Citations
- 964 F. Supp. 2d 951
Full opinion text
ORDER CERTIFYING QUESTIONS TO THE IOWA SUPREME COURT
MARK W. BENNETT, District Judge.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ...................................956
A. Factual Background.................................................957
1. The parties and their relation to each other........................957
2. The facts surrounding Hagen’s ñring..............................957
B. Procedural Background..............................................959
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS......................................................960
A. Authorization and Standards for Certification of Questions...............960
B. Certification Analysis ......................................... 961
1. Whether legal issue is unsettled...................................961
a. Question 1: Whether Iowa law recognizes Protected Conduct 3, 4, or 5 as protected activities that can support claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.....961
i. Iowa’s standards for recognizing protected activities.....961
ii. Protected Conduct 3: A doctor reporting nurses’ ' malpractice to the hospital where the malpractice occurred ................................962
iii. Protected Conduct 4: A doctor disclosing to a patient’s family that the patient was a victim of medical malpractice.................................965
iv. Protected Conduct 5: A doctor consulting with an attorney about whether that doctor had a legal duty to report another doctor’s medical malpractice to the Iowa Board of Medicine ............965
b. Question 2: Whether contractual employees can bring claims for wrongful discharge in violation of Iowa public policy.....................................................965
c. Question 3: Whether the lack of an “overriding business justification” is an independent element of a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy...............969
2. Availability of legal resources..............................<......972
3. Court’s familiarity with state law...................... 976
4. Time demands on comparative court dockets..............'.........977
5. Frequency legal issue is likely to reoccur ..........................977
6. Age of litigation and prejudice from certification ...................977
7. Whether there is a split in authority................................978
a. Question I;, Whether other courts recognize Protected Conduct 3, 4, or 5 as protected activities that can support claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.....978
i.Protected Conduct 3: A doctor reporting nurse s’ malpractice to the hospital where the malpractice occurred.............................................978
ii. Protected Conduct 4: A doctor disclosing to a patient’s family that the patient was a victim of medical malpractice...............................1.984
iii. Protected Conduct 5: A doctor consulting with an attorney about whether that doctor had a legal duty to report another doctor’s medical malpractice to a state board of medicine...............987
b. Question 2: Whether contractual employees can bring claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.....989
c. Question 3: Whether the lack of an “overriding business justification” is an independent element of a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy...............992
III. CONCLUSION..........................................................992
This is an order certifying questions to the Iowa Supreme Court following a jury trial in which a jury found Defendants liable for wrongfully discharging the Plaintiff in violation of Iowa public policy. On June 6, 2013, I sua sponte ordered the parties in this case to provide supplemental briefs on the following issue, among others: “Whether the Court should certify to the Iowa Supreme Court the question of whether Iowa law recognizes the public policy exceptions on which the jury found Defendants liable” (docket no. 124). The Plaintiff and Defendants filed their supplemental briefs on July 5, 2013 (docket nos. 134 and 137). The parties presented oral arguments on this issue on August 23, 2013. Like the eight-day jury trial, the oral arguments were vigorously and zealously presented by highly skilled and exceptionally well-prepared counsel. Though their clients obviously disliked each other, counsel demonstrated the utmost professionalism and civility toward each other and to me. It would be wonderful if I could clone these lawyers for other hotly contested federal civil litigation.
I raised this matter sua sponte because this case turns on a number of unresolved questions of Iowa law. The answers to these questions are critical to resolving the Defendants’ post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law (docket no. 119), which is currently pending before me. Because this case raises issues of first impression under Iowa law that should, under the circumstances, be decided by the Iowa Supreme Court, I conclude that I should certify the following questions to the Iowa Supreme Court:
Question 1
Does Iowa law recognize any of the following conduct as protected conduct on which a doctor-employee can base a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Iowa public policy?:
(a) A doctor reporting, stating an intention to report, or stating that he might report, to a hospital, conduct of nurses that the doctor believed may have involved wrongful acts or omissions;
(b) A doctor disclosing to a patient or a patient’s family that the patient may have been the victim of negligent care or malpractice; or
(c)A doctor consulting with an attorney, stating an intention to consult with an attorney, or stating that he might consult with an attorney, about whether another doctor or nurses had committed wrongful acts or omissions that the doctor should report to the Iowa Board of Medicine or a hospital.
Question 2
Does Iowa law allow a contractual employee to bring a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Iowa public policy, or is the tort available only to at-will employees?
Question 3
Under Iowa law, is an employer’s lack of an “overriding business justification” for firing an employee an independent element of a wrongful discharge claim, or is that element implicit in the element requiring that an employee’s protected activity be the determining factor in the employer’s decision to fire the employee?
Whether I grant the Defendants’ post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or motion for a new trial will depend, in part, on the answers to these questions.
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
“A certification order shall set forth ... a statement of facts relevant to the questions certified, showing fully the nature of the controversy in which the questions arose.” Iowa Code § 684A.3. Unless I note otherwise, the following facts are presented “in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, assuming all conflicts in the evidence were resolved in [the Plaintiffs] favor, and giving Plaintiff[ ] the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.... ” Craig Out door Adver., Inc. v. Viacom Outdoor, Inc., 528 F.3d 1001,1013 (8th Cir.2008).
A. Factual Background
In this case, Dr. Edward Hagen (Hagen) sued his former employer, Siouxland Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C. (Siouxland), and his former partners, Dr. Paul Eastman (Eastman), Dr. Tauhni Hunt (Hunt), and Dr. Angela Aldrich (Aldrich) (collectively “the Siouxland Defendants”) for wrongful discharge in violation of Iowa public policy. In particular, Hagen claims that the Siouxland Defendants ousted him from their medical practice bécause Hagen reported, or threatened to report, to St. Luke’s hospital and a patient, that Eastman and two nurses committed medical malpractice causing an unborn baby’s death. Hagen also claims that the Sioux-land Defendants ousted him for consulting with attorneys about whether Eastman and the nurses had committed malpractice, and whether Hagen should report Eastman to the Iowa Board of Medicine or St. Luke’s.
1. The parties and their relation to each other
Siouxland, an Iowa professional corporation, is located in Sioux City, Iowa, and provides obstetric and gynecologic services to patients. Siouxland expanded into the area of cosmetic surgery and related services, including the development of The Rejuvenation Centre, which provided client services such as Botox treatment, Juviderm treatment, hair removal, liposuction, massage therapy, and weight loss consultation. Siouxland was formed and organized by three physicians, including Hagen’s father, in 1975. At the -time of Hagen’s firing, in November 2009, the doctors with an interest in Siouxland were Hagen, Eastman, Hunt, and Aldrich.
Hagen is a doctor of obstetrics and gynecology, presently licensed to practice medicine in Iowa, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. On January 1, 1993, Hagen entered into an employment agreement with Siouxland. Hagen has been an equity owner, president, and director at Sioux-land. At the time he was fired, Hagen was the president of Siouxland.
When the doctors joined Siouxland, they agreed not to “engage in the practice of medicine except as an employee of the CORPORATION unless otherwise authorized by the Board of Directors.” The employment agreement states all income generated “for services as a doctor and all activities relating thereto, such as lecturing, writing articles and consulting work, shall belong to the CORPORATION....” A doctor could be terminated by delivering a written notice of cancellation at least 90 days prior to the effective date of cancellation or “discharged by the CORPORATION in the event of embezzlement or other theft; willful contravention of professional ethics; substantial and willful violation of any other terms or conditions of this employment agreement, all subject to determination by the Board of Directors of the CORPORATION.”
2. The facts surrounding Hagen’s firing
Hagen’s claims in this case arise out of an incident that began at St. Luke’s hospital in Sioux City, Iowa, on Thursday, November 5, 2009. On that day, Selvin and Maria Maeda, who were husband and wife, were at St. Luke’s because Maria Maeda was dealing with complications related to her pregnancy. She was 34 weeks pregnant and she was suffering from infections related to a prior liver transplant. Eastman was Maria’s consulting physician and had met her during a prior examination, bub he was nob ab bhe hospital with Maria on the 5th. In fact, Maria had been admitted to the hospital at around 1:00 pm and Eastman had never gone to St. Luke’s to check on her. Hagen was on call that evening to cover patients at St. Luke’s. At around 4:30 pm, Eastman called Hagen to ask whether Hagen was on call and to explain Maria’s complications. Eastman explained to Hagen that he thought Maria was at a hospital in Omaha, and had only ■recently learned that she was still at St. Luke’s. Eastman told Hagen that Maria was in labor and going into intensive care based on her complications.
After speaking with Eastman for about 30 minutes, Hagen went to St. Luke’s. Hagen arrived at the hospital at 5:30 pm. He immediately went to see Maria, who was under general anesthesia, and performed an ultrasound, which confirmed that her baby was dead. Hagen began asking two labor and delivery nurses— Peggy Mace and Holly Duerksen — how long the baby had been dead. They could not tell him. Hagen became very upset and asked the nurses: “How the fuck can this happen- at St. Luke’s that [nurses] watch a baby die on the monitor, suffocate, and do nothing?” Hagen went on to say to the nurses: “You killed this baby. You watched this baby die on the monitor. I mean, you guys did nothing.” Hagen noted that the nurses had missed the fact that Maria’s baby was dead because they had mistaken Maria’s elevated heart rate for her baby’s and presumed the baby was still alive.
After realizing that Maria’s baby was dead, Hagen determined that he needed to perform a C-section to deliver the dead baby. Before doing so, Hagen called Eastman on the telephone. At trial, Ha-gen testified that the conversation went as follows: “And I told [Eastman] we got a problem here. We’ve got a mother here that’s had no care. The nurses screwed up. You didn’t come see her, and this baby is dead, and now I’ve gotta do a C-section on a mother and deliver a dead baby.” Eastman offered to help do the C-section, but Hagen declined, telling Eastman: “I don’t need help doing a C-section. I can do that. I needed your help three hours earlier, but I don’t need it now.”
Before performing the C-section, Hagen spoke with Selvin, Maria’s husband. They talked for over an hour in the doctor’s lounge. During their conversation, Hagen told Selvin that “things could have been done better” and that Hagen thought “the nurses missed something here.” Hagen then performed the surgery to remove Maria’s baby.
The next day, Hagen went to one of the hospital’s administrators, Dr. Hildebrand (Hildebrand), to report himself for using the F-word to the nurses, and to report the nurses and Eastman for their failure to properly care for Maria. After making these reports to the hospital, Hagen consulted with three different attorneys about various issues, including how Hagen should document what had happened the night before and what Hagen should do personally in response to the incident. During one of these conversations, one of the attorneys reminded Hagen that he had a duty to report malpractice to the Iowa Board of Medicine. Later that day, Ha-gen told Eastman 'that “these attorneys are telling me I have to report you to the Iowa state medical board.” Hagen also had a conversation with Hunt and Aldrich in which he told them- that Hagen had reported the nurses and Eastman to the hospital, and that Hagen had spoken with attorneys who told him that he might have to turn Eastman in to the Iowa Board of Medicine.
Hagen spent the next two days, Saturday and Sunday, in Lincoln, Nebraska, with his children and then returned to Sioux City. The following Monday night, November 9, 2009, Hagen received a 10-day suspension from St. Luke’s hospital. On Tuesday, Hagen was noticeably upset at work because of how the hospital handled the suspension, punishing Hagen without also punishing the nurses or Eastman. Hagen told his medical partners that he was going to tell the patient to sue the hospital, and that he was going to tell the patient to get a lawyer and investigate what happened. Then, on Wednesday night, Hagen called Maria Maeda at the hospital and told her: “You were mistreated, this is malpractice, the nurses missed the boat, Dr. Eastman missed the boat, and I think you should get an attorney.” Finally, on Thursday, Hagen informed his partners that he had spoken with Maria. That was the last day Hagen worked at Siouxland.
The following Monday, while Hagen was out of town at his cabin in Wisconsin, Hagen received a call from Siouxland’s corporate attorney, who told Hagen he needed to be in a meeting at 7:00 pm because he was being fired. Hagen drove back to Sioux City to make the meeting, which was held at Siouxland’s attorney’s law firm. At the meeting, Siouxland’s attorney told Hagen that the partners at Siouxland had decided to fire him. Following his firing, Hagen sued the Sioux-land Defendants, claiming a number of causes of action including wrongful discharge in violation of Iowa’s public policy.
B. Procedural Background
On April 19, 2013, the parties went to trial on Count IV of Hagen’s Complaint: Retaliatory Discharge in Violation of Public Policy. The trial lasted eight days and oceurred between April 19, 2013, and May 1, 2013.
At the trial’s conclusion, the jury found the Siouxland Defendants liable for wrongfully discharging Hagen in violation of Iowa’s public policy. The verdict form provided five options of protected conduct that the jury could find to support their conclusion that the Siouxland Defendants wrongfully discharged Hagen. The verdict form read, in pertinent part:
If you found in favor of Dr. Hagen in Step 1, which one or more of the following kinds of conduct do you find were determining factor(s) in Siouxland’s decision to terminate Dr. Hagen?
_ Dr. Hagen reporting, stating an intention to report, or stating that he might report to the Iowa Board of Medicine conduct of Dr. Eastman that Dr. Hagen believed may have involved wrongful acts, omissions, negligence, or malpractice [Protected Conduct 1]
_ Dr. Hagen reporting, stating an intention to report, or stating that he might report to a hospital conduct of Dr. Eastman that Dr. Hagen believed may have involved wrongful acts, omissions, negligence, or malpractice [Protected Conduct 2]
X Dr. Hagen reporting, stating an intention to report, or stating that he might report to a hospital conduct of nurses that Dr. Hagen believed may have involved wrongful acts or omissions [Protected Conduct 3]
X Dr. Hagen disclosing to a patient or a patient’s family that the patient may have been the victim of negligent care or malpractice [Protected Conduct 4]
X Dr. Hagen consulting with an attorney, stating an intention to consult with an attorney, or stating that he might consult with an attorney about whether Dr. Eastman or nurses had committed wrongful acts or omissions that Dr. Ha-gen should report to the Iowa Board of Medicine or a hospital [Protected Conduct 5]
(Docket no. 113). The jury marked the last three options — ie., Protected Conduct 3, 4, and 5 — in support of the verdict in favor of Hagen, and awarded Hagen $1, 051, 814 for past lost earnings. The jury awarded Hagen no damages for future lost earnings, and it awarded no punitive damages. The Clerk entered judgment for Hagen in the amount of $1,051,814 on May 2, 2013.
Following the verdict, the Siouxland Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively a new trial. In their post-trial motion, the Siouxland Defendants argue, among other things, that none of the protected activities on which the jury based its verdict are actionable under Iowa law, and that Hagen failed to prove he was an at-will employee and therefore cannot maintain a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Iowa public policy.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Authorization and Standards for Certification of Questions
Both Iowa law and this court’s Local Rules permit me, on the motion of a party or sua sponte, to certify a question of state law to the Iowa Supreme Court. Iowa’s certification statute provides:
The supreme court may answer questions of law certified to it by the supreme court of the United States, a court of appeals of the United States, a United States district court or the highest appellate court or the intermediate appellate court of another state, when requested by the certifying court, if there are involved in a proceeding before it questions of law of this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the appellate courts of this state.
Iowa Code § 684A.1. Local Rule 83 of the Northern District of Iowa provides:
When a question of state law may be determinative of a cause pending in this court and it appears there may be no controlling precedent in the decisions of the appellate courts of the state, any party may file a motion to certify the question to the highest appellate court of the state. The court may, on such motion or on its own motion, certify the question to the appropriate state court.
N.D. Ia. L.R. 83.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that:
Certification procedure ... allows a federal court faced with a novel state-law question to put the question directly to the State’s highest court, reducing the delay, cutting the cost, and increasing the assurance of gaining an authoritative response.
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997); see Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391, 94 S.Ct. 1741, 40 L.Ed.2d 215 (1974) (by certifying a question of state law, the federal court may save “time, energy and resources and hel[p] build a cooperative judicial federalism”). Thus, “[tjaking advantage of certification made available by a State may ‘greatly simplif[y]’ an ultimate adjudication in federal court.” Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 76, 117 S.Ct. 1055 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 182, 151, 96 S.Ct. 2857, 49 L.Ed.2d 844 (1976)).
Whether a federal district court should certify a question of state law to the state’s highest court is a matter “committed to the discretion of the district court.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Steele, 74 F.3d 878, 881-82 (8th Cir.1996); Schein, 416 U.S. at 391, 94 S.Ct. 1741 (“[Certification’s] use in a given case rests in the sound discretion of the federal court.”); see Babinski v. American Family Ins. Group, 569 F.3d 349, 353 (8th Cir.2009) (“ ‘Whether a federal court should certify a question to a state court is a matter of discretion.’ ”) (quoting Johnson v. John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 151, 153 (8th Cir.1991)); see also Anderson v. Hess Corp., 649 F.3d 891, 891 (8th Cir. 2011); Jung v. General Cas. Co., 651 F.3d 796, 796 (8th Cir.2011); Packett v. Stenberg, 969 F.2d 721, 726 (8th Cir.1992).
I previously articulated the following factors to be considered in determining whether to certify a question to a state’s highest court:
(1) the extent to which the legal issue under consideration has been left unsettled by the state courts; (2) the availability of legal resources which would aid the court in coming to a conclusion on the legal issue; (3) the court’s familiarity with the pertinent state law; (4) the time demands on the court’s docket and the docket of the state supreme court; (5) the frequency that the legal issue in question is likely to recur; and (6) the age of the current litigation and the possible prejudice to the litigants which may result from certification.
Leiberkneckt v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 980 F.Supp. 300, 310 (N.D.Iowa 1997); accord Erickson-Puttmann v. Gill, 212 F.Supp.2d 960, 975 n. 6 (N.D.Iowa 2002); see Olympus Alum. Prod. v. Kehm Enters., Ltd., 930 F.Supp. 1295, 1309 n. 10 (N.D.Iowa 1996) (citing Rowson v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 866 F.Supp. 1221, 1225 & n. 5 (N.D.Iowa 1994)). In Leiberkneckt, I also considered a seventh factor; “whether there is any split of authority among those jurisdictions that have considered the issues presented in similar or analogous circumstances.” Leiberkneckt, 980 F.Supp. at 311. I will address each of these factors in turn below.
B. Certification Analysis
1. Whether legal issue is unsettled
The initial certification factor considers whether the issue is “unsettled” by state courts. See Leiberkneckt, 980 F.Supp. at 310; see also Erickson-Puttmann, 212 F.Supp.2d at 975 n. 6; Olympus Alum. Prod., 930 F.Supp. at 1309 n. 10. As is discussed below, both of the questions that I have chosen to certify are unsettled under Iowa law. Thus, I find that the first certification factor weighs in favor of certifying to the Iowa Supreme Court the questions of whether Hagen engaged in protected conduct, and whether a contractual employee can sue for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
a. Question 1: Whether Iowa law recognizes Protected Conduct 3, 4, or 5 as protected activities that can support claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
i. Iowa’s standards for recognizing protected activities
Iowa law recognizes a “public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine[,]” which “limits an employer’s discretion to discharge an at-will employee when the discharge would undermine a clearly defined and well-recognized public policy of the state.” Berry v. Liberty Holdings, Inc., 803 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Iowa 2011) (citing Jasper v. H. Nizam, Inc., 764 N.W.2d 751, 763 (Iowa 2009); Thompto v. Cobom’s Inc., 871 F.Supp. 1097, 1112-13 (N.D.Iowa 1994)). Under this “public-policy exception,” an employee can bring “an intentional tort claim of wrongful discharge from employment in violation of public policy” against his or her employer if the employer fired the employee for engaging in certain categories of “protected activity.” Id. at 109-10. At issue in this case is whether the protected activities found by the jury — Protected Conduct 3, 4, and 5 — are, or would be, recognized under Iowa law such that Iowa employers could be held liable if they fire employees for engaging in those activities.
Not every “socially desirable conduct” an employee might engage in is actionable under Iowa’s public policy exception. Jasper, 764 N.W.2d at 762. Rather, to be actionable, an employee’s purported protected conduct must be “clear and well-defined” under Iowa law such “that it should be understood and accepted in our society as a benchmark” activity for which employers cannot fire employees. Id. at 763. A well-defined public policy might be embodied in Iowa’s legislatively enacted statutes, Iowa’s Constitution, or even Iowa’s administrative regulations. Id. at 763-74. Whether legislative or administrative, a purported public-policy source “must not only relate to public health, safety, or welfare, but the regulation must also express a substantial public policy in a way that furthers a specific legislative expression of the policy.” Id. at 764. Based on these principles, Iowa law protects employees in performing at least four broad categories of conduct: “(1) exercising a statutory right or privilege; (2) refusing to commit an unlawful act; (3) performing a statutory obligation; and (4) reporting a statutory violation....” Id. at 762 (internal citations omitted).
This case involved three purportedly protected activities — Protected Conduct 3, 4, and 5 — that the Iowa courts have yet to explicitly recognize. Based on the discussion below, I would find that Iowa’s public policy exception protects employees, like Hagen, who engage in these activities. But because the Iowa courts have not addressed these activities directly, I find that certifying these questions to the Iowa Supreme Court is appropriate.
ii. Protected Conduct 3: A doctor reporting nurses’ malpractice to the hospital where the malpractice occurred
In this case, the jury found that Protected Conduct 3 was a determining factor in the Siouxland Defendants’ decision to fire Hagen. Specifically, the jury found that the Siouxland Defendants fired Hagen for “reporting, stating an intention to report, or stating that he might report to [St. Luke’s] hospital conduct of nurses that Dr. Hagen believed may have involved wrongful acts or omissions” (docket no. 113). The Iowa courts have not yet addressed whether a doctor stating his or her intention to report nurses’ malpractice to a hospital constitutes protected conduct.
Though the issue remains undecided, Iowa’s comprehensive statutory and regulatory schemes governing medical professionals demonstrate a strong public policy interest in protecting doctors and nurses who openly report malpractice. To start, Iowa law requires that all doctors and nurses be licensed by state licensing boards before they practice medicine or nursing. Iowa Code § 147.2. These state licensing boards — the board of medicine and the board of nursing — must establish rules for revoking and suspending licenses of doctors and nurses who engage in harmful or unprofessional conduct. Id. § 272C.10 (mandating that the boards establish revocation and suspension rules); see also id. § 147.55 (providing a non-exhaustive list of grounds for revoking or suspending licenses). For example, the board of medicine or nursing must revoke or suspend a doctor’s or nurse’s license if he or she demonstrates “[professional incompetence” or “[k]nowingly mak[es] misleading, deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations in the, practice of a profession or engag[es] in unethical conduct or practiced] harmful or fletrimental to the public,” among other things. Id. §§ 147.55(2)-(3). The Iowa Code goes on to permit the board of medicine to discipline doctors who are “guilty of a willful or repeated departure from, or the failure to conform to, the minimal standard of acceptable and prevailing practice of medicine and surgery” or who commit “an act contrary to honesty, justice, or good morals.... ” Id. § 148.6(2) (listing other grounds for discipline as well). And the board of nursing may similarly discipline nurses who are “guilty of willful or repeated departure from or the failure to conform to the minimum standard of acceptable and prevailing practice of nursing....” Id. § 152.10(2) (listing other grounds for discipline as well).
Additionally, the text of these licensing laws demonstrates that the regulations imposed on doctors and nurses are designed to protect the public, not just individual patients. See, e.g., id. § 272C.10(3) (requiring revocation or suspension where a doctor or nurse “engag[ed] in unethical conduct or practice harmful or detrimental to the public”); id. § 147.55(3) (same). In fact, if a doctor or nurse fails to live up to certain standards in Iowa’s licensing laws, “actual injury to a patient need not be established” before a board can discipline that doctor or nurse. Id. § 148.6(2)(g) (doctors); id. § 152.10(2)(g) (nurses); id. § 147.55(3) (noting that “[pjroof of actual injury need not be established” before disciplining both doctors and nurses who “[kjnowingly mak[e] misleading, deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations in the practice of a profession or engagfe] in unethical conduct or practiced] harmful or detrimental to the public”).
And Iowa’s licensing laws are designed to regulate not only how a doctor or nurse treats a patient, but also how a doctor or nurse responds to other medical professionals who fail to conform to Iowa’s licensing standards. Iowa’s statutes and administrative regulations impose a duty on doctors and nurses, in certain circumstances, to report other doctors or nurses who fail to meet the standards of care required of medical professionals. Under Iowa law, “[a] licensee has a continuing duty to report to the licensing board by whom the person is licensed those acts or omissions specified by rule of the board pursuant to section 272C.4, subsection 6, when committed by another person licensed by the same licensing board.” Id. § 272C.9(2). The Iowa Administrative Code further discusses a licensed doctor’s mandatory reporting duties, and provides: “A report shall be filed with the board when a licensee has knowledge as defined in this rule that another person licensed by the board may have engaged in reportable conduct.” Iowa Admin. Code r. 653-22.2(2). The Administrative Code defines “reportable conduct” as
wrongful acts or omissions that are grounds for license revocation or suspension under these rules or that otherwise constitute negligence, careless acts or omissions that demonstrate a licensee’s inability to practice medicine competently, safely, or within the bounds of medical ethics, pursuant to Iowa Code sections 272C.3(2) and 272C.4(6) and 653 — Chapter 23.
Id. r. 653-22.2(1).' . “Failure to report a wrongful act or omission in accordance with this rule within the required 30-day period shall constitute a basis for disciplinary action against the licensee who failed to report.” Id. r. 653-22.2(2)(e). Similarly, the Administrative Code defines “unethical conduct” for nurses to include “[flailing to report suspected wrongful acts or omissions committed by a licensee of the board.” Id. r. 655-4.6(4)(r).
Taken together, Iowa’s statutes and regulations governing the conduct of medical professionals express commonsense public policy values: People want to ensure that their doctors and nurses — who have immense control over people’s lives and health — are not only highly competent, but also highly accountable. These values benefit the public just as much as they benefit individual patients. After all, “[e]veryone will, • at some point, consume health-care ... services.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2618, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). And when the public inevitably consumes health-care services, it expects that its medical professionals will be qualified and will not attempt to sweep mistakes under the rug. Thus, Iowa law requires doctors and nurses to disclose malpractice to their governing boards. While Iowa Code § 272C.9(2) only requires a licensee to report malpractice committed by a “person licensed by the same licensing board,” Iowa’s mandatory reporting laws stand for a greater principle: Iowa law encourages medical professionals to disclose medical mistakes, not hide them.
Hagen’s open intention to report nurses who committed malpractice to St. Luke’s hospital was consistent, with the spirit of Iowa’s public policy favoring disclosure. True, Iowa’s mandatory reporting laws require only that licensees report malpractice to their board, rather than to a hospital. But the public policy benefit underlying Iowa’s mandatory reporting requirements — the open disclosure of medical mistakes — is equally served when a doctor reports malpractice to authorities at a hospital where the malpractice happened. It would be strange to protect a doctor from being fired for discharging his or her mandatory duty to report malpractice to the board of medicine, but leave that same doctor exposed to termination for reporting that same malpractice to a different medical authority, like a hospital’s management.
In Jasper v. H. Nizam, Inc., 764 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 2009), the Iowa Supreme Court confronted an analogous statutory scheme designed to protect the public. The Court in Jasper held that a children’s day-care director could sue her employer for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy after the director was fired for refusing to allow the day-care to operate below the proper child-to-staff ratio mandated by Iowa’s Administrative Code. Id. at 768. The Court in Jasper held that Iowa’s child-to-staff administrative rules could form the basis of a wrongful discharge claim because these rules were “a means ‘to assure the health, safety, and welfare of children’ in daycare facilities.” Id. at 766 (quoting Iowa Code § 237A.12(l)(a)). Based on this regulatory goal, and because “the protection of children is a matter of fundamental public interest,” Iowa’s child-to-staff regulations “satisfyfied] the goal that the regulation affect the public interest.” Id.
Like the regulations at issue in Jasper, Iowa’s mandatory reporting and licensing regulations for medical professionals protect the health, safety, and welfare of patients. In particular, these regulations were designed, in part, to protect against “unethical conduct or practiced] harmful or detrimental to the public.” Iowa Code § 272C.10(3). Given that Iowa’s licensing and reporting laws promote medical competence and open disclosure, I would find that a doctor reporting nurses’ malpractice to a hospital constitutes protected activity under Iowa law.
iii. Protected Conduct 4: A doctor disclosing to a patient’s family that the patient was a victim of medical malpractice
In addition to Protected Conduct 3, the jury found that Protected Conduct 4 was a determining factor in the Siouxland Defendants’ decision to fire Hagen. Specifically, the jury found that the Siouxland Defendants fired Hagen for “disclosing to a patient or a patient’s family that the patient may have been the victim of negligent care or malpractice” (docket no. 113). Like Protected Conduct 3, the Iowa courts have not yet directly addressed whether Iowa law recognizes Protected Conduct 4 as protected activity that can support a wrongful discharge claim. But, again, I would find that Iowa’s public policy protects a doctor who engages in this activity. The public policy goals of competence and open disclosure in Iowa’s licensing laws equally favor protecting doctors who openly disclose another’s malpractice to the very people victimized by the malpractice — the patients. Because I discussed the applicability and goals of Iowa’s licensing laws above, I will not repeat that rationale here.
Aside from the statutory policy goals favoring disclosure, Iowa law provides additional support for protecting doctors who disclose malpractice to patients. Under Iowa law, “[t]he close relationship of trust and confidence between patient and physician gives rise to duties of disclosure .... ” Koppes v. Pearson, 384 N.W.2d 381, 386 (Iowa 1986). A number of Iowa regulations and statutes recognize the importance of open and clear disclosure between doctors and their patients. See, e.g., Iowa Admin. Code r. 653-13.7(3) (requiring that patient “[ijnformation shall be divulged by the physician when authorized by law or the patient or when required for patient care”); id. r. 653-13.7(7) (requiring doctors to provide a patient with a copy of their medical records upon request); Iowa Code § 147.137 (detailing requirements of a patient’s written informed consent, which include a number of disclosures related to the risks of medical procedures). These statutes, combined with Koppes’s recognition of a doctor’s duties of disclosure and Iowa’s licensing standards favoring disclosing malpractice, would lead me to conclude that Iowa’s public policy protects doctors who inform patients that they were the victims of malpractice.
iv. Protected Conduct 5: A doctor consulting with an attorney about whether that doctor had a legal duty to report another doctor’s medical malpractice to the Iowa Board of Medicine
Finally, the jury found that Protected Conduct 5 was a determining factor in the Siouxland Defendants’ decision to fire Ha-gen. Specifically, the jury found that the Siouxland Defendants fired Hagen for
consulting with an attorney, stating an intention to consult with an attorney, or stating that he might consult with an attorney about whether Dr. Eastman or nurses had committed wrongful acts or omissions that Dr. Hagen should report to the Iowa Board of Medicine or a hospital.
(Docket no. 113). No Iowa court has ever directly addressed whether consulting with an attorney about whether a doctor has a legal obligation to report another doctor or nurses to the Iowa Board of Medicine constitutes protected activity. Thus, this issue, like those above, appears to be unsettled under Iowa law.
Based on Iowa’s public policy principles, I held nearly two decades ago that Iowa’s public policy protected an employee who was fired after threatening to consult an attorney about a dispute the employee was having with her employer. Thompto v. Cobom’s Inc., 871 F.Supp. 1097, 1116 (N.D.Iowa 1994). I reached that conclusion by relying on a combination of legislative and judicial authorities, all of which recognize the paramount importance of allowing people to consult with lawyers. These authorities fall into two categories: (1) statutes and rules regulating the legal profession, and (2) common-sense judicial and legislative declarations about the necessary role lawyers play in society. Id. at 1119-21.
First, I noted in Thompto that Iowa’s legislature has vested the Iowa Supreme Court with the authority to regulate many aspects of the legal profession, including granting and revoking law licenses, disciplining attorneys, and adopting rules regulating Iowa lawyers. See Iowa Code § 602.10101 (“The power to admit persons to practice as attorneys and counselors in the courts of this state, or any of them, is vested exclusively in the supreme court which shall adopt and promulgate rules to carry out the intent and purpose of this article.”); id. § 602.10121 (granting the court the power to revoke and suspend law licenses); Thompto, 871 F.Supp. at 1119. And “[t]he Iowa Supreme Court has always reserved to itself the inherent power to regulate the legal profession in this state[.]” Thompto, 871 F.Supp. at 1119 (citing Matter of Peterson, 439 N.W.2d 165, 166 (Iowa 1989) (further citations omitted)). Consistent with this authority, in 1994, when I decided Thompto, the Iowa Supreme Court enforced the Code of Professional Responsibility, which discussed the important role lawyers played in society. For example, the Code recognized that
[ljawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship with and function in our legal system. A consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct.
Id. (quoting Code of Professional Responsibility, Preamble). The Code also stated “that every person in our society should have ready access to the independent professional services of a lawyer of integrity and competence.” Id. (quoting Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 1-1). To promote this ideal, the Code provided that
[t]he need of members of the public for legal services is met only if they recognize their legal problems, appreciate the importance of seeking legal assistance, and are able to obtain the services of acceptable legal counsel. Hence, important functions of the legal profession are to educate laypersons to recognize their problems, to facilitate the process of intelligent selection of lawyers, and to assist in making legal services fully available.
Id. at 1119-20 (quoting Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 2-1). Based on these rules, I concluded that “the Code of Professional Responsibility embodies a strong public policy favoring access of persons to professional legal services for the purposes of recognizing legal problems.” Id. at 1120 (footnote omitted).
Then, in 2005, the Iowa Supreme Court adopted a new (though highly similar) set of professional rules — the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct — which govern Iowa lawyers today. Ia. Ct. R. Ch. 32; see also Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplin ary Bd. v. Casey, 761 N.W.2d 53, 57 (Iowa 2009) (noting that the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted in 2005). Though the text and organization of these newer rules differs from the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Rules of Professional Conduct retain much of the same language cited above. See, e.g., Iowa Rules of Profl Conduct Preamble [13] (“Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our legal system. The Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve to define that relationship.”); id. Preamble [6] (“[A] lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of justice, and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession.”); id. (“[A]ll lawyers should devote professional time and resources and use civic influence to ensure equal access to' our system of justice for all those who because of economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel.”).
Second, I noted in Thompto that, “[p]ractically speaking, attorneys are the key to obtaining relief from violations of individual and group rights in employment and many other contexts.” 871 F.Supp. at 1120. “[T]he nature of the judicial system of this country, civil and criminal, itself makes consultation, and often employment, of legal representatives essential....” Id. at 1120. “The importance of consultation and employment of legal counsel to vindicate civil rights has also been recognized by federal statutory provisions awarding attorney fees for parties who succeed in vindicating those rights at trial.... ” Id. For instance, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 allows prevailing parties to collect reasonable attorney fees in federal civil rights litigation. Similarly, Iowa’s legislature has passed fee-shifting statutes allowing successful litigants to recover attorney fees under the Iowa Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 216.15(9)(a)(8). “These fee-shifting statutes legislate a simple truth: In today’s complex legal system, lawyers play a critical role in vindicating important public and private rights.” Thompto, 871 F.Supp. at 1120.
Based on these observations, I held that an employer violates Iowa’s public policy when it deters employees from consulting with an attorney about their legal rights:
In light of the clear articulations of public policy favoring consultation with attorneys in order to determine whether a person has a legal problem, public policy favoring the availability of competent legal advice, public policy placing on lawyers a duty to counsel only actions that are legal and just, and public policy favoring compensation of legal counsel for individuals who endeavor to vindicate civil rights, the court concludes that acts that impede an individual from seeking legal advice would be injurious to the public, or against the public good, would not be right and just, and could potentially have a deleterious effect on what affects the citizens of the State collectively. Such conduct would therefore be in violation of public policy.
Id. at 1121 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Chapman v. Adia Servs., Inc., 116 Ohio App.3d 534, 688 N.E.2d 604, 609-10 (1997) (relying, in part, on Thompto’s reasoning in holding “that Ohio public policy encourages individuals to consult an attorney regarding a possible claim”).
In the nearly two decades since I decided Thompto, the Iowa Supreme Court has never explicitly recognized a public policy protecting an employee’s right to consult an attorney, nor has the Iowa Supreme Court rejected such a public policy. The Iowa Supreme Court has, however, held in Ballalatak v. All Iowa Agriculture Associ ation that Iowa’s public policy does not protect an employee who threatens to contact an attorney on behalf of his or her coworkers. 781 N.W.2d 272, 279 (Iowa 2010). But, contrary to the Siouxland Defendants’ assertion that “Thompto’s continued validity is questionable” (docket no 119-1, at 20), the Court in Ballalatak explicitly left open the possibility of “recognizing] a right to consult or threaten to consult one’s own attorney....” 781 N.W.2d at 279 (emphasis added). In fact, Thompto did not purport to recognize a public policy right to consult an attorney on behalf of third parties; rather, Thompto recognized an employee’s right not to be fired “for threatening to consult an attorney to vindicate what the employee believes to be his or her rights against an employer____” Thompto, 871 F.Supp. at 1121 (emphasis added).
The principles outlined in Thompto apply with even greater force to this case. In Thompto, I held that Iowa’s public policy protected an employee who threatened to consult an attorney about her employer’s decision to deny her husband cancer insurance coverage, which is merely a permissible reason to consult an attorney. Id. at 1107-08. In other words, Iowa law did not require the plaintiff in Thompto to take any action. By contrast, this case involves a doctor’s mandatory duty to report malpractice under Iowa law. As discussed above, the Iowa Administrative Code mandates that doctors report other doctors’ negligence to the Iowa Board of Medicine. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 653-22.2(2) (imposing a duty to report); id. r. 653-22.2(1) (defining reportable conduct to include “wrongful acts or omissions”). “Failure to report a wrongful act or omission in accordance with this rule within the required 30-day period shall constitute a basis for disciplinary action against the licensee who failed to report.” Id. r. 653-22.2(2)(e). Based on these mandatory reporting regulations, Hagen had a duty to report Eastman’s negligence. If he did not, he exposed himself to discipline. Following Thompto’s reasoning, if Hagen would have been protected in consulting an attorney to bring a permissible cause of action, he must have at least as much protection in consulting an attorney to meet a mandatory, legal duty.
In addition to Thompto, the Iowa Supreme Court’s holding in Jasper provides support for protecting an employee who tells his or her employer that he is consulting with an attorney regarding a mandatory legal obligation. Under Jasper, “the tort of wrongful discharge not only protects the reporting of an activity violative of public policy, but also protects the refusal by an employee to engage in activity that is violative of public policy.” 764 N.W.2d at 767-68 (citing Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 286 (Iowa 2000)). In fact, the employee in Jasper did not report an administrative violation to anyone; rather, she told her employer that she refused to violate an administrative regulation, which the Iowa Supreme Court held was protected conduct. Id. at 758-59, 768. Like the employee in Jasper, Hagen did not actually report Eastman to the Iowa Board of Medicine before the Siouxland Defendants fired him. He did, however, tell the Sioux-land Defendants that he might have to report Eastman under Iowa’s reporting regulations. Thus, like the employee in Jasper, Hagen made clear to his employer his intention to comply with Iowa’s administrative rules.
If Iowa law protects complying with, or stating an intention to comply with, certain administrative regulations, it follows that Iowa law also protects any reasonable steps an employee takes to determine how to comply with those regulations, which may include consulting with an attorney. Applying this logic to the case at hand, if Iowa law would protect Hagen in reporting Eastman to the Board, it must also protect Hagen in determining whether he needed to report Eastman by talking with an attorney. Iowa’s public policy would have little force if it only prohibited employers from firing employees who actually complied with Iowa’s regulations, but not those who attempted to comply with Iowa’s regulations. Cf. Roger v. Boise Cascade Corp., No. 88 C 1436, 1989 WL 31469, at *4 (N.D.I11. Mar. 27, 1989) (“Whether an employer terminates an employee for hiring an attorney to pursue a claim or waits until charges are formally made and a claim is actually filed, the employer is effectively attempting to deter or sabotage the employee’s effort to enforce his right to nondiscriminatory treatment.”). An employee may need to contact an attorney to determine how to comply with Iowa’s laws, and if those laws embody meaningful public policy goals, employers should not be free to thwart those goals by firing employees who consult attorneys.
Iowa’s mandatory reporting regulation for doctors benefits the public at large, and allowing employers to fire doctors who attempt to comply with this regulation by contacting an attorney would obstruct that benefit. Thus, if I were deciding this issue, I would find that Hagen informing the Siouxland Defendants that he had consulted with an attorney about reporting Eastman’s negligence is protected conduct under Iowa law.
b. Question 2: Whether contractual employees can bring claims for wrongful discharge in violation of Iowa public policy
Like the “protected conduct” issues discussed above, Iowa law similarly leaves open the question of whether a contractual employee can sue for wrongful discharge, or if this claim is only available to at-will employees. While “Iowa courts have consistently held that ‘an at-will employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the reasons for the discharge violate a clearly defined and well-recognized public policy,’ ” no Iowa court has ever expressly limited wrongful discharge claims to at-will employees, as opposed to contractual employees. Berry, 803 N.W.2d at 109 (citing Jasper, 764 N.W.2d at 761). Based on Iowa’s law discussing the wrongful discharge cause of action, I find it unlikely that the Iowa Supreme Court would foreclose a wrongful discharge suit to a contractual employee.
At least one court has interpreted Iowa law to support extending the wrongful discharge tort to contractual employees. In Vails v. United Community Health Center, Inc., No. C11-4048-LTS, 2012 WL 6045941, at *10 (N.D.Iowa Dec. 5, 2012), United States Magistrate Judge Strand held that he did “not believe that the Iowa Supreme Court would ... hold that the tort of wrongful discharge is available only to at-will employees.” The court in Vails relied primarily on three of the Iowa Supreme Court’s earlier cases involving claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. In Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., Inc., 429 N.W.2d 558, 560-61 (Iowa 1988) — the case that first recognized the wrongful discharge tort in Iowa — the Iowa Supreme Court held that “the public policy of this state [protecting] an employee’s right to seek the compensation which is granted by law for work-related injuries should not be interfered with regardless of the terms of the contract of hire ” (emphasis added). Under Springer’s broad language, it does not matter that an employee bargained for additional employment protections in an employment contract; the terms of that contract have no effect on the employee’s right to bring a wrongful discharge claim.
Two months after the Iowa Supreme Court decided Springer, it had to decide in Conaway v. Webster City Products Co., 431 N.W.2d 795, 796 (Iowa 1988), “whether an employee covered by a collective-bargaining agreement providing a contractual remedy for discharge without just cause may maintain ... an action [for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy].” The plaintiffs in Conaway claimed that they were fired in retaliation for filing worker’s compensation claims. Id. But because the plaintiffs were employed under a collective bargaining agreement, the district court dismissed their claims as being preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). Id. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, concluding that “the retaliatory tort actions ... are independent of the collective-bargaining agreement and are therefore not preempted by section 301' of the LMRA ... because resolution of these actions does not require an interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. at 799. After finding that the plaintiffs claims were hot preempted, the Iowa Supreme Court held that “[t]he plaintiffs’ actions are recognizable state tort claims” and remanded the case to the district court. Id. at 800. Had the Iowa Supreme Court intended to limit the wrongful discharge tort to at-will employees, it could have avoided the preemption issue and simply held that the plaintiffs could not maintain a wrongful discharge claim as contractual employees. But it did not, instead choosing to address the preemption issue on its merits, which suggests that the Iowa Supreme Court did not intend to limit the wrongful discharge tort to at-will employees.
Seven years after Conaway, the Iowa Supreme Court confronted a similar case in Sanford v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., 534 N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 1995). In Sanford, an employee subject to a collective bargaining agreement claimed that he was fired for seeking worker’s compensation benefits. Id. at 411, 413. In addressing a number of issues on appeal, the court in Sanford noted that the plaintiffs “retaliatory discharge claim rests on our holdings that public policy is violated when an employee, even an employee at-will, is discharged as a result of seeking workers’ compensation benefits.” Id. at 412 (emphasis added). Relying on this language, the court in Vails reasoned that “[t]he phrase ‘even an employee at-will’'is extremely inclusive. Instead of holding that ‘only’ at-will employees are protected from being discharged in violation of public policy, the [Iowa Supreme] Court pointed out that ‘even’ those employees enjoy that protection.” 2012 WL 6045941, at *9. Again, this inclusive language seems to presume that the wrongful discharge tort applies to contractual employees.
While the court in Vails relied on these early Iowa cases describing the wrongful discharge claim, more recent decisions further support the conclusion that wrongful discharge claims are not limited to at-will employees. For example, in Jasper, the Iowa Supreme Court noted that “[w]e have used public policy to constrain legal principles in many areas of the law, especially contracts.” 764 N.W.2d at 761 (emphasis added). In fact, the Court in Jasper noted that public policy considerations lead the Iowa Supreme Court to invalidate a contract for slavery in one of its first cases. Id. (citing In re Ralph, 1 Morris 1 (Iowa 1839)). . And the Court also recognized that “[w]hen a contract violates public policy, including a contract of employment, the entire community is damaged.” Id. These statement suggest that Iowa’s public policy considerations apply to contractual — not just at-will — employment relationships.
Moreover, Iowa courts have long recognized that public policy considerations can limit the effect of contracts outside the employment context. See, e.g., Rogers v. Webb, 558 N.W.2d 155, 156 (Iowa 1997) (“Contracts that contravene public policy will not be enforced.” (citations omitted)); Skyline Harvestore Sys., Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 331 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Iowa 1983) (noting that Iowa courts “do not hesitate to invalidate a contract which contravenes public policy,” but should do so sparingly); Wunschel Law Firm, P.C. v. Clabaugh, 291 N.W.2d 331, 335 (Iowa 1980) (“A contract which contravenes public policy will not be enforced by the courts.”); Liggett v. Shriver, 181 Iowa 260, 164 N.W. 611, 612 (1917) (“In general, however, it may be said that any contract which conflicts with the morals of the times or contravenes any established interest of society is contrary to public policy.”). Thus, contracts have never been beyond the reach of Iowa’s public policy.
In addition to the Iowa Supreme Court’s language, the purpose behind the wrongful discharge tort is best served by applying the tort to both contractual and at-will employees. Iowa’s wrongful discharge claim enforces “the communal conscience and common sense of our state in matters of public health, safety, morals, and general welfare.” Jasper, 764 N.W.2d at 761 (citing Truax v. Ellett, 234 Iowa 1217, 15 N.W.2d 361, 367 (1944)). Whether an employer’s choice to fire an employee violates Iowa’s “communal conscience” is completely independent of whether the fired employee was at-will or contractual. The firing in either case harms “the entire community” — ie., the public — which has an interest in discouraging employers from firing employees in violation of Iowa’s public policy.
Still, in their post-trial brief, the Sioux-land Defendants argue — without citation to any authority — that a contractual “employee does not need the protections of the public policy exception ... [because] he has already negotiated the terms for termination in the Employment Agreement” (docket no. 119-1, at 23). Their argument seems to be that, when an employee negotiates an employment contract, the protections embodied in Iowa’s public policy suddenly no longer apply to that employee because the employee has separately bargained for protection in an employment agreement. Stated differently, their argument is that an employee with contractual protections no longer needs public policy protections.
But the Siouxland Defendants’ argument incorrectly assumes that, by bargaining for particular employment protections, an employee implicitly relinquishes all other employment protections not explicitly stated in the employment agreement. An employee may explicitly relinquish some legal protections by entering into an employment contract. See, e.g., H Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 273-74, 129 S.Ct. 1456, 173 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (employment agreement may limit employee’s right to pursue AEDA claim in federal court by requiring the employee to arbitrate the claim). But the idea that a contractual employee foregoes certain common-law tort protections — especially those intended to protect the public interest — is absurd. “For more than twenty-five years, [Iowa courts] have con