Citations
- 949 F. Supp. 2d 1247
Full opinion text
OPINION
RIDGWAY, Judge:
In this action, the Plaintiff domestic producer of steel nails Mid Continent Nail Corporation (“Mid Continent”) contests the final results, as amended, of the U.S. Department of Commerce’s first administrative review of the antidumping duty order covering steel nails from, the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”). See Certain Steel Nails From the People’s Republic of China: Final Results of the First Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 76 Fed.Reg. 16,379 (March 23, 2011) (“Final Results”); Certain Steel . Nails From the People’s Republic of China: Amended Final Results of the First Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 76 Fed.Reg. 23,279 (April 26, 2011) (“Amended Final Results”).
Pending before the court is Mid Continent’s Amended Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record. ■ Mid Continent contests two aspects of Commerce’s Final Results — specifically, Commerce’s selection of mandatory respondents for individual review, and Commerce’s treatment of certain entries of merchandise that were initially wrongly attributed to one particular company. See generally Amended Memorandum in Support of Mid Continent Nail Corporation’s Rule 56.2 Amended Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record (“Pl.’s Brief’); Reply Brief of Mid Continent Nail Corporation (“Pl.’s Reply Brief’).
The Government as well as the Defendanfi-Intervenors — comprising a total of 15 producers, exporters, and importers of steel nails subject to the antidumping duty order — maintain that Mid Continent’s claims are baseless and that the Final Results should be sustained. See generally Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Rule 56.2 Motion for Judgment Upon the Agency Record (“Def.’s Brief’); Defendant-Intervenors’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Rule 56.2 Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record (“Def.-Ints.’ Brief’).
Jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2006). As detailed below, Mid Continent’s Amended Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record must be granted in part and denied in part.
I. Background
In this action, Mid Continent mounts two attacks on the Final Results in the first administrative review of the anti-dumping duty order on steel nails from the PRC. First, Mid Continent challenges Commerce’s selection of two respondents for individual examination. See generally Pl.’s Brief at 1, 6-10, 15; PL’s Reply Brief at 1-9. And, second, Mid Continent contests Commerce’s determination concerning the liquidation instructions issued to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) for certain entries of merchandise that were initially attributed to Certified Products International Inc. (“CPI”). See generally PL’s Brief at 1-2, 13-15; PL’s Reply Brief at 9-15. The relevant facts are summarized below.
A. Commerce’s Selection of Respondents for Individual Review
In an antidumping administrative review, Commerce generally is required to establish an individual dumping margin for “each known exporter and producer of the subject merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(1). However, when a review involves a “large number” of exporters and producers, the statute authorizes Commerce to limit its determination of individual dumping margins to a “reasonable number” of exporters or producers, which are referred to as “mandatory respondents.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f — 1(c)(2); Antidumping Manual, Chap. 10 at 6 (Dep’t Commerce Oct. 13, 2009) (“AD Manual”).
The dumping margins for respondents that qualify for a separate rate but are not subject to individual examination are based on the weighted average of the mandatory respondents’ dumping margins, excluding rates that are zero, de minimis, or based entirely on adverse facts available. AD Manual, Chap. 10 at 7. Companies subject to a review that do not respond to Commerce’s requests for information are considered to be part of the “non-market, economy-wide - entity” (“NME-wide entity”) and are assigned the “NME-wide rate.” Id.
The first issue in this action is whether Commerce’s decision to limit the number of mandatory respondents to two was lawful. Shortly after the. administrative review in question was initiated, Commerce signaled its intent — in light of the large number of exporters and producers involved in the review — to use U.S. import data from Customs to select a limited number of. respondents for individual review; and Commerce invited comments on that proposal. Mandatory Respondent Selection Notice at 1 (Pub.Doc. No. 26). In its first comments on respondent selection, Mid Continent stated that “analysis of the [customs] data indicates that [Commerce ] reasonably should determine to limit the number of respondents in this review to two.” Mid Continent First Comments on Respondent Selection at 3 (Pub.Doc. No. 35) (emphasis added). Mid Continent emphasized that “[n]either the statute nor the regulations set[s ] a minimum or limit on the number of respondents ..., or the volume of imports that should be covered,” opining that “those numbers will depend on a variety of factors, including the number of producers ... included in the review, the nature of the business operations, and the types of products that the respondents produce.” Id. (emphasis added). •.
Mid Continent specifically urged Commerce to select Stanley and CPI as the two mandatory respondents for individual review. Mid Continent First Comments on Respondent Selection at 4. Mid Continent stated that, among other things, Stanley and CPI would “provide a representative sample of respondent types,” because CPI sourced subject merchandise from multiple Chinese producers. Id.
In making its respondent selection decision, Commerce determined that, in light of the fact that review had been requested as to 159 exporters and producers, and given the agency’s resource constraints, it simply was not practicable to calculate individual margins for all respondents. See First Respondent Selection Memorandum at 2-3 (Pub.Doc. No. 123). Instead, relying on customs data, Commerce selected as mandatory respondents the two largest exporters by volume for the relevant period — specifically, Stanley and CPI, the two respondents that Mid Continent had advocated. See id. at 5; 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(e)(2)(B).
From the first days of the review, CPI had argued to Commerce that it should not be selected as a mandatory respondent, because it had no shipments to the United States during the period of review. See CPI Comments on Respondent Selection at 2-5 (Conf.Doc. No. 17). In the First Respondent Selection Memorandum, Commerce advised that, “if CPI claims it had no shipments during this [period of review], [Commerce] will consider it a no shipment respondent and then select another respondent.” First Respondent Selection Memorandum at 5. Commerce subsequently deselected CPI as a mandatory respondent in light of its claim of no shipments (see CPI “No Shipment” Letter at 2-3 (Pub.Doc. No. 124)), and replaced CPI with Tianjin Xiantong Material & Trade Co., Ltd., which, together with Stanley, “accounted] for the largest volume of exports that [could] be reasonably examined.” See Second Respondent Selection Memorandum at 2-3 (Pub.Doc. No. 142).
In response to Commerce’s decision to replace CPI with one additional respondent, Mid Continent submitted comments, in which it argued, among other things, that Commerce should “select as mandatory respondents no fewer than five and up to eight of the largest exporters identified by the [customs] data.” Mid Continent Additional Comments on Respondent Selection at 11 (Conf.Doc. No. 66). One month later, when Tianjin Xiantong refused to participate in the administrative review, Mid Continent urged Commerce to select the next three largest exporters by export volume as mandatory respondents. Mid Continent Supplemental Comments on Respondent Selection at 2 (Conf.Doc. No. 74). Commerce replaced Tianjin Xiantong with Shandong Minmetal Co., Ltd., the next largest exporter by volume. See Third Respondent Selection Memorandum at 2 (Pub.Doc. No. 175).
Commerce thereafter issued its Preliminary Results, reflecting dumping margins of 6.48% for Stanley and 51.25% for Shandong Minmetal. See Certain Steel Nails From the People’s Republic of China: Notice of Preliminary Results and Preliminary Rescission, in Part, of the Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,070, 56,077 (Sept. 15, 2010) (“Preliminary Results”). In addition, Commerce assigned dumping margins of 13.31% to the 24 “separate rate respondents” who were not individually reviewed based on the weighted average of the publicly available U.S. sales values for Stanley and Shandong Minmetal. See id., 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,074, 56,077. Eighty-two companies for which a review was requested did not apply for separate rate status and were thus assessed at the PRC-wide rate of 118.04%. Id., 75 Fed.Reg. at 56,074-75.
After the Preliminary Results were released, Mid Continent filed an administrative case brief with Commerce, contesting various aspects of the agency’s analysis. See generally Mid Continent Case Brief (Pub.Doc. No. 837). In general, when a party files an administrative case brief, that submission must address all of the party’s objections, even those arguments that the party “presented before the ... preliminary results,” in order to preserve an issue for further consideration. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.309(c)(2). However, although Mid Continent had previously voiced concerns about Commerce’s respondent selection process and although its positions on respondent selection had changed over time, Mid Continent’s administrative case brief was silent on the issue. See Mid Continent Case Brief.
After the Preliminary Results were released but before the Final Results issued, Shandong Minmetal ceased its participation in the administrative review. See Final Results, 76 Fed.Reg. at 16,380. As a result, Stanley became the sole mandatory respondent for the Final Results, and the weighted average margins of the separate rate respondents were adjusted to 13.90%, Stanley’s rate. See id., 76 Fed.Reg. at 16,381-82. The Amended Final Results, which accounted for a ministerial error in Commerce’s calculation of Stanley’s margin, further adjusted the dumping margins of Stanley and the separate rate respondents downward from 13.90% to 10.63%. See Amended Final Results, 76 Fed.Reg. at 23,280.
The Issues & Decision Memorandum that accompanied the Final Results did not address Commerce’s selection of mandatory respondents, because Mid Continent’s administrative case brief, filed with the agency after issuance of the Preliminary Results, had not raised the issue. See Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Results of the First Antidumping Duty Administrative Review (March 14, 2011) (Pub.Doc. No. 381) (“Issues & Decision Memorandum”).
B. Commerce’s Treatment of Entries Initially Mis-Attributed to CPI
In non-market economy (“NME”) investigations and administrative reviews, Commerce “begins with a rebuttable presumption that all companies within the country are essentially operating units of a single, government-wide entity and, thus, should receive a single antidumping duty rate (i.e., an NME-wide rate).” AD Manual, Chap. 10 at 3. If an exporter can establish that it is separate from the government-wide entity, it may obtain a “separate rate.” Id.; see also n. 6, supra (explaining how exporters establish that they qualify for separate rate). All separate rates assigned in NME investigations are specific to an exporter, and to the producer that supplied the exporter during the period of investigation. These rates are called “combination rates.” See Import Administration Policy Bulletin 05.1: Separate-Rates Practice and Application of Combination Rates in Antidumping Investigations Involving Non-Market Economy Countries (2005) (“Policy Bulletin 05.1”) at 6-7. Commerce uses these exporter-producer-specific “combination rates” as a tool to prevent companies from “funneling” subject merchandise through exporters with the lowest rates. See id. at 6-7.
The second issue presented in this action concerns Commerce’s rejection of Mid Continent’s request that Commerce impose the PRC-wide rate, 118.04% — the highest rate in this review — on certain companies that entered goods under the combination rates assigned to CPI, one of the defendant-intervenors in this case. CPI (discussed in section I.A, above) is a Taiwan-based company that does not produce nails, but, instead, purchases them from various unaffiliated producers in mainland China and resells them to customers in the United States. See CPI “No Shipment” Letter at Exh. 1.
In the antidumping investigation that preceded this administrative review, Commerce assigned exporter-producer-specific combination rates to CPI as an exporter with respect to 29 different Chinese producers. See Notice of Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Steel Nails From the People’s Republic of China, 78 Fed.Reg. 44,961, 44,968-64 (Aug. 1, 2008) (“Anti-dumping Order”) (listing CPI’s various combination rates). The combination rate for each such exporter-producer pair was 21.24%. See id., 73 Fed.Reg. at 44,963-64.
During the period of review, 23 of CPI’s unique combination rate codes from the investigation were used by importers to enter subject merchandise into the United States. See Issues & Decision Memorandum at 24. However, as discussed above, shortly after the administrative review began, CPI explained to Commerce that it had not exported any subject merchandise during the period of review and thus should not be considered the exporter of the entries that customs data attributed to CPI. See generally CPI “No Shipment” Letter at 2-3; section I.A, supra. On the other hand, CPI acknowledged purchasing nails for resale (but not for export) from many of the 23 unaffiliated producers that had entered goods into the U.S. using CPI’s combination rates during the period of review. See CPI Comments on Respondent Selection at 2-5.
Commerce’s “no shipment” review of CPI involved extensive investigation. In determining that CPI made no shipments, Commerce concluded that the entries that were initially attributed to CPI resulted from other companies entering merchandise under CPI’s combination rates. Partial Rescission Memorandum at 3-5 (Conf. Doc. No. 129). CPI acknowledged that it had sourced nails from 13 of the 23 companies that had entered subject merchandise under CPI’s combination rates during the period of review, and that those producers had knowledge that the goods sold to CPI were destined for the United States. Id. at 4. CPI also provided sample sales trace packages for the 13 companies. Id.
Commerce concluded that, where companies had knowledge that goods sold to CPI were destined for the United States, those companies (rather than CPI) would be considered the actual exporters, and CPI would be considered a reseller. Partial Rescission Memorandum at 3-4. Commerce confirmed with Customs that CPI itself had not made any relevant shipments, and then obtained from Customs entry packages for each of the 23 companies whose Customs case number related to CPI. See id. at 4, Att. 4.
Commerce determined that entries from 13 of the companies accounted for “the vast majority of the entries attributed to CPI” and that the 13 companies — and not CPI — should be considered the exporters. Partial Rescission Memorandum at 4. Commerce further determined that the combination rates shared by CPI and the other 10 companies “account for a minuscule percentage of the entries,” and indicated that those errors were explained as “coding errors upon entry or differences in timing.” Id. After reviewing Customs entry packages for the remaining 10 companies, Commerce concluded that “examination of the entry documents demonstrates that they did not pertain to the combination under which they were entered,” and that they were therefore not attributable to CPI. Id.
In its Preliminary Results, Commerce announced that — after investigating CPI’s claim that it had no shipments to the United States during the period of review — the agency was preliminarily rescinding the administrative review with respect to CPI. See Preliminary Results, 75 Fed.Reg. at 56,071. In the administrative ease brief that Mid Continent filed with Commerce following issuance of the Preliminary Results, Mid Continent challenged the various companies’ use of CPI’s combination rates. Mid Continent Case Brief at 11-16. Mid Continent argued that “exporters deliberately used CPI’s combination [rates] to take advantage of [CPI’s] cash deposit rate,” and asserted that Commerce should address “this type of exporter fraud” by instructing Customs to apply the highest rate in the proceeding — the PRC-wide rate — to steel nails exported by those companies using CPI’s combination rates. Id. at 14-15.
In its Issues & Decision Memorandum supporting the Final Results, Commerce explained that — as to the 23 companies with entries that were initially mis-attributed to CPI — the agency would instruct Customs to liquidate the entries at issue depending on whether the company was one of the 13 companies that had knowledge that its goods were destined for the United States or one of the 10 companies for which no record evidence demonstrated a connection to CPI. Issues & Decision Memorandum at 24-25. For the 13 companies that had knowledge that goods sold to CPI were destined for the United States, Commerce stated that it would instruct Customs to liquidate entries at “the separate rate they earned either in the [underlying antidumping] investigation or in this review, as applicable.” See id. at 24. For the 10 companies with entries that were initially mis-attributed to CPI but did not appear to be connected to CPI, Commerce indicated that it would instruct Customs to “assess [antidumping] duties at the rate in effect at the time of entry.” See id. at 25. In addition, noting that “record evidence” indicated that “some entries may have been classified under the incorrect combination rate,” Commerce advised that it was referring the matter to Customs for consideration of possible enforcement action. See id.
This action followed.
II. Standard of Review
' In an action reviewing an anti-dumping determination by Commerce, the agency’s determination must be upheld except to the extent that it is found to be “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i); see also NMB Singapore Ltd. v. United States, 557 F.3d 1316, 1319 (Fed.Cir.2009). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla”; rather, it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)); see also Mittal Steel Point Lisas Ltd. v. United States, 548 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2008) (same). Moreover, any evaluation of the substantiality of evidence “must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight,” including “contradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn.” Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 44 F.3d 978, 985 (Fed.Cir.1994) (quoting Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 487-88, 71 S.Ct. 456); see also Mittal Steel, 548 F.3d at 1380-81 (same). That said, the mere fact that it may be possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from the record does not prevent Commerce’s determination from being supported by substantial evidence. Am. Silicon Techs. v. United States, 261 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed.Cir.2001); see also Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966).
While Commerce must explain the bases for its decisions, “its explanations do not have to be perfect.” NMB Singapore, 557 F.3d at 1319. Nevertheless, “the path of Commerce’s decision must be reasonably discernable,” to support judicial review. Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983)); see generally 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(i)(3)(A) (requiring Commerce to “include in a final determination ... an explanation of the basis for its determination”).
Finally, under the familiar Chevron framework, Commerce’s statutory interpretation is reviewed using a two step analysis, first examining “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). If so, courts must “give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” ' Household Credit Servs. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 239, 124 S.Ct. 1741, 158 L.Ed.2d 450 (2004) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778). If instead Congress has left a “gap” for Commerce to fill, the agency’s interpretation is “given controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778; see also Household Credit, 541 U.S. at 239, 124 S.Ct. 1741.
As a rule, courts afford “great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration.” Udall v. Tall-man, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965). The agency’s construction need not be the only reasonable one or the result that the court would have reached had the question first arisen in' a judicial proceeding. Id. (citing Unemployment Comp. Comm’n of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153, 67 S.Ct. 245, 91 L.Ed. 136 (1946)). Courts thus are not to “weigh the wisdom of, or to resolve any struggle between, competing views of the public interest, but rather to respect legitimate policy choices made by the agency in interpreting and applying the statute.” Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 665 (Fed.Cir.1992) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866, 104 S.Ct. 2778).
III. Analysis
Mid Continent first contends that Commerce’s decision to limit its individual review to two respondents contravened the statute. In addition, Mid Continent disputes Commerce’s determinations concerning the treatment of the entries that were initially attributed to CPI.
For the reasons set forth in the analysis that follows, Mid Continent’s challenge to Commerce’s selection of respondents is unavailing. See section III.A, infra. However, one of Mid Continent’s arguments on the second issue raises concerns that warrant remand. See section III.B, infra.
A. Commerce’s Selection of Respondents for Individual Review
As a threshold matter, Defendant-Intervenors point out that Mid Continent failed to exhaust its administrative remedies as to Commerce’s respondent selection process. Defendant-Intervenors assert that Mid Continent therefore is not entitled to press its respondent selection claim here. See generally Def.-Ints.’ Brief at 2-3, 28-31. Mid Continent contends that it was not required to exhaust its remedies under the circumstances of this case. See generally Pl.’s Reply Brief at 5-9.
On the merits, Mid Continent argues that Commerce was obligated by statute to conduct individual reviews of more than two companies, and that the agency erred in not selecting additional respondents for individual review. See generally PL’s Brief at 1, 6-10, 15; PL’s Reply Brief at 1-5. For their part, the Government and Defendant-Intervenors defend Commerce’s respondent selection determinations, maintaining that they were in all respects supported by substantial evidence and otherwise in accordance with law. See generally Def.’s Brief at 7, 9-12, 18; Def.Ints.’ Brief at 2-3, 20-28, 39.
As detailed below, Mid Continent’s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies is fatal to its respondent selection claim. However, even if Mid Continent’s respondent selection claim were to be considered on its merits, Mid Continent nevertheless would not prevail.
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Commerce’s regulations authorize a party that is dissatisfied with the preliminary results in a proceeding to file an administrative case brief, which “must present all arguments that continue in the submitter’s view to be relevant” to a final determination by the agency, including “any arguments presented before the date of publication of the ... preliminary results.” See 19 C.F.R. § 351.309(e)(l)-(2). Emphasizing that Mid Continent did not object to any aspect of Commerce’s respondent selection determinations in the administrative case brief that Mid Continent filed in the course of the administrative review, Defendant-Intervenors argue that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies bars Mid Continent from raising any such objection now. See generally Def.-Ints.’ Brief at 2-3, 16, 28-31.
The doctrine of exhaustion holds generally that “no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.” Sandvik Steel Co. v. United States, 164 F.3d 596, 599 (Fed.Cir.1998) (quoting McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is thus a well-settled principle of administrative law that “[a] reviewing court usurps the agency’s function when it sets aside [an agency] determination upon a ground not theretofore presented and deprives the [agency] of an opportunity to consider the matter, make its ruling, and state the reasons for its action.” Unemployment Compensation Comm’n of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 155, 67 S.Ct. 245, 91 L.Ed. 136 (1946); see, e.g., Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1185, 1191 (Fed.Cir.1990).
“[T]he prescribed administrative remedy for challenging aspects of the preliminary results with which a party disagrees” is for the party to set forth its objections in its administrative case brief filed with the agency. Corus Staal BV v. United States, 502 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2007); see generally id., 502 F.3d at 1378-81 (holding, in context of administrative review, that party failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not raising issue in administrative case brief filed with agency). “If a party does not exhaust available administrative remedies, ‘judicial review of [Commerce’s actions] is inappropriate.’ ” Consol. Bearings Co. v. United States, 348 F.3d 997, 1003 (Fed.Cir.2003) (quoting Sharp Corp. v. United States, 837 F.2d 1058, 1062 (Fed.Cir.1988)). ‘“[T]he [Court of International- Trade] generally takes a “strict view” of the requirement that parties exhaust their administrative remedies.’ ” Yangzhou Bestpak Gifts & Crafts Co. v. United States, 716 F.3d 1370, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2013) (quoting Corus Staal; 502 F.3d at 1379 (citations omitted)).
Requiring exhaustion even in a discretionary, non jurisdictional context is sound policy, because it allows the agency to apply its expertise, to correct its own mistakes, and to compile an adequate record to support judicial review, advancing the dual purposes of protecting agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (discussing two main purposes of doctrine of exhaustion, i.e., protecting “administrative agency authority” and promoting judicial economy); Itochu Building Prods. v. United States, 733 F.3d 1140, 1144-46 (Fed.Cir.2013) (same); Richey v. United States, 322 F.3d 1317, 1326 (Fed.Cir.2003) (same). Accordingly, in actions challenging determinations in antidumping administrative reviews, the Court of International Trade requires litigants to exhaust administrative remedies “where appropriate.” 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d); see also Corus Staal, 502 F.3d at 1379 (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d) “indicates a congressional intent that, absent a strong contrary reason,” court should require exhaustion of administrative remedies); Itochu, 733 F.3d at 1144-46 (same, citing Corus Staal); McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) (explaining that, even “where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs”).
There are a handful of limited exceptions to the requirement that a party exhaust its administrative remedies. See, e.g., 5 J. Stein, G. Mitchell, & B. Mezines, Administrative Law § 49.02, at 49-47 (2012) (summarizing exceptions, including inadequacy of administrative remedy, impending irreparable harm, ultra vires agency action, futility, and pure legal question); Itochu, 733 F.3d at 1144-46, 1146-47 (noting that “[c]ourts have recognized several recurring circumstances in which institutional interests are not sufficiently weighty or application of the doctrine would otherwise be unjust,” including situations where the “futility” and “pure question of law” exceptions apply, and where requiring exhaustion would cause harm to party). In the case at bar, much like the importer in Corns Staal, Mid Continent “has provided nothing by way of affirmative justification for its failure to raise the [respondent selection] issue in its case brief.” Corus Staal, 502 F.3d at 1381. Mid Continent nevertheless seeks refuge within the narrow confines of the exceptions for “futility” and “pure legal question.” See generally Pl.’s Reply Brief at 5-9.
Mid Continent strains to cast its respondent selection claim as a “pure legal question.” See PL’s Reply Brief at 5-9. But that shoe won’t fit. Contrary to its assertions, Mid Continent’s respondent selection claim has factual, as well as legal, components. See, e.g., Asahi Seiko Co. v. United States, 35 C.I.T. -, -, 755 F.Supp.2d 1316, 1329-30 (2011) (rejecting party’s attempt to invoke “pure legal question” exception where “[t]he actual claim ... delves into factual issues impheating the evidence on the administrative record”). For example, Mid Continent’s contention that Commerce erred in deciding that two was a sufficient number of mandatory respondents implicates the agency’s reasons for selecting two respondents, which are factual in nature (including considerations such as the percentage of total period of review imports represented by the selected mandatory respondents). See First Respondent Selection Memorandum at 4. Also relevant are facts concerning whether an alternative selection of companies might have been more appropriate. See Third Respondent Selection Memorandum at 2-3 (summarizing reasons for selecting a certain company and noting administrative burden). Mid Continent’s reliance on the “pure legal question” exception to the doctrine of exhaustion therefore is misplaced.
Nor can Mid Continent shoehorn itself into the “futility” exception. See generally Pl.’s Reply Brief at 5-9. As the Court of Appeals has emphasized, the futility exception — like the other exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion — “is a narrow one.” See Corus Staal, 502 F.3d at 1379 (sustaining trial court’s rejection of futility exception in civil action challenging final results of administrative review). Thus, “[t]he mere fact that an adverse decision may have been likely does not excuse a party from ... exhausting] [its] administrative remedies.” Id. “[E]ven- if it is likely” that Commerce would have rejected Mid Continent’s arguments, “it would still have been preferable, for purposes of administrative regularity and judicial efficiency, for [Mid Continent] to make its arguments in its case brief and for Commerce to give its full and final administrative response in the final results.” Id., 502 F.3d at 1380.
Although Mid Continent maintains that Commerce fully addressed Mid Continent’s arguments in the agency’s Third Respondent Selection Memorandum, that document was not necessarily designed to be “Commerce’s last word on the matter.” See PL’s Reply Brief at 7; Corus Staal, 502 F.3d at 1380. If Mid Continent had addressed the issue of respondent selection in its administrative case brief, Commerce would have provided a “full and final administrative response [to Mid Continent’s arguments] in the final results.” Id. When Mid Continent failed to pursue the issue in its administrative case brief, Commerce (and the other parties) were reasonably entitled to assume that Mid Continent had elected to abandon the fight. See, e.g., Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm. v. United States, 33 C.I.T. 1906, 1919, 675 F.Supp.2d 1287, 1300 (2009) (Wallach, J.) (explaining that, where a party raised objections to respondent selection process earlier in a proceeding, but then failed to raise any issue as to respondent selection in its administrative case brief, “Commerce could reasonably have concluded that [the party] was no longer pursuing its respondent selection challenge”).
“[Requiring [Mid Continent] to set forth its factual and legal arguments [on respondent selection] in detail in its case brief would have had potential value either by resulting in possible relief for [Mid Continent] or at least providing the agency an opportunity to set forth its position in a manner that would facilitate judicial review.” Corus Staal, 502 F.3d at 1380 (emphasis added); see also Itochu, 733 F.3d at 1147-48 (same, quoting and discussing Corus Staal). By its silence, Mid Continent failed to properly preserve its respondent selection claim for judicial review. Its failure to exhaust its administrative remedies renders it unnecessary to reach the merits of those claims.
2. The Merits of Mid Continent’s Respondent Selection Claim
Even if Mid Continent’s challenge to Commerce’s respondent selection process were not barred by the doctrine of exhaustion, Mid Continent would lose on the merits. The gravamen of Mid Continent’s complaint is that Commerce erred in limiting the agency’s individual review in the underlying administrative proceeding to a total of two respondents. See generally PL’s Brief at 1, 6-10, 15; PL’s Reply Brief at 1-5. But see Def.’s Brief at 7, 9-12, 18; and Def.-Ints.’ Brief at 2-3, 20-28, 39.
As summarized above, the statute requires — as a general rule — that Commerce calculate individual weighted average dumping margins “for each known exporter and producer” of the merchandise at issue. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f — 1(c)(1); section I.A, supra. However, the statute also carves out an exception to that general rule, which applies when — as here — it is “not practicable” for Commerce to calculate individual margins for each known exporter or producer “because of the large number of exporters or producers involved in the ... review.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2). In such cases, the statute directs Commerce to select a “reasonable number” of respondents for individual review, by using either of two alternative methods: (1) by using a statistically valid “sample of exporters, producers or types of products,” or (2) by-selecting the exporters and producers “accounting for the largest volume of the subject merchandise ... that can be reasonably examined.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2)(A) & (B); Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, vol. 1 at 872-73 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4200-01 (“SAA”).
Distilled to its essence, Mid Continent’s claim is that, in a series of three cases— Zhejiang, Carpenter, and Schaeffler — the Court of International Trade has in effect established a “floor” on the number of respondents to be individually reviewed, such that (according to Mid Continent) Commerce is now required to individually review “at least four to eight” respondents, “whether the pool of respondents is eight, 10, or 159.” See Pl.’s Brief at 9; see generally Zhejiang Native Produce & Animal By-Products Import & Export Corp. v. United States, 33 C.I.T. 1125, 637 F.Supp.2d 1260 (2009); Carpenter Tech. Corp. v. United States, 33 C.I.T. 1721, 662 F.Supp.2d 1337 (2009); Schaeffler Italia S.R.L. v. United States, 35 CIT -, 781 F.Supp.2d 1358 (2011). These three cases are the linchpin of Mid Continent’s respondent selection claim. See generally PL’s Brief at 1, 6-10 (discussing three cases); PL’s Reply Brief at 1-3, 5 (same). But Mid Continent misrepresents the holdings of all three cases.
Contrary to Mid Continent’s assertions, Zhejiang, Carpenter, and Schaeffler have nothing to do with the particular respondent selection issue that Mid Continent seeks to press in this case. Specifically, Zhejiang, Carpenter, and Schaeffler each concerned whether the number of exporters and producers in the case was sufficiently “large” to render it “not practicable” for Commerce to conduct individual reviews of all respondents. In other words, each of those three decisions addresses whether, under the specific facts of the particular case, it was permissible for Commerce to invoke the statutory exception to the general rule requiring the agency to conduct individual reviews of all exporters and. producers — an issue that is very different than the particular issue that Mid Continent seeks to raise here. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c)(2); Zhejiang, 33 C.I.T. at 1128-31, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1263-65 (rejecting Commerce’s reliance on statutory exception, based on determination that four respondents is not a “large number” as that term is used in statute); Carpenter, 33 C.I.T. at 1728-29, 662 F.Supp.2d at 1343-44 (same; eight respondents is not a “large number”); Schaeffler, 35 C.I.T. at -, 781 F.Supp.2d at 1362-63 (same; two respondents is not a “large number”); see also Def.’s Brief at 10-11 (emphasizing that cases cited by Mid Continent “all address ... whether the total number of producers in a review constitute[s] a ‘large number,’ not whether the number of respondents selected is a ‘reasonable number’ ”); Def.-Ints.’ Brief at 24-28 (similar).
Simply stated, the applicability of the exception to the general rule requiring individual review of all respondents is not in dispute in this action. Mid Continent candidly concedes — as it must — that 159 is, in fact, a “large number,” and that it was “not practicable” for Commerce to individually review all 159 respondents. See Pl.’s Brief at 7 (confirming that Mid Continent “does not ... challenge” Commerce’s determination not to individually review “all 159 respondents,” and thus does not dispute agency’s invocation of statutory exception); 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c)(2); see also, e.g., Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm., 33 C.I.T. at 1918, 675 F.Supp.2d at 1299 (holding 136 to be sufficiently “large number” of companies to trigger statutory exception to general rule requiring individual review of all respondents). Thus, quite unlike the plaintiffs in Zhejiang, Carpenter, and Schaeffler, Mid Continent here does not challenge Commerce’s right to rely on the statutory exception to limit the number of respondents subject to individual review in this case.
As such, the section of the statute that is the subject of analysis in Zhejiang, Carpenter, and Schaeffler — focusing on the term “large number” — has no relevance to this case. The three cases on which Mid Continent predicates its argument are, in short, inapposite. And Mid Continent’s claim that those three cases required Commerce here to individually review “four to eight” respondents necessarily fails of its own weight.
Mid Continent’s claim turns instead on a different part of the statute — in particular, on the language stating that, in a proceeding like that at issue here (which indisputably involved a “large number” of respondents, rendering individual review of all respondents “not practicable”), Commerce instead may identify a “reasonable number” of respondents for individual review, using either of the two methodologies specified in the statute. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c)(2)(A) & (B). In this instance, Commerce, in exercising its statutory discretion, decided to limit individual review to those “exporters and producers accounting for the largest volume of the subject merchandise ... that [could] be reasonably examined.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2)(B); First Respondent Selection Memorandum at 1, 3, 5 (memorializing Commerce determination to limit the number of exporters/producers subject to individual review, due to, inter alia, “the significant number of companies requesting to be reviewed,” and to select for individual review “the two largest exporters by volume”). Accordingly, to prevail on the merits of its respondent selection claim, Mid Continent must establish that — in identifying companies for individual review in the underlying proceeding by “accounting for the largest volume of the subject merchandise ... that can be reasonably examined” — Commerce acted unreasonably in selecting the two respondents that it did. ' 19 U.S.C. § 1677f — 1(c)(2)(B). Zhejiang, Carpenter, and Schaeffler do not speak to that issue. And Mid Continent offers precious little by way of argument beyond its (misplaced) reliance on those three cases.
Thus, for example, not only does Mid Continent seek to build its respondent selection claim on three cases that do not concern the particular respondent selection issue at stake in this action, but, in addition, Mid Continent ignores the cases that in fact do bear on that issue — all of which cut against Mid Continent’s claim. See Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm., 33 C.I.T. at 1917-18, 675 F.Supp.2d at 1298-99 (sustaining Commerce’s determination to limit individual review to the four respondents accounting for the largest volume of subject imports); Pakfood Public Co. v. United States, 35 C.I.T. -, -, 753 F.Supp.2d 1334, 1336-48 (analyzing and rejecting challenge to agency determination to limit individual review to the two producer/exporter entities accounting for the largest volume of subject imports), aff'd, 453 Fed.Appx. 986 (Fed.Cir.2011); Longkou Haimeng Mach. Co. v. United States, 32 C.I.T. 1142, 1143-57, 581 F.Supp.2d 1344, 1347-57 (2008) (affirming agency determination to limit individual review to three companies accounting for the largest volume of subject imports, in rejecting claim that Commerce was required to conduct individual reviews of all voluntary respondents); Laizhou Auto Brake Equip. Co. v. United States, 32 C.I.T. 711, 712-14, 722-28, 2008 WL 2562915 (2008) (affirming agency determination to limit individual review to five companies selected using “probability-proportional-to-size” sampling methodology); see generally Def.-Ints.’ Brief at 20-24 (analyzing the four cases referenced here); id. at 24 (observing that Mid Continent “ignores the judicial precedent which clearly supports [Commerce’s] respondent selection process,” while “direct[ing] ... attention to three decisions [i.e., Zhejiang, Carpenter, and Schaeffler ] ... [that] are readily distinguishable from the facts in this case”).
In addition to its basic claim that Zhejiang, Carpenter, and Schaeffler required Commerce to individually review “at least four to eight” respondents (discussed above), Mid Continent also argues in its briefs that Commerce’s respondent selection process was flawed because the respondents selected for individual review were “not representative of the Chinese industry as a whole.” PL’s Brief at 6; see also id. at 7, 9-10; PL’s Reply Brief at 3-5. Mid Continent asserts that the Chinese nail industry is made up of both large, efficient producers and exporters (including the subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies, such as Stanley) and — according to Mid Continent — “literally hundreds of small and medium sized producers and exporters, with vastly different production efficiencies and pricing practices.” PL’s Brief at 6-7. Mid Continent maintains that, had Commerce selected more respondents in the underlying administrative proceeding, “even with the refusal of certain companies to participate!,] the rate assigned to the other unreviewed Chinese exporters would have been more representative.’-’ Id. at 9-10.
This “representativeness” claim is not only barred by the doctrine of exhaustion, it is also beyond the scope of Mid Continent’s Complaint in this matter. But, in any event, like Mid Continent’s basic respondent selection claim, Mid Continent’s representativeness claim too is without merit.
Mid Continent insists that the statute “clearly contemplates a situation where the sample size of respondents is ‘statistically valid’ or the number of respondents selected is large enough to reasonably approximate the experience of all known exporters or producers that could not be examined.” Pl.’s Reply Brief at 4 (emphasis added). Mid Continent further contends that “selecting exporters or producers for review based on volume must involve enough respondents to reflect the experience of a ‘reasonable ’ volume of subject merchandise.” Id. (emphasis added). However, Mid Continent cites no authority for these novel propositions, which find no support in either the text of 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2) or the legislative history. To the extent that those sources speak to Mid Continent’s “representativeness” claim, they contravene it. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1677f — 1 (c)(2); SAA, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, vol. 1 at 872-73, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4200-01.
On its face, the specific provision at issue expressly authorizes Commerce to limit individual review to a “reasonable number” of “exporters or producers accounting for the largest volume of the subject merchandise ... that can be reasonably examined.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Nothing in the language of that provision even hints that the exporters and producers selected for individual review must be “representative.” See id.; see also Def.’s Brief at 11 (stating that “[accepting Mid Continent’s argument ... would negate Section 1677f-1(c)(2)(B) of the statute completely”). The focus in 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c)(2)(B) is thus on capturing the greatest volume of merchandise possible — a relatively straightforward methodology that seems likely in many instances (including this case) to lead to results that differ from the results yielded by the type of random sampling that is the alternative authorized under the other prong of the statute, § 1677f~l(c)(2)(A).
Similarly, nothing in the relevant legislative history supports Mid Continent’s assertion that Commerce’s selection of respondents for individual review on the basis of volume (§ 1677f-l(e)(2)(B)) is constrained by concerns about representativeness. Thus, for. example, the SAA notes generally that the new statutory provision, 19 U.S.C. § 1677f — 1(c)(2), “provides that where there are large numbers of exporters, producers, importers, or products involved in an investigation, Commerce may limit its examination to: (1) a statistically valid sample of exporters, producers or types of products; or (2) exporters and producers' accounting for the largest volume of the subject merchandise ... that can reasonably be examined.” SAA, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, vol. 1 at 872, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4200-01. The SAA then goes on to address sampling in some detail: The SAA recognizes that “the authority to select samples rests exclusively with Commerce, but, to the greatest extent possible, Commerce will consult with exporters and producers regarding the method to be used.” Id., H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, vol. 1 at 872, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4201. In addition, the SAA explains that “[t]he phrase ‘statistically valid sample’ ... is not a substantive change from ... ‘generally recognized sampling techniques.’ ” Id. Even more to the point, the SAA expressly provides that “Commerce will employ a sampling methodology designed to give representative results based on the facts known at the time the sampling method is designed,” and underscores that “[tjhis important qualification recognizes that Commerce may not have the type of information needed to select the most representative sample at the early stages of an investigation or review when [Commerce] must decide on a sampling technique.” Id., H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, vol. 1 at 872-73, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4201 (emphasis on “most” in the original; other emphases added). In other words, the SAA reflects concerns about the statistical validity and “representativeness” of the “sample of exporters, producers,- or types of products” that is the subject of 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c)(2)(A). But the SAA reflects no such concern as to the methodology authorized under § 1677f-l(c)(2)(B), the specific provision at issue here, where the emphasis is on maximum volume.
Under the circumstances, it is enough to add that — notwithstanding Mid Continent’s repeated use of the phrase in its representativeness argument — neither the statute nor the legislative history makes any reference to “reasonable volume” (only “the largest volume of the subject merchandise ... that can be reasonably examined”), just as the statute and the legislative history, make no reference to “representativeness” in the context of respondents selected for individual review pursuant to 19 U.S.C., § 1677f-l(c)(2)(B). (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, even if it were to be considered on its merits, Mid Continent’s claim that Commerce was required to select respondents for individual review with an eye toward capturing “potential variability across the population” would be unavailing. See PL’s Reply Brief at 4-5 (quoting Proposed Methodology for Respondent Selection in Antidumping Proceedings; Request for Comment, 75 Fed. Reg. 78,678 (Dec. 16, 2010)).
The bottom line is that none of Mid Continent’s arguments undermines in any way Commerce’s interpretation and application of 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c)(2)(B) in the circumstances of this case. Most telling is the conspicuous absence from Mid Continent’s briefs of any reference to Chevron vis-a-vis the statutory provision at issue, including the key terms “reasonable number of exporters or producers” and “exporters and producers accounting for the largest volume of the subject merchandise ... that can be reasonably examined.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677U — 1(c)(2)(B) (emphases added); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45, 104 S.Ct. 2778; compare, e.g., Pakfood, 35 C.I.T. at -, 753 F.Supp.2d at 1342 (noting that “neither the [antidumping duty] statute nor any of Commerce’s regulations directly address[es] the methodology by which [Commerce] is to arrive at the number of ‘exporters and producers accounting for the largest volume of subject merchandise ... that can be reasonably examined,’ ” and invoking Chevron standard); Schaeffler, 35 C.I.T. at -, 781 F.Supp.2d at 1362-63 (applying Chevron analysis to interpret terms “reasonable number of exporters or producers” and “large number of exporters or producers”); Carpenter, 33 C.I.T. at 1727-29, 662 F.Supp.2d at 1342-43 (interpreting term “large number of exporters or producers” pursuant to Chevron analysis).
In sum, there is no merit to Mid Continent’s basic claim that “Commerce’s decision to select only two Chinese exporters for individual examination, based on claimed ‘resource constraints,’ is contrary to law.” See Pl.’s Brief at 1; see also Complaint, Count I. Commerce’s decision not to conduct individual reviews of all respondents was properly based on the agency’s determination that the proceeding here involved a' “large number” of exporters and producers — a determination that Mid Continent does not contest. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c)(2); Pl.’s Brief at 7 (confirming that Mid Continent does not contest that proceeding in question involved “large number” of exporters and producers).
Moreover, under the circumstances, there was nothing unlawful about Commerce’s reference to agency resource constraints. See, e.g., First Respondent Selection Memorandum at 1-3 (explaining basis for Commerce’s determination that 159 exporters/producers constitutes a “large number,” and outlining basis for limiting individual examination to two companies; referring, inter alia, to Commerce’s “current resource constraints,” the agency’s “available resources,” the “significant” resources “that would be necessary to individually examine all 159 exporters/producers,” “the finite available resources and [Commerce’s] already heavy workload,” and the lack of “resources to fully examine all of the companies for which [Commerce] received a request for review”). The line of cases that Mid Continent cites — including Zhejiang, Carpenter, and Schaeffler — holds only that, in proceedings that do not involve a “large number” of exporters and producers, Commerce may not rely on resource constraints to avoid conducting individual reviews of all respondents. Mid Continent has cited no authority to support its claim that, in proceedings which involve a “large number” of exporters and producers (such as this one), Commerce is prohibited from considering its resource constraints in determining the number of respondents to be subject to individual review. Quite to the contrary, the relevant statutory provision clearly contemplates Commerce’s consideration of agency resource constraints, among other factors. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c)(2)(B) (referring to “the largest volume of the subject merchandise ... that can be reasonably examined ”) (emphasis added). There was thus nothing unlawful about Commerce’s consideration of resource constraints here, where the agency also properly concluded that the proceeding involved a “large number” of exporters and producers, rendering individual review of all respondents impracticable.
Commerce’s determination to limit the number of mandatory respondents to the two respondents selected is similarly supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law. Mid Continent has barely fleshed out, much less adequately supported, its contentions that two was not a “reasonable number” and that Commerce’s selection of respondents failed to “account[] for the largest volume of the subject merchandise ... that [could] be reasonably examined.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c)(2)(B). As noted above, Mid Continent has not analyzed the key terms of the statute pursuant to Chevron; and Commerce’s determinations in the administrative record do not directly address the issues of statutory construction that are implicated by Mid Continent’s claims.
Nevertheless, Commerce’s implicit construction of the statute in this case must be reviewed in accordance with the. fundamental Chevron framework. The first issue is thus whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If so, the court must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. On the other hand, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with - respect to the specific issue” presented, the agency’s construction must prevail, provided that it is a permissible construction of the statute. Id., 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. “[A] court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation” that is proffered by the agency that is charged with administering and implementing the statute. Id., 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778.
Certainly Congress has not spoken specifically to whether two is a “reasonable number” of respondents for individual review in a case such as this. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c)(2). Nor has Congress spoken directly to more generally define “reasonable number,” except to the extent that the text of 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c)(2)(B) — i.e., the reference to “exporters and producers accounting for the largest volume of the subject merchandise ... that can be reasonably examined” — can be read to constitute the definition , of “reasonable number.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c)(2)(B). And Congress has not spoken directly to the meaning of “the largest volume of the subject merchandise ... that can be reasonably examined” to the extent that those terms are implicated by Mid Continent’s claims. Cf. Pakfood, 35 C.I.T. at -, 753 F.Supp.2d at 1342 (explaining that, because “neither the [antidumping duty] statute nor any of Commerce’s regulations directly address[es] the methodology by which [Commerce] is to arrive at the number of ‘exporters and producers accounting for the largest volume of the subject merchandise . .-.-that can be reasonably examined,’ ... the court will uphold Commerce’s methodology if it is reasonable, ... and is not arbitrarily applied”).
The administrative record here documents that Commerce properly gave thoughtful and careful consideration to various factors, including its resource constraints, and — at each stage of the proceeding — determined how to select respondents so as to “account[ ] for the largest volume of the subject merchandise ... that [could] be reasonably examined.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c)(2)(B); First Respondent Selection Memorandum (concerning selection of Stanley and CPI); Second Respondent Selection Memorandum (concerning selection of Stanley and Tianjin Xiantong, which replaced CPI); Third Respondent Selection Memorandum (concerning selection of Stanley and Shandong Minmetal, which replaced Tianjin Xiantong). In the process, Commerce (at least implicitly) construed the statute in such a way as to mean that, under the circumstances of this case, the mandatory respondents that the agency selected “account[ed] for the largest volume of the subject merchandise ... that [could] be reasonably examined.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c)(2)(B) (emphases added). Únder the circumstances of this case, the agency’s construction of the statute appears to be a permissible orie, and therefore must be sustained.
Mid Continent offers nothing to cast doubt on Commerce’s implicit construction of 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c)(2)(B). Mid Continent similarly points to no concrete record evidence to substantiate its suggestion that Commerce’s resources would have permitted the agency to individually review additional respondents and thus to increase the volume of merchandise subject to such review. In any event, as a matter of sound public policy, “agencies with statutory enforcement responsibilities,” such as Commerce, “enjoy broad discretion in allocating investigative and enforcement resources.” Torrington Co. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed.Cir.1995) (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985)). As the Court of Appeals emphasized in Torrington, any different allocation of authority between the agency and the courts would be unworkable, “put[ting] the Court of International Trade and [the Court of Appeals] in the position of routinely second-guessing [Commerce’s] decisions” on a wide range of matters (including the minutiae of respondent selection) in individual cases — “a role for which courts are ill-suited and one that could be quite disruptive of Commerce’s efforts to establish enforcement priorities” in the conduct of antidumping investigations and administrative reviews. Torrington, 68 F.3d at 1351.
The long and the short of the matter is that, even if consideration of Mid Continent’s challenge to Commerce’s selection of mandatory respondents were not barred, the challenge is lacking in merit. Commerce here reasonably exercised its broad discretion by selecting for individual review the two respondents that imported the largest volume of subject merchandise. Mid Continent’s challenge therefore must be rejected, and Commerce’s selection of mandatory respondents sustained.
B. Commerce’s Treatment of Entries Initially Mis-Attributed to CPI
Mid Continent casts its second claim— which challenges Commerce’s determinations concerning the treatment of the entries of 23 companies that were initially mis-attributed to CPI — as an example of a “serious” and “growing” phenomenon of “obvious evasion” of antidumping duties, to which Mid Continent claims Commerce has “turned a blind eye.” See Pl.’s Brief at 11, 13; see generally PL’s Brief at 1-2, 10-14; PL’s Reply Brief at 9-15. Specifically, according to Mid Continent, “[t]he misuse of combination rates is being