Smith v. Lynch (106 F. Supp. 3d 20, 2015)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BERYL A. HOWELL, United States District Judge

The plaintiff, Rhonda Smith, has been a long-time employee of the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) Office of Justice Programs (“OJP”) and, since July 2006, worked as a GS-13 staff accountant in OJP’s Customer Service Branch. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 21, ECF No. 1. She filed this suit against the defendant, Attorney General, in her official capacity, alleging that, between 2007 and 2009, she was subjected to a hostile work environment and retaliation because she is African-American and suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome (“CTS”) in her right hand, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Compl. ¶¶ 240-79. Pending before the Court is the defendant’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 55, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56. For the reasons set forth below, the defendant’s motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

The plaintiff has alleged myriad forms of mistreatment by OJP over a span of several years, allegedly due to both her race and her CTS. See generally Compl. Although the plaintiff initially alleged that the defendant failed to accommodate her asthma and that the defendant “discriminated against her by ‘improperly adjusting her service computation dates’ and ‘delaying her a[sic] within-grade increase in [salary in] 2008,’ ” the plaintiff subsequently withdrew those claims. Pl.’s Opp’n Def.’s Mot. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 59 at 2 n.1-2. Set out below is background to assess the five remaining actions by OJP that the plaintiff alleges establish her claims of racial and disability discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation. See id. ¶¶ 2-3.

A. The Plaintiffs Leave History And Onset Of CTS Symptoms

Approximately two months after the plaintiff started in her role as a staff accountant in the OJP’s Customer Service Branch, in September 2006, she was issued a “Memorandum of Counseling and Possible Leave Restriction” by her first-line supervisor, Darlene Mongelli. See Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 14 (the “Leave Counseling Memo”) at 1, ECF No. 59-19. The Leave Counseling Memo noted that, as of September 15, 2006, the plaintiff had accrued two hours of annual leave, 134.50 hours of leave without pay (LWOP), and a deficit of 114.75 hours of sick leave. Id. The Leave Counseling Memo stated that the plaintiffs prior leave history “shows that there is a long-term pattern of frequent unscheduled absences.” Id. The plaintiff was advised that she “must improve [her] attendance,” id., and she was given specific procedures to follow before taking additional leave, id. at 2-4. Specifically, the Leave Counseling Memo stated the plaintiff “must obtain verbal approval of’ any unscheduled leave and that she submit requests for scheduled leave “at least 1 workday prior to the scheduled leave.” Id. at 2 (emphasis in original). The Leave Counseling Memo further warned that if the plaintiff were “absent without leave having been approved, the absence [would] be recorded as absence without official leave (AWOL).” Id.

The plaintiff was specifically required by the Leave Counseling Memo “to promptly arrive at work at [her] regularly scheduled time ... and to work [her] tour of duty each workday.” Id. at 3. The Leave Counseling Memo required that the plaintiff notify the plaintiffs supervisor or second line supervisor, Joanne Suttington, if the plaintiff were running late, id., and required that she submit “the original copy of a medical certificate signed by the attending physician” for any medical absence resulting in more than three consecutive missed days of work, id. at 3. The plaintiff avers that the Leave Counseling Memo “did not take into account the fact that Plaintiffs absence [sic] had resulted largely from three operations and asthma attacks.” PL's Response to Def.’s Statement of Material Facts not in Genuine Dispute (“Pl.’s SMF”) ¶ 4, ECF No. 59-2.

Beginning in March 2007, the plaintiff experienced pain in her right hand and wrist. See Def.’s Statement of Material Facts Not in Genuine Dispute (“Def.’s SMF”) ¶ 8, ECF No. 55; PL’s SMF ¶8. OJP was first alerted to the plaintiffs symptoms when she submitted a note from her doctor stating she was “totally incapacitated” from March 23 through March 30, 2007. Def.’s Mot. Ex. 20 at 4, ECF No. 56. That period of total incapacitation was later extended through April 16, 2007, after the plaintiff submitted another note from her physician. Def.’s Mot. Ex. 21 at 6, ECF No. 56. The plaintiff returned to “light duty status lifting no more than 5 pounds” on April 17, 2007, Def.’s Mot. Ex. 22 at 8, ECF No. 56, but was prohibited from “keyboarding” from May 4 through May 8, 2007, Def.’s Mot, Ex. 23 at 10, ECF No. 56. The record indicates that the plaintiff had no restrictions on her work from May 9, 2007 through June 29, 2007, when the plaintiff submitted a physician’s note stating the plaintiff had “Right Carpal Tunnel Syndrome” and she was “to avoid using the keyboard for the next 30 days.” Def.’s Mot. Ex. 24 at 12, ECF No. 56. Thus, the plaintiff provided documentation of temporary work restrictions covering March 23, 2007 through May 8, 2007, .and June 29, 2007 through July 29, 2007. See supra.

On July 3, 2007, OJP’s Reasonable Accommodations Coordinator, Phillip Merkle, “informed Plaintiff of her right to request a reasonable accommodation.” PL’s SMF ¶ 11. Three days later, the plaintiff left a voicemail for an OJP human resources representative, indicating that she “had spoken with her doctor, and he is recommending that [the plaintiff] wait until all of her test results are in and [her doctor] has reviewed them before she completes the reasonable accommodation documentation.” Def.’s Mot. Ex. 25 at 7, ECF No. 55-20. The plaintiff avers that her doctor told her that “he would be unable to make [the] assessment” as to whether her condition was “long-term or permanent” until after the plaintiff had been seen by a specialist. Pl.’s SMF ¶ 12.

Nine days prior to the expiration of her keyboarding restrictions, on July 20, 2007, the plaintiff received a memorandum from her supervisor advising the plaintiff that she was not “expect[ed] to report back to work until your doctor indicates that you can resume your full duties and responsibilities.” Def.’s Mot. Ex. 26 at 2, ECF No. 55-21. The memorandum advised the plaintiff that OJP would approve accrued leave ór leave without pay (“LWOP”), but not advance leave, due to [the plaintiffs] negative leave balance.” Pl.’s SMF ¶ 13. The plaintiff signed the memorandum to acknowledge receipt, but wrote along with her signature that “[t]he information contained in this memorandum is not accurate.” Def.’s Mot Ex. 26 at 2. Pursuant to the memorandum directing the plaintiff to advise her supervisor “within five (5) calendar days” of any information “which [the plaintiff] believefd would] assist [OJP] in the review of this matter,” id., the plaintiff “wrote a memo to her supervisor, Ms. Mongelli, indicating that her 30-day keyboarding restriction was to expire on July 28, 2007, and [the plaintiff] anticipated ‘being able to fully resume all of [her] duties’ ” as of that date, Pl.’s SMF ¶ 14. Following the expiration of the plaintiffs total keyboarding restriction, the plaintiff “submitted a doctor’s note, dated July 30, 2007, indicating that [the plaintiff] ‘will be able ... to return to work ... with restrictions’ and that she ‘(1) use a brace [and] (2) keyboard 4 hours/day with breaks every hour of typing for 5 minutes.’ ” Pl.’s SMF ¶ 16; see Def.’s Mot. Ex. 27 at 14, ECF No. 56.

The plaintiff underwent carpal tunnel release surgery in January 2008 and returned to work six months later, in July 2008. Compl. ¶¶ 205, 207. While the plaintiff was recuperating from surgery, OJP rearranged the plaintiffs office furniture and installed an ergonomic keyboard. See Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 7 at 12, ECF No. 59-12. OJP personnel also researched and installed voice activated software on the plaintiffs computer. Def.’s Reply Ex. 5 at 3-6, ECF No. 62-5. Less than a month after the plaintiff returned to work, the plaintiff once again went out on medical leave for four weeks because she was “physically unable to work at all.” Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 34, at 1, ECF No. 59-33.

B. Alleged Discriminatory And Retaliatory Incidents

The five OJP actions, see supra at 2, underlying the plaintiffs claims are related primarily to conduct alleged to have occurred between March and August 2007, during which time the plaintiff was absent from work for approximately thirty percent of the possible work days. The alleged conduct is detailed below.

1. Holding Plaintiff Responsible For Co-Workers’ Assignments (April-June 2007)

The plaintiff claims that she was held responsible for her co-workers’ assignments, known as “closeouts.” Compl. ¶¶ 104-107; 125-128. The plaintiff was originally assigned to review two co-workers closeouts but, when she was out on leave in March and April of 2007, the plaintiffs supervisor reassigned those duties to Wendy Lynch, who is Asian-American. Pl.’s

Opp’n Ex. 4 at 19, ECF No. 59-9. The plaintiff states that on June 25, 2007, she received an email from Mongelli stating “that the reassignment of review responsibilities [away from the plaintiff] was only for the duration of [the plaintiffs] absence,” and instructed the plaintiff to resume reviewing one of her co-worker’s closeouts. Id. at 20. The plaintiff alleges that neither she nor her co-workers were informed of this arrangement before June 25, 2007, and that one closeout reassigned to the plaintiff for review should have been reviewed by Lynch. See id. at 19-20. The plaintiff avers that this reassignment of work was an example of discrimination and the creation of a hostile work environment based on race because other people in similar circumstances,, particularly Lynch, were not treated the same way in similar circumstances. Id.

2. Assigning Work In A Discriminatorg Manner (June 2007)

The essence of the plaintiffs work assignment discrimination claim is that the plaintiffs supervisor “had a different expectation” of Lynch “than she did for Plaintiff in similar situations.” Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Pl.’s Opp’n Def.’s Mot. (“Pl.’s Opp’n Mem.”) at 28, ECF No. 591. The plaintiff avers that Mongelli “discriminated against [her] based on [her] race and disability in assigning [her] the First Quarter Excess Cash project and expecting [her] to do it in June when [she] was under a medical keyboarding restriction,” but physically present at work. Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 1 ¶ 9, ECF No. 59-5. The plaintiff was originally assigned this project on February 23, 2007 by Mongelli, Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 36 at 51:11— 14, ECF No. 60-1, but it was reassigned to a co-worker, Max Mirin (“Mirin”) on April 4, 2007, id. at 52:20-53:2. Mongelli asserts that “[b]y the end of May, it became clear that [Mirin] was not experienced and familiar enough with the project to successfully complete it,” Def.’s Mot. Ex. 14 at 3, ECF No. 55-14.

On June 9, 2007, the plaintiff participated in a meeting where she was informed that “the first quarter ’07 excess cash report had never been completed,” Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 36 at 58:1-2, and the plaintiff contends that she learned via e-mail in late June that the project had been returned to her. Id. at 58:3-8. The Excess Cash Project was to be completed by August 9, 2007, but the plaintiff states she was unable to complete the project by the deadline due to her keyboarding restriction. See id. at 62:18-63:9.

The plaintiff alleges that she should not have been reassigned the Excess Cash Project and notes that Lynch “was assigned the second and the third quarter excess cash report project [and] went out on leave during both of those projects ... [h]er project was reassigned to someone else, and was never given back to her when she returned from her vacation.” Id. at 63:9-16. According to the plaintiff, other employees completed Lynch’s assignments, though she offers no evidence other than her own statements and assertions of to whom the reports were reassigned for this contention. See id. at 64:7— 67:5. Mongelli, who assigned the projects to both the plaintiff and Lynch, disputes this assertion, stating that Lynch was held responsible for completing her excess cash projects despite the leave she took, and that Lynch “finished [the projects] before she went — before she left. She came in on the weekend before.” Def.’s Mot. Ex. 16 at 191:22-192:7, ECF No. 55-16. The plaintiff contends that the reassignment of the first quarter project back to the plaintiff was an instance of Mongelli’s attempt “to make [the plaintiffs] working atmosphere adverse and hostile,” Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 36 at 68:6-7, since Mongelli expected the plaintiff to fail to complete the project on time and Mongelli “could [then] take adverse action against [the plaintiff],” id. at 68:7-12, for the failure.

3. Denying Advance Sick Leave (March to July 2007)

The plaintiff states that she was allowed to take regular leave as she accrued it, Def.’s Mot. Ex. 12 at 98:10-12, ECF No. 55-12, but cites several instances of being denied advance sick leave as support for her contentions that she was discriminated against, subjected to a hostile work environment, and retaliated against on the basis of her alleged disability. DOJ has a formal written policy outlining the requirements for requesting and granting advance sick leave, Def.’s Mot. Ex. 35, ECF No. 55-27, and that policy is explained first, before discussing the" specific instances challenged by the plaintiff.

a) DOJ’s Advance Sick Leave Policy

Under DOJ’s leave policy, an employee generally “must submit a request for advanee sick leave as far in advance of the requested period of absence as possible,” though allowances can be made “[i]n the event of injury or sudden illness” when “advance sick leave may be granted after the fact provided the employee submits any documentation required in support of the request within the time frame established by the approving official.” Def.’s Mot. Ex. 35 ¶ 34(b)(1). Specifically, an employee “must submit the following: (a) A Standard Form 71, Application for Leave, (b) A medical certificate or other administratively acceptable evidence substantiating the reason(s) for the absence, (c) Such additional documentation as the Department component or approving official may prescribe.” Id. ¶ 34(b)(2).

The policy states that “[e]mployees do not have a vested right to advance leave, regardless of the circumstances, and the approval of requests for advance sick leave is at the discretion of the approving official.” Id. ¶ 34(c)(1). Approving officials are to consider enumerated factors before granting such leave, including: “(a) Whether the employee can be expected to return to duty, (b) The need for the employee’s services, (c) The benefits in retaining this employee, (d) The fact that, if the employee separates because of disability or illness (whether by retirement or resignation), the Department has no authority to require repayment of the amount paid to the employee for advance leave.” Id. The ultimate decision is “entirely up to the discretion of the supervisor.” Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 10 at 53:11-12, ECF No. 59-15. “Approving officials may not grant advance sick leave” if the employee “has indicated an intention to resign for disability!;]” “a separation date has been established which would preclude the employee from earning enough leave to repay the advance sick leave[;]” or “there is other evidence that the employee will not return to duty.” Def.’s Mot. Ex. 35 ¶ 34(c)(2).

In the plaintiffs division, the plaintiffs second line supervisor, Suttington, set additional requirements for granting advance sick leave, noting that (1) “[a]ny request for advance leave must be authorized by the [Chief Financial Officer][;]” (2) the leave “must be requested in advance[;]” (3) the “request for advance leave should be written and include the time period for the leave[;]” (4) “[a]dequate documentation should be attached to support the request, e.g., physician’s note justifying the need for leave[;]” (5) the “employee’s advance sick leave balance cannot exceed -240 hours;” and (6) “[a]dvance annual leave is limited to the amount that the employee earned and [could] payback [sic] by the end of'the year, i.e., the projected year end balance cannot be less than zero.” Def.’s Mot. Ex. 36 at 2, ECF No. 55-28.

b) The March 2007 Denial

On March 23, 2007, the plaintiff submitted a request for advance sick leave,, along with a doctor’s note stating she was totally incapacitated. See Def.’s Mot. Ex. 20 at 4. In an email exchange between Mongelli and OJP’s Human Resources (“HR”) division, Mongelli advised that she received “a leave slip for Advanced [sic] Sick Leave dated 3/23” from the plaintiff, along “with some documentation. The documentation is NOT an original document.” Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 16 at 4, ECF No. 59-20 (capitalization in original). Mongelli told the HR personnel in the email that “[t]here are work assignments that could be completed without keyboarding,” and that Mongelli did not plan to approve any “leave at all based on this request.” Id. Mongelli was instructed by HR to record the plaintiffs leave as leave-with-out-pay LWOP, and recommended that Mongelli “provide [the plaintiff] with a leave restriction letter based on her continued pattern of leave abuse.” Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 19 at 4, ECF No. 59-22.

c) The April 2007 Denial

On April 2, 2007, Mongelli informed a DOJ HR specialist, Veronica (Tina) Hudson via email that the plaintiff “plan[ned] to come in [that day] just long enough to drop off paperwork for the Leave Bank program” and that the plaintiff would “be out 2 more weeks.” Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 19 at 3, ECF No. 59-22. Mongelli requested a meeting with the plaintiff to discuss the request. Id. At the meeting, which the plaintiff attended with a representative from her union, Mongelli “advised [the plaintiff] that [she] needed to come to work because [Mongelli] was not willing to advance [the plaintiff] leave.” PL’s Opp’n Ex. 36 at 99:12-15, ECF No. 60-2.

The plaintiff alleges that during this meeting, Mongelli told the plaintiff “there was plenty of work that could be done without” requiring the plaintiff to use a keyboard. Id. at 100:1-3. Mongelli avers that the plaintiffs “union rep recommended that as a compromise, [the plaintiff] come in for 1/2 days beginning today [April 3, 2007]. [Mongelli] agreed.” Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 19 at 2. The plaintiff alleges that Mongelli “stated she would provide [the plaintiff] with a list of written duties that [she] could do that didn’t require the use of [her] hand,” but she was never provided with the requested list. Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 36 at 101:2-8.

The next day, the plaintiff stated that she visited “personnel and once they reviewed [her] doctor’s notes ordering [the plaintiff] to remain home [and] stating [she] was totally incapacitated” that the personnel office advised the plaintiffs supervisors that it was a “risk and a liability” for the plaintiff to remain at work. Id. at 100:10-21. The plaintiff avers that her second-line supervisor, Suttington, informed her at the end of the working day on April 3, 2007 “that [the plaintiff] should not be at work, and [the plaintiff] should go home and remain home until [she] was cleared by [her] doctor.” Id. at 105:15-20. Subsequently, Mongelli denied the plaintiffs request for eighty hours of advance sick leave for the period from April 2 through April 13, 2007, citing the plaintiffs negative sick leave balance and available annual leave balance of .25 hours. Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 20 at 2, ECF No. 59-23. The plaintiffs absence was charged to leave without pay. Id.

d) The July 2007 Denial

From June 29, 2007 to July 29, 2007, the plaintiff was under doctor’s orders to avoid keyboarding. See supra Part I.A. The plaintiff worked under this restriction, reviewing Mirin’s work, until July 20, 2007; when the plaintiff was given a memorandum from Mongelli, Def.’s Mot. Ex. 26, instructing the plaintiff “to go home until [she] could perform [her] duties 100 percent,” Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 36 at 27:20-28:15. The memorandum stated that the plaintiffs “inability to use the keyboard rendered her] unable to perform 85% of the duties and responsibilities of [her] position,” and further stated that the reviewing tasks the plaintiff had been performing “are but a small part of [the plaintiffs] regular work assignments.” Def.’s Mot. Ex. 26 at 2. Moreover, the memo stated that the plaintiffs “primary work assignments [were] to process closeouts” and that she had “closed 176 of the 531 closeouts assigned” to her since April 2007, which was substantially less that the “3 to 5 [closeouts] per day” a GS-13 staff accountant such as the plaintiff was expected to complete. Id.

The memorandum stated that the plaintiffs “inability to produce at the average GS-13 level and [her] dependence on other staff members [was] affecting the ability of the Branch to meet its goals.” Id. at 3. Consequently, OJP was “not willing to approve any requests for advance sick or advance annual leave due to [the plaintiffs] current leave status.” Id. at 3. This did not mean that the plaintiff was not allowed to take any leave; the memorandum indicated that OJP would “approve any request ... to use any accrued sick or annual leave or to use leave without pay (LWOP) to cover [the plaintiffs] absences through the end of the remaining 30 day period,” and that the plaintiff could apply for two voluntary leave bank donor programs or leave under the FMLA. Id. (emphasis added). The plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to provide “within five (5) calendar days from” July 20, 2007, the date of the memorandum, “any additional information, including documentation from [her] doctor, which [she] believefd would] assist [DOJ] in the review of’ her status, if the plaintiff did not agree with the memorandum’s assessment. Id.

Three days after receiving the memorandum alerting her that no requests for advance sick leave would be approved, the plaintiff nonetheless submitted, on July 23, 2007, a request for advance sick .leave, Def.’s Mot. Ex. 30 at 2, ECF No. 55-23, which was denied, Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 36 at 32:12-14.

e) The Plaintiff’s Belief That Advance Sick Leave Denials Were Discriminatory

The plaintiff alleges that the denial of her advance sick leave requests was discriminatory because “there were others that were being advanced leave or there were [sic] speculation that others were being advanced leave,” who were not African-Americans. See Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 3 at 92:19-93:1, EOF No. 59-8. The plaintiff does not identify who these “others” were, stating that she “didn’t go to the non-African Americans to say are you getting advanced leave, you know, was yours advanced, but because people’s business never stayed personal in our office, somewhere along the line, somebody, whether it was the time keeper or somebody in the front office, would say well so and so just got their leave approved, but this one’s leave was denied.” Id. at 93:2-10. The plaintiff stated that she obtained the information supporting this allegation “secondhand” and not “from the source,” id. 93:18-24, and was unable to name any coworkers who had their advance leave requests denied, id. at 95:5-17.

4. Charging Plaintiff With Tardiness (2007 generally)

The plaintiff claims that she was racially discriminated against because she was forced to take leave if she arrived to work late, while other employees were given a fifteen minute “grace period” after their scheduled start times. See Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 3 at 99:1-18. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that if she failed to arrive at work by 8:00 a.m., Mongelli would require her to submit a leave slip for the time period between 8:00 a.m. and 8:15 a.m. See id. at 101:6-23. The plaintiff named three non-African-American employees in the customer service branch who were not required to submit leave slips in similar circumstances. See id. at 102:1-104:24. The plaintiff avers that this state of affairs ended after the plaintiff returned from her carpal tunnel release surgery in 2008. Id. at 111:8-13.

5. The Alleged Assault (August 14, 2007)

A portion of the plaintiffs hostile work environment and retaliation claims, based on race and disability, pertains to an August 14, 2007 incident, in which the plaintiff claims she was assaulted and battered by Mongelli. See Pl.’s Opp’n Mem. at 15-17. No witnesses to this incident, aside from the plaintiff and Mongelli, are identified. See Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 36 at 85:16-19. The investigator assigned to resolve the matter wrote that his “analysis of the incident is inconclusive.” Def.’s Mot. Ex. 41 (Report of Investigation (“Inv.Rep.”)) at 2, EOF No. 55-33.

On the morning of August 14, 2007, Mongelli and the plaintiff sent each other a series of emails regarding an alleged inaccuracy in the plaintiffs leave slips. See id.; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 9 at 203:21-205:12, ECF No. 59-14. At approximately 12:30 p.m., Mongelli went to the plaintiffs cubicle to discuss the matter with her. Inv. Rep. at 2; see Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 9 at 205:6-15; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 36 at 77:15-18. Mongelli states she was frustrated with the plaintiff at the time, walked into the plaintiffs cubicle unannounced, looked over the plaintiffs shoulder, saw that the plaintiff was composing an e-mail, and said “More e-mails.” Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 9 at 206:2-10; id. at 207:12-208:6; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 4 at 24.

“At this point, the parties do not agree about what happened next.” Inv. Rep. at 2. According to Mongelli, the plaintiff became angry and told Mongelli “she was sick of [Mongelli] walking in on [the plaintiff] and that [the plaintiff] wanted [Mongelli] to announce herself.” Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 9 at 210:5-12. Mongelli states the plaintiff then said she was “sick of it and she was going to go to EEO right now.” Id. at 210:11-19. At that point, according to Mongelli, the plaintiff stood up, pushed her chair back, and “bammed into” Mongelli, causing Mongelli to “rock[] to the side of the cubicle” while the plaintiff “barged right on out the door.” Id. at 212:10-14. Mongelli states that the plaintiff did not climb over a chair to leave her cubicle and that she did not block the plaintiffs exit. Id. at 215:10-19.

The plaintiff alleges that she and Mongelli exchanged words over whether Mongelli should knock before entering the plaintiff’s cubicle, Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 36 at 78:10-16, after which the plaintiff states she stood up and “said well, [she was] going to make a complaint to EEO. [She was] going to make another complaint.” Id. at 78:16-18. The plaintiff alleges, Mongelli stepped back, but did not clear a path for the plaintiff to move through the entry to her cubicle. Id. at 78:18-20, causing the plaintiff to say “excuse me” and “climb[ ] over [her] guest chair” to exit the cubicle. See id. at 78:20-79:1. At that point, the plaintiff alleges, Mongelli “went to block [her] to prevent [her] from leaving and pushed [her], bumped into [her] and bumped [her] into the wall.” Id. at 79:2-5. The plaintiff asserts that she had to grab the wall to keep from falling. Id. at 79:6-7. The DOJ investigator assigned to the case states that neither woman was “physically harmed” by the incident and, due to the small size and cluttered nature of the plaintiffs work area, “it would be difficult for the occupant to leave without touching the visitor regardless of intent.” Inv. Rep. at 3. The investigator noted that the plaintiff and Mongelli were each “convinced that [the incident] was an intentional action on the part of the other.” Id.

The official report of the incident from the Federal Protective Service states, based on interviews of both Mongelli and the plaintiff, that “it has been determined that there was never an assault that had ever occurred on either individuals [sic] part. This case is closed due to no criminal activity.” Def.’s Mot. Ex. 42 at 6, ECF No. 55-34.

The plaintiff describes this incident as “workplace violence” and alleges that her supervisor was retaliating against her for the plaintiffs EEO activity, about which Mongelli had recently become aware. See Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 36 at 84:1-7. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that Mongelli became aware of her EEO activities on August 7, 2007 when a union representative forwarded an email to Mongelli mentioning the plaintiffs activities. See Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 31 (email, dated Aug. 7, 2007, betwfeen plaintiff and union representatives forwarded to Mongelli and Suttington) at 5, ECF No. 59-31 (mentioning “discussions. [the plaintiff] ... had with EEO (re: discrimination complaint) and Personnel (re: reasonable accommodation form and workers comp for my hand).”). The plaintiff claims that the DOJ’s failure to discipline Mongelli was, at least partially, due to the plaintiffs race. See Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 3 at 208:4-25 (“[I]f the situation had been reversed, if [the plaintiff] were the one to assault [Mongelli], action would have been taken against [the plaintiff].”).

C. The Plaintiffs EEO Complaint

The plaintiff initiated the EEO Complaint process on July 25, 2007 “by contacting the OJP’s Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) Office.” Pl.’s SMF ¶ 32. The complaint was apparently triggered by the July 20, 2007 memorandum in which the plaintiff was advised that she would not be granted advance sick leave and that she was not allowed to return to work until she could perform' all of her duties. Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1 at 1, ECF No. 55-1 (EEO Counselor’s Report, Oct. 19, 2007, referring to July 20, 2007 memorandum requiring use of leave for remaining time period when plaintiff could not use keyboard); see supra Part I.B.3.d. The EEO Counselor’s report describes the plaintiffs “Specific Allegation(s)” as being that “the agency discriminated against her because of her race (Black), and physical disability (Carpal Tunnel Syndrome), when she was subjected to a hostile work environment and time and attendance issues.” Id. at 1. Two specific incidents were cited: the July 20, 2007 memorandum “requiring [the plaintiff] to use sick or annual.leave, or to use leave without pay (LWOP) to cover absences associated with the 30-day no keyboarding restriction invoked by her physician,” and the August 14, 2007 incident where the plaintiff “allege[d] that her 1st Line Supervisor bumped her while existing [sic] her cubicle.” Id.

The plaintiff completed pre-counseling efforts without reaching a resolution of her complaints, which resulted in her receiving a “Notice of Right to File a Discrimination Complaint.” Pl.’s SMF ¶ 35. The plaintiffs official “Complaint of Discrimination” was received by the OJP’s EEO office on October 25, 2007. Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 37 (the “EEO Complaint”) at 2, ECF No. 59-35. In her EEO Complaint, the plaintiff alleges that she was denied “reasonable leave relating to asthma and occupational carpal tunnel syndrome; [discriminatory distribution of work assignments; [h]ostile work environment and work place [sic] violence; and Reprisal.” Id. Not all of the issues raised in the EEO Complaint were accepted for investigation. Pl.’s SMF ¶ 37; Def.’s Mot. Ex. 5 (Acceptance and Partial Dismissal of Complaint of Discrimination) at 2, ECF No. 55-5. The EEO office agreed to investigate the plaintiffs racial and right-hand CTS disability discrimination and retaliation claims based on the July 20, 2007 memorandum and the bumping incident. Def.’s Mot. Ex. 5 at 1. The office initially rejected any claims based on the alleged discriminatory work assignment practices because these claims were not raised with the EEO Counselor. Id. at 2.

The plaintiff requested reconsideration of the EEO office’s decision not to investigate her work assignment claim. Pl.’s SMF ¶ 39; Def.’s Mot. Ex. 6 (Request for Reconsideration of. Partial Dismissed Claim) at 2, ECF No. 55-6. The OJP EEO office granted the appeal for investigative purposes and added the plaintiffs “claim of racially discriminatory assignment of work,” based on the August 2, 2007 reassignment of the Excess Cash Project back to the plaintiff, in light of the plaintiffs allegation that “work assignments are permanently reassigned for non African-Americans.” Pl.’s SMF. ¶ 40; Def.’s Mot. Ex. 7 (Amended Acceptance Notice of Complaint of Discrimination) at 1, ECF No. 55-7.

On April 29, 2010, the DOJ’s Complaints Adjudication Office issued its Final Agency Decision (“FAD”) as requested by the plaintiff. Pl.’s SMF ¶ 43; Def.’s Mot. Ex. 11 (“FAD”), ECF No. 55-11. The FAD denied (1) the plaintiffs discriminatory work assignment claim, without reaching the merits, because this claim was not discussed with the EEO Counselor at the informal complaint stage and was not “like or related to” the plaintiffs original complaint, FAD at 23; and (2) the plaintiffs claims based on the bumping incident and the July 20, 2007 memorandum, on the merits, upon finding that the DOJ had not engaged in discriminatory conduct, id. at 5-13.

D. Procedural History

The plaintiff filed the instant action on August 2, 2010, ECF Docket Entry 1 (noting date of filing as August 2, 2010), accompanied by a motion to accept the complaint as being timely filed on July 30, 2010, see generally Pl.’s Mot. Accept Her Compl. As Filed On July 30, 2010, ECF No. 2. The plaintiff mistakenly believed she could not file her complaint in the night drop box for the District Court. See id. at 3. The defendant opposed the plaintiffs motion and subsequently filed a motion to dismiss based on the untimeliness of the complaint. See generally Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 6. Since the plaintiffs opposition referenced material outside of the pleadings, the Court notified the parties that the defendant’s motion to dismiss would be treated as a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d). See Minute Order, Aug. 9, 2011.

Following the submission of additional material in response to the Court’s Order, the Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiffs motion in part and denied it in part, equitably tolling the time to file the plaintiffs complaint until August 2, 2010, making the complaint timely. See Order at 1, ECF-No. 14; Smith v. Holder, 806 F.Supp.2d 59, 64 (D.D.C.2011).

The complaint alleges four counts: “Race Discrimination-Hostile Work Environment” under Title VII, 42 U,S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-16, Compl. ¶¶ 240-47 (Count I); “Disability Discrimination” under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791, Compl. ¶¶ 248-59 (Count II); Retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), Compl. ¶¶ 260-70 (Count III); and Retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791, Compl. ¶¶271-78 (Count IV). The plaintiff seeks (1) “A declaratory judgment that the [defendant] discriminated and retaliated against plaintiff[;]” (2) reassignment to “a position elsewhere in the [DOJ] at the same grade level she now has, in which she would not need to keyboard as much as she now does[;]” (3) “reasonable accommodations for her disabilities[;]” (4) attorneys’ fees under the Rehabilitation Act; (5) $300,000 in compensatory damages “for emotional distress and aggravation of her disabilities^]” and (6) “Restoration of 251 hours of leave which the [defendant] denied plaintiff between 2007 and 2008.

After the Court’s ruling on the defendant’s initial motion to dismiss, the parties engaged in a protracted discovery and negotiation process, including two extensions of time for the defendant to file an answer, Minute Orders, Aug. 31, 2011 and Sept. 15, 2011; three settlement conferences before a Magistrate Judge, Minute Entries, Nov. 10, 2011, Nov. 17, 2011, Nov. 30, 2011; four extensions of time to the agreed upon initial briefing schedule for dispositive motions, see Minute Orders Dec. 23, 2011, Jan. 10, 2012, Jan. 23, 2012, Feb. 7, 2012; five extensions of the deadline for discovery, see Minute Orders Mar. 16, 2012, May 30, 2012, Aug. 31, 2012, Nov. 5, 2012, Dec. 5, 2012; a referral for alternative dispute resolution, Minute Order, Mar. 8, 2013; and another extension of time to file responses to renewed dispositive motions, Minute Order, June 7, 2013. The Court also allowed the parties to clarify their positions regarding the alleged retaliatory acts on which Counts III and IV are based. Minute Order, Mar. 31, 2014. In total, the parties engaged in well over a full year of discovery in addition to two separate attempts at settlement and mediation. The parties’ submissions on the instant motion include ninety exhibits, totaling over 1,200 pages, all of which have been carefully reviewed by the Court.

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is properly granted against a party who, “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, ... fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that there is an “absence of a genuine issue of material fact” in dispute. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and shall accept the nonmoving party’s evidence as true. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (“Liberty Lobby”), 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Court is only required to consider the materials explicitly cited by the parties, but may on its own accord consider “other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). For a factual dispute to be “genuine,” the nonmoving party must establish more than “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of [its] position,” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, and cannot rely on “mere allegations” or conclusory statements, see Veitch v. England, 471 F.3d 124, 134 (D.C.Cir.2006); Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Cir.1999); Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 154 (D.C.Cir.1993); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Rather, the nonmoving party must present specific facts that would enable a reasonable jury to find in its favor. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post Props., 633 F.3d 1136, 1141 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.2011) (noting that at summary judgment stage, plaintiff “can no longer rest on such ‘mere allegations,’ but must ‘set forth’ by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts,’ ... which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true.’ ” (quoting Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898-99 (D.C.Cir.2002)) (ellipsis and alterations in original)). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted).

“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In that situation, “[t]he moving party is ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law’ because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Id. Notably, “[s]elf-serving testimony does not create genuine issues of material fact, especially where that very testimony suggests that corroborating evidence should be readily available.” Fields v. Office of Johnson, 520 F.Supp.2.d 101, 105 (D.D.C.2007). Additionally, “on summary judgment, statements that are impermissible hearsay or that are not based on personal knowledge are precluded from consideration by the Court.” Riggsbee v. Diversity Servs., Inc., 637 F.Supp.2d 39, 46 (D.D.C.2009); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (“An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.”); see also Gleklen v. Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., Inc., 199 F.3d 1365, 1369 (D.C.Cir.2000) (holding that “[v]erdicts cannot rest on inadmissible evidence” and “sheer hearsay ... therefore counts for nothing” at summary judgment).

“Evaluating whether evidence offered at summary judgment is sufficient to send a case to the jury,” however, “is as much art as science.” Estate of Parsons v. Palestinian Auth., 651 F.3d 118, 123 (D.C.Cir.2011). Particularly in a case such as this where the non-moving party relies almost entirely upon her own generally uncorroborated statements in depositions, declarations, and interrogatory responses to create a genuine issue of material fact, the Court must carefully assess whether the plaintiffs evidence is “merely colorable,” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, or whether “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The Court must review the record “taken as a whole.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). The Court must accept all of the non-movant’s evidence as true and give her the benefit of all justifiable inferences. See id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The Court “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence,” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, as “[cjredibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Id. (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505). Nevertheless, a non-movant’s allegations that “are generalized, conclusory and uncorroborated by any evidence other than the [non-movant’s] own deposition testimony” are “insufficient to establish a triable issue of fact” — at least where the nature of the purported factual dispute reasonably suggests that corroborating evidence should be available. Akridge v. Gallaudet Univ., 729 F.Supp.2d 172, 183 (D.D.C.2010); see also GE v. Jackson, 595 F.Supp.2d 8, 36 (D.D.C.2009) (observing that when a “declaration is self-serving and uncorroborated” it is “of little value at the summary judgment stage”).

B. Title VII Discrimination Claims

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Under Title VII, “the two essential elements of a discrimination claim are that (i) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action (ii) because of the plaintiffs race, color, religion, sex, [or] national origin.” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1196 (D.C.Cir.2008); accord Brady v. Office of the Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C.Cir.2008). An “adverse employment action” is “ ‘a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in benefits.’ ” Baird v. Gotbaum, 662 F.3d 1246, 1248 (D.C.Cir.2011) (quoting Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C.Cir.2009)); see also Stewart v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 422, 426 (D.C.Cir.2003) (“An [a]dverse employment action ... [entails a] tangible employment action evidenced by firing, failing to promote, a considerable change in benefits, or reassignment with significantly different responsibilities.”). An adverse employment action occurs if an employee “experiences materially adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or future employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could find objectively tangible harm.” Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127, 1131 (D.C.Cir.2002).

The Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), set forth a burden-shifting framework to apply in Title VII cases. Under this framework, once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case under Title VII, “the burden of production shifts to the employer to produce a ‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’ for its action.” Solomon v. Vilsack, 763 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C.Cir.2014) (quoting Wiley v. Glassman, 511 F.3d 151, 155 (D.C.Cir.2007)); see also Hernandez v. Pritzker, 741 F.3d 129, 133 (D.C.Cir.2013); Youssef v. FBI, 687 F.3d 397, 402 (D.C.Cir.2012). Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, “the burden shifts to the employer to articulate ‘some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’ for the employment action, which the plaintiff can rebut by proving, under a preponderance of the evidence standard, -that the employer’s justification is merely pretext for discrimination.” Brown v. Sessoms, 774 F.3d 1016, 1022-23 (D.C.Cir.2014); see also Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 678 (D.C.Cir.2009). In other words, once an employer produces a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, “ ‘the sole remaining issue [is] discrimination ... vel non.’ ” Kersey v. Wash. Met. Area Transit Auth., 586 F.3d 13, 17 (D.C.Cir.2009) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)) (first alteration in original).

C. Rehabilitation Act Claims

“[T]he Rehabilitation Act prohibits federal agencies from engaging in employment discrimination against disabled individuals and further requires agencies to make reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities unless such accommodations would impose undue hardship on the agency.” Klute v. Shinseki, 840 F.Supp.2d 209, 215 (D.D.C.2012) (quoting Nurriddin v. Bolden, 674 F.Supp.2d 64, 82 (D.D.C.2009)). “To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation, the agency should ‘initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified individual with a disability in need of accommodation.’ ” Loya v. Sebelius, 840 F.Supp.2d 245, 258 (D.D.C.2012) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)). “ ‘[A]n employer is not required to provide an employee that accommodation [s]he requests or prefers, the employer need only provide some reasonable accommodation.’ ” Id. (quoting Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1305 (D.C.Cir.1998) (en banc)) (alteration in original).

To survive summary judgment on a Rehabilitation Act claim, a plaintiff must “come forward with sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that” she meets four elements: “(i) she was disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act; (ii) her employer had notice of her disability; (iii) she was able to perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (iv) her employer denied her request for a reasonable accommodation of that disability.” Solomon, 763 F.3d at 9 (internal citations omitted).

“An individual is disabled [within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act] if [s]he: (1) has ‘a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of [her] major life áctivities,’ (2) has ‘a record of such impairment,’ or (3) has been ‘regarded as having such an impairment.’ ” Klute, 840 F.Supp.2d at 215 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (incorporating into the Rehabilitation Act the Americans with Disabilities Act’s (“ADA”) definition of disabled individual). To be substantially limiting, “an ‘impairment’s impact must ... be permanent or long term.’ ” Klute, 840 F.Supp.2d at 216 (quoting Haynes v. Williams, 392 F.3d 478, 482 (D.C.Cir.2004)).

D. Title VII Retaliation Claims

“Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision makes it unlawful for an employer ‘to discriminate against [an] employee ... because he has opposed any practice’ made unlawful by Title VII or ‘has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in’ a Title VII proceeding.” Steele v. Schafer, 535 F.3d 689, 695 (D.C.Cir.2008) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). The Court assesses Title VII retaliation claims under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See supra Part II.B. First, the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of retaliation by showing: “(1) [s]he engaged in protected activity; (2) [s]he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Hamilton, 666 F.3d at 1357 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the prima facie case is made, the defendant must establish that the adverse employment action was “taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.” Youssef, 687 F.3d at 402 (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)). The Court then determines “whether a reasonable jury ‘could infer discrimination’ ” from the plaintiffs pleadings, the defendant’s proffered explanation, and any further rebuttal evidence or evidence of discrimination provided by the plaintiff. Vickers v. Powell, 493 F.3d 186, 195 (quoting Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289).

As to the first element, protected activity encompasses' utilizing informal grievance procedures such as complaining to management or human resources about the discriminatory conduct. Richardson v. Gutierrez, 477 F.Supp.2d 22, 27 (D.D.C.2007) (“It is well settled that Title VII protects informal, as well as formal, complaints of discrimination.”); see also Bell v. Gonzales, 398 F.Supp.2d 78, 94 (D.D.C.2005) (“Initiation of EEO counseling to explore whether an employee has a basis for alleging discrimination constitutes protected activity, even in the absence of an unequivocal allegation of discrimination.”).

A plaintiff meets the second element to show a prima facie case of retaliation if “a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse,” meaning that it “might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White (Burlington Northern), 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, adverse actions giving rise to retaliation claims are broader than for disparate impact claims and “are ‘not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment.” Baird, 662 F.3d at 1249 (quoting Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 64, 126 S.Ct. 2405). Yet, the Court in Burlington Northern distinguished “materially adverse” actions from “trivial harms,” “petty slights,” and “minor annoyances.” Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405. The Court also noted that “[cjontext matters” and “the significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances.” Id. at 69, 126 S.Ct. 2405; see also id. (“[A]n act that would be immaterial in some situations Is material in others.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Finally, the third element of the test requiring a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action requires “proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.” Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2528, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013). In other words, “traditional principles of but-for causation” apply and the plaintiff must show “that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.” Id. at 2533.

Significantly, however, even if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie ease of retaliation, dismissal may still be warranted if the defendant shows a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Broderick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (D.C.Cir.2006). Such a legitimate reason breaks the causal connection between the first two elements and defeats a retaliation claim. Then “the ‘central question’ in [the] case is whether [the plaintiff] has produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find those reasons were but pretexts for retaliation.” Hernandez v. Pritzker, 741 F.3d 129, 133 (D.C.Cir.2013); see also McGrath v. Clinton, 666 F.3d 1377, 1383 (D.C.Cir.2012).

E. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

A plaintiff may file a Title VII or Rehabilitation Act action in federal court only after exhausting her administrative remedies before the relevant federal agency for each allegedly discriminatory act. See Payne v. Salazar, 619 F.3d 56, 65 (D.C.Cir.2010) (Title VII); Barkley v. U.S. Marshals Serv. ex rel. Hylton, 766 F.3d 25, 34-35 (D.C.Cir.2014) (Rehabilitation Act, citing Spinelli v. Goss, 446 F.3d 159, 162 (D.C.Cir.2006)). Under the Rehabilitation Act, a failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a jurisdictional defect, requiring dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). See Spinelli 446 F.3d at 162 (remanding case since “[t]he district court also should have dismissed [the plaintiffs] Rehabilitation Act claim for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedy,” citing statutory language as “mandating administrative exhaustion”); see also Barkley, 766 F.3d at 3435 (D.C.Cir.2014) (noting Spinelli’s holding “that a district court lacks jurisdiction over a Rehabilitation Act claim if “there was no administrative complaint [filed] and thus no final disposition of one.” (alteration in original)). Since exhaustion of Rehabilitation Act claims “is a jurisdictional requirement,” the plaintiff has the burden to plead and prove it. Dick v. Holder, No. 13-1060, 80 F.Supp.3d 103, 110, 2015 WL 691189, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 2015).

By contrast, “Title VII’s exhaustion requirements are not jurisdictional.” Artis v. Bernanke, 630 F.3d 1031, 1034 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.2011) (citations omitted). “Accordingly, a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is the appropriate vehicle to challenge an alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies under Title VII.” Mahoney v. Donovan, 824 F.Supp.2d 49, 58 (D.D.C.2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Because untimely exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of pleading and proving it.” Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C.Cir.1997) (citation omitted). “In other words, odd as it may seem, Defendants carry the burden of proof under Title VII while Plaintiff bears that burden under the Rehabilitation Act.” Mahoney, 824 F.Supp.2d at 58.

The procedures governing administrative processing of discrimination complaints brought by employees of the federal government under the Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act are set forth in 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105. These regulations require an employee to “consult a[n EEOC] Counsel- or prior to filing a complaint in order to try to informally resolve the matter.” Id. § 1614.105(a). “An aggrieved person must initiate contact with a Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory----” Id. § 1614.105(a)(1).

If the matter is not resolved through informal counseling, the aggrieved employee must, within 15 days of receiving a notice of her right to file a discrimination complaint, file a written complaint with the agency that allegedly discriminated against her. See id. § 1614.106(a)-(c). The agency must investigate the matter within 180 days or reject the complaint and issue a final dismissal unless “the parties agree in writing to extend the time period.” Id. §§ 1614.106(e)(2), 1614.107. At the conclusion of the agency’s investigation, the complainant may request a hearing before an EEOC administrative judge or an immediate final decision by the agency. See id. § 1614.108(f).

A complainant who receives an adverse final decision from the agency may appeal that decision to the EEOC within 30 days, or may file a civil action within 90 days. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.402(a)-1614.407; see also Wilson v. Pena, 79 F.3d 154, 157 (D.C.Cir.1996); Holley v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 245-46 (3d Cir.1999). A complainant also may file a civil action at any time after a complaint has been pending before the agency or the EEOC for at least 180 days. See 42 U.S.C.2000e-16(c); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.408.

“Complainants must timely exhaust these administrative remedies before bringing their claims to court.” Bowden, 106 F.3d at 437. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, “ ‘strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.’ ” 536 U.S. 101, 108, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (quoting Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980)).

III. DISCUSSION

The four claims in the Complaint will be considered based on the underlying discrimination claimed. Thus, Counts I and III, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII, will be discussed separately from Counts II and TV, alleging disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs Rehabilitation Act claims fail based on the threshold finding that the plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act and the plaintiff otherwise failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to those claims. Those two counts are addressed first before turning to the Title VII counts.

A. Rehabilitation Act Claims

The plaintiff cannot sustain her Rehabilitation Act claims in Counts II and IV because the plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act in effect at the time the allegedly discriminatory actions occurred. As discussed more fully below, the applicable definition of “disabled” is too narrow to cover the plaintiffs right-hand CTS. Furthermore, to the extent that the plaintiff bases her Rehabilitation Act claims on events occurring after January 1, 2009, those allegations were not administratively exhausted, thus depriving this Court of subject matter jurisdiction.

1. The Pre-2009 Definition Of “Disabled” Applies To This Action

The threshold determination for any action under the Rehabilitation Act is whether the individual making a claim is “disabled” within the meaning of the statute. See, e.g., Bell, 398 F.Supp.2d at 85 (“[A] key element is establishment of a disability covered by the Act.”). The defendant challenges the plaintiffs Rehabilitation Act claims at the outset by arguing she is not “disabled” within the meaning of the Act. See Def.’s Mem. at 29; Def.’s Reply at 9. The Court agrees with the defendant.

As the plaintiff notes, what constitutes a “disability” under the Rehabilitation Act changed on January 1, 2009, when Congressional amendments to the ADA went into effect. See Pl.’s Resp. Court Order (“Pl.’s Resp.”) at 5 n.5, ECF No. 65 (citing Pub. Law No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (“the ADA Amendments”)). The ADA Amendments “reinstated] a broad scope of protection under the ADA and [rejected] the holdings in” two Supreme Court cases, namely, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams (Toyota), 534 U.S. 184, 195-96, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002), and Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). Lytes v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 572 F.3d 936, 939 (D.C.Cir.2009). The D.C. Circuit has made clear that these amendments “do not apply retroactively.” Id. at 938.

The plaintiff argues that “when, as here, some of the alleged disability discrimination occurred after January 1, 2009,” the amended, br