Bendlis v. NCL (Banamas), Ltd. (112 F. Supp. 3d 1339, 2015)

ORDER

DONALD L. GRAHAM, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon NCL’s Motion to Compel Arbitration [D.E. .6], Plaintiffs Motion to Remand [D.E. 7], and Plaintiffs Motion to Stay [D.E. 8].

THE COURT has considered the Motions, the Responses and Replies thereto, pertinent portions of the record, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the reasons stated below, NCL’s Motion is. GRANTED and Plaintiffs Motions are DENIED.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Karlens Bendlis (“Plaintiff’), a citizen of Nicaragua, began working as a seaman for Norwegian Cruise Lines (“NCL”) on May 17, 2009. [D.E. 1-1]. After Plaintiff completed his assignment on the Norwegian Star on March 11,- 2011, he received a new assignment on the Norwegian Sun departing from Copenhagen, Denmark on June 13, 2011. [D.E. 1-1, 1-4], NCL arranged and paid for Plaintiffs travel to and accommodations in Copenhagen. [D.E. 1]. However, prior to starting his assignment on the Norwegian Sun, Plaintiff suffered an episode of complete mental disorientation and was later admitted to a psychiatric ward. [D.E. 1-1, 1-2]. Plaintiff has since been diagnosed with a brain cyst. Id.

Plaintiff commenced this action on November 24,2014 in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida alleging NCL’s liability for: (1) Failure to provide prompt and adequate medical care; (2) Failure to provide maintenance and cure; and (3) Intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Bendlis v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., Case No. 14 -CIV-24731, D.E. 1-1 at 2 (S.D.Fla. Dec. 15, 2014); [D.E. 1-2]. NCL removed that action t.o federal court on the basis that Plaintiff fraudulently pled his Jones Act claim. [D.E. 1-1]. NCL argued that Plaintiff was not an employee because his employment agreement concluded on March 11, 2 Oil and he did not sign his new contract or begin his next assignment on the Norwegian Sun. Id. Plaintiff countered by moving to remand to a state forum on the basis that Jones Act claims are non-removable and Defendant did not meet its required burden of proving fraudulent pleading. Id.

In granting Plaintiffs Motion to Remand, Judge Altonaga held that: (1) Plaintiff did qualify as a “seaman” under the Jones Act; and (2) NCL did hot meet the high burden of proof' necessary to show that establishing a Jones Act claim was not possible. Id. Judge Altonaga did not consider Counts II and III of Plaintiffs Complaint. Id. On remand, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint re-alleging Counts I (specifying it as a Jones Act claim), II, and III. [D.E. 1-2, 7].

After removing the case to this Court for a second time, NCL now moves to compel arbitration pursuant to the signed arbitration clause in Plaintiffs Employment Agreement and the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”). [D.E. 1, 1-3, 6]. In turh, Plaintiff moves to remand and challenges NCL’s second removal on the basis of a'lack of circumstances to establish' new and different grounds for removal. [D.E. 7]. Plaintiff also moves to stay this proceeding and argues that the issue of remand should be addressed first and, if denied, -that he be given- more time to respond to NCL’s motion. [D.E. 8]. The Court will address the merits of the parties’ Motions below.

II. APPLICABLE LAW & DISCUSSION .

Two major issues confront the Court in this case. First) the Court must consider NCL’s Motion to Compel Arbitration to determine which court, state or federal, should address Plaintiffs Jones Act claim. Next, the Court must consider Plaintiffs Motion to Remand to determine if jurisdiction exists over his claim)

A. NCL’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

In its Motion, NCL asks' the Court to compel arbitration pursuant to the clauses contained in the Employment Agreement and the CBA signed by Plaintiff. [D.E. 6]. NCL claims. Plaintiff “agreed in writing that any claims, grievances, and .disputes of any kind whatsoever ‘relating to or in any way connected with the Seaman’s shipboard employment with Company’ shall be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration” pursuant to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “Convention”). Id. In'response, Plaintiff contends that no written agreement presently exists between the parties -and no written agreement- existed at. the time of his mental disorientation because the prior Employment. Agreement expired on March 11, 2011. [D.E. 10].

Essentially, NCL argues that the prior expired Employment Agreement does not necessarily terminate the arbitration clause contained therein. [D.E. 6]. Rather, NCL maintains that the Court .should interpret the arbitration clause broadly to survive expiration of the contract. Id. Moreover; NCL argues that a dispute arising from an employer-employee relationship such as the Employment Agreement and CBA justifies survival of the arbitra