Johnson v. Connecticut Department of Administrative Services (972 F. Supp. 2d 223, 2013)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Dkt. #38]

VANESSA L. BRYANT, District Judge.

I. Introduction

The Plaintiff, Rebecca Johnson (“Johnson”), brings this failure-to-hire action against the Defendant State of Connecticut Department of Administrative Services (“DAS”) pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Before the Court is the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

II. Local Rule 56 Statements

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for asserting and contesting facts on a motion for summary judgment. The Rules provide that

(c)(1) [a] party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. (2) A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence. (3) The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record. (4) An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.

(d) If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order.

(e) If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may: (1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact; (2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; (3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials— including the facts considered undisputed — show that the movant is entitled to it; or (4) issue any other appropriate order.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)-(e).

In order to defeat a motion for summary judgment a plaintiff must create more than a “metaphysical” possibility that his allegations were correct; she must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Electric Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In order to defeat a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by the evidence contemplated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), ‘the opposing party is required to come forward with materials envisioned by the Rule, setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact to be tried. He cannot defeat the motion by relying on the allegations in his pleading, or on conclusory statements, or on mere assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible.’ ” Powell v. Donahoe, 519 Fed.Appx. 21, 22 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Gottlieb v. Cnty. of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir.1996)).

Rule 56(a) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the District of Connecticut makes clear the procedure for prosecuting and opposing a motion for summary judgment. A party filing a summary judgment motion must annex a “concise statement of each material fact as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)l. Local Rule 56(a)2 further makes the opponent’s duty abundantly clear by stating that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file an answering document which states “whether each of the facts asserted by the moving party is admitted or denied” and must also include a “list of each issue of material fact as to which it is contended there is a genuine issue to be tried.” D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)2. Each statement of material fact in a Local Rule 56(a)l or Local Rule 56(a)2 statement, as well as each denial in a summary judgment opponent’s Local Rule 56(a)2 statement, “must be followed by a specific citation to (1) the affidavit of a witness competent to testify as to the facts at trial and/or (2) evidence that would be admissible at trial.” D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)3. The Local Rule further clarifies that “[a]ll material facts set forth in [a moving party’s 56(a)l] statement and supported by the evidence will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be filed and served by the opposing party.” D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)l. Where a party fails to appropriately deny material facts set forth in the moving party’s 56(a)l statement, and where those facts are supported by evidence in the record, those facts are deemed to be admitted. See SEC v. Global Telecom Servs., L.L.C., 325 F.Supp.2d 94, 109 (D.Conn.2004); Knight v. Hartford Police Dep’t, 3:04CV969 (PCD), 2006 WL 1438649 (D.Conn. May 22, 2006).

In support of its motion for summary judgment, the Defendant filed a Local Rule 56(a)l statement with specific citations to evidence in the record. The Plaintiff, however, has failed to include any citation to evidence in the record in her 56(a)2 denials of facts alleged to be undisputed by the Defendant. Further, Plaintiff has not denied many of the statements in the Defendants’ 56(a)l statement, admitting instead that she unable to admit or deny them for various reasons. The motion for summary judgment was filed after the discovery deadline and the Plaintiff has not filed any discovery motions suggesting that the Defendant has failed to meet its discovery obligations. Finally, the portion of the Plaintiffs 56(a)2 statement, entitled “Plaintiffs 56(b) Statement of Disputed Facts” is blank, indicating her awareness of the need to list such facts and her lack of knowledge of any such facts. [Dkt. 47, P’s 56(a)2 Stmnt. p. 5].

Where the Plaintiff has objected to Defendant’s facts but has failed to support her objection with any admissible evidence in the record, where the record itself does not support Plaintiffs denials, or where the Plaintiff has neither admitted nor denied a fact and where the record supports such fact, those facts are deemed to be admitted. Where a statement is not supported by the record, the Court either notes such or does not rely on the purported fact in its determination. See Buell v. Hughes, 568 F.Supp.2d 235, 237 (D.Conn.2008) on reconsideration, 596 F.Supp.2d 380 (D.Conn.2009) (plaintiffs’ response that they “lack[ed] sufficient information to agree or disagree” with defendant’s facts was an improper denial under Rule 56(a)2, as it neither agreed with nor denied the defendant’s statements); Henton v. City of New London, CIV.3:06 CV 2035(EBB), 2008 WL 2185933 (D.Conn. May 23, 2008) (same); Knight, 2006 WL 1438649 (deeming admitted defendant’s undisputed facts where plaintiff responded that he “ha[d] no knowledge” of or “disagree[d] with” the statements and where he offered no evidence in dispute); Walton v. State of Conn., Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 3:03CV2262 JBA, 2006 WL 533793 (D.Conn. Mar. 2, 2006) (deeming admitted defendant’s material facts where plaintiff claimed insufficient knowledge to respond and offered no evidence to dispute facts); Reynolds v. Town of Suffield, 3:10CV1528 JBA, 2012 WL 3135896, at *1 n. 1 (D.Conn. July 31, 2012) (deeming admitted facts that were supported by the evidence where non-moving party failed to cite to admissible evidence to support denials). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (holding that Rule 56(e) “requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ”).

III. Factual Background

On March 3, 2006, the Connecticut Department of Administrative Services (“DAS”) posted a Job Announcement for two Human Resources Consultant positions assigned to the Statewide Human Resources Management Unit. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 1; Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 1-2) (Exh. B), Job Announcement]. Qualified candidates would be “energetic, knowledgeable, and business minded HR professionals” who could provide “HR management services to state agencies in the areas of recruitment, business rules, employee relations, employee development, and staffing.” [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 1-2) (Exh. B), Job Announcement]. The Announcement specified that “[t]hese positions may be filled at the HR Consultant (MP57) level or as a Leadership Apprentice” and listed the following methods for eligibility:

• Candidate has applied for and passed the Personnel Officer 1 exam and is on the current certification list promulgated by the [DAS] for this classification. OR

• State employees currently holding the above title or those who have previously attained permanent status may apply for lateral transfer. OR

• Qualified for the Leadership Apprentice Program.

[Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 1-2) (Exh. B), Job Announcement (emphasis in original); Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 1]. The Announcement required successful candidates to be “analytical, organized, team and customer oriented, self-directed and results focused,” with strong computer and written and oral communication skills. [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 1-2) (Exh. B), Job Announcement]. After the Job Announcement was published, DAS received approval to fill a third identical vacancy. [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶ 16; Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 2].

To be considered for hire directly into the Human Resources Consultant (“HRC”) position, a candidate was required to either have taken and passed the Personnel Officer 1 exam, to currently be employed as a Human Resources Consultant, or to previously have held the job of HRC for at least six months. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 11]. Candidates who did not meet these requirements could still be eligible for the opening if they met the requirements for the Leadership Apprentice Program, a one to three year training program in which candidates could become qualified to move to the position of Human Resources Consultant at a junior working level (classified as MP57). [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 12]. Applicants were eligible for the Leadership Apprentice Program if they could “meet the experience and training requirements of the target class [here, HRC at the junior working level] within the three year training period.” [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 13; Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 15-18) (Exh. E), LA Job Desc. p. 1].

To have been qualified as a Human Resources Consultant at the junior working level, a candidate must have had “[s]ix (6) years of professional experience in classification, compensation, job evaluation, recruitment, examination, selection or closely related areas in the field of human resources management.” [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 14; Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 8-14) (Exh. D), HRC Job Desc.]. A candidate could also substitute up to four years of college credits for the six years of experience required for the HRC position, and could substitute one additional year if the candidate possessed a Master’s Degree in public administration, human resources management, or another closely related field. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶¶ 38, 39; Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 8-14) (Exh. D), HRC Job Desc. p. 2]. Neither the LA or HRC job descriptions, nor the Job Announcement for the positions, list a college or advanced degree as a requirement. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 35].

Thus, candidates were eligible to apply for the positions posted if they could demonstrate sufficient human resources management experience, or educational substitutes, such that they would be able to meet the six year experience requirement for the HRC position within three years of entering the Leadership Apprentice training program. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶¶ 15, 36]. The minimum qualifications, required knowledge, skill and ability for the LA position included

Considerable managerial aptitude; considerable oral and written communication skills; interpersonal skills; considerable ability to understand and apply state and federal laws, statutes and regulations; considerable ability to analyze and solve problems; considerable ability to effect and manage change; considerable ability to plan for an implement excellent customer service; considerable ability to learn a new knowledge base; considerable ability to learn and apply policy and procedure.

[Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 15-18) (Exh. E), LA Job Desc. p. 1].

Dr. Pamela Libby, Director of the Statewide Human Resources Management Division at the DAS, has affirmed that hiring Leadership Apprentices as opposed to HRCs was appealing because DAS could then structure the LA training programs to allow the Leadership Apprentices to be cross-trained to rotate through the different units within the Statewide Human Resources Management Division to determine the best fit for each hire, and to cross-train each Apprentice so that they could then replace HRCs who would be retiring in the next few years. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 9]. Moreover, some of the duties that DAS needed the new hires to perform were administrative in nature, such as posting and supporting the Human Resources Certificate training program, assisting in application review, and processing exams. [Id. at 17]. Additionally, hiring Leadership Apprentices was a less expensive option for the State than hiring lateral transfers or promotions. [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶ 10].

DAS received 26 applications in response to the Job Announcement, including the Plaintiffs, all of which were forwarded to and reviewed by Dr. Libby. [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶ 18; Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶¶ 3, 4; Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 11-13) (Exh. M), Aff. Action App. Flow and Selection Report]. Of the 26 applicants, eleven were eligible for direct entry into the Human Resources Consultant position and the remaining fifteen sought entry into the Leadership Apprentice program. [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶¶ 19, 20; Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶¶ 50, 51]. Dr. Libby selected five individuals to interview, each of whom had applied for a Leadership Apprentice position, and all of whom were white: Daniel Curry, Michael Cosgrove, Suzanne Kaswan, Daniel Moreland, and Mark Tendler. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 4], Libby then gave the applications to Keith Anderson, a Statewide Human Resources Manager responsible for the Reemployment/SEBAC unit within the Statewide Human Resources Management Division within DAS, for review. [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶ 26; Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 59-60) (Exh. J), Anderson Aff. ¶¶ 3, 5; Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 5]. Anderson has affirmed that he agreed with the five applicants that Libby chose, and also proposed interviewing Lisa Jaser and Teresa Vachon, who Libby agreed to add to the list of interviewees, and both of whom are white. [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶ 26; Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 59-60) (Exh. J), Anderson Aff. ¶ 6; Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 5]. Of these seven candidates, only Teresa Vachon was eligible for hire directly into the HRC position; the other six were eligible only for the LA position. [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶ 19].

Three-person panels of managers within the Statewide Human Resources Division (including Anderson) conducted interviews of six of the seven candidates, each using an identical pre-set list of questions. [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶ 28; Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 7; Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 59-60) (Exh. J), Anderson Aff. ¶ 7]. Libby did not participate in the interviews but was subsequently briefed by the managers as to each candidate’s performance. [Id.]. Libby then briefed DAS Commissioner Linda Yelmini, who had taken no part in the hiring process for these positions either by reviewing applications, choosing which applicants to interview, or conducting the interviews, about the applicants who had been interviewed; Libby recommended that Curry, Cosgrove, and Moreland be hired as Leadership Apprentices pending a check of their references. [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶ 29; Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 8; Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 1-2) (Exh. K), Yelmini Aff. ¶¶ 5, 6]. Libby and Yelmini affirm that they discussed only the interviewees and did not discuss any applicant who had not been selected for an interview. [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶ 29; Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 1-2) (Exh. K), Yelmini Aff. ¶ 6], Yelmini agreed with Libby’s choice of Cos-grove, Moreland, and Curry. All three accepted Leadership Apprentice positions in late May 2006. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 10].

Neither Libby nor Anderson selected the Plaintiff, who is African American, for an interview. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 6]. Both attest that at no time did they discriminate against Johnson or'any other candidate based on race or protected activity. [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶ 31; Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 59-60) (Exh. J), Anderson Aff. ¶ 8]. The Plaintiff received a letter dated May 16, 2006 informing her that she had not been selected for the position and explaining that DAS had “extended offers to candidates whose qualifications more closely match[ed] [its] needs.” [Dkt. 38-5 (p. 19) (Exh. F), Non-selection Letter; Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 6].

Affirmative Action Goals

Plaintiff contends that she was qualified for the Leadership Apprentice Program but was not selected for an interview because of DAS’s “undue reliance on hiring goals set forth in its then current, state approved, annual affirmative action plan,” and that DAS instead awarded the position to Daniel Moreland, “an obviously unqualified Caucasian male.” [Dkt. 32, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9-12], Under the state-approved affirmative action plan, DAS had affirmative action goals to hire white males for the HRC/LA positions for which Plaintiff applied. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 45; Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶ 31; Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 11-13) (Exh. M), AA Report p. 1]. In response to when an employer may take into account whether a candidate is a goal candidate under an affirmative action hiring plan, the Plaintiff has testified that, when deciding the finalists to interview after having eliminated unqualified candidates, “you take into consideration if any of them are goal candidates,” and “if you have several candidates that are equally qualified, at some point, when you need to make eliminations, you should bring that factor into play ... [a]nd give it some weight ... Again, all things being equal, where you have candidates that are substantially equally qualified, you use that to tip the scales, so to speak.” [Dkt. 38-3, P’s Depo. pp. 75:11-25; 76:14-25].

Libby offers the following affirmation in support of DAS’s contention, on the other hand, that its hiring goals played no part in its choice of candidates:

At no time during my review of the applications did I consider excluding any candidate based on race, gender, or any other protected trait or protected activity. I knew that, pursuant to the state-approved affirmative action plan, we had affirmative action goals to hire white males for these openings, but those goals did not determine who was interviewed or hired; I focused instead on finding the individuals — regardless of race or gender — who had the background and skills to best perform in the positions.

[Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶ 31; Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 46]. In further support, Libby affirms that a few months before recruiting for the positions at issue in this case, DAS recruited and hired a Leadership Apprentice with a target class of HRC and, although the hiring goal for that position was also white male, DAS chose a black female for the position because she was the best candidate. [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶ 32; Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 48].

Johnson’s Application

Both the Plaintiff and Moreland applied specifically for the Leadership Apprentice Program. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 18; Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 3-7) (Exh. C), Johnson Application; Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 3-10) (Exh. L), Moreland Application], Johnson submitted her application to DAS on April 5, 2006. [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 3-7) (Exh. C), Johnson App.]. Her cover letter stated, in relevant part:

Your review of my past professional experiences will illustrate that I am certainly a desirable candidate especially considering the level of training required for the position. I am quite capable of learning rapidly how to handle new complex responsibilities. My past professional experiences both as a litigator and H.R.O. Representative for the Commission on Human Rights and Responsibilities (sic) have regularly provided me with exposure to a multitude of difficult tasks which I have executed in an excellent and efficient manner.

I am also sensitive to handling the private, personnel related needs of employees in a highly professional, discreet and confidential manner. I am quite familiar with and enjoy studying and interpreting statutes, regulations and employment policies.

[Id. at p. 1; Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 19]. Plaintiffs resume indicates that she graduated from Oral Roberts University with a degree in History/Soeiology, and graduated from Villanova University School of Law in 1993. [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 3-7) (Exh. C), Johnson App. p. 2; Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 20].

Her resume further represents that Plaintiff was self-employed as an attorney for a total of nine years until January 2003 (although her resume states that she began this employment in January, 2004), during which time she “[p]rovided legal representation and litigation services to clients in a variety of areas including: civil rights, criminal, family and personal injury; Conducted trials and handled appeals in state and federal court and administrative agencies,” and reportedly earned between $60,000 and $80,000 annually. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶¶ 21, 22; Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 3-7) (Exh. C), Johnson App. p. 3]. Johnson did not fill in the box requesting that she report her “Reason for Leaving” this employment. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 23; Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 3-7) (Exh. C), Johnson App. p. 3].

Johnson’s application reflects that in July 2004, months after ceasing her employment as a private attorney, she took a part-time job as a bank teller earning $15 per hour. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 22; Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 3-7) (Exh. C), Johnson App. p. 3]. She listed her duties in full as “[p]rocess[ing] financial transactions; responding] to customer inquiries; selling] banking products.” [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 3-7) (Exh. C), Johnson App. p. 3]. Plaintiff worked as a bank teller until December 2004, a period of six months (although Plaintiffs resume reports this period as seven months), when she took a position with the CHRO as an “H.R.O. Rep./Affirm. Action Prog. Analyst.” [Id.; Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 24]. Plaintiff reported that her duties included “[investigating] charges of discrimination in employment, public accommodations settings; monitoring] affirmative action plans and practices of state agencies and private contractors doing business with state agencies.” [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 25; Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 3-7) (Exh. C), Johnson App. p. 3]. Johnson had worked for the CHRO full time for sixteen months before applying for the position at issue in this case. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 24].

Moreland’s Application

Like Johnson, Moreland applied specifically for the Leadership Apprentice program. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 18]. His cover letter indicates that at the time of application Mr. Moreland was an Executive Aide to Connecticut’s Governor and although he had “immensely enjoyed his tenure of five years at the Office of the Governor,” he felt it was “the right time to seek a new challenge and to further [his] educational and career development.” [Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 3-10) (Exh. L), Moreland App. p. 1]. Moreland’s cover letter also explained how his job experiences had allowed him to “further develop[] leadership, customer service and professional skills.” As the Governor’s Proclamation and Official Statement writer, Moreland “was responsible for drafting all ceremonious correspondence utilizing both creative and business templates as well as conducting public affairs often giving remarks to a diverse number of organizations, non-profits and schools.” [Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 3-10) (Exh. L), Moreland App. p. 1; Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 27]. He revamped the Governor’s Internship program “creating and centralizing the application process, instituting an orientation program and individualizing each intern’s experience with their career development goals,” and additionally “facilitated an internship program for students with disabilities” which often led to employment placement. [Id.}.

As an executive administrative support professional, Moreland noted in his cover letter that he interacted daily with state, federal, municipal, and corporate officials, had developed an in-depth knowledge of state government including its actors and programs and, as assistant to the Chief of Staff, was “directly responsible for the management of [the Governor’s] office including calendar/scheduling, information flow management, coordination of state travel request approval, staff support, execution of directives from both the Chief of Staff and Governor, and office budget matters including employee timesheets.” [Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 3-10) (Exh. L), Moreland App. p. 1], In providing assistance to the Governor’s Legislative Director, Moreland “track[ed] the Governor’s proposed legislation, draft[ed] bill summaries, and interpreted] existing state statutes and regulations.” [Id. at p. 1]. As an example of his leadership experience, Moreland described overseeing the development and logistics of the Hurricane Katrina Evacuee Relocation Plan, for which he served as the Governor’s main point of contact, “led the Governor’s Cabinet and community leaders in assessing state and volunteer resources” and also led two briefings for public officials and the general public. [Id. at 2; Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 27].

Moreland’s very detailed resume lists four full-time positions spanning from May 1998 to the time of Moreland’s application in April 2006, plus one part-time extracurricular position and various volunteer and board memberships. [Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 3-10) (Exh. L), Moreland App. pp. 4-5]. In addition to the tasks enumerated in his cover letter, Moreland elaborated that, as an Executive Assistant in 2000 with the Office of the Governor, he “served as statewide coordinator for the State of Connecticut’s Annual Observance and Celebration of United Nations Day.” [Id. at p. 4], Moreland was then asked to fill a vacant position as an Executive Assistant in the Department of Public Works beginning in August 2008, where he served as Assistant to the First Lady [in the Rowland gubernatorial administration] and Executive Director of the Governor’s residence and was responsible for the coordination and scheduling of official duties and personal matters, assistance in the daily management and oversight of activities at the Governor’s mansion, and assistance in the planning of various state conferences. [Id.; Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 27], More-land left this position in July 2004 upon the resignation of the Governor and assumed the title of Executive Assistant in the Office of the Governor where, in addition to the tasks detailed in his cover letter, More-land worked on an initiative to assess and identify services to at risk youth. [Id.].

Moreland also reported that he worked as a Customer Service Representative for Express I Airlines, d.b.a. Northwest Airlines before beginning his tenure with the State; had for the five years prior to his application served as a Customer Service Representative for the Bushnell Center for the Performing Arts; and had been a member of four municipal or state boards. [Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 3-10) (Exh. L), Moreland App. p. 5]. Finally, Moreland’s resume states that he had been working toward his undergraduate degree from the University of Arkansas since 1993 and would graduate “pending completion of independent study,” which his application indicates he was currently completing. [Id. at 3; Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 26].

DAS’s Purported Reasons for Hiring Decisions

The Department of Administrative Services prepared an “Affirmative Action Applicant Flow and Selection Report” (“AA Report”) detailing the reasons for not interviewing various candidates and the dispositions of the six interviews conducted. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 28; Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 11-13) (Exh. M), AA Report]. Of the 26 applicants, two women — one white (Judy Macala) and one Hispanic (Nayda Vega) — were unable to meet the qualifications for the Leadership Apprentice Program and were thus disqualified from contention; Libby has affirmed that a third woman who did not report her race or ethnicity was similarly disqualified. [Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 11-13) (Exh. M), AA Report p. 1; Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶ 20]. The twelve remaining candidates, qualified for only the Leadership Apprentice program, consisted of three white females, two black females (including the Plaintiff), one Hispanic female, and six white males. [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶¶ 19-20; Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 11-13) (Exh. M), AA Report], Four white males (Daniel Moreland, Mark Tendler, Daniel Curry, and Michael Cos-grove) and two white females (Lisa Jaser and Suzanne Kaswan) were chosen to interview for the LA program openings. [Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 11-13) (Exh. M), AA Report]. One white female (Kelly Porter), two black females (the Plaintiff and Veronica Lee), one Hispanic female (Juliette Khan), and two white males (Scott Nattinger and John Neumon) were not chosen. [Id.].

The AA Report states that the Plaintiff was not selected for an interview because “Candidate’s prior work experience deemed unsuitable for position.” [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 29; Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 11-13) (Exh. M), AA Report]. Dr. Libby explained her reasons for not choosing to interview the Plaintiff as follows:

Ms. Johnson met the minimum qualifications for the Leadership Apprentice position. However, it did not seem to me to be a good match to place an experienced attorney into the training level positions we were seeking to fill. I felt that a lawyer, a highly trained professional in a different field with no background in human resources, would be unlikely to thrive or stay long in a training position that involved performing administrative support tasks, such as posting and supporting the HR Certificate training program, assisting in application review, and processing exams. Since the long-term goal of hiring Leadership Apprentices is to train people to fill future HRC positions, it did not make sense to me to pursue applicants that seemed likely to be bored or dissatisfied with the level of the work to be performed.

[Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)l Stmnt. ¶32; Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶ 24].

Libby noted that she “had similar concerns about Veronica Lee, the only other attorney to apply for these positions,” and thus did not select Ms. Lee for an interview either. [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶24; Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)l Stmnt. ¶ 56]. The AA Report noted the reason for excluding Ms. Lee, who was the only other black female applicant qualified for the LA program, and also ‘ the only other lawyer, as “No HR, predominantly law.” [Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 11-13) (Exh. M), AA Report; Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)l Stmnt. ¶ 56]. The AA Report noted “No HR, trainer” as the reason that Juliette Khan, a Hispanic female, was not selected. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)l Stmnt. ¶ 53; Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 11-13) (Exh. M), AA Report]. Libby explained that she did not consider Khan to be a good fit for the LA program because “her background was as a trainer in emergency management issues, a field not related to human resources management. She had also worked as a social worker and had a degree in psychology. She did not have any work or educational experience in human resources.” [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)l Stmnt. ¶ 54]. Three white applicants were not selected to interview for similar reasons. The AA Report states that Kelly Porter, a white female, was not selected to interview for the LA position because “Degree & work experience finance-related.” Scott Nattinger, a white male, was not selected because his “Overall qualifications deemed unsuitable for position, questionable work experience,” and John Neumon, also a white male, was not selected because his “prior work experience deemed unsuitable for position.” [Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 11-13) (Exh. M), AA Report].

On the other hand, the AA Report noted of Daniel Moreland post-interview: “Five years experience at Governor’s Office interacting with multiple state & municipal entities. Excellent communication skills. Proven ability to interpret state statutes & regulations. Very impressive references.” [Id.]. Libby affirmed that she chose to interview Moreland

[b]ecause. his background made him a good fit for the Leadership Apprentice program. He had some experience with personnel management in the Office of the Governor — including revamping and coordinating the Governor’s Internship Program, and facilitating internship programs for students with disabilities. Additionally, his experience coordinating large events for the Governor’s Office, his legislative .work, and the other duties he performed for the Governor demonstrated his attention to detail and organizational skills, his oral and written communication skills, and his ability to provide excellent customer service.

[Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)l Stmnt. ¶ 31; Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶ 22d], She further reported that More-land’s prior experience coordinating internship programs was an asset as DAS had contemplated establishing a statewide Cooperative Internship Program. [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶ 28d].

Libby affirms that she chose to interview Michael Cosgrove, who received an offer of employment, because he had “personnel experience working with the State Office of the Comptroller in the retirement and benefits area, advising employees about their benefit entitlements and performing some payroll functions.” He also demonstrated attention to detail and had “experience with the unique processes” used in Connecticut state human resources. Further, Libby noted that she felt his educational background in journalism and work experience as a reporter would be helpful in interviewing employees about their job duties and in writing clearly. [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶ 22b]. Post-interview, the AA Report characterized Cosgrove as having “[p]rior State experience at State Comptroller in Human Resources-related field. Strong communication skills, especially writing skills. Has B.S. in Journalism & related employment history.” [Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 11-13) (Exh. M), AA Report].

Libby has stated that she selected Daniel Curry for an interview because he possessed a bachelor’s degree in Human Resources Management and had worked as a Summer Worker for DAS in the Statewide Human Resources Management Division, which provided him with the background to be successful in the LA Program. [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶ 22a]. Libby further affirmed that she knew that Curry “was reliable, had great computer skills, produced high quality work product, and worked efficiently.” [Id.]. The AA Report notes similarly that Daniel Curry “[r]eeently received B.S. in Human Resources Management. Excellent reference from Department Chair at Western N.E. College. Prior experience working in agency Statewide Human Resources unit.” [Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 11-13) (Exh. M), AA Report].

Johnson’s Protected Activity

In addition to her claim of race discrimination, Plaintiff has alleged that she was not considered for the DAS Leadership Apprentice opening in retaliation for her opposition to the CHRO’s discriminatory practices.

On February 14, 2006, while working at the CHRO, the Plaintiff filed an initial complaint of discrimination with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and which was date-stamped as received by the EEOC’s Philadelphia office on March 13, 2006. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 57; Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 19-21) (Exh. P), P’s EEOC Compl. 2/14/06]. Plaintiff brought this complaint against the State of Connecticut, the CHRO, CHRO Executive Director R. Hamisi Ingram, CHRO Deputy Assistant Executive Director Ray Pech, CHRO C.O.O. Don Newton, and CHRO Affirmative Action Manager Gloria Spavari, alleging that she and two coworkers, Valerie Kennedy and Paula Ross, had been suspended without pay in retaliation for opposing discriminatory practices within the CHRO, including discrimination perpetrated by Ingram. [Id. at ¶ 58; Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 19-21) (Exh. P), P’s EEOC Compl. 2/14/06 ¶ 6]. Johnson alleged that during an internal investigation she had been a fact witness in support of her coworkers’ complaints against Ingram, for which she had been disciplined. [Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 19-21) (Exh. P), P’s EEOC Compl. 2/14/06 ¶ 7], Plaintiff neither named DAS, DAS Commissioner Yelmini, Statewide Human Resources Management Director Libby, nor DAS Manager Anderson as a respondent in this initial complaint, nor did Plaintiff mention any of them in her complaint as filed. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 59], Moreover, Plaintiff does not claim or cite to any evidence in the record to show that the Defendant was aware of this EEOC Complaint.

On July 24, 2006, two months after Johnson had applied for and had not been selected for a Leadership Apprentice position with DAS, she filed an Amended Complaint Affidavit with the EEOC, adding allegations against DAS Commissioner Yelmini to those in her original complaint. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 60; Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 22-32) (Exh. Q), P’s Am. EEOC Compl. 7/24/06]. Johnson did not name Yelmini as a respondent, but rather listed her as one of “several other parties who are State employees, but are assigned to other divisions outside of CHRO who [Johnson] [has] recently learned were involved in facilitating CHRO’s harassment and discriminatory and retaliatory conduct.” [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 61; Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 22-32) (Exh. Q), P’s Am. EEOC Compl. 7/24/06 ¶ 5]. In support, Plaintiff attached to this Amended Complaint a letter from Yelmini to CHRO Executive Director Ingram dated February 14, 2006 and a letter from Ingram to Yelmini dated February 27, 2006 regarding the two complaints against Ingram by Johnson’s CHRO coworkers Kennedy and Ross. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 62; Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 33-36) (Exh. R), 2/14/06, 2/27/06 Ingram/Yelmini Correspondence].

Yelmini noted in this correspondence that a member of her staff had reviewed the CHRO internal investigation into the Ross and Kennedy complaints against Ingram and had determined that the investigations “appear to have been conducted in a professional manner” and in accordance with procedures. [Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 33-36) (Exh. R), 2/14/06, 2/27/06 Ingram/Yelmini Correspondence p. 1]. Yelmini noted that she had “also read the information and would agree.” [Id.]. However, Yelmini expressed criticism of certain management practices regarding the filing of employee grievances and admonished Ingram that employees have the right to file grievances pursuant to their collective bargaining agreement, that the grievance process was designed to resolve complaints, that it was important to manage change in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, and finally that it is “also important to remember that no adverse action can result to individuals based upon the exercise of their rights in a legitimate manner.” [Id. at 1-2],

Commissioner Yelmini has affirmed that the hiring process for the three open DAS positions was handled by DAS Human Resources and the DAS Statewide Human Resources Management Division, and that she was not involved in reviewing any applications, choosing which applicants to interview, or in conducting the interviews. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 65; Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 1-2) (Exh. K), Yelmini Aff. ¶ 5]. After the interviews were completed, Yelmini attests that Libby briefed her regarding the six applicants who had been interviewed and recommended that DAS offer employment to Curry, Cosgrove, and Moreland. She further attests that she and Libby had not discussed any applicants who had not been selected for an interview. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 66; Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 1-2) (Exh. K), Yelmini Aff. ¶ 6]. Libby has also testified that she and Yelmini did not discuss applicants who had not been interviewed. [Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 52-58) (Exh. I), Libby Aff. ¶ 29]. As a result, Yelmini states that she was not aware that Johnson had applied for the LA position until after the hiring decision had been made and the offers had been extended. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 67; Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 1-2) (Exh. K), Yelmini Aff. ¶ 7]. Three months after DAS hired other applicants and not the Plaintiff, Commissioner Yelmini signed the AA Report listing the names of all 26 applicants and interviewees in August 2006; she does not recall whether she noticed Johnson’s name on the AA Report at the time she signed it. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 67; Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 1-2) (Exh. K), Yelmini Aff. ¶ 8].

Yelmini has also attested that she cannot recall specifically when she became aware of Johnson’s protected activity against the CHRO. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 63; Dkt. 38-6 (pp. 1-2) (Exh. K), Yelmini Aff. ¶ 10]. Libby and Anderson, the DAS employees who had been responsible for reviewing applications and choosing interviewees, have attested that they were not aware of Plaintiffs involvement with complaints made against her then-employer the CHRO at the time they made their hiring decisions for the three open positions at issue here. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 64].

In October 2006, Johnson filed a separate complaint with the CHRO against the DAS alleging discriminatory and retaliatory failure to hire her for the LA position on or about May 26, 2006. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 68; Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 20-25) (Exh. G), P’s 10/6/06 CHRO Charge]. In this complaint Plaintiff stated as the basis for her retaliation claim her protected activity of filing her original complaint with the EEOC on February 14, 2006. [Dkt. 38-1, D’s 56(a)1 Stmnt. ¶ 69; Dkt. 38-5 (pp. 20-25) (Exh. G), P’s 10/6/06 CHRO Charge ¶ 4]. The record in the case before this Court contains no further information about this complaint, including any determinations made or investigations conducted by the CHRO or by any federal agency.

IV. Legal Standard

Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of proving that no factual issues exist. Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir.2010). “In determining whether that burden has been met, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and credit all factual inferences that could be drawn in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). “If there is any evidence in the record that could reasonably support a jury’s verdict for the nonmoving party, summary judgment must be denied.” Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Hapag Lloyd Container Linie, GmbH, 446 F.3d 313, 315-16 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“A party opposing summary judgment cannot defeat the motion by relying on the allegations in his pleading, or on conclusory statements, or on mere assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible. At the summary judgment stage of the proceeding, Plaintiffs are required to present admissible evidence in support of their allegations; allegations alone, without evidence to back them up, are not sufficient.” Welch-Rubin v. Sandals Corp., No.3:03cv481, 2004 WL 2472280, at *1 (D.Conn. Oct. 20, 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Martinez v. State of Connecticut, 817 F.Supp.2d 28, 37-38 (D.Conn.2011). Where there is no evidence upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it and upon whom the onus of proof is imposed, such as where the evidence offered consists of conclusory assertions without further support in the record, summary judgment may lie. Fincher v. Depository Trust and Clearing Co., 604 F.3d 712 (2d Cir.2010).

Further, when deciding whether summary judgment should be granted in a discrimination case, courts must take additional considerations into account. Desir v. City of New York, 453 Fed.Appx. 30, 33 (2d Cir.2011).

A trial court must be cautious about granting summary judgment to an employer when ... its intent is at issue. Affidavits and depositions must be carefully scrutinized for circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show discrimination. Summary judgment remains appropriate in discrimination cases, as the salutary purposes of summary judgment — avoiding protracted, expensive and harassing trials — apply no less to discrimination cases than to ... other areas of litigation.

Id. Thus, “[a]t summary judgment in an employment discrimination case, a court should examine the record as a whole, just as a jury would, to determine whether a jury could reasonably find an invidious discriminatory purpose on the part of an employer.” Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir.2001). “A court is to examine the entire record to determine whether the plaintiff could satisfy his ‘ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.’ ” Byrnie, 243 F.3d at 102 (2d Cir.2001) (citations omitted). “A motion for summary judgment may be defeated where ‘a plaintiffs prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.’ ” Id. at 103 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)).

V. Discussion

Plaintiffs complaint focuses on the comparative credentials of Plaintiff and Daniel Moreland. Nowhere in her complaint does the Plaintiff make allegations against or even mention the other two applicants selected to fill the LA positions, Daniel Curry and Michael Cosgrove, who were also white males. Johnson has not alleged in her complaint that either Cosgrove or Curry was unqualified, or that she or any of the other minority applicants were more qualified than Curry or Cosgrove, and has only fleetingly mentioned Curry in her opposition to the Defendant’s summary judgment motion, without any citation to evidence in the record. Further, although the Defendant has competently argued that Johnson’s discrimination claim must be limited to a comparison of her application to only Moreland’s, as specified in her amended complaint, Plaintiff has failed to respond at all to this argument as to scope. Therefore, as Plaintiff has not placed Curry’s or Cosgrove’s qualifications at issue and makes no reference to them in her operative complaint, and additionally has failed to address the Defendant’s argument as to scope, the Defendant has appropriately limited its arguments to Plaintiffs allegation against Moreland only. See Karath v. Bd. of Trustees, 3:07-CV-1073 (WWE), 2009 WL 4879553, at *3 (D.Conn. Dec. 10, 2009) (holding that plaintiff could not “amend his [Title VII] complaint by implication in response to summary judgment”); Auguste v. Dep’t of Corr., 424 F.Supp.2d 363, 368 (D.Conn.2006) (plaintiff “cannot amend his complaint in his memorandum in response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment”); Natale v. Town of Darien, Conn., CIV. 3:97CV583 (AHN), 1998 WL 91073, at *4 n. 2 (D.Conn. Feb. 26, 1998) (holding that plaintiff cannot amend his complaint in a memorandum of law). The Court, however, consistent with its obligation to review the entirety of the record in discrimination cases at the summary judgment stage, will examine the record as a whole insofar as the record contains evidence as to Curry and Cosgrove.

Plaintiffs chief contention is that she was qualified for the HRC position through the Leadership Apprentice Program but was not selected for an interview, while DAS instead awarded the position to Moreland, “an obviously unqualified Caucasian male,” based on its “undue reliance on hiring goals set forth in [DAS]’s then current, state approved, annual affirmative action plan.” [Dkt. 32, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9-12], She further alleges that eight other minority applicants were better qualified for this position than was Moreland, and that, in addition to unlawful discrimination based on race, DAS also declined to hire her in retaliation for Johnson having previously opposed the CHRO’s unlawful discriminatory conduct. [Dkt. 32, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 21].

The Defendant urges the Court to grant summary judgment in its favor because Johnson has failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination and, even if she has, she has presented no evidence that DAS’s proffered legitimate, nondiseriminatory reasons for declining to hire the Plaintiff were a pretext for discrimination. DAS further contends that Johnson cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The Court addresses Defendant’s arguments in turn.

a. Title VII Racial Discrimination

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire any individual ... because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e — 2(a)(1). Johnson’s Title VII racial discrimination claim is governed by the three-step burden shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Ruszkowski v. Kaleida Health Sys., 422 Fed.Appx. 58, 60 (2d Cir.2011). Under this framework, a plaintiff complaining of discriminatory failure to hire must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position for which she applied; (3) she was denied the position; and (4) the denial occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; Ruszkowski, 422 Fed.Appx. at 60; Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir.2010). The burden upon the plaintiff to prove a prima facie ease is minimal. Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir.2001). See also Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 76 (2d Cir.2005) (“We have characterized plaintiffs prima facie burden as ‘minimal’ and ‘de minimis.’ ”). However, “[a] plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case based on ‘purely eonclusory allegations of discrimination, absent any concrete particulars.’ ” Ruszkowski, 422 Fed.Appx. at 60 (quoting Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.1985)).

If a plaintiff successfully alleges a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the employer to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision not to hire the plaintiff. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; Ruszkowski, 422 Fed.Appx. at 60. If the employer articulates such a reason, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to present “admissible evidence that would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer that the employer’s proffered reason is pretext for an impermissible motivation.” Vivenzio, 611 F.3d at 106 (citation omitted); Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“To accomplish this, the defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiffs rejection.”). “[A] reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (emphasis in original). Throughout the burden-shifting process, “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Vivenzio, 611 F.3d at 106 (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089).

Furthermore, although Plaintiffs complaint alleges that DAS has engaged in “discriminatory use of affirmative action goal setting,” evidencing a “pattern and practice that adversely impacts African American employees,” [Dkt. 32 Compl. ¶ 22], and has “consistently shown a pattern and practice of engaging in acts of retaliation against employees,” [Id. at ¶ 23], the Defendant correctly notes that Johnson may not avail herself of the more permissive pattern-or-practice method of proving discrimination articulated in Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). “[U]nlike in a typical individual disparate treatment suit, a plaintiffs burden under the pattern-or-practice method requires the plaintiff to prove only the existence of a discriminatory policy rather than all elements of a prima facie case of discrimination — -but under the pattern-or-practice method, only prospective relief [is] available, unless the plaintiffs offer [ ] additional proof.” Chin v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 685 F.3d 135, 149 (2d Cir.2012) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1724, 185 L.Ed.2d 785 (2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Second Circuit has recently held that, while “[e]vidence of an employer’s general practice of discrimination may be highly relevant to an individual disparate treatment or to a disparate impact claim,” “[o]utside the class context, however, private plaintiffs may not invoke the Teamsters method of proof as an independent and distinct method of establishing liability.” Id. at 150. This case is not a class action. Thus, while Johnson may offer evidence of Defendant’s pattern or practice of discrimination to aid her individual disparate treatment claim, “the pattern-or-practice method of proof is not available to nonclass, private plaintiffs” like Johnson, who instead remain subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting standard articulated above. Id.

i. Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case of Discrimination

Defendant DAS concedes that Johnson has satisfied the first three elements of her prima facie case of racial discrimination, as Plaintiff is a member of a protected class, was qualified for the Leadership Apprentice position for which she applied, and was denied the position. DAS argues that Johnson’s discrimination claim must fail because she cannot satisfy the fourth element of her prima facie case: that the decision to hire Daniel Moreland instead of her was made under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. The Court will analyze Defendant’s arguments in turn.

Plaintiffs allegations of discrimination are based primarily on her belief that Daniel Moreland, to whom DAS awarded the LA position, was “obviously unqualified” “as he held no college degree and lacked the necessary qualifying professional experiences which the Defendant apparently required for consideration for hire,” while the Plaintiff possessed both bachelor’s and master’s degrees. [Dkt. 32, Compl. ¶¶ 9,10,11]. The Plaintiff testified at deposition that it was her understanding, “based on conversations that [she] had with people that worked for DAS,” that a college degree was required for the HRC position. [Dkt. 38-3, P’s Depo. p. 32:21-25]. Plaintiff does not identify the DAS employees who made the statements, does not state the context in which the statements were made, and has not submitted affidavits from these individuals. Such statements are inadmissible hearsay as they are non-testimonial assertions of fact offered by the Plaintiff to establish that the assertion is true. Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). These alleged statements are not a statement of an opposing party falling outside the definition of hearsay because Plaintiff has not disclosed any information about the declarant and the context in which the statement(s) were made to fall within that category. Fed. R. Rule. Evid. 801(d)(2). Only admissible evidence need be considered by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Presbyterian Church Of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir.2009). See Bell v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 329 Fed.Appx. 304 (2d Cir.2009) (exclusion of racially offensive e-mail offered by former employee to show pretext in opposing summary judgment on Title VII discriminatory discharge claim was not abuse of discretion, given lack of evidence authenticating e-mail, such as showing that e-mail was sent or received through former employer’s e-mail system); Fall v. New York State United Teachers, 289 Fed.Appx. 419 (2d Cir.2008) (unsworn audiologist reports offered by terminated employee in ADA action were inadmissible hearsay evidence for purposes of opposing motion for summary judgment); Dingle v. Zon, 189 Fed.Appx. 8 (2d Cir.2006) (summary judgment affidavit was not inadmissible on hearsay grounds, where affidavit contained a statement about events that the affiant witnessed). This Court will not exercise its discretion to admit these attributed statements as their credibility are undermined by admissible evidence in the record.

Neither the Job Announcement nor the Leadership Apprentice or Human Resources Consultant positions states a requirement of a college or advanced degree, and instead specifically contemplates the substitution of post-high school education for the professional experience required for the job. The LA Program required a successful applicant to “be able to meet the experience and training requirements of the [HRC] target class within the three year training period” of the LA program. To qualify as a Human Resources Consultant at the junior working level, an applicant was required to have “[s]ix (6) years of professional experience in classification, compensation, job evaluation, recruitment, examination, selection or closely related areas in the field of human resources management,” but could substitute up to four years of college credit for this six year requirement, and an additional year if the candidate possessed a Master’s degree in public administration, human resources management, or another closely related field.

Johnson herself acknowledged at deposition that she could identify nothing in the HRC job description stating that a college degree was required for consideration. [Dkt. 38-3, P’s Depo. p. 32:2-14]. She further acknowledged that she could not remember who at DAS advised her that a college degree was nece