Young v. County of Hawaii (947 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 2013)

United States District Court for the District of Hawaii 2013-05-22

Citations

Full opinion text

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DECLINING IN PART DEFENDANTS COUNTY OF HAWAII, HAWAII ISLAND HUMANE SOCIETY S.P.C.A., DONNA WHITAKER, STARR K. YAMADA, AND MICHAEL OSTENDORP’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT (2) DECLINING DEFENDANTS ROBERTA KAWENA YOUNG, CARROLL COX, AND DARLEEN DELA CRUZ’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT, AND (3)- DECLINING CROSSCLAIM DEFENDANTS MICHAEL OSTENDORP, CARROLL COX, AND DARLEEN DELA CRUZ’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO ROBERTA KAWENA YOUNG’S CROSS-CLAIM

ALAN C. KAY, Senior District Judge.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 23, 2011, Plaintiff Warne Keahi Young (“Plaintiff’) filed a Complaint against Defendants County of Hawai’i, the Hawaii Island Humane Society S.P.C.A. (“HIHS” or “Humane Society”), Donna Whitaker (individually and in her official capacity as Executive Director of HIHS), Starr K. Yamada (individually and in her official capacity as a HIHS Officer), Michael Ostendorp, Carroll Cox, Darleen Déla Cruz, and Roberta Kawena Young. (ECF No. 1). On January 9, 2012, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against all Defendants. (ECF No. 8). On March 30, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (ECF No. 44).

On September 24, 2012, Roberta Kawe-na Young (“Roberta Young”) filed a Cross-claim against Defendants Ostendorp, Cox, and Dela Cruz. (ECF No. 76-1).

On December 28, 2012, Defendant Roberta Young filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment” as to Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 102). On January 8, 2013, Defendant Roberta Young filed a Concise Statement of Facts in Support of her Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 108). Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition and a Concise Statement of Facts on January 10, 2013. (ECF No. 113, 114). Defendant Roberta Young did not file a Reply. (See generally, ECF Docket).

On December 31, 2012, Defendants County of Hawai’i, HIHS, Donna Whitaker, and Starr Yamada (collectively, “HIHS Defendants”) filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff Warne Keahi Young” (“HIHS MSJ”) and a Concise Statement of Facts in support of their MSJ (“HIHS Defs.’ CSF”). (ECF Nos. 98 & 99). The HIHS Defendants also filed an additional exhibit to their MSJ on January 2, 2013. (ECF No. 101). Plaintiff filed his Opposition to the HIHS Defendants’ MSJ and a Concise Statement of Facts (“Plntf.’s HIHS CSF”) on January 10, 2013. (ECF No. 109, 114). On February 21, 2013, the HIHS Defendants filed their Reply in support of their MSJ. (ECF No. 139). The HIHS Defendants also filed an errata to their Reply on February 22, 2013. (ECF No. 140). On March 5, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Amended Concise Statement .of Facts. (ECF No. 145). This Court held a hearing on March 7, 2013 regarding the HIHS Defendants’ MSJ and Defendant Roberta Young’s MSJ. (ECF No. 147).

Also on December 31, 2012, Defendants Ostendorp, Cox, and Dela Cruz each filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint Filed on March 30, 2012 and Crossclaim Plaintiff Roberta Young’s Crossclaim Filed on September 24, 2012” (“Ostendorp’s MSJ,” “Cox’s MSJ,” and “Dela Cruz’s MSJ” respectively). (ECF No. 103, 104, 105). Ostendorp, Cox, and Dela Cruz also filed a Joint Separate, Concise Statement of Facts in support of their Motions for Summary Judgment (“Ostendorp, Cox, and Dela Cruz’s’ JCSF”). (ECF No. 106). On January 10, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Ostendorp’s MSJ, a Memorandum in Opposition to Cox’s MSJ, and a Memorandum in Opposition to Dela Cruz’s MSJ. (ECF No. 110, 111, 112). Plaintiff also filed a Concise Statement of Facts in response to Defendants’ Joint Statement of Facts (“Plntf.’s JCSF”). (ECF No. 114). On January 23, 2013, Plaintiff untimely filed a “Supplemental Concise Statement of Material Facts in Opposition to Defendants] Osten-dorp, Cox, and Dela Cruz[’s] Joint.Separate Concise Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment” (“Plntf.’s Supp. JCSF”). (ECF No. 121). On January 28, 2013, Ostendorp, Cox, and Dela Cruz filed a single Reply Memorandum responding to Plaintiffs Oppositions. (ECF No. 124).

On January 29, 2013, eight days past the deadline for opposition memorandums, Crossclaim Plaintiff Roberta Young filed an “Omnibus Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Michael G.M. Ostendorp, Carroll Cox, and Darleen R.S. Dela Cruz’[s] Motion for Summary Judgment.” (ECF No. 129). Crossclaim Plaintiff Roberta Young did not file a Concise Statement of Facts. See ECF Docket. Defendants Ostendorp, Cox, and Dela Cruz did not file a reply. Id. On February 11, 2013, this Court held a hearing regarding Defendants Ostendorp, Cox, and Dela Cruz’s Motions for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint and Roberta Young’s Crossclaim. (ECF No. 133).

In the February 11 and March 7, 2013 hearings, the Court observed that Exhibit 4 of Plaintiffs Supplemental Joint Concise Statement of Facts (ECF No. 121) is a heavily redacted report of the State of Hawaii Department of the Attorney General’s (“AG”) investigation regarding an allegedly forged general power of attorney dated September 12, 2009. On April 3, 2013, this Court issued an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery Response and directed the Hawai’i AG to submit to this Court an unredacted version of the report. ECF No. 152. The Court received an unredacted copy of the Hawaii AG’s report on April 23, 2013. (ECF No. 154 & 155). The Court subsequently allowed the parties to view the unredacted version of the AG report and to submit supplemental briefing regarding the report’s effect on Defendants’ MSJs. (ECF No. 155). Plaintiff timely submitted a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition discussing the effect of the report on Defendant’s MSJs. (ECF No. 156).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises from the seizure of seventeen dogs (“Dogs”) from a residence in Hilo and the subsequent events that resulted in the HIHS’s disposal of the Dogs by way of euthanasia or offering the Dogs for adoption. The parties agree on the following basic outline of events, but they disagree regarding the details.

At some point in 2007, Plaintiff was charged with Animal Cruelty in the 2nd Degree under Haw.Rev.Stat. § 711-1109. See HIHS Defs.’ MSJ Ex. A at 4, Ex. F. at 92-93, ECF No. 98. After pleading guilty to the offense of animal neglect and cruelty, Plaintiff subsequently was fined and placed on probation. HIHS Defs.’ MSJ Ex. F at 93-94, 106-107, ECF No. 98. As a result of the charges in 2007, Plaintiff was only allowed to have ten dogs at his house. Id. at 106-07.

On September 25, 2009, Yamada, an officer of HIHS, applied for a search warrant in the District Court of the Third Circuit of the State of Hawai’i to search Plaintiffs residence at 42 W. Kahaopea Street, District of South Hilo, HI (“Residence”). See HIHS Defs.’ MSJ Ex. A, ECF No. 98; SAC at 7, ECF No. 44. According to the affidavit that Yamada submitted as part of the application, Yamada had observed two of the Dogs on June 30, August 17, September 18, and September 24, 2009. Id. She observed among other things that (1) the kennels of the two Dogs had feces covering the bottoms of the cages, (2) the Dogs did not have water in their bowls, and (3) one of the Dogs appeared to have a skin infection. Id. The District Court of the Third Circuit, State of Hawai’i subsequently granted Search Warrant No. 09-001 on September 25, 2009 (“Search Warrant”) based on the search warrant application. Id.

The Search Warrant empowered HIHS officers to search for and seize any abused animals at the Residence, as well as documents establishing the identity of the person who owned or controlled the Residence. HIHS Defs.’ MSJ at 3, Ex. B, ECF No. 98.

On the morning of September 29, 2009, Yamada executed the search warrant at the Residence and seized the Dogs, pieces of mail belonging to Plaintiff, and a court document in Plaintiffs name. SAC at 8, ECF No. 44. On that same morning of September 29, 2009, Plaintiff traveled to

Oahu; he was not at the Residence when HIHS executed the search warrant. Id. On September 30, 2009, a Return of Search Warrant No. 09-001 was filed in the District Court of the Third Circuit, State of Hawai’i. Id. Yamada attached an inventory statement to the Return of Search Warrant containing a list of the Dogs, pieces of mail, and a court document seized from the Residence. Id. at 9.

Shortly thereafter, on or about October 1, 2009, Plaintiff and Roberta Young met with Defendant Ostendorp, an attorney in private practice, in Honolulu at the Waikiki Yacht Club. Dec. of Ostendorp at 3, ECF No. 139; Plntf.’s Supp. JCSF Ex. 4 at 000020, ECF Nos. 154 & 155. Osten-dorp agreed to help Plaintiff and Roberta Young regarding the seizure of the Dogs on September 29, 2009. Id. As a result of the agreement to help Plaintiff and Roberta Young, Ostendorp flew with Defendant Cox and Plaintiff to Hilo. Id. Subsequently, Ostendorp met with HIHS Officer Yamada on October 5, 2009 regarding the status of the Dogs. Id.

During Ostendorp’s meeting with Officer Yamada on October 5, 2009, Ostendorp told Yamada that he represented Plaintiff, that Plaintiff was under suicide watch in a Honolulu hospital, and informed her that he “wanted to work this out because [Plaintiff] did not want to get into any more trouble since he was still on probation.” Plntf.’s Supp. JCSF Ex. 4 at 00016, ECF Nos. 154 & 155. Yamada indicated that an owner surrender of the dogs would be an ideal way to resolve the situation. Id.

At some point after the October 5 meeting, Defendant Ostendorp drafted a general Power of Attorney dated September 12, 2009, (“POA”) purporting to appoint Roberta Young as Plaintiffs attorney-in-fact. SAC at 16, Dec. of Ostendorp at 3 ¶ 6-7, ECF No. 139-6. On October 7, 2009, Os-tendorp called Yamada and stated that Roberta Young had a signed power of attorney from Plaintiff, and that Roberta Young wanted to surrender the dogs to HIHS. Plntf.’s Supp. JCSF Ex. 4 at 00016, ECF Nos. 154 & 155. Yamada told Osten-dorp that she would need to speak with Roberta Young. Id. A woman identifying herself as Roberta Young called later that day, stated that she had a power of attorney from Plaintiff, and indicated that she wanted to surrender the Dogs to HIHS. Id. During the conversation, the woman told Yamada that she was fearful of Plaintiff and did not want him to find out that she had surrendered the Dogs. Id. Using Plaintiffs general POA, Roberta Young completed an Animal Surrender Policy Form surrendering “her dogs” to HIHS on October 7, 2009 (“Surrender Form”). SAC at 16; HIHS Defs.’ MSJ at Ex. C, D, & E, ECF No. 98. She gave the Surrender Form to Ostendorp, who in turn transmitted it to HIHS along with a letter asking Yamada not to notify Plaintiff regarding the status of the Dogs because “he is not the owner of the dogs.” Id.

On October 13, 2009, Yamada sent an email requesting a power of attorney from Ostendorp. Plntf.’s Supp. JCSF Ex. 3, ECF No. 121. Ostendorp’s office sent the September 12, 2009 general POA to Yama-da. Id. Subsequently, HIHS euthanized nine of the Dogs and placed eight of them for adoption. HIHS Defs.’ MSJ at 6 n. 3, ECF No. 98.

I. Defendants’. Version of the Facts

Defendants state that Plaintiff informed attorney Ostendorp that he was afraid of criminal prosecution for the neglect of the Dogs that had been seized at the Residence and for being accused of violating the terms of his probation from the 2007 animal neglect charges. HIHS Defs.’ MSJ Reply, Dec. of Ostendorp at 2, ECF No. 139-6. When Ostendorp spoke with HIHS regarding Plaintiffs alleged violations of law, HIHS suggested that if the Dogs were surrendered to HIHS, Plaintiff would not be charged with violating state animal cruelty laws and thus his probation would not be revoked. Plntf.’s Supp. JCSF Ex. 4 at 000016, ECF Nos. 154 & 155. As a result of the surrender of the Dogs, HIHS never initiated proceedings to file charges against Plaintiff for violating any animal cruelty law in 2009. See HIHS Defs.’ MSJ Ex. F at 104-105, ECF No. 98. Additionally, Plaintiff at some point threatened to commit suicide because of the prospect of facing jail time as a result of the September 29, 2009 seizure of the neglected Dogs. Dec. of Ostendorp at 3, ECF No. 139-6. Plaintiff and Roberta Young decided to pick the date of September 12, 2009 on the general POA in order to substantiate Plaintiffs claim that Roberta Young was the true owner of the Dogs during the time of the September 29, 2009 seizure. Id. at 3.

11. Plaintiffs Version of the Facts

Plaintiff claims that he never told Defendant Ostendorp that he was afraid of criminal prosecution for neglecting the Dogs. Ostendorp, Cox, and Dela Cruz’s JCSF Ex. A at 104, ECF No. 106. He also claims that he never told Defendants Os-tendorp and Cox that he was in violation of the terms of his probation, that he was afraid of going to jail, or that he would commit suicide if he had to go to jail. Id. at 223. Plaintiff states that he never signed the general POA transferring his rights to Roberta Young or giving Roberta Young the legal right to transfer his property. HIHS Defs.’ MSJ Ex. F at 168, ECF No. 98. He also contends that the Surrender Form did not legally surrender his dogs seized from his property. Id. at 172.

However, the Court notes that Plaintiff does admit to (1) calling Ostendorp for legal assistance regarding seizure of the Dogs, (2) meeting with Ostendorp, Cox, Déla Cruz, and Roberta Young at the Waikiki Yacht Club on October 1 and October 8, (3) learning that Roberta Young hired Ostendorp to keep Plaintiff out of jail, and (4) signing a general power of attorney dated October 8, 2009, that would give Roberta Young authority to exercise his legal rights in the event that Plaintiff was declared “not mentally fit” by a psychiatrist. Plntf.’s Supp. JCSF Ex. 4 at 000020, ECF Nos. 154 & 155, Plntf.’s Supp. JCSF Ex. 6 at 1, ECF No. 121. Additionally, Plaintiffs Exhibit 4, a copy of a Hawai’i AG report, indicates that Os-tendorp told Yamada that he was representing Plaintiff, that Plaintiff was under suicide watch, and that Ostendorp as Plaintiffs attorney wanted to “work this out” to prevent Plaintiff from violating his probation. Plntf.’s Supp. JCSF Ex. 4 at 000016, ECF Nos. 154 & 155. Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 also states that a woman purported to be Roberta Young called Yama-da and indicated that she had a signed power of attorney signed by Plaintiff and desired to surrender the Dogs. Id.; see Plntf.’s Supp. Opp. at 3, ECF No. 156.

STANDARD

A party may move for summary judgment on any claim or defense—or part of a claim or defense—under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56. Summary judgment “should be granted ‘if the mov-ant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Maxwell v. Cnty. of San Diego, 697 F.3d 941, 947 (9th Cir.2012) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(a)). Under Rule 56, a “party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion,” either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).

The substantive law determines which facts are material; “only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir.2012). “The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (citation omitted).

A genuine issue of material fact exists if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” United States v. Arango, 670 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir.2012) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Conversely, “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769.

The moving party has the burden of persuading the court as to the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 587 (9th Cir.2010). If the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Simmer v. Verity, Inc., 606 F.3d 584, 587 (9th Cir.2010). The nonmoving party must present evidence of a “genuine issue for trial,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), that is “significantly probative or more than merely colorable.” LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir.2009) (citation omitted). Summary judgment will be granted against a party who fails to demonstrate facts sufficient to establish “an element essential to that party’s case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Parth v. Pomona Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., 630 F.3d 794, 798-99 (9th Cir.2010) (citation omitted).

When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must “view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment motion.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). The court may not, however, weigh conflicting evidence or assess credibility. In re Barboza, 545 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir.2008). Accordingly, if “reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence,” summary judgment will be denied. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51,106 S.Ct. 2505.

DISCUSSION

I. Whether This Court Should Grant the HIHS Defendants’ MSJ as to Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims

Plaintiffs SAC alleges, inter alia, that the HIHS Defendants violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments by seizing and disposing of the Dogs. SAC at 22-25. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. To prevail on a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must prove two essential elements: (1) “that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated,” and (2) “that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of State law.” Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.2006). The HIHS Defendants do not contest that they were acting under the color of state law. See HIHS Defs.’ MSJ at 10-18, ECF No. 98. The HIHS Defendants only contest the first element by arguing that they did not violate Plaintiffs constitutional rights.

The Court also notes that Plaintiffs § 1983 claims in the SAC and the § 1983 discussion in his Opposition refer only to the Dogs and do not discuss other property mentioned in the state tort law claims of the SAC and the MSJ briefs. See SAC Counts I-IV and Plntf.’s HIHS MSJ Opp. at 4-13. Accordingly, the Court only examines the HIHS Defendants and Defendant Ostendorp’s conduct regarding the Dogs when considering the § 1983 claims.

A. Whether the HIHS Defendants Violated Plaintiffs Constitutional Rights

1. Whether the HIHS Defendants Violated Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment Rights

The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 700, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). A “seizure” of property occurs when “there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” Soldal v. Cook Cnty., Ill, 506 U.S. 56, 68, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992). “In the ordinary case, the Court has viewed a seizure of personal property as per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized.” Id. at 701, 103 S.Ct. 2637. Destruction of property originally obtained through a lawful search and seizure may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment. See U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124-25, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) (noting that a field test that destroyed a small quantity of powder violated the owner’s possessory interest).

Plaintiff alleges that Officer Yamada violated his Fourth Amendment rights because (1) she was not statutorily authorized to apply for and execute the Search Warrant, and (2) “the continued illegal seizure of [Plaintiffs Dogs] ... effectively deprived [Plaintiff] of his 4th Amendment rights.” Plntf.’s HIHS Opp. at 5-6. The Court will address each argument in turn.

Plaintiff argues that HIHS officers do not have authority to apply for or execute search warrants under Hawai’i statutory law. Plntf.’s HIHS Opp. at 5. Contrary to Plaintiffs erroneous interpretation of the statutory language, HIHS officers may apply for and execute search warrants as officers of the state. According to Haw. Rev.Stat. § 711-1109.1 (1993 & Supp. 2009), a law enforcement officer who obtains a valid search warrant may impound a pet animal, among other things. The statute defines “law enforcement officer” according to H.R.S. § 710-1000 (1993 & Supp.2009), which provides the following definition:

any public servant, whether employed by the State or subdivisions thereof ... vested by law with a duty to maintain public order, to make arrests for offenses or to enforce the criminal laws, whether that duty extends to all offenses or is limited to a specific class of offenses.

H.R.S. § 710-1000 defines a “public servant” as “any officer or employee of any branch of government ... and any person participating as advisor, consultant, or otherwise, in performing a governmental function.” H.R.S. § 710-1000 (emphasis added).

Plaintiff argues that Hawai’i County Ordinance § 4.9 states that HIHS officers shall not be viewed as an agent or employee of the county; therefore, HIHS officers do not meet the definition of “public servant” in H.R.S. § 710-1000. Id. Plaintiffs interpretation completely disregards the second half of the definition, which includes “any person ... performing a governmental function.” H.R.S. § 710-1000. In this case, the County of Hawai’i signed a contract for HIHS to perform the governmental function of enforcing animal control laws. See HIHS Defs.’ Reply Errata Ex. A at 2084, ECF No. 140.

Hawai’i law does not bar such an arrangement; in fact, the statutory scheme demonstrates that the state legislature intended to allow organizations like HIHS to perform government functions to enforce animal control laws. See H.R.S. § 711-1110 (providing that agents of a society formed or incorporated for the prevention of cruelty to animals may arrest violators of animal cruelty laws). Accordingly, Defendant Yamada had authority under state law to apply for and execute the Search Warrant. Plaintiff does not argue that the Search Warrant lacked probable cause or is invalid on any other basis. See Plntf.’s HIHS Opp. at 5-6. Accordingly, Officer Yamada’s search and seizure of the Dogs on September 29, 2009 did not violate Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights because it was performed under a valid search warrant.

Plaintiffs next argument that Defendant Yamada “seized” the Dogs by disposing of them after the legal seizure is likewise without merit. The Fourth Amendment does not protect against all seizures by law enforcement officials—in order for a violation to occur, the seizure must be “unreasonable.” Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989). The Fourth Amendment is not violated when an individual consents to relinquish his person or property. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557-60, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when she gave voluntary consent to police search), Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed. 898 (1924) (no Fourth Amendment violation when police seized jug and bottle abandoned by plaintiff), and Waters v. Howard Sommers Towing, Inc., Civ. No. 10-5296 CAS (AJWx), 2011 WL 2601835 at *8 (C.D.Cal.2011) (no Fourth Amendment seizure when police retained drivers license voluntarily given by plaintiff).

Officer Yamada received the Surrender Form signed by Roberta Young and the general POA dated September 12, 2009 purportedly signed by Plaintiff conferring “broad and sweeping powers” to Roberta Young to “exercise all of [Plaintiffs] legal rights and powers.” HIHS Defs.’ MSJ at Ex. D & E, ECF No. 98. The Surrender Form stated that the signer relinquished ownership of the animals and that HIHS would become the new legal owner. Id. at Ex. E. These documents were transmitted to Officer Yamada and HIHS by Ostendorp, an attorney who represented to Yamada and HIHS that he was acting on Roberta Young and Plaintiffs behalf. Id. at Ex. C; Plntf’s Supp. JCSF Ex. 4 at 000016, ECF Nos. 154 & 155. Ostendorp specifically stated that Plaintiff was not the owner of the Dogs. HIHS Defs.’ MSJ at Ex. C, ECF No. 98. Additionally, Yamada asked for verification—she requested that Ostendorp tell the person with the general POA to call Yamada, and the record reflects that Yamada did in fact receive a call from a woman purported to be Roberta Young, who- stated that she had a general POA signed by Plaintiff. Plntf.’s Supp. JCSF Ex. 4 at 000016, ECF Nos. 154 & 155. Furthermore, Yamada asked Ostendorp to submit a copy of the signed general POA before HIHS would take action with respect to the Dogs, and she received a copy of the general POA. Plntffs Supp. JCSF Ex. 3, ECF No. 121. Based on these uncontested facts, Officer Yamada concluded that the Dogs were no longer Plaintiffs property.

Although Plaintiff concedes that the general POA and Surrender Form were in fact given to Officer Yamada, Plaintiff argues that the general POA and Surrender Form were invalid because of fraud and forgery. Plntf.’s Opp. at 8, ECF No. 109; HIHS Defs.’ MSJ Ex. F at 168, ECF No. 98. Assuming Plaintiffs version of the facts as true—namely that the general POA and Surrender Form were in fact invalid—Officer Yamada’s actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment because her disposal of the Dogs was based on a mistake of fact as to the validity of the documents. A mistake of fact does not automatically result in a conclusion that an officer’s conduct constitutes an unreasonable seizure. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802-804, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971) (officer’s mistake of fact in arresting the wrong person did not violate Fourth Amendment), Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 86-87, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987) (officer’s mistake of fact in searching the wrong premises did not violate Fourth Amendment), and Torres v. City of Madera, 524 F.3d 1053, 1056-57 (9th Cir.2008) (acknowledging that officer conduct might not violate Fourth Amendment despite mistake of fact).

Plaintiff then presents a barrage of arguments as to why Yamada should have known that Plaintiff did not want to surrender the Dogs—in other words, the crux of Plaintiffs argument is that Yamada’s conduct was unreasonable because she should have detected the alleged fraud. See Plntf.’s Supp. Opp. at 2, ECF No. 156 (arguing that Yamada should have challenged the authenticity of the POA). For a reasonableness inquiry as to whether the Fourth Amendment was violated, the Court examines whether Yamada’s conduct was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802-804, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971), Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87 n. 11, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987)(“the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability”) and Torres v. City of Mardera, 524 F.3d 1053,1056-57 (9th Cir.2008) (holding that district court should make a finding as to whether officer’s mistake in using a gun instead of a taser was objectively unreasonable). Additionally, the Court examines the perspective of the officer when judging the reasonableness of the mistake and should take into account the facts and circumstances confronting him or her. Torres, 524 F.3d at 1056.

Plaintiffs contentions do not create a material issue of fact that Yamada’s actions were objectively unreasonable. Plaintiff argues that the HIHS Defendants should have known that Roberta Young was not the rightful owner because (1) the animals had been taken from Plaintiffs Residence, (2) HIHS had numerous contacts with Plaintiff regarding the care of his animals from the time of his previous charge of animal cruelty in 2007, and (3) the HIHS Defendants had interactions with Ostendorp regarding the status of the animals. Plntf.’s Opp. at 9, ECF No. 109. Regarding the first two arguments, there is uncontested evidence in the record that, viewing the situation from Yamada’s perspective, Ostendorp and Roberta Young had authority to surrender the Dogs in 2009.

Ostendorp “informed Yamada that he was [Plaintiffs] attorney and that [Plaintiff] was currently under suicide watch in a Honolulu hospital.” Plntf.’s Supp. JCSF Ex. 4 at 000016, ECF Nos. 154 & 155. He also stated that “he wanted to work this out because [Plaintiff] did not want to get into any more trouble since he was still on probation.” Id. Ostendorp later told Ya-mada that Roberta Young had a general POA signed by Plaintiff, and that she wanted to surrender the Dogs based on her authority to do so. Id. Plaintiff fails to identify a material issue of fact that Yama-da had reason to know that Ostendorp’s representations were false and that Osten-dorp’s request to “work this out” did not reflect the actual position of Plaintiff or those apparently authorized to act on Plaintiffs behalf. Even if Plaintiff had past encounters with HIHS, Yamada’s conclusion that Plaintiffs purported agents had authority to change his position with regard to the Dogs was not objectively unreasonable.

The representations explained above also address Plaintiffs third argument that Yamada’s interactions with Ostendorp should have alerted her as to any fraudulent activity. The content of the conversations reveals that Yamada performed her actions with the understanding that she was acting in alignment 'with Plaintiffs agents, not contrary to his interests. In fact, the Court observes that, in one of the conversations mentioned by Plaintiff, Ya-mada asked to speak with the woman who allegedly had the general POA. Plntf.’s Supp. JCSF Ex. 4 at 000016, ECF Nos. 154 & 155. A woman identifying herself as Roberta Young called Yamada on October 7, 2009 to verify that she had a general POA signed by Plaintiff and wanted to surrender the Dogs to HIHS. Id. at 000016-17. Regarding the letter dated October 7, 2009, Ostendorp specifically stated that Plaintiff “is not the owner of the dogs and none of the information regarding this matter should be released to him.” HIHS Defs.’ MSJ at Ex. C, ECF No. 98. Accordingly, based- on the explicit representations of Ostendorp and Roberta Young, Yamada’s failure to detect fraud regarding the general POA and the Surrender Form is not objectively unreasonable.

As a result, the Court concludes that there has been no Fourth Amendment violation under these circumstances because Plaintiffs evidence does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Yamada’s accepting the surrender of the Dogs was objectively unreasonable. Cf. Pennington v. Penner, 207 F.Supp.2d 1225, 1241 (D.Kan.2002) (no § 1983 liability for animal control officer who relied on surrender form to seize animals).

2. Whether the HIHS Defendants Violated Plaintiffs Fifth Amendment Rights

Plaintiff alleges that the HIHS Defendants violated Plaintiffs Fifth Amendment rights because “there was no opportunity or any other means to have HIHS’ decision reviewed by the operation of any administrative or judicial process.” Plntf.’s HIHS Opp. at 7, ECF No. 109. Plaintiff complains that he was not notified that (1) his ownership rights in the Dogs had been terminated and (2) the Dogs would be killed or adopted out. Id.

Regarding Plaintiffs Fifth Amendment claim, this Court grants the HIHS Defendants’ MSJ to the extent that Plaintiff alleges a taking under the Takings Clause. See HIHS Defs.’ MSJ at 13, ECF No. 98. The HIHS Defendants argue that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the existence of the Surrender Form and the general POA demonstrate that HIHS did not unlawfully take Plaintiffs property. Id. at 14, Ex. D, E. Plaintiff fails to respond to this argument in his opposition. See generally Plntf.’s HIHS Opposition, ECF No. 109. Also, Plaintiff fails to present a material issue of fact that the HIHS Defendants had reason to know of the purported fraud, forgery, or invalidity of the documents. See supra at 1100-02. Under FRCP 56, summary judgment is proper regarding this claim because Plaintiff fails to identify a genuine issue of material fact for trial.

Moreover, “the Takings Clause is implicated only when the taking in question is for a public use”; it does not apply when the taking is for law enforcement purposes. Scott v. Jackson, 297 Fed.Appx. 623, 625-26 (9th Cir.2008), see also Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 448, 116 S.Ct. 994, 134 L.Ed.2d 68 (1996). Plaintiff neither alleges in his SAC nor states in his opposition that the HIHS Defendants acquired the Dogs for public use as opposed to law enforcement purposes. See generally SAC and Plntf.’s HIHS Opposition, ECF No. 109.

The Court also grants the HIHS Defendants’ MSJ regarding Plaintiffs claims under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the equal protection component thereof apply only to actions of the federal government—not to those of state or local governments.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 687 (9th Cir.2001). Plaintiff has presented claims only against the County of Hawai’i and private actors in his SAC; therefore, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause does not apply. See id. and Souza v. Cnty. of Haw., 694 F.Supp. 738, 750 (D.Haw.1988).

3. Whether the HIHS Defendants Violated Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Rights

The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause provides that the government may not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). However, for both substantive and procedural due process, “this guarantee of due process has been applied to deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property.” Id. and Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998). Souza v. Cnty. of Haw., 694 F.Supp. 738, 746 (D.Haw.1988). Because the Due Process Clause is concerned with protecting people from government abuses of power, the Supreme Court has held that negligent conduct by a state official that causes injury does not constitute a Due Process deprivation. Id.

The Ninth Circuit has held that people have a property interest in pet animals. San Jose Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 977 (9th Cir.2005). However, Plaintiff does not show that the HIHS Defendants made a deliberate decision to deprive him of the Dogs. As mentioned above, Officer Yamada received (1) a general POA signed by Plaintiff purporting to give Roberta Young broad authority to exercise his legal rights and (2) a Surrender Form purporting to transfer legal title to the Dogs from Roberta Young to HIHS. HIHS Defs.’ MSJ at Ex. D. & E, ECF No. 98.

Even if this Court construes the facts in favor of Plaintiff that the documents did not actually transfer legal rights in the Dogs, the HIHS Defendants did not take conscious action to deprive Plaintiff of his property in violation of his constitutional rights; rather, the HIHS Defendants passively agreed to Plaintiffs agents’ decision to transfer the Dogs to the HIHS Defendants through the general POA and Surrender Form. Cf. Souza v. Cnty. of Haw., 694 F.Supp. 738, 747 (D.Haw.1988) (government decision to include condition on permit did not constitute conscious decision to take plaintiffs property). The HIHS Defendants’ conduct might at most constitute negligence or mistake (although the Court by this statement does not make such a ruling) rather than a deliberate decision to deprive Plaintiff of his rights. See Preven v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, Civ. No. 11-2340-R (RNB), 2011 WL 2882399 (C.D.Cal.2011)(adopted as order of the court by Preven v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, Civ. No. 11-2340-R (RNB), 2011 WL 2882853 (C.D.Cal.2011)) (county officials did not violate plaintiffs’ due process rights when officials relied on plaintiffs’ signed agreement to restrain their dogs even though plaintiffs argued agreement was obtained through duress from third party).

Regarding Plaintiffs substantive due process claim, the HIHS Defendants’ conduct does not meet the “shocks the conscience” standard, which is a high standard to meet as illustrated by the Supreme Court’s examples of executive abuse of power. The HIHS Defendants’ decision regarding whether or not to honor a form submitted by Plaintiffs purported agents is not the type of “egregious official conduct” that is “arbitrary in the constitutional sense.” See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998)(providing example of stomach pumping as a form of oppression and abuse of power barred by the due process clause). While Plaintiff perhaps may have an action in state tort law against other Defendants for his alleged harm (although the Court by making this statement does not make such a ruling); the HIHS Defendants’ actions do not fall within the category of “the large concerns of the governors and the governed” that due process attempts to address. See id. at 848-54, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (officer that killed passenger in a high-speed car chase did not deprive passenger of due process because intent was “to do his job as a law enforcement officer, not to induce ... lawlessness, or to terrorize, cause harm, or kül.”)

Additionally, regarding Plaintiffs procedural due process claims, a violation of due process will not be found if state law provides adequate postdeprivation procedures. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 538-540, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). The Supreme Court has noted that, “where only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial inquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for ultimate judicial determination of liability is adequate.” Id. at 540, 101 S.Ct. 1908 (citing Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97, 51 S.Ct. 608, 75 L.Ed. 1289 (1931)). The Supreme Court has applied this principle to cases where (1) “the loss is not a result of some established state procedure and the [sjtate cannot predict precisely when the loss will occur” or (2) “a predeprivation hearing is unduly burdensome in proportion to the liberty interest at stake.” Id. at 541, 101 S.Ct. 1908.

In this case, Plaintiffs loss was not the result of some established state procedure, and the HIHS Defendants could not reasonably predict that fraud or forgery affected the validity of the form transferring ownership of the Dogs. Contrast Parratt, 451 U.S. 527, 536-37, 101 S.Ct. 1908 (post-deprivation hearing sufficient where prison officials’ loss of plaintiffs package considered unpredictable) with Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 133-34, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990) (predeprivation hearing required because mental health hospital could forseeably predict that a person needing mental health care might be incapable of making an informed, voluntary decision).

Additionally, requiring a predeprivation hearing to verify the validity of every form that purports to voluntarily relinquish property rights would be unduly burdensome in light of the low risk of fraudulent or forged forms. Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977) (No predeprivation hearing required for corporal punishment because of “low incidence of abuse ... and the common-law safeguards that already exist.”). The low risk of fraud and forgery combined with sufficient state tort remedies to protect people’s interests in their pets merits a conclusion that the Due Process Clause does not require a predeprivation hearing in this type of case. Id.

Moreover, Plaintiff acknowledges in his Opposition that a tort action for monetary damages can redress Plaintiffs injury from the loss of the Dogs. Plntf.’s HIHS Opp. at 14, ECF No. 109. Accordingly, because state tort remedies may provide adequate post-deprivation relief, the HIHS Defendants did not violate Plaintiffs procedural due process rights. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44, 101 S.Ct. 1908, Souza, 694 F.Supp. 738 (noting that state court remedies were sufficient to meet hearing requirement of due process clause), and Anderson v. Smith, Civ. No. 1:06-CV-1795 OWW SMS, 2009 WL 2139311 at *19 (E.D.Cal.2009) (plaintiff who denied'knowingly surrendering her interest in her animals because she did not wear her glasses when she signed the form did not suffer a due process violation because state remedies could redress her injury).

4. Whether the HIHS Defendants Violated Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment Right to Equal Protection

Plaintiff asserts that the HIHS Defendants intentionally treated him differently from other similarly situated individuals and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. SAC at 26-27. The HIHS Defendants state that the Surrender Form and the general POA demonstrate that the HIHS Defendants did not violate Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. HIHS Defs.’ MSJ at 2-3, ECF No. 98.

Plaintiff argues a “class-of-one” theory for his Equal Protection Claim. For the “class-of-one” doctrine, the court determines whether a person has “been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 602, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008). However, the Supreme Court noted that the cases applying the “class-of-one” doctrine involved “the existence of a clear standard against which departures, even for a single plaintiff, could be readily assessed.” Id. at 602, 128 S.Ct. 2146. In this case, Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact because Plaintiff has not presented any evidence of a clear standard that the HIHS Defendants deviated from when performing their duties. SAC at 26-27, See generally Plntf.’s HIHS Opp., ECF No. 109.

Moreover, the Supreme Court noted that state actors involved in discretionary decisions do not create a “class-of-one” claim because discretionary decisionmak-ing involves a “vast array of subjective, individualized assessments,” precluding the creation of a standard. Id. at 603, 128 S.Ct. 2146. The Supreme Court specifically noted that officers enforcing laws like traffic laws are considered to be operating in a discretionary function and therefore do not violate the Equal Protection Clause by enforcing the law against some people and not others. Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 602, 128 S.Ct. 2146,170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008).

The HIHS Defendants’ actions as law enforcement officials likewise do not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the HIHS Defendants had discretion with regard to enforcing animal control laws.

Accordingly, because Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding his Equal Protection Claim, this Court grants summary judgment in favor of the HIHS Defendants. See also, Dun-ham v. Kootenai Cnty., 690 F.Supp.2d 1162, 1177 (D.Idaho 2010) (court denied equal protection claim involving law officer’s seizure of plaintiffs horses).

B. Whether Defendant Yamada’s Actions Are Protected by Qualified Immunity

The Court concludes that the HIHS Defendants did not violate Plaintiffs constitutional rights, but as an alternative basis for deciding the constitutional claims, the Court will consider whether or not Officer Yamada is entitled to protection under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Officer Yamada raises the defense of qualified immunity as to Plaintiffs § 1983 Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims because the actions forming the basis of this suit were performed in the course of her official duties. HIHS Defs.’ MSJ at 15-17, ECF No. 98, SAC at 23. Because qualified immunity protects Officer Yama-da’s actions, this Court GRANTS summary judgment as to Plaintiffs federal claims against Officer Yamada.

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). “The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government official’s error is “a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.” ” Id.

When examining a claim of qualified immunity, the court may use a two part test by examining (1) “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right” and (2) “whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of [the] defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id. at 232, 129 S.Ct. 808. The Supreme Court has held that courts “may grant qualified immunity on the ground that a purported right was not “clearly established” by prior case law, without resolving the more difficult question whether the purported right exists at all.” Reichle v. Howards, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 2093, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012)(eiting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236,129 S.Ct. 808). When examining whether a right has been “clearly established,” the right allegedly violated must be established “not as a broad general proposition, but in a particularized sense so that the contours of the right are clear to a reasonable official.” Reichle v. Howards, 132 S.Ct. at 2094.

In this case, the Court already examined the first prong of the qualified immunity test in Section I.A. and concluded that the HIHS Defendants did not violate Plaintiffs constitutional rights. See supra at 1097-1106. However, even if the HIHS Defendants had committed a violation, Reichle indicates that Officer Yamada would still be protected from liability if the right was not “clearly established” during the time of the violation. See id. Accordingly, the Court examines the second prong of whether the constitutional rights identified by Plaintiff were clearly established during the time of the alleged violation.

1. Whether the Doctrine of Qualified Immunity Applies to Hawaii Island Humane Society Officers

As an initial issue, Defendant Yamada is employed by the Hawaii Island Humane Society, which is an independent contractor hired by the County of Hawai’i to carry out the “County’s animal control program” under Hawai’i County Code and the Hawai’i Revised Statutes. HIHS Defs.’ Errata Ex. A at 2079, ECF No. 140. The Supreme Court has held that private defendants are not covered by immunity unless “firmly rooted tradition” and “special policy concerns involved in suing government officials” warrant immunity. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 404, 117 S.Ct. 2100, 138 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997). In this case, Officer Yamada qualifies for qualified immunity.

In Filarsky v. Delia, the Supreme Court noted that historical tradition supports qualified immunity for “individuals engaged in law enforcement activities, such as sheriffs and constables.” — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1657, 1664, 182 L.Ed.2d 662 (2012). “[A]t common law, a special constable, duly appointed according to law, had all the powers of a regular constable so far as may be necessary for the proper discharge of the special duties entrusted to him, and in the lawful discharge of those duties, was as fully protected as any other officer.” Id. The Supreme Court also noted that sheriffs executing warrants were allowed under common law to enlist the aid of private individuals in order to do so. Id. Under common law, a private individual had the same authority of the sheriff and was protected to the same extent. Id.

In this case, state and county law demonstrates that officers of HIHS like Defendant Yamada are duly appointed by law to execute search warrants and perform law enforcement functions like those of the police. See Haw.Rev.Stat. § 711-1109.1(1) & (4). Hawaii state law also directly provides that HIHS officers may “make arrests and bring before any district judge thereof offenders found violating the provisions of section 711-1109 to be dealt with according to law.” Haw.Rev. Stat. § 711-1110. Additionally, the Humane Society’s contract with the Hawaii County Police Department (“HCPD”) provides, inter alia, (1) HIHS requires agreement with HCPD before it may change facility hours or patrol hours; (2) HIHS is required to respond to HCPD dispatch requests and to make dispatch requests to HCPD when HIHS is contacted by the public; (3) HIHS is to coordinate with HCPD regarding after-hours responses by police officers to public requests regarding animals; (4) HCPD will offer training, including the attempt to “coordinate training with an ongoing police recruit class”; (5) HIHS will submit quarterly reports of activities, revenues, and expenses to the HCPD police chief; (6) HIHS will keep a system of records regarding communications with HCPD and the public; and (7) HIHS must submit its administrative procedures regarding enforcement, investigation, and shelter operations to HCPD for review and approval. HIHS Defs.’ Errata to MSJ Ex. A at 2085-2089, ECF No. 140. The statutory provisions, close collaboration between HIHS and the HCPD, and HCPD’s power to review HIHS procedures merits a conclusion that officers of HIHS are private actors enlisted by the police department to exercise police powers to discharge special public duties. See id. Accordingly, in this situation, the private actors also enjoy the same protections afforded to law enforcement officers.

Additionally, “special policy concerns” support granting HIHS officers qualified immunity in this case. Animal control officers, like police officers, should be encouraged to perform their public duties without “unwarranted timidity” that may decrease their effectiveness in responding to public danger. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (“[T]here is the danger that fear of being sued will dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible public officials, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.”). This concern particularly applies to the type of work required by the HIHS and HCPD contract, which includes HCPD and fire department emergency calls, animal attacks by uncontained animals, and public safety situations. See HIHS Defs.’ Errata to MSJ Ex. A at 2087, ECF No. 140.

In Filarsky, the Supreme Court also noted that private individuals who work in close coordination with public employees may face threatened legal action for the same conduct. 132 S.Ct. at 1666. While government employees would be protected by some form of immunity; private individuals would face “full liability for actions taken in conjunction with government employees who enjoy immunity for the same activity.” Id. In such cases, private individuals may be deterred from accepting such assignments. This special policy concern applies in this case, where HIHS officers are required to accompany HCPD officers upon request. HIHS Defs.’ Errata to MSJ Ex. A at 2089, ECF No. 140.

Additionally, the Supreme Court noted that in situations where private individuals work with government employees, lawsuits filed against private individuals for conduct performed in conjunction with government employees will likely embroil government employees as well, distracting them from their duties. Filarsky, 132 S.Ct. at 1666 (noting that government employees are likely to be called to testify in the private individual’s lawsuit). HCPD and HIHS are likely to face such embroilment based on the collaboration required under the contract as explained above. See supra at 1107-08. In conclusion, the nature of the relationship between HIHS and HCPD combined with the historical background of private individuals employed by law enforcement officers establishes that Officer Yamada is protected by qualified immunity in this case.

While the Supreme Court held in Richardson v. McKnight that private contractor prison guards are not covered by qualified immunity; that case is distinguishable from Defendant Yamada’s case because the Court found that “firmly rooted tradition” did not support a finding of qualified immunity for private contractor prison guards. 521 U.S. 399, 404, 117 S.Ct. 2100, 138 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997). Regarding the second prong of “special policy concerns,” the Supreme Court noted that the prison had competitive market pressures to provide incentives to avoid timid or fearful performance. Id. at 409-410, 117 S.Ct. 2100. Wfiiile HIHS as an independent contractor may also have competitive market pressures; the Court in Richardson noted that the prison performed its task “independently, with relatively less ongoing direct state supervision.” Id. at 409, 117 S.Ct. 2100 (noting that the private prison was exempted from monitoring or inspections). Such freedom allowed the private contractor prison to respond to market pressures to adjust employee behavior. See id. at 410, 117 S.Ct. 2100. In this ease, there is close government collaboration and supervision that restricts HIHS’s ability to respond as a private firm to market pressures. See supra at 1107-08. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendant Yamada is protected by qualified immunity because of HCPD’s collaboration with HIHS and its supervision over HIHS’ work.

2. Whether the Doctrine of Qualified i Immunity Protects Officer Yamada as to Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment Claims

Plaintiffs argument that Defendant Ya-mada violated Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights by disposing of the Dogs does not overcome Officer Yamada’s protection under the doctrine of qualified immunity. See Plntf.’s HIHS Opp. at 6, ECF No. 109. Wfiiile the Fourth Amendment generally prevents “meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests” in his property (Soldal v. Cook Cnty., Ill, 506 U.S. 56, 68, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992)); Officer Yamada argues that, at the time HIHS disposed of the Dogs, she reasonably assumed that Plaintiff Young did not have a possessory'interest in the Dogs. HIHS Defs.’ MSJ at 6-7, ECF No. 98, HIHS Defs.’ Reply at 5-6, ECF No. 139.

As mentioned in Section I.A. above, the Court concludes that Officer Yamada did not violate the Fourth Amendment because a reasonable officer could have believed that Roberta Young had the authority to execute a Surrender Form for the Dogs based on the general POA.- See supra at 1100-02. However, even if Officer Yamada’s actions constituted a violation of Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights, qualified immunity would apply because Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights were not “clearly established” during the time of Officer Yamada’s actions. See Torres, 524 F.3d at 1057 n. 5 (holding that, even if an officer acted unreasonably, the officer may be entitled to qualified immunity if it was not clearly established that the objective unreasonableness of the conduct violated constitutional rights).

There is no clear statute or court precedent that an animal control officer violates constitutional rights by relying on facially valid forms consenting to the transfer of ownership of property to the government. See Pennington v. Penner, 207 F.Supp.2d 1225, 1241 (D.Kan.2002) (qualified immunity protected animal control officer who relied on plaintiffs agreement to relinquish horses even though plaintiff alleged agreement was obtained under duress). Accordingly, in the absence of explicit statutory or ease law, the contours of Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights in this ease were not “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official” would understand that accepting the validity of the Surrender Form and the general POA would violate Plaintiffs constitutional rights. See id.; cf. James v. Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646, 652 (9th Cir.2010).

Plaintiff fails to identify a genuine issue of material issue of fact as to whether Yamada violated a “clearly established” right. See Plntf.’s HIHS MSJ Opp. at 9-10, ECF No. 109. If reasonably competent officials could disagree about whether or not the Surrender Form and general POA legitimately divested Plaintiff of his ownership in the Dogs, then qualified immunity should be recognized. KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1115 (9th Cir.2004) (“the relevant, dispositive inquiry ... is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted”); Cf Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (“Defendants will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue; but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized.”).

While Plaintiff may contest what he actually stated to Ostendorp (supra at 1094-95), Plaintiff does not contest what Osten-dorp said to Yamada, which is a key factor in the inquiry for determining the objective reasonableness of Yamada’s conduct. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (holding that an examination of objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct will “often require examination of the information possessed by the ... officials”). The conversations between Yamada and Osten-dorp presented in Plaintiffs own exhibit illustrate that Ostendorp, representing himself to be Plaintiffs attorney, indicated that the Dogs would willingly be surrendered to prevent Plaintiff from getting into more trouble while on probation. Plntf.’s JCSF Ex. 4 at 000016, ECF Nos. 154 & 155. Plaintiff does not refute the content of these conversations.

Plaintiff makes specific arguments about (1) comments in a letter Yamada received from Ostendorp and (2) a conversation between Yamada and a woman who called on October 7, 2009 and represented herself to be Roberta. Plntf.’s Supp. Opp. at 2-3, ECF No. 156. While the letter shows that Ostendorp asked Yamada not to notify Plaintiff about the Dogs, Plaintiff ignores the part of the letter where Ostendorp represents to Yamada that the Dogs no longer belonged to Plaintiff. HIHS Defs.’ MSJ Ex. C, ECF No. 98. As a result, this evidence fails to create a material issue of fact as to whether Yamada violated a “clearly established” constitutional right because reasonable officers could certainly disagree as to whether Plaintiff had a pos-sessory interest under the Fourth Amendment.

In the October 7th phone call to Yama-da, the woman purported to be Roberta stated that she had a general POA signed by Plaintiff and wanted to surrender the Dogs to HIHS. During the conversation, she also stated that “she was fearful of [Plaintiff], and did not want him learning that she had surrendered the dogs.” Plntf.’s Supp. JCSF Ex. 4 at 5, ECF Nos. 154 & 155. However, as mentioned previously, Yamada