Citations
- 108 F. Supp. 3d 963
Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION
JAMES O. BROWNING, District Judge.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Individual DOH Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Thirteenth Amendment Claim and Supporting Memorandum, filed' March 6, 2014 (Doc. 22)(“MTD”). The Court held a hearing on October 23, 2014. The primary issues are: (i) whether Defendants Dan Sandoval, Roger Adams, Joseph Mateju, and Beth Schaefer (collectively “Individual DOH Defendants”) violated Plaintiff A.M.’s right to be free from involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America when they transferred Plaintiff A.M. to the Homestead House, a private, unlicensed group shelter for elderly people; and, (ii) whether qualified immunity protects the Individual DOH Defendants. The Court will grant the MTD because the Individual DOH Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The Court concludes that: (i) the work that M. Evans forced A.M. to perform constituted involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States; (ii) the Individual DOH Defendants proximately caused M. Evans’ violation of A.M.’s Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude; and (iii) the Individual DOH Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, because proximate causation for Thirteenth Amendment violations was not clearly established in 1979. Consequently, the Court will grant the MTD.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Court takes its facts from the Complaint, as it must when considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court has reorganized the factual material in the Complaint, however, to explain the facts more clearly.
1. The Parties.
A.M. is a sixty-six-year-old woman who has been diagnosed with various developmental disabilities. See Complaint ¶ 66, at 18. A.M. was involuntarily committed to the New Mexico Department of Health (“DOH”) by court order on May 8, 1963, when she was sixteen years old, because her developmental disabilities rendered her unable to care for herself. See Complaint ¶¶ 67-69, at 18-19. Because of her disabilities, A.M. brings this action through her guardian ad litem, Joleen Youngers. See Complaint ¶ 66, at 18.
The DOH operates all of the facilities that house and treat people with developmental disabilities in the State of New-Mexico. See Complaint ¶ 8, at 4. One of these facilities is the Los Lunas Center for Persons with Developmental Disabilities— formerly known as the Los Lunas Hospital and Training School (“Los Lunas Hospital”). Complaint ¶ 8, at 4. The Fort Stanton Hospital and Training School (“Fort Stanton”) was another DOH facility for individuals with developmental disabilities, and was an affiliate of the Los Lunas Hospital. Complaint ¶¶ 8-9, at 4. Because the Complaint refers to the Los Lunas Hospital and Fort Stanton collectively as the “Training School,” the Court will do so throughout this Memorandum Opinion (“MO”). Complaint ¶ 1, at 1-2; id. ¶ 11, at 4-5. Moreover, because the Complaint refers to the DOH and the Training School collectively as “the DOH Defendants,” the Court will do so throughout this MO. Complaint ¶ 11, at 4.
Before 1992, the New Mexico Human Services Department (“HSD”) was responsible for operating Adult Protective Services (“APS”) in New Mexico. Complaint ¶ 22, at 8. APS is responsible for protecting adults with developmental disabilities from exploitation, abuse, and neglect. See Complaint ¶ 22, at 8. APS must also ensure that those adults receive the treatment and social services that they need. See Complaint ¶ 22, at 8. From 1992 to 2005, the New Mexico Children Youth and Families Department (“CYFD”) inherited HSD’s responsibilities for all protective services in the state, including APS. Complaint ¶ 23, at 8. CYFD was responsible for the continuing coordination and supervision of APS, for adopting rules and regulations necessary to implement and operate APS, and for evaluating APS’ effectiveness. See Complaint ¶ 23, at 8. In 2005, the New Mexico Aging and Long-Term Services Department (“ALTSD”) inherited APS from CYFD, and has since then operated APS. Complaint ¶ 24, at 8-9. Similar to its predecessors, the ALTSD is responsible for the continuing coordination and supervision of APS, for adopting rules and regulations necessary to implement and operate APS, and for evaluating APS’ effectiveness. See Complaint ¶ 25, at 9. Because the Complaint refers to the ALTSD, APS, and the DOH Defendants as the “State Agency Defendants,” the Court will do so throughout this MO. Complaint ¶ 27, at 9.
Schaefer was an attorney for the DOH and the Training School from September 13, 1976, to December 31, 2001. See Complaint ¶ 14, at 5. Sandoval was the Director of Resident Living for the Training School between 1979 and 1985. See Complaint ¶ 16, at 5. As Director of Resident Living, Sandoval was in charge of social services and the Training School’s social workers. See Complaint ¶ 45, at 12. Sandoval was also a member of the Training School’s Screening Committee on Admissions and Releases (“SCAR”) and, at times, its chairman. Complaint ¶ 16, at 6.
Defendant Roger Adams was the Training School’s Deputy Administrator or Acting Administrator “during the relevant time period.” Complaint ¶ 18, at 6. Adams made hundreds of decisions regarding the-placement and treatment of Training School residents — including the Training School’s placement and discharge decisions relating to AM. See Complaint ¶ 18, at 6. Adams chaired SCAR, attended most SCAR meetings, and approved A.M.’s discharge from aftercare without taking any steps to ascertain whether she would be safe or have her medical and other needs met. See Complaint ¶ 18, at 6.
Defendant Joseph Mateju was the Training School Administrator “during the relevant time period.” Complaint ¶ 20, at 7. As Administrator, he made the final decisions regarding the placement and treatment of Training School residents, and all placement and discharge decisions relating to A.M. See Complaint ¶ 20, at 7. He also had the authority to unilaterally accept and remove individuals from the Training School. See Complaint ¶ 20, at 7. Mateju was responsible for the placement of many residents — including A.M. — into third-party homes, boarding homes, and other outside facilities. See Complaint ¶ 20, at 7. Mateju personally attended SCAR meetings during which A.M. was discussed, and he personally approved decisions regarding her discharge from DOH treatment without taking any steps to ascertain whether she would be safe or have serious medical and other needs addressed. See Complaint ¶ 20, at 7. Mateju had responsibility for ensuring that appropriate measures were taken to: (i) provide for A.M.’s health, safety, and well-being; (ii) ensure that she received appropriate services; and (iii) ensure that AM. continued to receive those services in any third-party placements. See Complaint ¶ 20, at 7-8.
2. The Aftercare Program.
Over a period of two decades — through the 1970s and 1980s — the DOH Defendants systematically transferred hundreds of developmentally disabled individuals from state institutions to various private third parties throughout New Mexico. See Complaint ¶ 2, at 2;- id. ¶ 37, at 10. These private third parties ranged from boarding homes to private residences and commercial enterprises. See Complaint ¶ 2, at 2. The Defendants called this program “aftercare”; the developmentally disabled individuals placed with third parties through the aftercare program were called “aftercare residents.” Complaint ¶ 2, at 2; id. ¶ 38, at 11.
The Defendants placed aftercare residents with private third parties “without anyone’s informed consent, without the appointment of guardians or any other legally-authorized surrogate decision-makers, without permission 'from the courts that committed them to the state institutions ..., and without due process of law.” Complaint ¶ 3, at 2. In some cases, the Defendants contacted ex parte the judicial authorities that had committed aftercare residents to the Training School and “provided misleading information to them concerning the status of individuals discharged from the Training School.” Complaint ¶ 3, at 2-3. In other cases, the Defendants did not communicate with the judicial authorities that committed individuals to the Training School before transferring those individuals to private third parties. See Complaint ¶ 3, at 2-3.
After transferring aftercare residents to their third-party placements, the DOH and the Individual DOH Defendants “abandoned” them. Complaint ¶ 3, at 2. The DOH and the Individual DOH Defendants neither provided them with the services that they needed, nor protected them from abuse, neglect, or exploitation. See Complaint ¶.3, at 2. When the events alleged in the Complaint occurred, approximately eight social workers at the Training School oversaw 431 aftercare residents, “while also performing social work duties for hundreds of people still residing” at the Training School. Complaint ¶ 48, at 13. Although Training School policies required Training School personnel to oversee and conduct periodic visits of aftercare residents, the DOH Defendants “did not use any system to ensure that residents in aftercare would be safe or that they would receive minimally adequate services.” Complaint ¶ 43, at 12.
Sandoval, despite being charged with overseeing the Training School’s social workers, “did not know of any guidelines on how residents in aftercare placements would be cared for, did not know of a system to follow up with those residents, and did not know of a system ... to know how many residents were placed in private third-party placements.” Complaint ¶ 49, at 13. Sandoval did not know “what the conditions of the residents was” or “what services they needed.” Complaint ¶ 49, at 13.
Training School administrators — including the Individual DOH Defendants — were aware that the social workers assigned to oversee aftercare placements often did not visit aftercare residents in their third-party placements. See Complaint ¶ 47, at 12. They were aware that the social workers— when they checked on the aftercare residents at all — usually relied on telephone calls to the private third parties who administered the placements rather than an in-person contact. See Complaint ¶ 47, at 12-13. Training School administrators— including Adams, Mateju, and Schaefer— had frequent conversations about the problem of social workers’ failure to make their required visits or to contact aftercare residents. See Complaint ¶ 51, at 13-14. The DOH Defendants and the Individual DOH Defendants were “well aware of the dangers residents faced due to the way in which the aftercare program was operated, but they proceeded anyway.” Complaint ¶ 52, at 14.
The “well-known failure” of the Training School’s social workers to provide oversight for aftercare residents drove the DOH Defendants and the Individual DOH Defendants to “discharge” Training School residents from aftercare “whenever and however possible.” Complaint ¶ 53, at 14. Schaefer supervised changes to the Training School’s discharge procedures in the late 1970s and early 1980s. See Complaint ¶ 55, at 14. Specifically, Schaefer told Training School administrators that “there were too many residents on aftercare” and recommended that the Training School discharge residents from aftercare. Complaint ¶ 54, at 14. Sometime between September 1978 and the end of 1980, Schaefer began advising that all aftercare residents should be discharged from the Training School “without judicial review and without any due process protections whatsoever.” Complaint ¶ 57, at 15.
Schaefer told Training School administrators that “the state institutions’ custody of people committed to the institution by court order automatically lapsed” on the New Mexico Mental Health Code’s effec-five date of July 1, 1977, despite judicial orders of commitment for an indeterminate period. Complaint ¶ 56, at 15. Schaefer advised Training School administrators that a change in the Mental Health Code meant that the court orders committing aftercare residents to State custody were void — regardless whether the residents’ original placements with private third parties had been judicially reviewed. See Complaint ¶ 56, at 15. Schaefer explained to Training School administrators and staff that “it’s different now and you don’t need a discharge order signed by a judge.” Complaint ¶ 61, at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
According to Schaefer, Training School administrators were “reluctant to proceed without a paper trail, so [she] instructed Defendant Adams to ‘just put a note in ... the file that says ... [that the aftercare resident] was discharged.’ ” Complaint ¶ 61, at 17 (alterations in Complaint). Once there was a “piece of paper in the file,” residents could be, in Schaefer’s words, “cut loose” from the Training School without consideration of judicial orders, the residents’ health and safety, or the residents’ need for services. Complaint ¶ 61, at 17. Schaefer neither conducted legal research nor consulted legal experts in developing these new discharge policies. See Complaint ¶ 56, at 15.
Schaefer acknowledged that former Training School residents were particularly vulnerable, and in danger of abuse and exploitation, once they were no longer under the Training School’s supervision. See Complaint ¶ 60, at 16-17. Schaefer was aware when she designed and directed the new aftercare discharge policy that Training School personnel had not, done any discharge planning for aftercare residents, and had failed to make contact with residents before or after their discharge, to assure their health and safety, and to assure that they were not being abused or exploited. See Complaint ¶ 59, at 16. Schaefer considered the fallout from the danger that such a policy posed to aftercare residents “to be merely a public relations issue, not a legal obstacle.” Complaint ¶ 61, at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under Schaefer’s direction, Training School administrators “deliberately decided not to appoint surrogate decision-makers for its residents or to otherwise provide procedural due process” before removing residents’ names from the Training School’s rolls. Complaint ¶ 57, at 15. “Training School residents were not even informed that they were no longer clients of the Training School.” Complaint ¶ 57, at 15. Aftercare residents “were routinely removed from the rolls of Training School clients” based solely on letters that Mateju sent to the district attorney in the county where each resident was originally committed. Complaint ¶ 65, at 18. These letters did not “supply! ] the background information necessary for discharge, including the circumstances of residents and whether the resident or a responsible adult consented to discharge.” Complaint ¶ 65, at 18. Instead, judicial authorities were “misled into believing that residents consented to and were happy in their placements.” Complaint ¶ 65, at 18.
In Sandoval’s view, “discharge from aftercare was not a complete separation of the Training School’s responsibility for residents.” Complaint ¶ 63, at 17AL8. “Even after residents were discharged from aftercare, the Training School at times took action to respond to allegations of abuse when they came to their attention.” Complaint ¶ 64, at 18. DOH Defendants and Individual DOH Defendants, however, “failed to establish any system permitting residents to complain about their treatment, or any system permitting the Training School to provide oversight at third-party placements.” Complaint ¶ 64, at 18. The DOH Defendants and Individual DOH Defendants decided that discharging residents from aftercare eliminated the need for social worker visits. See Complaint ¶ 51, at 13-14. Sandoval has admitted that he “wouldn’t know whether somebody was going to be taken care of after discharge from aftercare, and it never crossed his mind to be concerned that residents discharged from aftercare might be abused or neglected.” Complaint ¶ 63, at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted)(braekets omitted).
3. AM.
A court order committed A.M. to Fort Stanton or to another state institution on May 8, 1963, when she was sixteen years old. See Complaint ¶ 66, at 18. By 1967, either through transfer or continuing placement, A.M. was a Fort Stanton resident. See Complaint ¶ 66, at 18. On November 12, 1979, the Defendants transferred A.M. to the Homestead House and “abandoned” her there as part of the aftercare program. Complaint ¶ 73, at 20. The Homestead House was a private, unlicensed group shelter for elderly people that M. Evans owned. See Complaint ¶ 73, at 20. A.M. did not know M. Evans before she was transferred to the Homestead House. See Complaint ¶ 73, at 20. The DOH Defendants’ and the Individual DOH Defendants’ transfer of A.M. from Fort Stanton to the Homestead House “was without legal authority.” Complaint ¶ 78, at 20. A.M. was still in the DOH Defendants’ and Individual DOH Defendants’ legal custody after she was placed with M. Evans at the Homestead House. See Complaint ¶ 12, at 5.
The Defendants allege, however, that A.M. was transferred to the Homestead House “pursuant to State District Court Order No. 1/387-388 filed on October 17, 1979 in Case No. CV-SQ-0095-79, Twelfth Judicial District, County of Lincoln” (“Oct. 17, 1979, Order”). MTD 1 at 2. The Oct. 17, 1979, Order reads, in pertinent part:
1. Respondent has a developmental disability which is'so greatly disabling that residential habilitation is in her best interest;
2. Respondent’s habilitation at Fort Stanton Hospital and Training School is not consistent with the least drastic means principle as respondent could benefit from a less restrictive setting such as a community based group home;
3.Placement in a community based program for persons with developmental disabilities is not presently available for respondent.
IT IS ORDERED
That respondent be and hereby is committed to Fort Stanton Hospital and Training School for residential habilitation for a period not to exceed six months;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED
That during the period of extended residential habilitation petitioner shall make application to less restrictive programs on behalf of respondent and shall make every effort to transfer respondent to a less restrictive setting. At the expiration of this order petitioner shall report to this Court concerning its progress toward releasing respondent if further confinement at Fort Stanton Hospital is sought.
Oct. 17,1979, Order.
Neither the Homestead House nor M. Evans was a licensed service provider for people with developmental disabilities. See Complaint ¶ 73, at 20. Neither M. Evans nor any Homestead House employee had the necessary training or experience to properly care for A.M., and M. Evans had no legal right to hold A.M. See Complaint ¶¶ 76, 78, at 20.
A.M. lived with M. Evans for over thirty years. See Complaint ¶ 85, at 23. Although the Defendants retained legal control over A.M. after placing her at the Homestead House, neither the Defendants nor any of their agents checked on A.M. in any fashion. See Complaint ¶¶ 77, at 21; id. ¶ 80, at 22. Instead, the Defendants “eloak[ed] the Homestead House and Mary Evans with untoward authority and absolute control over Plaintiff, who was entirely dependent on this third-party placement for her day-to-day existence.” Complaint ¶ 77, at 21.
At the Homestead House, A.M. was “put to work.” Complaint ¶ 93, at 24-25 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although A.M. performed housekeeping and other services at the Homestead House, M. Evans never compensated her for her work. See Complaint ¶ 93, at 24-25. M. Evans threatened A.M. if she did not work, emotionally abused A.M., and neglected her medical needs. See Complaint ¶ 91, at 24; id. ¶ 96, at 25. While in M. Evans’ custody, A.M. did not receive social services; Medicaid and social security benefits; adequate medical, dental and psychological care; rehabilitative, educational and vocational services; or day habilitation and therapy. See Complaint ¶ 85, at 23. M. Evans stole A.M.’s social security checks for her own use and did not spend the funds for A.M.’s benefit. See Complaint ¶ 94, at 25. The Defendants facilitated the transfer of A.M.’s social security checks to M. Evans with deliberate indifference to whether M. Evans was using or intended to use the social security funds for A.M.’s benefit. See Complaint ¶ 83, at 22. The Individual DOH Defendants “were aware that Mary Evans intended to keep” A.M.’s federal benefits, “and force her to work in return for a place to live, and approved the arrangement.” Complaint ¶ 95, at 25. While at the Homestead House, A.M. was socially isolated and rarely allowed to leave. See Complaint ¶ 87, at 23.
The DOH transferred J.P., another developmentally disabled woman, to the Homestead House on the same day as A.M.’s transfer. See Complaint ¶ 88, at 24. While at the Homestead House, J.P. attempted to leave to find her children, from whom she had been separated. See Complaint ¶ 88, at 24. J.P. climbed over the wall and wandered the streets calling out for her children, and eventually either returned or was brought back to the Homestead House. See id. After this incident, Evans took J.P.’s shoes and planted cacti at the place where J.P. had climbed the wall to prevent her from escaping. See id. J.P. continued to try to escape. See id. At one point, J.P. jumped over the wall and landed in the cactus. See id. Through punishing J.P. for escaping, M. Evans made it clear to A.M. that she could prevent A.M. from leaving the Homestead House. See Complaint ¶ 88, at 24.
The State eventually shut down the Homestead House. See Complaint ¶ 97, at 24. When that occurred, A.M. was transferred to M. Evans’ private residence— also an unlicensed group shelter. See Complaint ¶ 98, at 25. A.M.’s transfer from the Homestead House was without either A.M.’s consent or, most likely, judicial authority. See Complaint ¶ 98, at 25-26. If judicial authority was obtained for A.M.’s transfer, “the presiding judge was misled by DOH Defendants and the individual Defendants concerning the circumstances of Plaintiffs removal to Mary Evans’ private residence.” Complaint ¶ 98, at 26.
In October, 1999, APS investigated allegations that M. Evans was physically neglecting A.M. See Complaint ¶ 99, at 26. APS found the allegations unsubstantiated. See Complaint ¶ 99, at 26. APS did not determine, however, whether M. Evans was paying A.M. for her labor, whether M. Evans was properly accounting for A.M.’s federal benefits, why A.M. was not receiving any therapeutic services or medical or dental care, or why A.M. was kept isolated without any opportunity to socialize with, others. See Complaint ¶ 99, at 26. APS’ investigation consisted solely of interviews with M. Evans and/or other non-disabled persons, “rather than engaging in any meaningful conversation with [A.M.] concerning her condition or circumstances.” Complaint ¶ 99, at 26.
In or about October, 2004, APS received allegations that M. Evans and John Evans — M. Evans’ husband — were physically abusing and exploiting A.M. See Complaint ¶ 100, at 26. APS received a report that M. Evans and J. Evans “were taking Plaintiffs social security money but were not caring for her, and that Plaintiff was emotionally abused.” Complaint ¶ 100, at 26. The reports also alleged that the Ev-anses were abusing J.P. See Complaint ¶ 100, at 26. APS concluded that the Ev-anses had emotionally abused A.M., and stated that its report would be forwarded to the DOH and to law enforcement. See Complaint ¶ 100, at 26. The case remained open for eighteen months, but was ultimately closed as unsubstantiated, because APS found the report to be “malicious.” Complaint ¶ 101, at 26-27. Again, APS did not engage in any meaningful conversation with A.M. before it closed its investigation. See Complaint ¶ 101, at 27.
In 2006 or 2007, “the Governor’s investigation identified AM and JP as two of the former Training School resident [sic] who had been illegally discharged from the Training School.” Complaint ¶ 102, at 27. In March, 2008, “more than four years after DOH learned of the plight of former Training School residents, the DOH investigated Plaintiffs circumstances” as part of the Governor’s investigation. Complaint ¶ 106, at 28. The DOH limited its investigation, however, to an interview of M. Evans — it did not take into account the prior allegations of abuse, interview A.M., or conduct an independent investigation of A.M.’s circumstances. See Complaint ¶ 106, at 28. That same month, APS in Grant County, New Mexico, also investigated A.M.’s circumstances after a caseworker at Fort Baynard reported that M. Evans was physically and emotionally abusing A.M. See Complaint ¶ 106, at 28. APS acknowledged that: (i) A.M. was developmentally disabled; (ii) A.M. had expressed fear of M. Evans; (iii) a psychiatrist had recommended that a guardian be appointed for A.M.; (iv) M. Evans’ residence was an unlicensed facility; (v) A.M. had not seen a primary care physician in at least five years; and (vi) M. Evans never applied for disability benefits for A.M. See Complaint ¶ 108, at 28. Nonetheless, APS found the report unsubstantiated, declined to pursue a guardianship for A.M., and closed the report. See Complaint ¶ 108, at 28. The DOH did not, as part of its investigation, engage in meaningful conversation with A.M. concerning her condition or circumstances. See Complaint ¶ 108, at 28.
In December, 2008, the DOH began a new investigation or re-opened its prior investigation into A.M.’s circumstances. See Complaint ¶ 110, at 29. The DOH referred to M. Evans as A.M.’s “guardian,” despite clear indications in A.M.’s file that M. Evans was never appointed her guardian. Complaint ¶ 110, at 29. The DOH continued to “interact exclusively or primarily with Mary Evans” during its investigation. Complaint ¶ 110, at 29. The DOH did not consider the prior allegations of abuse, interview A.M., or independently investigate A.M.’s circumstances. See Complaint ¶ 110, at 29. The DOH’s policy and practice of deferring to caregivers rather than interacting with the disabled individuals themselves or otherwise independently investigating aftercare residents’ circumstances continued into 2009. See Complaint ¶ 110, at 29.
In June, 2009, Tom Roach, an ALTSD employee, prepared a report for the ALTSD and the DOH regarding A.M. and J.P. See Complaint ¶ 111, at 29. Roach stated that M. Evans was managing A.M.’s and J.P.’s care in exchange for payments for room and board. See Complaint ¶ 111, at 29-30. Roach stated that M. Evans had legal authority to make decisions for A.M. See Complaint ¶ 111, at 30. Roach reported that A.M. was “happy in her home” and was “getting all the care she needs from Ms. Evans.” Complaint ¶ 111, at 30 (internal quotation marks omitted). He also noted that “one recent APS referral for exploitation (04/06) was found to be malicious and unsubstantiated.” Complaint ¶ 111, at 30 (internal quotation marks omitted). Roach limited his investigation to an interview of M. Evans — he did not take into account prior allegations of abuse, interview A.M. or J.P., or independently investigate J.P.’s or A.M.’s circumstances. See Complaint ¶ 112, at 30. The State Agency Defendants “did nothing to assist AM or JP.” Complaint ¶ 113, at 30. The State Agency Defendants never sought a guardian, conservator, or representative payee for A.M., nor arranged for her to receive therapeutic services. See Complaint ¶ 113, at 30.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.M. alleges, among other things, that the Individual DOH Defendants violated her Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude. See Complaint ¶¶ 156-64, at 38-39. A.M. contends that the Individual DOH Defendants, acting under color of state law, gave physical custody of A.M. to a third party “who then used her as a servant” without compensation. Complaint ¶¶ 158-159, at 38. A.M. argues that the Individual DOH Defendants “conspired” with M. Evans or other third parties to facilitate A.M.’s involuntary servitude, or alternatively “acted with deliberate indifference to the probability that Plaintiff would be put to work without compensation.” Complaint ¶ 160, at 38. According to A.M., the proximate result of the Individual DOH Defendants’ arrangement with third parties to force A.M. into involuntary servitude “deprived [A.M.] of the value of her labor for at least thirty years,” in addition to causing other damages that A.M. seeks to recover from the Individual DOH Defendants in their individual capacity. Complaint ¶¶ 161-162, at 38. A.M. asserts that she is entitled to punitive damages sufficient to punish the Defendants for their conduct, because the Individual DOH Defendants “knowingly, intentionally, deliberately, recklessly, maliciously and wrongfully” violated her Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude. Complaint ¶ 163, at 38-39. A.M. maintains that she is entitled to have the Individual DOH Defendants pay the attorney’s fees and costs that she incurred while bringing her Thirteenth Amendment claim. See Complaint ¶ 164, at 39.
1. The MTD.
The Individual DOH Defendants filed the MTD on March 6, 2014. See Individual DOH Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Thirteenth Amendment Claim and Supporting Memorandum (Doc. 22)(“MTD”). In the MTD, the Individual DOH Defendants ask the Court to dismiss A.M.’s Thirteenth Amendment claim for three reasons.
First, the Individual DOH Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The Individual DOH Defendants point out that qualified immunity shields state officials from liability for civil damages if they violate a plaintiffs federally protected right, “so long as the state officials did not violate clearly established law.” MTD at 3 (citations omitted). The Individual DOH Defendants cite the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Gomes v. Wood, 451 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir.2006), to support their qualified immunity argument. See MTD at 4. The Individual DOH Defendants quote Gomes v. Wood: “The law is clearly established if a reasonable official in the defendant’s circumstances would understand that her conduct violated the plaintiffs constitutional right.... If the law is not clearly established, we do not require officials to anticipate its future developments.” MTD at 4 (quoting Gomes v. Wood, 451 F.3d at 1134) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Individual DOH Defendants argue that a law is clearly established if there is a Supreme Court of the United States of America or Tenth Circuit decision on point, “or if the clearly established weight of authority from other courts sufficiently defines the right.” MTD at 5 (citing Farmer v. Perrill, 288 F.3d 1254, 1259 (10th Cir.2002)). The Individual DOH Defendants also argue that the burden is on A.M. to point to Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent to establish that the Individual DOH Defendants violated clearly established law that is “indisputable” and “unquestioned.” MTD at 5 (quoting Zweibon v. Mitchell, 720 F.2d 162, 172 (D.C.Cir.l983))(internal quotation marks excluded)(citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009)).
The Individual DOH Defendants argue that it was not clearly established in 1979 that requiring a developmentally disabled individual to perform “common household chores or housework, such as sweeping floors, constituted involuntary servitude.” MTD at 8. The Individual DOH Defendants note that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is the only Court of Appeals to address what work developmentally disabled individuals can be expected to perform without infringing on their Thirteenth Amendment rights. See MTD at 8 (citing Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir.1966)). The Individual DOH Defendants say that, in Jobson v. Henne, the Second Circuit held that “the Thirteenth Amendment may be violated if a mental institution requires inmates to perform chores which have no therapeutic purpose or are not personally related, but are required to be performed solely in order to assist in defraying of institutional costs.” MTD at 8 (quoting Jobson v. Hen-ne, 355 F.2d at 132 n. 3)(internal quotation marks omitted).
Second, the Individual DOH Defendants allege that the Homestead House — -where A.M. alleged she involuntarily worked for M. Evans — -was not a state institution. See MTD at 7. “In other words, the alleged coercive behavior was allegedly committed by a non-state actor, Mary Evans, at a non-state facility, the Homestead House.” MTD at 7. The Individual DOH Defendants argue that, under § 1983, “liability attached only to conduct occurring ‘under color of state law.’ ” MTD at 7 (quoting Pena v. Greffet, 922 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1218 (D.N.M.2013)). The Individual DON Defendants contend that A.M. must plead that each government-official defendant violated the Constitution through his or her individual actions. See MTD at 7 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). The Individual DOH Defendants argue that A.M. has failed to allege that any of them “used [A.M.] as a servant without compensation.” MTD at 7.
Third, the Individual DOH Defendants argue that A.M. failed to allege that the work which she was required to perform was “not therapeutic” — the standard that the Second Circuit created in Jobson v. Henne to determine what work can be required of developmentally disabled individuals without infringing on their Thirteenth Amendment rights. MTD at 6. The Individual DOH Defendants point to Weid-enfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F.Supp. 445 (E.D.Wis.1974), in which the Honorable John W. Reynolds, Jr., then-Chief United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, relied upon Jobson v. Henne to establish a two-prong test for similar Thirteenth Amendment claims. See MTD at 6. The Individual DOH Defendants argue that, under Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, A.M. must allege: (i) that she performed work involuntarily; and (ii) that the work that she performed was not therapeutic. See MTD at 6 (citing Weidenfel-ler v. Kidulis, 380 F.Supp. at 451). The Individual DOH Defendants conclude: “While Plaintiff has overcome the first hurdle by alleging that her labor was performed involuntarily ... nowhere in her Amended Complaint has Plaintiff also alleged that the work she performed at the Homestead House was not therapeutic.” MTD at 6-7.
2. The Response.
A.M. responded to the MTD on May 7, 2014. See Plaintiffs Response to Individual DOH Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Thirteenth Amendment Claim (Doc. 35)(“Response”). In her Response, A.M. argues that the Individual DOH Defendants are liable for M. Evans’ conduct — regardless of the fact that it occurred at the Homestead House rather than a state-operated facility — because A.M. “remained in the legal custody of Defendants.” Response at 6. A.M. argues that her placement in M. Evans’ custody “was supposedly overseen by Defendants” for six months after A.M.’s physical discharge from Fort Stanton. Response at 6.
A.M. contends that qualified immunity, should not apply to the Individual DOH Defendants, because the law prohibiting involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment was clearly established before 1979, when A.M. was transferred to M. Evans’ physical custody. See Response passim. A.M. submits that the law prohibiting involuntary servitude has been clearly established since the late-1800s. See Response at 6, 11 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883)). A.M. argues that the Honorable Robert C. Brack, United States District Judge for the District of New Mexico, held that Thirteenth Amendment protections were established since the late-1800s in J.M. v. New Mexico Department of Health, No. CIV 07-0604 (“March 4, 2009, MOO”). A.M. says that, in that case, Judge Brack noted that “the legal contours of the Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude were well established prior to the 1970s.” Response at 11 (quoting J.M. v. N.M. Dep’t of Health, March 4, 2009, MOO)(internal quotation marks omitted)(citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1872)).
A.M. further points to Stone v. City of Paducah, 120 Ky. 322, 86 S.W. 531 (Ky.Ct.App.1905), as effectively putting the Individual DOH Defendants on notice of clearly established Thirteenth Amendment protections. See Response at 7. A.M. says that Stone v. City of Paducah said, in dicta, that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits a government actor “from requiring persons confined as idiots or insane persons to perform” compulsory manual labor. Response at 7 (citing Stone v. City of Paducah, 86 S.W. at 533). A.M. quotes the Kentucky Court of Appeals, saying: “[A]s these persons are in jail not because of their conviction of any offense, they cannot be compelled to labor, for such would be involuntary servitude, and in violation of ... the constitution of the United States.” Response at 7 (quoting Stone v. City of Paducah, 86 S.W. at 533)(internal quotation marks omitted). A.M. contends that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit echoed Stone v. City of Paducah’s holding in United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir.1977), when it said that “[i]t is too late in the day to deny that in a proper case the protections of the Eighth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments extend to the mentally retarded who are involuntarily confined.” Response at 7 (quoting United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d at 1124)(internal quotation marks included)(emphasis omitted).
A.M. says that Thirteenth Amendment protections for developmentally disabled individuals were further established in 1966 in Jobson v. Henne. See Response at 7. A.M. contends that Jobson v. Henne held state defendants liable for work that was required of the developmentally disabled plaintiff in state custody. See Response at 7-8. A.M. quotes Jobson v. Henne’s holding that the state defendants in that case “had the power to alter this program; in a real sense they can be said to have ‘caused’ the conditions under which the appellant labored.” Response at 8 (quoting Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d at 131-132)(emphasis omitted). A.M. argues that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin further extended the application of the Thirteenth Amendment in Weidenfeller v. Kidulis. See Response at 8. In A.M.’s view, that case maintained protections for developmentally disabled in state custody receiving care through a privately operated facility. See Response at 8.
Next, A.M. responds to the Individual DOH Defendants’ assertion that the Homestead House was not a state institution. See Response at 5. She states: “The Thirteenth Amendment prohibited Defendants from arranging to give Plaintiff to a private business to perform free labor.” Response at 6. A.M. argues that she remained in the state’s legal custody when she was transferred to the Homestead House in 1979. See Response at 5. A.M. argues that her transfer from a state facility to the Homestead House makes the Individual DOH Defendants liable for A.M.’s living conditions at the privately operated facility. See Response at 6. A.M. contends: “The violation of the Thirteenth Amendment was complete when the State forcibly transferred A.M. to a third party for the purpose of performing involuntary labor, regardless whether the involuntary labor occurred in a public institution or at a for-profit business.” Response at 6.
A.M. also argues that her Complaint properly alleges that the work M. Evans forced her to perform served no therapeutic purpose. See Response passim. She asserts: “Neither was the work even minimally therapeutic; instead, it was menial and repetitious and not associated with any vocational program.” Response at 6. A.M. acknowledges that Jobson v. Henne and Weidenfeller v. Kidulis establish that plaintiffs must show that the work required of developmentally disabled individuals participating in treatment programs was not minimally therapeutic. See Response 8-10. She argues, however, that “the entire tenor of the First Amended Complaint is that A.M. received no services after her exile to Homestead House, and in various paragraphs throughout her First Amended Complaint, she explicitly states that she received no therapeutic services.” Response at 10. A.M. argues that her allegations that no therapeutic care was provided at the Homestead House demonstrate that the uncompensated labor which she performed there lacked therapeutic value. See Response at 10.
Finally, A.M. argues that the work she performed at the Homestead House was coerced. See Response at 10. A.M. cites United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 108 S.Ct. 2751, 101 L.Ed.2d 788 (1988), a criminal case where, according to A.M., the Supreme Court held that a person’s vulnerable mental condition warrants special consideration when determining whether legal or physical coercion occurred. See Response at 10. A.M. quotes United States v. Kozminski:
[A] victim’s age or special vulnerability may be relevant in determining whether a particular type or certain degree of physical or legal coercion is sufficient to hold that person to involuntary servitude .... [I]t is possible that threatening an incompetent with institutionalization or an immigrant with deportation could constitute the threat of legal coercion that induces involuntary servitude.
Response at 10 (quoting United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 948, 108 S.Ct. 2751).
3. The Reply.
The Individual DOH Defendants replied to the Response on May 20, 2014. See Reply Supporting Individual DOH Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Thirteenth Amendment Claim [Doc. 22], filed May 20, 2014 (Doc. 41)(“Reply”). The Individual DOH Defendants contend that the work which A.M. performed, as alleged in the Complaint, amounted to housekeeping and personal chores. See Reply at 1. In the Individual DOH Defendants’ view, that routine work is not clearly established as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. See Reply at 1-2.
The Individual DOH Defendants argue that Stone v. City of Paducah, Jobson v. Henne, and Weidenfeller v. Kidulis fail to clearly establish Thirteenth Amendment law related to developmentally disabled individuals in treatment programs in New Mexico, because neither the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit decided them. See Reply at 2. The Individual DOH Defendants argue that, moreover, those cases are factually distinguishable . from this case. See Reply at 2. They said the holding in. Stone v. City of Paducah cited by A.M. is dicta, see Reply at 2 (citing 86 S.W. at 533); the work required in Jobson v. Henne, working night shifts on a boiler room, was more intense than it was for A.M., see Reply at 2 (citing 355 F.2d at 131-32); and Weidenfeller v. Kidulis stood for the proposition that a plaintiff must allege that required work was not therapeutic, see Reply at 2 (citing 380 F.Supp. at 451).
The Individual DOH Defendants reiterate their argument that A.M. fails to allege in her Complaint that the Homestead House was a “state institution” or that any of the Individual DOH Defendants compelled A.M. to perform uncompensated labor. Reply at 3. The, Individual DOH Defendants reiterate their argument that Pena v. Greffet and Ashcroft v. Iqbal limit defendants’ liability to instances where the officials’ own individual actions, under col- or of state law, violate the Constitution. See Reply at 3. The Individual DOH Defendants assert: “Here, the Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the individual DOH Defendants themselves violated the Thirteenth Amendment.” Reply at 3.
The Individual DOH Defendants also reiterate their MTD argument that A.M. failed to allege that the work she performed at Homestead House was not therapeutic. See Reply at 3. The Individual DOH Defendants argue that A.M.’s contention that she received no therapeutic services is alleged “in the context of her ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims,” and should not be extended to her Thirteenth Amendment claim. Reply at 3. The Individual DOH Defendants conclude: “A close examination of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint reveals that Plaintiff has failed to allege that the ‘housekeeping’ work she performed at M. Evan’s Homestead House was not therapeutic.” Reply at 3 (citations omitted).
4. The October 23,2014 Hearing.
The Court held a hearing on the MTD on October 23, 2014. See Transcript of ‘Hearing (taken Oct. 23, 2014)(“Tr.”). At the hearing, both sides largely repeated the arguments from their briefing. See Tr. at 1:1^18:19 (Court, Constantaras, Simmons). Neither side introduced new cases regarding the Thirteenth Amendment. The Individual DOH Defendants argued that A.M.’s claims should be evaluated using a two-part analysis to determine whether: (i) the Individual DOH Defendants “had the requisite physical and legal custody” of A.M. to establish liability as state actors; and (ii) the law supporting A.M.’s claims was clearly established in 1979, when A.M. was transferred to the Homestead House. Tr. at 4:14-20 (Constantaras).
The Court inquired whether the Individual DOH Defendants contend that they had no responsibility for A.M. after she was discharged from Fort Stanton in 1979. See Tr. at 4:21-25 (Court). The Individual DOH Defendants confirmed that they believed their lack of physical custody limited their liability to A.M. See Tr. at 5:1 (Con-stantaras). The Individual DOH Defendants argued that A.M. has not disputed the fact that she was in M. Evan’s physical custody, and. not in the Individual DOH Defendants’ physical custody, when the alleged abuses occurred. See Tr. at 5:2-13 (Constantaras). The Individual DOH Defendants said that there was a court order filed in a New Mexico District Court in Lincoln County, after a hearing for which A.M. was represented by an attorney, that discharged A.M. from the state’s physical custody. See Tr. at 5:18-6:16 (Constantar-as, Court). The Court asked whether A.M.’s Thirteenth Amendment claim is going to turn on whether the Individual DOH Defendants or a state court discharged A.M. from the state’s physical custody. See Tr. at 8:9-13 (Court). The Individual DOH Defendants responded, without elaboration, that establishing that a state court rather than a state agency discharged A.M. means that “one of the requisite elements is missing.” Tr. at 8:14-17(Con-stantaras).
The Individual DOH Defendants argued that A.M. fails to allege that the work she performed for M. Evans — such as sweeping floors — was not therapeutic or, alternatively, that those limited work requirements constituted involuntary servitude. See Tr. at 8:18-23. The Individual DOH Defendants’ argument that the work A.M. was required to perform did not establish involuntary servitude preceded the following exchange:
CONSTANTARAS: [I]t’s not clear what type of regulations, if you will, it is that they’re claiming violated the Thirteenth Amendment. If it’s sweeping the floor in the private home[ ] ... in which she resides, then, Your Honor, I would state that in 1979 I could sue my mother for making me sweep, you know, the floor.
COURT: Well, but don’t they have a little bit more? I mean, they have that this is not somebody’s home. They have this, the' Homestead House, with Mary Evans is a commercial enterprise, is it not? I mean, it’s a facility that takes care of the elderly. So don’t I have to kind of put in the word business establishment in there, not that it was just room and board, doesn’t that change then the whole character of their complaint and allow some inferences that maybe a room and board place would not?
CONSTANTARAS: Well, Your Honor, it is, it was a boarding house, but to what extent that boarding house was a legally commercial enterprise, I don’t think they’ve alleged those facts____ [A]nd again, that doesn’t change the fact that this is private.
Tr. at 8:24-10:1 (Constantaras, Court).
The Court then asked whether the Homestead House warrants different consideration in the Thirteenth Amendment analysis because it was not an entirely private residence. See Tr. at 10:2-7 (Court). The Individual DOH Defendants responded that, while she operated the Homestead House, M. Evans was acting as a private individual despite that other people, in addition to A.M., resided at the home. See Tr. at 10:8-25 (Constantaras). The Individual DOH Defendants said that A.M. was transferred to the Homestead House after the state identified it as a less-restrictive location to provide care for A.M. than the state facilities available at the time. See Tr. at 11:1-8 (Constantar-as). The Individual DOH Defendants said that, for a Thirteenth Amendment analysis, the “less restrictive means” determination to place A.M. at the Homestead House is not analogous to transferring A.M. to a private corporation like Wal-Mart, a hypothetical example that the Court provided. See Tr. at 10:16-19, 11:8-9 (Constantaras, Court).
The Individual DOH Defendants repeated the argument from their briefing that A.M. failed to allege that the work that she performed for M. Evans was “not therapeutic.” Tr. at 11:12-16 (Constantar-as). The Court asked whether the therapeutic-work standard came from the Second Circuit’s decision in Jobson v. Henne. See Tr. at 11:17-19 (Court). The Individual DOH Defendants responded, saying the standard “actually came” from Weidenfel-ler v. Kidulis. Tr. at 11:20-23 (Constan-taras). The Court asked why it should apply a standard on which the District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin relied, prompting the Individual DOH Defendants to say that Weidenfeller v. Ki-dulis should apply, because A.M. relied upon that case for her Thirteenth Amendment claim. See Tr. at 12:1-18 (Court, Constantaras).
The Individual DOH Defendants argued that their MTD is dispositive, because none of the defendants “used plaintiff as a servant without compensation.” Tr. at 13:11-16 (Constantaras). The Court asked whether the legal analyses used in substantive due-process claims to establish state actors’ liability for the acts of nongovernmental third parties — the special-relationship doctrine and the danger-creation exception — should also be applied to Thirteenth Amendment claims. See Tr. at 13:17-21 (Court). The Individual DOH Defendants argued that the Court should grant their MTD even if the substantive due-process tests are applied to A.M.’s Thirteenth Amendment claim:
[Tjhat’s what they need to do, because otherwise they don’t get there. But they still don’t get there; not only because the law wasn’t clearly established in 1979 with those two exceptions, but also because even if they were clearly established at the time ... for the special relationship, you’ve got to have both physical and legal custody. And they’ve already admitted that it was Mary Evans that had physical custody of A.M., so how do they get around that hurdle? They don’t.
Tr. at 13:22-14:7 (Constantaras). Addressing the danger-creation exception, the Individual DOH Defendants said that the dangerous condition must shock the conscience of the Court. See Tr. at 14:7-11 (Constantaras). To support that standard, the Individual DOH Defendants pointed to Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567 (10th Cir.1995), and to Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992). See Tr. at 15:17-16:9 (Constantaras).
Finally, the Individual DOH Defendants argued that the Court should dismiss A.M.’s Thirteenth Amendment claim, because it falls short of the pleading standards that the Supreme Court recognized in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal. See Tr. at 17:13-24. The Individual DOH Defendants said that A.M.’s allegations of forced housekeeping “are merely recitations of the very types of conclusory types of allegations that Twom-bly doesn’t allow for anymore.” Tr. at 17:16-22 (Constantaras). The argument prompted the following exchange:
COURT: But if I have a picture in my mind of one of these [Bjeehive [H]omes[] in the communities, and it’s taking care of elderly people, and' A.M. is there for 16 years providing housekeeping to this commercial— let’s even say it’s a non-profit establishment — what do I do with that? That doesn’t sound good.
CONSTANTARAS: Well, Your Honor, just because she’s mentally disabled doesn’t mean she can’t perform some simple task which may ...
COURT: But it sounds a whole lot like work to me rather than just ...
CONSTANTARAS: Which may indeed be therapeutic for her.
COURT: But the Department of Health can’t farm out its people to work at Wal-Mart, even if it’s therapeutic.
CONSTANTARAS: No, Your Honor, but that’s not the case here.
Tr. at 17:25-18:18 (Court, Constantaras).
A.M. then took the podium and immediately responded to the Court’s question about her current living situation, saying that she was transferred from M. Evans’ custody to a group home in Las Cruces, New Mexico, about five years earlier. See Tr. at 19:5-16 (Simmons). A.M. said that she was in M. Evans’ care “for many, many years until [A.M.] showed up on the radar of adult protective services.” Tr. at 19:22-24 (Simmons). A.M. said that her case was discovered after a series of other cases of former Fort Stanton residents “placed all over the state with no oversight” were identified after “a series of scandals.” Tr. at 19:25-20:9 (Simmons). A.M.’s discussion of other individuals who are not parties in A.M.’s claim drew an objection from the Individual DOH Defendants, but the Court overruled it, saying that the information on other cases was “just background for me----I’m trying to get the setting here.” Tr. at 10-20 (Con-stantaras, Court). A.M. continued, saying: “There were two women who were farmed out, one to a hotel to do housekeeping consideration and another to a similar type of boarding house for the elderly to do housekeeping and cleanup after the elderly folks, somewhat similar” to A.M. Tr. at 21:1-6 (Simmons). A.M. said that some of those other cases led to other lawsuits, including the case that Judge Brack decided. See Tr. at 22:3-9 (Simmons).
The Court asked whether Judge Brack, or any other court, “focused on the discharge and found that the discharge is of constitutional significance if it is something that the federal courts ought to be concerned about.” Tr. at 22:10-18 (Court). A.M. said that the question is significant, ■ because A.M. never was discharged from the state’s custody. See Tr. at 22:19-23:2 (Simmons); id. at 23:19-24-6 (Simmons). The Individual DOH Defendants objected that A.M.’s argument was attempting to introduce new evidence that she did not include in the Complaint. See Tr. at 23:6-11 (Constantaras). The Court overruled the objection and said that it would rely on the Complaint’s allegations in deciding the MTD. See Tr. at 23:12-15 (Court). A.M. said that the order that made her a ward of the State of New Mexico never has been rescinded and remains valid. See Tr. at 23:19-24:5 (Simmons). A.M. said: “She was not discharged by a court, period, ever.” Tr. at 24:5-6 (Simmons).
The Court asked the Individual DOH Defendants to clarify their position on A.M.’s legal discharge from state custody, prompting the Individual DOH Defendants to say that A.M. was not discharged from state custody, but rather that a state court gave the state permission to transfer her to the Homestead House. See Tr. at 24:7-22 (Court, Constantaras). A.M. disputed the Ihdividual DOH Defendants’ statement and argued that A.M. remained in the state’s physical custody despite being moved to the Homestead House. See Tr. at 24:23-25:3 (Simmons).
The Court asked A.M. if there were additional facts that she could add to the Complaint to develop a plausible claim for relief if the Court determined that the pleaded facts fell short of the Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal pleading standard. See Tr. at 25:4-12 (Court). A.M. said that additional facts omitted from the Complaint include that a representative of the New Mexico Fifth Judicial District court where A.M. originally was committed to state custody argued at the time of A.M.’s'transfer hearing in the New Mexico Twelfth Judicial District that A.M. should not be transferred out of the state’s Fort Stanton facility “because she was not able to look after herself.” Tr; at 25:13-22, 32:1-4 (Simmons). A.M. said that, moreover, she would show that the work M. Evans required her to perform included “cleaning up [after elderly residents] when they have accidents.” Tr. at 26:16-21 (Simmons). A.M. said:
If I had to do [the Complaint] over, Your Honor, I would allege that she was forced to do menial regulations, day after day with no therapeutic value. Because once you learn how to clean up after an old person who has had an accident, about a week of that and you know how to do it, you’re not learning a skill, you’re not doing something therapeutic for yourself. You’re providing free labor for a lady who didn’t want to have to pay someone to do work that’s tough work.
Tr. at 27:4-12 (Simmons).
The Court asked whether A.M. agrees with the Individual DOH Defendants that the substantive due-process law, allowing a state actor’s liability to extend to the acts of third parties only in cases where the special relationship doctrine or the danger creation exception exists, applies to a Thirteenth Amendment claim. See Tr. at 28:6-9 (Court). A.M. said no and argued that the standard for the Thirteenth Amendment claim should be different than a due-process violation: “What happens is that the state or any party, for that matter, who turns someone over to perform free labor is guilty of violating the Thirteenth Amendment.” Tr. at 28:14-17 (Simmons).
A.M. argued that she did not need to demonstrate that the Individual DOH Defendants personally forced A.M. to perform labor to be liable for a Thirteenth Amendment claim. See Tr. at 27:21-28:5 (Simmons). A.M. said: “There is no need that the state be involved in continuing to force you to commit that labor if they’ve turned you over to a private party, the violation is complete then.” Tr. at 27:25-28:3 (Simmons). A.M. said that the law was clearly established in 1979 that turning A.M. over to a third party to perform labor was a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. See Tr. at 28:3-5 (Simmons). A.M. argued:
It’s been illegal since the Civil War for people, for the state to give people in state custody to someone else. And the fact that the physical custody may change, that’s the whole point. Of course it does. If the state takes me and gives me to Wal-Mart and says Wal-Mart, you can have her and whatever you want her to do, she’ll do. Well, of course the physical custody changes, but that’s a substantive due process paradigm that you’re trying to impose on the Thirteenth Amendment such that the Thirteenth Amendment would disappear if that were the test.
Tr. at 30:10-22 (Simmons). A.M. argued that the state retains full custody over her, regardless whether she is in the care of a third party, and presented the following hypothetical: “If [A.M.] were just shoved out the door ... and wanders off, can the state come .back later and say she wasn’t in our physical custody because we shoved her out the door? No. They can’t, most especially when you have taken custody.” Tr. at 31:5-15 (Simmons). A.M. said her “special relationship” with the state extended beyond 1979, because she remained in their legal custody as a ward of the state. Tr. at 32:9-12 (Simmons). A.M. cited New Mexico ex rel. Kershner v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 447 F.2d 620, 622 (10th Cir.1971), in which the Tenth Circuit held that a developmentally disabled individual committed to state custody “remains an inmate” of the state facility where first com