Estate of Heenan ex rel. Heenan v. City of Madison (111 F. Supp. 3d 929, 2015)

OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM M. CONLEY, District Judge.

In the early morning hours of November 9, 2012, in a bohemian, residential neighborhood on the near east side of the Capitol in Madison, Wisconsin, affectionately known as “Willy Street,” defendant police officer Steven Heimsness tragically shot Paul Heenan, who had been mistaken for a burglar after he drunkenly attempted to enter a neighbor’s home rather than his own. Because Heenan was unarmed, a criminal investigation was conducted, but no charges were filed against Heimsness. Following that decision, the Estate of Paul Heenan filed this federal lawsuit, alleging that Heimsness used excessive force in violation of Heenaris rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff also asserts a claim against the City of Madison for constitutionally defective policies and procedures that allegedly led to the tragic shooting. See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

Now before the court are motions for summary judgment by both defendants. (Dkt. ## 44, 49.) Because plaintiff has raised genuine issues of material facts with respect to both claims, the court will deny defendants’ motions in their entirety. Also before the court is defendants’ joint motion to bifurcate the liability phase of trial to address first whether Heimsness violated Heenaris Fourth Amendment rights and then whether the City should be liable for any constitutional violation under Monell. (Dkt. # 91.) Because the court agrees that the likely prejudice to Heimsness in having a jury consider both claims in the same phase warrants bifurcation of the liability issues, the court will grant that motion.

UNDISPUTED FACTS

The basic facts relevant to deciding both defendants’ motions for summary judgment are set forth first and primarily concern the events surrounding the shooting. Additional facts relevant to deciding plaintiffs municipal liability claim against the City of Madison are set forth in the opinion on the Monell claim. Except as noted, these facts are undisputed, at least for purposes of summary judgment.

A. Background

At the time of the shooting, Officer Steven Heimsness was a City of Madison Police Officer, working nights for the Madison Police Department (“MPD”). Heimsness was hired by the City on September 8, 1997, had worked for the MPD Central District for 12 years and had been on regular patrol in the Willy Street neighborhood for three years before the shooting. During the summer of 2012, Heimsness knew there had been armed robberies and burglaries from working in that area, from alerts sent to officers from MPD, and from speaking with day-shift officers who patrolled the same area. Because drunken people coming out of the bars at night were easy targets for robberies, Heimsness particularly tried to patrol the area at bar time. Heimsness was also aware that there was a lot of foot traffic in the area he patrolled, and that it was very dark in this area around bar time.

At 10:45 p.m. on November 8, 2012, Officer Heimsness started his normal shift wearing MPD’s full military-style uniform, including a radio earpiece. Heimsness also was wearing his duty belt, which held two loaded magazines of bullets, a Taser, a baton, a second cartridge for the Taser, a portable radio, a multi-tool, an AR 15 magazine, gloves, a set of keys, a gun holster containing a 9 mm Glock model 17 pistol, OC (oleoresin capsicum) spray (more commonly known as pepper spray), and double handcuffs. At approximately 12:27 a.m., Heimsness sent a Mobile Data Computer (“MDC”) message to another Madison Police Officer: “I’m the right cop for the wrong job,” “no witnesses, no problem.” (Am. Compl. (dkt. #20) § 4125; Answ. (dkt. # 22) ¶ 4125.)

During the early morning hours of November 9, Heimsness was dispatched to a noise complaint at 606 S. Brearly Street in Madison. Once at the scene, Heimsness heard dispatch relay information at approximately 2:47 a.m. of a possible breaking and entering (described by dispatch as a “B & E”) at 513 S. Baldwin Street. In response, Heimsness notified dispatch that the noise complaint was unfounded, and that he was en route to the Baldwin Street burglary call. Officer Heenan heard a number of other officers report to dispatch that they would be responding to the breaking and entering call as well.

B. Officer Heimsness Arrives at Scene

At 2:48:43 a.m., dispatch informed Heimsness that a female occupant of the house where the breaking and entering was in progress reported hearing something at the front door of the house, that someone had come to the front door, that her husband had gone downstairs to see what was happening, and that the female occupant remained upstairs in the house with her four children. Based on this information while travelling to Baldwin Street, Heimsness understood he was being dispatched to a felony in progress, that it was a high risk incident, that he may be confronting a suspect who did not want to get caught, that confronting a suspect can be dangerous, and that the suspect could have a weapon or be armed.

Heimsness proceeded to 513 S. Baldwin Street at the cautious rate of approximately 30 miles per hour, which is at or below the speed limit, and did not turn on his squad lights or sirens so as not to notify the suspect that police were responding. When Heimsness arrived at the intersection of Baldwin Street and Spaight Street, he also turned off his car’s headlights so that any suspects who might have been acting as lookouts or accomplices would not know that the police had arrived. Officer Heimsness then parked his squad car on Baldwin Street at the southwest corner of the intersection of Baldwin and Spaight, approximately 150 feet from the driveway of 513 S. Baldwin.

As depicted below, the relevant block of Baldwin runs between Jenifer Street on the north (left-hand side of the page) and Spaight Street on the south (right hand side of the page). The house located at 513 S. Baldwin Street is on the east side of the street (depicted at the top of the image, approximately at the midpoint of the image).

(Declaration of Andrea J. Farrell ( Farrell Decl.”), Ex. I (dkt. # 64-9).) Heimsness crossed Baldwin at an angle and walked toward 513 S. Baldwin Street. While approaching, dispatch relayed at approximately 2:49:33 a.m. that the husband/homeowner was wearing a light-colored shirt and plaid pajama pants. There were trees and street lights along Baldwin Street, and Heimsness attempted to stay somewhat concealed as he approached.

Around this same time, Heimsness saw another MPD squad ear on Baldwin Street, approaching the Jenifer Street intersection with its lights off. Although Heimsness did not know that the squad car was being driven by Officer Stacy Troumbly, he knew the car was responding to the same call and contained at least one police officer who was armed, trained and could offer assistance. Because Heimsness wanted the other officer or officers in that car to know where he was, he turned on his flashlight and “blipped” the squad car a couple of times before turning off his flashlight and returning it to its holder. Then Chief of Police, Noble Wray, testified at his deposition that officers are trained to wait for back up whenever possible in responding to calls like a potential breaking and entering. Officers also wear a radio to facilitate communication with dispatchers and other officers.

C. Physical Encounter Between Heenan and O’Malley

As Heimsness continued to approach S. Baldwin, he was able to see the address number 513. He also noticed that the porch light was on and the screen door was closed, but that the interior door was open. After crossing the street, Heimsness stopped on the terrace and waited— albeit from the record it appears very briefly — for more officers. At that moment, Heimsness represents that a tree was still blocking his view of what was occurring on the sidewalk between the house and him. Heimsness then stepped onto the sidewalk, at which point he saw movement approximately 60 feet away to his left toward Jenifer Street and observed what he described as two ‘males — later identified as the homeowner, Kevin O’Malley, and the deceased, Paul Heenan— “struggling” with each other. (Pl.’s Resp. to City’s PFOFs (dkt. # 71) ¶ 33.)

The parties dispute the proper characterization of this physical exchange, but it appears undisputed that there was some physical contact between Heenan and O’Malley. Whether it was pushing and shoving as defendants’ characterize or simply grabbing as O’Malley testified, Heimsness admits that he did not see either man throwing punches or kicking. Neither did he see any weapons in either man’s hands, although he obviously did not know if Heenan had any concealed weapons. He also could see that the two men were also of comparable size.

At 2:49:39 a.m., Heimsness alerted dispatch that there was a “fight” between the homeowner and the suspect. Troumbly also heard Heimsness alert dispatch of the fight over the radio as she proceeded from her squad car on foot crossing Jenifer Street to Baldwin Street. At 2:49:45 a.m., Troumbly relayed over her radio that she was on the scene. Plaintiff represents that she was approximately three houses or 150 feet away from 513 S. Baldwin.

Tragically and unbeknownst to Heimsness, what he apparently thought was occurring and what was actually occurring were two entirely different things. O’Malley explained at his deposition that he was actually attempting to situate his neighbor Paul Heenan and to lead him back to his own home, which was just two doors away. Specifically, when O’Malley encountered Heenan, who was plainly intoxicated, he had asked Heenan if he had been out at the bar and told Heenan that he had attempted to enter the O’Malleys’ home rather than his own. Heenan then said something to the effect of, “you want to get weird,” and leaned his head toward O’Malley. (PL’s Resp. to Heimsness’s PFOFs (dkt. # 62) ¶ 13 (citing Deposition of Kevin J. O’Malley (“O’Malley Depo.”) (dkt. # 40) 81-82).) At that point, O’Malley grabbed Heenan’s lapel in an attempt to create some distance between himself and Heenan, and Heenan responded by grabbing O’Malley’s arms hard enough to sustain a “slight mark” on his left arm. (PL’s Resp. to City’s PFOFs (dkt. #71) ¶ 35 (citing O’Malley Depo. (dkt. # 40) 114).) O’Malley then attempted to move Heenan and himself toward O’Malleys’ home so that he could get help from his wife. While on the sidewalk, O’Malley first noticed a police officer, later identified as Officer Heimsness.

D. Officer Heimsness Confronts Heenan

Heimsness had surmised at about that same time that the man with the light-colored shirt and pajama pants was the homeowner, consistent with the information received from dispatch, and that the other man, who was wearing jeans, a navy jacket and a striped scarf, was the suspect. Heimsness also represents that while he could hear the two men saying things to each other, he could not hear exactly what they were saying. Plaintiff contends that the only person talking was O’Malley, who may have been saying something in an effort to alert Heenan to his surroundings. While plaintiff also contends that it was “readily apparent to a layperson that Mr. Heenan was extremely intoxicated” (PL’s PFOFs (dkt. # 72) ¶ 42 (citing Declaration of Kevin O’Malley (“O’Malley Dec!.”) (dkt. # 65) ¶¶ 7, 11)), Heimsness disputes this, testifying at his deposition ’ that Heenan did not appear intoxicated to him (Heimsness’s Resp. to PL’s PFOFs (dkt. # 88) ¶42 (citing Deposition of Steven Heimsness (“Heimsness Depo.”) (dkt. # 23) 162)).

There is no dispute that Heimsness silently approached the two men to within approximately 25 feet, then drew his gun, pointed it at the two men and yelled something like “get on the ground now” or “get down, get down.” (City’s PFOFs (dkt. #45) ¶41.) Heimsness avers that he drew his gun because he needed to confront a suspect who was in a physical struggle with a victim. Heimsness also contends that he yelled the command to get down “repeatedly.” (Affidavit of Steven Heimsness (“Heimsness Aff.”) (dkt. # 52) ¶ 48.) O’Malley states that he remembers Heimsness only yelling “get down, get down” once, but acknowledges that Heimsness may have repeated that command while O’Malley was yelling “he’s a neighbor.” (PL’s Resp. to City’s PFOFs (dkt. # 71) ¶ 41 (citing O’Malley Decl. (dkt. # 65) ¶ 57); City’s Reply to PFOFs (dkt. #78) ¶41 (citing O’Malley Depo. (dkt. # 40) 97-98).) Officer Troumbly testified at her deposition that Heimsness’s order was “repeated.” (City’s Reply to PFOFs (dkt. # 78) ¶ 41 (citing Deposition of Stacy Troumbly (“Troumbly Depo.”) (dkt. #29) 122).)

After shouting an order and with the gun pointed at them, both of the men looked at Heimsness. While Heimsness never identified himself as a police officer, O’Malley understood by this point that Heimsness was an officer. Accordingly, O’Malley let go of Heenan, put his hands up and moved out of the way, off of the sidewalk onto the terrace, while still remaining within 10 to 15 feet of Heimsness.

Heenan then turned toward Officer Heimsness, who was approximately 10 to 25 feet away. Heimsness continued to point his gun at Heenan with his right hand and also used his left hand to point at him, all while, he contends, continuing to give loud orders to get on the ground. Heimsness represents that Heenan then quickly walked toward him, and said, “no, fuck you goddammit, no, fuck you goddammit.” (City’s PFOFs (dkt. # 45) ¶ 48 (citing Heimsness Aff. (dkt. # 52) ¶ 54).) O’Malley states that he only heard Heenan say, “Oh, now you?” (PL’s Resp. to City’s PFOFs (dkt. #71) ¶ 48 (citing O’Malley Depo. (dkt. # 40) 95).)

Regardless, there appears no dispute that Heenan approached Heimsness, but plaintiff contends — relying again on O’Malley’s account — that he did so at a slow pace with his arms flailing. There is also no dispute that Heimsness could see (1) Heenan’s hands while he was approaching and (2) there was nothing in his hands. (Farrell Deck, Ex. D (dkt. # 64 — 4) 8; see also Am. Compl. (dkt. # 20) ¶ 4215; Heimsness’s Answ. (dkt. # 22) ¶ 4215.) Despite seeing no weapon in Heenan’s hands, Officer Heimsness did not re-holster his gun or transition to another weapon.

E. Physical Encounter Between Heenan and Heimsness

As Officer Troumbly approached, she heard Heimsness say something to the effect of “Stop, get back, get back, get down, stop, now.” (City’s PFOFs (dkt. # 45) ¶ 79 (citing Troumbly Depo. (dkt. # 29) 124-125).) Troumbly testified at her deposition that Heimsness sounded scared and distressed, but also like he sounds when he is angry. She then saw Heimsness and Heenan become physically engaged, and began sprinting toward them.

During this time, O’Malley states that he was on the terrace yelling as loudly as he could, “he’s my neighbor.” O’Malley claims he continued yelling while he was moving into the driveway in Heimsness’s line of sight, hoping that Heimsness would be attuned to what O’Malley was trying to communicate to him. (Pl.’s PFOFs (dkt. # 72) ¶ 96.)

What follows is largely disputed. As Heenan approached, Heimsness avers that he began to back up in an attempt to distance himself from Heenan. Plaintiff disputes this, relying on O’Malley’s view that Heimsness and Heenan were both moving toward each other, as Officer Troumbly approached. (PL’s Resp. to City’s PFOFs (dkt. # 71) ¶ 50.)

Heimsness also contends that he pulled his right hand holding the gun back towards his right shoulder in an effort to keep it away from Heenan, but that Heenan reached for his right hand. Plaintiff contends that this account is not credible given the limited amount of time Heenan would have had to reach for his gun and the fact that Heimsness failed to convey this information to Troumbly, although it is undisputed that he told others after the shooting that Heenan had grabbed for his gun.

Heimsness further contends that he attempted to push Heenan away, but that Heenan with his right hand grabbed Heimsness’s left hand and squeezed it to the point where Heimsness felt pain in his left pinky finger for several hours after the encounter. Plaintiff disputes this as well, largely relying on O’Malley’s testimony that Heenan “sort of swat[ted] at the back of the police officer,” without any mention that Heenan grabbed Heimsness’s hand. (PL’s Resp. to City’s PFOFs (dkt. #71) ¶ 54 (citing O’Malley Depo. (dkt. # 40) 101, 109).)

Heimsness contends that he continued to try to push Heenan away and was stepping back while doing so. Once again, plaintiff challenges this account, contending instead that Heimsness was moving toward Heenan, in part because of the fact that the two men advanced north, toward Jenifer Street from 513 S. Baldwin to 511 S. Baldwin. From Troumbly’s perspective, she could see the back of Heenan’s head and Heimsness was facing her, but with Heenan always between Heimsness and Troumbly. Troumbly had pulled her Taser and was prepared to deploy it toward Heenan’s back.

While this physical exchange was occurring, Heimsness further avers that he did not want to turn and run, having been trained not to turn his back on a suspect. He also claims to have been unsure of how much room he had to back up, worrying that he might trip over a curb or other object. At the same time, Officer Heimsness contends that Heenan’s right hand continued to have a hold of Heimsness’s left hand, and that Heenan was using his left hand to swat and grab at Heimsness’s gun. Heimsness further contends that Heenan’s eyes were locked on his gun.

Although Heimsness acknowledges that he did not know if Heenan ever touched his gun (City’s Resp. to Pl.’s PFOFs (dkt. # 81) ¶ 117 (citing Heimsness Depo. (dkt. # 23) 69)), Heimsness at this point represents that he became worried Heenan was trying to disarm him and, if successful, might shoot him, or at least disable his gun. Regardless, there is no dispute that Heimsness then gave Heenan a weak push or shove with his left hand, moved him back at least a few feet, got a strong two-handed grip on his gun, and shot Heenan three times in rapid succession.

The shots were fired at 2:49:54 a.m., just fifteen seconds after Heimsness alerted dispatch of the struggle between Heenan and O’Malley and nine seconds after Troumbly had alerted dispatch (and in turn Heimsness) that she was on the scene. There is no dispute that the physical encounter between Heimsness and Heenan lasted a matter of seconds.

At 2:49:58 a.m., Heimsness called dispatch to report, “David 8, shots fired, suspect down, we are 10-2.” (PL’s PFOFs (dkt. #72) ¶ 134.) “10-2” means “we’re okay.” (Id. at ¶ 135.)

F. Aftermath of Shooting

Immediately after the shooting, supervisor Sergeant Krahn responded to the scene. Heimsness noticed Krahn and told him, “He came at me and I shot to get him off of me.” (PL’s PFOFs (dkt. #81) ¶ 148.) Krahn requested a channel for emergency rescue efforts for Heenan, but Heimsness responded that a channel was not needed because “he’s dead.” (Id. at ¶ 152.) Heimsness reported being really mad after the shooting because “the guy made me shoot him. I was pissed off at the guy that he made me shoot him.” (Id. at ¶ 155.) Plaintiff also points to testimony of Chief Wray that Heimsness did not display typical symptoms an officer may feel following a high-stress event — though Wray did testify that he witnessed Heimsness pacing at one point. Instead, Heimsness appeared very calm and normal to Wray. (City’s Resp. to PL’s PFOFs (dkt. # 81) ¶¶ 156-67.)

Heimsness now contends that as he prepared and fired, he saw no one else around or behind the suspect, including O’Malley and Officer Troumbly. After Heenan was shot and fell to the ground, Heimsness acknowledges seeing Troumbly standing at the scene in a position that would have been behind Heenan — and therefore in Heimsness’s line of sight — during the physical altercation, but claims he was suffering from tunnel vision at the time he shot Heenan. Plaintiff contends that this is an issue of credibility that only a jury can decide.

According to William Newhouse of the Wisconsin State Crime Lab, the muzzle of Heimsness’s firearm and Heenan’s coat were approximately 24 to 42 inches apart when Heenan was shot. Adjusting for the length of Heimsness’s arm and the gun, Heenan was approximately 4.5 to 6.5. feet from Heimsness at the time he was shot, which is consistent with O’Malley’s estimátion of 4 to 6 feet. (Pl.’s PFOFs (dkt. # 72) ¶ 140.)

Dr. Vincent Tranchida, the Dane County Chief Medical Examiner, conducted Heenan’s autopsy. Dr. Tranchida identified three gunshot paths: (1) going through the upper right arm, past the armpit, and into the rib cage; (2) going through the upper chest and exiting out the back; and (3) going through the back of the left hand and then into his torso. (Pl.’s PFOFs (dkt. # 72) ¶ 170 (citing Deposition of Vincent Tranchida, M.D. (“Tranchida Depo.”) (dkt. # 58) 17, 26, 30-31).) Relying on Dr. Tranchida’s description of the gunshot wounds, plaintiff posits that (1) Heenan was shot from a distance of greater than three feet, and (2) Heenan’s back may have been up against a wooden pole. (Id. at ¶¶ 171-75 (citing Tranchida Depo. (dkt. # 58) 19, 22-24, 26-27, 39-31, 79-80).)

G. MPD’s Investigation of Shooting

At approximately 3:00 a.m. on November 9, 2012, the night shift officer in charge contacted Lieutenant Dan Olivas, the Professional Standard & Internal Affair (“PISA”) Lieutenant for MPD. In that role, Olivas completed the internal investigation and administrative review of the facts surrounding the shooting to determine if Heimsness’s actions- complied with MPD policies and training.

Olivas began his review that morning. In response to an MPD request that the Dane County Sheriffs Office provide an observer, Lieutenant Tim Schuetz of the sheriffs office also monitored the investigation. Olivas’s review and investigation spanned several weeks. Olivas interviewed everyone involved in any way with the shooting, reviewed voluminous reports, and met with an MPD use of force expert.

As part of his investigation, Olivas considered two use of force decisions: (1) Heimsness’s decision to confront Heenan at gunpoint; and (2) his decision to deploy deadly force. Olivas analyzed the first use of force decision in light of MPD Policy 4-500 Police Weaponry and concluded that Heimsness’s actions complied with the policy. Olivas analyzed the second decision in light of MPD Police 6-100 The Use of Deadly Force. Olivas concluded that Heimsness’s actions also complied with this policy. Olivas’s findings were captured in a 38-page administrative review report to Chief Wray, dated January 1, 2013. (Olivas Deck, Ex. E (dkt. # 51-5).)

Chief Wray had final authority to determine whether Heimsness’s use of force complied with policy and training. After reviewing the investigative materials, Wray agreed with Olivas that Heimsness’s actions were consistent with the two policies identified above. Specifically, Wray testified at his deposition that he believed it was reasonable for Heimsness to use deadly force (1) to protect O’Malley, (2) to protect himself because Heenan was reaching for Heimsness’s gun, and (3) to a lesser degree, to prevent the escape of a person who Heimsness had reasonable cause to believe had committed a burglary in progress and who was not complying with the officer. By letter dated January 9, 2013, Wray released to the public MPD’s administrative report and the DOJ report referenced below. (Olivas Decl., Ex. G (dkt. # 51-7).)

MPD also requested an independent review of the shooting by the State of Wisconsin Department of Justice Training and Standards Bureau. MPD provided the DOJ with information, including that compiled as part of the criminal investigation into the shooting by the Dane County District Attorney. The DOJ issued its own written administrative review report dated January 8, 2013, concluding that Heimsness’s use of deadly force fell within the training approved by the Wisconsin Law Enforcement Standards Bureau. (Olivas Decl., Ex. F (dkt. #51-6).) In a press release dated December 27, 2012, Dane County District Attorney Ismael R. Ozanne announced his determination that there was no potential criminal liability for Officer Heimsness, explaining the factual findings from the investigation that his officer had directed. (Olivas Decl., Ex. H (dkt. # 51-8).)

In challenging the significance of the investigation, plaintiff points out that in every investigation involving deadly use of force, MPD has found the officer’s conduct reasonable. (Pl.’s PFOFs (dkt. # 72) ¶ 337.) Plaintiff also criticizes MPD’s failure to release Heimsness’s MDC messages until after the various investigations concluded. Plaintiff further takes issue with the Department’s consideration of information from the Dane County Medical Examiner to assess Heimsness’s credibility in describing Heenan’s position. (Id. ■ at ¶¶ 343-353.)

Plaintiff is also critical of MPD’s investigation of Heenan as compared to what it characterizes as a lack of investigation of Heimsness. Specifically, MPD requested preservation of Heenan’s social media accounts and subsequently reviewed them, reviewed Heenan’s recent purchases and credit card history, interviewed members of his family, friends, coworkers and acquaintances as to how he had been acting in the recent past and his propensity toward violence, tested him for drug and alcohol consumption, searched his room and car, and reviewed his text messages and call history. In contrast, MPD took none of those same steps for Officer Heimsness.

Plaintiff also points out that MPD searched for Heenan’s criminal records— of which there were none — as well as searched for any municipal violations. Wray explained at his deposition that this search provided information regarding what Heenan’s demeanor might have been at the time he was shot. In contrast, Wray had not reviewed Heimsness’s disciplinary records concerning prior use of force, although he was aware of a past violation that had been sustained. (Deposition of Noble Wray (“Wray Depo.”) (dkt. #39) 66.) See infra Opinion § IV.B.II.b.

In particular, Wray was not aware that in the context of the 2001 investigation (described below), MPD had credited witness statements that Heimsness moved and had ample time to exercise an alternative over Heimsness’s contention that he “froze” and saw no alternative. Wray was also unaware at the time he exonerated Heimsness that the City had determined in 2001 that Heimsness: (1) employed poor judgment and tactical decision-making as he moved relative to the actions of the vehicle; (2) was found to not have a full comprehension of the MPD Use of Force policy; and (3) violated policy with respect to the shots fired in the 2001 incident.

Chief Wray finally testified that while he believed a lesser degree of force would have, been sufficient to subdue Heenan, he nonetheless concluded that Heimsness reasonably believed a lesser degree of force would have been insufficient. Wray knew that Heimsness created distance by pushing Heenan with his left non-dominant hand, but still believed that it was reasonable to shoot Heenan. Wray also took into account Heimsness’s claim that he was suffering from tunnel vision and auditory exclusion in finding his use of force reasonable. Finally, while Heimsness was exonerated for the Heenan shooting, he was not permitted to return to active duty.

OPINION

I. Excessive Force Claim

The parties agree that plaintiffs excessive force claim is governed by the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness standard” defined by the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). See 490 U.S. at 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (holding that “all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force — deadly or not — in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard”). Still, “[determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (quotation marks omitted)). This balancing is “not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Instead, the Supreme Court instructs that the analysis must focus on the “totality of circumstances” surrounding the incident. Id. (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-9, 105 S.Ct. 1694); see also Sallenger v. Oakes, 473 F.3d 731, 739 (7th Cir.2007). In particular, the fact finder should consider “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865.

Critically, all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the use of force “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. The reasonableness determination must also “embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865. The failure to use an alternative, non-deadly force is not dis-positive, although whether such an alternative existed is a factual question that may weigh on a trier of facts’ ultimate determination of objective reasonableness. Deering v. Reich, 183 F.3d 645, 650-51 (7th Cir.1999) (discussing Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 884 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir.1989)).

Generally speaking, “when an officer believes that a suspect’s actions place him, his partner, or those in the immediate vicinity in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, the officer can reasonably exercise the use of deadly force.” Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 805 (7th Cir.1988) (en banc); see also Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12, 105 S.Ct. 1694 (defining reasonable use of deadly force in context of fleeing suspect). Accordingly, the defendants’ summary judgment motion turns on whether plaintiff has come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the objective reasonableness of Heimsness’s belief that Heenan posed an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury to himself or others at the time he fired his weapon. For the reasons that follow, the court finds that it has.

As an initial matter, many of the key proposed finding of facts on which defendants rely in moving for summary judgment are legitimately in dispute. For example, the City’s brief lists 21 “undisputed” facts to establish that no reasonable jury could find Heimsness’s use of force was objectively unreasonable. Without going through each one, the court notes that several of the most material facts are in dispute on this record:

• The nature of the physical exchange and separation between O’Malley and Heenan. (City’s Opening Br. (dkt. # 46) 22 at ¶ 6.)

• How Heenan approached Heimsness. (Id. at ¶ 12.)

• Whether Heimsness repeatedly shouted orders to Heenan. (Id. at ¶ 13.)

• The nature of the physical exchange and separation between Heenan and Heimsness. (Id. at ¶¶ 13,14.)

• Whether Heimsness’s push created sufficient separation to remove any imminent threat posed by Heenan. (Id. at ¶ 20.)

In addition to casting disputed facts in a light most favorable to defendants, rather than to Heenan as the non-movant, defendants fail to acknowledge other alleged facts that must be accounted for under a “totality of the circumstances analysis”:

' «Whether O’Malley was yelling “He’s my neighbor”; Heimsness’s apparent failure to acknowledge or react to that information; and whether an objective officer would have reasonably reacted similarly given O’Malley’s purported tone and the claimed urgency with which he was attempting to convey its significance.

• Whether Heimsness was aware that backup (Officer Troumbly) was on the scene, and whether and how that knowledge should have altered an objective officer’s actions. See Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 772 (7th Cir.2005) (“[T]he plaintiffs proffered expert testimony that Brook’s tactics violated standard police practices, while not dispositive, may also be deemed relevant to the reasonableness inquiry.”).

• Whether Heenan was obviously, heavily intoxicated; whether Heimsness was or should have been aware of that fact; and if so, whether and how that should have affected his actions. Cf. Sallenger, 473 F.3d at 739 (“[Mjental illness may be relevant to the reasonableness inquiry.”) (citing Abdullahi, 423 F.3d at 772).

• Whether Heimsness was retreating or advancing toward Heenan.

• The nature of the forensic evidence to establish Heenan’s position vis-á-vis a wooden pole when he was shot. See, e.g., Abdullahi, 423 F.3d at 772 (“[M]edical evidence and other circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to create triable issues of fact in excessive force cases.”).

More fundamentally, defendants’ argument on summary judgment is flawed by their general failure to consider and analyze the events under the totality of the circumstances. Instead, defendants press the court to consider narrowly the specific moment when Officer Heimsness chose to pull the trigger, shooting Heenan, a view soundly rejected by the Seventh Circuit. In Deering, 183 F.3d at 649, the court was critical of the district court’s jury “instructions and ... evidence rulingsf] rather restrictive view of what constitutes the totality of the circumstances.” The court went on to explain that

what Deputy Reich knew at the time— about Deering, his crime, and the warrant, and his perception of the danger he and the other deputies were in — was relevant to the evaluation of the reasonableness of his conduct. In addition, the balancing required by Gamer requires a look at the countervailing governmental interest in serving the warrant on Deering, which would include the time and manner in which it was served. Finally, of course, all of the events that occurred around the time of the shooting are relevant. In other words, the totality of the circumstances is what must be evaluated. When a case is tried to a jury, the evaluation of those circumstances must be left to that jury.

Deering, 183 F.3d at 652.

Here, the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding the shooting include the fact that (1) Heimsness had backup as he approached the scene; (2) Heimsness was wearing a baton and had access to pepper spray; (3) on his command, Heimsness had achieved substantial separation between the suspect and the victim/homeowner; and (4) the suspect appeared to be unarmed. While the relevant inquiry is limited to what Heimsness knew at the time, plaintiff is also free to challenge the veracity of Heimsness’s account of what he knew, including by use of O’Malley’s testimony that Heenan was visibly intoxicated and that he repeatedly told Heimsness that Heenan was actually his neighbor. See Sherrod, 856 F.2d at 806 (“The veracity of Officer Berry’s testimony and the reasonableness of his actions based upon the totality of the information he possessed at the time of the shooting are questions we leave for a properly informed and instructed jury on remand.”).

The Seventh Circuit’s statement in Marion v. City of Corydon, Ind., 559 F.3d 700 (7th Cir.2009), that “[p]re-seizure police conduct cannot serve as a basis for liability under the Fourth Amendment,” does not conflict with Deering or Sherrod. While Heimsness’s civil liability may not be based on his decision to take out his gun or to approach the scene without back-up clearly in place, nor will plaintiff be allowed to argue liability based on those decisions, his pre-seizure actions and decisions are part of the totality of circumstances that the jury may consider in determining the ultimate issue: whether his ultimate decision to use deadly force was objectively reasonable.

In support of his motion, Heimsness directs the court to a number of other cases, none of which are sufficiently close on the facts to support the grant of summary judgment here. For example, Heimsness cites to Henning v. O’Leary, 477 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir.2007), in which the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant officers, finding that the officers’ use of deadly force was reasonable. Like the case at issue here, the shooting of an unarmed suspect occurred during a scuffle with officers. Unlike here, however, that plaintiff (also an estate of the decedent) “offer[ed] no real evidence” to contradict “the officer’s characterization of the events,” making it undisputed that: Henning was actively resisting arrest; that the officers “tried hand strikes, pepper spray, and baton blows to the torso and legs to get him subdued”; one officer’s gun fell to the ground and was positioned under Henning’s body with Henning’s hand possibly on the gun; and Henning yelled “shoot me, you’re going to have to shoot me.” Id. at 494-95, 496. In contrast, the plaintiff here has come forward with: (1) substantial contradictory testimony from a third-party witness, O’Malley, corroborated in part by the testimony of Troumbly, Heimsness’s fellow officer; and (2) forensic evidence concerning bullet exit wounds, as well as other evidence calling into question the accuracy of Heimsness’s account. All of this evidence raises genuine issues of material fact surrounding Heimsness’s ultimate use of lethal force. See also Marion, 559 F.3d at 701 (affirming grant of summary judgment to defendants officers where plaintiff “offered no counter-affidavit and pointed to no evidence that would call into question defendants’ submissions”).

Curiously, Heimsness also relies on the Seventh Circuit’s en banc decision in Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir.1988), which reversed and remanded a jury’s verdict in favor of an estate not for entry of summary judgment, but for a new trial. Importantly, the court did not — as Heimsness suggests — find that “the officer’s shooting was justified.” (Heimsness’s Opening Br. (dkt. # 55) 6.) Instead, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court erred in allowing testimony and other evidence establishing that the suspect was found to be unarmed because the defendant officer did not claim otherwise. “Knowledge of facts and circumstances gained after the fact (that the suspect was unarmed) has no place in the trial court’s or jury’s proper post-hoc analysis of the reasonableness of the actor’s judgment.” Sherrod, 856 F.2d at 805. Importantly, the court also concluded that “[t]he veracity of Officer Berry’s testimony and the reasonableness of his actions based upon the totality of the information he possessed at the time of the shooting are questions we leave for a properly informed and instructed jury on remand.” Id. at 806.

Equally curious, Heimsness points to another Seventh Circuit decision in Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243 (7th Cir.1993), which actually reversed a grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, finding that: (1) the plaintiff had raised issues of material fact touching on the question of qualified immunity; and (2) even accepting the police officer’s account of events, “a jury could conclude that the immediate danger had passed by the time [the officer] fired.” Id. at 247. Heimsness nonetheless argues that this case supports his motion for summary judgment because of dicta in the opinion describing certain circumstances that were not at issue in that ease and that may have provided a basis for affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Id. at 247. Even if the court were to treat this language as providing general guidance on an officer’s reasonable use of deadly force, fact issues still remain as to Heenan’s actions and whether they posed an objectively reasonable threat to the safety of Heimsness and others.

The court’s denial of defendants’ motions for summary judgment should hardly be surprising. “[S]ince the Graham reasonableness inquiry nearly always requires a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom, we have held on many occasions that summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in excessive force cases should be granted sparingly.” Abdullahi, 423 F.3d at 773 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1147 (7th Cir.1994) (“The award of summary judgment to the defense in deadly force cases may be made only with particular care where the officer defendant is the only witness left alive to testify.... [A] court must undertake a fairly critical assessment of the forensic evidence, the officer’s original reports or statement and the opinions of experts to decide whether the officer’s testimony could reasonably be rejected at trial.”). Here, a jury is required to resolve a number of discrete, factual disputes, as well as the ultimate difficult question of whether Heimsness’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable.

While a determination of Heimsness’s civil liability under the Fourth Amendment must, therefore, proceed to trial, the court would be remiss not to address briefly plaintiffs repeated attempts to usher in evidence of supposed bad faith in its claim against Heimsness. As described above, the test is an “objective one,” meaning that the determination is made “without regard to [an officer’s] underlying intent or motivation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865. “[E]vil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer’s good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.” Id. As this statement from Graham makes plain, this framework cuts both ways: while a plaintiff may not introduce evidence of bad faith to somehow bolster a jury’s finding of objective unreasonableness, neither need a plaintiff show deliberate indifference as in the Eighth Amendment context to demonstrate liability under the Fourth Amendment. “Of course, in assessing the credibility of an officer’s account of the circumstances that prompted the use of force, a factfinder may consider, along with other factors, evidence that the officer may have harbored ill-will toward the citizen.” Id. at 399 n. 12, 109 S.Ct. 1865. The exact line between admissible evidence and inadmissible evidence will be addressed by this court as part of the parties’ motions in limine before trial, with reference to the specific pieces of evidence either side seeks to introduce, but both sides should understand their obligation to hew that line.

II. Qualified Immunity

Having found that factual issues preclude defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the merits of plaintiffs excessive force claim, the court must further address whether those same factual issues preclude a grant of qualified immunity before trial. The test for qualified immunity is a familiar one. To determine whether defendant Heimsness is entitled to qualified immunity, the court must consider: (1) whether the facts as shown make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) if so, whether that right was “clearly established” at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)). “A plaintiff can show that a right is ‘clearly established’ by statute or constitution in at least two ways: (1) he can point to a clearly analogous case establishing the right to be free from the conduct at issue; or (2) he can show that the conduct was ‘so egregious that no reasonable person could have believed that it would not violate established rights.’” Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 508-09 (7th Cir.2015) (quoting Smith v. City of Chi., 242 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir.2001)).

Defendant Heimsness’s claim to qualified immunity is also based on facts and inferences made in his favor. Essentially, Heimsness argues that it was not clearly established he could not use deadly force “when he responded to a burglary and home invasion in progress and observed: (1) the suspect physically struggling with the homeowner; (2) the suspect disobey repeated lawful commands; (3) the suspect turn on him and swat at him and at his service weapon; and (4) the suspect continue to physically attack him while he tried to retreat and protect his gun away from Mr. Heenan’s advances.” (Heimsness’s Opening Br. (dkt. #55) 16.) As explained above, among other factual disputes that may impact the jury’s determination of whether the force used was objectively reasonable, plaintiff has raised genuine issues of material fact with respect to the proper characterization of the actual physical exchange between O’Malley and Heenan; whether Heimsness issued repeated orders to Heenan; whether Heenan was swatting or attempting to swat at his gun; whether Heenan was advancing and how he was advancing toward Heimsness; and whether Heimsness was retreating or moving toward Heenan.

Where factual disputes exist, a defendant must adopt plaintiffs version of the facts in asserting his right to be free from the excessive force inflicted on him was not sufficiently clear at the time of the shooting. See Sallenger, 473 F.3d at 742 (reversing grant of qualified immunity because “[viewing the' facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” the right to be free from excessive force was clearly established); Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230, 235 (7th Cir.1993) (dismissing officer defendant’s appeal of denial of qualified immunity because the appeal rested on factual disputes for which the court lacked jurisdiction to consider). Adopting plaintiff’s version of the facts as the jury would have to do to find Heimsness liable at the time of the shooting, it has been clearly and long established that shooting an individual in the chest three times who did not pose an imminent threat to the safety of the officer or others violates that individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force.

Accordingly, while it is an arguably higher standard of proof for plaintiff and, therefore, a ploser question, the court denies Heimsness’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds for the same reason the motion is denied on the merits — factual disputes preclude a finding under the first prong that plaintiff has not made out a constitutional violation, and those same factual disputes similarly preclude a determination of whether the particular constitutional right at stake was clearly established at the time of the shooting. See Weinmann v. McClone, 787 F.3d 444, 446, 447 (7th Cir.2015) (affirming district court’s denial of qualified immunity in excessive force claim because of factual disputes). Certainly, where the facts are sufficiently clear, it is preferable to grant qualified immunity at summary judgment to spare a state actor the added disruption and expense of trial, and this court is willing to revisit the question of qualified immunity after trial,-but in a case this heavily fact intensive, and more importantly heavily laden with material factual disputes, Heimsness’s entitlement to qualified immunity must await trial. See Gutierrez v. Kermon, 722 F.3d 1003, 1010-14 (7th Cir.2013) (denying interlocutory appeal where claim to qualified immunity depend upon disputed facts).

III. Motion, to Bifurcate Liability Phase of Trial

Before turning to the City’s separate motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim asserted against it, the court first takes up defendants’ joint motion to bifurcate the liability phase of trial since that motion frames the court’s treatment of the City’s motion for summary judgment. Defendants propose that the excessive force claim against Heimsness be tried first, separate from the Monell claim asserted against the City, arguing that both judicial economy and avoiding unfair prejudice to Heimsness justifies the request. Adding to defendants’ assertion of judicial economy, the City agrees to stipulate to entry of judgment against it if Heimsness is found liable, attaching a signed “stipulation and waiver of requirement of proof’ to its motion. (See Joint Mot. to Bifurcate, Ex. A (dkt. # 91-1).)

Federal Rule of Evidence 42(b) provides in pertinent part that:

For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.

The court agrees with defendants that bifurcation is warranted both to avoid prejudice to Heimsness and for judicial economy, especially in light of the City’s stipulation.

First, introducing evidence of Heimsness’s disciplinary history and the recent MDC messages — both of which would be pertinent to plaintiffs Monell claim against the City for deliberate indifference to the need for supervision — in the same phase of the trial in which the jury considers whether Heimsness’s use of force was objectively reasonable may well unfairly prejudice Heimsness. See, e.g., Fuery v. City of Chi., No. 07 C 5428, 2015 WL 715281, at *3 (N.D.Ill.2015) (finding bifurcation warranted where evidence relevant to the Monell claim would unfairly prejudice the individual defendants); Awalt v. Marketti, No. 11 C 6142, 75 F.Supp.3d 777, 780, 2014 WL 6908470, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 8, 2014) (granting motion to bifurcate Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims directed against individual defendants from those asserted against the county to avoid prejudice to individual defendants).

There are cases in which the evidence relevant to a personal liability claim sufficiently overlaps with that of the municipal liability claim that the efficiencies of a single phased liability trial would overcome the possible prejudice to an individual defendant — e.g., deliberate indifference to serious medical need based on a treatment protocol set by a county jail — but this is not such a case. Even with a strongly-worded curative instruction that the standard Heimsness must meet is an objective one, the risk is too great that the jury would be unable to ignore the subjective aspects of Heimsness’s specific, prior instances of use of force, as well as MDC messages, which arguably reflect a dark humor that sometimes accompanies a very difficult occupation or a disturbingly flippant attitude about shooting someone.

Plaintiff does not directly address the likely prejudice to Heimsness, but rather argues that defendants have not met their burden of demonstrating that bifurcation is warranted in light of the fact that “the plaintiff has the right to tell his story with such descriptive richness as he sees fit.” (Pl.’s Opp’n (dkt. # 99) 3.) While plaintiff may be the master of its complaint, the court is obligated under Rule 42(b) to steer the course of the trial, and the Federal Rules of Evidence require the exclusion of marginally relevant evidence that has a substantial risk of unduly prejudicing a party. Given the very different standards of liability the jury must apply in deciding Heimsness’s and the City’s respective liability, which directly impacts the relevance of much of the charged evidence here, the court is compelled to manage its introduction. Even assuming it is defendants’ burden to demonstrate that bifurcation is warranted, therefore, defendants have met that burden.

Second, the court also agrees with defendants that bifurcation is warranted in light of judicial economy. While there are circumstances where the jury could find the individual defendant not liable, but the municipality could still be on the hook for a constitutional violation — most notably instances where qualified immunity applies —this is not one of those cases. See generally 1A Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation: Claims and Defenses § 7.13[C] (4th ed.2015); see also Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 305 (7th Cir.2010) (explaining that the jury could have found that the medical technician defendants were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s medical needs, but still find the County liable “because of the well-documented breakdown in the County’s policies for retrieving medical request forms”). Here, if the jury finds Heimsness not liable, then there will be no need to try a Monell claim against the City. In other words, plaintiffs claim against the City is entirely dependent on the success of its claim that Heimsness used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

As for qualified immunity, the court has denied that relief before trial and, at this stage, while Heimsness may renew his motion before the jury returns a verdict on the claim against him, the court would likely again deny that motion given the need for the jury to resolve material factual disputes for the reasons already explained at length above. To clarify, the jury necessarily will reach the question of whether Heenan’s rights were violated. Regardless, the court can foresee no circumstance in which Monell liability will need to be tried at all in light of the City’s stipulation. As such, judicial economy warrants excluding potentially prejudicial evidence relevant mainly, if not exclusively, to that issue.

Third and finally, plaintiff argues that the City’s stipulation would defeat important “societal benefits” derived from a jury’s determination of the City’s liability. Indeed, plaintiff points out, since the City is required to indemnify Heimsness for any damages here, “the City’s offer to stipulate adds nothing to the equation — a judgment against Heimsness already effectively operates as a judgment against the City.” (Pl.’s Opp’n (dkt. # 99) 5.) The court certainly appreciates plaintiffs argument, but absent a relevant factual question for the jury to decide on plaintiffs Monell liability claim, there is no reason this evidence need be placed before a jury.

Of course, a claim for injunctive relief against a municipality under § 1983 might still be ripe. Swanigan v. City of Chi., 775 F.3d 953, 961 (7th Cir.2015) (“Municipalities ‘can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief.’ ” (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018)). The court, therefore, would be open to entertaining requests for an equitable remedy as the evidence may dictate {e.g., requiring different training, methods for supervising officers, etc.). Any disputed facts pertinent to a claim for equitable relief could be heard by the court outside of the jury’s presence, while the jury is deliberating on plaintiffs claim against Heimsness.

Accordingly, the court will accept the City’s stipulation of entry of judgment against it should the jury find in favor of plaintiff on its claim against Heimsness, as well as grant defendants’ motion to bifurcate. Because of this, the court need only consider whether plaintiff has identified a genuine issue of fact as to any one of its multitude of Monell liability theories.

IV. Monell Liability

“[A] municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Rather, there must be a “link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional violation.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989); see also Thomas, 604 F.3d at 306 (requiring a showing of a “causal link” between the municipal policy and the constitutional violation). Generally speaking, there are four bases for finding municipal liability: (1) a formal policy; (2) a well-settled custom or practice; (3) a final decision of a municipal policymaker; or (4) deliberate indifference for training or supervision. 1A Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1988 Litigation: Claims & Defenses § 7.06[A] (4th ed.2015). As far as the court can discern, plaintiff attempts to argue for liability on all four bases, but the court will focus on the two for which plaintiff responded with meaningful evidence on summary judgment.

A. Formal Policy

i.MPD’s Structure

The Madison Police Department has about 525 employees, including 450 commissioned officers, and an annual budget in 2013 of approximately $60 million. From 2004 through the time of the shooting, Nobel Wray was its chief of police. As chief, Wray was the person with the ultimate responsibility for assigning, training, supervising and disciplining Madison police officers. The chief of police is also an official policy maker for the City of Madison with regard to the City’s police force,

ii. City’s Use of Force Policies

Madison Police Department Policy 6-100 provides in pertinent part:

The use of deadly force is only authorized when under any of the following circumstances, an officer reasonably believes a lesser degree of force would be insufficient:

1. in the defense of another person when the officer has reasonable cause to believe is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm;

2. in defense of oneself, when there is reasonable cause to believe one is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm;

3.to effect the arrest or prevent the escape of a suspect who the officer has reasonable cause to believe has committed, or attempted to commit, a felony involving the use or threatened use of deadly force, when a high probability exists that the suspect, if not immediately apprehended, may cause death or great bodily harm;

(Declaration of Dan Olivas (“Olivas Deck”), Ex. D (dkt. # 51-4) p. 2.)

The MPD also has a specific policy on “drawing the handgun and confronting suspects,” which is part of MPD Policy 4-500 and provides in pertinent part:

1. A handgun may be removed from its holster in the performance of duty under the following circumstances and only with the finger outside of the trigger guard:

a. When an officer reasonably believes that the potential for the authorized use of deadly force may exist.

b. When it is necessary to secure in a safe place or check on the serviceability of the weapon.

c. At an approved range.

2. Confronting Suspects with Drawn Handgun

a. The finger will remain outside of the trigger guard until such time as circumstances exist which reasonably indicate a danger to life or of great bodily harm.

b. If applicable to the officer’s particular weapon system, the pistol will be in double action mode, and the weapon will not be cocked.

c. If applicable to the officer’s particular weapon system, after being fired, a semiautomatic pistol may remain in the eocked/single action mode until such time as the immediate threat of death or great bodily harm has been neutralized. The weapon will then be restored to double action mode by use of the decocking lever.

(Olvas Deck, Ex. C (dkt. # 51-3).)

In addition to this formal, written policy, plaintiff contends that the force authorized or encouraged during its MPD’s training of police officers is equivalent to a “working policy” on use of force. (PL’s PFOFs (dkt. # 72) ¶ 193.) The evidence at least indicates that MPD expects that an officer will use deadly force consistent with the way the department has trained the officer. Accordingly, plaintiff cites heavily to a PowerPoint presentation, “Winning Mindset: Peak Performance During and After Critical Incidents,” which purports to be a training document for MPD recruits. (City’s Resp. to PL’s PFOFs (dkt. # 81)