Citations
- 105 F. Supp. 3d 981
Full opinion text
ORDER RE MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND MOTIONS TO TRANSFER
Re: Docket Nos. 281, 283, 285, 286
JOSEPH C. SPERO, United States Chief Magistrate Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs in this putative class action are former Minor League baseball players who assert claims under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and California, Florida, Arizona, North Carolina and New York wage and hour laws against the Office of the Commissioner of Baseball doing business as Major League Baseball (“MLB”) and its thirty member franchises. Presently before the Court are two sets of motions challenging personal jurisdiction and venue.
With respect. to personal jurisdiction, two motions to dismiss have been filed in this action (the “Motions to Dismiss”). First, ten of the MLB Clubs named ; as Defendants in the Complaint — Atlanta National League Baseball Club, Inc., Boston Red- Sox Baseball Club L.P., -Chicago White Sox, Ltd., -Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., Inc., Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., L.P., Detroit Tigers, Inc., New York Yankees Partnership, The Phillies, Pittsburgh Associates, L.P., Tampa Bay Rays Baseball, Ltd., and Washington Nationals Baseball Club, LLC (“Proskauer PJ Defendants”) bring a Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Amended Complaint as Against Certain Defendants for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, Docket No. 281 (“Proskauer Motion to Dismiss”). Second, Defendant Baltimore Orioles Limited Partnership and Baltimore Orioles, Inc. (collectively, “Baltimore Orioles”) join in the Proskauer Motion to Dismiss and also bring a Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violations of Federal and State Wage and Hour Laws Against the Baltimore Orioles Limited Partnership and Baltimore Orioles, Inc., Docket No. 285 (“Baltimore Orioles Motion to Dismiss”). -The Court refers collectively to the Defendants who seek dismissal on the basis of lack of personal jurisdiction as the “Personal Jurisdiction Defendants.”
Similarly, two motions seeking transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) have been filed (“the Transfer Motions”). First, all of the Defendants except the Baltimore Orioles (“Proskauer Transfer Defendants”) bring a Motion to Transfer Action to Middle District of Florida, Docket No. 283 (“Proskauer Transfer Motion”). Second, the Baltimore Orioles join in the Pros-kauer Transfer Motion and also bring a Motion to Transfer Case to the Middle District of Florida Filed by Defendants Baltimore Orioles, Inc. and Baltimore Orioles Limited Partnership (“Baltimore Orioles Transfer Motion”). In these motions, Defendants ask that the entire case be transferred to the Middle District of Florida.
All of the Motions came on for hearing on Friday, February 13, 2015 at 2:00 p.m. Following the Motion hearing, the Court gave Plaintiffs leave to file a proposed amended complaint that included additional named Plaintiffs to address possible defects with respect to personal jurisdiction over the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants. The Court further instructed Plaintiffs to file a supplemental brief addressing the “arising out of’ requirement for specific jurisdiction on a team-by-team 'basis. Plaintiffs have filed a Proposed Second Consolidated Amended Complaint (“SCAC”) adding name Plaintiffs, as well as the supplemental brief requested by the Court; the Baltimore Orioles and ■ the Proskauer PJ Defendants have filed a brief in response in which they assert that Plaintiffs still cannot establish the. existence of personal jurisdiction as to the teams that challenge jurisdiction.
For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Proskaur Motion to Dismiss and GRANTS the Baltimore Orioles’ Motion to Dismiss. The Court DENIES the Transfer Motions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of Major League Baseball
MLB is an unincorporated association whose members are the thirty MLB Clubs named as defendants in this action. SCAC, ¶ 62. Each MLB Club is affiliated with several Minor League teams, organized into “classes” roughly reflecting the skill levels of the players. Id., ¶ 169. Although some Minor League teams are directly owned by an MLB Club, most Minor League teams are independently owned and operated pursuant to Player Development Contracts (“PDCs”), agreements by which a' Minor League club agrees to “affiliate” itself with an MLB Club .for a-certain time period. Id., ¶ 171.
MLB teams employ a small number of players who play at the highest level, the Major Leaguers. Id.,' ¶ 146. They also employ a larger number of Minor Leag-uers, who the teams acquire through either an amateur draft or free agency. Id., ¶¶ 147,150. The Minor Leaguers begin at the “Rookie” level and then, ideally, advance to higher levels (Class-A, Advanced Class-A, Double-A and Triple-A), potentially leading to the major leagues. Id., ¶ 169. Many Minor Leaguers do not advance past Class-A. Id.
MLB operates a scouting service known as the Major League Baseball Scouting Bureau (“Scouting Bureau”) that evaluates amateur players on behalf of all the Defendants. Id., ¶ 163. MLB owners created the centralized service in 1974, and it operates under the umbrella of the Office of' the Commissioner. Id. The Scouting Bureau hosts tryouts for amateur players seeking to enter the industry, and its scouts attend amateur games throughout the country and in Latin America to develop reports on amateur players. Id.
MLB' rules require that all teams use the same uniform player contract (“UPC”) when signing players. Id., ¶ 164. Under the UPC, players receive a salary during the championship season, which lasts approximately five months. Id., ¶¶ 182-83. They are not compensated during the remainder of the year. Id., ¶ 183. The UPC imposes “duties and obligations” that “continue in full force throughout the calendar year,” however. Id. Thus, during the off-season, players are required to participate in spring training (lasting approximately one month) and sometimes in extended spring training and instructional leagues as well. Id., ¶¶ 185-86. Players are also required to maintain “first-class” conditioning throughout the year. Id., ¶ 187.
B. Summary of Plaintiffs’ Claims
Plaintiffs are former and current Minor League baseball players who allege that they were paid “illegally low wages during the championship season, no overtime wages, and no wages for work performed outside the championship season.” Id., ¶¶ 19-61, 189. Defendants are the Office of the Commissioner of Baseball and MLB’s thirty member franchises. Id., ¶¶ 62-102. Plaintiffs assert twenty state law wage and hour claims on behalf of a number of putative classes (including a California class) under Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id., ¶¶ 103-27. In particular, Plaintiffs assert eight claims under California la\y, two claims under Florida law, three claims under Arizona law, three claims under North Carolina law, four claims under New York law, three claims under Pennsylvania law, three claims under Maryland law and three claims under Oregon law. They also assert two claims under the FLSA on behalf of themselves and all persons similarly situated since three years before filing of the action. Id., ¶ 128.
III. MOTIONS TO DISMISS
A. Motions
1. Proskauer PJ Defendants
The Proskauer PJ Defendants are ten MLB Clubs that contend they are not subject to personal jurisdiction in California. Proskauer Motion to Dismiss at 1. According to these defendants, they “do not have any Minor League affiliates based in California or that play games in California, and do not have any operations whatsoever in California.” Id. at 4 (citing Dkt. No. 115-1 (“Heller Decl.”) at ¶ 8; Dkt No. 115-2 (“Steward Decl.”) at ¶ 8; Dkt No. 115-3 (“Znidarsic Decl.”) at ¶ 8; Dkt. No. 115-4 (“Corvino Decl.”) at ¶8; Dkt No. 115-5 (“Westhoff Decl.”) at ¶ 8; Dkt. No. 115-6 (“Trost Decl.”) at ¶ 8; Dkt No. 115-7 (“Strouse Decl.”) at ¶8; Dkt No. 115-8 (“Stroh Decl.”) at ¶ 8; Dkt. No. 115-9 (“Higgins Decl.”) at ¶ 8; Dkt. No. 115-10 (“Jones Decl.”) at ¶ 8)). They assert that their primary connection with California is that “their Major League Baseball Clubs occasionally play baseball games against other California-based Major League Clubs in California.” Id. (citing Heller Decl. at ¶ 7; Steward Decl. at ¶ 7; Znidar-sic Decl. at ¶7; Corvino Decl. at ¶ 7; Westhoff Decl. at ¶ 7; Trost Decl. at ¶ 7; Strouse Deck at ¶7; Stroh Decl. at ¶7; Higgins Decl. at ¶ 7; Jones Decl. at ¶ 7). In particular, the Proskauer PJ Defendants represent that aside from “sporadic travel to California by individual employees and a small number of California-based employees,” they travel to California to play Major League baseball games only one and three times per year and those trips are relatively short, ranging in duration from two to ten days per trip. Id. (citing Declaration Of Elise M. Bloom In Support Of Motion To Dismiss The Consolidated Amended Complaint As To Certain Defendants For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction (“Bloom Jurisdiction Decl.”), Ex. A-J (Moving Defendants’ Supplemental Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 2)).
The Proskauer PJ Defendants further state that they “are not licensed to do business in California; are incorporated in or organized under the laws of states other than California; maintain their principal places of business outside of California; and do not own or rent property, maintain bank accounts, or have a designated agent in the State of California.” Id. at 5 (citing Heller Decl. at ¶¶2-6; Steward Decl. at ¶¶ 2-6; Znidarsic Deck at ¶¶ 2-6; Corvino Deck at ¶¶ 2-6; Westhoff Deck at ¶¶ 2-6; Trost Deck at ¶¶2-6; Strouse Deck at ¶¶ 2-6; Stroh Deck at ¶¶ 2-6; Higgins Deck at ¶¶ 2-6; Jones Deck at ¶¶ 2-6) (emphasis in original). Nor do they “receive any income from tickets, concessions, parking or similar items for regular season games played as a visiting Club in California,” the Proskauer PJ Defendants contend. Id. (citing Bloom Jurisdiction Deck, Ex. K (Defendant MLB’s Supplemental Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 6); id., Exs. A-J (Moving Defendants’ Supplemental Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 10)).
The Proskauer PJ Defendants assert that exercise of personal jurisdiction in California is not consistent with due process and California’s long-arm statute, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 410.10, because they do not have sufficient minimum contacts with California to comport with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at 6-7 (citing Walden v. Fiore, — U.S. -, -, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1121, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014); Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir.2011); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). In particular, the Pros-kauer PJ Defendants argue that they are not subject to personal jurisdiction under the doctrines of either general or specific jurisdiction. Id.
The Proskauer PJ Defendants argue that the theory of general jurisdiction applies only if their “affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Id. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, — U.S.-,-, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011) (quotations and citations omitted)). This is a high standard, they assert, requiring that the contacts of a defendant corporation “approximate physical presence” in the state. Id. at 7-8 (citing Brand v. Menlove Dodge, 796 F.2d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir.1986); Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir.2000)). They argue that merely “engaging in commerce with residents of the forum state is not in and of itself the kind of activity that approximates physical presence within the state’s borders.” Id. at 8 (quoting Bancroft & Masters, Inc., 223 F.3d at 1086 (internal quotations omitted)). They also point to the Supreme Court’s recent statement that “it would be the ‘exceptional case’ where ‘a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.’ ” Id. (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, — U.S. -,-, 134 S.Ct. 746, 761, n. 19, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014)).
In light of these stringent requirements, the Proskauer PJ Defendants argue, their limited contacts with California related to the occasional major league games that are played here are insufficient to show that they are “at home” in California or to support general jurisdiction. Id. at 8. Further, the Proskauer PJ Defendants assert, the fact that MLB does not challenge personal jurisdiction in California has no bearing on the analysis because the exercise of personal jurisdiction over an unincorporated association is not a basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over its non-resident members. Id. at 9 (citing Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 284 F.Supp.2d 204 (D.Mass.2003)). Nor can the contacts of other (non-moving) member Clubs be imputed to the Proskauer PJ Defendants, they assert. -Id. They point to the Supreme Court’s holding in Daimler that a foreign corporation may not be subjected to a court’s general jurisdiction based on the contacts of its in-state subsidiary, which the Proskauer PJ Defendants assert amounts to a rejection of'the Ninth Circuit’s “expansive view of agency principles” in the context of personal jurisdiction. Id. (citing 134 S.Ct. at 759-60). .According to the Proskauer PJ Defendants, the reasoning of Daimler compels the conclusion that “simply because [the Pros-kauer PJ] Defendants are members of an unincorporated association some of whose members are California residents, does not mean that the foreign Clubs are ‘at home’ in California for all purposes.” Id. at 10.
The Proskauer PJ Defendants further assert that case law specifically addressing personal jurisdiction in the context of sports teams supports the same conclusion. Id. at 10-11 (citing Davis v. Billick, Case No. 301CV1964D, 2002 WL 1398560, at *6 (N.D.Tex. June 26, 2002); Manton v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 493 F.Supp. 496, 496-98 (N.D.Ga.1980); Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 785 F.Supp. 1076, 1081 (D.R.I.1992); Evans v. Boston Red Sox, Case No. 13-00262 SOM BMK, 2013 WL. 6147675, at *4-5, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166307, at *10-12 (D.Haw. Nov. 22, 2013); Donatelli v. Nat’l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459 (1st Cir.1990)).
Nor do communications with California residents support a finding of general jurisdiction, the Proskauer PJ Defendants contend. Id. at 11 (citing Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1331 (9th. Cir.1984); SRE-Cheaptrips, Inc. v. Media Synergy Grp., LLC, Case No. 09-cv-00622-S-EJL, 2010 WL 1913589, at *2 (D.Id. May 12, 2010); MMCA Grp., Ltd. v. Hewlett-Packard, Co., Case No. 06-cv-7067 MMC (EMC), 2007 WL 1342586, at *5 (N.D.Cal. May 8, 2007)).. Even to the extent such communications might be evidence that players who reside in California performed work during the offseason, they argue, this evidence would not support a finding of general jurisdiction because it is well-established that such unilateral activities, based on those players’ choice to live in California, cannot give rise to general jurisdiction. Id. at 11-12 (citing McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 816-17 (9th Cir.1988); Hall v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 651 F.Supp. 335, 339 (D.Kan.1987)). Finally, the Proskauer PJ Defendants argue that intermittent travel to California by their employees is not sufficient to support general jurisdiction. Id. at 12-14 (citing A.C.K Sports, Inc. v. Doug Wilson Enters., Inc., 661 F.Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y.1987); Collyard v. Washington Capitals, 477 F.Supp. 1247, 1250, n. 3 (D.Minn.1979); Munchak Corp. v. Riko Enterprises, Inc., 368 F.Supp. 1366, 1374 (M.D.N.C.1973); Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1490 (9th Cir.1993); Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech., Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012, 1018 (Fed.Cir.2009); Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l., Inc., 45 F.Supp.2d 777, 781 (N.D.Cal.1998), reversed on other grounds, 223 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir.2000); Vice v. Woodline USA, Inc., Case No. C 10-04103 CW, 2011 WL 207936, at *2-3, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8014, at *6-7 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 21, 2011); Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., Case No. 11-cv-03505 CRB, 2012 WL 1309179, at *11 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 16, 2012)).
The Proskauer PJ Defendants also argue that the Court lacks specific jurisdiction over them, Id. at 14. According to the Proskauer PJ Defendants, to establish specific jurisdiction Plaintiffs must satisfy the Ninth Circuit’s three-part test, which requires that they demonstrate the following:
(i) the nonresident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or residents thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections. of its laws; (ii) the Named Plaintiffs’ claims must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (iii) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e., it must be reasonable.
Id. (citing Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir.2008)). In the class action context, they assert,’ “courts may not consider a defendant’s contacts with unnamed putative class members residing in the forum state when considéring specific jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Ambriz v. Coca Cola, Case No. 13-cv-03539-JST, 2014 WL 296159 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 27, 2014)). The Proskauer PJ Defendants contend Plaintiffs fail to meet any of the three requirements for specific jurisdiction. Id.
■ With respect to the first part of the test, which requires either “purposeful availment” or “purposeful direction,” the Pros-kauer PJ Defendants argue that there is no evidence of “purposeful availment” because they have not “performed some type of affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the transaction of business within the forum-state.” Id. at 14-15 (quoting Sinatra v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir.1988)). The “purposeful direction” requirement, which is the one .that applies to cases like this one, involving wage-and-hour claims, also is not met, the Proskauer PJ Defendants assert. Id. at 15 (citing Enriquez v. Interstate Group, LLC, Case No. 11-cv-05155 YGR, 2012 WL 3800801, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 31, 2012); Holliday v. Lifestyle Lift, Inc., Case No. 09-cv-4995 RS, 2010 WL 3910143, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 5, 2010)).
Purposeful direction, according to the Proskauer PJ Defendants, requires that “Defendants must have: (1) committed an intentional act that was; (2) expressly aimed at the forum state and which; (3) caused harm that Defendants knew was likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Id. (quoting Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 803 (9th Cir.2004)). Even assuming the first and third requirements are met, the express aiming requirement is not, the Proskauer PJ Defendants assert.. Id. at 15-17. In particular, any contacts the Proskauer PJ Defendants may have with Minor League players in California are “simply a function of where the players chose to live in the offseason” and are not the result of any intentional conduct on the part of the Proskauer PJ Defendants. Id. at 16-17 (citing Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1123; Slepian v. Guerin, 172 F.3d 58, 1999 WL 109676 (9th Cir.1999) (unpublished disposition); Novak v. NanoLogix, Inc., Case No. 13-cv-01971 EJD, 2014 WL 991119, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Mar.. 11, 2014); SRE-Cheaptrips, Inc., 2010 WL 1913589 at *4; Hall, 651 F.Supp. at 339).
-The Proskauer PJ Defendants argue that the second part of the specific jurisdiction test is not satisfied because Plaintiffs’ claims do not arise out of or relate to the Proskauer PJ Defendants’ forum-related activities. Id. at 17-18. This requirement, they contend, is satisfied only if the plaintiffs’ claims “would have- arisen but for the defendants’ contacts with California.” Id. (citing Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 924-25 (9th Cir.2001)). That requirement is not satisfied here, they argue, because none of the Plaintiff Minor League players “worked for the [Pros-kauer PJ Defendants] or their Minor League affiliates in California ... [and], even though the Defendants’ Major League players worked in California while playing Major League Baseball games, neither these players — nor the time they spent playing Major League games — are the subject of this action.” Id. at 17 (citing Thomas P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Producción de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir.1980)). Nor do Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the Pros-kauer PJ Defendants’ “other insubstantial contacts with California,” as they have not “ ‘directed’ their activities to California any more than any other state, and they do not — and cannot — claim that ‘but for’ the [Proskauer PJ Defendants’] contacts with California, their alleged injuries would not have occurred.” Id. at 18 (citing SRE-Cheaptrips, Inc., 2010 WL 1913589 at *7).
Finally, the third requirement for specific jurisdiction, that exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable, also is not met, the Proskauer PJ Defendants assert. Id. at 18-20. In determining whether this requirement is met, they contend, courts consider the following seven factors:
(1) the extent of the defendant’s purposeful interjection into the forum state’s affairs; (2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the sov- ■ ereignty of the defendant’s state; (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiffs’ interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an alternative forum.
Id. (citing CE Distrib., LLC. v. New Sensor Corp., 380 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir.2004)). According to the Proskauer PJ Defendants, these'factors weigh in favor of finding that exercise of personal jurisdiction over them is not reasonable. Id.
The Proskauer PJ Defendants contend the first factor favors their position because, for the reasons discussed above, their contacts with California do not amount to “purposeful interjection” and they have not sought the protection of California’s laws. Id. at 19. They argue that the second factor, the burden of defending in California, is substantial “because it would require each Club’s representatives and employees to travel out-of-state to litigate claims that did not arise here.” Id. The Proskauer PJ Defendants concede the third factor is neutral, but assert the fourth factor favors their position because “California does not have a compelling interest in adjudicating the dispute where the conduct at issue did not take place within its borders.” Id. (citing Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. British-Am. Ins. Co., 828 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir.1987)). The fifth factor, efficiency of the forum, turns primarily on where witnesses and evidence are likely to be located and weighs “heavily in favor of dismissal,” the Proskauer PJ Defendants assert, because “the evidence related to the Moving Defendants’ Minor League operations exists exclusively outside of California.” Id. (citing Core-Vent Corp., 11 F.3d at 1489). Further, they argue, “[ljitigating Plaintiffs’ claims against the Moving Defendants in California would be demonstrably inconvenient because out-of-state witnesses would be required to travel here to testify about events which occurred outside of California.” Id. The Proskauer PJ Defendants note that the sixth factor, which looks to the convenience and effectiveness of relief in the forum, is “not of paramount importance.” Id. at 20 (citing Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1116 (9th Cir.2002)). They suggest, however, that it favors their position because “only six out of the 34 Named Plaintiffs reside in this State.” Id. The seventh factor also favors the Proskauer PJ Defendants, they assert, because the plaintiff has the burden of proving the unavailability of an alternative forum and Plaintiffs cannot do so here. Id. In particular, according to the Pros-kauer PJ Defendants, each of them is subject to general jurisdiction in the state where it has its principal placg of business and all of them are also subject to specific jurisdiction in Florida, where the claims arose. Id. Considered together, the Pros-kauer PJ Defendants assert, the seven factors discussed above demonstrate that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them by this Court is not reasonable. Id.
2. Baltimore Orioles
The Baltimore Orioles join in and adopt the arguments and authorities set forth in the Proskauer Motion to Dismiss. In their motion, they do not offer any new arguments but rather, highlight the evidence they contend demonstrates a lack of personal jurisdiction (either general or specific) as to the Baltimore Orioles specifically. In particular, the Baltimore Orioles point to the following evidence:
The Baltimore Orioles do not have Minor League affiliates based in California, and none of their Minor League affiliates play Minor League baseball games in California. Baltimore Orioles Motion to Dismiss at 2 (citing Declaration of Daniel F. Du-quette in Support Motion to Dismiss Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violation of Federal and State Wage and Hour Laws Against the Baltimore Orioles Limited Partnership and Baltimore Orioles, Inc. (“Duquette Decl.”) at ¶ 3; Declaration of Kent Qualls in Support Motion to Dismiss Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violation of Federal and State Wage and Hour Laws Against the Baltimore Orioles Limited Partnership and Baltimore Orioles, Inc. (“Qualls Deck”) at ¶¶ 2-3).
The Baltimore Orioles do not hold tryouts in California and pre-draft workouts normally are held in Baltimore, Maryland. Id. at 3 (citing Declaration of M. Celeste Bruce in Support Motion to Dismiss Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violation of Federal and State Wage and Hour Laws Against the Baltimore Orioles Limited Partnership and Baltimore Orioles, Inc., (“Bruce Deck”), Ex. 1 (Baltimore Orioles’ Supplemental Answers to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories regarding Jurisdiction and Venue, Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 9)).
Players who are drafted by the Baltimore Orioles are subjected to physical examinations before being offered a contract; these physicals and execution of the contracts are “generally conducted” in either Maryland or at the Baltimore Orioles’ spring training facility in Florida. Id.
Beginning with the 2012 baseball season, Minor League players with off-season addresses in California “have signed their Addendum Cs in Florida during spring training camp.” Id. (citing Bruce Deck, Ex. 1 (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 7)). “Minor League players are provided off-season workout packages during in-person meetings held at the location of the Minor League Club, normally during the last week of the Minor League season.” Id. (citing Bruce Deck, Ex. 1 (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 8)).
• With respect to Major League games played by the Baltimore Orioles in California, “[i]n each year since 2009, the Baltimore Orioles have not made more than three separate trips to California, nor played more than thirteen (13) Major League Championship Season Baseball games” in California. Id. (citing Duquette Decl. at ¶2). Further, the .schedule for these games i is set by the Commissioner of Baseball and not the Baltimore Orioles. M.
“The Baltimore Orioles only , employ a small number of California-based , scouts (in 2014, 6) and had a handful of scouts who travelled to California for short periods of time.” Id. (citing Bruce Decl., Ex. 1).
“The Baltimore Orioles do not have corporate officers or directors located in California. Nor do the Baltimore Orioles have operations, offices, a place of business or postal address in California.” Id. (citing Declaration of H. Russell Smouse in Support Motion to Dismiss Consolidated Amended Complaint. for Violation' of Federal and State Wage and Hour Laws Against the Baltimore Orioles Limited Partnership and Baltimore Orioles, Inc., (“Smouse Decl.”) at ¶¶ 4-5).
“The Baltimore Orioles, Inc. is a Maryland corporation with its principal place of business in Maryland. The Baltimore Orioles Limited Partnership was formed in Maryland and also has its principal place of business in Maryland.” Id. (citing Smouse Decl. at ¶¶ 2 -3; Bruce Decl., Ex. 1 (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 14)).
“The Baltimore Orioles do not own or lease property in ■California.” Id. (citing Smouse Decl. at ¶ 4; Bruce Decl., Ex. 1 (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 1)). ■
“The Baltimore Orioles do not receive income from tickets, concessions, parking or similar items for regular season games -that it plays in California as a- visiting Club. Id. (citing Bloom Jurisdiction Decl., Ex. K (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No..5)). “And the Baltimore Orioles have not been sued in California (other than the instant lawsuit, consolidated with Marti v. MLB) nor initiated any lawsuits, filed cross-claims or counterclaims- [in California] since 2008.” Id. (citing Bruce Decl., Ex. 1 (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 13)).
B. Opposition
Plaintiffs respond that the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants have “deep roots in California,” with “extensive contacts related to recruitment, hiring, and employment of California Minor Leaguers, all resulting from systematic, affirmative acts.” Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Certain Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (“Personal Jurisdiction Opposition”) at 1. In particular, Plaintiffs assert, “all [Personal Jurisdiction] Defendants consciously chose to base multiple scouts within California to evaluate and recruit the state’s amateurs ... [then] used these contacts to' consciously select California Minor Leaguers and induce them into signing contracts (which are often signed within California).” Further, Plaintiffs assert, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants “then expect these Minor Leaguers to not only work during the season but also during the winter training months, and they even direct the work by providing training packets ... knowing] and expecting] that these youths will return to their home state to perform this winter work.” Id.
Plaintiffs contend Personal Jurisdiction Defendants’ “other contacts with California also result from express acts.” Id. According to Plaintiffs, “[t]hey all obtain significant sums of California revenue from doing business within the state, and they all pay taxes to California. They also obtain substantial California revenue from other streams tunneled through Major League Baseball.” Id. Plaintiffs assert that “[w]ith far more MLB franchises located in California than any other state (including prominent franchises such as the Dodgers and Giants), [the Personal Jurisdiction] Defendants obtain a direct financial benefit from business occurring in the state through television revenue, internet revenue, merchandise sales, and other shared revenue.” Id. at 1-2. In light of these contacts, Plaintiffs assert, it is “quintessentially fair” to exercise personal jurisdiction over these MLB franchises. Id. at 2.
According to Plaintiffs, MLB “entrenched itself in California” in 1958, when the Dodgers and the Giants came to California, followed in 1969 by the San Diego Padres. Id. at 4 (citing Declaration Of Garrett R. Broshuis In Support Of Plaintiffs’ Opposition To Certain Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction (“Broshuis Deck”), Ex. D (Dodgers Franchise Timeline, MLB.com); Id. Ex. E (Giants Franchise Timeline, MLB.com); Id. Ex, F (Padres Franchise Timeline, MLB.com); Id., Ex. G (Team-by-Team Information, MLB.com)). There are now five franchises in California, they assert, which is. more than in any other state. Id. This high number of franchises in California means that the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants “routinely travel to California to play multiple games every season — up to 16 games in a season.” Id. at 5 (citing Proskauer Motion to Dismiss at 4).
Plaintiffs assert that MLB’s contacts with California go beyond travel and that the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants each derive substantial income from California, including “$113,128.10 in revenue attributable to California from MLB Advanced Media (MLB’s internet arm) and $52,199.17 in revenue attributable to California from MLB Network (MLB’s own TV network).” Id. at .5 (citing Blopm Jurisdiction Deck, Ex. K (MLB!s Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 5)). Plaintiffs also assert that although MLB “did not .provide California revenue for television contracts or MLB Properties (its licensing arm that licenses products for all Defendants and distributes revenue) ... it goes without saying that significant revenues and sales emanate from California— the most populous state — and are eventually funneled to all Defendants.” Id.- (citing Broshuis Deck, Ex. H (search engine metrics showing that “three out of the five top keywords in search engines that lead consumers tomlb.com are California-related (‘sf giants,’ ‘dodgers,’ and ‘giants’), and, frommlblcom, a significant percentage of these consumers shop on MLB’s e-commerce site, shop.mlb.com”). Plaintiffs also point to the admissions of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants that they pay taxes in California. Id. (citing Bloom Jurisdiction Deck, Exs. A-J (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory Nos. 11 & 12); Bruce Deck, Ex. 1 (Orioles Objection and Answer to Interrogatory NOs. 11 & 12)). In addition, according to Plaintiffs, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants have participated in workers compensation claims within California and MLB has lobbied the California legislature on behalf of its franchises “to make it more difficult to bring certain sports-related workers compensation claims in California.” IcL at 6. (citing Broshuis Deck, Ex. I (Injury claims by professional athletes, L.A. Times (Feb.' 1, 2014)); Id. Ex. J (California limits workers’ comp sports injury claims, L.A. Times (Oct. 8, 2013)). Plaintiffs also point to evidence that MLB has hosted industry-wide meetings in California in recent years. Id. (citing Broshuis Deck, Ex. K (2014 Baseball Winter Meetings returns to San Diego after three decades, MiLB. com)).
In addition to the contacts discussed above, Plaintiffs point to what they contend is “systematic recruitment” of California Minor Leaguers. Id. at 6. According to Plaintiffs, “California has long produced more major leaguers than any other state, and one recent study found that over 23 percent of American major leaguers came from California — more than twice as many as the next state.” Id. (citing Broshuis Decl., Ex. L (Kevin Nelson, THE GOLDEN GAME xiii (2004)); id. Ex. M (California is top producer of major league players, L.A. Times (July 12, 2010)); Bloom Jurisdiction Decl., Exs. A-J (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 5); Bruce Decl., Ex. 1 (Orioles Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 5)). Plaintiffs further contend that more Minor Leaguers come from California than any other state, citing the discovery responses of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants reflecting that “[a]ll PJ Defendants drafted dozens of Californians since 2008, and on average they each selected 7.2 Californians per year.” Id. (citing Bloom Jurisdiction Decl., Exs. A-J (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 5); Bruce Decl., Ex. 1, (Orioles Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 5)).
According to Plaintiffs, the recruitment of Minor Leaguers from California involves a “long, intense process requiring a substantial presence in California.” Id. In particular, they contend, all of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants have multiple employees in California (an average of 6.3 employees per franchise), many of whom are scouts. Id. (citing Bloom Jurisdiction Decl., Exs. A-J (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 2); Bruce Decl., Ex. 1 (Orioles Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 2)). The fact that the MLB Scouting Bureau is based in California is a reflection of the importance of scouting here, Plaintiffs contend. Id. at 7. Plaintiffs also cite to evidence that the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants “systematically dispatch many other employees to California to target, evaluate, and recruit players, such as higher-level employees like cross checkers, directors of scouting, and even vice presidents and general managers.” Id. (citing Bloom Jurisdiction Decl., Ex. AJ (Personal Jurisdiction Defendants’ Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 2); Wyckoff Decl. at ¶ 5; McAtee Decl. at ¶5). Plaintiffs assert that in 2013, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants sent an average of 9.7 such employees per franchise to California. Id. And further, when a player is selected, according to Plaintiffs, the scouts will continue to be involved in the formal discussions with the player and may also be present when the player signs the UPC. Id. (citing Wyckoff Decl. at ¶ 9; McAtee Decl. at ¶ 6; Watts Decl. at ¶ 4; Bennigson Decl. at ¶ 4; Kahaulelio Decl. at ¶ 4; Woodruff Decl. at ¶ 4; Henderson Decl. at ¶ 4; Giarraputo Decl. at ¶ 4; Lewis Decl. at ¶ 4).
Plaintiffs also present evidence relating to the work performed by Minor Leaguers in California. Plaintiffs note that the UPC requires that the Minor Leaguers “maintain ‘first class’ conditioning during the entire year, and a franchise can ‘impose a reasonable fine’ for not meeting these requirements.” Id. at 8 (citing CAC, ¶ 178 (citing UPC ¶¶ VLD and XII)). They also point to the admissions of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants that they direct this conditioning by handing out “work-out packets” to the players. Id. (citing Bloom Jurisdiction Deck, Exs. A-J (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 7); Bruce Decl., Ex. 1 (Orioles Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 7); Hilligoss Decl., Ex. A; Pahuta Decl., Ex. A). Further, although only five franchises provided information about how many of their players reside in California during the offseason, as to those that did, the discovery responses showed that an average of 24.7 Minor Leaguers per franchise reside in California each winter training period, Plaintiffs contend. Id. (citing Bloom Jurisdiction Decl., Exs. C-F (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 6); Bruce Decl., Ex. 1 (Orioles Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 6)). According to Plaintiffs, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants are aware that these players are living in California during the offseason because they communicate with the players and must maintain correct addresses, sending them rules and information about spring training and also a contract addendum with their salaries. Id. at 9 (citing Senne Decl., Ex. A; Khoury Decl. at ¶ 7; Bennigson Decl. at ¶ 7; Pahuta Decl. at ¶ 7; Lawson Decl. at ¶¶7-8; Watts Decl. at ¶¶ 6 — 11; Kahaulelio Decl. at ¶ 5; Smith Decl. at ¶ 4; Opitz Decl. at ¶ 5; Woodruff Decl. at ¶ 5; Henderson Decl. at ¶ 5; Giarraputo Decl. at ¶¶ 5-6; McAtee Decl. at ¶ 7; Lewis Decl. at ¶ 5 [collectively “Declarations Describing Winter Work”]).
Plaintiffs argue that there is both general and specific jurisdiction over the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants in California. Id. at 11. They assert that for general jurisdiction, the minimum contacts test of International Shoe and the “bedrock principal” of fundamental fairness are satisfied when “a defendant’s systematic and continuous contacts essentially render a corporation at home ... meaning defendant’s contacts ‘approximate physical presence’ in the state.” Id. (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, — U.S.-,-, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011), Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir.2006)). Under Tuazon, Plaintiffs assert, “some non-exhaustive factors include soliciting or engaging in business in the state, as well as the ‘[ljongevity, continuity, volume, economic impact, physical presence, and integration into the state’s regulatory or economic markets.’ ” Id. (citing Tua-zon, 433 F.3d at 1172). Those factors support a finding of general jurisdiction here, Plaintiffs assert, based on the “longstanding presence in California” of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants, discussed above. Id. at 12. Plaintiffs further assert that here, as in Tuazon, the “‘long and. successful operation’ in the state- were ‘not accidental.’ ” Id. (citing 433 F.3d at 1174). ' .
Plaintiffs also argue that “the highly ■interdependent nature of MLB” supports a finding of general jurisdiction. Id. at 13 (citing Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F.Supp. 709, 712-15 (E.D.N.Y.1972)). Thus, Plaintiffs assert, in Erving, the court found that the Squires basketball team, which was a member of the American Basketball Association (“ABA”), was subject to personal jurisdiction in New York, even though it played only -six to eight games in New York out of a season schedule of 84 games, because the games that were played in New York were “essential to the fulfillment of the business purposes -and objects of the ABA enterprise of which Squires is an integral part.” Id. (citing 349 F.Supp. at 713). According to Plaintiffs, the court in Erving concluded that it “did not matter that gate receipts were not purely shared — other revenue was shared and the relationships were symbiotic.” Id. (citing 349 F.Supp. at 713-14). Plaintiffs contend other courts analyzing sports teams and sports leagues have reached the same conclusion. Id. (citing Hollins v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, 469 F.Supp.2d 67, 74 (E.D.N.Y.2006); Cent. Sports Army Club v. Arena Assocs., Inc., 952 F.Supp. 181, 188 (S.D.N.Y.1997); Hawkins v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 288 F.Supp. 614, 618-19 (W.D.Pa.1968); Am. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 27 F.R.D. 264, 268-69 (D.Md.1961)). This conclusion is consistent with the law of agency, Plaintiffs assert,- where the acts of one joint venturer can be imputed to another joint venturer. Id. (citing Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 55-63 (1st Cir.2002)).
Plaintiffs argue that the facts here support a finding of general jurisdiction even more strongly than the cases cited above because this case involves “a universal scheme enacted by all Defendants to depress salaries.” Id. at 14. Further, as discussed above, Plaintiffs point to “common conduct [that] was applied in and directed at California, and [which] resulted from all Defendants’ common decisions, uniform contracts, and common implementation.” Id. Although the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants “do not directly share gate receipts, the collective bargaining agreement requires all MLB franchises to share substantial revenue, with each franchise contributing 34 percent of its local revenue into a. common pool split amongst all 30 MLB franchises.” Id. at 14 (citing Broshuis Deck, .Ex. O (Article XXIV, 2012-2016 Basic Agreement) at 121). The rules also require other revenue sharing, Plaintiffs contend, and as there are more franchises in California than in any other state, “much of this shared revenue emanates from California.” Id. Further, Plaintiffs point to substantial revenue from California, including from the website and TV "network, possible licensing revenues from California, and MLB’s lobbying in California, all of which show that the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants have made California their second home, Plaintiffs assert, thus giving rise to general jurisdiction. Id. at 15.
Plaintiffs also contend that there is specific jurisdiction over their claims in California. Id. at 15. According to Plaintiffs, the theory of specific jurisdiction is based on the premise that “[d]oing business within a state is a privilege, and obligations accompany that privilege.” Id. (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S: at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154). Thus, it is not unfair to subject a defendant to litigation in a forum where the claims are related to the defendant’s activities in the forum. Id. at 15-16. The Ninth Circuit uses a “sliding scale” for determining whether there is specific jurisdiction, Plaintiffs assert, considering both “the extent of the defendant’s contacts with the forum and the degree to which the plaintiffs suit is related to those contacts. A strong showing on one axis will permit a lesser showing on the other.” Id. at 16 (quoting Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir.2006)). The contacts that the Court should consider, according to Plaintiffs, are not limited to the plaintiffs’ contacts but also include contacts with non-plaintiffs. Id. (citing Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1207).
Plaintiffs agree with the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants that specific jurisdiction is evaluated under a three-part test that asks whether: (1) the defendant purposefully directed its activities towards the forum or . purposefully availed itself of the privileges of the forum;, (2) the claim arises out of , or relates to those activities; and (3) the exercise of personal jurisdiction is reasonable. Id. (citing Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1205-06).' Plaintiffs also agree that the proper inquiry in this case as to the first part of the test is whether the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants “purposefully directed” their activities at the forum rather than the purposeful availment test. Id. at 16-17. According to Plaintiffs, purposeful direction .is satisfied when: “(1) the company commits an intentional act, (2) aimed at the forum state, that (3) causes harm that the company knows will likely be felt in the forum state.” Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1206 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984)). Plaintiffs reject the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants’ argument that this test is not met, however. Id.
Plaintiffs argue that because the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants did not address the first and third prongs of the purposeful direction test, the Court should find that those requirements are met. Id. In any event, they contend, the evidence shows that all three requirements are, in fact, met. Id. In particular, they argue that in wage and hour cases, the intentional act requirement is met where, as here, there is a uniform employment policy that is applied within the state, even if it is also applied to employees in other states. Id. at 18 (Holliday v. Lifestyle Lift, Inc., Case No. 09-CV-4995 RS, 2010 WL 3910143, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 5, 2010); Telles v. Li, Case No. 11-cv-1470 LHK, 2013 WL 5199811, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 16, 2013); Enriquez v. Interstate Group., LLC, Case No. 11-cv-5155 YGR, 2012 WL 3800801, at *4 (NJD.Cal. Aug. 31, 2012)). According to Plaintiffs, “[a] company expressly aims its conduct in such cases whén it applies the allegedly unlawful employment practices in the state” and “knows harm will likely occur in a state when it applies a policy to workers in the state.” Id. (citing Holliday, 2010 WL 3910143, at *4; Telles, 2013 WL 5199811, at *5; Enriquez, 2012 WL 3800801, at *5). Further, Plaintiffs assert, specific jurisdiction, is found “[e]ven for work performed at home ... if the company knowingly hires a forum’s resident and has reason to know that work will be performed at home.” Id. (citing Wood v. Kinetic Sys., Inc., Case No. Case No. 09-cv—579 SCWD, 2010 WL 893647, at '*5 (D.Idaho Mar. 9, 2010)). Here, Plaintiffs assert, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants “acted intentionally by creating the policy decision to pay no wages at all during the winter training period and to pay no minimum wage or overtime during the season,” “expressly aimed their conduct at California by applying the policies to Californians working in California,” and “knew harm was likely to occur because they knowingly required Californians to work in California for no pay.” Id.
Plaintiffs further assert that the purposeful direction requirement is satisfied on the basis of the recruiting activities conducted by the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants in California. Id. at 19. According to Plaintiffs, numerous courts have reached this conclusion. Id. (citing Davis v. NIH Fed. Credit Union, Case No. 12-cv-5502 JCS, 2013 WL 2147468, at *6 (N.D.Cal. May 15, 2013); Ochoa v. J.B. Martin & Sons Farms, Inc., 287 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (9th Cir.2002); Potts v. Cameron Offshore Boats, Inc., 401 F.Supp.2d 733, 737-38 (S.D.Tex.2005)). These cases are distinguishable from the Supreme Court’s decision in Walden, they contend; because they “involved' far more activities directed at the forum state.” Id. (citing Ochoa, 287 F.3d at 1189-93; Davis, 2013 WL 2147468, at *6; GT Sec., Inc. v. Klastech GmbH, Case No. 13-cv-3090 JCS, 2014 WL 2928013, at *13-14 (N.D.Cal. June 27, 2014)). According to Plaintiffs, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants have “systematically recruited” .in California, as. is apparent from evidence showing that each one of them “drafted California amateurs every year for the last 6 years,” and that they “averaged 7.2 California draft picks per team per year.” Id. Further, they assert, “[b]oth before and after [the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants] select California Minor Leaguers, their scouts and employees communicate with them and induce them into signing the uniform contracts at issue while they reside in California.” Id.
. Plaintiffs reject the argument - of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants that there is no purposeful direction because their contacts with California “are simply a function of where players • choose to live during the off-season.” Id. at 20 (citing Proskauer Motion to Dismiss at 16). In fact, Plaintiffs assert, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants “affirmatively decided to target Californians and contract with them,” knowing that “most of these Californians would return to California during the offseason, where they would then expect them to perform winter work for no pay.” Id. (citing Wood, 2010 WL 893647, at 5-6). Further, they argue, “[sjeveral named Plaintiffs and opt-in plaintiffs suffered injuries in California while performing winter training work in California, and all [Personal Jurisdiction Defendants] employ many California Minor Leaguers in California who perform winter training work for no pay — an average of 24.7 per team based on supplied data.” Id. These activities are sufficient to show purposeful direction, Plaintiffs argue, and the Court should reject the reliance of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants on contract cases involving purposeful availment and “far fewer contacts with the forum state” in support of a contrary result. Id. (citing Slepian v. Guerin, 172 F.3d 58 (9th Cir.1999) (unpublished); Novak v. NanoLogix, Inc., Case No. C-13-01971 EJD, 2014 WL 991119, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 11, 2014); SRE-Cheaptrips, Inc. v. Media Synergy Grp., LLC, Case No. C09-00622-S-EJL, 2010 WL 1913589, at *3 (D.Idaho May 12, 2010); Hall v. Natl Basketball Ass’n, 651 F.Supp. 335, 339 (D.Kan.1987)).
Further, Plaintiffs contend, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants are incorrect in their assertion that in determining whether there is purposeful direction, the court should consider named plaintiffs only and not putative class members. Id. at 21. Defendants cite only a single case in support of their position, Ambriz v. Coca Cola, and that case, according to Plaintiffs, is not on point-because it involved venue rather than personal jurisdiction. Id. Moreover, Plaintiffs assert, Yahoo, International Shoe, and Walden all make clear that the purposeful direction inquiry requires an evaluation of all of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state that are connected with the litigation; thus even contacts with non-parties (such as putative class. members) are considered in cases where the contacts of the plaintiffs are intertwined with those the non-parties. Id.
The second requirement for specific jurisdiction — that the claims must “arise out of’ or be “related to” the plaintiffs activities in the forum is also met here, Plaintiffs assert. Id. at 22. Plaintiffs argue that this requirement is a “low bar” in the Ninth Circuit and merely requires “some nexus between the claims and the company’s activities — a ‘but for’ test.” Id. (citing Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir.1990), rev’d on other grounds by Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 111 S.Ct. 1522, 113 L.Ed.2d 622 (1991)). Here, Plaintiffs assert, “there is a clear nexus between the [Personal Jurisdiction Defendants’] policies (relating to recruitment and employment of California Minor Leaguers), the harm (relating to their failure to pay minimum wage and overtime to these Minor Leag-uers), and the claims (for violations of wage and hour laws).” Id. According to Plaintiffs, “[b]ut for Defendants’ uniform policies applied in California, there would be no harm to Minor Leaguers in California — and no claims.” Id.
Finally, Plaintiffs assert, it is reasonable to exercise jurisdiction in this District rather than “litigating it in a piecemeal fashion in other forums.” Id. at 23. The burden as to this third requirement is on the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants because Plaintiffs have met the first two prongs of the specific jurisdiction test, they contend. Id. (citing Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1111). Plaintiffs argue that the seven factors that are considered to determine reasonableness (discussed above) “strongly favor exercising personal, jurisdiction over [the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants] in California.” Id.
First, for the same reasons there is purposeful direction, Plaintiffs assert, the “purposeful interjection” factor weighs in favor of reasonableness. Id. (citing Enri-quez, 2012 WL 3800801, at *6).
Second, Plaintiffs argue, the burden on a defendant is only unreasonable where defending in the forum is “so gravely difficult and inconvenient that it violates due process.” Id. (citing Enriquez, 2012 WL 3800801, at *6 (internal citation omitted)). Moreover, they assert, when determining whether the “burden of defending” in the forum is unreasonable, the Court must consider the burdens on both the defendants and the plaintiffs. Id. (citing Ochoa, 287 F.3d at 1192). The facts here favor Plaintiffs, they argue, because seven Plaintiffs (some of whom were employed by the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants) live in California and 22 of 34 Plaintiffs live west of the Mississippi. Id. In addition, the burden of travel is greater for Plaintiffs, who have limited resources, than it is on the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants, who regularly travel to California, Plaintiffs contend. Id. at 24. Moreover, Plaintiffs argue, because all but one of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants are represented by the same counsel, there will be little additional burden of litigating in California.. Id. In contrast, they assert, “filing a new case based on identical facts in multiple districts against the [Personal Jurisdiction Defendants] would be substantially more burdensome and inefficient.” Id. Thus, this factor favors the conclusion that exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable, they contend. Id.
Plaintiffs agree with the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants that the “sovereignty” factor is neutral. Id.
Plaintiffs argue that the next factor, the forum’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, strongly favors California. Id. In particular, they argue that “[w]hile residents from states throughout the country are also harmed by Defendants’ practices, more California residents are harmed than residents in any other state because many more Minor Leaguers come from California than-any other state.” Id.
Plaintiffs argue that the exercise of jurisdiction in California will also support the fifth factor, which asks the court to consider “the most efficient judicial resolution.” Id. Plaintiffs contend it would be most efficient to litigate this dispute within a single district and further, that as the “epicenter of harm,” California is the most appropriate forum. Plaintiffs also assert that dismissal of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants would result in “highly inefficient, piecemeal litigation,, which would risk disparate .rulings on identical factual and legal issues.” Id. ■
The importance of the forum to Plaintiffs also, favors a finding that jurisdiction is reasonable, Plaintiffs argue, because three named Plaintiffs live in this district, far more Plaintiffs reside in California than any other state and over half of Plaintiffs suffered alleged harm in California. Id. at 25.
Finally, the last factor — the existence of an alternative forum — favors Plaintiffs’ position, they argue, because “far more named Plaintiffs are in California than in any other state, more Defendants are headquartered in California than in any other state, and more Minor Leaguers come from California than any other state, [and therefore] no other forum would be as convenient as California.” Id.
Consequently, Plaintiffs assert, the seven factors that go to reasonableness “demonstrate that Defendants cannot demonstrate a compelling burden, and the Court should find that it has specific jurisdiction over all [Personal Jurisdiction Defendants].” Id.
C. Reply Briefs
1. Proskauer PJ Defendants
In their Reply brief, the Proskaur PJ Defendants reject Plaintiffs assertion that there is general jurisdiction' over them, asserting that Plaintiffs have relied on outdated precedent while failing to address the Supreme Court’s more recent guidance in Daimler AG v. Bauman, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014) and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011). Reply in Support Of Motion To Dismiss The Consolidated Amended Complaint As Against Certain Defendants For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction (“Proskauer Jurisdiction Reply”) at 1. Moreover, they assert, the contention that California is their “second home” is “unsupportable.” Id. They also challenge Plaintiffs’ assertion that there is specific jurisdiction over them. Id. As they argued in the underlying motion, the Proskauer PJ Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ position is based almost' entirely on the fact that “-certain Plaintiffs and unnamed members of the putative class voluntarily choose to live in California during the off-season.” Id. The Proskauer PJ Defendants argue that this is not a sufficient basis to find specific jurisdiction given that it is “undisputed that (i) not one Minor League player played a single inning fpr a Moving Defendant in California, and (ii) not one Minor League player was required to perform any training activities for a Moving Defendant in California.” Id. The Proskauer PJ Defendants also point to Plaintiffs’ assertion in response to Defendants’ transfer motions that there is no personal jurisdiction over some- of the MLB clubs in Florida,- asserting that Plaintiffs’ argument is based on the same absence of contacts with Florida that the -Proskauer PJ Defendants assert in their Motion to Dismiss deprives this Court of personal jurisdiction over them. Id.
On the question of general jurisdiction, the Proskauer PJ Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have relied heavily on a Ninth Circuit case, Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir.2006), that predates Daimler and Goodyear and is inconsistent with those more recent Supreme Court cases. Id. at 3. In particular, the Proskauer PJ Defendants assert, in Tuazon, the Ninth Circuit found that there was general jurisdiction over -a defendant that had a “serious presence” and generated “enormous revenues” in the fo(rum even though the forum was not the defendant’s “home away from home.”. Id. That conclusion is at odds with Daimler, the Proskauer PJ Defendants argue, in which the Supreme Court “warned that [the exercise of general jurisdiction in every State in which a corporation engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business ... is unacceptably grasping.’ ” Id. (citing 134 S.Ct. at 761 (internal quotations omitted)). Even if th