Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM & ORDER MARGO K. BRODIE, District Judge: Plaintiff Edward Weber brought the above-captioned action against Defendants City of New York (the “City”), the New York City Department of Education (“DOE”), Principal Lashawn Robinson (“Robinson”) and Assistant Principals Lana Phillips (“Phillips”) and Katwona Warren (“Warren”) of Brownsville Academy High School (“Brownsville Academy”), alleging claims of age discrimination, religious discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq. (“NYSHRL”), and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”). Plaintiff also alleges equal protection claims in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and in violation of the New York State Constitution. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. The Court heard oral argument on July 26, 2013, and, at oral argument, dismissed Plaintiffs age discrimination claims pursuant to the ADEA, NYSHRL and NYCHRL as to all Defendants, and equal protection claims in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the New York State Constitution as to the City. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to all other claims. I. Background a. The Parties’ Employment at Brownsville Academy Plaintiff, a high school teacher, has been employed by DOE since 2001. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 1; PI. 56.1 ¶ 1.) Plaintiff began working as a chemistry teacher at Brownsville Academy in Brownsville, Brooklyn, in September 2005. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 3; PI. 56.1 ¶ 3.) Brownsville Academy is a transfer high school that serves students who are overage and under-credited. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 5; PI. 56.1 ¶ 5.) Joanne Nabors, who was Principal of Brownsville Academy at the time, hired Plaintiff to teach chemistry. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 4; PI. 56.1 ¶ 4.) Robinson began working at Brownsville Academy in September 2005, at approximately the same time as Plaintiff. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 11.) Robinson was the Assistant Principal at Brownsville Academy during the 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 school years, (Def. 56.1 ¶ 10; PI. 56.1 ¶ 10), spent the 2007-2008 school year at another school while participating in the New York City Leadership Academy, (Def. 56.1 ¶ 19; PI. 56.1 ¶ 19), and was hired as principal of Brownsville Academy beginning in the 2008-2009 school year, replacing Nabors, (Def. 56.1 ¶ 31). Assistant principals Phillips and Warren were hired by Nabors during the 2007-2008 school year. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 20; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 20.) b. Plaintiffs Religious Accommodation Requests Plaintiff identifies himself as “an observant Hasidic ultraorthodox Jew” and was 56 years old at the time he commenced this action. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 2; PL 56.1 ¶ 2.) Brownsville Academy made a number of accommodations of Plaintiffs religious practice. Throughout Plaintiffs employment at Brownsville Academy, Plaintiff was excused from school for religious observanees several times, including six absences in the 2007-2008 school year, five absences in the 2008-2009 school year, two absences in the 2009-2010 school year, and five in September and October 2010 during the Fall 2010 semester. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 199 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. III).) Plaintiff acknowledges that Brownsville Academy has never prohibited him from taking a day off for religious observance of a Jewish holiday on which he was not permitted to work according to Jewish law. (Weber Day 1 Tr. 130:15-19.) Plaintiff alleges that during his employment at Brownsville Academy, Defendants “did not accommodate his request for time off for at least one religious day to bake matzahs for Passover in 2010.” (Pl. Opp’n 9.) Plaintiff admits that Jewish law did not require him to refrain from working on the day in question or to take off for religious observance. (Weber Day 1 Tr. at 131:13-17.) Plaintiff also alleges that on one occasion the school secretary “called his home on a Sukkot holiday in 2010.” (Pl. Opp’n 9; Weber Day 1 Tr. 125:1-126:25.) According to Plaintiff, he had advised “the attendance teacher” that he would be taking the day off, but it is unclear that Brownsville Academy had a record of any notice that Plaintiff would be absent from school that day. (Id. at 126:24-25.) The school secretary left a message stating, “We have to know what’s going on,” because they did not have a record of Plaintiffs advance notice that he needed to take the day off. (Id. at 126:6, 21-28.) Plaintiff also alleges that he was denied kosher food at school meetings. (PI. Opp’n 10.) Defendants assert that Plaintiff received reimbursements for kosher meals that he purchased for professional development days, and Robinson approved reimbursement for two meals on at least one occasion. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 201 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. JJJ).) Plaintiff claims that during a parent-teacher meeting he was told that he would be reimbursed for purchasing kosher food, but was refused reimbursement. (Weber Day 1 Tr. 176:21-25.) c.Religious Remarks Plaintiff admits that during his employment at Brownsville Academy, he never heard any of his co-workers or supervisors use any negative religion-related or derogatory terms about his religion. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 211, 213 (citing Weber Day 1 Tr. 183:1— 184:5).) Plaintiff alleges, however, Guidance Counselor Kevin Rank joked that things were “[kjosher because he blessed it” and although Plaintiff knew Rank was joking when he made these remarks about things being “kosher,” Plaintiff asserts that “it is not a funny joke after the 100th time.” (Weber Day 1 Tr. 147:11-25.) Plaintiff admits that he never complained to Rank and never told the administration about Rank’s comments. (Oral Arg. Tr. 55:2-56:1.) d.Plaintiffs Performance Evaluations Plaintiff was regularly observed and evaluated by his superiors. (See, e.g., McNally Decl. Exs. R, S, V, AA, KK, LL, QQ, SS, UU, XX, BBB.) Plaintiffs superiors prepared performance evaluations following their observations of Plaintiffs class-room performance, as well as year-end performance evaluations. (See, e.g., McNally Decl. Exs. R, S, V, AA, KK, LL, QQ, SS, UU, XX, BBB.) Plaintiffs performance evaluations demonstrate that he was subject to increasing criticism during his tenure at Brownsville Academy. (See, e.g., McNally Decl. Exs. R, S, V, KK, LL, QQ, SS, UU, XX.) Plaintiff received a satisfactory rating on his year-end performance evaluations for the four consecutive school years between 2005 and 2009. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 13, 18, 24, 33; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 13, 18, 24, 33.) During this time, however, Plaintiffs teaching performance was subject to criticism. (See Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 14-17, 25-27 (citing McNally Decl. Exs. F, G, H, L).) For example, Plaintiff was criticized for failing to actively engage his students, (McNally Decl. Ex. G), failing to address the fact that half of his students arrived late to class, (McNally Decl. Ex. H), excessive talking during class discussions, (id.), allowing a student to watch a sitcom on the computer during class, (McNally Decl. Ex. I), and failing to execute the objectives of his lesson plans, (id.). Plaintiff received his first unsatisfactory performance evaluation during the 2009-2010 school year, in February 2010. (Id. ¶¶ 37-41 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. Q).) Plaintiff was criticized for, among other things, having a vague lesson objective resulting in a failure to achieve a well-planned and executed lesson, allowing students to spend more than a half-hour on an assignment that should have taken no more than ten minutes to complete, failing to differentiate between different levels of students, and fading to display the work of the students in the classroom. (McNally Deck Ex. Q.) Plaintiff claims that “in February of 2010, they just started going after me.” (Weber Day 1 Tr. 68: 1-6; see also Def. 56.1 ¶42 (citing Weber Day 1 Tr. 67:18-68:6).) Plaintiff received another satisfactory rating during the 2009-2010 school year followed by additional unsatisfactory ratings for the remainder of the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 school years for issues such as failing to address the objective for the day, failing to assess the students’ understanding at the end of lessons, accepting incorrect answers as correct, failing to wrap-up lessons, allowing students to arrive late without comment, moving on when students were clearly confused, and failing to provide students with clear directions. (See McNally Decl. Exs. R, S, V, KK, LL, QQ, SS, UU, XX.) Plaintiff was commended on his strengths, including his use of technology, and was provided detailed recommendations for improvement. (See, e.g., McNally Deck Exs. V, QQ, SS, UU, XX.) Prior to and after many of the observation sessions, Phillips, Robinson and/or Warren met with Plaintiff. (See, e.g., McNally Deck Exs. V, KK, LL, QQ, SS, XX.) However, Plaintiff was not always willing to accept input from others. For example, prior to a lesson in April 2010, Plaintiff repeatedly refused opportunities to meet with Phillips, who had offered to work with him on his lesson plan. (McNally Dec. Ex. S.) In a June 2010 performance evaluation, Robinson noted that “Phillips [had] worked diligently with [Plaintiff] ... to no avail.” (McNally Deck Ex. V.) Robinson informed Plaintiff that his colleagues would continue to support him, but noted that Plaintiff needed to accept constructive feedback in order to improve. (Id.; see also McNally Deck Exs. BB, LL.) In April 2011 Plaintiff was given an Action plan and recommendations for achieving a satisfactory rating. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 126 (citing McNally Deck Ex. TT).) According to the Action Plan, Brownsville Academy’s Lead Teacher, Diana Ramsawak, as well as Phillips, Robinson and Warren, would continue to work with Plaintiff on various aspects of the plan. (Id.) Plaintiff was warned that “unsatisfactory observations may lead to further disciplinary action including an unsatisfactory rating and charges that may lead to the termination of your license.” (Id. ¶ 128 (quoting McNally Deck Ex. TT).) In Plaintiffs last performance evaluation of the 2010-2011 school year, Robinson reviewed all of the support Plaintiff had been provided, including support from three supervisors and the Lead Teacher Ramsawak and weekly professional development sessions, (Def. 56.1 ¶ 151 (citing McNally Deck Ex. XX)), and found that Plaintiff had “not demonstrated the necessary growth to accelerate the learning outcomes of [his] scholars,” had been “insubordinate to supervisors,” “unresponsive to the supports that have been provided,” and that he had “a pending ... case regarding numerous discriminatory statements [he] made to scholars.” (Id.) Plaintiffs overall performance rating for the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 school years was unsatisfactory. (Id. ¶ 68 (citing McNally Deck Ex. AA), ¶ 161 (citing McNally Deck Ex. BBB).) Defendants assert that Plaintiff reacted unprofessionally on many occasions when he was notified of various performance issues. For example, according to Nabors, at a meeting with Nabors and Robinson during the 2005-2006 school year, when Nabors attempted to discuss Plaintiffs lesson plan with him he “became very agitated and abrupt,” asking if he needed his union representative present. (McNally Deck Ex. G.) When Nabors and Robinson attempted to address the format of Plaintiffs lesson plan, he “became very belligerent” and told Nabors to “be quiet,” at which point she asked him to leave her office. (Id.) On another occasion during the 2007-2008 school year, after Phillips criticized Plaintiff for failing to execute his lesson plan, Plaintiff started shouting in front of his class that he was being harassed. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 26 (quoting McNally Deck Ex. L).) After that incident, Plaintiff complained to Nabors that he was being harassed by Phillips, and Nabors investigated his complaint of harassment. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 28-29 (citing McNally Deck Ex. M).) At the conclusion of her investigation of Plaintiffs complaint, Nabors found that Plaintiffs conduct was “unprofessional [and] unacceptable,” and she directed Phillips to assist Plaintiff “in an effort to improve the quality of instruction and implement the very best chemistry course that Brownsville Academy High School can offer.” (Id. ¶ 30 (quoting McNally Deck Ex. M).) After Phillips observed and critiqued Plaintiffs performance in class on February 25, 2010, Plaintiff again accused Phillips of harassing him and filed a grievance against her. (McNally Deck Ex. Q; Def. 56.1 ¶ 50 (citing McNally Dec. Exs. T, U); PI. 56.1 ¶ 50.) Robinson denied Plaintiffs grievance on the grounds that he had failed to demonstrate that he had been harassed or that Phillips’s performance evaluation was unfair or inaccurate. (McNally Dec. Ex. T.) Plaintiff was also found to be insubordinate on several occasions. During two of the Plaintiffs classes in 2010-2011 he made inappropriate comments to Robinson and Warren while they were observing him. Robinson and Warren observed Plaintiffs class on April 15, 2011. (McNally Deck Ex. SS.) During class, Plaintiff repeatedly directed his comments and questions at Robinson and Warren, rather than the class, with statements like, “Ms. Warren, feel free to chime in since this is an easy lesson,” “Ms. Warren and Ms. Phillips ... are teachers[,] I am sure they would like to learn a little chemistry,” “Ms. Warren, you should know this. Ms Warren, do you know the answer?,” and “Are you learning chemistry Ms. Warren?” (Id.) Robinson told Plaintiff that his behavior during the class towards his superiors who were observing “was unprofessional and unacceptable,” and had a “negative impact” on the students. (Id.) After investigating the matter further, including meeting with Plaintiff and his union representative, Robinson concluded that Plaintiffs behavior during the class “constitute[d] conduct unbecoming of a professional educator and insubordination.” (McNally Decl. Ex. W.) Robinson told Plaintiff that his behavior had a “negative effect” on the “character and personality growth” of the students. (Id.) Robinson warned Plaintiff that the incident could “lead to further disciplinary action, including an unsatisfactory rating and charges that could lead to your termination.” (Id.) Robinson and Warren observed Plaintiffs class again on May 17, 2011. (McNally Decl. UU.) While Robinson and Warren were reviewing the bulletin boards outside of Plaintiffs classroom, Plaintiff told the class, “It’s not you, it’s me they don’t like!” (Id.) When Robinson asked him to refrain from making such comments to students, Plaintiff responded “I don’t appreciate you eavesdropping,” and closed the classroom door. (Id.) Robinson opened the door and asked Plaintiff to leave the door open because she planned to return to the classroom, but Plaintiff closed the door again. (Id.) Robinson later informed Plaintiff that his conduct “constitute[d] unprofessional and insubordinate behavior,” and warned him that “this incident may lead to disciplinary action including an unsatisfactory rating and charges that may lead to your termination.” (McNally Decl. Ex. UU.) e. Plaintiffs Appeal of his 2009-2010 Unsatisfactory Rating On July 2, 2010, Plaintiff appealed his first unsatisfactory year-end performance evaluation, for the 2009-2010 school year, to the DOE’s Office of Appeals and Reviews. (Id. ¶ 71 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. CC).) A hearing was held before Ron Gerstman, the Chancellor’s Committee Chairperson, on November 12, 2010. (Id. ¶ 72.) Plaintiff, his union representative, Robinson, Phillips and Warren all participated in the hearing. (Id. ¶ 72.) In challenging his unsatisfactory rating, Plaintiff claimed that he was “continually harassed.” (McNally Decl. Ex. DD at 2.) Plaintiff did not claim that he was harassed or discriminated against based on his religion or age. Gerstman recommended that Plaintiffs unsatisfactory rating for the 2009-2010 school year be sustained. The Chancellor Committee found that “[b]oth the verbal testimony and the documentation submitted” supported the evaluation. (Id.) The Committee concluded that “[t]here was clearly a failure to align curriculum, instruction and assessment, and [Plaintiffs] ‘Unsatisfactory’ teaching resulted in none of his students passing their Regents examinations.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 73 (quoting McNally Decl. Ex. DD); see also McNally Decl. Ex. EE.) f. Article 78 Proceeding On July 7, 2011, Plaintiff commenced an Article 78 proceeding against the City, DOE, and the Chancellor in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, challenging the Chancellor’s determination. (Id. ¶ 75 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. GG); PI. 56.1 ¶ 75.) Plaintiff sought a declaration annulling the Chancellor’s decision to uphold the 2009-2010 unsatisfactory rating “as arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, an abuse of discretion, lacking a rational basis, in violation of lawful procedure, and in bad faith.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleged that beginning in 2009-2010 he was “suddenly and without any genuine professional basis, targeted for firing by Principal Robinson and her assistant principals, and, in building a bogus paper trail to justify that termination, [they] issued an unbroken string of negative observation reports seeking to establish his impotence.” (Id.) Plaintiff called the Chancellor’s review of the unsatisfactory rating a “sham.” (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff also referenced his 2010-2011 unsatisfactory annual rating, which he had recently received and accused Robinson of “ill-motives and bad faith,” “harassment” and “assault,” and a “desire to damage” him.” (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff did not claim age or religious discrimination. (See McNally Decl. Ex. GG.) On June 25, 2012, the Honorable Paul G. Feinman of New York Supreme Court issued a decision denying Plaintiffs Article 78 Petition and finding that Plaintiff “failed to show that the U[nsatisfactory]rating was arbitrary and capricious or made in bad faith.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 77 (quoting McNally Decl. Ex. HH).) Judge Feinman reviewed the detailed reports of Plaintiffs classroom observations and other letters in his file and concluded that, “[t]aken together, these documents and the testimony presented at the [DOE Office of Appeals and Reviews] hearing were sufficient to support the Chancellor’s Committee’s determination to deny [Plaintiffs] internal appeal of his U-rating from the 2009-2010 school year.” (Id. ¶ 78 (quoting McNally Decl. Ex. HH).) Judge Feinman also concluded that Plaintiffs “contention that the principal and assistant principals are biased against him was ‘speculative and insufficient to establish bad faith,”’ and “unsupported by competent proof.” (Id. ¶ 79 (quoting McNally Dec]. Ex. HH).) Judge Feinman noted that “[t]o establish bad faith, the burden falls squarely on the petitioner to demonstrate, by competent proof, that a substantial issue of bad faith exists, and mere speculation, or bald, conclusory allegations are insufficient,” and “mere personality conflicts must not be mistaken for unlawful discrimination.” (McNally Decl. Ex. HH at 11 (alteration, citations and internal quotations omitted).) Plaintiff alleged in the Article 78 Petition that Robinson stated at the Office of Appeals and Reviews hearing that Plaintiff would never again receive a satisfactory rating, but Judge Feinman held that he did “not find a statement of this nature in the audio recording of the hearing or its written transcription.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 80.) Judge Feinman noted that if Plaintiff was arguing that he was abused and harassed by Robinson, such allegation would have needed to be raised before the Chancellor’s Committee, and that, in any event, implicit in the Chancellor Committee’s “approval of the U-Rating is the determination that petitioner’s allegations on this point were not credible or that it had no impact on petitioner’s performance.” (McNally Decl. Ex. HH at 12.) g. Improvement Program During the 2010-2011 school year Plaintiff was invited to participate in a voluntary program jointly developed by DOE and the United Federation of Teachers and designed for teachers who needed to work on improving their performance. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 115 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. RR).) The Peer Observation and Evaluation program, known as “PIP Plus,” was “designed for tenured teachers who have been identified as in continuing need of assistance for significant instructional improvement, and who are in danger of 3020a charges being filed against them.” (Id.) Robinson strongly encouraged Plaintiff to participate in the program. (Id.) Plaintiff was warned that if he did not participate, his decision not to participate could be used against him in future proceedings. (Id.) Plaintiff declined to participate in the PIP Plus program. (Id. ¶ 116 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. RR).) According to Plaintiff, “the PIP Plus program has been used as a weapon against tenured teachers in which, upon information and belief, any teacher who has consented to be admitted into the program has been judged incompetent by the DOE-hired peer intervenors.” (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 116.) h. Allegations of Misconduct i. April 13, 2010 Incident While Covering Another Class On April 13, 2010, Plaintiff covered a class for a teacher who was absent. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 57 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. W).) Five of the students present in the classroom were not on the class roster and were in Plaintiffs classroom because they failed to attend their assigned classes. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that he did not have a roster of students and did not ask for a roster of students who were assigned to the class. (Id. ¶ 58.) Plaintiff instead assumed that everyone who was in the classroom belonged in the class. (Id. (citing McNally Decl. Ex. W).) During the April 13, 2010 class, $155 was allegedly stolen from L.G., one of the students on the class roster. (Id. ¶ 59 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. W).) L.G. suspected T.M., another student who did not belong in the class and was not on the class roster, of being the individual who stole $155. (Id. ¶ 60 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. W).) The next day, L.G. confronted T.M., resulting in a fight. (Id.) Warren was injured in her attempt to break up the fight. (Id.) Following an investigation, Robinson determined that the incident may have been avoided if Plaintiff had not allowed students to avoid attending their assigned classes by attending his class, and she concluded that Plaintiff did not take appropriate action to ensure that the students who did not belong in his class were removed from his classroom. (Id. ¶ 61 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. W).) Robinson informed Plaintiff that “allowing scholars to cut in your classroom is a very serious infraction,” and notified Plaintiff that the incident could lead to further disciplinary action, including “an unsatisfactory rating and charges that may lead to your termination.” (Id. ¶ 62 (quoting McNally Decl. Ex. W).) Plaintiff objected to Robinson’s findings, accused the Brownsville Academy administration of a “campaign of harassment” and stated that “they have been trying to find ways to give me a ‘U’ all year.” (McNally Decl. Ex. Z.) ii. OEO Investigation Regarding Allegations of Inappropriate Racial Comments On December 3, 2010, two students, C.G. and D.S., informed Brownsville Academy’s Guidance Counselor Rank that they were upset about inappropriate racial comments they alleged were made by Plaintiff in class that day about African Americans. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 81.) Rank documented the information from the students in a letter to Robinson dated December 3, 2010 which states: Dear. Ms. Robinson, This morning C[.]G[.] and D[.]S[.] came into my office after their first period Chemistry class and were very upset. The two girls informed me that Mr. Weber had made some inappropriate racial comments about African Americans during the class. The girls said that not only were they upset but the whole class was upset as well. I asked the girls what comment was made and they stated that he had said that the lack of education was the reason why their community was in trouble. The girls also mentioned that he has made other comments in the past that had inappropriate racial undertones. Sincerely, Kevin Rank School Counselor (McNally Decl. Ex. II.) On December 6, 2010, three students provided handwritten statements about the incident. (Id.) The following day, December 7, 2010, a parent of one of the complaining students emailed Robinson and Phillips about comments her daughter had shared with her. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 86 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. II).) According to the parent, “[m]y daughter continues to come home every other day and tells us how [Plaintiff] speaks candidly about how he feels towards minorities and the racial categories that she and the other students gets subjected to. He has made references to drug contraband in order to make a connection to the chemistry lesson in school to their assume[ed] outside lifestyle,” and “[Plaintiff] insist[s] on telling the students they live in the hood and if they reply they don’t live in the hood[,] he would sarcastically tell them they can go tell the people in their mansion.” (Id.) The parent requested a meeting with Robinson, Phillips, the Parent Coordinator and Plaintiff to resolve these issues. (Id.) After receiving the parent’s email, Robinson reported the complaints from the students and the parent to DOE’s Online Occurrence Reporting System. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 87.) As a result of Robinson’s report, the DOE Office of Employment Opportunity (“OEO”) was assigned to investigate the complaint. (Id. ¶ 88.) Approximately 10 months later, the OEO’s Executive Director notified Plaintiff by letter dated October 21, 2011, that OEO’s investigation “did not substantiate[ ] that [he] violated Chancellor’s Regulation A-830, which outlines the Department of Education’s NonDiscrimination Policy.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 89 (quoting McNally Decl. Ex. JJ); PL 56.1 ¶ 89.) iii. May 26, 2011 Student Complaint On May 26, 2011, a student complained that Plaintiff improperly left her alone in the classroom. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 135 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. WW).) The student also complained about comments Plaintiff made to her. The student stated that, on or about May 24, 2011, “I told [Plaintiff] I wanted to practice for the chemistry 2 Regent and so he told me that he didn’t think I was going to pass it because it was very hard. For some reason Mr. Weber is always downgrading me and making me feel like I can’t make it. Out of all teachers and staff members in the building he is the only person who thinks I can’t do it or that I’m not smart enough.” (Id. ¶ 136 (quoting McNally Decl. Ex. WW).) Brownsville Academy investigated the complaint and received statements from other students complaining about other comments made by Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 137 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. WW).) On Friday, June 3, 2011, Robinson and Phillips met with Plaintiff and his union representative to discuss the students’ complaints. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 142 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. WW).) Plaintiff stated that he “could not recall any of these incidents,” but he “could [not] think of a reason why these scholars would lie about these incidents.” (Id.) Robinson offered Plaintiff the remainder of the day and the following Monday to produce witnesses who could substantiate that the complaints were untrue, but Plaintiff did not provide any contrary evidence. (Id.) Robinson notified Plaintiff in a June 7, 2011 letter that she had concluded that Plaintiff made several inappropriate comments to students, and that those comments constituted conduct unbecoming of a professional educator. (Id. ¶ 143 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. WW).) Robinson reminded Plaintiff that staff members serve as role models and instructed him that, “It is extremely unprofessional for you to make derogatory comments about your supervisors in our school community, especially to scholars. You must always have high expectations for scholars and support them in attaining their goals. It is paramount that the safety and welfare of our students is always a priority. Further, it is discriminatory to make comments about a person’s race, col- or, religion, creed, ethnicity, national origin, alienage, citizenship status, age, marital status, partnership status, disability, sexual orientation, gender (sex), etc. (this list is not exhaustive).” (Id.) Robinson warned Plaintiff that “these incidents may lead to further disciplinary action including an unsatisfactory rating and charges that may lead to your termination.” (Id.) iv. May 26, 2011 Parent Complaint On May 26, 2011, the parent of a student, Ms. C., wrote to Robinson that she had written a letter to Plaintiff requesting a change in her son’s grade. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 166 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. DDD).) She complained that Plaintiff had not responded even though he previously stated that he would change the grade. (Id.) Ms. C. further stated that Plaintiff “didn’t have any records in his grade book for [her son]” and told Ms. C. “to go to Administration.” (Id.) Ms. C. wrote that Plaintiff “was yelling and screaming at me. He blame [sic] on the administration because he stated that they keep changing his program all the time.” (Id.) Robinson and Phillips met with Plaintiff and his union representative to discuss the complaint. (Id. ¶ 166 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. DDD).) Phillips asked Plaintiff whether he had the student’s records and whether the student was in his class. (Id. ¶ 167 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. DDD).) Plaintiff told Phillips that he would “have to get back to [her].” (Id. ¶ 167 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. DDD).) When asked whether he yelled and screamed at the parent and blamed the administration, Plaintiff did not respond. (Id.) Robinson concluded that “the conduct [Plaintiff] exhibited when [he] did not have records available for [the student] when requested by the parent,” which included yelling and screaming, and blaming the administration, “constitute^] conduct unbecoming a professional educator.” (Id. ¶ 168 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. DDD).) Robinson informed Plaintiff that he was obligated to address all parents in a professional manner and maintain good relationships with them, and that the student’s records should have been available to his mother during the parent-teacher conference. (Id.) i. Plaintiffs Comments to Ramsawak Lead Teacher Diana Ramsawak alleged that Plaintiff “raved” to her about the administration, complaining that he “did not deserve an unsatisfactory” rating, became “frustrated and angry,” felt that the students were not “working hard enough” and stated that they “acted like animals.” (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 152-53 (quoting McNally Decl. Ex YY).) Ramsawak reported Plaintiffs comments to Robinson, and Robinson confronted Plaintiff with Ramsawak’s report which Plaintiff denied. (Id. ¶ 152, 154.) Plaintiff acknowledged that he did not know of any reason why Ramsawak would have lied about Plaintiff making these statements. (Id. ¶ 154 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. YY).) Robinson concluded that Plaintiff had made the statements and exhibited conduct that was unbecoming of a professional educator, and reminded Plaintiff of his obligation to address staff members in a professional manner and not to discuss students in a derogatory manner. (Id. ¶ 155 (citing McNally Decl. Ex YY).) j.Plaintiffs “Curse” of Robinson Melissa Ingrati, Brownsville Academy’s secretary, reported to Robinson that in May 2011, Plaintiff told her he was “sick of’ receiving letters from Robinson, and that “If she doesn’t stop harassing me, I’m going to put a curse on her. I told my Rebbi about what they’re doing to me and he even told me to curse her.... I mean it, I’ll do it and she’ll be sorry.” (Id. ¶ 156 (quoting McNally Decl. Ex. ZZ).) Robinson confronted Plaintiff about this “curse” statement. (Id. ¶ 152.) Plaintiff did not recall making the statements but acknowledged that he did not know of any reason why Ingrati would have lied. (Id. ¶ 157 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. ZZ).) Robinson concluded that Plaintiff had made the statements, that they constituted conduct unbecoming of a professional educator, and warned Plaintiff that they may lead to further disciplinary action, including an unsatisfactory rating and disciplinary charges. (Id. ¶ 158 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. ZZ).) Plaintiff later admitted that he did mention putting a curse on Robinson, but asserts that he was “joking” when he made the statement. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 159 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. AAA).) According to Plaintiff, “We were sort of joking at about how I was always getting letters, and I said, just jokingly, that I could put a curse on her, but this is not something that any sane person would take seriously.” (Id.) k.Plaintiffs State Division of Human Rights and EEOC Complaints On or about November 9, 2010, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging age and religious discrimination with the State Division of Human Rights and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 104-105 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. MM); PI. 56.1 ¶ 104-105.) The State Division of Human Rights sent the complaint to the legal department of DOE sometime in November 2010. (See Glass Decl. ¶ 3 (citing Glass Decl. Ex. 1); see generally Def. Reply.) According to Defendants, Robinson first learned of the complaint on December 22, 2010 when she received an email from Christina Graves of the DOE’s Office of Legal Services. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 106 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. NN).) On July 6, 2011, the State Division of Human Rights dismissed Plaintiffs complaint for administrative convenience after Plaintiff notified the State Division of Human Rights that he intended to pursue his complaint in federal court. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 107 (citing McNally Decl. Ex. OO); PI. 56.1 ¶ 107.) The EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights to Plaintiff on July 21, 2011. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 108 (citing Cmplt. Ex. A); PI. 56.1 ¶ 108.) Plaintiff filed this action on October 19, 2011. (Dkt. Entry No. 1.) 1.Service of 3020-a Disciplinary Charges Plaintiff was served with 3020-a disciplinary charges in October 2011. DOE attorney Sherine Cummings signed the DOE’s disciplinary charges on September 27, 2011. (Id. ¶ 172.) By letter dated October 3, 2011, Robinson notified Plaintiff of the charges. (Id. ¶ 173; PI. 56.1 ¶ 173.) The letter and charges were served on Plaintiff by mail on October 4, 2011, and by personal service on October 5, 2011. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 173; PI. 56.1 ¶ 173.) Plaintiff asserts that as an “ultraorthodox Jew,” he was “observing the highest holy days of the year at that time (Rosh Hashanah fell on September 28, 2011, and Yom Kippur fell on October 7, 2011 that year)” when he was served with the 3020-a charges. (PI. Opp’n 10.) Plaintiff was charged with failing to properly, adequately and/or effectively plan and/or execute lessons or manage students in his charge during the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 school years, using poor judgment and/or violating regulations and/or school policy by videotaping a lesson without proper authorization, using poor judgment and/or acting unprofessionally by making inappropriate comments, interacting unprofessionally with a parent, leaving a student unattended, threatening to put a curse on Robinson, and failing to attend and/or accept professional development and assistance. (McNally Deck Ex. EEE.) m. Plaintiffs Removal from Brownsville Academy After the DOE served Plaintiff with 3020-a charges, Plaintiff was removed from his teaching duties at Brownsville Academy and assigned to non-classroom duties. (Def. 56.1 ¶179; PI. 56.1 ¶179.) Shortly thereafter, DOE transferred Plaintiff from Brownsville Academy to another school. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 182.) Robinson requested Plaintiffs transfer because during the time Plaintiff was assigned to an administrative position at Brownsville Academy, he continued to make unsolicited negative comments to students about Robinson and the Assistant Principals, and Robinson believed Plaintiffs conduct was disruptive. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 182.) n. 3020-a Opinion and Award In February and March 2012, Plaintiff had a hearing on the 3020-a disciplinary charges before hearing officer John L. Woods, Jr. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 187; PI. 56.1 ¶ 187.) On June 14, 2012, the hearing officer issued a 46-page Opinion and Award. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 188; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 188; see also 3020-a Opinion and Award.) The hearing officer reviewed the charges, testimony, documentary evidence, and arguments of the parties in detail. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 188; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 188; see also 3020-a Opinion and Award.) He noted that “[t]he parties were accorded full and fair hearings, including the opportunity to present evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses and make arguments in support of their respective positions,” and that “[t]he parties were represented by Counsel throughout the proceedings.” (3020-a Opinion and Award 2.) The hearing officer found Plaintiff “guilty” of failing to properly, adequately, and/or effectively plan and execute lessons during the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 school years. With regard to these charges, the hearing officer found that the unsatisfactory observations that were conducted and the reports that were prepared on February 25, 2010, April 19, 2010, June 1, 2010, December 6, 2010, December 20, 2010, February 15, 2011, April 15, 2011, and June 10, 2011, were all “constructive” towards the goals of improving Plaintiffs performance. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 189; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 189.) The hearing officer concluded that “[b]ased on the totality of evidence” which included “[Plaintiffs] consistent failure to deliver satisfactory lessons,” Plaintiff was guilty of the charges. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 189 (quoting 3020-a Opinion and Award 32-35); Pl. 56.1 ¶ 189.) The hearing officer also found Plaintiff “guilty” of poor judgment and unprofessional behavior on April 15 and May 17, 2011. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 192 (citing 3020-a Opinion and Award 37-38); Pl. 56.1 ¶ 192.) The hearing officer found that Plaintiffs “comments to the administration in the presence of students, were distasteful, evidence of poor judgment, unprofessional, undermined the administration[’]s leadership authority as well as the academic environment, and more importantly, lacked any pedagogical significance.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 192 (quoting 3020-a Opinion and Award 37-38); Pl. 56.1 ¶ 192.) The hearing officer also found Plaintiff “guilty” of failing to attend assistance meetings or accept professional development throughout the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 school years. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 196 (quoting 3020-a Opinion and Award 41-42); Pl. 56.1 ¶ 196.) The hearing officer explained that “[a]s an employee that has demonstrated performance deficiencies, [Plaintiff] has forfeited the right to unilaterally select and avail himself to [sic] professional development opportunities solely of his choosing” and “does not have the option to disregard instruction made by and within the scope of his supervisor’s supervisory and/or administrative authority.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 196 (quoting 3020-a Opinion and Award 41-42); Pl. 56.1 ¶ 196.) While recognizing Plaintiffs right to “challenge any perceived or actual injustices that he feels that he was subjected to by the administration,” the hearing officer made clear that Plaintiffs decision to exercise such rights “does not absolve him of his duties and responsibilities as an employee,” including “being professional, subordinate, and compliant with directives pertaining to professional development issued by his superiors at Brownsville Academy.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 196 (quoting 3020-a Opinion and Award 41-12); Pl. 56.1 ¶ 196.) The hearing officer imposed a 60-day suspension without pay, “[i]n order to impress upon [Plaintiff] his need' to immediately improve his conduct as well as his performance,” followed by reinstatement, along with additional training and professional development at DOE’s expense for a period of one year. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 197 (quoting 3020-a Opinion and Award 43-44); Pl. 56.1 ¶ 197.) The hearing officer characterized Plaintiffs teaching performance as “mediocre,” but not incompetent, and stated that it was “important to note that-although [Plaintiff] survived the Department’s request to terminate his employment in this instance, continued resistance [to the full integration of the Diploma Plus teaching competencies and the overall academic goals of Brownsville Academy within his instruction] can ultimately progress to where [a termination] request will eventually be firmly supported and ultimately affirmed.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 198 (quoting 3020-a Opinion and Award 43-44); Pl. 56.1 ¶ 198.) II. Discussion a. Standard of Review Summary judgment is proper only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir.2013); Redd v. N.Y. Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 174 (2d Cir.2012). The role of the court is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A genuine issue of fact exists when there is sufficient “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment; “there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. The court’s function is to decide “whether, after resolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, a rational juror could find in favor of that party.” Pinto v. Allstate Ins. Co., 221 F.3d 394, 398 (2d Cir.2000). The Second Circuit has “cautioned that ‘[w]here an employer acted with discriminatory intent, direct evidence of that intent will only rarely be available, so affidavits and depositions must be carefully scrutinized for circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show discrimination.’ ” Taddeo v. L.M. Berry & Co., 526 Fed.Appx. 121, 122 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir.2010)). b. Religious Discrimination Claims— Title VII and NYSHRL Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against him by treating him differently because of his religion and failing to provide him with religious accommodations. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). An individual’s “religion” includes not just religious beliefs, but “all aspects of religious observance and practice,” unless the employer demonstrates that it is unable to reasonably accommodate that observance or practice “without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); see also Cosme v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152 (2d Cir.2002) (stating that “Congress delineated the scope of an employer’s duties ... by defining ‘religion’ in a substantively significant way”); Siddiqi v. N.Y. Health & Hospitals Corp., 572 F.Supp.2d 353, 369 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (“Courts interpret [42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) ] to mean that an employer cannot discriminate against any employee on the basis of the employee’s religious beliefs unless the employer shows that he cannot reasonably accommodate the employee’s religious needs without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, “[a] plaintiff may claim a violation of religious discrimination under Title VII under theories of either disparate treatment or denial of reasonable accommodation.” Bind v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-11105, 2011 WL 4542897, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (citing Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir.2004) (disparate treatment) and Cosme, 287 F.3d at 158 (denial of reasonable accommodation)). To establish a disparate treatment discrimination claim under Title VII, Plaintiff can either (1) “show[ ] that he has suffered an adverse job action under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” or (2) “demonstrate^] that harassment on one or more of these bases amounted to a hostile work environment.” Feingold, 366 F.3d at 149; see also Bind, 2011 WL 4542897, at *9 (“A disparate treatment claim ... may be established by showing either (1) adverse job action under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of religion, or (2) harassment on the basis of religion that amounts to a hostile work environment.” (citing Feingold, 366 F.3d at 149)); see also Marmulszteyn v. Napolitano, 523 Fed.Appx. 13, 15 (2d Cir.2013) (to make out a disparate treatment claim a plaintiff must “show that he suffered an adverse employment action” and present “evidence giving rise to an inference of discrimination” (citations omitted)). Title VII disparate treatment religious discrimination claims are assessed using the burden-shifting framework established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See e.g., Marmulszteyn, 523 Fed.Appx. at 15 (explaining that a “disparate-treatment claim” based on religion “is governed by the familiar burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas ”). Under the framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id.; see also St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); Ruiz v. Cnty. of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 491 (2d Cir.2010). The plaintiffs burden at this stage is “minimal.” Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742). If the plaintiff satisfies this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the defendants to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their actions. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742; Ruiz, 609 F.3d at 492. The defendants’ burden “is not a particularly steep hurdle.” Hyek v. Field Support Servs., 702 F.Supp.2d 84, 93 (E.D.N.Y.2010). It “is one of production, not persuasion; it ‘can involve no credibility assessment.’ ” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509, 113 S.Ct. 2742); see also Lambert v. McCann Erickson, 543 F.Supp.2d 265, 278 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (applying the Reeves standard). If the defendants offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for their action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that “the evidence in plaintiffs favor, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, is sufficient to sustain a reasonable finding that [his] [adverse treatment] was motivated at least in part by [religious] discrimination.” Adamczyk v. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 474 Fed.Appx. 23, 25 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Grp., Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir.2007)); see also Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. _, _, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2522-23, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013) (“An employee who alleges status-based discrimination under Title VII need not show that the causal link between injury and wrong is so close that the injury would not have occurred but for the act. So-called but-for causation is not the test. It suffices instead to show that the motive to discriminate was one of the employer’s motives, even if the employer also had other, lawful motives that were causative in the employer’s decision.”). Plaintiff asserts a disparate treatment discrimination claim and a reasonable accommodation claim. i. Disparate Treatment Religious Discrimination Claim 1. Prima Facie Case To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination based on disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show “that: ‘(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position he held; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action took place under circumstances giving rise to the inference of discrimination.’ ” Marmulszteyn, 523 Fed.Appx. at 15 (quoting Ruiz, 609 F.3d at 492); see also Yoselovsky v. Associated Press, 917 F.Supp.2d 262, 273 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (citing Reynolds v. Barrett, 685 F.3d 193, 202 (2d Cir.2012) and Stratton v. Dep’t for the Aging, 132 F.3d 869, 879 (2d Cir.1997)). Plaintiff can satisfy the first three elements of his prima facie case. A. Member of Protected Class Plaintiff asserts that he is a “Hasidic ultraorthodox Jew.” (PL 56.1 ¶2.) Defendants concede that Plaintiff, as a Hasidic Jew, is a member of a protected class, satisfying the first element of his prima facie case. (See Def. Mem. 4 (Plaintiff “is a member of protected classes in the categories of age and religion”).) See also Weiss v. Dep’t of Educ. of City of N.Y., No. 09-CV-1689, 2012 WL 1059676, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2012) (“Being Jewish, he is a member of a protected class.... ”); Pesok v. Hebrew Union Coll.-Jewish Inst. of Religion, 235 F.Supp.2d 281, 285 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (“As a Jew, [plaintiff] is a member of a protected class on the basis of his religion.” (citing Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989 (2d Cir.1985))). Therefore this element is satisfied. B. Adverse Employment Action Plaintiff asserts that he suffered several adverse employment actions. Although not clearly stated in the Complaint or his opposition to the motion for summary judgment, at oral argument Plaintiff listed his alleged adverse employment actions as: (1) the unsatisfactory performance evaluations which led to the initiation of 3020-a charges, culminating in a 60-day suspension of Plaintiff; (2) the denial of time off for religious observance; (3) being disturbed at home on a Jewish holiday; and (4) the investigation by OEO of alleged biased conduct by Plaintiff against some of his students. (Oral Arg. Tr. at 7:10-16:23.) In order to establish an adverse action, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he suffered “a materially adverse change in h[is] employment status or in the terms and conditions of his employment.” Kessler v. Westchester Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 207 (2d Cir.2006). Plaintiffs unsatisfactory performance evaluations which led to the initiation of 3020-a charges culminating in the suspension of Plaintiff qualify as adverse employment actions since Plaintiff suffered a “materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment ... [that was] more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.” Bowles v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 285 Fed.Appx. 812, 814 (2d Cir.2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Farina v. Branford Bd. of Educ., 458 Fed.Appx. 13, 17 (2d Cir.2011) (“While negative employment evaluation letters[] or reprimands may be considered adverse employment actions,” that is not the case where there is “no proof that [the] evaluation had any effect on the terms and conditions of [the plaintiffs] employment.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Taylor v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 11-CV-3582, 2012 WL 5989874, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012) (negative performance evaluation that triggers negative consequences to the conditions of employment is an adverse employment action); Davis v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 10-CV-3812, 2012 WL 139255, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2012) (“[Wlhere a negative performance evaluation results in an adverse change in work conditions, it may be considered an adverse employment action.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Kaur v. N.Y.C. Health & Hospitals Corp., 688 F.Supp.2d 317, 332 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“In the disparate treatment context, a negative performance evaluation only qualifies as an adverse employment action if there are accompanying adverse consequences affecting the terms of employment.”); Kelly v. Huntington Union Free Sch. Dist. (“Huntington Union ”), No. 09-CV-2101, 2012 WL 1077677, at *16 n. 21 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012) (“[T]he 3020-a charges are clearly an adverse employment action because the institution of disciplinary proceedings is sufficient in this circuit to constitute an adverse employment decision.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), overruled on other grounds by Appel v. Spiridon, 531 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir.2008); Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 223 (2d Cir.2001) (“[Suspension without pay is sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action.”). Plaintiff has satisfied this element and Defendants concede that he has. (Def. Mem. 11-12.) Plaintiffs additional adverse employment action claims — denial of time off for a religious observance on a non-holiday, being disturbed at home during a religious holiday, and the initiation of an OEO investigation, none of which resulted in any materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of Plaintiffs employment — are not adverse employment actions. See, e.g., Manessis v. New York City Dep’t of Transp., No. 02-CV-359, 2003 WL 289969, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2003) (finding no adverse employment action where the terms of the plaintiffs employment were not altered by an investigation of a co-worker’s complaint alleging he was a racist, which complaint was ultimately dismissed); Wallace v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep’t, 396 F.Supp.2d 251, 261 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (holding plaintiff “may not rely on the investigation, by itself, as an adverse employment action” where plaintiff did not allege that the charges were decided against him or that he “suffered any changes in the circumstances of his employment status as a result of the charges”); Radolf v. Univ. of Conn., 364 F.Supp.2d 204, 224 (D.Conn.2005) (finding no adverse employment action where plaintiff was exonerated by investigation and the accusations did not result in any discipline or “any reduction in his pay, benefits, or terms of his employment”); Wharton v. Cnty. of Nassau, No. 10-CV-0265, 2013 WL 4851713, at *3, *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2013) (finding that denials of plaintiffs requests for time off for religious observances “do not constitute adverse employment actions for purposes of Plaintiffs Title VII discrimination claims,” because “[d]enials of vacation time are not adverse actions” (collecting cases)); Kaur, 688 F.Supp.2d at 332 (“denial of vacation time ... do[es] not rise to the level of an adverse employment action”); Dawson v. Cnty. of Westchester, 274 F.Supp.2d 364, 372, 377-78 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (multiple telephone calls to plaintiffs on leave, even if excessive, “do not constitute adverse employment actions based on the very obvious fact that nothing adverse happened with respect to plaintiffs’ employment”), aff'd in relevant part, vacated in part, remanded, 873 F.3d 265 (2d Cir.2004). C. Qualification for the Position Although Defendants argue otherwise, Plaintiff is qualified for the position and satisfies this element. “To show ‘qualification’ sufficiently to shift the burden ... to the employer, the plaintiff need not show perfect performance or even average performance.” Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 696 (2d Cir.2001). “Instead, she need only make the minimal showing that she possesses the basic skills necessary for performance of [the] job.” Id. (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kaboggozamusoke v. Rye Town Hilton Hotel, 370 Fed.Appx. 246, 248 n. 1 (2d Cir.2010) (“[A]ll that is required is that the plaintiff establish basic eligibility for the position at issue.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir.2001) (“As we have repeatedly held, the qualification necessary to shift the burden to defendant for an explanation of the adverse job action is minimal; plaintiff must show only that he possesses the basic skills necessary for performance of the job. As a result, especially where discharge is at issue and the employer has already hired the employee, the inference of minimal qualification is not difficult to draw.” (alteration, citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Hird-Moorhouse v. Belgian Mission to United Nations, No. 03-CV-9688, 2010 WL 3910742, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2010) (“Plaintiff need show only that he ‘possesses the basic skills necessary for performance of [the] job.’ ” (quoting Slattery, 248 F.3d at 92 (alteration in original))). However, a trail of negative performance reviews can serve as evidence that a plaintiff is not qualified for his position. See, e.g., Grant v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., No. 10-CV-6384, 2013 WL 3105536, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. June 18, 2013) (finding negative mid-year report and year-end evaluation to be evidence of Plaintiffs lack of qualification); Bailey v. Frederick Goldman, Inc., No. 02-CV-2429, 2006 WL 738435, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2006) (finding trail of performance reviews and improvement plans that documented plaintiff’s deteriorating performance to be evidence of plaintiffs lack of qualification). Here, Plaintiff received several unsatisfactory performance evaluations during the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 school years, and Defendants sought his termination in part because of these evaluations. (See generally 3020-a Opinion and Award.) However, after a 3020-a hearing, the hearing officer declined to terminate Plaintiff. (Id. at 43.) The hearing officer concluded that DOE’s assessment of Plaintiffs performance as “mediocre” was accurate but determined that being “mediocre is not incompetent.” (Id.) Based on the evidence before this Court — Plaintiffs satisfactory reviews from 2005 through 2009 and the hearing officer’s determination— Plaintiff has met his burden of demonstrating that although his work was mediocre, he was qualified for the position. D. Inference of Religious Discrimination Inference of discrimination “is a ‘flexible [standard] that can be satisfied differently in differing factual scenarios.’ ” Howard v. MTA Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 866 F.Supp.2d 196 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (quoting Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir.1996)). “No one particular type of proof is required to show that Plaintiffs termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Ofoedu v. St. Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., No. 04-CV-1707, 2006 WL 2642415, at *14 (D.Conn. Sept. 13, 2006). An inference of discrimination can be drawn from circumstances such as “the employer’s continuing, after discharging the plaintiff, to seek applicants from persons of the plaintiffs qualifications to fill that position”; “the employer’s criticism of the plaintiffs performance in ethnically degrading terms”; “its invidious comments about others in the employee’s protected group”; “the more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group”; or “the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs discharge.” Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 468 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting Chambers v. TRM Copy Centers Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir.1994)). However, a plaintiffs own subjective belief that he was discriminated against because of his religion is insufficient to sustain a religious discrimination claim. See Saqib v. Stein deVisser & Mintz, PC, _ Fed.Appx. _, _, 2010 WL 2382253, at *1 (2d Cir. June 15, 2010) (holding that in order “[t]o defeat summary judgment” on plaintiffs claim for religion, race, color, and national origin discrimination plaintiff “may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation”); Boyar v. City of New York, No. 10-CV-65, 2010 WL 4345737, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2010) (finding that “[w]hile [plaintiff] states his belief that his [Jewish] religion played a role in these decisions