Brown v. Tucci (960 F. Supp. 2d 544, 2013)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NORA BARRY FISCHER, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by the Defendants pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Docket Nos. 14 & 17. For the reasons that follow, that motion will be granted in part and denied in part. The Plaintiff will be ordered to file a more definite statement in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e).

II. Background

Slippery Rock Township (“Township”) and Slippery Rock Borough (“Borough”) are municipal entities organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 4-5. The Township’s territory completely surrounds that of the Borough. Id. at ¶ 6. In other words, the Borough is geographically situated within the Township, and an individual traveling by foot cannot leave the Borough without entering the Township. Id. The Township does not have its own police force. Docket No. 17 at 2, n. 1. Pennsylvania law permits a township to contract with a municipal corporation in order to procure the services of its police force. 53 Pa. Stat. 66903. For several years, the Borough’s Police Department (“Department”) patrolled the Township in exchange for monetary payments made pursuant to a contract known as the Slippery Rock Borough Police Services Mutual Aid Agreement (“Agreement”). Docket No. 1 at ¶ 7. Under the terms of the Agreement, the Borough was paid $25.00 for every hour of police services provided to the Township. Id. at ¶ 18.

Plaintiff Terry Brown (“Brown”) is a resident of the Township. Id. at ¶ 14. He was employed as a Borough police officer for more than twenty-four years. Id. at ¶ 12. As an active member of the community, Brown was known and liked by many of the Township’s residents. Id. at ¶ 15. At some point, he became the Borough’s Chief of Police. Id. at ¶ 13.

Borough and Township officials began to renegotiate the terms of the Agreement during the latter part of 2009 or the early part of 2010. Id. at ¶ 8. As the Chief of Police, Brown was directly involved with the negotiations. Id. at ¶ 16. While the negotiations were underway, some members of the Borough Council (“Council”) proposed that the Borough and the Township merge to form a single entity. Id. at ¶ 9. The proposal was spearheaded by David Miller (“Miller”), who served as the President of the Council, and Blasé Tucci (“Tucci”), who served as the Council’s Vice-President. Id. at ¶ 10. With the support of many Township residents, the Township Supervisors (“Supervisors”) expressed opposition to the proposed merger. Id. at ¶ 11.

During the spring of 2010, Brown and Tucci met with the Supervisors to discuss the status of the Agreement. Id. at ¶ 18. The Supervisors offered to increase the Township’s hourly payment for police protection from $25.00 to $100.00. Id. Brown supported the idea and expressed the view that such an increase would adequately compensate the Borough for its services. Id. at ¶ 19. Tucci resisted the proposal put forth by the Supervisors. Id. at ¶ 20. He stated that no new agreement would be executed, and that the Township could continue to enjoy the services of the Borough’s police force only if it agreed to merge with the Borough. Id. Tucci essentially presented the Supervisors with an “all or nothing” offer. Id. at ¶ 21. Brown was “shocked” by Tucci’s refusal to accept the payment increase offered by the Supervisors. Id. at ¶ 22.

Shortly after the meeting, Tucci privately approached Brown and asked him to “personally endorse” the merger proposal. Id. at ¶ 23. Brown refused to support the idea. Id. at ¶ 24. He told Tucci that he would be “subject to termination” if he were to engage in “political conduct” relating to the proposed merger. Id. at ¶ 25. Brown’s fear of termination was apparently rooted in 53 Pa. Stat. § 46190(6), which provides that a police officer or firefighter may be “suspended without pay, removed or reduced in rank” for participating in a “political or election campaign while on duty or in uniform or while using borough property.”

In May 2010, the Council sent a memorandum to the Department advising that Borough police officers should offer assistance to Township residents only when such assistance was first sought from the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”). Id. at ¶26. In Brown’s presence, Miller and Tucci stated that the delayed response times observed by Township residents would make them wish that they had “played ball” and agreed to the merger. Id. at ¶ 32. Brown did not understand the memorandum to require Borough police officers to await the arrival of a state police officer before responding to a request for help made by a Township resident. Id. at ¶ 29. After hearing about Brown’s interpretation of the Council’s instruction, Tucci “stormed” into Brown’s office and accused him of “playing fucking games with the memo.” Id. at ¶ 27. Tucci told Brown that a member of the PSP needed to be “physically present” at the scene of an incident occurring within the Township before Borough police assistance could be authorized. Id. at ¶ 30. Brown responded by accusing the Council of “using the safety of Township residents as leverage” to garner support for its merger proposal. Id. at ¶ 31. He described that tactic as “a very bad way to do business.” Id.

In September 2010, Bureau Administrator Lucinda Lipco (“Lipco”) informed Brown that he needed to attend the Council’s next executive session. Id. at ¶ 33. This was the first time that Brown was required to attend such a meeting. Id. at ¶ 34. At the meeting, Brown claimed that the Council was “putting a price” on the safety of Township residents by conditioning continued police protection on a merger. Id. at ¶ 35. He expressed disagreement with the Council’s approach to the issue. Id. Despite his reservations about the policy reflected in the earlier memorandum, Brown stated that he would follow any “official directions” given to him by the Council. Id. Nonetheless, he emphasized that he could not “engage in political conduct” pertaining to the proposed merger. Id. at ¶ 36.

On October 7, 2010, Brown taught a class on “close-quarter shooting” at a local shooting range. Id. at ¶ 37. After disabling a student’s weapon, Brown placed himself between the student and his or her “range target” in order to conduct a demonstration. Id. at ¶ 38. By going “down range,” Brown apparently violated the applicable firearms safety protocol. Officer Jason Bennett (“Bennett”) witnessed the incident. Id. at ¶ 39. A few weeks later, Bennett’s wife saw Tucci at a local store and told him that Brown had improperly “stepped down range during a training session.” Id. at ¶ 40. With Miller’s approval, Tucci started to investigate the incident. Id. at ¶ 41. Neva Stanger (“Stanger”), the Borough Solicitor, was asked to participate in the investigation. Id. at ¶¶ 43^5. She spoke with Bennett about the matter on October 21, 2010. Docket No. 14-1 at 2.

Pennsylvania law permits a borough police officer to be “suspended without pay, removed or reduced in rank” only for reasons specified by statute. 53 Pa. Stat. § 46190. A public employee “who can be discharged only for cause” has a constitutionally-protected property interest in his or her employment. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928-929, 117 S.Ct. 1807, 138 L.Ed.2d 120 (1997). In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-548, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985), the United States Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a public employer from discharging such an employee without affording him or her a pretermination hearing. During a hearing conducted on November 2, 2010, Brown and Stanger discussed the incident at the shooting range. Docket No. 14-1 at 2. Brown’s attorney was present for the discussion. Id.

The Council voted to terminate Brown’s employment with the Department on December 7, 2010. Docket No. 1 at ¶47. Each Pennsylvania borough maintaining “a police force or paid fire apparatus operators” has a “civil service commission” consisting of “three commissioners.” 53 Pa. Stat. § 46172(a). On December 17, 2010, Brown appealed his dismissal to the Slippery Rock Borough Civil Service Commission (“Commission”). Docket No. 14-1 at 3. A hearing was conducted on May 10, 2011. Docket No. 1 at ¶ 50. The Commission unanimously denied Brown’s appeal in a decision rendered on November 29, 2011. Docket No. 1-2 at 2-5. It was noted that under Jenkintown v. Civil Service Commission, 84 Pa.Cmwlth. 183, 478 A.2d 941, 943 (1984), and Borough of Edgeworth v. Blosser, 672 A.2d 854, 856 (Pa. Commw.Ct.1996), the Commission could modify the Council’s decision only if the allegations lodged against Brown were lacking in evidentiary support, or if the penalties imposed on him were otherwise prohibited by law. Id. at 4. The Commission clarified that the disciplinary action taken against Brown may have been less severe if it had been the body vested with the authority to discipline him in the first instance. Id. at 4-5; Docket No. 27-1 at 2.

On December 28, 2011, Brown appealed the Commission’s decision to the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County. Docket No. 14-2 at 10; 53 Pa. Stat. § 46191(c). The Commission filed its “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law” on January 25, 2012. Id. In that filing, the Commission stated that Brown’s conduct had provided the Council with a sufficient basis for discharging him under subsections (2) and (4) of 58 Pa. Stat. § 46190. Docket No. 14-1 at 3. Those provisions permit a borough police officer to be “removed” for the “[n]eglect or violation of any official duty,” or for “[inefficiency, neglect, intemperance, immorality, disobedience of orders, or conduct unbecoming an officer.” 53 Pa. Stat. § 46190(2), (4). The Council filed a notice of intervention on January 27, 2012. Docket No. 14-2 at 10. In a memorandum opinion and order dated May 15, 2012, Judge Marilyn J. Horan affirmed the Commission’s decision. Docket No. 14-1. In her opinion, Judge Horan declared that since “the Council’s decision to remove Brown was supported by substantial evidence,” “the Commission had no authority to modify Brown’s penalty.” Id. at 13.

Brown filed a motion for post-trial relief on May 25, 2012. Docket No. 14-2 at 11. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 227.1(g) provides that “[a] motion for post-trial relief may not be filed in an appeal from the final adjudication or determination of a local agency or a Commonwealth agency as to which jurisdiction is vested in the courts of common pleas.” PA. R. CIV. P. 227.1(g). Relying on Rule 227.1(g), Judge Horan determined that she had no jurisdiction to entertain Brown’s motion for post-trial relief. Docket No. 14-2 at 14. The earlier order affirming Brown’s dismissal was deemed to be the “final appealable order” in the case. Id. The order dismissing Brown’s motion for post-trial relief was entered on August 31, 2012. Id. at 15-16.

Brown commenced this action against Miller, Tucci and Stanger on December 5, 2012, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 53-60. The constitutional claims were premised on an assertion that the Defendants had discharged Brown in retaliation for his refusal to endorse the merger proposal and opposition to the Council’s negotiating tactics. Id. at ¶¶ 48^49. Brown further alleged that the- Defendants had violated Pennsylvania law by wrongfully dischargng him because of his refusal to violate § 46190(6). Id. at ¶¶ 61-67. On March 4, 2013, the Defendants moved for the dismissal of Brown’s claims pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Docket No. 14. The parties advanced their respective positions during the course of an oral argument session conducted on April 26, 2013. The motion to dismiss filed by the Defendants is the subject of this memorandum opinion.

III. Standards of Review

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “At issue in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is the court’s ‘very power to hear the case.’ ” Judkins v. HT Window Fashions Corp., 514 F.Supp.2d 753, 759 (W.D.Pa.2007), quoting Mortensen v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.1977). As the party asserting that jurisdiction exists, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that his or her claims are properly before the court. Development Finance Corp. v. Alpha Housing & Health Care, 54 F.3d 156, 158 (3d Cir.1995). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, a court must determine whether the attack on its jurisdiction is a facial attack or a factual attack. A facial attack challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiffs pleadings on jurisdictional grounds. Petruska v. Gannon University, 462 F.3d 294, 302, n. 3 (3d Cir.2006). When considering a facial attack, a court must accept the allegations contained in the plaintiffs complaint as true. Id. A factual attack on the court’s jurisdiction must be treated differently. Id. When considering a factual attack, the court does not attach a presumption of truthfulness to the plaintiffs allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts does not preclude the court from deciding for itself whether jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims can be properly exercised. Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891.

In light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), a complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). This standard requires more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The complaint must allege a sufficient number of facts “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. This requirement is designed to facilitate the notice-pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added).

In considering a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court accepts all of the plaintiffs allegations as true and views all reasonable inferences drawn from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Buck v. Hampton Township School District, 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir.2006). Nonetheless, a court need not credit bald assertions, unwarranted inferences, or legal conclusions cast in the form of factual averments. Morse v. Lower Merion School District, 132 F.3d 902, 906, n. 8 (3d Cir.1997). The primary question in deciding a motion to dismiss is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but rather whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to establish the facts alleged in the complaint. Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir.2000). The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to “streamline[ ] litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). In addition to the allegations contained in the complaint, a court may consider matters of public record, exhibits attached to the complaint, and other items appearing in the record of the case. Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384, n. 2 (3d Cir.1994).

IV. Jurisdiction and Venue

Jurisdiction to adjudicate Brown’s federal constitutional claims is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Brown’s wrongful discharge claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

V. Discussion

Brown brings his constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action against “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. This statutory provision does not create substantive rights. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129, n. 11, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980). A plaintiff cannot prevail in an action brought under § 1983 without establishing an underlying violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right. City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 119-120, 125 S.Ct. 1453, 161 L.Ed.2d 316 (2005).

The first step in the Court’s analysis is to “identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841, n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998). The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

U.S. Const., Amend. I. Brown’s constitutional claims appear to be based on the Free Speech and Petition Clauses. Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 53-60. Those provisions apply to the States because of their incorporation within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420, 108 S.Ct. 1886, 100 L.Ed.2d 425 (1988).

In addition to his constitutional claims, Brown asserts “wrongful termination” claims against the Defendants. Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 61-67. Pennsylvania does not recognize a generalized cause of action for wrongful or improper discharge. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174, 180 (1974). Nevertheless, an employer may be held liable for dismissing an employee in violation of Pennsylvania’s “public policy.” Donahue v. Federal Express Corp., 753 A.2d 238, 244 (Pa.Super.Ct.2000). Brown maintains that the Defendants violated Pennsylvania’s “public policy” by terminating his employment with the Department because of his refusal to engage in conduct constituting a violation of § 46190(6). Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 63-65.

The Defendants move for the dismissal of Brown’s claims on several grounds. They challenge the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain this action. Docket Nos. 14 & 17 at ¶ 33. The Defendants argue that, for purposes related to employer discipline, Brown’s expressive conduct did not enjoy constitutional protection. Id. They assert the affirmative defenses of res judicata, collateral estoppel, qualified immunity and high public official immunity. Id. The Defendants also contend that Stanger did not act “under color of’ state or local law in connection with Brown’s discharge, and that the constitutional claims asserted against her must be dismissed for that reason. Id.

Before adjudicating the claims brought by a plaintiff, a federal court must ensure that it has jurisdiction over the matter in controversy. Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 453, 20 S.Ct. 690, 44 L.Ed. 842 (1900). In the absence of jurisdiction, the Court cannot consider the viability of Brown’s claims. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 93-102, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). For this reason, the Court will address the Defendants’ jurisdictional challenge before considering the other arguments raised by the parties.

A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Federal “district courts” have “original jurisdiction” over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Given the “original” nature of this jurisdiction, United States district courts are “precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 163 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2006) (per curiam). The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions rendered by state tribunals is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which provides:

§ 1257. State courts; certiorari

(a) Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.

(b) For the purposes of this section, the term “highest court of a State” includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

28 U.S.C. § 1257. In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), a statutory predecessor to § 1257(a) was construed to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to review decisions issued by state courts, thereby precluding federal district courts from reviewing such decisions. The rule established in Rooker was reaffirmed and applied in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). In Feldman, the Supreme Court declared that federal district courts did not have jurisdiction to entertain “challenges to state-court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings.” Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486, 103 S.Ct. 1303.

The decisions in Rooker and Feldman gave rise to the so-called “Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” Payne v. Lampe, 665 F.3d 506, 518, n. 15 (3d Cir.2011). Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005), some federal courts incorrectly understood the doctrine “to extend far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman cases.” In Exxon Mobil, the Supreme Court narrowed the reach of the doctrine by stating as follows:

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we hold today, is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments. Rooker-Feldman does not otherwise override or supplant preclusion doctrine or augment the circumscribed doctrines that allow federal courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in deference to state-court actions.

Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517 (emphasis added). The Defendants’ jurisdictional challenge must be considered in relation to the guideposts enunciated in Exxon Mobil.

Brown’s dismissal was ultimately affirmed by the Court of Common Pleas. Docket No. 14-1. Therefore, Brown is a “state-court loser” for Rooker-Feldman purposes. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517. The order affirming his dismissal was entered before the commencement of this action. Id. Consequently, the jurisdictional inquiry turns on whether Brown’s injuries were “caused by” the judgment entered by the Court of Common Pleas, and on whether his claims invite “review and rejection” of that judgment. Id.

In Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild, LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir.2010), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine raises no bar to the exercise of federal jurisdiction when a plaintiff complains of an injury “caused by the defendant’s actions and not by the state-court judgment” in question. The Court of Appeals went on to observe that an injury existing “prior to the [relevant] state-court proceedings” cannot be “ ‘caused by those proceedings.” Great Western, 615 F.3d at 167. The “injury” alleged by Brown dates back to December 7, 2010, when the Council voted to terminate his employment with the Department. Docket No. 1 at ¶47. Judge Horan’s order affirming Brown’s dismissal was not entered until May 15, 2012. Docket No. 41-1 at 15. Since the “injury” suffered by Brown predated the judgment entered by the Court of Common Pleas, it was not “caused by” that judgment. Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir.2006).

Brown’s constitutional claims do not invite “review and rejection” of Judge Horan’s decision. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517. In affirming the Council’s discharge decision, the Commission was careful to point out that it may not have terminated Brown’s employment if it had been delegated the task of exercising “disciplinary responsibility” in the first instance. Docket No. 1-2 at 4-5. Judge Horan reasoned that since the Council’s decision was “supported by substantial evidence,” the Commission “had no authority” to modify the penalty imposed on Brown. Docket No. 14-1 at 14. The decision rendered by the Court of Common Pleas established only that Pennsylvania law permitted the Council to dismiss Brown for his conduct on October 7, 2010. Id. It did not establish that the Council was required to discharge Brown.

In order to establish a violation of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, Brown must demonstrate the existence of a causal relationship between his constitutionally protected expression and the Council’s decision to terminate his employment. Stephens v. Kerrigan, 122 F.3d 171, 180 (3d Cir.1997). The issue of causation is governed by the standard announced by the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). “Under Doyle, a plaintiff asserting a First Amendment retaliation claim bears the initial burden of demonstrating that his or her speech was a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind the employment action at issue.” Toth v. California University of Pennsylvania, 844 F.Supp.2d 611, 651 (W.D.Pa.2012). When such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged employment action would have been taken even in the absence of the plaintiffs speech. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. 568. In this context, the existence of causation need not be premised on a finding that the decision in question was “motivated solely by a single concern.” Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 236 (3d Cir.2000), quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). Even if Brown’s conduct provided the Council with a legitimate basis for terminating his employment under Pennsylvania law, it does not necessarily follow that his employment would have been terminated in the absence of his speech. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 286, 97 S.Ct. 568 (“A borderline or marginal candidate should not have the employment question resolved against him because of constitutionally protected conduct.”). By contending that the Council would not have effectuated his discharge if he had refrained from engaging in constitutionally-protected conduct, Brown does not invite “review and rejection” of Judge Horan’s conclusion that the Council could have discharged him without violating Pennsylvania law. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517.

These principles apply with equal force to Brown’s wrongful termination claims. Since Brown’s “injury” existed before the issuance of Judge Horan’s decision, it was not “caused by” that decision. Great Western, 615 F.3d at 167. Moreover, Brown need not impugn the judgment entered by the Court of Common Pleas in order to establish that he was discharged because of his refusal to engage in activities prohibited under § 46190(6). The instant action “encounters no Rooker-Feldman shoal.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. -,-, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 1297, 179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011). The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain Brown’s claims against the Defendants.

B. Preclusion

The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires the courts of one State to give preclusive effect to the judgments rendered by the courts of other States. U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1; Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 348-349, 62 S.Ct. 608, 86 L.Ed. 885 (1942). “A final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land” and “gains nationwide force.” Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998). Unlike state courts, federal courts are not bound by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986). When a judgment is rendered by a state court, however, federal courts are statutorily required to give it preclusive effect under 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett Square, 4 F.3d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1993). The applicable statutory language provides that “[t]he records and judicial proceedings of any court of any ... State, Territory or Possession ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738. “This statute has long been understood to encompass the doctrines of res judicata, or ‘claim preclusion,’ and collateral estoppel, or ‘issue preclusion.’ ” San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 336, 125 S.Ct. 2491, 162 L.Ed.2d 315 (2005) (emphasis added). “Claim preclusion generally refers to the effect of a prior judgment in foreclosing successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the same issues as the earlier suit. Issue preclusion generally refers to the effect of a prior judgment in foreclosing successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment, whether or not the issue arises on the same or a different claim.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748-749, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001). A State’s judicial proceedings must “satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in order to qualify for the full faith and credit guaranteed by federal law.” Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). If those requirements are satisfied, § 1738 mandates that a judgment rendered by a state court be given the same preclusive effect in a federal court that it would be accorded in another state court. Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 523, 106 S.Ct. 768, 88 L.Ed.2d 877 (1986).

Congress has the authority to carve exceptions into § 1738’s legislative prescription. Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 386, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 84 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985). In enacting § 1983, however, Congress did not “repeal or restrict the traditional doctrines of preclusion” normally applicable under § 1738. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). Consequently, the preclusive effect of the judgment entered by the Court of Common Pleas must be ascertained by reference to Pennsylvania law. Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 81-87, 104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984).

“Res judicata, or claim preclusion, is a doctrine by which a former adjudication bars a later action on all or part of the claim which was the subject of the first action.” Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 542 Pa. 555, 669 A.2d 309, 313 (1995) (emphasis in original). The doctrine “applies not only to claims actually litigated, but also to claims which could have been litigated during the first proceeding if they were part of the same cause of action.” Id. In order for one adjudication to bar a subsequent action, the cases in question must involve not only the same cause of action, but also the same subject matter and parties. Levitt v. Patrick, 976 A.2d 581, 589-590 (Pa.Super.Ct.2009). Furthermore, the doctrine of claim preclusion cannot be applied unless there is an “identity of the quality or capacity of the parties suing or being sued.” In re: Iulo, 564 Pa. 205, 766 A.2d 335, 337 (2001).

Brown seeks to proceed against Miller, Tucci and Stanger in both their individual and official capacities. Docket No. 1. A plaintiff bringing a personal-capacity claim against a governmental official seeks to hold the official personally liable for his or her misconduct. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). “An award of damages entered against a personal-capacity defendant can be executed only against his or her ‘personal assets.’ ” Douglas v. Brookville Area School District, 836 F.Supp.2d 329, 353 (W.D.Pa.2011), quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099. A defendant sued in his or her personal capacity “may assert personal immunity defenses such as objectively reasonable reliance on existing law.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991). An official-capacity claim against a governmental official seeks to impose liability on the entity that he or she represents. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-472, 105 S.Ct. 873, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985). An award of damages entered against an official-capacity defendant can be executed only against the governmental entity of which he or she is an agent. Douglas, 836 F.Supp.2d at 353. A defendant sued in his or her official capacity may invoke only the immunities available to the employing governmental entity. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25, 112 5.Ct. 358. The distinction between personal-capacity claims and official-capacity claims turns on the capacity in which a defendant has been sued rather than on the capacity in which he or she has acted. Burns v. Alexander, 776 F.Supp.2d 57, 72, n. 14 (W.D.Pa.2011). A governmental official can be held personally liable under § 1983 for his or her official misconduct. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 27-31, 112 S.Ct. 358.

Brown and the Commission were the original parties to the appeal filed in the Court of Common Pleas. The Council became a party on January 27, 2012, by filing a notice of intervention. Docket No. 14-1 at 3. Miller, Tucci and Stanger were not parties to that case. Indeed, the Court of Common Pleas listed Stanger as one of the Council’s two attorneys of record. Id. at 1. Although the Council was itself a party, the same cannot be said of its individual members. To the extent that Brown has sued Miller and Tucci in their individual capacities, their “quality or capacity” in this action differs from that in the appeal to the Court of Common Pleas. Yamulla Trucking & Excavating Co., Inc. v. Justofin, 771 A.2d 782, 784 (Pa.Super.Ct.2001). Judge Horan’s decision does not preclude Brown from proceeding with his personal-capacity claims in this case. Edmundson, 4 F.3d at 191-193. The Court does not understand the Defendants to argue otherwise. Docket No. 28 at 1.

In Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the Supreme Court classified municipal entities as “persons” amenable to suit under § 1983. The holding in Monell applies with equal force to “local government officials sued in their official capacities.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Brown’s official-capacity claims against Miller, Tucci and Stanger must be regarded as claims against the Borough. McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785, n. 2, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997). The Defendants maintain that those claims are precluded by Judge Horan’s order affirming Brown’s dismissal. Docket No. 28 at 1-2. Brown argues that his official-capacity claims should not be dismissed. Docket No. 27 at 9-11. This issue is important because the Borough “may not assert the good faith of its officers or agents as a defense to liability under § 1983.” Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980). If Brown’s official-capacity claims are not precluded, he may be able to recover dam-, ages from the Borough even if the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in their personal capacities. Sajford Unified School District # 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 379, 129 S.Ct. 2633, 174 L.Ed.2d 354 (2009); Brandon, 469 U.S. at 472-473, 105 S.Ct. 873.

Brown and the Borough were both parties to the case adjudicated by the Court of Common Pleas. Docket No. 14-1. Like the instant action, the appeal filed in the Court of Common Pleas concerned the “subject matter” of Brown’s discharge. Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 116-117 (3d Cir.1988). A careful examination of Pennsylvania law reveals that a court reviewing an adjudication completed by a municipal civil service commission has jurisdiction to consider “whether constitutional rights have been violated.” Day v. Civil Service Commission, 593 Pa. 448, 931 A.2d 646, 650 (2007); Lewis v. Civil Service Commission, 518 Pa. 170, 542 A.2d 519, 522 (1988). The statute governing the disposition of an appeal from a civil service commission specifically permits a reviewing court to consider whether the commission’s adjudication “is in violation of the [appellant’s] constitutional rights.” 2 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 754(b). Although an appealing party may ordinarily raise only the issues previously raised before the relevant “local agency,” a reviewing court may consider additional issues upon a showing of “due cause” for the party’s failure to preserve such issues for appeal. 2 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 753(a). An aggrieved party can easily surmount that hurdle in any case involving “a violation of constitutional dimensions.” Marchionni v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 715 A.2d 559, 561 (Pa.Commw.Ct.1998). If the record developed before the local agency is incomplete, the reviewing court has discretion to permit the introduction of additional evidence and consider the appeal de novo. Powell v. Middletown Township Board of Supervisors, 782 A.2d 617, 621 (Pa.Commw.Ct.2001). The adequacy of the record to facilitate judicial review turns on whether the court has a sufficient basis for considering the “questions presented” on appeal. Retirement Board of Allegheny County v. Colville, 852 A.2d 445, 451 (Pa.Commw.Ct.2004). Even when the court “has not taken additional evidence,” it remains free to decide whether “an error of law” has been committed. In Re: Appeal of Zimmett, 28 Pa.Cmwlth. 103, 367 A.2d 382, 383 (1977).

When he appealed the Commission’s decision to the Court of Common Pleas, Brown did not request a “fact-gathering hearing.” Docket No. 14-1 at 7. Consequently, Judge Horan’s review was limited to the record developed before the Commission. Id. at 6-7. Relying on language used by the Commonwealth Court in Davis v. Civil Service Commission, 820 A.2d 874, 878 (Pa.Commw.Ct.2003), Judge Horan acknowledged in her decision that the scope of her review was broad enough to encompass potential violations of Brown’s “constitutional rights.” Id. at 6. Nothing in the record suggests that Brown would not have been able to challenge his discharge on constitutional grounds. Indeed, Brown unsuccessfully challenged the adequacy of his pretermination hearing under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 8-9. It is beyond dispute that the Pennsylvania courts had the competence to entertain constitutional challenges to Brown’s dismissal. Edmundson, 4 F.3d at 190.

Relying on Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111 (3d Cir.1988), and Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett Square, 4 F.3d 186 (3d Cir.1993), the Defendants maintain that Brown is precluded from proceeding with his official-capacity' claims in this action. Docket No. 28 at 1-2. In those decisions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit assumed that because a discharged public employee could challenge his or her dismissal on First Amendment grounds within the context of an appeal to the Pennsylvania courts, Pennsylvania’s rules of claim preclusion would bar him or her from challenging the termination decision in a subsequent official-capacity action brought under § 1983. Gregory, 843 F.2d at 116-121; Edmundson, 4 F.3d at 190-191. In Gregory, the Court of Appeals declared that the additional remedies available under § 1983 did not render the plaintiffs claim “a separate cause of action” from the one litigated in a Pennsylvania court. Gregory, 843 F.2d at 118-119. That issue was not discussed in Edmund-son.

Since the decisions in Gregory and Edmundson were grounded in Pennsylvania law, the Court can consider whether the reasoning employed in those decisions has been undermined by subsequent decisions rendered by Pennsylvania courts. Nationwide Insurance Co. v. Patterson, 953 F.2d 44, 46-49 (3d Cir.1991). In Hopewell Estates, Inc. v. Kent, 435 Pa.Super. 471, 646 A.2d 1192, 1194-1195 (1994), the Pennsylvania Superior Court explained that a court presented with the defense of claim preclusion must consider whether the action at issue “seek[s] compensation for the same damages” sought in the earlier action. The Superior Court went on to declare that “two suits which have arisen out of the same set of factual circumstances may involve entirely separate causes of action,” and that the doctrine of claim preclusion “will not bar a subsequent action where the damages for which relief was sought in the earlier action were entirely different.” Hopewell Estates, 646 A.2d at 1195. In McNeil v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 545 Pa. 209, 680 A.2d 1145, 1147, n. 2 (1996), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the applicability of claim preclusion turns on whether the subsequent action involves “the same claim, demand or cause of action” as the earlier action. Applying the standard enunciated in McNeil, the Superior Court has considered a litigant’s entitlement to relief in determining whether separate claims constitute a single “cause of action.” Stoeckinger v. Presidential Financial Corp., 948 A.2d 828, 832-833 (Pa.Super.Ct.2008).

Although a plaintiff cannot overcome the defense of claim preclusion “by recasting the nomenclature for the relief requested,” the precise content of his or her “demand for recovery” is a factor that the Pennsylvania courts consider in determining whether a particular claim is precluded. Tobias v. Halifax Township, 28 A.3d 223, 227 (Pa.Commw.Ct.2011). Sections 25(2) and 26(l)(e) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments describe the manner in which that factor should be considered. Section 25(2) states that a plaintiff cannot overcome the defense of claim preclusion simply by “seek[ing] remedies or forms of relief not demanded in the first action.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 25(2) (1982). Section 26(l)(e) provides that a “claim” litigated in an earlier action “subsists as a possible basis for a second action by the plaintiff against the defendant ... [if] [t]he plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case or to seek a certain remedy or form of relief in the first action because of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts or restrictions on their authority to entertain multiple theories or demands for multiple remedies or forms of relief in a single action, and the plaintiff desires in the second action to rely on that theory or to seek that remedy or form of relief.” Restatement (Second) op Judgments § 26(l)(c) (1982). The Restatement clearly makes a distinction between forms of relief that were not demanded in an earlier action and forms of relief that could not have been demanded in that action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently recognized that § 26(1) is followed in Pennsylvania. R & J Holding Co. v. Redevelopment Authority of the County of Montgomery, 670 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir.2011). It is doubtful that the Pennsylvania courts would find Brown’s official-capacity claims to be precluded if, during the course of his appeal, he would not have been able to seek the monetary relief available under § 1983. Marrese, 470 U.S. at 382, 105 S.Ct. 1327 (observing that the preclusion law of most States incorporates a “requirement of pri- or jurisdictional competency”). The application of claim preclusion is ordinarily based on a determination that the precluded claim could have been asserted during the earlier proceeding. Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 (3d Cir.2010).

The decision in Gregory appears to have been premised on a belief that the plaintiff in that case could have sought relief under § 1983 during the proceedings conducted in the Pennsylvania courts if he had elected to do so. Gregory, 843 F.2d at 119, n. 5. Federal and state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over actions arising under § 1983. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 734-736, 129 S.Ct. 2108, 173 L.Ed.2d 920 (2009). As a general matter, the Pennsylvania courts have the competence to entertain such actions. Wagner v. Waitlevertch, 774 A.2d 1247, 1251-1255 (Pa.Super.Ct.2001). It does not follow, however, that every Pennsylvania court always has jurisdiction to adjudicate a § 1983 claim, regardless of the procedural posture of the case in question. Boettger v. Miklich, 85 Pa.Cmwlth. 5, 481 A.2d 972, 973-974 (1984). A claim can only be precluded by a prior judgment rendered by a “court of competent jurisdiction.” R/S Financial Corp. v. Kovalchick, 552 Pa. 584, 716 A.2d 1228, 1230 (1998), quoting Balent, 669 A.2d at 313. In this case, the relevant question is whether the Court of Common Pleas could have entertained Brown’s § 1983 claims within the context of his appeal from the Commission’s decision. McNasby v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 888 F.2d 270, 277-279 (3d Cir.1989).

The doctrine of claim preclusion “prohibits parties involved in prior, concluded litigation from subsequently asserting claims in a later action that were raised, or could have been raised, in the previous adjudication.” Wilkes v. Phoenix Home Life Mutual Insurance Co., 587 Pa. 590, 902 A.2d 366, 376 (2006) (emphasis added). The application of the doctrine presupposes that two different “actions” are involved. Under Pennsylvania law, a “statutory appeal” does not constitute a “civil action” governed by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Airo Die Casting, Inc. v. Westmoreland County Board of Assessment Appeals, 706 A.2d 1279, 1282 (Pa.Commw.Ct.1998). It is treated as a “part of the administrative agency process” rather than as a “lawsuit.” Evangel Baptist Church v. Mifflin County Board of Assessment Appeals, 815 A.2d 1174, 1179 (Pa.Commw.Ct.2003). A reviewing court is constrained by statutory standards of review. 2 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 753-754. Even if a constitutional violation is established, the court can only reverse or modify the decision under review, or remand the case for further consideration by the local agency. SSEN, Inc. v. Borough Council of the Borough of Eddystone, 810 A.2d 200, 206-207 (Pa. Commw.Ct.2002); Springfield School District v. Shellem, 16 Pa.Cmwlth. 306, 328 A.2d 535, 538 (1974). A court entertaining a statutory appeal has no authority to “award damages.” Human Development of Erie, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board of Millcreek Toumship, 143 Pa.Cmwlth. 675, 600 A.2d 658, 662-663 (1991).

If Brown had succeeded in challenging his discharge before the Commission or the Court of Common Pleas, he would have been entitled to reinstatement and back pay. 53 Pa. Stat. § 46191(b)-(c). The monetary damages available under § 1983 include compensation for injuries extending beyond out-of-pocket losses or expenses. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-280, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263-265, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). Brown seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages in this action. Docket No. 1 at ¶ 60. His official-capacity claims cannot result in an award of punitive damages under § 1983, since the Borough enjoys immunity from such damages. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981). Nonetheless, § 1983 provides plaintiffs in Brown’s position with a basis for obtaining compensation for injuries attributable to a municipal entity’s misconduct. Owen, 445 U.S. at 657, 100 S.Ct. 1398. “Compensation for damages upon discharge from employment is not limited to back pay.” Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 733 F.2d 260, 264 (3d Cir.1984).

A party who successfully vindicates a right enforceable under § 1983 may seek an award of counsel fees. North Carolina Dept. of Transportation v. Crest Street Community Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, 12, 107 S.Ct. 336, 93 L.Ed.2d 188 (1986). Brown requests such an award in this case. Docket No. 1 at ¶ 67. In Gregory, the Court of Appeals assumed that the plaintiff in that case could have sought an award of counsel fees if he had prevailed in his statutory appeal on constitutional grounds. Gregory, 843 F.2d at 119, n. 5. In two subsequent decisions, however, the Commonwealth Court has held that the counsel fees available to prevailing § 1983 plaintiffs in “lawsuits” are not available to parties who prevail in statutory appeals. Evangel Baptist Church, 815 A.2d at 1178-1179; Human Development of Erie, Inc., 600 A.2d at 662-663. Consequently, it appears that the Court of Common Pleas, when sitting as an appellate court in Brown’s ease, lacked jurisdiction to order relief extending beyond the reinstatement and back pay provided for by statute. 53 Pa. Stat. § 46191(b)-(c).

Because Brown’s statutory appeal to the Court of Common Pleas constituted a “part of the administrative agency process,” it cannot be regarded as a “lawsuit” in which his § 1983 claims could have been asserted. Evangel Baptist Church, 815 A.2d at 1179. The Defendants point to nothing which suggests that Brown could have brought § 1983 claims against the Borough in his appeal to the Court of Common Pleas. McNasby, 888 F.2d at 277 (holding that a claim was not precluded under circumstances in which the plaintiff had previously “proceeded only in adjudicative bodies of limited original jurisdiction”). Since there was a “jurisdictional obstacle” to the maintenance of a § 1983 action in the earlier case, Brown is not precluded from proceeding with his official-capacity claims in this case. Briar Meadows Developments, Inc. v. South Centre Township Board of Supervisors, Civil Action No. 10-1012, 2010 WL 4024775, at *7, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108995, at *21-22 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 13, 2010).

A party attempting to invoke the defense of issue preclusion must establish that the relevant factual or legal issue was “actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment.” County of Berks ex rel. Baldwin v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 544 Pa. 541, 678 A.2d 355, 359 (1996). It is undisputed that the legality of Brown’s dismissal under the First and Fourteenth Amendments was never litigated in the Pennsylvania courts. If Brown had unsuccessfully litigated the constitutionality of his discharge in his appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, he would have most likely been precluded from proceeding with his § 1983 claims against the Defendants in both their official and personal capacities. Matternas v. Stehman, 434 Pa.Super. 255, 642 A.2d 1120, 1125 (1994) (“Collateral estoppel does not require identity of causes of action or parties.”). Since that issue was never litigated, however, Brown is not precluded from asserting that Miller, Tucci and Stanger terminated his employment in retaliation for his expressive conduct. Swineford v. Snyder County Pennsylvania, 15 F.3d 1258, 1268-1269 (3d Cir.1994).

C. The Status of Brown’s Speech

For much of this nation’s history, the prevailing view was that the Constitution did not provide a public employee with a basis for objecting to the terms or conditions of his or her employment, even where such terms or conditions restricted the exercise of constitutional rights. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 492, 72 S.Ct. 380, 96 L.Ed. 517 (1952). In more recent times, however, the United States Supreme Court has maintained that “a State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes [an] employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). The test used to determine whether a public employer has contravened this principle was announced in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), in which the Supreme Court explained:

“The theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subject to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.” Keyishian v. Board of Regents, [385 U.S. 589, 605-606, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967)]. At the same time it cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731 (emphasis added). This language in Pickering describes the analysis that must be undertaken in determining whether the First Amendment prohibits a public employer from discharging or disciplining an employee in response to his or her speech.

“Decisions rendered subsequent to Pickering illustrate that the precise language used in that decision must be taken seriously.” Mitchell v. Miller, 884 F.Supp.2d 334, 356 (W.D.Pa.2012). For expression to enjoy the particular form of constitutional protection provided under Pickering, it must come from a public employee who is speaking “as a citizen.” Id. In Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006), the Supreme Court held that public employees “are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes” when they “make statements pursuant to their official duties.” The rule established in Garcetti reflects a public employer’s prerogative to control “what the employer itself has commissioned or created.” Garcetti 547 U.S. at 422, 126 S.Ct. 1951. In Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983), the Supreme Court held that the Free Speech Clause does not prevent a public employer from taking disciplinary action against an employee who speaks about matters of only “personal interest.” The decision in Connick gives effect to the language in Pickering referring to a public employee’s interest in “commenting upon matters of public concern.” Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731.

Where a public employee speaks “as a citizen” about “matters of public concern” and is disciplined in response to that speech, “the possibility of a First Amendment claim arises.” Garcetti 547 U.S. at 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951. In that situation, the legality of the disciplinary action typically turns on “whether the relevant government entity ha[s] an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public,” whether the employee’s speech “has some potential to affect the entity’s operations,” and whether the restrictions on speech imposed by the entity are necessary to its efficient and effective operation. Id. at 418-419, 126 S.Ct. 1951. Consideration must also be given to whether the speech “impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers,” “has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary,” “impedes the performance of the speaker’s duties,” or “interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise.” Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987). Where a public employee speaks pursuant to his or her official duties rather than “as a citizen,” the First Amendment “does not insulate [his or her] communications from employer discipline.” Garcetti 547 U.S. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951. Similarly, where a public employee’s speech does not involve matters of public concern, the Constitution does not prevent his or her employer from taking disciplinary action in response to that speech. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82-83, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) (explaining that “a public employee’s speech must touch on a matter of ‘public concern’ ” in order to “merit Pickering balancing”).

The Petition Clause, which is “cut from the same cloth” as the Free Speech Clause, provides individuals with “a particular freedom of expression.” McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482, 105 S.Ct. 2787, 86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985). “Whereas the Free Speech Clause protects the right to ‘wide-open’ debate, the Petition Clause encompasses only activity directed to a government audience.” Forak er v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 237 (3d Cir.2007). In Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. -, -, 131 S.Ct. 2488, 2500, 180 L.Ed.2d 408 (2011), the Supreme Court extended the Pickering framework to claims brought by public employees under the Petition Clause. Although the rule established in Connick was the primary focus of the Supreme Court’s analysis, the holding in Guamieri similarly embraces the rule established in Garcetti. Guarnieri, 131 S.Ct. at 2501 (“The right of a public employee under the Petition Clause is a right to participate as a citizen, through petitioning activity, in the democratic process.”) (emphasis added).

A governmental entity operating under constitutional constraints “has significantly greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees than it does when it brings its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large.” Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 599, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008). The Supreme Court’s decisions applying Pickering and its progeny recognize that “[t]he government’s interest in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer.” Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675, 114 S.Ct. 1878, 128 L.Ed.2d 686 (1994) (plurality opinion). That is because the government “gains additional authority to regulate speech” when it “acts in a capacity that goes beyond merely being sovereign.” In re Kendall, 712 F.3d 814, 825 (3d Cir.2013). In order to enjoy such latitude, however, a government must truly act “as an employer.” Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731. In Connick, the Supreme Court remarked that “an employee’s false criticism of his employer on grounds not of public concern may be cause for his discharge but would be entitled to the same protection in a libel action accorded an identical statement made by a man on the street.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 103 S.Ct. 1684. “This observation in Connick reflects the fact that statements made by a public employee pursuant to his or her official duties, or regarding matters of purely personal interest, may be characterized as ‘unprotected’ only ‘in the sense that employ