Citations
- 113 F. Supp. 3d 494
Full opinion text
OPINION & ORDER
BESOSA, District Judge.
Current and former employees of the Diagnosis and Treatment Health Center of Yabucoa (“CDT-Yabucoa”) brought this suit, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § Í983, against SM Medical Services, CSP (“SM Medical”), the president of SM Medical, Victor Simmons (“Simmons”), the director of SM Medical, Ricardo Rivera-Garcia (“Rivera”) (collectively, the “SM Medical, defendants”), the Municipality of Yabucoa (the “Municipality”)) the mayor of Yabucoa, Rafael Surillo-Ruiz (“Mayor Surillo”); and the Municipality’s liaison officer,' Lydia Cruz (“Officer Cruz”) (collectively, the “Municipal defendants”), alleging political discrimination in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as the laws of Puerto Rico. (Docket Nos. 1, 44.)
Currently before, the Court are' defendants’ motions' for summary judgment, (Docket Nos. 131, 135), which plaintiffs opposed, (Docket No. 155). For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the SM Medical defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (Docket No. 131), and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Municipal defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (Docket No. 135).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
A court will grant summary judgment' if the moving party shows, based on the materials in the record, “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [she] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it potentially affects the outcome of the case. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.2004). A factual- dispute is “genuine” if its resolution could favor either party at trial. Id.
If the moving party shows the absence of a genuine issue as to any outcome-determinative fact, the nonmoving party must “demonstrate, through submissions of‘evidentiary quality, that a trialworthy issue persists” to forestall the entry of summary judgment. DePoutot v. Raffaelly, 424 F.3d 112, 117 (1st Cir.2005). Conclusory allegations, improbáble inferences, and rank speculation are insufficient to discharge the nonmovant’s burden. Id.
At the summary judgment stage, a court must construe the entire record in a light most hospitable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Id. What is more, the reviewing court refrains from making credibility determinations, weighing the evidence, and drawing legitimate inferences from the facts, because those tasks are properly left to the jury. See Hicks v. Johnson, 755 F.3d 738, 743 (1st Cir.2014); cf. Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 19 (“So long as the plaintiff’s evidence is both cognizable and sufficiently strong to support a verdict in her favor, the factfinder must be allowed to determine which version of the facts is most compelling.”).
BACKGROUND
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, as the nonmoving party, and drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor, the factual background is as follows:
The CDT-Yabucoa
Puerto Rico law creates government-owned health care centers — “centros de diagnostico y tratamiento de salud” (“CDTs”) — designed to provide services to indigent persons. See Docket No. 44 at pp. 23-24 & n. 3. The relevant statute directs Puerto Rico’s Secretary of Health to enter into agreements with municipalities to effectuate the administration and operation of those health care centers. See id. Pursuant to this statute, the Municipality of Yabucoa entered into an agreement with the Puerto Rico Department of Health (the “PRDOH”) by which the Municipality assumed responsibility for the administration and control of its local CDT. Id. at ¶21. With this agreement, the Municipality became the nominating authority at the CDT-Yabucoa. Id. at ¶ 22. The CDT-Yabucoa’s employees were considered municipal employees. Id.
The SM Medical Contract
On February 3, 2011, the Municipality entered into a five-year contract with SM Medical, a private corporation registered and organized under the laws of Puerto Rico, to assist with fulfilling its obligations to the PRDOH. Docket No. 44 at ¶¶ 24-25; see also Docket No. 160-1 at p. 1. Pursuant to the contract, SM Medical agreed to assume the responsibility of, at a minimum, the following services:
(A) The full operation of the CDT that includes, among others: Laboratory; X-Rays; Pharmacy; specialist clinics such as Pediatrics, Cardiology, Gynecology and other agreed by the Municipality and SM Medical; and
(B) Emergency Room — 24hrs/7days a week services.
(Docket No. 160-1 at p. 2.) SM Medical further committed to “improving] and maximizing]” these services, “developing] and implementing] new services [and] programs,” and “maintaining] a quality of services in accordance to the public health standard for good practice.” Id. SM Medical is required to “provide periodic reports to the Municipality of the functioning and operation of the [emergency room] facilities.” Id. at p. 3.
For its services, the Municipality agreed to pay SM Medical $95,833.33 per month for the first seventeen months of the contract’s five-year term, and $83,333.33 per month thereafter. (Docket No. 160-1 at p. 7.) The contract also provided for profit-sharing with respect to certain earnings from SM Medical’s operation of the facilities. See Docket No. 44 at ¶ 27.
Upon execution of the contract, SM Medical assumed the CDT-Yabucoa’s personnel, employees, and professional service contracts. (Docket No. 160-1 at p. 5.) Employees hired to work at the CDT-Yabucoa after the contract’s execution would not be considered “municipal employees” unless: (1) the Municipality recruited them directly; and (2) the municipal budget covered their salary. Id.'For its general hiring, SM Medical agreed to consult with the Municipality regarding the selection of personnel. Id. at p; 9. The contract calls for the creation of a municipal officer position, a “municipal liaison,” to be appointed by .the .. mayor, (Docket No. 160-1 at p. 5.) As the title suggests, the municipal liaison is “the liaison between the Municipality and SM Medical,” as well as “the advisor who governs on administrative, matters in. [the contract].” Id. The municipal liaison-is specifically responsible for evaluating SM Medical’s requests, and making corresponding recommendations to the mayor. Id. The municipal liaison is to be- considered a municipal officer. Id. . . ' .
According to the contract,’ SM Medical’s relationship to the Municipality is that of an “independent contractor,” and “[n]oth-ing contained in th[e] agreement will constitute or be interpreted as [creating] a partnership, joint venture, or lease” between the Municipality and SM Medical. (Docket No. 160-1 at p. 7.)
The contract was . signed by Angel “Papo” Garcia-de Jesus (“Garcia”), the mayor of Yabucoa at the time, .on behalf of the Municipality, and,Simmons, SM Medical’s president, on- behalf of SM Medical.See Docket No. 160-1 at p. 1.0. After making the arrangement with SM Medical, Garcia frequently visited the. CDT-Yabu-coa and remained actively involved in its affairs. See, e.g., Docket No. 156-6 at pp. 42-43; Docket No. 156-1 at pp. 10-13.
Approximately two years into the contract, the Municipality became delinquent on its payments to SM Medical. See Docket No. 44 at ¶ 33. By the end of 2012, uncertainty arose as to whether SM Medical would maintain its- contractual relationship with the Municipality. See id. at ¶¶ 2, 33, 55-56.
The 2012 Yabucoa Mayoral Election
On November 6, 2012, after a highly contentious race, Mayor Surillo, the Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”) candidate, defeated Garcia, the New Progressive Party (“NPP”) candidate and incumbent, to become the mayor of Yabucoa. (Docket No. 44 at ¶¶ 10,. 38.) Mayor Surillo took office on January 14, 2013. Id. at ¶ 10.
After the election, rumors began to circulate at the CDT-Yabucoa regarding the impact of the regime change. See Docket No. 156-3 at pp. 36-53. A politically-charged environment developed, and within it, employees affiliated with the former .mayor’s campaign felt an air of uncertainty. See id.
Against this backdrop emerge the events giving rise to the political discrimination claims at issue.
The Plaintiffs
, Plaintiffs are four current and former CDT-Yabucoa employees who allegedly suffered adverse employment actions because of then’ political leanings: (1) Alba Diaz-Garcia (“Diaz”); (2) Nezmaida Medina-Sanchez (“Medina”); (3) Carlos Lazu-Santiago (“Lazu”); and (4) Juana Velazquez-Torres (“Velazquez”). The nature of each plaintiffs employment and political affiliation is discussed below.
Plaintiff Diaz
Diaz worked as the administrative secretary at the CDT-Yabucoa from May 11, 2011, until she was terminated on January 31, 2013. (Docket No. 156-3 at pp. 13, 24-32.) During her tenure, Diaz provided administrative support for the municipal liaison, the corporate representative, the director of nursing, and the 911 supervisor. Id. at p. 31. Diaz’s duties also included greeting visitors, assisting with payroll, answering phones, and other tasks assigned to her by Rivera or Simmons. Id. at pp. 31-32.
Diaz is a member of the NPP and is active in Yabucoa politics. (Docket No. 156-3 at pp. 52-53.) She often worked at polling centers and attended meetings, caravans, walkabouts, and, other; political events. Id. Diaz is the- niece of former mayor Garcia, who was involved in Yabu-coa politics for twelve or more years. Id. In light of her uncle’s political career, Diaz has known Mayor Surillo for some time. Id. at p. 65. Mayor Surillo is from the same neighborhood and voting ward as Diaz, and he saw her during the election working at their local polling station. Id. at p. 66. (When Diaz volunteered at the polling station, she donned a blue shirt indicating NPP support. Id. After the election, former mayor Garcia gave Mayor Surillo a tour of the CDT-Yabucoa facilities and introduced Diaz as his niece. Id.
Plaintiff Medina
Medina began working at the CDT-Ya-bucoa as the director of nursing of the emergency room in March 2011. (Docket No. 156-1 at p. 10.) In this role, Medina supervised the nursing department, managed the work schedules and annual vacation leave plans for the nursing staff, prepared reports for the emergency department, supervised the vaccination area, and purchased =medical and surgical supplies. Id. at pp. 18-19. Although Medina was an exemplary employee with no complaints- about her performance, id. at p. 78, she was demoted on February 22, 2013, id. at p. 68. Medina now works as the CDT-Yabucoa’s “purchasing officer.”. Id. at pp. 17-19.
Medina is an NPP-member .and was an active supporter of Garcia’s mayoral candidacy. (Docket No. 155 at p. 7.) Mayor Surillo has known Medina’s family, since childhood and, at the time of the events in question, played softball with Medina’s father. (Docket No. 156-1 at pp. 70-72.) According to Medina, Mayor Surillo knows Medina’s family as members of the NPP and is aware that her brother was the NPP-affiliated president of Yabucoa’s municipal, assembly for twelve years. Id.
Plaintiff Lazu
Lazu b'egan working at the CDT-Yabu-coa as a nursing supervisor on February 3, 2011. (Docket No. 156-4 atp. 18.) In this role, Lazu’s duties included overseeing the nursing staff to ensure compliance with prevailing standards of care, coordinating nurse staffing, generating work programs, and occasionally providing nursing services. Id. at p.- 31. On February 26, 2013; Lazu was transferred to the CDT-Canova-•nas, another SM Medical-run facility, and was demoted to the position of associate nurse. Id. at pp. 31-41. Lazu worked at the CDT-Canovanas until he resigned on November 15, 2013. Id. at pp. 31-32, 78-79.
Lazu is an active member of the NPP and was.a longtime supporter of former mayor Garcia. (Docket No. 156-4 at pp. 108-120.) Lazu was publicly involved in Garcia’s mayoral campaign, having attended and worked at numerous political functions. Id. As a spokesperson for Garcia, Lazu routinely appeared on local radio stations to promote Garcia’s candidacy and to criticize Mayor Surillo. - (Docket No. 155-1 at ¶'202.) Lazu has known Mayor Surillo since childhood and believes that Mayor Surillo is aware of his longstanding friendship with former mayor Garcia. (Docket No. 156-4 at pp. 128-30.)" Lazu also believes that Mayor Surillo is aware of his political affiliation because on several occasions during the election season, Mayor Surillo saw Lazu advocating on his opponent’s behalf. Id. at pp. 132-36.
Plaintiff Velazquez
Velazquez worked at the CDT-Yabucoa from February 16, 2011, until she officially resigned on September 3, 2012. (Docket No. 150-2 at pp. 23, 58.) Velazquez was originally hired .as an administrative .officer, but her title later changed to “corporate representative.” Id. at pp. 27-31. In her position, Velazquez did a variety of administrative tasks, such as preparing office letters and memoranda, maintaining files, organizing records, and assisting with payment disbursements. Id. at pp. 44-57. Velazquez'helped with hiring at the CDT-Yabucoa by -writing job descriptions, collecting applications, and organizing interviews. Id. She also supervised clerical, maintenance,' custodial; and security employees. Id. After June 2012, Velazquez also began working as a security officer for the CDT-Yabucoa. Id. at pp. 52-53.
Velazquez is an active member of the NPP, having held a trust position in Garcia’s administration from . 2008-2009, (Docket No. 155 at p. 8), and having served as a poll station worker during Garcia’s 2012 mayoral campaign, (Docket No. 156-2 at p. 127-128). Velazquez submits that her activism is well known to PDP members because her neighbor is the president of Yabucoa’s local PDP chapter and during his meetings, she would not allow PDP-affiliated individuals to park in front of her home and “would openly and proudly display flags and propaganda alluding [to] the NPP and [to Garcia].” (Docket No. 155-1 at ¶ 140.) Velazquez believes that Officer Cruz' is aware of her political affiliation because she ‘participated in caravans and walkabouts for the NPP, which would frequently cross paths with PDP caravans and walkabouts. Id. at pp. 139-42. ' During this time, Velazquez believes. Officer Cruz saw her advocating for the NPP candidate. Id.
Post-Election Discrimination
After the election, in early December 2012, Mayor, Surillo and his team visited the CDT-Yabucoa to meet with Simmons to discuss the Municipality’s contract with SM Medical, (Docket No. 156-2 at pp. 58-59.) During this meeting, Simmons asked Velazquez for a list of CDT-Yabucoa employees. Id. at p. 60. Velazquez complied, giving Simmons a list containing each employee’s name, department, position, and start date. Id. at pp. 60-62. According to Simmons, when Mayor Surillo received the list, he skimmed it, read certain names out loud, and made stateménts such as: “[plaintiff] Carlos Lazu, oh, he was one of [Mayor] Surillo’s ‘tirapiedras,’ he’s out”; and “[plaintiff] Nezmaida Medina, who’s that? Oh, the redheaded sister [of the former NPP-affiliated leader]. [She’s] out.” (Docket No. 156-1 at pp.’ 67-69.)
When the meeting ended, Velazquez asked Simmons what was going to happen. (Docket No. 156-2 at p. 63.) Simmons responded, “they want some employees, you saw they wanted the list.” Id. Velazquez took that to mean that Mayor Sur-illo and his hides wanted hospital positions that they could fill. (Docket Nó. 155-1 at- ¶ 99.) Simmons then indicated that there were going to be “changes” at the CDT-Yabucoa. (Docket No. 156-2 at p. 65.)
Indeed, following the 2012 mayoral election,- Simmons and Rivera made several similarly foreboding comments to plaintiffs, causing them — as Garcia supporters — to feel insecure about their jobs. For example, in or around December 2012, Simmons instructed Diaz to “update [her] resume,” warned her that her continued employment depended on what the new mayor wanted, and told her that in light of the change in leadership, “anything could happen.” (Docket No. 156-3 at pp. 32-24.) Around that time, Rivera told Diaz that because she was the ex-mayor’s niece, the new mayor might be inclined to remove her. Id. at p. 50.
On several occasions, Rivera explained to Medina that she “had to understand” that Garcia had lost the election and that “there were going to be changes” in light of Yabucoa’s new leadership. (Docket No. 156-1 at pp. 64, 75-76.) Rivera also informed Medina that Mayor Surillo told him that people who campaigned on his behalf were asking for positions, id. at p. 95, .and that Mayor Surillo indicated that he wanted “people of his trust” in administrative roles, id. at p. 75. In the same vein, at some point after the election, Rivera notified Lazu that the new administration was “going to be putting [its] people in.” (Docket No. 156-4 at p. 103.)
After the December 2012 meeting, the forewarned-of “changes” at the CDT-Ya-bucoa began to manifest themselves. A basic chronology of these events is sketched below.
Plaintiff Diaz’s Termination
On January 31, 2013, Rivera informed Diaz that, with Simmons’s authorization and at the new mayor’s request, she was being fired. (Docket No. 156-3 at pp. 13, 117-18.) At the time of Diaz’s termination, Rivera indicated that the reason for the decision was the change in municipal leadership and said that he and Simmons were otherwise happy with her performance. Id. at pp. 117-18.
SM Medical’s Interim Hiring
On January 22, 2013, approximately one week before Diaz’s termination, Rivera told Velazquez that Mayor Surillo would be sending people to the CDT-Yabucoa for jobs. (Docket No. 156-2 at pp. 66-67.) After firing Diaz, SM Medical went on to hue three of these individuals: Gabriela Riefkohl (“Riefkohl”); Tina Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”); and Mariliz Ortiz (“Ortiz”). See Docket No. 155 at p. 13. SM Medical also created a Human Resources (“HR”) department at the CDT-Yabucoa and hired Migdalia Delgado (“Delgado” or “HR Director Delgado”) as its director. Shortly thereafter, Mayor Surillo appointed Officer Cruz as the CDT-Yabucoa’s municipal liaison. A timeline of these events is as follows:
On January 31, 2013, the day of Diaz’s termination, Rivera told Velazquez: “[A]n employee is coming tomorrow, her name is Gabriela Riefkhol— [S]he’s-going to do the same duties as [Diaz], but please introduce her as [HR] coordinator, because you cannot say the same thing as [Diaz’s position].” (Docket No. 156-2 at p. 67.) During this conversation, Velazquez voiced concern regarding her job. stability. Id. at p. 77. Rivera responded: “Well, you know, there are going to be some changes. [Garcia] is no longer [in office], and ... [Mayor Surillo] doesn’t want you, Lazu, [Medina], [or] [Diaz], who already got [fired].” Id.
-The next day,- on February 1, 2013, Delgado began working as the CDT-Yabu-coa’s new HR directpr. See Docket No. 135 at pp. 23-25; Docket No. 131 at pp. 24-25.
On the same day, as foretold by Rivera, Riefkhol began working as Diaz’s de facto replacement. (Docket No. 156-2 at p. 67.) Riefkohl sat at Diaz’s old desk, and Velazquez supervised Riefkohl as she had previously supervised Diaz. Id. at pp. 69-73. Riefkohl initially performed the same secretarial functions as Diaz. Id. at pp. 73-77. Only later was Riefkhol tásked with assisting Delgado in the HR department. See Docket No. 156-9 at pp. 53-54.
Once Riefkohl had assumed her HR responsibilities, SM Medical brought in a new replacement for Diaz, hiring Rodriguez to serve as the municipal liaison’s administrative assistant on February 15, 2013. (Docket No. 156-2 at pp. 77-79.)
On the same day, Ortiz began working at the CDT-Yabucoa in a nursing capacity. (Docket No. 156-1 at pp. 76-77.) Ortiz told Medina that she “had been placed there by [Mayor Surillo].” Id. at p. 97. While her employment application indicated that she sought the position of director of nursing, id, at pp. 73-74, Ortiz came to occupy the position of “nursing supervisor,” (Docket No. 156-9 at pp. 12-17). When she was hired, and for the first five months of her employment, Ortiz did not have a nursing license. (Docket No. 156-6 at p. 132.) Medina was tasked with training Ortiz and, during this time, discovered that Ortiz fulfilled essentially all of her duties as director of nursing, aside from the purchasing-related tasks. (Docket No. 156-1 at pp. 30-34.)
• On February 19, 2013, Officer Cruz began working as the ,CDT-Yabueoa’s municipal liaison. (Docket No. 156-8 at p. 56.) Officer Cruz was appointed by Mayor Sur-illo; she is a fellow PDP member and supported- his campaign. (Docket No. 155 at pp. 13-14.)
Plaintiff Medina’s Demotion
During this period of reshuffling, Medina’s concern for her job security increased, so she reached out to her father, a longtime acquaintance of Mayor Surillo, who agreed to speak to the mayor on her behalf. (Docket No. 156-1 at pp. 64-65.) On February 21, 2013, Mayor- Surillo came to the CDT-Yabucoa to assure Medina that she would not be fired. Id. at p. 65. Later, Rivera called Medina to téll her that Mayor Surillo had instructed him not to dismiss her and indicated that he must obey “since [the mayor] is the boss.” Id. at p. 66. Rivera went on to say, however, that Mayor Surillo wanted .to fill administrative positions with his own people, explaining “that’s why we had to get rid of [Diaz], because [she] is not a person of trust with the mayor.” Id.
The next day, HR Director Delgado informed Medina that she would be removed as the. director of nursing. (Docket No. 156-1 at p. 68.) In lieu of firing Medina, Delgado offered a reassignment. Delgado initially suggested the role of “epidemiologist nurse,” a position that did not previously exist, but Medina declined, as she had no experience in that area. Id. Delgado then suggested the position of “purchasing officer.” Id. at pp. 17-19. Medina signed a letter indicating that she accepted “freely and voluntarily” the reassignment because Delgado gave her an ultimatum: take the position or “lose [your] job.” Id. at pp. 58-59. Later that day, Simmons came to Medina’s office to discuss her reassignment, appearing “red as a tomato” and nervous. (Docket No. 156-1 at pp. 67-69.) Simmons told Medina, “if you feel pressure, ! feel even more.” Id. He then told her about Mayor Surillo’s politically-charged comments at the December 2012 meeting. Id. . ,
Medina’s new position turned out to be a curtailed version of her former position and a demotion: her salary was reduced by $300 per month, she lost her status as an exempt employee, her duties were diminished to merely ordering medications and surgical equipment, and she was removed from her office and assigned to work in the supply closet, which was isolated and unclean. See Docket No. 156-1 at pp. 18-24,40-44.
Plaintiff Lazu’s Transfer and Demotion
On February 26, 2013, Lazu was transferred to the CDT-Canovanas. (Docket No. 156-4 at pp. 31-41.) As a resident of Yabucoá, the new placement required Lazu to commute an hour each way.' Id. at pp. 72-79, 149-151. Additionally, Lazu was demoted from supervising nurse to associate nurse, which meant a change in his duties as well as a salary reduction of $500 per month. Id. ■ at pp.' 31-41. Although Lazu signed a document indicating that he" “freely and voluntarily” accepted his transfer, he did so because Delgado told him he could either change facilities or be jobless. See id. at 41-42.
Lazu worked at the CDT-Canovanas until he resigned on November 15, 2013, as he was unable to cope with the higher transportation costs and lower salary. (Docket No. 156-4 at pp. 31-32, 78-79.) Before resigning, Lazu made efforts to speak with Simmons and Rivera about his demotion and salary reduction. Id. at pp. 31-32. On one occasion, Lazu asked Rivera in person whether he might consider returning Lazu to the CDT-Yabucoa. Id. at p. 32. Rivera told Lazu that he should “speak to the mayor” if he wanted to be transferred back. Id.
Plaintiff Velazquez’s Hostile Work Environment
Before the 2012 mayor election and resulting change in administration, Velazquez never had problems at the CDT-Yabucoa. (Docket No. 156-2 at pp. 129— 30.) After Officer Cruz joined the staff, however, Velazquez began to experience issues at work. For example, on April 23, 2013, while Velazquez was in a meeting with HR Director Delgado, Officer Cruz came in to scream at her about a decision that Velazquez made regarding the hospitals security. Id. at pp: 100-03. In May 2013, after Velazquez ordered food for an event on Officer Cruz’s request,. Officer Cruz complained to Simmons that Velazquez failed to follow instructions. Id. at pp. 103-04. On or about June 17, 2013, Officer Cruz gave Velazquez “the finger” in the hospital hallway. Id. at p. 104.
These negative interactions culminated when, in late June or early July 2013, Officer Cruz started a fight with Velazquez and screamed in her face until another employee intervened. (Docket No. 156-2 at ppv 106-07.) Among other things, Officer Cruz stated loudly: “Do you understand that the administration [has] changed?” Id. at p. 107. When Velazquez responded that she understood, Officer Cruz s'aid, “I’m fed up. I’m going to call [Mayor Surillo] so that he calls [Simmons], because this has to [stop] ’ already.” Id'. HR Director Delgado suspended Velazquez for the incident. Id. at 108. After her suspension, Velazquez felt she had no other option but to resign. Id. at pp. 132-33. On September 3,2013, Velazquez officially ceased working for SM Medical. Id. at p. 58.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Plaintiffs sue defendants 'pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section' 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,*or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or' other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, - privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall beTiable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or- other proper proceeding for redress. ,
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Simply put, section 1983 “renders persons acting under color of state law liable' for constitutional and federal-law violations.” Elena v. Municipality of San Juan, 677 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2012). To make out a viable section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) a person deprived her of a federally secured right; and (2) the perpetrator acted under color of state law. Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir.2011).
Political Discrimination
The political discrimination framework finds its roots in the First Amendment’s free-speech protections; Cordero-Suarez v. Rodriguez, 689 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir.2012). Among other things, the First Amendment protects associational rights. Galloza v. Foy, 389 F.3d 26, 28 (1st Cir.2004). “Incorporated within this prophylaxis is the right to be free from discrimination on account of one’s political opinions or beliefs.” Id. This right extends to matters of public employment:' as a general rule, public ¿mployees enjoy protection from adverse employment actions based on their political affiliations. Carrasquillo v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Justice Dep’t, 494 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2007).
A two-part burden shifting framework is used to evaluate claims of political discrimination. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). First, the plaintiff must, at a minimum, show that she engaged in constitutionally-protected conduct and that this conduct was a substantial factor in the adverse employment decision. Carrasquillo, 494 F.3d at 4. If the plaintiff does her part, the burden shifts, to the defendants to point out evidence that they would have taken the same action regardless of the plaintiffs political affiliation — “a defense familiarly known as the Mt. Healthy defense.” Rodriguez v. Municipality of San Juan, 659 F.3d 168, 176-77 (1st Cir.2011).
DISCUSSION
Both sets of defendants move for summary judgment. The SM Medical defendants argue that summary judgment is warranted for two reasons: (1) plaintiffs do not satisfy section 1983’s “under color of state law” requirement; and (2) plaintiffs do not establish a prima facie case of political discrimination. (Docket No. 131.) The Municipal defendants likewise argue that plaintiffs fail to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination, while also asserting a qualified immunity defense. (Docket No. 135.)
The Court will first address the state action issue as to the SM Medical defendants. The Court will then determine whether plaintiffs establish a prima facie case of political discrimination, addressing defendants’ overlapping and distinct arguments in the process. Finally, the Court will assess the Municipal defendants’ qualified immunity defense.
Before delving into the analysis, however, the Court must clarify the scope of plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs Diaz, Medina, and Lazu do not appear to bring claims against Officer Cruz. With respect to Diaz, the record is clear that she never worked with Officer Cruz: Diaz was terminated on January 31, 2013, (Docket No. 156-3 at p. 32), and Officer Cruz began working at the CDT-Yabucoa on February 19, 2013, (Docket No. 156-8 at p. 56). Similarly, with respect to Lazu, the record shows that he was transferred from the CDT-Yabucoa to the CDT-Canovanas on February 26, 2013, see Docket No. 156-4 at pp. 31-41, approximately one week after Officer Cruz began working at the CDT-Yabu-coa. Nothing in the complaint — or even in the record at large — indicates that Lazu and Officer Cruz interacted in any capacity, professional or otherwise during this time, let alone that Officer Cruz discriminated against Lazu. Indeed, in their opposition, plaintiffs make no effort to establish Lazu’s prima facie case of discrimination against Officer Cruz.
The record is arguably less clear as to whether Medina intends to bring claims against Officer Cruz. On one hand, plaintiffs’ opposition includes instances of Medina’s exclusion from SM Medical events at Officer Cruz’s behest as well as claims that Officer Cruz verbally belittled Medina. See, e.g., Docket No. 155-1 at 1ÍK73, 78. On the other, these grievances are not included in the complaint. Moreover, plaintiffs never try to establish that Officer Cruz knew of Medina’s political affiliation, which is required for a prima facie case of political discrimination.
For the foregoing reasons, the Municipal defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (Docket No. 135), is GRANTED as to plaintiffs Diaz, Medina, and Lazu’s claims against defendant Officer Cruz. To the extent that plaintiffs Diaz, Medina, and Lazu bring claims against defendant Officer Cruz, these claims are DISMISSED.
State Action
Seeking summary judgment, the SM Medical defendants first argue that plaintiffs’ political discrimination claim against SM Medical, Rivera, and Simmons is doomed for want of state action, an essential requirement for section 1983 liability. See Docket No. 131 at pp. 10-17. According to the SM Medical defendants, they are “private [parties] whose alleged actions did not transpire under color of state law.” Id. at p. 2. The SM Medical defendants concede that, in limited circumstances, the conduct of private parties, may constitute “state action” for purposes of section 1983, but argue that “this is not one of them.” Id. at 11.
To . make out a viable section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that the rights-depriving conduct transpired under color of state law. Santiago, 655 F.3d at 68. Section 1983 excludes from its reach “merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50, 119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is not to say, however, that ostensibly private organizations and individuals are impervious to section 1983 suit. To the contrary, “private actors may align themselves so closely with either state , action or state actors that the undertow pulls them inexorably into [section 1983’s] grasp.” Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 253-54 (1st Cir.1996). In such cases, “conduct by nominally private actors can be characterized as governmental action for constitutional purposes.” Gonzalez-Maldonado v. MMM Healthcare, Inc., 693 F.3d 244, 247 (1st Cir.2012).
Where a plaintiff sues non-government actors pursuant to section 1983, she must show that the private defendants’ conduct is “‘fairly attributable to the State,’ ” so as to “constitute action under color of state law.” Santiago, 655 F.3d at 68 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982)). Within this analytical arena, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has identified three avenues through which a private individual or entity may be deemed a state actor: the public function test; the state compulsion test;. and the nexus/joint action test. Santiago, 655 F.3d at 68-69. If the record, viewed through a lens favorable.to plaintiffs, makes out a jury question as to any one of these tests, the “under color of state law” requirement is satisfied for summary judgment purposes. Id. at 69.
, In an effort to shield their section 1983 claims from summary judgment attack on the state action element, plaintiffs contend that the evidence demonstrates: (1) that the defendants acted jointly to deprive plaintiffs of their First Amendment rights; and (2) that Mayor Surillo and Officer Cruz compelled the rights-depriving conduct. See Docket No. 155 at pp. 32-38. The Court will evaluate plaintiffs’ evidence first pursuant to the state compulsion test.
At the motion to dismiss stage, this Court found that plaintiffs adequately plead facts, to meet the state compulsion test. (Docket No. 109 at pp. 17-18.) The standard for deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, however, differs considerably from the standard for deciding a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment: the former requires the court to take all well-pleaded allegations of fact as true, while the latter requires only that the court indulge in favor of the nonmoving party all reasonable inferences arising from facts established by affidavit, deposition, or other reliable method. See Garcia-Catalan v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir.2013) (“[S]ummary judgment, like a trial, hinges on the presence or absence of evidence, • not' on the adequacy of the pleadings.”). At this stage, plaintiffs contend that “[t]he evidence on the record ... supports each of the averments on which the Court’s [previous] ruling relied.” (Docket No. 155 at p. 35.) Defendants beg to differ. See Docket No. 131 at pp. 1315; Docket No. 135 at pp. 52-54.
“[A] private party is fairly characterized as a state actor when the state ‘has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the [challenged conduct] must in law be deemed to be that of the State/” Estades-Negroni v. CPC Hosp. San Juan Capestrano, 412 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982)). “[T]o establish state action under [the state compulsion test], a plaintiff must demonstrate a particularly close tie between the state and the private party’s conduct, such that the conduct may fairly be regarded as state action.” Santiago, 655 F.3d at 71. As the First Circuit Court of Appeals informs,-“[the] inquiry is a targeted one, with the challenged conduct 'at the hub of the analytical wheel.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Perkins v. Londonderry Basketball Club, 196 F.3d 13, 19-20 (1st Cir.1999) (“[T]he focal point [of the state compulsion test] is the connection between the State and the challenged conduct, -not the broader relationship between the State and the private entity.”).
According to plaintiffs, the evidence that the Municipal defendants encouraged the personnel decisions at issue begins after Mayor Surillo’s 2012 electoral victory. Velazquez testified that Mayor Surillo and his staff met with Simmons in early December 2012, and that during this meeting Simmons asked Velazquez to retrieve a list of CDT-Yabucoa employees, per Mayor Sur-illo’s request.- (Docket No.-156-2 at pp. 58-62.) Although none of the plaintiffs were in-attendance, Medina testified that Simmons -later told her that during this meeting, Mayor Surillo went through the list and' identified those employees to be removed because of their ties to the former administration, openly stating: “[plaintiff] Carlos Lazu, oh, he was one of [Mayor] Surillo’s ‘tirapiedras,’ he’s out”; and “[plaintiff] Nezmaida Medina, who’s that? Oh, the redheaded sister [of the former-' NPP-affiliated leader]. [She’s] out.” (Docket No. 156-1 - at pp. 67-68.)
Plaintiffs' contend that after the December 2012 meeting, the events giving rise to their complaint occurred: Diaz was terminated, Medina 'was demoted, Lazu was transferred and • demoted,' and Velazquez was effectively driven out by harassment. According to plaintiffs, all of whom are supported Mayor Surillo’s opponent, the timing of these events is no coincidence. Plaintiffs’ theory is that after he was elected mayor of Yabucoa, Mayor Surillo wanted to give CDT-Yabucoa jobs to his political backers as a reward for their loyalty and support; , To effectuate this plan, Mayor' Surillo compelled or encouraged Simmons, and Rivera to get rid of a handful of employees who had campaigned against him in order to make room for his allies.- Amplifying Mayor Surillo’s pressure on the SM Medical defendants, plaintiffs posit, was the risk -of losing the CDT-Yabucoa contract. Faced with the mayor’s encouragement and fearing the loss of an important contract, Simmons and Rivera caved to the, new administration’s • demands..
To survive summary judgment, plaintiffs are tasked with putting forth proof of municipal coercion or significant encouragement as to the employment actions at issue, See Santiago, 655 F.3d at 71. Because the state compulsion test is laser-focused on “the connection between the State and the challenged conduct,” see Perkins, 196 F.3d at 19-20, the Court will inspect each of the plaintiff s grievances, for evidence of municipal string pullipg.
With respect to 'Diaz, the alleged rights-depriving conduct is her termination on the basis of her political affiliation. Simmons and Rivera admittedly partook in the decision to fire Diaz. (Docket No.- 133 at ¶ 128.) The question is thus whether the record supports a finding that the Municipality coerced or significantly encouraged this decision. The Court finds that it does, Diaz testified that' after the December 2012 ■ meeting, Simmons told her to “update, [her] resume because [her] permanence .depended on [Mayor Surillo’s] decision.” (Docket No. 156-3 at p. 33.) Diaz was fired soon thereafter, and she testified that Rivera indicated to her that the “new mayor” was the reason. Id. at 13.
As defendants point out, these remarks could be construed in a less incendiary way — for example, perhaps the defendants were simply conveying the possibility that thé new mayor might see’ fit to cancel his predecessor’s contract with SM Medical. See Docket No. 133 ab ¶¶ 112-115. Still, plaintiffs proffer evidence from employees who remained at the CDT-Yabucoa after Diaz’s departure 'indicating that Mayor Surillo compelled the discriminatory termination. Medina’s testimony that Rivera told her that “[SM Medical] had to get rid of [Diaz]” because Mayor Surillo wanted administrative vacancies'and that “[Diaz] is not a person of [the mayor’s] trust,” is evidence of municipal compulsion or encouragement, (Docket No. 156-1 at p. 66), as is Velazquez’s testimony that Rivera specifically told her that SM Medical fired Diaz at Mayor Surillo’s request, (Docket No. 156-2 at p. 77). Although Rivera might deny making these statements, the Court cannot choose between the competing testimonies at the summary judgment, stage. See, e.g., Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 55 (1st. Cir.2000) (“For purposes of summary judgment, we cannot weigh the credibility of witnesses making these comments and must assume they were made as stated.”).
With respect to Medina and Lazu, plaintiffs submit ample evidence to support a finding of municipal coercion or encouragement. Most notably, as discussed above, Medina testified that at the time of her demotion, a nervous Simmons came to her office, expressed feeling “pressure[d],” and told her about Mayor Surillo’s politically-driven demand for her and Lazu’s removal at the December 2012 meeting. (Docket No. 156-1 at pp. 67-68.) The record contains other evidence of the mayor’s influence, such as Velazquez’s testimony that in early February 2013, just weeks before Medina’s demotion and Lazu’s transfer, Rivera told her that Mayor Surillo did not want her, Lazu, or Medina at the CDT-Yabucoa. (Docket No. 156-2 at p. 77.) Velazquez also testified that Rivera told her that Mayor Surillo did not want Lazu at the CDT-Yabucoa because of his radio show activism. See id. at p. 80. Viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, this evidence is plainly demonstrative of municipal compulsion or encouragement.
Regarding Medina’s demotion, defendants maintain that Simmons and Rivera were not involved in the decision. See Docket No. 133 at ¶ 177. To be sure, the record indicates that as of February 2013, the CDT-Yabucoa had HR officials to carry out personnel decisions, see Docket No. 156-9 at p. 54, and plaintiffs admit that it was HR Director Delgado who formally executed Medina’s reassignment, see Docket No. 155 at pp. 19, 22-23.
While plaintiffs might lack direct evidence to show that Simmons and Rivera were involved in Medina’s demotion, plaintiffs present sufficient circumstantial proof that they were. Chief among this evidence is Medina’s testimony regarding her conversations with Mayor Surillo and Rivera. Medina testified that at some point after the 2012 mayoral election, fearing for her job’s security, she asked her father to speak with his friend and softball teammate, Mayor Surillo. (Docket No. 156-1 at p. 70-71.) On February 21, 2013, May- or Surillo came to the CDT-Yabucoa to tell Medina she would not be fired, and later that day, Rivera called Medina to tell her that he would obey Mayor Surillo’s instruction to not dismiss her. See id. at pp. 67-69. The following day, Medina found out that she would, in fact, keep her job, so long as she accepted a demotion. See id. This sequence of events illustrates not only the faet of Rivera’s participation in the decision to demote Medina, but the degree of Mayor Surillo’s influence over the matter. Plaintiffs also provide circumstantial evidence of Simmon’s involvement, including Medina’s testimony about Simmons’s behavior and admissions on the day of her demotion. See id.
With respect to Velazquez, however, plaintiffs fail to satisfy the state compulsion test. In Velazquez’s case, the rights-depriving conduct is the hostile work environment that Officer Cruz, a municipal employee, is said to have cultivated. Plaintiffs allege a series of events — including false accusations, threats of reprimand, and verbal abuse — which culminated in Velazquez’s suspension and constructive discharge. Regarding the events leading up to the suspension, however plaintiffs provide no evidence that either Simmons or Rivera performed the challenged actions, let alone that they did so at the behest of a state actor.
Velazquez’s suspension is the only event in which any SM Medical defendant is alleged to have partaken. Plaintiffs maintain that HR Director Delgado told Velazquez that she was suspending her pursuant to Simmons’s instruction. See Docket No. 155 at p. 28. But plaintiffs provide no competent evidence of municipal compulsion. Plaintiffs rely upon Velazquez’s testimony that, at the time of her suspension, Delgado said that “Mayor Sur-illo had called [Simmons].” See Docket No. 156-2 at pp. 107-109. This evidence is' insufficient. To begin, Delgado is not a party to this action, and thus her' statement about the mayor’s call is inadmissible hearsay. See Soto-Padro v. Pub. Bldgs. Auth., 675 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2012) (finding testimony that “smacks of hearsay”’ cannot defeat summary judgment, particularly where plaintiff points to no applicable hearsay-rule exception). More to the point, the record sheds no light on what Mayor Surillo said to Simmons before Simmons allegedly instructed Delgado to suspend Velazquez. Plaintiffs’ unsupported speculation is plainly, insufficient to discharge their summary judgment burden. See DePoutot, 424 F.3d at 117.
To the extent plaintiffs may be relying on Velazquez’s testimony as to the various statements Rivera and Simmons purportedly made .regarding Mayor Surillo’s desire to terminate her and other Garcia supporters as proof of municipal coercion, see, e.g., Docket No. 156-2 at pp. 83-88, this evidence is unavailing. In the context of the state compulsion inquiry, the focal point is “the connection between the Státe and the challenged conduct.” Perkins, 196 F.3d at 19-20. The mayor’s alleged encouragement of Velazquez’s dismissal took place in the weeks following his election victory, from December 2012 through February 2013. Velazquez was not suspended until July 2013. These events are too temporally attenuated to constitute a “close nexus” between the Municipality and the challenged conduct.
In sum, plaintiffs fail to provide sufficient proof of municipal compulsion to hold the SM Medical defendants liable-as state actors for the particular actions taken against Velazquez. Most of the complained-of conduct against Velazquez is attributable specifically to Officer Cruz, who is a'municipal actor and who did not begin working at the CDT-Yabucoa until months after the postelection municipal compulsion took place. ■ To the extent plaintiffs claim that Simmons had a hand in Velazquez’s suspension, they provide no competent proof that any municipal actor coerced or encouraged him to-do so. For these reasons, the Court finds that plaintiffs do not satisfy the state compulsion test for the actions taken against Velazquez.
• Plaintiffs advance an alternative avenue for finding state action: that the-' SM Medical defendants “acted jointly” with the Municipal defendants to deprive plaintiffs of their First Amendment rights. See Docket No. 155 at p. .35. Plaintiffs contend that the record demonstrates that defendants “jointly planned, orchestrated[,] and executed” the challenged actions. Id. at p. 34,
As an initial point of clarification, it is evident that plaintiffs are not pursuing a “nexus/joint action” theory of liability for the- SM Medical defendants. The nexus/jóínt action test provides that “a private party can be held to be a state actor where an examination‘of the totality of the circumstances reveals that the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the [private party] that it was a joint participant in [the challenged activity].” Estades-Negroni, 412 F.3d at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). To pass this test, a plaintiff must show that “the private party’s actions are attributable to the state through a symbiotic relationship between the two.” Santiago, 655 F.3d at 71. The opposition, however, tenders no proof of symbiosis between the Municipality and SM Medical in its discussion of the state action element. Moreover, plaintiffs rely on cases such as Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), and Alexis v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Mass., Inc., 67 F.3d 341 (1st Cir.1995), (Docket No. 155 at p. 33), which do, pot fit within the First Circuit Court of Appeals’ nexus/joint action rubric.
But plaintiffs’ evidence need not square with the three conventional models to establish state action. Regarding the state-action determination, the United 'States Supreme Court has consistently embraced a fact-specific approach. See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 298, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001); Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939, 102 S.Ct. 2744.
It is possible that a private individual who is a “willful participant in joint activity with the- State or its agents” can be held liable under section 1983. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980). To establish joint discriminatory action between private and state actors, plaintiffs. must put forth evidence of a “plan, .prearrangement, conspiracy, custom, or policy.” Alexis, 67 F.3d at 351. The evidence must be sufficient to. “enable a rational factfinder to conclude that [the rights-depriving conduct] resulted from concerted action tantamount to substituting the judgment of a private party for that of the [state actor] or allowing the private party to exercise state power.” Id. at 351-52.
Read in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, the record contains at least some evidence demonstrating a plan between Mayor Surillo, Simmons, and- Rivera to discriminate against Velazquez-on the basis .of her political affiliation. For example, Velazquez testified as to various statements Rivera and Simmons made to her regarding Mayor Surillo’s desire to terminate her and other employees who supported his .opponent. See, e.g., Docket No. 156-2 at pp. 83-88. The record, however, contains no evidence as to Officer Cruz’s knowledge of this alleged conspiracy or plan. Again, Officer Cruz was hired months after the - post-election, conduct. See Docket No. 156-8 at p. 56. Perhaps the only indication -of Officer Cruz’s possible involvement in a discriminatory plan is plaintiffs’ evidence that Officer Cruz, in chastising Velazquez, asked whether . Velazquez understood that “the administration [had] changed,” and threatened to “call the mayor.” See Docket No. 156-2 at pp. 106-107. Without-context or further elaboration, these comments hardly establish that Officer Cruz was a co-conspirator .in a discriminatory scheme, especially considering that, as discussed infra, plaintiffs fail to show Officer Cruz was even aware of Velazquez’s political leanings. -
In any event, the mere existence of a discriminatory plan is insufficient to hold the SM Medical defendants liable as state actors. The color-of-law element requires that “defendant acted ‘under color of law.’ ” Adickes, 398 U.S. at 150, 90 S.Ct. 1598 (emphasis added); cf. Ginsberg v. Healey Car & Truck Leasing, Inc., 189 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.1999) (“Section 1983 does not impose civil liability on persons who merely stand to benefit from an assertion of authority under color of law, but only on those who act under color of law.”). For example, in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., the Supreme Court found a private restaurant employee to be acting under color of state law for “reaching an underr standing” with a state police officer and for conspiring with the officer to deprive a customer of her civil rights. 398 U.S. at 150-60, 90 S.Ct. 1598. In that case, the defendant-employee had acted: he refused the plaintiff-customer service on the basis of her race. See id. at 147, 90. S.Ct. 1598.
In this case, plaintiffs must - not only show that -the. SM Medical defendants had an agreement or plan with the Municipal defendants to drive out Velazquez through harassment and suspension, but that .the SM Medical defendants acted in concert with the Municipal defendants to execute this plan. As discussed supra, the complained-of harassment is largely limited to Officer. Cruz’s actions: it was Cruz who chastised Velazquez for the air conditioners; yelled at Velazquez about the security; reprimanded Velazquez for the food order; gave Velazquez the finger; and berated Velazquez in the ER. The record contains no evidence that the SM Medical defendants acted to effectuate Officer Cruz’s conduct." To the contrary, the record indicates that- to the extent Officer Cruz, a municipal actor, deprived Velazquez of her constitutional rights, she acted alone in doing so. See Roche, 81 F.3d at 254 (finding no principled basis'for attributing state action to a private insurance company who reported-the criminal conduct of a former employee where the police officers,'magistrate, and prosecutors involved in pursuing the casé all exercised independent judgment and acted of their own volition); Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir.1989) (finding no state action .where, state official used independent judgment, rather than the judgment of a private party, in issuing citations to protesters).
At best, the evidence indicates that Velazquez made Simmons and Rivera aware of Officer Cruz’s maltreatment and that neither intervened on her behalf. See, e.g., Docket No. 156-2 at pp. 109-31. Such passive acquiescence is hardly enough to hold Simmons and Rivera liable as state actors. Cf. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. at 1004-05, 102 S.Ct. 2777 (finding “mere approval” of the initiatives of a private party insufficient to render the private party-a state actor for section 1983 - purposes). The Court is thus unable to find that the SM Medical defendants acted jointly with the Municipal defendants. to deprive Velazquez of her First Amendment rights.
For the foregoing reasons, insofar as the SM Medical defendants move for summary judgment for want of state action, (Docket No. 131), the motion is GRANTED as to plaintiff Velazquez, but DENIED as to thé remaining plaintiffs. Plaintiff Velazquez’s claims against the SM Medical defendants are DISMISSED.
Prima Facie Case
A political-discrimination plaintiff must first show that she engaged in constitutionally-protected conduct and that this conduct was a substantial factor in the adverse employment action taken against her. Carrasquillo, 494 F.3d at 4. The First Circuit Court of Appeals has found that a prima facie political-discrimination claim, typically entails “four showings”:- (1) that the plaintiff and the defendant belong to opposing political affiliations; (2) that the defendant has knowledge of the plaintiffs opposing political affiliation; .(3). that an adverse employment action occurred; and (4) that political affiliation was a substantial or motivating factor behind the adverse action.. See Peguero-Moronta v. Santiago, 464 F.3d 29, 48 (1st Cir.2006).
Both sets of defendants maintain that plaintiffs fail to establish a prima faciq case of political discrimination, albeit for different reasons. While the SM Medical defendants argue that plaintiffs fail to satisfy the opposing-affiliation element, the Municipal defendants contend that plaintiffs fail to establish the knowledge element. Neither set of defendants dispute that plaintiffs satisfy the adverse-action element. Finally, both sets of defendants argue that plaintiffs do not satisfy the causation element. The Court will address plaintiffs’ proof as to each element.
Opposing Political Affiliations
Regarding the first element, opposing political affiliations, it is undisputed that plaintiffs are members of the NPP and that defendants Mayor Surillo and Officer Cruz are members of the PDP, an opposing political party. With respect to the SM Medical defendants, however, the record reveals that, like plaintiffs, Simmons and Rivera are also NPP members. The SM Medical defendants thus challenge whether the opposing-affiliation requirement is met with respect to Simmons and Rivera. See Docket No. 131 at p. 7. In opposition, plaintiffs argue that the absence of opposing party affiliations is not dispositive. (Docket No. 155 at p. 39 n. 10.) The Court agrees.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the fact that the defendant is a member of the same political party as the plaintiff does not necessarily alter the “constitutionally protected status” of the plaintiffs political affiliation. Padilla-Garcia v. Guillermo Rodriguez, 212 F.3d 69, 76 & n. 6 (1st Cir.2000); cf. Anthony v. Sundlun, 952 F.2d 603, 606 (1st Cir.1991) (“[Liability in a political discrimination case involving non-policymaking positions [does not] necessarily dependí ] on a finding that the defendants knew to a certainty that the ousted jobholders were members of the opposition party.”).
To determine whether the opposing political affiliation requirement of the prima facie case is met in cases of intra-party discrimination, courts opt for a more nuanced approach. For example, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has found that a claim for impermissible political discrimination may lie where a plaintiff and her employer support different factions of the same political party during a primary election. See, e.g., Padilla-Garcia, 212 F.3d at 76. In doing so, the court of appeals reasoned that “the underlying principle, freedom to express political beliefs, is very much still at stake” where members of a single political party adhere to different philosophies or subscribe to different factions. Id.
While this case does not involve an intra-party conflict in the context of a primary election, the First Circuit Court of Appeals’s reasoning applies with equal force. Here, plaintiffs attribute the alleged discriminatory acts to their support of a specific leader within their political party during a particular election. The record demonstrates that plaintiffs were not merely NPP members, they were avid supporters of former mayor Garcia during the 2012 mayoral race in Yabucoa. While Simmons and Rivera might also have been members of the NPP party, neither lived in Yabucoa, see Docket No. 156-7 at p. 62; Docket No. 133-5 at p. 49, nor indicated an allegiance to Garcia’s mayoral candidacy. In this regard, their political affiliations are beside the point. What matters is that plaintiffs were allegedly targets of discrimination on the basis of their political beliefs and associations. This is sufficient to satisfy the first prong.
Knowledge of Political Affiliation
Plaintiffs must also establish that defendants were aware of their political affiliation. See Garcia-Gonzalez v. Puig-Morales, 761 F.3d 81, 98 (1st Cir.2014). Only the Municipal defendants challenge plaintiffs’ proof as to this element. (Docket No. 135 at pp. 57-60.) The Court will determine whether the knowledge element is met as to each plaintiff.
Plaintiff Diaz
Plaintiffs put forth several pieces of evidence in support of their contention that Mayor Surillo was aware of Diaz’s ties to the NPP. The record reveals that Diaz is the niece of Garcia, Yabucoa’s former NPP-affiliated mayor, and -is herself an active member of the party. (Docket No. 156-3 at pp. 52-53.) When Garcia ran for reelection in 2012, Diaz assisted his campaign by volunteering at polling centers and attending meetings, caravans, walkabouts, and other events. Id. at p. 53. Because Diaz and Mayor Surillo live in the same neighborhood, they shared a polling station during elections. Id. at p. 66. Mayor Surillo had the occasion to see Diaz working at their local polling station and wearing a blue shirt to signify NPP support. Id. After the election, former mayor Garcia gave Mayor Surillo a tour of the CDT facilities and introduced Diaz as his niece. Id.
According to the Municipal defendants, “Diaz assumes that [Mayor] Surillo knows her political affiliation because of her participation in political activities,” but Diaz is unable to “assert that. [Mayor] Surillo knew her even by name before they saw each other at the CDT. after the 2012 elections.” (Docket No. 135 at p. 22.) Defendants’ arguments fall flat. As an initial matter, the First Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes that political discrimination cases “often turns on an employer’s cloaked motives” and “can be hard for a worker to prove,” and thus has “consistently held' that circumstantial evidence can suffice to show a defendant’s knowledge of a plaintiffs political party.” Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuño-Burset, 777