Ritchie picketed, CPD officers approached him and stated that they were investigating a complaint by the School District that Ritchie was trespassing on school property. (Id. ¶ 40.)

On September 27, 2010, Ritchie learned that a complaint and warrant had been issued against him for allegedly trespassing on school property on September 7, 2010. Ritchie immediately turned himself in to the authorities, waived arraignment, and posted bond. (Id. ¶ 41.) That evening, Ritchie went to the ASC to attend the monthly School Board meeting. Prior to the meeting, Iveson and Kerr instructed Jackie Lyon, a school secretary, to call the police based on the CPD no trespassing order if Ritchie appeared at the meeting. (Iveson Dep. at 29-30, PL’s 530 Resp. Br. Ex. 33.) As Ritchie was sitting quietly waiting to speak during the public comment period, Kerr instructed Ms. Lyon to call the CPD and notify them that Ritchie was at the meeting and subject to an arrest warrant. At one point, Kerr spoke to the dispatcher and said that she could not believe that Ritchie had already been picked up, booked, and released. (PL’s 530 Resp. Br. Ex. 28.) The dispatcher advised Kerr that Ritchie had in fact been booked and released on the charge. Kerr advised the dispatcher that the School District had a “no trespassing” on Ritchie, and the dispatcher responded that she could send an officer to arrest Ritchie if that were the case. (Id.) Kerr acknowledged that the meeting was- a public board meeting, but she wanted the officer’s interpretation of the situation. (Id.) Officer Nicholas Thornton and Corporal Patricia Johnson were dispatched to the meeting. Kerr told Officer Thornton that she thought Ritchie was going to make a scene during the public comment portion of the meeting because that was his “M O.” (PL’s 530 Resp. Br. Ex. 31.) Kerr acknowledged that it was a public meeting, but she told Officer Thornton that she would rather not have Ritchie at the meeting. (Id.) Kerr did not tell Officer Thornton that Ritchie had her prior permission to attend the meeting. (Kerr Dep. at 125.) Officer Thornton responded that he had no problem arresting Ritchie based on the information from Kerr. As Ritchie was sitting in the meeting, Kerr approached him and asked him to speak with CPD officers in the hallway. Ritchie complied and left the room. Ritchie told Officer Thornton that he had a right to attend the public meeting and that he had a letter from Kerr stating that he was allowed to be on school property. (Thornton Dep. at 57.) • Officer Thornton handcuffed Ritchie after he refused to leave the meeting and arrested him for trespassing.

On October 25, Ritchie appeared at the monthly School Board meeting at the ASC and sat quietly while waiting for an opportunity to speak during the public comment portion of the meeting. (Ritchie Aff. ¶ 44.) During a recess, Kerr approached Ritchie and advised him that he was trespassing. Ritchie responded that it was a public meeting and then questioned President Iveson about a procedural issue, which Iveson acknowledged. Thereafter, Officer Thornton and Officer Eastmead were dispatched to the ASC. Officer Thornton spoke with Kerr, who stated that she wanted Ritchie removed from the meeting. The officers confronted Ritchie in the board room, but Ritchie refused to leave, citing his right under the OMA to attend the public meeting. (Ritchie Dep. at 276-78.) The officers then arrested Ritchie.

On October 27, 2010, the CPD issued a letter to Ritchie apologizing for arresting him at the September 27 and October 25 meetings and acknowledging Ritchie’s right to attend the School Board meetings under the OMA. (Letter from Pehrson to Ritchie of 10/27/10, Pl.’s 530 Resp. Br. Ex. 36.) The following day, the City attorney requested dismissal of the charges against Ritchie arising out of the September 27 and October 25 arrests.

III. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56. Material facts are facts which are defined by substantive law and are necessary to apply the law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return judgment for the non-moving party. Id.

The court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, but may grant summary judgment when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th Cir.1992) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

IV. Discussion

A. School District Defendants (Case No. l:ll-CV-530)

1. The School Board as a Proper Defendant

At the outset, the Court addresses Defendants’ argument that the School Board is not a proper defendant. Defendants argued in their opening brief that the School Board is entitled to summary judgment on Counts I through IV of the Second Amended Complaint because Ritchie cannot demonstrate that the alleged constitutional deprivations were caused by a custom or policy of the School Board. In their reply, Defendants argued for the first time that the School Board should also be dismissed because it is not a governmental entity that can be sued.

The Court declines to consider the latter argument because Defendants failed to raise it in their opening summary judgment brief. As the Sixth Circuit has stated, “[ijssues raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly before this court.” United States v. Perkins, 994 F.2d 1184, 1191 (6th Cir.1993); see also Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Flowers, 513 F.3d 546, 553 (6th Cir.2008) (noting that “we have found issues to be waived when they are raised for the first time in motions requesting reconsideration or in replies to responses”). Such issues are deemed waived. Blandford v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 483 Fed. Appx. 153, 161 (6th Cir.2012) (citing San-born v. Parker, 629 F.3d 554, 579 (6th Cir.2010)). This rule applies in district court proceedings as well. See PNC Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Tyre Works-Hoffman, LLC, No. l:12-cv-07499, 2013 WL 678145, at *4 n. 2 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 25, 2013) (“Usually, arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived.”); Steele v. Heard, 487 B.R. 302, 316 n. 20 (S.DAla. 2018) (“Case law is legion for the proposition that it is generally improper for a litigant ... to present a new, previously available argument for the first time in a reply brief.”) Moreover, Defendants did not raise the School Board’s capacity to sue or be sued as an affirmative defense, and even had they done so, they should have raised the issue in their previous Motion to Dismiss, rather than sandbagging Ritchie on the issue. Finally, to the extent the School Board is not a suable entity, the Court determines that the appropriate remedy under the circumstances would be to treat Ritchie’s claims as being asserted against the School District, rather than outright dismissal of Ritchie’s claims. See Dass v. Chi Bd. of Educ., 675 F.3d 1060, 1061 n. 1 (7th Cir.2012) (“The Chicago Public Schools is not a suable entity. Therefore, we amend the caption of this ease to reflect that the Chicago Board of Education is the proper justiciable party.”); Donaldson v. Nassau Cnty. Police Deft, No. 10-CV-1690 (JS)(ARL), 2010 WL 2976520, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2010) (stating that the plaintiffs claim against the Nassau County Police Department was “redirected against Nassau County” and ordering the clerk to “so amend the caption”).

2. Count I—Violation of First Amendment Rights at the May 24, 2010 Meeting

a. Iveson and Disler

In Count I, Ritchie alleges that Disler and Iveson violated his First Amendment rights by cutting him off as he attempted to speak during the public comment portion of the May 24, 2010 School Board meeting. Disler and Iveson argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. “Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials performing discretionary functions generally are-shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). A case directly on point is not required for the law to be clearly established. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, — U.S.-,131 S.Ct. 2074, 2083, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). However, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” 'Id.- The ultimate question is whether the governmental official had “fair warning” that his conduct violated the plaintiffs, constitutional right. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 2515, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002).

As set forth in the prior Opinion, when opened to the public, a school board meeting is a limited public forum for discussion of school-related issues. Featherstone v. Columbus City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 92 Fed.Appx. 279, 282 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 175-76, 97 S.Ct. 421, 426, 50 L.Edüd 376 (1976)); see also Fairchild v. Liberty Indep. Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 747, 758-59 (5th Cir.2010) (concluding that a school board meeting, including the public comment section, fit “the hornbook definition” of a limited public forum). While the government may impose time, place and manner rules on access to such forums, the restrictions must be content neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 955, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). “It is ... clearly established that content-based restrictions on speech in a public forum are subject to strict scrutiny, while viewpoint-based restrictions violate the First Amendment regardless of whether they also serve some valid time, place, manner interest.” Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth, 436 F.3d 397, 404 (3d Cir.2006) (citing, among other cases, Good News v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07, 121 S.Ct. 2093, 2100, 150 L.Ed.2d 151 (2001)). Moreover, the government may not mask viewpoint-based discrimination under -the guise of time, place or manner regulations. City of Madison, 429 U.S. at 176, 97 S.Ct. at 426.

Iveson and Disler contend that they did not violate Ritchie’s First Amendment rights because the audio recording was unintelligible, and allowing Ritchie to play the tape was a waste of the School Board’s time and may have violated the law. Ive-son and Disler also contend that they interrupted Ritchie’s comments pursuant to the OMA and School Board policy because they 3692 reasonably believed Ritchie to be making a complaint against Mrs. Ren-ner. The School Board policy provides:

A person who states a complaint against a Board member, employee, or student of the District that is related directly to their job performance, duties, or the administration of the District during public comment will, as provided in these bylaws, be permitted to make the initial allegation. Thereafter, the affected board member, employee, or student may request that further discussion and/or deliberation occur in a closed session pursuant to the Open Meetings Act.

(School Board Bylaws § 1370, attached to Iveson Aff. Defs.’ Br. Supp. Ex. L.)

The Court concludes that Defendants did not violate Ritchie’s rights by refusing to allow him to continue playing an audio recording that Ritchie himself concedes was unintelligible. Allowing Ritchie to play the tape would have been a waste of time, and Disler thus appropriately told Ritchie to address the School Board by speaking. Moreover, the School Board policy is a valid time, place, or manner regulation. Nonetheless, the issue is whether Defendants applied the policy with an intent to suppress Ritchie’s viewpoint. See Monteiro, 436 F.3d at 404 (noting that “if Perkins-Auguste acted with an intent to suppress Monteiro’s speech on the basis of viewpoint, she violated clearly established law and is not entitled to qualified immunity”); Timmon, 633 F.Supp.2d at 463 (“A defendant’s motive is a question of fact that must be determined by a jury, but to survive summary judgment Plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find that Defendants intended to silence her viewpoint.” (internal citation omitted)).

The evidence in the record suffices to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether Iveson and Disler intended to silence Ritchie’s viewpoint when they cut him off. Although Defendants contend that Ritchie was complaining about Mrs. Renner, a reasonable jury could conclude that Ritchie was complaining about Dis-ler’s refusal to investigate Ritchie’s allegations against Mrs. Renner and Disler’s treatment of Ritchie in response to his allegations. The video recording of the meeting shows that Ritchie was in fact complaining about Disler and never mentioned Mrs. Renner’s name or the basis of his prior allegations against her. When asked if his comments were “in tandem” with his wife’s comments about Mrs. Ren-ner, Ritchie denied that they were and told Iveson and Disler that he was not making allegations against an employee. A reasonable jury also could infer improper motive based, upon Defendants’ application of the School Board policy. The policy states that the complaining speaker will be permitted to make the initial allegation—presumably for the full five minutes of time that the rules allow—after which the affected Board member, employee, or student may request that further discussion or deliberation occur in a closed session pursuant to the OMA. Here, however, Mrs. Renner’s request came before Ritchie made his comments, and Iveson and Disler applied the policy before Ritchie used his five minutes of speaking time. Finally, a reasonable jury could infer animus from Disler’s warning to Ritchie that Ritchie had only three minutes of speaking time left, when Ritchie had only used about thirty seconds of his time. Cf Briner v. City of Ontario, 370 FedAppx. 682, 705 (6th Cir.2010) (concluding that the evidence created an issue for the jury whether the plaintiffs First Amendment rights were violated when the city council president interrupted the plaintiff for making inappropriate comments, even though the plaintiff was addressing a legitimate issue and was not engaged in threatening or harassing behavior).

Iveson and Disler contend that Ritchie cannot show that his First Amendment rights were violated because, even after being interrupted, Ritchie continued to speak and expressed his disdain for the administration in general and Disler in particular. Iveson and Disler further note that when Ritchie finished his first speech he told the School Board that he had nothing more to say, and when he finished speaking the second time did not indicate that he had more to say. Nonetheless, an issue of fact remains as to whether Defendants precluded Ritchie from expressing his views. Disler and Iveson both interrupted. Ritchie’s first speech and told him that he would have to pursue his complaint in a closed session. Although Ritchie continued his speech when he spoke the second time, an issue of fact remains as to whether Ritchie was continuing his prior interrupted comments or simply responding to Disler’s comments. Therefore, Ive-son and Disler are not entitled to qualified immunity on Count I.

b. The School Board

A governmental entity, such as the School Board, can be found liable under § 1983 only where the entity itself causes the constitutional violation at issue. See Monell v. New York Dep’t of Social Sews., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). “It is only when the ‘execution of the government’s policy or custom ... inflicts the injury' that the municipality may be held hable under § 1983.” Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 267, 107 S.Ct. 1114, 1119, 94 L.Ed.2d 293 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037). Therefore, the School Board may be liable under § 1983 only if its policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional injury. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037-38. For a municipal liability claim, the finding of a policy or custom is the initial determination to be made. Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir.1996). A “policy” includes a “policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated” by the governmental entity. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. at 2035-36. For purposes of Monell, a government custom “is a practice ‘that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker,’ but is ‘so widespread as to have the force of law.’ ” Parsons v. Caruso, 491 Fed.Appx. 597, 609 (6th Cir.2012) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1388, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997)). “A governmental custom or policy can be established by, among other means, evidence of official action or the agency’s written policies, proof of inadequate training or supervision, or evidence that such violations are routinely tolerated.” Copeland v. Cnty. of Franklin, 496 Fed.Appx. 568, 569 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir.2005)).

Ritchie contends that he has presented sufficient evidence to show that his First Amendment • injury was caused by the School Board’s informal policy of automatically cutting off dissenters critical of a staff member merely because the staff person has requested a closed session. Ritchie’s evidence in this regard consists of anecdotal evidence from Audrey Burgher, a former principal in the School District, describing a former superintendent’s reaction to her complaint about a male teacher’s inappropriate relationship with a female student, as well as other administrators’ unwillingness to investigate or take action on her complaints regarding teacher misconduct. (Burgher Aff. ¶¶ 4, 7-9, 12,- 14, PL’s- 530 Resp. Br. Ex. 2.) Ritchie also offers an affidavit from former board member Ronald Smith, who states that he recalls “persons ... whose speech was cut off when attempting to criticize staff,” but he has “never heard anyone cut off while making positive comments about staff.” (Smith 2d Aff. ¶¶ 15-16, Pl.’s 530 Resp. Br. Ex. 1.) In a transcript of a recorded interviewed attached to a prior affidavit, however, Mr. Smith states that he could only remember one person prior to Ritchie who was cut off for using a staff member’s name. (Smith 1st Aff. & Tr. at 9, PL’s 530 Resp. Br. Ex. 3.) Mr. Smith also stated that the School Board tended to ignore or minimize parent complaints regarding staff members. (Id. at 8.) The Court finds this evidence insufficient to establish either an official policy or custom that was “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The experiences Ms. Burgher relates in her affidavit did not pertain to School Board meetings. Moreover, although Smith describes his perceptions of the School Board’s attitude toward parent complaints regarding staff, he cites only one other situation (without providing specifics) in which a speaker was cut off'for using a staff member’s name.

Nonetheless, the Court concludes that there is sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact regarding the School Board’s liability. “A single act by a ‘decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered’ may suffice in demonstrating [a] policy or custom.” Cady v. Arenac Cnty., 574 F.3d 334, 345 (6th Cir. 2009) (first alteration in original) (quoting Pembdur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1299, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986)). As School Board President, Iveson was responsible for running School Board meetings, including applying School Board policies and rules during meetings. (Iveson Dep. at 9.) Acting for the School Board, Iveson applied the policy as the basis for cutting off Ritchie’s speech. Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury could find that Iveson’s acts constituted School Board policy. See Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 977 (9th Cir. 2010) (suggesting that the plaintiffs’ ejections from a city council meeting could constitute official government policy for purposes of Monell); Ward v. Athens City Bd. of Educ., No. 97-5967, 1999 WL 623730, at *8 (6th Cir. Aug. 11, 1999) (instructing the district court on remand to determine whether the school board’s action constituted a policy for purposes of § 1983); Piscottano v. Town of Somers, 396 F.Supp.2d 187, 196-97 (D.Conn.2005) (holding that the defendant’s statement that he was responsible for chairing the meeting and determining the agenda sufficed to create an issue of fact whether the defendant set the policy about who spoke at board meetings, thus precluding the town’s motion for summary judgment on municipal liability). Therefore, the Court will deny summary judgment to the School Board on Count I.

3. Count II—Violation of First Amendment Rights by Disler a. Disler

In Count II, Ritchie alleges that Disler interfered with his right to attend the July 12, 2010 School Board meeting at the ASC by approving Corporal Miller’s June 11, 2010 order that Ritchie not return to the ASC. The Court previously held that Rit-chie stated a claim because he alleged that Disler “authorized, acquiesced in and/or tacitly approved the order and threat of arrest when specific inquiry was made by the issuing police officer to Defendant Dis-ler.” (7/11/12 Opinion at 21.) The Court also concluded that Disler was not entitled to qualified immunity.

The record evidence shows that after Ritchie refused to leave the ASC parking lot on June 11, 2010, Corporal Miller simply asked Disler whether he wanted Ritchie on the property and Disler responded “no.” Under these circumstances, there is no basis to conclude that Disler understood Corporal Miller’s inquiry to extend beyond the present circumstances to future School Board meetings. In other words, Corporal Miller’s inquiry did not suggest a permanent ban on Rit-chie’s access to the ASC. It was not until Ritchie asked Corporal Miller to repeat himself that Corporal Miller told Ritchie never to return to the ASC.

Disler contends that he is entitled to summary.judgment because the evidence shows that Corporal Miller was solely responsible for the order banning Ritchie from the ASC and that Disler did not authorize an order instructing Ritchie never to return. Disler further notes that he did not prohibit Ritchie from returning to the ASC property and that Ritchie never asked Disler or the School Board to have the CPD rescind the order. Finally, Dis-ler argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Although Corporal Miller had the lawful authority to order Ritchie to leave the ASC premises when Disler confirmed that he wanted Ritchie to leave, Corporal Miller exceeded that authority by issuing an order that precluded Ritchie from exercising his clearly established First Amendment rights to attend and speak at public School Board meetings at the ASC. See Madison Joint Sch. Dist., 429 U.S. at 175, 97 S.Ct. at 426; see also Berlickij v. Town of Castleton, 248 F.Supp.2d 335, 344 (D.Vt. 2003) (“Berlickij has a First Amendment right not to be excluded from a forum that is generally held open to the public.”). A reasonable government official in Disler’s position would have recognized that Corporal Miller had no basis to ban Ritchie, who had committed no crime, from the ASC for all purposes. In an analogous situation, the Sixth Circuit observed that “[a]ny competent government official, particularly a police officer, should have realized that he cannot deprive a person, who has not committed a crime or violated some regulation, nor was likely to do so, of access to public grounds without due process of law.” Kennedy v. City of Cincinnati, 595 F.3d 327, 338 (6th Cir.2010). While Disler was not a police officer, he should have known that Corporal Miller’s order was unlawful because it precluded Ritchie from exercising his clearly established right to attend School Board meetings held at the ASC. In fact, Disler acknowledged as much in his June 18, 2010 communication telling School Board members that the police order precluded Ritchie from attending the July 12 meeting. Even though Disler could not have reasonably anticipated from Corporal Miller’s question that Corporal Miller intended to ban Ritchie from the ASC, Dis-ler, as the School District’s chief executive official, had both the power and authority to rectify the unlawful order after it was issued. In fact, Disler’s successor, Kerr, and the CPD both recognized the Superintendent’s authority to amend or rescind the no trespassing order in August 2010, when Kerr notified Deputy Director Bar-tell that she would advise the CPD if Rit-chie’s current restrictions were altered in the future.

Based on the foregoing facts, Ritchie has presented sufficient evidence to establish a First Amendment violation by Dis-ler. The law is well established that a governmental official can be held liable under § 1983 for failure to intercede to prevent a constitutional violation if he had reason to know that a violation was oecur-ring and had a realistic opportunity to prevent the harm. See Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir.1997) (noting in the context of use of excessive force that a police officer may be held liable for failing to intervene “when (1) the officer observed or had reason to know that excessive force would be or was being used, and (2) the officer had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring”). Ritchie has shown that Disler had reason to know that the order violated Ritchie’s constitutional rights and had both the opportunity and means to prevent the harm by instructing Corporal Miller or the CPD to rescind the order, at least in part, to correct the constitutional violation. Moreover, while bystander or failure to intervene cases most often occur in excessive force cases involving police or corrections officers, see id., the Court finds no reason why this basis of liability should not extend to other types of cases in which a defendant has both the opportunity and means to prevent a constitutional violation. See Wright v. Hedgepeth, No. C 09^1358 CW (PR), 2012 WL 4556632, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 30, 2012) (noting that if an individual who denies “a prisoner’s appeals had the authority and opportunity to prevent an ongoing constitutional violation, [the prisoner] may be able to establish liability by alleging that they knew about an existing or impending violation and failed to prevent it”); Kolin v. Sch. Dish of City of Harrisburg, 817 F.Supp.2d 487, 507-08 (M.D.Pa.2011) (concluding that the defendant-elected school board members could be held liable for constitutional violations caused by another governing body where the board members “failed to act when presented with the opportunity to fix the alleged constitutional violations”).

Disler argues that even if he had authority to countermand Corporal Miller’s order, he is entitled to qualified immunity because he reasonably believed that Ritchie threatened the physical safety of people on School District property. Defendants have presented no evidence that Corporal Miller’s order arose out of, or was directed at, concerns that Ritchie posed a threat to others. In fact, Disler testified that his intention was simply to have Ritchie removed from the ASC for that particular day. (Disler Dep. at 92-93.) Moreover, as set forth below in the discussion regarding the September 27 and October 25 School Board meetings, there is significant evidence in the record that Ritchie was never disruptive or disrespectful at the School Board meetings he attended and did 3700 not engage in threatening behavior. Accordingly, Disler is not entitled to qualified immunity on Count II. b.

b. The School Board

Regarding Ritchie’s claim against the School Board, Ritchie has presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether the School Board adopted and ratified Corporal Miller’s order as an official policy, either directly or by its approval of Disler’s decision to maintain the order to bar Ritchie from attending the July 12 meeting. “If the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it, their ratification would be chargeable to the municipality because their decision is final.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127, 108 S.Ct. 915, 926, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (plurality opinion). As noted above, Disler advised the School Board that the order was in place against Ritchie and would preclude him from attending the July 12 meeting. Moreover, Ritchie has presented evidence showing that the School Board considered the order to be a valid bar to Ritchie’s attendance of School Board meetings. For example, Iveson—who ran School Board meetings—testified that based on the no trespassing order, she authorized Jackie Lyon to call the police if Ritchie showed up at the September 27 meeting. (Iveson Dep. at 28-29.) As the Supreme Court has explained, a policy is not limited to formal rules adopted by legislative bodies, but may include a single decision by an authorized decisionmaker.

[A] government frequently chooses a course of action tailored to a particular situation and not intended to control decisions in later situations. If the decision to adopt that particular course of action is properly made by that government’s authorized decisionmakers, it surely represents an act of official government “policy” as that term is commonly understood. More importantly, where action is directed by those who establish governmental policy, the municipality is equally responsible whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly.

Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481, 106 S.Ct. at 1299 (footnote omitted). Based on the foregoing evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that the School Board adopted the order—which caused the constitutional violation—as its official policy.

4. Counts III and IV—Violation of First Amendment Rights by Kerr a. Kerr

Ritchie alleges in Counts III and IV that Kerr violated his First Amendment rights by having CPD officers forcibly remove him from the September 27 and October 25, 2010 School Board meetings. As the Court has previously noted, Ritchie had a right to attend and speak at School Board meetings so long as he was not creating a disturbance. Hansen v. Westerville City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edue., Nos. 93-3231, 93-3303, 1994 WL 622153, at *8 (6th Cir. Nov. 7, 1994) (per curiam); see also Green v. Nocciero, 676 F.3d 748, 754 (8th Cir.2012) (“But having chosen to conduct its business in public and to hear citizen views, the Board could not deny access to the meeting and, while it could limit the subject matter of citizen comments, it could not discriminate against a speaker based on his viewpoint.”) (citing City of Madison, 429 U.S. at 176, 97 S.Ct. at 426-27); cf. Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 361 (6th Cir.2007) (holding that “no reasonable officer would find that probable cause exists to arrest a recognized speaker at a chaired public assembly based solely on the content of his speech (albeit vigorous or blasphemous) unless and until the speaker is determined to be out of order by the individual chairing the assembly”).

It is undisputed that Ritchie was not creating a disturbance at either meeting at the time Kerr requested CPD officers to remove Ritchie. In fact, Iveson testified that she never declared Ritchie out of order at any School Board meeting, and she confirmed that Ritchie never engaged in any disruptive or disrespectful behavior during the September 27 and October 25 meetings. (Iveson Dep. at 18, 23-24.) Finally, to the extent a disturbance occurred at either meeting, record evidence shows that resulted solely from Kerr’s decision to have police officers remove Ritchie from the meetings.

Relying on many of the same cases the Court has previously distinguished as inapplicable in the First Amendment context, see, e.g. Cole v. Buchanan Cnty. Sch. Bd., 328 Fed-Appx. 204, 207 (4th Cir.2009); Lovem v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir.1999), Defendants argue that Kerr had a valid basis to remove Ritchie from the meetings because Kerr determined that Ritchie presented a “clear and present danger” to those attending the meeting and she therefore had Ritchie removed “for reasons narrowly tailored to serve significant government interests, and that were ‘content neutral.’ ” (Defs. Br. Supp. Mot. at 19.) Defendants contend that Kerr reasonably believed that Ritchie posed a threat because, among other things:

• Ritchie was angry at Mrs. Renner for harming his daughter and he refused to accept Mr. Bower’s and Dis-ler’s conclusions.

• Ritchie demanded that his daughter be removed from Mrs. Renner’s class and then requested that she be returned to Mrs. Renner’s classroom.

• Ritchie stated to the Etolls that there was a time in this country when a person could shoot someone who had hurt his child and the community would back him.

• Ritchie made School District personnel aware that he owned guns, wore a holster (without a gun) onto school property, and told a school secretary that he shot ammunition.

• Disler asked the CPD to conduct a risk/threat assessment of Ritchie.

• Ritchie demanded that Mrs. Renner, Mr. Bower, and Disler be punished for complaints the CPD concluded were unfounded.

• Ritchie was unwilling to resolve his issues with school personnel on any basis other than his own demands.

• Ritchie demonstrated abrupt mood swings.

• Ritchie appeared to engage in stalking behavior.

(Id. at 24-25.) On the other hand, it is undisputed that as of the September 27 meeting, Ritchie had attended at least four prior School Board meetings and was never ruled out of order, was not disruptive, and did not threaten anyone, including School Board members and the general public. Moreover, in her conversation with Officer Thornton on September 27, referring to Ritchie, Kerr said that “it’s our understanding that he’s gonna make a scene during public comment because that’s what his M 0 is.” (Pl.’s 530 Resp. Br. Ex. 31.) In fact, the evidence shows that Ritchie’s “M.O.” was speaking during the public comment portion of School Board meetings without creating a disturbance. This evidence tends to show that Kerr’s concern was not safety, but the content of Ritchie’s speech during the public comment period.

b. The School Board

Defendants argue that Ritchie has not shown that Kerr acted pursuant to School Board policy or custom in having Ritchie removed from the meetings. Defendants emphasize that the School Board, rather than Kerr, possesses final policy making authority for the school. See M.C.L. § 380.11a(3), (5). The Court concludes that Ritchie has presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact whether his removal from the September 27 and October 25 meetings was caused by School Board policy. As explained above, there is sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the School Board ratified or adopted the CPD’s no trespassing order as its own policy. Iveson testified that she relied on the order in authorizing a secretary to call the police if Ritchie appeared at the September 27 meeting. See Ross v. United States, 910 F.2d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir.1990) (“Where a particular course of action is authorized by a municipality’s authorized decisionmakers, it represents a policy rightly attributed to the governmental entity, and in such a case there is no need to resort to proof of the policy’s multiple applications to attribute its existence to the municipality.”). Therefore, the Court will deny the School Board summary judgment on Counts III and IV.

5. Counts VI and IX—Open Meetings Act Claims

a. The School Board

In its July 11, 2012, Opinion, the Court concluded that Ritchie stated a valid claim against the School Board under Section 11 of the OMA based on a November 22, 2010 regular School Board meeting. Ritchie alleged that during the public meeting the board adjourned to meet in “executive session” to “consider material exempt from discussion or disclosure by state or federal statute.” M.C.L. § 15.268(h). Ritchie alleges that during the closed meeting, the School Board discussed a proposed resolution to ban Rit-chie from entering all school property and took an informal poll of the School Board members, which turned out to be 4-3 against the resolution. This Court concluded that Ritchie stated a valid claim because he alleged that the closed meeting involved a quorum of the School Board and the meeting involved deliberations and an informal poll on a matter of public policy.

Pursuant to Section 8 of the OMA, a public body may meet in a closed session to deliberate various matters, including “material exempt from discussion or disclosure by state or federal law.” M.C.L. § 15.268(h). Such material includes a written legal opinion within the attorney-client privilege. Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. Wyoming City Council, 168 Mich.App. 459, 467, 425 N.W.2d 695, 699 (1988). Although deliberations concerning matters covered by Section 8 “may take place in closed session, all actual votes and decisions must be made in an open meeting.” Titus v. Shelby Charter Twp., 226 Mich.App. 611, 616, 574 N.W.2d 391, 393 (1998).

The record evidence shows that the School Board entered into an executive session during the November 22, 2010 meeting to consider a matter covered by the attorney-client privilege—specifically, a written legal opinion addressing the possibility of obtaining an order prohibiting Ritchie from accessing school property. (Iveson Dep. at 58-59, Defs.’ Reply Br. Ex. S; Smith 1st Aff. & Tr. at 26.) Although Ritchie alleges that the School Board took an informal poll during the closed meeting as an intended resolution of the matter, the evidence does not support this allegation. Rather, the evidence shows that the board members deliberated the issue but never took any action that might constitute a “decision” as defined by the OMA. See M.C.L. § 15.262(d). Ritchie’s evidence— the transcript of former board member Smith’s statement to Ritchie’s counsel— shows that board members simply discussed the issue without entertaining a formal motion or otherwise taking any action on the issue. (Smith 1st Aff. & Tr. at 25.) Accordingly, the Court concludes that the School Board did not violate the OMA during the closed session held on November 22, 2010. . Therefore, the Court will grant the School Board summary judgment on Count VI.

b. Iveson .

The other remaining OMA claim is against Iveson under Section 13. Section 13(1) of the OMA provides that “[a] public official who intentionally violates this act shall be personally liable in a civil action for actual and exemplary damages of not more than $500 total, plus court costs and actual attorney fees to a person bringing the action.” M.C.L. § 15.273(1). Section 3(5) of the OMA provides that “[a] person shall be permitted to address a meeting of a public body under rules established by the public body.” M.C.L. § 15.263(5). Ritchie contends that Iveson violated this section by interrupting him during the May 24, 2010 meeting.

Defendants contend that Iveson is entitled to summary judgment on this claim because Ritchie has not shown that Iveson intended to violate the OMA. Defendants argue that the evidence shows that Iveson intended to comply with the OMA.

In order to prove a violation under Section 13, a defendant “must have a subjective desire to violate the OMA or knowledge that the offender is committing an act violative of the OMA.” People v. Whitney, 228 Mich.App. 230, 255-56, 578 N.W.2d 329, 341 (1998). Based on the evidence in the record, the Court concludes that whether Iveson violated the OMA during the May 24 meeting and Iveson’s subjective intent or desire are issues for the jury. As discussed above regarding Count I, the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Ritchie was not complaining about Mrs. Renner and - that Disler and Iyeson improperly interrupted his comments. This same evidence, combined .with Ritchie’s statement that he was not complaining about Mrs. Renner would allow a reasonable jury to infer that Iveson knew that she was violating the OMA by cutting off Ritchie’s comments. Therefore, the Court will deny summary judgment to Iveson on Count IX.

6. Punitive Damages

Defendants contend that Ritchie’s punitive damage claims against the School Board must be dismissed because they are not available as a matter of law. Ritchie wisely does not dispute this point because the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff may not recover punitive damages against municipalities in a § 1983 lawsuit. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 2762, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981); see also Long v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 807 F.Supp.2d 1274, 1290 (N.D.Ga.2011) (“FDSD, a public school district, undoubtedly falls within the scope of [City of Newport ].”). Therefore, the Court will dismiss Ritchie’s punitive damages claim against the School Board. To the extent Defendants also request that Ritchie’s punitive damages claims be dismissed as to Iveson, Disler, and Kerr, the Court will defer its ruling until trial.

B. City Defendants (Case No. 1-11-CV-616)

1. Count I—Corporal Miller

In Count I of his Amended Complaint, Ritchie alleges that Corporal Miller violated his constitutional rights in several respects by issuing the June 11, 2010 no trespassing order. The Court interprets Ritchie’s Amended Complaint to allege that the order violated Ritchie’s fundamental right to travel, his substantive due process right to be free from arbitrary and capricious government action, and his First Amendment rights to access publicly available information and to access the ASC in order to attend the July 12, 2010 School Board meeting. As the Court understands Ritchie’s response, however, Ritchie limits the theories of his claim to violation of his right to intrastate travel and violation of his First Amendment rights of access to publicly-available records and to access the ASC to attend School Board meetings. Defendants contend that Ritchie’s claim fails as a matter of law and that Corporal Miller is entitled to qualified immunity.

Ritchie’s claim fails to the extent it relies on a right to intrastate travel. As the Sixth Circuit has explained, the right to intrastate travel is limited to “the right to travel locally through public spaces and roadways.” Johnson v. City of Cincinnati 310 F.3d 484, 498 (6th Cir. 2002). Ritchie does not claim that Corpora