Carter v. Butts County (110 F. Supp. 3d 1325, 2015)

ORDER

ABRAMS, District Judge.

Before the Court are Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46), Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike (Doc. 65), and Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Reply Brief (Doe. 66). For the reasons explained below, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike (Doc. 65) is DENIED, and Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Reply Brief (Doc. 66) is GRANTED.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs David Carter, Clayton Graham, Jr., and Mitchell Webster commenced this action on June 7, 2012, alleging violations of their federal and state law rights. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiffs subsequently amended their Complaint on February 14, 2014, asserting federal constitutional tort claims, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for arrest without probable cause as well as state law claims for negligent hiring and retention and conversion. (Doc. 22.) Plaintiffs brought these claims against Butts County, Georgia (“Butts County”), Sheriff Gene Pope (“Sheriff Pope”), individually and in his official capacity, and Lieutenant Timothy Filbeek (“Lieutenant Filbeck”), individually and in his official capacity. (Id.) On March 10, 2014, Defendants moved for summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Lieutenant Filbeck are barred by the existence of probable cause and qualified immunity; (2) neither Butts County nor Sheriff Pope engaged in any activities that would give rise to liability under § 1983; (3) Sheriff Pope, in his official capacity, is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; (4) Butts County is ■not amenable to suit for the actions of the Butts County Sheriff or his employees; (5) Sheriff Pope and Lieutenant Filbeek are entitled to official immunity as to Plaintiffs’ state law claims; and (6) Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for conversion. (See Doc. 46-1.)

On April 3, 2014, Plaintiffs filed them Response. (Doc. 52.) On April 17, 2014, Defendants requested a fourteen-day extension pursuant to Local Rule 6.2 to file a reply brief, which the Clerk of the Court granted. (Doc. 61.) Although Defendants’ reply brief was due on May 1, 2014, because of a purported calendaring error, Defendants did not file their Reply until May 5, 2014. (Doc. 64.) Plaintiffs thereafter moved to strike Defendants’ Reply. (Doc. 65.) In response, Defendants filed a Motion for Leave to Accept their Reply (Doc. 66) as well as a Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike. (Doc. 67.) The forgoing motions are now ripe for review. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.3.1(a).

MOTION TO STRIKE

As a preliminary matter, the Court will address Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike (Doc. 65) and Defendants’ Motion for Leave to Accept their Reply (Doc. 66), both of which will be construed together. Plaintiffs contend that the Court should strike Defendants’ Reply because it was filed four days late. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the Court should grant them an enlargement of time and accept their untimely Reply because the delay in filing was due to a simple calendaring error.

Under Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a request for an enlargement of time after the time to respond has elapsed may only be granted for good cause where the movant has demonstrated excusable neglect. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 6(b)(1)(B). In determining whether a party’s neglect is excusable under Federal Rule 6(b), courts consider the following factors: “(1) the danger of prejudice to the opposing party, (2) the length of delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, (B) the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith.” Glover v. City of Pensacola, 372 Fed.Appx. 952, 955 n. 6 (11th Cir.2010) (citing Pioneer Inv. Sens. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993)). This determination is primarily “an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s omission.” Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489.

Weighing the Pioneer factors, the Court finds that Defendants’ neglect in filing their Reply four days late is excusable. First, Plaintiffs will not be prejudiced by the consideration of Defendants’ Reply. Second, a delay of four days has no impact on these judicial proceedings or the efficient administration of justice. Third, the reason for delay was the failure of defense counsel’s administrative assistant to properly calendar the correct due date — the type of “innocent oversight” that courts in this Circuit have repeatedly deemed excusable. See Walter v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 181 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir.1999) (finding excusable neglect where “the reason for the delay was the failure of a former secretary of [plaintiffs] attorney to record the applicable deadline”); Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 71 F.3d 848, 850 (11th Cir.1996) (finding that the late filing was due to excusable neglect, as it “was simply an innocent oversight by counsel” that resulted from a breakdown in communication between attorneys). Finally, there is no evidence that counsel for Defendants acted in bad faith. Accordingly, the Court will consider Defendants’ Reply as though timely filed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This action arises out of the alleged unlawful arrest of Plaintiffs as they were cleaning out the foreclosed home of Lieutenant Filbeck, a lieutenant in the Butts County Sheriffs Office, on February 22, 2011.

I. Arrest of Plaintiffs

Lieutenant Filbeck and his wife purchased the property located at 191 Quail Trail, Jackson, Georgia 30233 (the “Property”) on March 29, 2005. (Doc. 59 at 38-70.) In connection with the purchase, Lieutenant Filbeck. executed a Security Deed, dated March 29, 2005 (the “Security Deed”). (Doc. 59 at 59-69.) Section 9 of the Security Deed states, in relevant part, that “[i]f (a) Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in this Security Instrument ... or (c) Borrower has abandoned the Property, then Lender may do and pay for whatever is reasonable or appropriate to protect Lender’s interest in the Property ... including protecting and/or assessing the value of the Property, and securing and/or repairing the Property.” (Doc. 59 at 64.)

Beginning in 2007, Lieutenant Filbeck fell behind on his mortgage payments, causing him to file for bankruptcy. (Doc. 46-2 at ¶ 3.) The bankruptcy petition was subsequently dismissed in 2009, after Lieutenant Filbeck successfully reached an agreement with his creditors. (Doc. 46-2 at ¶ 4.) However, by July 2010, Lieutenant Filbeck had again fallen into default (Doc. 59 at 119-21); and, as early as September 2010, Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC (“Ocwen”) initiated foreclosure proceedings on the Property. (Docs. 46-2 ¶ 6.) Ocwen notified Lieutenant Filbeck of the impending' foreclosure by letters dated September 22, 2010 and November 22, 2010. (Docs. 37 at 36:14-20, 92:19-21; 59 at 29-36.) Ocwen also placed notices of the foreclosure sale in the local paper in December 2010, and Lieutenant Filbeck acknowledged that he saw those notices. (Doc. 37 at 48:4-9, 64:18-20, 92:22-24; see also Doc. 59 at 100.)

Lieutenant Filbeck and his family ceased residing at the Property in early November 2010, and moved to 446 James Moore Drive, where they ate, slept, and began receiving mail. (Doc. 37 at 7:13-22, 45:5-12, 51:13-19, 81:7-82:14.) The Filbecks also discontinued the utilities on the Property sometime in November or December 2010. (Docs. 37 at 46:8-47:17; 52-1 at ¶ 10; 52-3 at ¶ 9; 59 at 80, 88-99.) Ultimately, the Property was foreclosed on January 4, 2011, and conveyed by a deed under power of sale (the “Deed Under Power”) to U.S. Bank National Associa,tion, as Indenture Trustee for the Registered Holders of Aegis Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-2, Mortgage Backed Notes, by and through its duly appointed attorney-in-fact, Ocwen. (Doc. 45 at Idles.) Lieutenant Filbeck’s ownership interest in the Property was thus extinguished on January 4, 2011. Nothing in the record suggests that Lieutenant Filbeck ever sought to challenge the foreclosure.

On or about December 12, 2010, Alti-source Portfolio Solutions (“Altisource”), Ocwen’s agent and property manager, contracted with MD Maintenance, LLC (“MDM”) to prepare the Property for resale. (Doc. 52-1 at ¶ 9.) MDM regularly contracts with financial institutions to provide maintenance services for residential properties, including preparing foreclosed homes for resale. (Doc. 52-1 at' ¶ 5.) Danny and Tina Carter have owned MDM for approximately twelve years and have worked "with Ocwen and Altisource since MDM’s inception. (Docs. 52-1 at ¶ 6; 52-3 at ¶¶ 4-5.) As part of its standard procedure for preparing a foreclosed home for resale, MDM first determines whether the home is still occupied or has been abandoned. (Docs. 52-1 at ¶ 7; 52-3 at ¶¶ 6-7.) If the home is still occupied, MDM notifies Altisource, which then initiates eviction proceedings. (Id.) If the home has been abandoned, MDM will typically change the locks, take pictures of the home, clean out the home, repair any damage, and place signs on the home notifying any person with questions to contact MDM. (Id.) As described in detail below, MDM followed its standard procedure with respect to the Property, first determining whether the Property was abandoned and then taking pictures of the Property, cleaning it out, and affixing a notice directing anyone with questions to contact MDM.

After being contracted by Altisource, MDM conducted due diligence on the Property to ensure that no one was still residing there. (Docs. 52-1 at ¶ 7; 52-3 at ¶ 6.) Between December 12, 2010 and January 15, 2011, MDM visited the Property on multiple occasions and found the home empty with no heat or electricity and “cobwebs from wall to wall in almost every room.” (Doc. 52-2 at ¶ 12; see also Doc. 52-1 at ¶ 10.) MDM also confirmed that the utilities on the Property had been discontinued. (Docs. 52-1 at ¶ 10; 52-3 at ¶ 9.) In addition, Tina Carter personally spoke with a neighbor of the Property who confirmed that no was living there. (Doc. 52-1 at ¶ 10.) As such, MDM determined that the Property had been abandoned.

On or about January 18, 2011, Danny Carter, along with three other MDM employees, Plaintiff Graham, Jordan Harrington and Greg Carter, went to the Property to assess its condition and begin preparing it for resale. (Docs. 52-1 at ¶ 11; 52-2 at ¶ 5). They affixed a notice to the front door (the “Notice”), which stated that the Property had been foreclosed upon, that Ocwen and Altisource had taken control of the Property, and that any questions regarding the Property should be directed to MDM. (See id; see also Doc. 59 at 115.) Greg Carter photographed the Notice and sent it to Altisource. (Doc. 52-2 at ¶ 5.) When Plaintiff Graham, along with other MDM employees returned to the Property on January 29, 2011, to continue cleaning it out, the Notice was still affixed to the front door. (Doc. 54 at ¶ 28.)

On or about January 30, 2011, Lieutenant Filbeck visited the Property and discovered that some of his personal property was missing. (Doc. 46-2 at ¶ 20.) Although the-Notice was allegedly still affixed to the front door, Lieutenant Filbeck did not contact anyone at Ocwen, Alti-source, or MDM regarding their entry into the home or the removal of any property. (Docs. 52-1 at ¶¶ 13, 25; 52-2 at ¶ 10.) Instead, he boarded up the windows, nailed the doors shut, and replaced the Notice with four keep-out signs. (Doc. 46-2 at ¶ 21.) In addition, he allegedly filed a false police report under the name of Sergeant Kenneth Mundy (compare Doc. 59 at 12-14, with Doc. 42 at 5-7), and submitted a fraudulent insurance claim to Liberty Mutual Insurance for his missing property. (Doc. 42 at 19-25.) Sergeant Mundy subsequently discovered the police report and demanded that his name be removed from it, stating that he did not prepare it, authorize it, or know anything about it prior to discovering it sometime after Plaintiffs were arrested. (Doc. 43 at 34:19-36:8.)

The following day, on or about January 31, 2011, Plaintiff Graham and Greg Carter returned to the Property to finish cleaning it out when they discovered that the windows had been boarded, the doors nailed shut, and the Notice removed and replaced by the keep-out signs. (Doc. 52-2 at ¶¶ 6-7, 9.) Greg Carter called Tina Carter to inquire as to how he should proceed. (Docs. 52-1 at ¶ 13; 52-2 at ¶ 8.) Tina Carter first called Altisource to confirm that the Property had in fact been foreclosed upon and that MDM was authorized to be there. (Doc. 52-1 at ¶ 14.) After receiving confirmation from Alti-source, Tina Carter called the Butts County Sheriffs Office. She explained the situation to the dispatcher, and requested that an officer meet with MDM at the Property. (Doc. 52-1 at ¶¶ 14-16.) The Butts County Sheriffs Office subsequently dispatched Officer Thomias Middleton and another unknown officer to the scene. Greg Carter explained to Officer Middleton that the Property had been foreclosed upon by Ocwen, who had in turn hired his employer, MDM, to prepare the Property for resale. (Doc. 52-2 at ¶¶ 11-12.) Greg Carter further explained that MDM had determined that the home was abandoned “based on the fact that there was mold in the sink, no power to the house and cobwebs from wall to wall in almost every room.” (Doc. 52-2 at ¶ 12.) At his deposition, Officer Middleton testified that it was clear that no one was living at the Property as of January 31, 2011. (Doc. 29 at 27:8-15.)

During their interaction, Greg Carter presented Officer Middleton with paperwork explaining who they were, where they worked, and what their purpose was for being at the Property. (Doc. 29 at 8:21-24, 10:9-11:4, 17:24-18-10, 29:3-4; see generally Doc. 59 at 115, 122.) Greg Carter also gave a written statement to Officer Middleton, explaining that he and Plaintiff Graham worked for MDM and the purpose of their visit. (Doc. 52-2 at ¶ 16.) Officer Middleton made a report of the incident in his Daily Activity Report. (Doc. 29 at 18:21-20:12.) Ultimately, Greg Carter and Plaintiff Graham left the Property without entering the home because they did not want to forcibly enter without explicit permission from Altisource, and because of the delay caused by the meeting and the time of day. (Doc. 52-2 at ¶ 19.)

Officer Middleton later told Lieutenant Filbeck about his January 31, 2011 interaction with MDM personnel. (Doc. 29 at 23:20-24:5.) Although the record is not clear as to exactly how many times Lieutenant Filbeck and Officer Middleton spoke about the interaction or what was discussed (see Doc. 29 at 23:20-30:8), during one of their conversations, Officer Middleton told Lieutenant Filbeck that Plaintiffs showed him paperwork that purportedly authorized them to clean out the Property. (Doc. 29 at 26:15-24.) Lieutenant Filbeck also asked whether Plaintiffs were the same individuals that Officer Middleton met with on January 31, 2011. (Doc. 29 at 24:1-5, 28:1-4.) Officer Middleton could not recall their names, but told Lieutenant Filbeck to check the dispatch log or his Daily Activity Report. (Doc. 29 at 24:16-25.)

On the morning of February 22, 2011, Plaintiffs Graham and Webster returned to the Property to finish cleaning it out. (Docs. 46-2 at ¶ 30.) Plaintiff Carter subsequently arrived to deliver additional trash bags. (Doc. 46-2 at ¶41.) Tina Carter gave each of the men a document explaining their purpose and authorizing them to be on the premises. (Doc. 52-1 at ¶ 18.) In addition, Tina Carter emailed Plaintiff Carter a copy of the Deed Under Power as well as an authorization letter from Ocwen and Altisource (the “Authorization Letter”), which confirmed that the Property had been foreclosed upon by Ocwen and that Tina Carter, as Ocwen’s agent, was authorized full access to the Property. (See Doc. 59 at 122.) The Authorization Letter also directed anyone with questions to contact Altisource. (See id.)

While Plaintiffs were removing household items and trash from the flooded basement, Lieutenant Matthew Vaughn arrived at the scene. (Docs. 31 at 15:11-25; 71 at 72:9-73:15.) At that time, Plaintiffs had loaded a utility trailer with personal effects and trash from within the Property. (Id.) Plaintiff Carter explained MDM’s purpose at the Property and presented Lieutenant Vaughn and other deputies who had subsequently arrived on the scene with the document from Tina Carter and the email with the Authorization Letter. (Docs. 31 at 18:7-9; 43 at 11:6-13; 52-1 at ¶ 22; 70 at 44:16-24; 71 at 88:4-23, 90:12-17; 72.)

Lieutenant Filbeck subsequently arrived on the scene and assumed control of the investigation. (Doc. 81 at 24:3-6.) Lieutenant Vaughn handed Lieutenant Filbeck the document from Tina Carter. (Doc. 43 at 11:6-13.) When questioned, Plaintiff Carter attempted to show Lieutenant Fil-beck the Authorization Letter on his phone, but Lieutenant Filbeck refused to review it, claiming that the Authorization Letter “and the rest of this paperwork don’t [sic] mean a damn thing.” (Doc. 72 at 75:15-21; see also Doc. 71 at 91:892:1.) Lieutenant Filbeck appeared to be extremely angry, cursing and shouting at Plaintiffs. (Docs. 70 at 49:24-50:24; 71 at 97:11-98:4; 72 at 78:7-22.) Plaintiff Carter then called Tina Carter to explain the situation and ask her to speak with Lieutenant Filbeck. (Doc. 71 at 92:5-21.) Tina Carter tried to explain to Lieutenant Filbeck why MDM was at the Property, but Lieutenant Filbeck refused to listen. (Doc. 52-1 at ¶¶ 23-24.) Instead, he told her that the Notice MDM affixed to the Property was a worthless piece of “shit,” just like the documents Plaintiffs had in their possession. (Doc. 52-1 at ¶ 25; see also Doc. 71 at 123:10-125:12.) Tina Carter continued to try to reason with Lieutenant Filbeck and even gave him Danny Carter’s contact information to discuss the situation. (Doc. 52-1 at ¶¶ 28, 30.) Lieutenant Filbeck, however, would not listen and even threatened to arrest Tina Carter next because she was the “ring leader.” (Doc. 52-1 at ¶ 29.)

Tina Carter subsequently contacted Sheriff Pope and emailed him a copy of the Authorization Letter. (Doc. 52-1 at 31-32.) Sheriff Pope, however, allegedly refused to look at the email, telling Tina Carter that he would only review hard copies of documents. (Id.) Notably, Sheriff Pope testified that he did not speak with Tina Carter, nor did he know anything about the foreclosure, the actions taken by Lieutenant Filbeck on January 30, 2011, or Officer’s Middleton’s encounter with MDM personnel on January 31, 2011. (Doc. 35 at 48:24-49:23, 80:9-12; 226:3-8.) Tina Carter also contacted the District Attorney who likewise refused to provide assistance. (Doc. 52-1 at ¶ 32.)

Prior to ordering Plaintiffs’ arrest, Lieutenant Filbeck contacted the Clerk of Superior Court of Butts County and the Butts County Sheriffs Office Warrants and Civil Papers Division to inquire about whether any eviction notices had been issued against the Property. (Doc. 46-2 at ¶¶ 62-65.) After being notified that no such notices' had been filed, Lieutenant Filbeck ordered Plaintiffs’ arrest for burglary. (Doc. 46-2 at ¶ 69.) Plaintiffs were transferred to the Butts County Detention Center and held until the following day, February 23, 2011, when they were released without any charges being filed. (Doc. 72 at 123:22-124:3.) At the time of their incarceration, the Butts County Sheriffs Office allegedly confiscated two cameras, silverware, and twenty dollars in cash. (Docs. 52-1 at ¶¶ 20, 38; 71 at 145:4-9, 148:7-152:23.) The cameras purportedly contained photos of the Property that were taken to record and preserve Plaintiffs’ actions there. Lieutenant Fil-beck admits accessing a camera and downloading pictures onto his computer without a warrant or authorization while Plaintiffs were incarcerated. (Doc. 37 at 14:11-15:6, 73:19-74:22.) The cameras, silverware, and twenty dollars in cash have never been returned to Plaintiffs, despite requests from Tina Carter and MDM. (Docs. 52-1 at ¶38; 71 at 145:4-9,148:7-152:23.)

On the day of Plaintiffs’ arrest, Sergeant Mundy’s father-in-law, who lived two doors down from Lieutenant Filbeck, called Sergeant Mundy to let him know that MDM personnel had returned to the Property. Sergeant Mundy’s father-in-law stated that these were the same individuals that Lieutenant Filbeck had previously asked about. (Doc. 43 at 6:20-7:4) While on the scene, Sergeant Mundy also spoke to Lieutenant Vaughn and expressed his disagreement with Lieutenant Filbeck’s decision to arrest Plaintiffs. (Docs. 31 at 23:7-24:13; 43 at 18:21-19:7.) Sergeant Mundy subsequently reiterated his disagreement with Lieutenant Filbeek’s decision to Sheriff Pope and Colonel Mooney. (Doc. 43 at 19:10-20:3.) Sheriff Pope, however, simply responded that any officer in Filbeck’s position would have done the same thing. (Doc. 43 at 20:4-9.)

II. GBI Investigation

In September 2009, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (the “GBI”) began investigating Major Mike Overbey at the request of Sheriff Pope and the district attorney for possible criminal charges stemming from various complaints, including misappropriation of a carburetor from an impounded vehicle, improperly impounding and purchasing a seized vehicle, theft of seized evidence, and the illegal sale and purchase of prescription pain medication. {See Doc. 58 (the “GBI Report”).) The investigation indicated that Lieutenant Fil-beck may have been involved in assisting Major Overbey with removing the carburetor from the impounded vehicle as well as providing him with prescription pain medication. As a result of the investigation, Sheriff Pope gave Lieutenant Filbeck a written reprimand (Doc. 59 at 111) and forced Major Overbey to resign (Doc. 58 at 290; see also Doc. 35 at 135:20-136:9).

The case was presented to the Grand Jury, who ultimately decided not to indict Major Overbey. (See Doc. 57 (the “Grand Jury Presentment”).) Nevertheless, the Grand Jury charged the county manager .with establishing a “community advisory board to review operational procedures involving all aspects of the Butts County Sheriffs Office, including but not limited to the following: seized property and evidence, impound procedures, surveillance cameras, disciplinary action and follow up procedures, and random on site property and drug checks of employees.” (Doc. 57 at 3.) Sheriff Pope subsequently followed up with the county manager about establishing the community advisory board, but the county manager represented that he did not have the authority to create such a board. As such, no further action was taken. (Doc. 35 at 205:3-6.)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 allows a party to move for summary judgment when the party contends no genuine issue of material fact remains and the party is entitled to .judgment as a matter of law. “Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1118 (11th Cir.2013). “A genuine issue of material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.” Grimes v. Miami Dade Cnty., 552 Fed.Appx. 902, 904 (11th Cir.2014) (citing Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir.2000)). “An issue of fact is ‘material’ if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.1997) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). “It is ‘genuine’ if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998 (11th Cir.1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

The movant bears the initial burden of showing, by reference to the record, that there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986); Barreto v. Davie Marketplace, LLC, 331 Fed.Appx. 672, 673 (11th Cir.2009). The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no genuine dispute of material fact, or by demonstrating to the district court that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the movant has met its burden, the nonmoving party is required “to go beyond the pleadings” and identify “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party “must do more than summarily deny the allegations or show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Instead, the nonmovant must point to evidence in the record that would be admissible at trial. See Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1294 (11th Cir.2012) (quoting Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir.1999)) (noting that hearsay may be considered on a motion for summary judgment only if it “could be reduced to admissible evidence at trial or reduced to admissible form”). Such evidence may include affidavits or declarations that are based on personal knowledge of the affiant or declarant. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4).

On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view all evidence and factual inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether that evidence could reasonably sustain a jury verdict in its favor. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Allen, 121 F.3d at 646. However, the Court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c).

ANALYSIS

I. Section 1983 Claims

A. Claims against Lieutenant Filbeck in his Individual Capacity

Lieutenant Filbeck moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ false arrest claims arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the existence of probable cause and qualified immunity. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that Lieutenant Filbeck knew they were authorized to' be at the Property and prepare it for resale and thus violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure when he ordered their arrest on February 22, 2011.

It is well established that “[a] warrantless arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment and forms a basis for a section 1983 claim.” Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir.1996). “The existence of probable cause at the time of arrest, however, constitutes an absolute bar to a section 1983 action for false arrest.” Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). “Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the collective knowledge of the law enforcement officials, of which they had reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to cause a person of reasonable caution to believe an offense has been or is being committed.” United States v. Jimenez, 780 F.2d 975, 978 (11th Cir.1986) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “This probable cause standard is practical and non-technical, applied in a specific factual context and evaluated using the totality of the circumstances.” Skop v. City of Atlanta, GA 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir.2007).

“Intertwined with the question of probable cause is the issue of qualified immunity.” Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 578 (11th Cir.1990). “Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from suits in their individual capacities unless their conduct violates ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir.2003) (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002)). “To receive qualified immunity, ‘the public official must first prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.’ ” Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1232 (quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir.2002)). “An officer acts within the scope of his discretionary authority when his conduct is undertaken pursuant to the performance of his official duties.” Clark v. City of Atlanta, 544 Fed.Appx. 848, 852 (11th Cir.2013) (citing Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir.1998)). Courts consider“whether the government employee was (a) pursuing a legitimate job-related function (that is, pursuing a job-related goal), (b) through means that were in his power to utilize.” Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir.2004). Here, it is undisputed that Lieutenant Filbeck was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when he ordered Plaintiffs’ arrest on February 22, 2011.

“Once the defendant establishes that he was acting within his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1232. Whether a plaintiff meets this burden involves two discrete inquiries. First, the Court asks “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)). As noted above, an arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment. Ortega, 85 F.3d at 1525. Second, the Court asks “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232, 129 S.Ct. 808. In wrongful arrest cases, the Eleventh Circuit has “defined the ‘clearly-established’ prong as an ‘arguable probable cause’ inquiry.” Moran v. Cameron, 362 Fed.Appx. 88, 93 (11th Cir.2010) (citations omitted); Poulakis v. Rog ers, 341 Fed.Appx. 523, 526 (11th Cir.2009). Thus, “[t]o receive qualified immunity, an officer need not have actual probable cause, but only ‘arguable’ probable cause.” Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1079 (11th Cir.2003). Arguable probable cause exists where “reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the Defendants could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff.” Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1232 (quotation marks omitted). The standard is an objective one and does not include an inquiry into the officer’s subjective intent or beliefs. Rushing v. Parker, 599 F.3d 1263, 1266 (11th Cir.2010); Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1231 (“The essence of qualified immunity analysis is the public official’s objective reasonableness, regardless of his underlying intent or motivation.”).

1. Probable Cause

Whether an officer possesses arguable probable cause to make an arrest depends on the elements of the alleged crime and the operative fact pattern. Shop, 485 F.3d at 1137-38 (citing Crosby v. Monroe County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir.2004)). Showing arguable probable cause does not, however, require proving every element of a crime. Scarbrough v. Myles, 245 F.3d 1299, 1302-03 (11th Cir.2001). If the arresting officer had arguable probable cause to arrest for any offense, qualified immunity will apply. Skop, 485 F.3d at 1138; Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1195-96 (11th Cir.2002) (noting that “the validity of an arrest does not turn on the offense announced by the officer at the time of the arrest”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Lieutenant Filbeck contends that he had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs for three possible crimes: burglary in the second degree, criminal trespass, and theft by taking. (Doc. 46-1 at 12.) In support, Lieutenant Filbeck avers that he remained in lawful possession of the Property, despite the foreclosure sale on January 4, 2011, as a tenant at sufferance. Thus, because no eviction notice had been filed, Lieutenant Filbeck contends that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiffs for the alleged crimes on February 22, 2011.

Under Georgia law, “[w]here former owners of real property remain in possession after a foreclosure sale, they become tenants at sufferance.” Steed v. Fed. Nat. Mortg. Corp., 301 Ga.App. 801, 689 S.E.2d 843, 848 (2009). “A landlord-tenant relationship exists between a legal title holder and a tenant at sufferance such that the dispossessory procedures set forth in OCGA § 44-7-50 et seq. are applicable.” Id. Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-7-50 et seq., “[t]he exclusive method whereby a landlord may evict a tenant is through a properly instituted dispossessory action.” Id. However, “when a former owner yields possession of the property at some point after the sale, but then later reenters the property, he is an intruder.” Id. It follows, then, “that if a former owner is not in possession of the property at the time of the foreclosure sale or subsequently goes out of possession, but then later reenters the property aware that a foreclosure sale has already taken place, the former owner is a mere intruder, and the legal title holder is not required to follow the dispos-sessory procedures set forth in OCGA § 44-7-50 et seq.” Id.

Plaintiffs contend that Lieutenant Fil-beck abandoned the Property when he and his family ceased residing there in early November 2010, and thus no eviction notice was required in order to secure and clean out the Property. According to Plaintiffs, Lieutenant Filbeck was nothing more than a mere intruder upon reentering and boarding up the windows, nailing the doors shut, and affixing keep-out signs to the home on January 30, 2011.

It is undisputed that Lieutenant Filbeck and his family vacated the Property in November 2010, when they moved to 446 James Moore Drive and began eating, sleeping, and receiving mail there. Further, between December 12, 2010 and January 15, 2011, MDM visited the Property on multiple occasions and observed the home in disarray with “mold in the sink, no power to the house and cobwebs from wall to wall in almost every room.” (Doc. 52-2 at ¶ 12.) Tina Carter also confirmed that the utilities had been disconnected, and personally spoke with a neighbor of the Property who represented that no one was living there. In fact, according to Officer Middleton, it was clear that no one was living at the Property when he responded to MDM’s call on January 31, 2011. (Doc. 29 at 27:8-15.) Construing these facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Lieutenant Filbeck abandoned the Property in November 2010. See Dickinson v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 10-CV-688, 2012 WL 163883, at *6 (W.D.Mich. Jan. 19, 2012) (finding that bank’s agent “could have reasonably assumed that the [plaintiffs] had abandoned the Property because they were not occupying it at the time, the electricity was turned off, and there was no indication that it was occupied”). As such, Plaintiffs were not required to file a dispossessory action in order to evict Lieutenant Filbeck.

Citing Paragraph 9(c) of'the Security Deed, Plaintiffs further contend that they were authorized, at the direction of Ocwen, to enter and secure the Property, including cleaning it out and preparing it for resale. Paragraph 9 of the Security Deed states, in relevant part, that “[i]f (a) Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in this Security Instrument ... or (c) Borrower has abandoned the Property, then Lender may do and pay for whatever is reasonable or appropriate to protect Lender’s interest in the Property ... including protecting and/or assessing the value of the Property, and securing and/or repairing the Property.” (Doc. 59 at 64.) “Georgia law. recognizes that ‘the common law right to the exclusive use and possession of property may be modified by agreement, in which the landowner grants permission to enter his property under certain circumstances.’ ” Bates v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 768 F.3d 1126, 1134 (11th Cir.2014) (quoting Tacon v. Equity One, Inc., 280 Ga.App. 183, 633 S.E.2d 599, 604 (2006)). Here, Paragraph 9 so modified Lieutenant Filbeck’s exclusive right to the possession of the Property. Indeed, Paragraph 9 unambiguously granted Ocwen and its duly authorized agents the right to enter the premises if Lieutenant Filbeck defaulted under the Security Deed or abandoned the Property. See Bates, 768 F.3d at 1134 (dismissing action for trespass against bank because the deed authorized bank and its agent to inspect the property upon borrower’s default); Tacon, 633 S.E.2d at 604 (finding that under the terms of the security deed, plaintiffs waived their absolute right to the exclusive use and possession of the proper-' ty upon defaulting on the loan, and that defendant were therefore authorized “to enter the house, regardless of whether it still held personal items [of the plaintiff], to secure the premises and protect its interest in the property”); see also Farinacci v. City of Garfield Heights, 461 Fed.Appx. 447, 452 (6th Cir.2012) (affirming that “[w]hen [plaintiff] signed her mortgage, which included the property preservation provisions, she expressly assumed the risk that, if it became necessary to preserve the property, the bank might permit its agents and others to enter the house to effectuate that purpose”); Lupas v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. 11-14584, 2012 WL 3758037, at *7 (E.D.Mich. Aug. 30, 2012) (dismissing claim for trespass where the language of the mortgage clearly authorized defendant’s entry onto the property for the purpose of securing it in the event plaintiffs vacated or failed to fulfill their obligations under the mortgage); Paatalo v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 10-CV-119, 2012 WL 2505742, at *10-11 (D.Mont. June 28, 2012) (“Because [plaintiff] was in default, paragraph 9 of the Deed of Trust ... gave Chase the right to access the property”); Dickinson, 2012 WL 163883, at *6 (holding that “paragraph 9 grants the mortgagee the unconditional right to enter the premises if the mortgagor defaults, and nothing therein requires that mortgagee to contact the mortgagor before entering the premises”).

It is undisputed that Lieutenant Filbeck had defaulted by September 2010, when Ocwen notified him that it had initiated foreclosure proceedings on the Property. Thus, Lieutenant Filbeck was on notice that he no longer retained exclusive possession of the Property and that Ocwen had the right to secure and prepare it for resale months before Plaintiffs were arrested on February 22, 2011. Therefore, regardless of whether or not Lieutenant Filbeck abandoned the Property, Plaintiffs were lawfully authorized to enter the Property and protect Ocwen’s interest therein, including securing the Property for resale.

The inquiry, however, is not whether Plaintiffs in fact committed a crime, but whether Lieutenant Filbeck had probable cause to believe a crime was being committed at the time of Plaintiffs’ arrest. See Harvey v. City of Stuart, 296 Fed.Appx. 824, 828 (11th Cir.2008) (holding that whether plaintiff was “actually trespassing is not relevant to whether the officers had probable cause at the time of the arrest”). Taking Plaintiffs’ version of the facts as true, Lieutenant Filbeck knew at the time of Plaintiffs’ arrest: (i) that he defaulted under the Security Deed as early as July 2010; (ii) that Ocwen initiated foreclosure proceedings as early as September 2010; (iii) that he ceased residing at the Property in November 2010; (iv) that Ocwen published the foreclosure sale in the local newspaper in December 2010; (v) that the Property was in fact foreclosed upon by Ocwen in January 2011; (vi) that upon defaulting under the Deed or abandoning the Property, he no longer retained exclusive possession of the Property; (vii) that Ocwen, through its agent Altisource, did in fact hire MDM to secure the Property and prepare it for resale; and (viii) that Plaintiffs worked for MDM and were therefore authorized by Ocwen, the rightful owner, to enter and clean out the Property. In light of these facts, a jury question exists as to whether a reasonable police officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as Lieutenant Filbeck could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiffs for any of the alleged crimes.

Furthermore, the crimes for which Lieutenant Filbeck purportedly had probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs not only required Plaintiffs’ actions to be unlawful, they also required Plaintiffs to have specific intent — i.e., to intentionally commit a felony or theft within the Property, to knowingly or maliciously interfere with the possession or use of the Property, or to intentionally deprive Lieutenant Filbeck of his personal property. See Dillard v. State, 323 Ga.App. 333, 753 S.E.2d 772, 774 (2013) (“Burglary is a specific intent crime—the State must prove that the defendant intended to commit a felony after making an unauthorized entry.”) (citation omitted); Bowman v. State, 258 Ga. 829, 376 S.E.2d 187, 188-89 (1989) (finding that criminal trespass requires the state to prove specific intent); Brown v. State, 302 Ga.App. 641, 692 S.E.2d 9, 11 (2010) (noting for theft by taking, “[t]he evidence must show that the requisite intent to deprive the owner of the property was present at the time of the taking.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Phillips v. State, 176 Ga.App. 834, 338 S.E.2d 57, 58 (1985) (“[T]heft by taking ... is a specific intent crime.”). While the Court recognizes that “it is not necessary that an officer prove every element of the crime before making an arrest,” Rhodes v. Rollar, 503 Fed.Appx. 916, 924 (11th Cir.2013) (citations omitted), this rule must be applied with an eye to the core probable cause inquiry; namely, that “[p]robable cause to arrest exists when an arrest is objectively reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.” Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1226.

Taking the facts as presented by Plaintiffs as true, Lieutenant Filbeck knew at the time of Plaintiffs’ arrest that Ocwen had foreclosed on the Property and hired MDM to clean it out. Lieutenant Filbeck also knew that when Officer Middleton met with Greg Carter on January 31, 2011, Greg Carter showed him the Authorization Letter and gave a written statement stating that Plaintiffs were simply on the Property at the direction of MDM to prepare it for resale. A reasonable police officer possessing this knowledge objectively could not have concluded that Plaintiffs harbored the requisite intent to commit any of the alleged crimes. See Killmon v. City of Miami, 199 Fed.Appx. 796, 800 (11th Cir.2006) (holding that officers did not have arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiffs for trespass where “[o]fficers should have known that the [plaintiffs] were not on the [property] willfully” and thus lacked the requisite intent); Kleinschnitz v. Shares, No. 13-CV-0209, 2013 WL 5797621, at *5 (M.D.Ala. Oct. 28, 2013) (finding that “[defendant] lacked arguable probable cause to arrest [plaintiff] for obstruction because [defendant] had information that would establish to a reasonable officer that [plaintiff! lacked the necessary mens rea of intent”); Ruffino v. City of Hoover, 891 F.Supp.2d 1247, 1271 (N.D.Ala.2012) (denying summary judgment for defendants where they did “not specify any facts that would lead a reasonable officer to believe that [plaintiff] pushed [officer] with the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm him,” the specific intent required for harassment); see also Garrison v. Hadder, No. 12-CV-2659, 2012 WL 5427708, at *6 (N.D.Ala. Nov. 5, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity where “nothing alleged in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint indicates he had specific intent”). Accordingly, a jury question exists as to whether it was objectively reasonable for Lieutenant Filbeck to infer, given the totality of the .circumstances, that Plaintiffs possessed the intent necessary to commit any of the alleged crimes.

Because questions of fact exist as to (i) whether Lieutenant Filbeck knew or should have known that Plaintiffs were lawfully authorized to enter and secure the Property and (ii) whether a reasonable police officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as Lieutenant Filbeck could have reasonably inferred that Plaintiffs possessed the requisite intent to commit any of the alleged crimes, the question of whether probable cause or arguable probable cause existed is a question best suited for the jury.

2. Objective Good Faith

The inquiry does not end there. “While an officer who arrests an individual without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment, this does not inevitably remove the shield of qualified immunity.” Skop, 485 F.3d at 1137. “Indeed, it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and in such cases those officials should not be held personally liable.” Von Stein, 904 F.2d at 579 (quotation marks and ellipses omitted); see also Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (“Even law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present are entitled to immunity.”) (internal punctuation omitted). Thus, qualified immunity will protect officers who objectively make good faith mistakes. See Post v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., 7 F.3d 1552, 1558 (11th Cir.1993) (finding arguable probable cause existed where officers erroneously counted people in excess of a restaurant’s maximum' capacity because officers mistake was reasonable); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 399 n. 12, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (noting that an “officer’s objective ‘good faith’ ... may be relevant to the availability of the qualified immunity defense to monetary liability under § 1983”); Scott v. Dixon, 720 F.2d 1542, 1547 (11th Cir.1983) (holding that law enforcement officers “acquire qualified immunity only for the good faith performance of their duties” under an objective standard).

Qualified immunity will not, however, protect officers whose conduct “creates factual issues as to their honesty and credibility.” Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1233. Nor will qualified immunity protect officers who abuse their position of authority to further their personal gain or settle a private dispute. See Skop, 485 F.3d at 1143 (denying summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity where the officer’s actions, if true, were “an abuse of his authority”); Scott, 720 F.2d at 1547-48 (finding a question of fact existed as to officers’ good faith where they allowed defendant to use a criminal warrant to try to collect a debt). The relevant inquiry, then, is whether Lieutenant Filbeck, acting in good faith, could reasonably but mistakenly have believed that Plaintiffs committed a crime warranting their arrest.

The record demonstrates that Plaintiffs, along with Tina Carter, repeatedly attempted to provide Lieutenant Filbeck with proof of MDM’s authority to secure the Property. Lieutenant Filbeck, however, refused to review the Authorization Letter or investigate Plaintiffs’ claims. While “a police officer is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest,” he or she may not “conduct an investigation in a biased fashion or elect not to obtain easily discoverable facts.” Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1229 (internal quotation and citations omitted). Nor may an officer “turn a blind eye” and “choose to ignore information that has been offered to him or her.” Id. at 1228-29.

Under the circumstances presented here, an objectively reasonable officer would have, at a minimum, reviewed the Authorization Letter — which identified

Tina Carter as Ocwen’s agent and provided contact information for an Altisource representative — and attempted to verify Plaintiffs’ authority to be at the Property by contacting either Altisource or Ocwen. Had Lieutenant Filbeck done so, it would have been clear that Plaintiffs were authorized to secure the Property and certainly lacked the necessary intent to commit any of the alleged crimes. This is particularly true in light of Plaintiffs’ allegations that Lieutenant Filbeck knew Ocwen had foreclosed on the Property and, through Altisource, hired MDM to secure and prepare it for resale. As Sheriff Pope stated, “[assuming that Mr. Filbeck saw [the Notice] and knew what it was and understood what it was, he should have contacted [MDM].” (Doc. 35 at 96:4-6.) And, “[i]f [Lieutenant Filbeck] had spoken to somebody with the lending institution who had the authority to send someone down and he knew they had the authority to send someone down to do exactly what they were doing, he should not have made the arrest.” (Doc. 35 at 20: 17-22.) However, Lieutenant Filbeck “consciously and deliberately” chose not to “uncover reasonably discoverable, material information.” Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1229-30. As such, to the extent Lieutenant Filbeck chose to ignore readily available evidence that Plaintiffs were lawfully at the Property and did not possess the requisite intent to commit any of the alleged crimes, his stubbornly held belief that Plaintiffs were breaking the law cannot be said to constitute a good faith mistake justifying the application of qualified immunity. See Battiste v. Lamberti, 571 F.Supp.2d 1286, 1296-97 (S.D.Fla.2008) (denying summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity where factual questions existed regarding what the officers knew, “how easily they could have investigated [plaintiffs’] claims, and generally whether an officer in those circumstances should have known that Plaintiffs were not on the [property] willfully”).

Indeed, Lieutenant Filbeck’s failure to reasonably investigate the circumstances surrounding Plaintiffs’ arrest is consistent with his actions taken on January 30, 2011, when he visited the Property and discovered that some of his personal effects were missing. Although MDM posted the Notice, which Lieutenant Filbeck allegedly discovered on January 30, 2011, Lieutenant Filbeck never attempted to contact anyone at Ocwen, Altisource, or MDM regarding MDM’s entry onto the Property or the removal of any of his property. Instead, he boarded up the windows, nailed the doors shut, removed the Notice, and affixed keep-out signs to the front of the Property. In addition, he allegedly filed a false police report under the name of another officer and submitted a fraudulent insurance claim to Liberty Mutual Insurance to recover for his missing property. Because these actions “create[ ] factual issues as to [Lieutenant Filbeck’s] honesty and credibility” and his objective good faith, qualified immunity does not apply. Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1233; see also Holmes, 321 F.3d at 1083-84 (reversing the grant of qualified immunity as factual questions existed as to officer’s truthfulness).

Lieutenant Filbeck’s questionable conduct surrounding Plaintiffs’ arrest is analogous to that of the defendant in Motes v. Myers, 810 F.2d 1055 (11th Cir.1987). There, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a sergeant with thq local city police department, violated her constitutional rights by swearing out a false arrest warrant in order to settle a dispute between the parties regarding the ownership of an air conditioner. Id. at 1056-57. Observing that the Eleventh Circuit recognizes “a cause of action under § 1983 for false arrest and imprisonment motivated by the desire to settle a private dispute,” the court held that the resolution of plaintiffs case depended upon whether defendant “abused the state warrant process to settle a private dispute.” Id. at 1059-60 (citations omitted). Because the evidence indicated that the defendant knew that the plaintiff disputed the defendant’s ownership of the air conditioner but “never attempted to settle the dispute,” the court concluded that “[i]t remain[ed] for the jury to decide whether [the defendant] believed, in good faith, that a crime had been committed ... or whether [the defendant] swore out the warrant to coerce settlement of a private disagreement or to harass [the plaintiff].” Id. at 1060.

Here, as in Motes, a jury question exists as to whether Lieutenant Filbeck abused his position of authority as a law enforcement officer by ordering Plaintiffs’ arrest in order to settle a private disagreement regarding his legal status vis-a-vis the Property or to harass the Plaintiffs for their part in the dispute. While the Court acknowledges that Motes did not specifically address the issue of qualified immunity, as it was uncontroverted that the defendant was not acting in his official capacity as a police officer at the time of the plaintiffs’ arrest, id. at 1059, the Court nevertheless finds the good faith analysis in Motes instructive here. It would indeed be incongruous to reason that Lieutenant Filbeck would be liable if he had abused the state warrant system to effectuate Plaintiffs’ arrest, yet find him immune from liability where he abused his position of authority as a law enforcement officer to achieve the same result. Qualified immunity will not shield officers who act in bad faith by using their positions of authority to settle private disputes. See Scott, 720 F.2d at 1547-48.

As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, “[qualified immunity is, as the term implies, qualified. It is not absolute. It contemplates instances in which a public official’s actions are not protected.” Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1233 (citations omitted). Indeed, “[t]he principles behind qualified immunity would be rendered meaningless if such immunity could be invoked to shelter officers who, because of their own interests, allegedly flout the law, abuse their authority, and deliberately imperil those they are employed to serve and protect.”' Id. at 1234. Thus, “[w]hen an officer plainly violates the legal rights of the people he serves, and when a reasonable officer in his position had fair warning that his conduct was unlawful, § 1983 suits exist to provide a vehicle for recourse.” Skop, 485 F.3d at 1144.

Here, there are genuine issues of material fact as to the existence of probable cause and arguable probable cause. There is also a genuine issue as to whether Lieutenant Filbeck acted in good faith when he ordered Plaintiffs’ arrest. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims against Lieutenant Filbeck in his individual capacity.

B. Claims against Sheriff Pope in his Individual Capacity

Plaintiffs seek to hold Sheriff Pope liable in his individual capacity for Plaintiffs’ alleged unconstitutional arrest based on his purported policy, practice or custom in failing to discipline his deputies for “patently illegal conduct.” (Doc. 52 at 19.) In support, Plaintiffs point to the GBI Report as well as the Grand Jury Presentment, which Plaintiffs assert are “tantamount to a legal determination that [Sheriff Pope] was deliberately indifferent.” (Doc. 52 at 20.) Although not clearly articulated, Plaintiffs effectively contend that Sheriff Pope should be held liable in his individual capacity undér the theory of supervisory liability. “It is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir.2003) (quoting Hartley, 193 F.3d at 1269). Rather, “supervisory liability under § 1983 occurs either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when there is a causal connection between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs’ claims against Sheriff Pope fail as a matter of law.

First, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Sheriff Pope personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation. Although Sheriff Pope expressed indifference to Sergeant Mundy’s complaint and allegedly spoke with Tina Carter about Plaintiffs’ arrest, Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence that Sheriff Pope was apprised of the arrest as it was happening or that he was in a position to intervene. Indeed, Plaintiffs have failed to introduce any facts to support an inference that Sheriff Pope directed Lieutenant Filbeck to act unlawfully or knew that Lieutenant Filbeck would act unlawfully prior to Plaintiffs’ arrest but failed to stop him from doing so. In short, Sheriff Pope’s post hoc actions cannot serve as a basis for holding him liable. See Richardson v. Quitman Cnty., Ga., 912 F.Supp.2d 1354, 1380 (M.D.Ga.2012) (finding that sheriffs “post hoc approval of the actions in question could not have possibly been the cause of these actions because they had already occurred”); Gainor v. Douglas Cnty., Ga., 59 F.Supp.2d 1259, 1293 (N.D.Ga.1998) (“A post hoc approval of an action already taken could not possibly be the motivating force for causing the action to be taken.”).

Because the record is devoid of any evidence that Sheriff Pope personally participated in the events prior to or during Plaintiffs’ arrest, to survive summary judgment, Plaintiffs must establish the requisite causal connection.

The necessary causal connection can be established' when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so. Alternatively, it can be established when a supervisor’s custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights or when facts support an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.

Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “The deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.” Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1048 (11th Cir.2014) (quoting Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir.1999)). In sum, “[t]he standard by which a supervisor is held liable in his individual capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360 (quoting Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir.2003)).

Plaintiffs point to the GBI Report and the Grand Jury Presentment as evidence that Sheriff Pope knew or should have known of Lieutenant Filbeck’s “unfitness and tendencies to abuse his position as a law enforcement officer.” (Doc. 22 at ¶ 34.) The Court disagrees. The GBI Report discusses four incidents involving Major Overbey, with Lieutenant Filbeck possibly implicated in two — removing a carburetor from a seized vehicle and providing Major Overbey with prescription pain medication. None of these incidents, however, involved unconstitutional arrests. Rather, as the Grand Jury Presentment makes clear, the incidents outlined in the GBI Report concerned officer misconduct relating to seized property and evidence, impound procedures, and drug use. Nowhere in the GBI Report does it discuss arrests without probable cause. Indeed, Plaintiffs have set forth no evidence of past arrests made without probable cause. Thus, Plaintiff