Shenzhen Xinboda Industrial Co. v. United States (976 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 2014)

OPINION

RIDGWAY, Judge:

In this action, Plaintiff Shenzhen Xinboda Industrial Co., Ltd. (“Xinboda”) — -an exporter of fresh garlic — contests the final results of the U.S. Department of Commerce’s fifteenth administrative review of the antidumping duty order covering fresh garlic from the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”). See Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Final Results and Final Rescission, in Part, of the 2008-2009 Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 76 Fed.Reg. 37,321 (Dep’t Commerce June 27, 2011) (“Final Results”); Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Results of the 15th Administrative Review of Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China (June 20, 2011) (Pub.Doc. No. 176) (“Issues & Decision Memorandum”).

Pending before the Court is Xnboda’s Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record, contesting Commerce’s determinations as to the surrogate values for whole raw garlic bulbs, financial ratios, and labor, as well as the agency’s application of the “zeroing” methodology in calculating Xnboda’s dumping margin. See generally Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record (“Pl.’s Brief’); Plaintiffs Reply Brief (“Pl.’s Reply Brief’).

The Government opposes Xnboda’s motion and maintains that the Final Results should be sustained in all respects, save one. See Defendant’s Memorandum in Response to Plaintiffs Rule 56.2 Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record at 1, 29-30 (“Def.’s Response Brief’). Specifically, the Government requests that the “zeroing” issue be remanded, to permit Commerce to reconsider and further explain its position. See id.

The DefendanWmtervenors — the Fresh Garlic Producers Association, Christopher Ranch, L.L.C., The Garlic Company, Valley Garlic, and Vessey and Company, Inc. (collectively, the “Domestic Producers”)— also oppose Xinboda’s motion and support the Government as to all four of Xinboda’s claims. See generally Defendant-Intervenors’ Response to Plaintiffs Rule 56.2 Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record at 2 (“Def.-Ints.’ Response Brief’).

Jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2006). For the reasons set forth below, Xinboda’s Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record must be granted.

I. Background

Dumping occurs when goods are imported into the United States and sold at a price lower than their “normal value,” resulting in material injury (or the threat of material injury) to the U.S. industry. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1677(34), 1677b(a); see also Union Steel v. United States, 713 F.3d 1101, 1103 (Fed.Cir.2013). The difference between the normal value of the goods and the U.S. price is the “dumping margin.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35). When normal value is compared to the U.S. price and dumping is found, anti-dumping duties equal to the dumping margin are imposed to offset the dumping. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673; see also Union Steel, 713 F.3d at 1103.

When the exporting country is a market economy country, normal value is typically calculated using either the price in the exporting market {i.e., the price in the “market” where the goods are produced) or the cost of production of the goods. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b. However, where — as here — the exporting country has a non-market economy, there is often concern that the factors of production used to produce the goods at issue are under state control and that market data therefore may not be reliable indicators of normal value. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A). In such eases, where the subject merchandise is exported from a non-market economy country and Commerce concludes that concerns about the sufficiency or reliability of the available data do not permit the normal value of the goods to be determined in the typical manner, Commerce “determinéis] the normal value of the subject merchandise on the basis of the value of the factors of production,” including “an amount for general expenses and profit plus the cost of containers, coverings, and other expenses.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(l); see generally Ningbo Dafa Chem. Fiber Co. v. United States, 580 F.3d 1247, 1250-51 (Fed.Cir.2009) (briefly summarizing “factors of production” methodology).

In certain circumstances, where Commerce finds that the available information on the value of factors of production is not adequate for purposes of determining the normal value of the subject merchandise pursuant to the agency’s standard surrogate “factors of production” methodology (described above), Commerce determines the surrogate value of an “intermediate input” instead. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(2). Under Commerce’s so-called “intermediate input methodology,” rather than valuing the various individual “upstream” factors of production that are used to produce an intermediate input, Commerce directly values the “downstream” intermediate input itself.

The antidumping statute requires Commerce to value factors of production “based on the best available information regarding the values of such factors” in one or more appropriate surrogate market economy countries. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(l). The statute further requires that all data must, “to the extent possible,” come from market economy countries that are both (1) “at a level of economic development comparable to that of the nonmarket economy country” at issue and (2) “significant producers of comparable merchandise.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4). In determining which data constitute the “best available information” for purposes of calculating surrogate values, Commerce seeks data that are “publicly available, product-specific, representative of a broad market average, tax-exclusive and contemporaneous with the [period of review].” Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Results of, Partial Rescission of, and Intent to Rescind, in Part, the 15th Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 75 Fed.Reg. 80,458, 80,463 (Dep’t Commerce Dec. 22, 2010) (“Preliminary Results”); see also Issues & Decision Memorandum at 11-12.

The underlying antidumping order in this case, which dates back to 1994, covers imports of fresh garlic from the PRC, including whole garlic bulbs and peeled garlic cloves (the products exported by Xinboda). See Antidumping Duty Order: Fresh Garlic From the People’s Republic of China, 59 Fed.Reg. 59,209, 59,209-10 (Dep’t Commerce Nov. 16, 1994). This action involves the fifteenth administrative review of that antidumping order, initiated in December 2009. See Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews and Request for Revocation in Part, 74 Fed.Reg. 68,229, 68,230-31 (Dep’t Commerce Dec. 23, 2009). The period of review is November 1, 2008 through October 31, 2009. See Final Results, 76 Fed.Reg. at 37,321. Commerce selected India as the primary surrogate country for purposes of this review (as it has in prior reviews), and used data from that country to calculate the surrogate values for all factors of production, with the sole exception of labor. See Preliminary Results, 75 Fed.Reg. at 80,462; Issues & Decision Memorandum at 12 (calculating surrogate values for whole raw garlic bulbs based on Indian data); id. at 17 (same as to water); id. at 20-21 (same as to surrogate financial ratios); id. at 28 (calculating surrogate wage rate based on data from eight countries, not including India).

In the course of the administrative review, Commerce compiled voluminous information concerning Xinboda and its operations, particularly the company’s exports of whole garlic bulbs and peeled garlic cloves from the PRC. Commerce similarly compiled detailed information on Zhenzhou Dadi Garlic Industry Co., Ltd. (“Dadi”), the affiliated processor/producer that supplied Xinboda with garlic products produced from raw garlic bulbs that Dadi purchased from local Chinese farmers. See Pl.’s Brief at 8, 22; Issues & Decision Memorandum at 19 (describing Dadi as “Xinboda’s supplier,” and “a non-integrated processor that purchases its raw garlic input (rather than growing it from seed)”). Dadi processed the whole raw garlic bulbs that it purchased — which had diameters of between 50 mm and 65 mm — into whole garlic bulbs and peeled garlic cloves for Xinboda, using relatively simple procedures involving principally manual labor. See generally Pl.’s Brief at 8-9, 22-23; Def.’s Response Brief at 3.

To produce whole fresh garlic, farmers deliver whole raw garlic bulbs to Dadi in large mesh bags sorted by the size of the garlic, as specified in the particular order(s) that Xinboda needs to fill. Pl.’s Brief at 8. Workers sitting at tables in a simple warehouse then rub off the outer skins of the whole raw garlic bulbs (to give the garlic a clean white appearance), cut or trim the roots and stems, place the bulbs into small mesh begs (typically holding three to five bulbs, depending on the customer), and affix the customer’s labels to seal the bags. Id. at 8, 22. Bags are then packed into cartons, ready for shipping. Id.

Peeled garlic cloves are similarly produced from whole garlic bulbs, which are also delivered in large mesh bags. PL’s Brief at 8, 22. The whole bulbs are run in bulk through a machine, to break the bulbs into individual whole cloves and to remove the skins. Id. Workers then hand sort the cloves at nearby tables in the warehouse, separating out cloves that are too small or that may be damaged or blemished. Id. at 9, 22. All cloves suitable for sale as “peeled garlic” are moved into a sterile environment, where they are washed, sorted, and dried, then packed directly into plastic jars, which are injected with a preservative gas and vacuum sealed. Id. at 9, 22-23. The jars are packed into cartons and remain in cold storage until they are transported by container truck to the port for export. Id. at 23. Despite the additional steps, the production of peeled garlic — like the production of whole garlic bulbs — is ultimately relatively simple and involves mostly manual labor. Id.

Xinboda’s administrative operations are modest as well, consisting of a small suite of rooms in a high-rise building, in addition to an administrative office in the provinces. See PL’s Brief at 23; PL’s Reply Brief at 6 n. 4. Xinboda’s sales process is similarly basic and straightforward. Xinboda does not develop or market its own brands and sells only a handful of products (i.e., garlic, onion shoots, and ginger) to its established customer base. PL’s Brief at 23. Its advertising and selling expenses are minimal. PL’s Reply Brief at 8.

Early in the course of the instant administrative review, Commerce concluded (as it had since the tenth review) that “garlic industry producers in the PRC do not generally track actual labor hours incurred for growing, tending, and harvesting activities and, thus, do not maintain appropriate records” which would allow Commerce to verify “the completeness and accuracy” of data reported for the numerous expenses incurred in growing and harvesting whole raw garlic bulbs. See Preliminary Results, 75 Fed.Reg. at 80,462. Lacking the documentation necessary to ascertain the costs of growing, tending, and harvesting the subject whole raw garlic, Commerce used its intermediate input methodology to value “growing” and “harvesting” factors of production, as it had since the tenth review. See Issues & Decision Memorandum at 11; see also id. at 11-28; Jinan Yipin Corp. v. United States, 35 CIT -, - & n. 9, 800 F.Supp.2d 1226, 1236 & n. 9 (2011) (“Jinan Yipin II ”) (summarizing agency determination to use “intermediate input” methodology to value raw garlic bulbs for first time, in tenth administrative review). Thus, in lieu of separately valuing each of the various individual growing and harvesting factors of production that are consumed in growing and harvesting a whole raw garlic bulb (ie., the leased land, garlic seed, water, pesticides, herbicides, fertilizer, plastic film, labor, and other “inputs” or commodities), Commerce instead sought to determine the value of the “intermediate input” — ie., the whole raw garlic bulb — at the “farm gate” (ie., before any “post-harvest” processing, and excluding operations such as sales, packing, and transportation). See Preliminary Results, 75 Fed.Reg. at 80,462-63; Jinan Yipin II, 35 CIT at - n. 38, 800 F.Supp.2d at 1257 n. 38 (quoting remand determination in which agency defined “farmgate” prices as prices for produce that goes “straight from the farm to the customer, without intermediary distributors”).

To value the whole raw garlic bulb input (ie., the “intermediate input”) at the “farm gate,” Commerce based its calculations in the Final Results on size-specific prices for garlic at the Azadpur APMC Market (located near Delhi and operated by the Azadpur Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee (“APMC”)), as published in the Azadpur APMC’s Market Information Bulletin. See Issues & Decision Memorandum at 12. Commerce rejected the other potential sources of data on the record— including garlic pricing information included in the financial statements of Garlico Industries Limited (“Garlico”), an Indian purchaser, processor, and trader of garlic, onions, and other vegetables and related products — because those other sources of data did not specify the physical characteristics of the garlic that was priced. See id. at 12-13.

Specifically, to value the whole raw garlic bulbs purchased by Dadi that had a diameter of greater than 55 mm, the Final Results relied on non-contemporaneous Azadpur APMC price data for garlic classified as “grade S.A.” (or “Super-A”), which Commerce then inflated to be contemporaneous with the dates of the period of review. See Preliminary Surrogate Value Memorandum at 4 (Pub.Doc. No. 121); Issues & Decision Memorandum at 12 (explaining Commerce decision to use full year of data for “S.A.”-grade garlic prices in Final Results, rather than three months of data used in the Preliminary Results); PL’s Brief at 9-10; Def.’s Response Brief at 4, 10. Notwithstanding the agency’s established and longstanding policy favoring contemporaneous data (ie., data from within the period of review), Commerce used non-contemporaneous data to value Xinboda’s larger-bulbed garlic because the Azadpur APMC Market ceased use of the “S.A.”-grade classification in February 2008. See Issues & Decision Memorandum at 13 (noting that “grade super-A prices have not been reported since February 2008”); id. at 11-12 (highlighting, in two different places, agency preference for contemporaneous data). To value the whole raw garlic bulbs purchased by Dadi that were somewhat smaller (with a diameter of between 50 mm and 55 mm), the Final Results averaged the non-contemporaneous but indexed Azadpur APMC data for “S.A.”-grade garlic (described above) together with contemporaneous Azadpur APMC data for “A”-grade garlic (ie., data for “A”-grade garlic from within the period of review). See Final Surrogate Value Memorandum at 1 (Pub.Doc. No. 177); PL’s Brief at 9-10; Def.’s Response Brief at 4,10.

To calculate the surrogate value for post-harvest labor costs, Commerce averaged industry-specific data on wages and earnings from a group of eight countries that Commerce deemed to be both “significant producers” of comparable merchandise and “economically comparable” to the PRC, and which had also reported data under one particular revision of an international standard. See Issues & Decision Memorandum at 25, 28. However, that group of eight countries did not include India, because — although India reported contemporaneous data under the prior revision of the international standard — India’s reporting had not used the particular revision on which Commerce relied. See id. at 27. Citing “concerns that the industry definitions may lack consistency between different ... revisions” of the standard, Commerce declined to include the Indian data in its calculations in the Final Results. See id.

Because valuing the various direct inputs that are used in producing subject merchandise does not capture certain items that must also be factored into prices — specifically, manufaeturing/factory overhead, selling, general and administrative expenses (“SG & A”), and profit— Commerce calculates surrogate values for those three items using ratios that it derives from the financial statements of one or more companies that produce “comparable merchandise” in the surrogate market economy country. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(l); 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(4); see generally Dorbest Ltd. v. United States, 604 F.3d 1363, 1368, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir.2010) (“Dorbest IV”). In the administrative review at issue here, Xinboda’s surrogate financial ratios were drawn from the unconsolidated financial statements of Tata Global Beverages Limited, an Indian company that grows, processes, and sells its own trademarked and heavily-branded and -marketed coffee and tea products, including individually-packaged “Tetley” tea bags as well as “Tata Teas” (a so-called “Super Brand” in India). See Issues & Decision Memorandum at 20-22; Pl.’s Brief at 31-33, 35-36; PL’s Reply Brief at 7-8.

Commerce cited two reasons for selecting the financial statements of Tata Global over the five other sets of financial statements on the record. First, Commerce concluded, based on its review of the other companies’ financial statements, that all but one had received subsidies that the agency had previously determined to be countervailable. See Issues & Decision Memorandum at 21 (stating that Limtex, REI Agro, and LT Foods received subsidies under programs found to be countervailable); id. at 22 (same as to ADF). In light of Commerce’s practice of “disregarding] financial statements where [the agency has] reason to suspect that the company has received actionable subsidies,” Commerce therefore disregarded the financial statements of four of the five companies. See id. at 20. As to the remaining company, Garlico (the only one of the six companies that actually purchased and processed garlic), Commerce concluded that its operations were not comparable, based on the agency’s determination that “the majority of Garlico’s products are described as ‘dehydrated’ or ‘powder,’ ” as well as the determination that Garlico “act[ed] as a trading company (rather than a food processor) on nearly one quarter of its sales.” Id. at 22; see also id. at 12-13 (noting that Garlico purchased raw garlic bulbs).

Finally, in calculating Xinboda’s weighted-average dumping margin, Commerce applied its controversial “zeroing” methodology, which the agency has since abandoned. See Issues & Decision Memorandum at 31-33; Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted-Average Dumping Margin and Assessment Rate in Certain Antidumping Duty Proceedings; Final Modification, 77 Fed.Reg. 8101 (Dep’t Commerce Feb. 14, 2012); see generally Union Steel, 713 F.3d at 1103-04 (summarizing practice of “zeroing”). Thus, in Commerce’s calculations in the Final Results, negative dumping margins (i e., margins of sales of merchandise found to have been sold at non-dumped prices) were given a value of zero, and only positive dumping margins (ie., margins for sales of merchandise sold at dumped prices) were aggregated. In other words, sales that were not found to have involved dumping were not used to offset sales that were found to have involved dumping. See Issues & Decision Memorandum at 33 (explaining that, where the price in an export transaction at issue in the review exceeded normal value, the amount by which the price exceeded normal value did not offset dumping found in other transactions).

Based on the methodologies, analyses, calculations, and data summarized above, Commerce assigned Xinboda a weighed-average dumping margin of $0.06 per kilogram in the Final Results. See Final Results, 76 Fed.Reg. at 37,326. This action ensued.

II. Standard of Review

In an action reviewing an anti-dumping determination by Commerce, the agency’s determination must be upheld except to the extent that it is found to be “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i); see also NMB Singapore Ltd. v. United States, 557 F.3d 1316, 1319 (Fed.Cir.2009). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla”; rather, it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)); see also Mittal Steel Point Lisas Ltd. v. United States, 548 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2008) (same).

Moreover, any evaluation of the substantiality of evidence “must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight,” including “contradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn.” Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 44 F.3d 978, 985 (Fed.Cir.1994) (quoting Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 487-88, 71 S.Ct. 456); see also Mittal Steel, 548 F.3d at 1380-81 (same). That said, the mere fact that it may be possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from the record does not prevent Commerce’s determination from being supported by substantial evidence. Am. Silicon Techs. v. United States, 261 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed.Cir.2001); see also Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966).

Finally, while Commerce must explain the bases for its decisions, “its explanations do not have to be perfect.” NMB Singapore, 557 F.3d at 1319-20. Nevertheless, “the path of Commerce’s decision must be reasonably discernable,” to support judicial review. Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983)); see generally 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(i)(3)(A) (requiring Commerce to “include in a final determination ... an explanation of the basis for its determination”).

III. Analysis

Xinboda challenges four aspects of the Final Results of the fifteenth administrative review. Xinboda first disputes Commerce’s calculation of the surrogate value for whole raw garlic bulbs. Xinboda contends that the data on which Commerce relied do not reflect “farm gate” prices for the “intermediate input” — whole raw garlic bulbs — that Commerce was supposed to value. Xinboda also protests Commerce’s use of non-contemporaneous data for “S.A.”-grade garlic. See generally PL’s Brief at 1-2, 8-22, 40; PL’s Reply Brief at 1-6. But see Dei’s Response Brief at 1, 6, 10-21; Def.-Ints.’ Response Brief at 2. Xinboda next challenges Commerce’s calculation of the surrogate wage rate. Specifically, Xinboda asserts that Commerce erred in using labor data from multiple countries, and should have relied on Indian data alone. Xinboda further argues that— even if it was permissible for Commerce to use data from multiple countries — Commerce failed to limit its “basket” of countries to those that were “significant producers” of comparable merchandise and also improperly excluded India based on the manner in which the country reported its data. See generally Pl.’s Brief at 2, 37-40; PL’s Reply Brief at 10-14. But see Def.’s Response Brief at 1, 6, 26-28; Def.Ints.’ Response Brief at 2. Xinboda similarly challenges Commerce’s calculation of surrogate financial ratios. According to Xinboda, Commerce’s justification for the financial statements that it selected is fundamentally flawed, and Commerce’s rejection of the financial statements that Xinboda favored was groundless. See generally PL’s Brief at 2, 22-36, 40; PL’s Reply Brief at 6-10. But see Def.’s Response Brief at 1, 6, 21-26; Def.-Ints.’ Response Brief at 2. As its fourth and final challenge to the Final Results, Xinboda contests Commerce’s application of the agency’s “zeroing” methodology in calculating Xinboda’s weighted-average dumping margin. See generally PL’s Brief at 1, 2-7, 40; PL’s Reply Brief at 14-15. But see Def.’s Response Brief at 1, 6, 29-30; Def.-Ints.’ Response Brief at 2.

Each of Xinboda’s arguments is analyzed in turn below.

A. Surrogate Value for Whole Raw Garlic Bulbs

As previously explained, in the administrative review at issue, rather than separately valuing each of the various individual “growing” and “harvesting” factors of production that are consumed in growing and harvesting whole raw garlic bulbs, Commerce instead employed its “intermediate input” methodology and sought to determine the value of the intermediate input itself — i.e., the whole raw garlic bulb — at the “farm gate.” See Issues & Decision Memorandum at 11; Def.’s Response Brief at 3; see generally section I, supra (explaining, inter alia, Commerce’s “intermediate input” methodology). Similarly, as it has in numerous other reviews, Commerce here relied upon price data from the Azadpur APMC Market to value the whole raw garlic bulbs. See Issues & Decision Memorandum at 11-12; see generally section I, supra.

In choosing the Azadpur APMC data over the other potential sources of surrogate value data on the record of this review, Commerce emphasized the fact that the Azadpur APMC data that it used in the Final Results included prices for various grades of garlic, including grades super-A (“S.A.”) and “A.” According to Commerce, “garlic bulb sizes that range from 55 mm and above are Grade Super-A, and garlic bulb sizes that range between 40 mm and 55 mm are Grade A and Grade Super-A.” Preliminary Surrogate Value Memorandum at 4; Issues & Decision Memorandum at 12; Preliminary Results, 75 Fed.Reg. at 80,463 (noting that definitions of grade “A” and grade “S.A.” garlic used by Commerce in this review were “Consistent with [Commerce’s] findings in the twelfth [administrative review]”).

Commerce found the Azadpur APMC data to be the “best available information” notwithstanding the fact that data on “S A.’’-grade garlic have not been reported since early February 2008 (approximately nine months before the beginning of the period of review in this case). See Issues & Decision Memorandum at 12-13. Commerce nevertheless concluded that, compared to the other data sources on the record, the Azadpur APMC prices that it chose to use were “much more similar to the inputs being valued and more accurately represented] a range of pricing during the [period of review] by providing size-specific pricing information.” Id. at 12-13.

The whole raw garlic bulbs that Dadi (Xinboda’s processor/producer) purchased for whole garlic production ranged from 50 to 65 mm, and from 50 to 55 mm for the production of peeled garlic. See PL’s Brief at 8; see also Def.’s Response Brief at 3. To value bulbs with a diameter of 55 mm or more, the Final Results relied on the Azadpur APMC data for “S.A.”-grade garlic for the period February 2007 through January 2008 (which Commerce inflated to the dates of the period of review using a garlic-specific wholesale price index). See Preliminary Surrogate Value Memorandum at 4; Issues & Decision Memorandum at 12 (explaining Commerce decision to use full year of data for “S.A.”-grade garlic prices in Final Results, rather than three months of data used in the Preliminary Results); PL’s Brief at 9-10; Def.’s Response Brief at 4, 10. To value garlic bulbs with a diameter of between 40 mm and 55 mm, the Final Results averaged the Azadpur APMC data for “S.A.”-grade garlic that is described above together with contemporaneous Azadpur APMC data for “A”-grade garlic (i.e., data for “A”-grade garlic from within the period of review). See Final Surrogate Value Memorandum at 1; PL’s Brief at 9-10; Def.’s Response Brief at 4, 10. The Final Results reflect values of 33.18 rupees per kilogram for “S.A.”-grade garlic, 23.52 rupees per kilogram for “A”-grade garlic, and 27.58 rupees per kilogram for “A”-and “S.A.”grades combined. See PL’s Brief at 10.

Xinboda challenges the Final Results’ reliance on the Azadpur APMC data principally on two grounds. See generally PL’s Brief at 1-2, 8-22, 40; PL’s Reply Brief at 4-6. Xinboda first argues that the Azadpur APMC price data reflect a product that is much closer to a finished “retail” product than the “intermediate input” that Commerce assertedly seeks to value in this review. According to Xinboda, the Azadpur APMC data thus are not even close to “farm gate” prices. See PL’s Brief at 9-10, 11-19, 21-22; PL’s Reply Brief at 5-6; see also id at 1-4. In addition, Xinboda contests Commerce’s use of Azadpur APMC data for “S.A.”-grade garlic from outside the period of review, arguing that garlic of the size and quality previously designated as “S.A.”-grade was subsumed into “A”grade garlic as of early February 2008. In other words, Xinboda maintains that the Azadpur APMC price data for “A”-grade garlic that is contemporaneous with the period of review include prices for garlic bulbs that previously would have been classified as grade “S.A.”. See PL’s Brief at 10,19-21; PL’s Reply Brief at 4-5.

Xinboda argues that, in light of its challenges to the Azadpur APMC data, “[t]he most accurate approach” would be to calculate the surrogate value for the intermediate input — whole raw garlic bulbs — using averaged garlic price data from the 2009-2010 financial statements of the Indian garlic processor and trader Garlico, which Xinboda placed on the administrative record. PL’s Brief at 15, 21; Xinboda Surrogate Value Submission at Exh. 40, Schedules 1.(5) & I.(e) (Pub.Doc. No. 133) (Garlico financial statements for 2009-2010); see generally PL’s Brief at 9-10, 15, 16, 18-19; PL’s Reply Brief at 3. Xinboda contends that “Garlico’s experience more nearly matches Xinboda’s experience in the purchase of garlic at farm gate prices.” PL’s Brief at 16; see also id at 18-19; PL’s Reply Brief at 3, 6. Alternatively, if Commerce continues to rely on Azadpur APMC data, Xinboda argues that — to calculate the surrogate value for the intermediate input, whole raw garlic bulbs, at the farm gate stage — the agency must use only fully-contemporaneous data, “commenc[ing] its valuation ... with the average of Grade A garlic,” then “deductfing] 70%” from that figure “[t]o account for transportation and handling costs, interstate fees, commissions, and other markups” (to render the figure representative of an intermediate input at a “farm gate” price). PL’s Brief at 21-22; see also id. at 15; PL’s Reply Brief at 6.

The Government maintains that “Commerce reasonably relied upon the [Azadpur] APMC Bulletin data for grades A and Super-A garlic, because they were the only data on the record specific to the size of Xinboda’s raw garlic bulb inputs,” and that Commerce properly rejected “the less specific [Garlico] data advocated by Xinboda.” Def.’s Response Brief at 6, 10; see generally id at 10-21. According to the Government, Xinboda’s challenges to Commerce’s use of the Azadpur APMC data are lacking in merit. See generally id. at 6, 10-21. Both the Government and the Domestic Producers thus contend that, as to the surrogate value for whole raw garlic bulbs, Commerce’s Final Results should be sustained. See id. at 6, 21; Def.-Ints.’ Response Brief at 2.

1. Whether the Final Results Reflect “Farm Gate” Prices for an “Intermediate Input”

Xinboda claims that, in the Final Results, Commerce mis-applied the agency’s intermediate input methodology. See Pl.’s Brief at 11; see generally id. at 9-10, 11-19; Pl.’s Reply Brief at 1-4, 5-6. Xinboda emphasizes that Commerce here was supposed to determine a surrogate value for raw garlic bulbs (as an “intermediate input,” at the “farm gate” stage), reflecting only the “growing, tending, and harvesting costs” associated with the garlic that Xinboda exported. See Pl.’s Brief at 11; see also Pl.’s Reply Brief at 6. Instead, according to Xinboda, the Azadpur APMC prices inherently reflect certain expenses that Xinboda also separately reported, resulting in double-counting. See PL’s Brief at 12. Similarly, Xinboda argues that the Azadpur APMC prices inherently reflect a wide range of significant expenses incurred beyond the farm gate. See id. at 9-10, 11, 12-16; PL’s Reply Brief at 1-3, 5-6. Xinboda thus charges that the Azadpur APMC price data used in Commerce’s Final Results are “laden with additional costs that Xinboda [did] not pay,” that the data do not “in any way represent ] the growing, tending, and harvesting costs of Xinboda’s suppliers,” and that the data therefore are not representative of the value of the intermediate input at issue — i.e., whole raw garlic bulbs — at the farm gate. PL’s Brief at 11, 13, 16; see also id. at 14, 18-19, 21; PL’s Reply Brief at 3, 5-6.

Xinboda argues, for example, that undisputed record evidence establishes that garlic arriving at the Azadpur APMC market is essentially already “fully processed for retail consumption,” with “a fresh white appearance” and with the outside layers of the garlic already removed and the long stems already cut. See PL’s Brief at 12 (citing Declaration of Xinboda Research Consultant, Exh. 1 ¶ 9 (Survey of Garlic Offerings — Azadpur Market, New Delhi) (Pub.Doc. No. 138)); see also PL’s Brief at 14. The Azadpur APMC prices thus must incorporate the costs of such processing. According to Xinboda, these same processes — peeling away the outside layers of the garlic and cutting the long stems — are processes that Dadi performed for Xinboda at Dadi’s own facility. See id. at 12. Xinboda further asserts that it (Xinboda) was required to report to Commerce the labor hours and electricity usage for those tasks, and that Commerce ultimately added the value of that labor and electricity — together with a proportional figure for overhead (“SG & A”) costs — to Commerce’s calculated surrogate value for raw garlic bulbs, i.e., the Azadpur APMC prices. See id. Xinboda thus concludes that, because it separately reported to Commerce the costs of removing the outer layers and long stems of the garlic, and because the expense of such processes are already effectively “embedded” in the Azadpur APMC price, such expenses are, in essence, being double-counted and the Azadpur APMC data do not truly reflect prices at the farm gate. See id.

Commerce’s Final Results largely ignore Xinboda’s point, stating only that “information on the record speaks to the similarities of garlic entering the Azadpur market and the garlic entering Xinboda’s processing facilities.” Issues & Decision Memorandum at 15; see also Defi’s Response Brief at 18. But it is no answer to say — as the Issues & Decision Memorandum does — that both the garlic delivered to Dadi and the garlic arriving at the Azadpur APMC market are “pre-sorted by grade” and packaged in “large mesh sacks.” See Issues & Decision Memorandum at 15. Those facts are not in dispute, but have no relevance to whether in fact Commerce’s use of the Azadpur APMC data effectively results in the double-counting of costs for processes such as the removal of garlic’s outer layers and long stems.

Xinboda similarly asserts that it was required to separately report to Commerce the distances and modes of transportation for transporting garlic from its suppliers to its own facility, and that Commerce ultimately added the value of that transportation to the agency’s surrogate value for whole raw garlic bulbs, ie., the Azadpur APMC prices. See Pl.’s Brief at 12. Xinboda argues, however, that the expenses of comparable transportation logically must already be reflected in the Azadpur APMC prices. See id. Xinboda thus contends that — much like the costs associated with processes such as the removal of garlic’s outer layers and long stems — these transportation costs too are basically being double-counted. See id. According to Xinboda, “[t]hese are ... costs that [Commerce] is well aware of and must subtract from the Azadpur market price.” Id. The Issues & Decision Memorandum is silent on this point.

More generally, Xinboda emphasizes that garlic arriving at the Azadpur APMC Market has been shipped for substantial distances, and that the expense of that transportation obviously must be embedded in the prices charged at the market. See PL’s Brief at 12-13,14,15,16, 21; PL’s Reply Brief at 5-6. Commerce itself acknowledges that “the Azadpur data ... used [by Commerce] in this proceeding represent millions of kilograms of garlic sold from at least eight Indian states.” Issues & Decision Memorandum at 12 (emphasis added). By definition, the transportation of garlic to market takes place beyond the farm gate, belying the assertion that the Azadpur APMC data reflect farm gate prices. See PL’s Brief at 13; PL’s Reply Brief at 5-6; see generally Jinan Yipin II, 35 CIT at -, 800 F.Supp.2d at 1268-71 (discussing evidence concerning costs associated with transportation of garlic to Azadpur APMC Market, noting that Azadpur APMC data there indicated that “at least some of the garlic reflected in [the] data was transported for substantial distances” (as much as 100 miles or more), and concluding that fact of such transportation “undermines Commerce’s claims that the Azadpur APMC data reflect the price of large-bulb Indian garlic at the ‘farm gate’ and that those data ... are representative of the ‘intermediate input’ at issue”).

Xinboda also highlights evidence indicating that the Azadpur APMC prices used in the Final Results include significant “downstream expenses,” such as sums paid to “middlemen” or “intermediaries” including “commission agents, wholesalers and retailers to cover transportation, loading, unloading, storage, overheads, profits, etc.” that are associated with sales at such markets — still more expenses that logically should not be included in a surrogate value for an intermediate input at the farm gate stage. See PL’s Brief at 13-14; see gener ally id. at 13-16, 21-22; Pl.’s Reply Brief at 3, 5-6. The Issues & Decision Memorandum inexplicably states that Xinboda failed to “placet] information on the record” regarding these “extra transportation and handling expenses.” Issues & Decision Memorandum at 15; see also Def.’s Response Brief at 18-19. Quite to the contrary, Xinboda mustered significant documentation to substantiate its claims.

As Xinboda notes, the administrative record in this matter includes the 2009-2010 Annual Report of the Indian Ministry of Agriculture’s Department of Agriculture & Cooperation (“AgriCoop”), which advises that the country’s market system has become increasingly “restrictive and monopolistic” over time, such that “produce is required to be channeled through regulated markets and licensed traders” (Le., the “intermediaries” to which Xinboda refers), resulting in “an enormous increase in the cost of marketing.” See PL’s Brief at 13-14 (quoting Xinboda Surrogate Value Submission at Exh. 35); see also id. at 10; PL’s Reply Brief at 3. Xinboda reasons that the expenses associated with the use of such intermediaries and such “enormous” marketing costs must, as a matter of logic, be included in the Azadpur APMC market prices. See id. at 3, 5-6; see also PL’s Brief at 16. But such expenses have no place in the price that Commerce uses to value raw garlic bulbs as an intermediate input at the farm gate stage for purposes of this administrative review.

Other record evidence to the same general effect includes an article authored by the Director of India’s National Academy of Agricultural Research Management (“NAARM”) stating that the supply chains for agricultural products such as onions, tomatoes, and garlic are “inefficient, dominated by intermediaries.” See PL’s Brief at 14 (citing Xinboda Surrogate Value Submission at Exh. 34); see also PL’s Reply Brief at 3. The Director of NAARM further explained that “[s]tudies have shown that nearly 60-80% of the price consumers pay goes to commission agents, wholesalers and retailers to cover transportation, loading, unloading, storage, overheads, profits, etc.” See PL’s Brief at 14 (citing Xinboda Surrogate Value Submission at Exh. 34); see also id. at 15, 21; PL’s Reply Brief at 3. Another similar article, by a senior agricultural economist from Credit Rating and Information Services of India (“Crisil”), underscores “[t]he difference between the farm gate and retail prices” of onions and other similar vegetables in India and attributes that mark-up to “exploitation] by intermediaries.” See PL’s Brief at 14 (citing Xinboda Surrogate Value Submission at Exh. 34).

Xinboda points out that the involvement of intermediaries in sales at facilities such as the Azadpur APMC Market and the existence of associated additional fees and expenses are borne out by the Domestic Producers’ own Market Research Report, on which both Commerce and the Domestic Producers so heavily rely. See PL’s Brief at 15-16. As Xinboda notes, the Domestic Producers’ initial (2003) Market Research Report clearly distinguishes among “farm level,” wholesale, and retail sales. See id. at 15; Market Research on Fresh Whole Garlic in India (June 2003) at 20-21 (Pub.Doc. No. 131) (“2003 Market Research Report”). Similarly, the October 2006 update to the Market Research Report states that an individual transporting produce out of a local APMC jurisdiction to a market such as the Azadpur APMC Market must pay a market fee to the local market at the local district’s exit checkpoint. See Pl.’s Brief at 15-16; Clarifications on Garlic Study (Oct. 2006) at 6 (Pub.Doc. No. 133) (“2006 Market Research Report Update”).

Xinboda cites the Garlico pricing data on the record as corroboration of Xinboda’s claims that the Azadpur APMC market prices reflect substantial expenses that Xinboda did not incur and which, moreover, should not be reflected in a surrogate value for whole raw garlic bulbs as an intermediate input at the farm gate. See Pl.’s Brief at 9-10, 15, 16, 18-19, 21; PL’s Reply Brief at 3, 6. According to Xinboda, “[djeducting the average 70% markup reported by [India’s National Academy of Agricultural Research Management] from the Grade A prices of garlic sold on the Azadpur [APMC] market during the [period of review] amounts to a farm gate price of 7.055 Rs/kg.” PL’s Brief at 15; see also id. at 21-22. Xinboda argues that this figure “comes very close to the average prices for raw garlic that Garlico paid” during the period of review, and thus constitutes further proof that the Azadpur APMC price data used in Commerce’s Final Results do not reflect farm gate prices for whole raw garlic bulbs, the intermediate input that Commerce sought to value. See id. at 15.

The Final Results fail even to acknowledge the evidence adduced by Xinboda (and outlined above), much less address it; and the Final Results brush off Xinboda’s concerns about additional fees and expenses embedded in the Azadpur APMC prices with the general proposition that Commerce “is not required to duplicate the exact experience of an exporter when calculating surrogate values.” Issues & Decision Memorandum at 14; see also Def.’s Response Brief at 17-18. As the Issues & Decision Memorandum further recognizes, however, Commerce is required to “select from among the available surrogate values those that permit the [agency] to calculate the most accurate dumping margin possible.” Issues & Decision Memorandum at 14. Further, as Jinan Yipin I emphasized, “when valuing an intermediate [input] in [a non-market economy] country case,” Commerce must “be mindful that ... it must find a surrogate representative of that intermediate product.” Zhengzhou Harmoni Spice Co. v. United States, 38 CIT 453, 472-73, 617 F.Supp.2d 1281, 1300 (2009) {“Jinan Yipin I ”). It is beyond cavil that, in a situation such as this, a surrogate value that reflects a level of trade that is beyond the farm gate and the intermediate input at issue cannot yield “the most accurate dumping margin possible.”

The record evidence that Xinboda has marshaled significantly undermines Commerce’s representation that the Azadpur APMC prices used in the Final Results reflect farm gate prices for whole raw garlic bulbs, the intermediate input in question. This matter therefore must be remanded to Commerce to permit the agency to analyze and respond to Xinboda’s arguments and evidence, and to reconsider the calculation of the surrogate value for whole raw garlic bulbs in light of those arguments and evidence (including, if necessary, making appropriate adjustments to the Azadpur APMC data in order to exclude specific costs or, alternatively, selecting another source of data).

2. Whether the Final Results Properly Relied on Non-Contemporaneous Data for Grade “S.A. ” Garlic

As explained above, to value the garlic that Dadi purchased that had a bulb diameter of 55 mm or more, the Final Results relied on Azadpur APMC data for “S.A.”grade garlic for the period February 2007 through January 2008 (which was then inflated to the dates of the period of review). See section I, supra. Similarly, to value the garlic that Dadi purchased that had a bulb diameter of between 50 mm and 55 mm, the Final Results combined the Azadpur APMC data for “S.A.”-grade garlic (described above) with contemporaneous Azadpur APMC data for “A”-grade garlic {ie., data for “A”-grade garlic from within the period of review). See id.

It is undisputed that the Azadpur APMC data for “S.A.”-grade garlic that Commerce used in the Final Results are not contemporaneous with the period of review. See Issues & Decision Memorandum at 12-13; Pl.’s Brief at 9; Def.’s Response Brief at 4. It is similarly undisputed that the Azadpur APMC Market Bulletin has not published prices for “S.A.” grade garlic since early February 2008. See Issues & Decision Memorandum at 13; PL’s Brief at 19; Def.’s Response Brief at 16.

What is squarely in dispute is whether, as Xinboda maintains, the Azadpur APMC price data for grade “A” garlic for the period of review at issue — ie., the contemporaneous data — include not only garlic with a bulb diameter of between 40 mm and 55 mm, but also garlic with a bulb diameter of 55 mm or more. In other words, what is squarely in dispute is whether grade “S.A.” garlic was, as Xinboda puts it, “subsumed” into grade “A” garlic as of February 2008. Thus, what is squarely in dispute is whether the Final Results’ use of Azadpur APMC data for “S.A.”-grade garlic not only was unnecessary, but, in fact, fundamentally distorted Commerce’s calculation of the surrogate value for whole raw garlic bulbs. PI.’s Brief at 10, 20-21; PL’s Reply Brief at 4; see generally Issues & Decision Memorandum at 13; PL’s Brief at 19-21; PL’s Reply Brief at 4-5; Def.’s Response Brief at 16-17.

In the Final Results, Commerce summarily dismissed Xinboda’s concerns, asserting that there is “no evidence ... on the record which clearly explains why grade super-A prices have not been reported since February 2008” and that the agency could not simply “assume that grade super-A prices have been subsumed under grade A prices.” See Issues & Decision Memorandum at 13; see also Def.’s Response Brief at 16-17. As Xinboda observes, however, it is of no real import why the Azadpur APMC Market ceased use of the “grade S.A.” classification. See PL’s Brief at 19-20. Whatever the reason, the fact remains that the “S.A.” classification apparently was no longer in use at the time of the subject period of review. Moreover, as Xinboda points out, uncontroverted record evidence means that Commerce need not “assume” anything concerning whether, in fact, garlic that previously would have been graded “S.A.” is now included within grade “A.” See id. Specifically, Xinboda’s research consultant attested on the record that Azadpur APMC Market vendors now sell garlic with bulb diameters as large as 65 mm under the classification grade “A.” See Declaration of Xinboda Research Consultant, Exh. 1 ¶¶ 5-6 (Survey of Garlic Offerings — Azadpur Market, New Delhi); see also PL’s Brief at 10, 19-20 (explaining, inter alia, that Xinboda research consultant visited the Azadpur APMC Market and surveyed all garlic vendors there); PL’s Reply Brief at 4-5.

The Final Results do not mention— much less refute — the report of Xinboda’s consultant. For its part, the Government seeks to minimize Xinboda’s evidence as the “self-serving statements of a researcher that Xinboda hired.” Def.’s Response Brief at 16. But the Government’s attempts to discredit the research consultant are both impermissible post hoc rationalization and ill-conceived. See Pl.’s Reply Brief at 4-5.

It is well-established that an agency determination cannot be sustained on the strength of a rationale supplied after the fact by litigation counsel. See Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962). As the Supreme Court has explained, “an agency’s action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 50, 103 S.Ct. 2856. Moreover, even if Commerce itself had questioned the report of Xinboda’s research consultant as “self-serving,” that objection nevertheless would have been unavailing. The same accusations of self-interest could be leveled (arguably with even greater force) at the Market Research Report, which was commissioned and placed on the record by the Domestic Producers and on which both Commerce and the Domestic Producers have so heavily relied (in this and numerous other administrative reviews). Cf. Jinan Yipin II, 35 CIT at -, 800 F.Supp.2d at 1258-63 (rejecting Chinese producers’ attempts to discount the 2003 Market Research Report as a “private market study commissioned by [the Domestic Producers], which is neither an official nor an objective source”). Here, there is nothing whatsoever on the record to impugn the overall credibility of Xinboda’s research consultant or to cast doubt on the reliability of the specific information that was supplied. Under these circumstances, it ill-behooves the Government to disparage the research consultant’s work as that of a mere “hired gun.”

In short, the existing evidence of record supports only one conclusion — that grade “S.A.” garlic was subsumed into grade “A” garlic as of February 2008. As such, Commerce’s use of the non-eontemporaneous prices for “S.A.”-grade garlic would have been both unnecessary and distortive. Specifically, if (as all record evidence indicates) the data for grade “A” garlic that were contemporaneous with the period of review included garlic with bulb diameters of up to 65 mm, there was no need for Commerce to use indexed non-contemporaneous data for grade “S.A.” garlic to value larger-bulbed garlic; the value of such larger-bulbed garlic would be already accounted for in the contemporaneous data for grade “A” garlic.

But, more importantly, if (as all record evidence indicates) the contemporaneous data for grade “A” garlic include garlic with bulb diameters of up to 65 mm, then it stands to reason that the Final Results must be distorted. For example, by valuing Dadi’s garlic with a bulb diameter of 50 mm to 55 mm using a combination of the indexed, non-contemporaneous data for “S.A.”-grade garlic together with the contemporaneous data for “A”-grade garlic (which, it now appears, already reflected values for garlic with a bulb diameter of up to 65 mm), Commerce presumably skewed the surrogate value toward Iarger-bulb (typically higher-value) garlic.

As noted above, in light of the significant problems with the Azadpur APMC data, Xinboda advocates use of the Garlico prices to calculate the surrogate value for whole raw garlic bulbs. See Pl.’s Brief at 16, 19, 21. In the alternative, if Commerce continues to rely on the Azadpur APMC data, and if (as all existing record evidence indicates) the contemporaneous data for grade “A” garlic include garlic with bulb diameters of up to 65 mm, then (as Xinboda notes) it would seem that Xinboda’s raw garlic bulb input should be valued based entirely on those contemporaneous data — with, of course, any adjustments that might be necessary to exclude expenses that should not be reflected in an “intermediate input” at the “farm gate.” See id. at 20-22; see also section III.A.1, supra (discussing apparent need for adjustments to Azadpur APMC data to ensure that calculated surrogate value re-fleets “intermediate input” at “farm gate” stage).

Accordingly, in the course of the remand to reconsider whether the surrogate value for raw garlic bulbs calculated in the Final Results included expenses that should have been excluded from the valuation of an intermediate input at the farm gate (discussed in section III.A.1 above), Commerce also shall consider the record evidence indicating that the contemporaneous Azadpur APMC data for grade “A” garlic include garlic with a bulb diameter of up to 65 mm and shall make any necessary revisions to its surrogate value calculations, including the use of another source of data, if appropriate.

B. Surrogate Wage Rate

As section I above explained, in non-market economy cases such as this, all data used to calculate surrogate values for factors of production must satisfy the two prongs of 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4); see gen erally section I, swpra. Specifically, the data must, to the extent possible, come from one or more market economy countries that are “at a level of economic development comparable to that of the non-market economy country” at issue — here, the PRC. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4)(A) (the “economic comparability” requirement). In addition, the data must, to the extent possible, come from one or more market economy countries that are “significant producers of comparable merchandise.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4)(B) (the “significant producer” requirement).

For factors of production other than labor, Commerce typically uses values from a single market economy country — known as the primary surrogate country (here, India) — that Commerce has determined to be both (a) economically comparable to the non-market economy country in question and (b) a significant producer of merchandise that is comparable to the merchandise at issue. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(2). However, in the past, Commerce treated the valuation of labor quite differently than other factors of production. See generally Dorbest IV, 604 F.3d at 1367-68.

Historically, Commerce valued the cost of labor in non-market economy country cases using “regression-based wage rates reflective of the observed relationship between wages and national income in market economy countries,” a methodology codified in the agency’s regulations at 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(3). See 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(3) (invalidated in Dorbest IV); see also Dorbest IV, 604 F.3d at 1368. Thus, between 1997 and 2010, in contrast to its treatment of other factors of production in non-market economy cases, Commerce calculated surrogate values for labor based on data from a broad “basket” of market economy countries, and did not limit itself to countries at a level of eeonomic development comparable to the non-market economy country in question.

The Court of Appeals’ 2010 decision in Dorbest TV fundamentally altered the landscape. See generally Dorbest IV, 604 F.3d at 1370-73. In that case, the Court of Appeals invalidated Commerce’s regulation providing for the valuation of labor using a multi-country regression analysis (i.e., 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(3)), holding that the regulation did not comply with the provisions of 19 U.S.C. § 1677(c)(4) requiring the agency to use data from economically comparable market economy countries that are significant producers of comparable merchandise. Id., 604 F.3d at 1366, 1370-73, 1377.

In response to the Court of Appeals’ ruling in Dorbest TV, Commerce abandoned the surrogate labor calculation methodology codified in its regulations and implemented an interim methodology. Under its interim methodology, Commerce calculated a surrogate value for labor by averaging wage data from countries that the agency found to be both “economically comparable” to the non-market economy country in question and “significant producers” of merchandise comparable to the merchandise at issue in a case. See Anti-dumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Non-Market Economies: Valuing the Factor of Production: Labor; Request for Comment, 76 Fed.Reg. 9544, 9544, 9546 (Dep’t Commerce Feb. 18, 2011) (“Interim Labor Methodology”). The agency later modified its interim methodology to limit averaging to industry-specific data. See id. at 9544. Under both the original and modified interim methodology, Commerce deemed all countries that exported comparable merchandise within a three-year period to be “significant producers.” See id. at 9546.

Commerce characterized its Interim Labor Methodology as the agency’s “attempt! ] to balance its desire for multiple data points with the statutory requirements that [factors of production] data be from countries that are both economically comparable and significant producers” of subject merchandise. See Antidumping Methodologies in Proceedings Involving Non-Market Economies: Valuing the Factor of Production: Labor, 76 Fed.Reg. 36,-092, 36,093 (Dep’t Commerce June 21, 2011) (“Revised Labor Methodology”). Although “the amount of available data was more constrained as a result of the [Court of Appeals’] Dorbest decision,” Commerce reasoned that the agency’s “industry-specific interim methodology still provided the best available wage rate because it allowed for multiple data points.” Id.

After the administrative review at issue here was initiated but before the Final Results issued, Shandong Rongxin ruled that Commerce’s inference that all countries exporting subject merchandise were “significant producers” was “wholly unsupported” and constituted an impermissible construction of 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(4). See Shandong Rongxin Import and Export Co. v. United States, 35 CIT -, -, 774 F.Supp.2d 1307, 1315-16 (2011). Based on its review of the matter, Commerce determined that any alternative definition for “significant producer” which would comply with Shandong Rongxin would greatly restrict the number of countries from which the agency could source labor data. See Revised Labor Methodology, 76 Fed.Reg. at 36,093. According to Commerce, “the base for an average wage calculation would be so limited that there would be little, if any, benefit to relying on an average of wages from multiple countries for purposes of minimizing the variability that occurs in wages across countries.” Id.

Ultimately, Commerce concluded — given both the Court of Appeals’ decision in Dorbest IV and the decision of this court in Shandong Rongxin — that “relying on multiple countries to calculate the wage rate [was] no longer the best approach” for determining the surrogate value of labor. See Revised Labor Methodology, 76 Fed.Reg. at 36,093. Under Commerce’s Revised Labor Methodology, announced in June 2011, Commerce now relies exclusively on industry-specific labor cost data from the primary surrogate country, which the Revised Labor Methodology describes as “the best approach for valuing the labor input in [non-market economy] antidumping duty proceedings.” See id. In releasing the Revised Labor Methodology, Commerce advised that “[in] ongoing [non-market economy] proceedings,” the agency would “consider on a case-by-case basis whether it is feasible to implement the new labor methodology within statutory deadlines.” See id. at 36,093; see also id. at 36,094 (stating that Revised Labor Methodology “will be applied to ongoing administrative [non-market economy] proceedings where the statutory deadlines permit”).

The Issues & Decision Memorandum in the instant review — dated June 20, 2011 (i.e., 10 days after the Revised Labor Methodology’s issuance on June 10, 2011, and one day before the revised methodology’s publication in the Federal Register)— reflects the use of Commerce’s modified interim methodology in calculating the surrogate value for labor. See Issues & Decision Memorandum (dated June 20, 2011); Final Results, 76 Fed.Reg. 37,321 (June 27, 2