Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge. In these related cases, Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 barring Defendants from implementing various provisions of North Carolina Session Law 2013-381 (“SL 2013-381”), an omnibus election-reform law. (Docs. 96 & 98 in case L13CV861; Docs. 108 & 110 in case 1-.13CV658; Docs. 112 & 114 in case L13CV660.) Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). (Doc. 94.) A trial on the merits is currently scheduled for July 2015. (Doc. 30 at 4.) Plaintiffs include the United States of America (the “United States”) in case 1:13CV861, the North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP and several organizations and individual plaintiffs (the “NAACP Plaintiffs”) in case 1:13CV658, and the League of Women Voters of North Carolina along with several organizations and individuals (the “League Plaintiffs”) in case 1:13CV660. Additionally, the court allowed a group of young voters and others (the “Intervenors”) to intervene in case 1:13CV660. (Doc. 62 in case 1:13CV660.) Considered together, Plaintiffs raise claims under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1973. (Doc. 1 in case 1:13CV861; Doc. 52 in case 1:13CV658; Docs. 1 & 63 in case 1:13CV660.) The United States also moves for the appointment of federal observers to monitor future elections in North Carolina pursuant to Section 3(a) of the VRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(a). (Doc. 97 at 75-77.) Finally, Plaintiffs move to exclude and strike the testimony of three of Defendants’ expert witnesses. (Docs. 146, 148, & 150.) Defendants are the State of North Carolina, Governor Patrick L. McCrory, the State Board of Elections (“SBOE”), and several State officials acting in their official capacities. They contend that Plaintiffs have not stated any claims for which relief can be granted under either the Constitution or the VRA and, in any event, have not established entitlement to preliminary relief. (Docs. 94, 95 & 126.) The court held a four-day evidentiary hearing and argument beginning July 7, 2014. The record is extensive. Throughout the proceedings, there was much debate over the policy merits of SL 2013-381 as an election law and the popularity and desirability of various voting mechanisms it affects. It is important to note that, while these have evoked strongly-held views, this is not the forum for resolving that aspect of the parties’ dispute; such considerations are matters for legislative bodies to address. The jurisdiction of this court is limited to addressing the legal challenges raised based on the evidence presented to the court. After careful consideration, the court concludes that Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings should be denied in its entirety. Plaintiffs’ complaints state plausible claims upon which relief can be granted and should be permitted to proceed in the litigation. However, a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy to be granted in this circuit only upon a “clear showing” of entitlement. After thorough review of the record, the court finds that as to two challenged provisions of SL 2013-381, Plaintiffs have not made a clear showing they are likely to succeed on the merits of the underlying legal claims. As to the remaining provisions, the court finds that even assuming Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits, they have not demonstrated they are likely to suffer irreparable harm — a necessary prerequisite for preliminary relief— before trial in the absence of an injunction. Consequently, the motions for preliminary injunction and the United States’ request for federal observers will be denied. This resolution renders the motions to exclude expert testimony moot. I. BACKGROUND A. Legislative History The North Carolina General Assembly began consideration of a voter identification (“voter ID”) requirement in March 2013. On March 12, the House Committee on Elections, chaired by Republican Representative David R. Lewis, held public hearings on voter ID. (See J.A. at 2388-92.) Over 70 citizens from a wide variety of organizations spoke before the committee. (Id.) The next day, the committee met and considered the testimony of five individuals representing a wide variety of organizations, including the Brennan Center for Justice and the Heritage Foundation. (See J.A. at 2393-2416.) One of the speakers was Allison Riggs, counsel of record for the League Plaintiffs in case 1:13CV660, who appeared on behalf of the Southern Coalition for Social Justice. (J.A. at 2394.) On April 3, the committee heard from Ion Sancho, the Supervisor of Elections for Leon County, Florida, who testified about Florida’s experience when it reduced early-voting days in advance of the 2012 general election. (J.A. at 2418, 2420-23.) The initial version of HB 589 was introduced in the House of Representatives on April 4. (J.A. at 2101-12.) The bill dealt almost exclusively with the implementation of a voter ID requirement beginning in 2016 in portions titled the “Voter Information Verification Act.” (J.A. at 2101-06, 2112.) On April 8, it passed “first reading” and was referred to the Committee on Elections. (J.A. at 2354.) The committee subsequently held another public hearing on April 10, whereupon over 70 citizens from across the political spectrum had the opportunity to speak. (J.A. at 2424-28.) It further debated the bill and added amendments at a meeting held on April 17. (J.A. at 2432-43.) The bill was also referred to the Committees on Finance and Appropriations. (J.A. at 2354, 2444-45.) HB 589 advanced, as amended, from the various House committees, and was debated on the House floor on April 24, 2013. (J.A. at 2354, 2446-51.) After three amendments were adopted and six others rejected, the bill passed “second reading” on a roll-call vote of 80-36. (J.A. at 2354, 2450.) The bill subsequently passed “third reading” immediately, on a vote of 81-36, and was passed by the House. (J.A. at 2450-51.) Five House Democrats joined all present Republicans in voting for the final voter ID bill (J.A. at 2366, 2573, 2581, 2592), but none of the black members of the House supported it (J.A. at 2655). Representative Rick Glazier, who strongly opposed the bill, testified at the preliminary injunction hearing in this case that he felt that “for a large bill,” HB 589 received up to this point “the best process possible” in the House, one he characterized as “excellent.” (Doc. 165 at 56-57.) HB 589 was received in the North Carolina Senate the next day, passed first reading, and was assigned to the Senate Rules Committee. (J.A. at 2354.) The committee took no immediate action on the bill. The parties do not dispute that the Senate believed at this stage that HB 589 would have to be submitted to the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) for “pre-clearance” under Section 5 of the VRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a), because many North Carolina counties were “covered jurisdictions” under that Section. However, at that time the United States Supreme Court was considering a challenge to the DOJ’s ability to enforce Section 5. On June 25, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Shelby County v. Holder, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 186 L.Ed.2d 651 (2013), declaring the formula used to determine the Section 5 covered jurisdictions, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b), to be unconstitutional. The next day, Senator Thomas Apodaca, Republican Chairman of the Rules Committee, publicly stated, “So, now we can go with the full bill.” (J.A. at 1831.) The contents of the “full bill” were not disclosed at the time. A meeting of the Rules Committee was subsequently scheduled for July 23. {See J.A. at 2452.) The night before the Rules Committee meeting, the new bill, now 57 pages in length, was posted for the members on the Rules Committee website. (J.A. at 183-84 (declaration of Sen. Josh Stein); Doc. 164 at 111-12 (testimony of Sen. Dan Blue); J.A. at 2129-85.) In addition to the voter ID provisions, HB 589 now included many additional provisions, including the following that are being challenged in this litigation: (1) the reduction of the period for so-called “early voting” from 17 to ten days; (2) the elimination of same-day registration (“SDR”), which permitted voters to register and then vote at the same time during the early-voting period; (3) the prohibition on the counting of provisional ballots cast outside of a voter’s correct voting precinct on Election Day (“out-of-precinct” ballots); (4) the expansion of allowable poll observers and voter challenges; (5) the elimination of the discretion of county boards of election (“CBOEs”) to keep the polls open an additional hour on Election Day in “extraordinary circumstances”; and (6) the elimination of “pre-registration” of 16- and 17-year-olds who will not be 18 by the next general election. The bill proposed that the voter ID requirement go into effect in 2016 but be implemented through a “soft rollout,” whereby voters would be advised at the polls in 2014 and 2015 of the law’s requirement that they will need a qualifying picture ID to vote beginning in 2016. At the committee meeting on July 23, Senator Apodaca allowed members of the public in attendance to speak for two minutes. (See Doc. 134-4 at 45-60.) Speakers included the League Plaintiffs’ counsel, Riggs, as well as Jamie Phillips, who represented the North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP. (Id. at 45-47, 57-58.) Although the majority of comments addressed the voter ID requirement, citizens also spoke in opposition to the other challenged provisions, including the elimination of SDR and pre-registration and reduction of early voting. Several opponents characterized the bill as an effort at voter suppression. (See, e.g., id. at 45 (Riggs: “voter suppression at its very worst”); id. at 57 (Phillips: “The fewer young people and minorities who vote, the better it seems in your minds. We get it. No one is being fooled.”).) After debate, the bill passed the committee and proceeded to the floor for second reading. (Id. at 80.) The following afternoon, on July 24, HB 589 was introduced on the floor of the full Senate. (Id. at 84.) During several hours of debate after the bill’s second reading, Democratic Senators introduced and discussed several proposed amendments. Most significantly, Senator Josh Stein introduced an amendment to require the CBOEs to offer the same number of aggregate hours of early voting as were offered in the last comparable election (whether presidential or off-year). (Id. at 125-26.) This could be accomplished, he proposed, by CBOEs offering more hours at present sites, or by opening more sites. (Id. at 130-31.) Senator Stein argued that the amendment would reduce, but not eliminate, the impact the reduction of early-voting days would have on all voters, including African-Americans. (Id. at 111.) Senator Robert Rucho, the Republican sponsor of HB 589, asked the Senate to support Senator Stein’s amendment (id. at 126), and it passed by a vote of 47 to 1 (id. at 131). The Senators also exchanged argument on many of the other challenged provisions, including voter ID, SDR, pre-registration, and the increase in allowable poll observers, as well as several provisions not at issue here (including the elimination of straight-ticket voting and reduction of various campaign-finance restrictions). (See generally id. at 148-223.) At the close of debate on July 24, Senator Apodaca objected to a third reading, effectively mandating that the debate of the bill be carried over into the next day. (Id. at 224.) On July 25, the Senate began its session with the third reading of amended HB 589. (Id. at 229.) Senator Rucho then offered a bipartisan amendment, which passed 46 to 0; it clarified the aggregate-hours amendment and permitted a county to obtain a waiver from the aggregate-hours requirement upon unanimous approval of both the CBOE and the SBOE. (Id. at 232-33, 236, 241.) Proponents and opponents of the bill debated both its provisions and the merits of various amendments over the next four hours, and the Senate accepted an amendment dealing with electioneering from Senator Dan Blue (Democrat). (Id. at 307-08.) Several Senators characterized the bill as voter suppression of minorities. (E.g., id. at 251-60 (Sen. Stein), 282-93 (Sen. Blue), & 293-99 (Sen. Robinson).) At the close of debate fourteen amendments had been considered, and the Senate voted in favor of HB 589 along party lines, sending the bill back to the House for concurrence, as amended. (Id. at 325.) Senator Martin Nesbitt (Democrat), although opposing the bill strongly, noted that “we’ve had a good and thorough debate on this bill over two days.” {Id. at 315.) With the end of the legislative session approaching, the House received the Senate’s version of HB 589 that night. (J.A. at 2355.) At the beginning of a two-hour floor session starting at 7:45 p.m., Representative Henry M. Michaux, Jr. (Democrat) moved that the House form a Committee of the Whole to consider the bill. (J.A. at 2507-08.) Representative Tim Moore opposed the motion on the grounds that “it is simply a waste of time” because such a committee “is the same as the full House,” which the bill was properly before at the moment. (J.A. at 2509.) The motion failed by a vote of 41 to 69. (J.A. at 2510.) Two amendments offered by opponents (Sen. Blue’s amendment of the date for electioneering; Sen. Rucho’s and Stein’s amendment altering several items, including the types of ID that can be presented for voting, and requiring the same number of hours of early voting) were adopted 109 to O. (J.A. at 2511-15.) The provisions of the new full bill were then reviewed. (J.A. at 2516-31.) Each member of the House Democratic caucus present — including four of the five members who voted for the House version in April — were granted time to speak in opposition to the bill. (J.A. at 2571-73, 2580-81, 2581-83, 2592-93; Doc. 165 at 64-65 (testimony of Rep. Glazier).) Among other things, opponents characterized the measure variously as voter suppression, partisan, and disproportionately affecting at 2561 (“[0]ur anger tonight is palpable. Passage of this bill is a political call to arms.”); 2563 (“the most pointedly, obviously politically partisan bill I’ve ever seen”); 2568 (“voter suppression”). On the Republican side, only Representative Lewis, the bill’s primary House sponsor, spoke in support of the amended bill. (J.A. at 2620-24.) He pointed out, among other things, that the bill does not bar Sunday voting, does not reduce overall hours of early voting, provides for free photo ID, and, in his opinion, strengthens the requirements for absentee voting. {Id.) Subsequently, the House voted— again along party lines — to concur in the Senate’s version of HB 589 at 10:39 p.m. (J.A. at 2369.) The bill was ratified the next day and presented to Governor McCrory on July 29. (J.A. at 2355.) The governor signed SL 2013-381 into law on August 12, 2013. {Id.) B. Procedural History Almost immediately after SL 2013-381 became law, two of the instant cases were filed in this court. The NAACP Plaintiffs filed a complaint challenging the voter ID requirement, elimination of SDR, reduction of early-voting days, prohibition on counting out-of-precinct provisional ballots, and the expansion of poll observers and ballot challengers under Section 2 of the VRA and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. (Doc. 1 in case 1:13CV658 ¶¶ 56-80, 82-119.) In an amended complaint, the NAACP Plaintiffs also challenge the elimination of pre-registration. (Doc. 52 ¶¶ 112, 130-32 in case 1:13CV658.) The League Plaintiffs initiated their case on the same day, challenging the elimination of SDR, prohibition on counting out-of-precinct ballots, elimination of the discretion of CBOEs to extend poll hours one hour on Election Day in “extraordinary circumstances,” and the reduction in early-voting days pursuant to both Section 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 1 in case 1:13CV660 at 27 (prayer for relief).) On September 30, 2013, the United States filed its complaint challenging the early voting, SDR, out-of-precinct voting, and voter ID provisions of SL 2013-381 under Section 2. (Doc. 1 in case 1:13CV861.) The Magistrate Judge consolidated the three cases for the purposes of scheduling and discovery on December 13, 2013. (Doc. 30.) On January 27, 2014, the court permitted a group of young voters and others to intervene as plaintiffs in case 1:13CV660 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b). (Doc. 62 in case 1:13CV660.) Intervenors’ complaint contends that the elimination of pre-registration, reduction in early voting, repeal of SDR, prohibition on counting out-of-precinct ballots, elimination of CBOE discretion to keep the polls open an extra hour on Election Day, and implementation of a voter ID requirement violate the Fourteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments. (Doc. 63 in case 1:13CV660.) Pursuant to the scheduling order (Doc. 91), Plaintiffs filed motions for a preliminary injunction on May 19, 2014. Combined, Plaintiffs seek to preliminarily enjoin SL 2013-381’s provisions regarding poll observers, challenges, and hours; its elimination of SDR, out-of-precinct provisional voting, and pre-registration; its cutback of early voting; and its “soft rollout” of the voter ID requirement. The United States seeks to preliminarily enjoin only the early voting, SDR, and out-of-precinct voting sections of the law. (Doc. 97.) On the same day, Defendants filed their motion for judgment on the pleadings, contending that Plaintiffs have failed to state viable legal claims. (Docs. 94 & 95.) The parties responded to the various motions on June 18 (Docs. 126, 129, & 135), and replies were filed on June 30 (Docs. 152, 153, & 155). Plaintiffs also moved to exclude three of Defendants’ experts. (Docs. 146,148, & 150.) During a four-day evidentiary hearing on the pending motions beginning July 7, 2014, Plaintiffs presented nine live lay witnesses, two live expert witnesses, and one witness by video deposition, while Defendants rested on the record, which contains many more depositions and extensive expert reports. The court then allowed a full day of legal argument, including argument by counsel representing Judicial Watch, Inc., Allied Educational Foundation, and Christina Gallegos-Merrill, whom the court permitted to appear as amici curiae. (Doc. 136.) Post-hearing, the court allowed the parties to file hundreds of pages of deposition designations as well as supplemental briefing on the issue of standing and exclusion of Defendants’ experts, bringing the total paper record in these cases to over 11,000 pages. The motions are now ripe for decision. Ordinarily, the court would address a dismissal motion before turning to motions based on the evidence. However, because the court has determined that Plaintiffs have stated claims on their pleadings and the legal claims must also be analyzed in the context of the evidence presented on the injunction motions, it makes sense to address the motions for preliminary relief first before addressing Defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion. Before reaching these topics, though, there is a threshold issue of Intervenors’ standing to challenge SL 2013-381’s elimination of pre-registration, to which the court now turns. II. STANDING OF INTERVENORS Intervenors are the only party challenging the repeal of pre-registration for 16- and 17-year-olds on Twenty-Sixth Amendment grounds. Because none of them is under the age of 18, their standing to assert that claim is not readily apparent. Although Defendants did not raise the question and no party addressed it in the original briefing, standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite, and the court has an independent obligation to ensure it. Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); Goldsmith v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 845 F.2d 61, 64 (4th Cir.1988). At the preliminary injunction hearing, the court directed Intervenors to brief their standing to challenge the elimination of pre-registration. Intervenors did so (Doc. 159), and Defendants have responded (Doc. 168). To establish standing, a party must demonstrate three elements: (1) an “injury in fact,” (2) a “causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,” and (3) a likelihood that the injury would be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Plaintiffs sufficiently allege a causal connection and a likelihood of redressability; at issue is whether In-tervenors have suffered an “actual or imminent” injury from the elimination of preregistration, creating a particularized “injury in fact.” Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. First, Intervenors contend that some of them are or will be imminently injured because they can no longer register voters through the pre-registration program following its repeal. (Doc. 159 at 3.) Defendants dispute that harm to an interest in registering voters can create legally cognizable injury and further assert that such harm is not present here because pre-registration—not registration—is at issue. (Doc. 168 at 4.) Preventing an individual from registering others to vote has been recognized as a legally sufficient injury for the purpose of standing. In Coalition for Sensible and Humane Solutions v. Wamser, 771 F.2d 395 (8th Cir.1985), an association dedicated to helping minority and low-income citizens register to vote sued the Board of Election Commissioners of St. Louis for refusing to allow their qualified volunteers to serve as deputy registration officials. The Eighth Circuit held that the association had standing to sue on behalf of its members because the Board of Election Commissioners injured individual association members “by preventing them from registering new voters.” Id. at 399. By contrast, in People Organized for Welfare and Employment Rights (P.O.W.E.R.) v. Thompson, 727 F.2d 167 (7th Cir.1984), an association dedicated to increasing political power of the poor and unemployed sued to compel the State to allow city registrars to conduct voter-registration drives in the waiting rooms of State social services offices. The Seventh Circuit found that the association lacked standing: P.O.W.E.R. in bringing this suit alleged only that its goal of improving the lot of the poor and the unemployed required for its fulfillment that the state make it easier for them to register. This might be a persuasive, basis for standing if P.O.W.E.R. had been trying to advance its goal by registering new voters itself. Anyone who prevented it from doing that would have injured it, just as the defendants in this case would have injured it if they had prevented it from going into waiting rooms and urging the people waiting there to register. But P.O.W.E.R. was never forbidden to do that, and never sought to do the actual registering of voters. Id. at 170 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Read together, Wamser and P.O.W.E.R. indicate that an individual or association would not have standing to compel Defendants to allow a third party to conduct voter-registration drives but suffers a cognizable injury if they prevent the litigant him- or herself from registering voters. Here, Intervenors allege and produced evidence that they pre-registered young voters in the past and would continue doing so had SL 2013-381 not eliminated that program. (Doc. 63 ¶ 10 in case 1:13CV660; Doc. 159-3 ¶¶ 5-6.) Although Defendants attempt to draw a distinction between registration and pre-registration, they fail to explain why any difference matters. Rather, pre-registration appears to be the functional equivalent of registration, except that 16- and 17-year-olds’ applications wait in a “hopper” to be processed by the State upon eligibility. (Doc. 167 at 184.) Furthermore, harm to an interest in registering voters is not the only civic harm courts have recognized as sufficient for standing. See Lerman v. Bd. of Elections in City of N.Y., 232 F.3d 135, 141-43 (2d Cir.2000) (finding harm to an individual’s interest in witnessing petition signatures legally cognizable). Based on the current allegations and evidence, Intervenors have sufficiently alleged standing to challenge the elimination of preregistration because they allege that SL 2013-381 directly injures their interest in registering 16- and 17-year-olds. Ordinarily, the standing inquiry would end here. However, Intervenors have moved to preliminarily enjoin the elimination of pre-registration, and whether they can demonstrate irreparable harm to justify an injunction depends in part on the scope of the harm they properly assert. So, the court must consider Intervenors’ alternative bases for standing to the extent they rely on other claims of harm. Intervenors contend that they will have to expend greater effort and resources to register young, 18-and-older voters because they were not pre-registered as 16- or 17-year-olds. (Doc. 159 at 4-5.) Defendants dispute this as a factual matter, arguing that there is no greater effort required to register an 18-year-old than a 16-year-old. (Doc. 168 at 6-7.) However, there may be reasons why registering 16- and 17-year-olds is more effective and less expensive than registering 18-year-olds, and at this stage in the litigation the court is bound to accept Inter-venors’ reasonable factual allegations as true. Therefore, to the extent that Inter-venors assert it takes greater effort to register young voters who otherwise would have been preregistered, they have alleged a direct, legally cognizable injury. However, to the extent they seek to ground their injury in loss of resources, relying on authority applicable to organizational plaintiffs and without any allegations or evidence of financial harm (Doc. 159 at 4-5), that argument fails. Intervenors also contend that they will have to expend greater effort and resources to get out the vote because SL 2013-381 discourages young voters from voting. (Id. at 5-6.) Intervenors are not a political party or any other kind of organization, however. Intervenors, as individuals, do not have a direct, particularized interest in the outcome of an election like that of the Democratic Party, see Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951 (7th Cir.2007), aff'd by 553 U.S. 181, 128 S.Ct. 1610, 170 L.Ed.2d 574 (2008), or of an association of candidates challenging incumbents, see Common Cause v. Bolger, 512 F.Supp. 26, 30 (D.D.C.1980). They have no budget from which resources must now be diverted to deal with the effects of SL 2013-381. Even assuming the truth of all Intervenors’ factual allegations and evidence, therefore, they do not have standing on this ground. Next Intervenors assert that SL 2013-381 harms their interest in living in a State that does not discriminate against young voters. (Doc. 159 at 6-7.) Under such a theory, any one of North Carolina’s approximately 6.5 million registered voters would have standing to challenge the elimination of pre-registration. That injury is not sufficiently particularized to confer standing, and Intervenors’ argument and authority do not indicate otherwise. Cf. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993) (discussing the merits of the Fourteenth Amendment claim, not standing). Intervenors’ attempt to ground standing in their support of a particular Democratic candidate similarly fails. (Doc. 159 at 7-9.) Finally, Intervenors contend that they are “not require[d]” to “have standing independent from the original [Plaintiffs.” (Id. at 9.) While that may be true as to claims that other Plaintiffs actually assert, here, no other Plaintiff has challenged the elimination of pre-registration as to all young voters. The circuits appear to be split on whether the jurisdictional rule requiring a party to have standing to bring a claim can be dispensed with entirely for Intervenors injecting new claims into the litigation. Cf. Shaw v. Hunt, 154 F.3d 161 (4th Cir.1998) (permissive Intervenors not required to have standing where they adopted plaintiffs’ complaint and asserted no new claim); S.E.C. v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 460, 60 S.Ct. 1044, 84 L.Ed. 1293 (1940) (interve-nor had “a sufficient interest in the maintenance of its statutory authority and the performance of its public duties to entitle it through intervention to prevent [bankruptcy] reorganizations”); King v. Christie, 981 F.Supp.2d 296, 307 (D.N.J.2013) (noting circuit split on the question of whether an intervenor must have standing). Intervenors cite no Fourth Circuit case addressing the issue, nor has the court found one. Because Intervenors fail to allege any different harm should its position be correct, the court need not decide this issue at this stage; and, in light of the lack of Fourth Circuit precedent, the court declines to do so. For these reasons, therefore, the court finds that Intervenors have alleged sufficient harm to their interest in registering 16- and 17-year-olds to provide standing at this stage, but have not properly asserted any broader harm than that. III. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MOTIONS A. Preliminary Injunction Standard and General Principles Issuance of a preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy involving the exercise of a very far-reaching power, which is to be applied only in the limited circumstances which clearly demand it.” Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir.2013) (en banc) (quoting Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 811 (4th Cir.1991)); Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 24, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). This is true even when the asserted injury is a violation of the Constitution or the VRA. See, e.g., Centro Tepeyac, 722 F.3d at 187 (First Amendment claim); Perry-Bey v. City of Norfolk, 679 F.Supp.2d 655, 662 (E.D.Va.2010) (VRA claim). To demonstrate entitlement to preliminary relief, Plaintiffs must make a “clear showing” that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue; (3) the balance of the equities tips in their favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S at 20, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365; Dewhurst v. Century Aluminum Co., 649 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir.2011). All four requirements must be satisfied in order for relief to be granted. Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir.2009), vacated on other grounds by 559 U.S. 1089, 130 S.Ct. 2371, 176 L.Ed.2d 764 (2010). It is not enough that a plaintiff show a grave or serious question for litigation; he must make a “clear” demonstration he will “likely” succeed on the merits. Id. at 346-47. The denial of a constitutional right, such as the right to vote, constitutes irreparable harm. Ross v. Meese, 818 F.2d 1132, 1135 (4th Cir.1987); United States v. Berks Cnty., 250 F.Supp.2d 525, 540 (E.D.Pa.2003). Because a trial on the merits is scheduled in these cases for July 2015, Plaintiffs and Intervenors must therefore make a clear showing that they will be irreparably harmed in connection with the November 2014 general election — the only scheduled election between now and the trial date. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the right to vote is fundamental and preservative of all other rights in our republic. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886)). The Constitution’s Elections Clause reserves to the States the general power to regulate “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,” subject to laws passed by Congress. U.S. Const, art. I § 4 cl. 1. “Common sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government must play an active role in structuring elections; ‘as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.’ ” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974)). The State’s power to regulate elections is subject to limits imposed by the Constitution, including the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, and federal law. Here, Plaintiffs challenge several provisions of SL 2013-381, individually and cumulatively. The statute contains a sever-ability provision that would allow the court to enjoin portions without striking it wholesale. Thus, the court will examine the challenged provisions with this in mind. B. SDR In 2007, the General Assembly passed legislation permitting SDR at early-voting sites, which the governor signed into law effective October 9, 2007. The law provided that “an individual who is qualified to register to vote may register in person and then vote at [an early-voting] site in the person’s county of residence during the period for [early] voting provided under [Section] 163-227.2.” 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 253, § 1 (codified at N.C. GemStat. § 163-82.6A(a) (2008)). The law required a prospective voter to complete a voter-registration form and produce a document to prove his or her current name and address. Id. (codified at N.C. GemStat. § 163-82.6A(b) (2008)). If the person elected to vote immediately, he or she could “vote a retrievable absentee ballot as provided in [Section] 163-227.2 immediately after registering.” Id. (codified at N.C. Gen.Stat. § 163-82.6A(c) (2008)). Within two business days, both the CBOE and SBOE were required to verify the voter’s driver’s license or social security number, update the database, proceed to verify the voter’s proper address, and count the vote unless it was determined that the voter was not qualified to vote. Id. (codified at N.C. Gen.Stat. § 163-82.6A(d) (2008)). SL 2013-381 repealed the SDR provisions. Now, to be eligible to vote in any primary or general election, a voter must comply with preexisting law that requires that the registration be postmarked at least 25 days before Election Day or, if delivered in person or via fax or scanned document, received by the CBOE at a time established by the board. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 163 — 82.6(c)(1)—(2). All Plaintiffs, including Intervenors, move to preliminarily enjoin SL 2013-381’s elimination of SDR for the November 2014 election. Plaintiffs rely on four distinct legal theories: (1) racially discriminatory results under Section 2 of the VRA; (2) racially discriminatory intent under Section 2 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments; (3) undue burden on the right to vote of all voters under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (4) unlawful denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of age under the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. Each basis will be addressed in turn. 1. Section 2 “results” Section 2 of the original VRA provided that “[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976). In City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980), the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs were required to show discriminatory intent in order to prevail on a Section 2 claim. In response to Bolden, Congress amended the VRA to clarify that Section 2 plaintiffs need only show that a particular voting practice “results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a); see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986) (“Congress substantially revised § 2 to make clear that a violation could be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone and to establish as the relevant legal standard the ‘results test,’ applied by this Court in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973), and by other federal courts before.”) Consequently, a Section 2 violation may be proven either by showing discriminatory results or discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Garza v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 766 (9th Cir.1990); Brown v. Detzner, 895 F.Supp.2d 1236, 1244 (M.D.Fla.2012); United States v. Charleston Cnty., 316 F.Supp.2d 268, 272 n. 3 (D.S.C.2003). Section 2(b) now provides: A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). “The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47, 106 S.Ct. 2752. The Gingles Court noted that the Senate Judiciary Committee’s majority Report that accompanied the amendment provided several factors that may be probative in establishing a Section 2 violation: 1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; 2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized; 3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; 4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process; 5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; 6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; 7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part of plaintiffs’ evidence to establish a violation are: whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group, whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous. Id. at 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (quoting S.Rep. No. 97-417, pp. 28-29, 97th Cong. 2nd Sess. 28 (1982), 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-207). As other courts have noted, these factors were clearly designed with redistricting and other “vote-dilution” cases in mind. See Brown, 895 F.Supp.2d at 1245 n. 13; Miss. State Chapter, Operation Push v. Allain, 674 F.Supp. 1245, 1263 (N.D.Miss.1987), aff'd sub nom. Miss. State Chapter, Operation Push, Inc. v. Mabus, 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir.1991); see also Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L.Rev. 689, 709 (2006) (“The legislative history of the 1982 amendments, however, provides little guidance on how Section 2 should apply to practices resulting in the disproportionate denial of minority votes.”). In contrast, claims challenging voting procedures that disproportionately affect minority voters are referred to as “vote-denial” cases. See, e.g., Brown, 895 F.Supp.2d at 1244-45 (“Vote denial occurs when a state employs a standard, practice, or procedure that results in the denial of the right to vote on account of race.” (quoting Johnson v. Governor of State of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1227 n. 26 (11th Cir.2005) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted))). Vote-denial claims under Section 2 have thus far been relatively rare, perhaps due in part to the fact that since 1965, many jurisdictions — including many North Carolina counties — were under federal control and barred from enacting any new voting procedure without first obtaining “pre-clearance” under Section 5 of the VRA from the DOJ or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a). Under Section 5, the covered jurisdiction was required to show that the new provision would not “lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 478, 117 S.Ct. 1491, 137 L.Ed.2d 730 (1997) (quoting Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141, 96 S.Ct. 1357, 47 L.Ed.2d 629 (1976)). The Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Shelby County, declaring the formula used to determine the “covered jurisdictions” under Section 5 to be unconstitutional, relieved several States, counties, and townships of the burden of submitting their voting changes to federal authorities to be precleared. As a result, very few appellate cases have considered vote-denial claims under Section 2. See, e.g., Irby v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that black voters could not establish Virginia’s choice to appoint, rather than elect, school board members violated Section 2 because there was no evidence the admitted disparity between black and white school board members had been caused by the appointive system); Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia, 28 F.3d 306, 312-14 (3d Cir.1994) (holding that State statute removing voters who did not vote in the last two federal elections from the registration rolls did not violate Section 2 because its disparate impact on minorities was not caused by the statute, but rather “because [individual voters] do not vote, and do not take the opportunity of voting in the next election or requesting reinstatement”); Smith v. Salt River Project Agrie. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 595-96 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that a special utility district’s decision to limit the right to vote in the district to property owners was not a Section 2 violation because, even though the requirement disproportionately affected minorities, there was no causal connection between the decision and a discriminatory result). These cases indicate that “a bare statistical showing of disproportionate impact on a racial minority does not satisfy the § 2 ‘results’ inquiry.” Smith, 109 F.3d at 595 (emphasis in original). However, few cases attempt to set out the proper provide some guidance. In Brown, the Middle District of Florida denied the plaintiffs’ motion to preliminarily enjoin a Florida law that reduced the number of days of early voting from between 12 and 14 days to eight days, leaving each county discretion to offer between 48 and 96 hours of early voting (after 96 had been required under the old law). 895 F.Supp.2d at 1239. After considering evidence that Florida’s largest counties (as well as the State’s five covered counties under Section 5) would offer the maximum number of hours of early voting, the district court found that the plaintiffs’ claim was not likely to succeed on the merits. The court stated the Section 2 inquiry as “whether, based on an objective analysis of the totality of the circumstances, the application of the [statute] will act to exclude African American voters from meaningful access to the polls, on account of race.” Id. at 1249-50 (internal quotation marks omitted). Despite accepting the findings of experts that the changes would disproportionately impact black voters, see id. at 1251, the court found that “[b]ecause [the new statute] allows early voting during non-working hours, as well as voting during the weekend, including one Sunday, voting times which are important to African American voters, as well as to [get-out-the-vote] efforts, the Court cannot find that [it] denies equal access to the polls.” Id. at 1255. In doing so, the court emphasized that it was not comparing the old law to the new one, because that retrogression standard applies only in a Section 5 proceeding. In Frank v. Walker, — F.Supp.3d —, 2014 WL 1775432 (E.D.Wis. Apr. 29, 2014), the court permanently enjoined enforcement of Wisconsin’s voter ID law. Drawing from Gingles—although declining to apply the Gingles factors, which the court viewed as applicable only in the vote-dilution context — the court held that Section 2 plaintiffs “must show that the disproportionate impact results from the interaction of the voting practice with the effects of past or present discrimination and is not merely a product of chance.” Id. at —, at *31. After concluding that black voters disproportionately lacked IDs, the court found that the ID requirement interacted with historical conditions of discrimination in housing, employment, and other areas to cause an additional barrier to be placed in the path of black voters. Id. at - - -, at *32-33. Thus, the voter ID provision violated Section 2. The Brown court’s formulation accurately captures the Section 2 results inquiry: whether the current electoral law interacts with historical discrimination and social conditions to cause black voters to have unequal access to the polls. Plaintiffs contend that North Carolina’s lack of SDR interacts with its history of official discrimination and present conditions to cause a discriminatory result. Plaintiffs’ expert testimony demonstrates that black citizens of North Carolina currently lag behind whites in several key socioeconomic indicators, including education, employment, income, access to transportation, and residential stability. They also presented unrebutted testimony that black North Carolinians have used SDR at a higher rate than whites in the three federal elections during which SDR was offered. North Carolina also has an unfortunate history of official discrimination in voting and other areas that dates back to the Nation’s founding. See, e.g., Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F.Supp. 345, 359-61 (E.D.N.C.1984), aff'd in part and rev’d in part by Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986); (see also J.A. at 1036-92 (report of Dr. Lorraine C. Minnite).). This experience affects the perceptions and realities of black North Carolinians to this day. Simply put, in light of the historical struggle for African-Americans’ voting rights, North Carolinians have reason to be wary of changes to voting laws. Plaintiffs’ historical evidence in these cases focuses largely on racial discrimination that occurred between a quarter of a century to over a century ago. However, as the Supreme Court recently stated, “history did not end in 1965.” Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2628. In the period between the enactment of the VRA and 2013, “voting tests were abolished, disparities in voter registration and turnout due to race were erased, and African-Americans attained political office in record-numbers.” Id. The record reflects such progress in North Carolina, too. Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Barry C. Burden, indicates that black North Carolinians have reached “parity” with whites in turnout for presidential elections. (J.A. at 1100.) And Dr. Charles Stewart III concludes that “[t]he registration rate of African-Americans has surged in North Carolina since 2000, to the point that the registration rate of African Americans now exceeds that of whites,” a development he characterizes as “significant.” (J.A. at 800.) Plaintiffs’ experts attribute these increases to the candidacy of President Barack Obama as well as to North Carolina’s election law changes since 2000. {See J.A. at 1100 (report of Dr. Burden); 1193 (report of Dr. J. Morgan Kousser).) In addition, Dr. Burden notes, blacks in North Carolina have been elected to political office at levels that now “approach[] parity with their prevalence in the electorate.” (J.A. at 1107.) In examining the totality of the circumstances, therefore, the court views all evidence in context, giving it due weight, but also being careful to acknowledge that “[p]ast discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn governmental action that is not in itself unlawful.” Bolden, 446 U.S. at 74, 100 S.Ct. 1490. Plaintiffs rely on Operation Push. There, the plaintiffs challenged Mississippi’s system of maintaining, for some municipalities, a system of “dual registration” that required a person to register in two different locations to be eligible to vote in municipal elections as well as county, state, and federal elections. 674 F.Supp. at 1249-50. It was admitted that the practice was initially enacted in 1890 as part of a plan to disenfranchise black voters, but the court did not address whether it was being maintained for a discriminatory purpose in the 1980s. Id. at 1251-52. The district court nevertheless enjoined the requirement after a searching examination of what it considered to be the relevant Gin-gles factors: (1) history of discrimination, (2) socioeconomic results of discrimination, (3) the extent that black citizens have been elected to public office, (4) lack of responsiveness among elected officials to the black community, and (5) the tenuousness of the State’s interest. Id. at 1263-68. The present cases are distinguishable in important respects, however. The Mississippi system had led to a large disparity in registration between black and white voters, and the court found that the valid registration rate for whites remained approximately 25 percentage points above that for blacks. Id. at 1254. Thus, the discriminatory results of the lingering dual-registration system were clear — fewer black than white Mississippians were able to register to vote over a long period, magnifying the effect of the system. Also, the dual-registration system had been in effect to varying degrees for almost 100 years, propagating its effects even further, and the court found that the challenged statutes did not advance or relate rationally to any substantial or legitimate governmental interest. Id. at 1260-61. In fact, at the time of the decision Mississippi was the only State maintaining such a dual-registration scheme. Id. at 1252. Finally, Operation Push was decided in 1987, not long after Mississippi had engaged in official disenfranchisement of black would-be voters. Here, voting-age blacks in North Carolina maintain a higher current registration rate than whites, black registration rates continued to make significant increases in the seven years before the adoption of SDR (J.A. at 804, Table 2 (noting an increase of black registered voters from 988,134 to 1,116,818 in the period from 2000 to 2006)), and SDR existed for only three federal election cycles (six years) before it was repealed by SL 2013-381. Additionally, the high registration rate of black North Carolinians — 95.3%, some 7.5 percentage points above that of whites — suggests strongly that black voters will not have unequal access to the polls. Plaintiffs point to Dr. Stewart’s conclusion that SL 2013-381 would have affected 3% of the 2012 African-American registrants if it had then been in effect. (J.A. at 789.) From this, Plaintiffs predict that without SDR, North Carolina will experience a similar reduction in black registrants. But this prediction appears to ignore important considerations. Particularly, Plaintiffs have not shown that African-American voters in 2012 lacked — or more importantly, that they currently lack — an equal opportunity to easily register to vote otherwise. For example, under current law, every State resident can register to vote by mail. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 163-82.6(a) (“The county board of elections shall accept any form described in [N.C. GemStat. § ]163 — 82.3 if the applicant submits the form by mail, facsimile transmission, transmission of a scanned document, or in person.”). Thus, those with transportation, economic, or other challenges need not physically appear to register. Cf. Operation Push, 674 F.Supp. at 1250-52 (describing Mississippi law that initially prevented all registration outside of the office of the county registrar). Certain State agencies are also required to offer voter registration services. Such agencies include departments of social services and public health, disability services agencies (vocational rehabilitation offices, departments of services for the blind, for the deaf, and for mental health), the North Carolina Employment Security Commission, and, under certain circumstances, the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”), pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 163-82. 19 & 163-82. 20. (Doc. 126-1 ¶ 10.) In response to questioning at the hearing, no Plaintiff demonstrated how these various other options failed to provide an equal opportunity to any black voter who otherwise wished to use SDR. {See, e.g., Doc. 167 at 135-40 (acknowledging that these other avenues mean that “many people who are of lower socioeconomic status have an opportunity to register to vote elsewhere”). In addition, State law permits any individual, group, or organization — such as the get-out-the-vote (“GOTV”) efforts conducted by some Plaintiffs — to conduct a voter registration drive, without any special training, pursuant to SBOE-published guidelines and with materials the SBOE and CBOEs provide. (Doc. 126-1 ¶ 11.) Finally, under SL 2013-381, a voter who has moved within the county can still update his or her registration during early voting (i.e., after the 25-day registration cut-off). N.C. Gen.Stat. § 163-82.6A(e). That voters preferred to use SDR over these methods does not mean that without SDR voters lack equal opportunity. Furthermore, because Section 2 does not incorporate a “retrogression” standard, the logical conclusion of Plaintiffs’ argument would have rendered North Carolina in violation of the VRA before adoption of SDR simply for not having adopted it. Yet, neither the United States nor the private Plaintiffs have ever taken the position that a jurisdiction was in violation of Section 2 simply for failing to offer SDR. Indeed, “[extending Section 2 that far could have dramatic and far-reaching effects,” Irby, 889 F.2d at 1358, placing the laws of at least 36 other states which do not offer SDR in jeopardy of being in violation of Section 2. The district court in Brown recognized this inherent difficulty in Plaintiffs’ argument in the context of the early-voting reduction, where the court stated: Consider the fact that many states do not engage in any form of early voting. Following Plaintiffs’ theory to its next logical step, it would seem that if a state with a higher percentage of registered African-American voters than Florida did not implement an early voting program a Section 2 violation would occur because African-American voters in that state would have less of an opportunity to vote than voters in Florida. It would also follow that a Section 2 violation could occur in Florida if a state with a lower percentage of African-American voters employed an early voting system ... that lasts three weeks instead of the two week system currently used in Florida. This simply cannot be the standard for establishing a Section 2 violation. Brown, 895 F.Supp.2d at 1254 (quoting Jacksonville Coal. for Voter Protection v. Hood, 351 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1335-36 (M.D.Fla.2004)). Rather, the court clarified, it “must consider whether the State of Florida, having decided to allow early voting, has adopted early voting procedures that provide equal access to the polls for all voters in Florida.” Id. at 1254-55 (emphasis in original). Similarly here, the court is not concerned with whether the elimination of SDR will “worsen the position of minority voters in comparison to the preexisting voting standard, practice, or procedure,” id. at 1251 (internal quotation marks omitted) — a Section 5 inquiry, but whether North Carolina’s existing voting scheme (without SDR) interacts with past discrimination and present conditions to cause a discriminatory result. Moreover, in the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”), Congress explicitly sanctioned a State’s power to set a registration cut-off of 30 days before an election. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(a)(1). As this statute was passed 11 years after the amendment to Section 2, it is difficult to conclude that Congress intended that a State’s adoption of a registration cut-off before Election Day would constitute a violation of Section 2. See United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64, 61 S.Ct. 102, 85 L.Ed. 40 (1940) (concluding that “all acts in pari materia are to be taken together, as if they were one law,” and thus that “[t]he later act can therefore be regarded as a legislative interpretation of the earlier act in the sense that it aids in ascertaining the meaning of the words as used in their contemporary setting” (internal citations omitted)); cf. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1230 (concluding that Section 2 did not prohibit enforcement of felon-disenfranchisement provisions in part because such laws are explicitly sanctioned by the Fourteenth Amendment). Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Defen-' dants’ stated policy underlying elimination of SDR is tenuous, noting that supporters expressed concern for providing “integrity of the voting process” to ensure that votes “be protected and not negated by fraud.” (J.A. at 2516-17.) To be sure, a freestanding claim of “electoral integrity does not operate as an all-purpose justification flexible enough to embrace any burden.” McLaughlin v. N.C. Bd. of Elections, 65 F.3d 1215, 1228 (4th Cir.1995) (quoting Republican Party of Ark. v. Faulkner Cnty., 49 F.3d 1289, 1299 (8th Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)). But here there is more in the legislative record. During the Senate Rules Committee debate on the challenged SDR provision, Senator Rucho contended: There’s no way and there’s no simple way to validate. What we’re trying to do is give the Board of Elections an opportunity to do their job correctly, validate those individuals and be sure that the election is above board. (Doc. 134-4 at 45.) Later, during the second reading, he added: It also allows time for — to verify voters’ information by repealing same day registration and which will ensure accuracy. It’s been a challenge for the Board of Elections to be able to identify and validate everyone that has come there on the basis of one-day registration.... (Id. at 87.) Defendants have presented evidence in support of this interest. Plaintiffs witness, Gary Bartlett (SBOE Executive Director from 1993 to 2013), acknowledged at the hearing that under SDR, CBOEs sometimes lacked sufficient time to verify registrants under State law. (Doc. 165 at 166.) As a consequence, over a thousand ballots were counted in recent elections by voters who were not (or could not be) properly verified. (Doc. 165 at 148-66;