Achal v. Gate Gourmet, Inc. (114 F. Supp. 3d 781, 2015)

United States District Court for the Northern District of California 2015-07-14

Citations

Full opinion text

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 14

JOSEPH C. SPERO, United States Chief Magistrate Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Andrew Achal, a former employee of Gate Gourmet, filed his First Amended -Complaint in federal court against Defendants Gate Gourmet, Inc. (“Gate Gourmet”) and Does I — 100, inclusive. -Achal alleges various violations of the California, Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). and California Labor Code violations actionable under the California Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”). Gate Gourmet now moves to dismiss Achal’s First Amended Complaint in its entirety, including Achal’s requests for punitive damages, and injunctive and declaratory relief. The Court held a hearing on July 10, 2015. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that Achal may proceed on all of his claims, but dismisses Achal’s requests for punitive damages and.injunctive and declaratory relief with leave, to amend. The Court.-also dismisses Claim Seven to .the extent that it relies on an alleged violation of California Labor Code section 226(a)(6).

II: BACKGROUND

A. Complaint

Achal’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC” or “Complaint”) alleges that several months after beginning woitk with Gate Gourmet, Achal experienced religious and disability discrimination, which culminated in his termination. It also alleges that Gate Gourmet failed to furnish and maintain accurate wage statements as required by California Labor Code section 226(a). The Complaint focuses on the following incidents.

First, Achal alleges that his supervisor “began to retaliate” against him in April 2014, after he returned to work from his home country of Fiji to attend a Hindu funeral and religious observance. FAC ¶ 8. The FAC recounts in particular the comments made by Achal’s supervisor regarding his return from Fiji, specifically that “it’s about time you returned” and that it was “ridiculous for a religious ceremony to take so long.” Id. at ¶ 8. It further alleges that following Achal’s return, his supervisor began subjecting him to unfavorable scheduling, unreasonable work demands, and set him up for failure on one particular project. Id. at ¶ 9.

Second, Achal claims that the reason given by Gate Gourmet for terminating him — that he fraudulently sought benefits by causing his own disability — is both false and pretextual, Id. at ¶¶ 12-13. The Complaint describes how Achal fell from a platform at work, sustaining injuries that caused him to be off work for several weeks and to require ongoing medical care. Id. at ¶ 10. According to the Complaint, Gate Gourmet completed a worker’s compensation claim for Achal, who returned to work with lifting and bending restrictions, but who was otherwise capable of performing his essential job functions with reasonable accommodations for those restrictions. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. Achal alleges that instead of making reasonable accommodations for his injury and/or engaging him in the interactive process; Gate Gourmet terminated him. Id. at ¶ 12. According to the Complaint, Gate Gourmet issued a letter on October 10, 2014, which stated that it was terminating Achal for intentionally causing his disability. Id., at ¶ 13. Achal maintains that this assertion is false, and that Gate Gourmet had no basis for making this conclusion. . Id. .

In response to his termination, Achal filed an administrative complaint (“DFEH Complaint”) with the - California Department of Fair Employment and - Housing (“DFEH”) on February 9, 2015. Id. at ¶ 15. In the DFEH Complaint, Achal alleged that Gate Gourmet had committed, several FEHA violations on the basis of his disability and religion. DFEH Complaint (FAC Ex. A). He then described the basis for his claims as follows:

Complainant Achal was discriminated against and retaliated against for taking time off from work, to attend a religious observance (Hindu) in his home country of Fiji His supervisor stated words to the effect that it was “about time”, he returned and questioned the purpose of a religious ceremony connected to a funeral.- On June 10, 2014, Complainant Achal fell and injured himself, causing him to become disabled and to be placed on disability leave by his doctor. Respondent failed to reasonable [sic] accommodate this disability and failed to engage in the interactive process. Respondent terminated Complainant Achal on October 6, 2014, based on actual and perceived disability and because he engaged in religious practice and observance. Respondent failed to prevent the discrimination and retaliation.

Id. Because Achal requested an immediate right to sue letter, DFEH did not pursue an investigation into the allegations, and' issued Achal a right to sue letter that same day, February 9, 2015. FAC ¶ 15; DFEH Complaint (FAC Ex. A).

Third, Achal claims that Gate'Gourmet failed to maintain and failed to furnish Gate Gourmet employees, himself included, with accurate itemized wage statements. Id. at 16. The Complaint describes how on at least some of its wage statements, Gate Gourmet failed to report only the last four digits of employees’ so cial security numbers, failed to include the inclusive dates for,, the period for which employees are paid, or failed to set forth the address of the corporate employer. Id. On December 31, 2014, and on January 26, 2015, Achal notified the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) and Gate Gourmet of Gate Gourmet’s alleged, violations of the state Labor Code. Id. at ¶ 24.

Based on these core factual allegations, Achal brings seven claims for relief. Claims One through Five allege disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, religious discrimination, and failure to prevent discrimination, under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12940(a), (m), (n), (1), (k). FAC ¶¶ 25-54. Claims Six and Seven allege failure to furnish accurate wage 'statements and failure to maintain accurate wage statements under the California Labor Code Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”), which allows aggrieved employees to seek civil penalties for actions taken by employers in violation of specified provisions of the California Labor Code. FAC ¶¶ 55-64. '

B. Procedural History

Achal initially filed this action in the California Superior Court for the County of San Francisco on March 9, 2015. See Notice of ' Removal (dkt.l). Defendant Gate- Gourmet removed this action to this Court on April 6, 2015. Id. On April 13, 2015, Gate Gourmet filed an initial Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See First Motion to Dismiss (dkt.8). Achal filed his First Amended Complaint on April 20, • 2014. See FAC. The Court denied as moot Gate Gourmet’s initial Motion to Dismiss on April 22, 2015. See Order (dkt.13). On May 4, 2015, Gate Gourmet filed the present Motion' to Dismiss Achal’s First Amended ' Complaint, and to dismiss Achal’s requests for punitive damages, and injunctive and declaratory relief. See Second Motion to Dismiss (“Mot.”) (dkt.14).

C. Parties’ Arguments

1. California Fair Employment and Housing Act Claims

Gate Gourmet moves to dismiss AcHal’s1 FEHA claims (Claims 1-5) with prejudice on the basis of two purported deficiencies. Mot. at 1.

First, Gate Gourmet argues that Claims One through Five should be dismissed because Achal fails to properly plead administrative exhaustion under FEHA. Mot. at 2. Gate Gourmet does not dispute that Achal filed an administrative complaint with the DFEH, nor does it dispute that Achal obtained a right to sue letter from DFEH. Rather, Gate Gourmet argues that Achal’s DFEH Complaint is insuffi-. ciently specific in its allegations, and therefore fails to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Mot. at 5. Because the.timely filing of a DFEH complaint is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the bringing of a civil action for damages under, FEHA, - Gate Gourmet maintains that this Court should, dismiss these claims. Id. In response, Achal argues that FEHA does not require “literary exactitude” in the allegations set forth in administrative complaints, and that Gate Gourmet’s position relies on a misreading of the case law, FEHA, and its legislative intent. Opp’n at 4-6 (citing Soldinger v. Nw. Airlines, 51 Cal.App.4th 345, 381, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d .747 (1996)). Specifically, because courts are to liberally construe DFEH administrative complaints to ensure vindication of employees’ FEHA rights; Achal maintains that the information' contained in the DFEH Complaint suffices to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Id. (citing 2 Cal.Code Regs. § 10003).

Second, Gate Gourmet argues that Claims One through' Five should be dismissed because Achal has failed to allege sufficient facts in ’ support of his FEHA claims to satisfy the pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Mot. at 2 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). In particular, Gate Gourmet contends that Achal fails to allege sufficient facts supporting the elements of his claims. Id. Achal asserts that the allegations pleaded in his FAC satisfy the liberal notice pleading requirements of .Rule 8(a) and therefore should not be dismissed. Opp’n at 6-13.

2. California Private Attorneys General Act Claims

Gate Gourmet moves to dismiss Achal’s PAGA claims (Claims 6-7) with prejudice on the basis of two purported deficiencies. Mot. at 1. -

First, Gate Gourmet argues that Claims Six through Seven should be dismissed because Achal has failed to plead them in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which governs class actions in federal courts. Id. at 17-21. Gate Gourmet argues that Achal’s representative PAGA claims must be pleaded as Rule 23 class actions in federal court in order to satisfy -Article III standing and the prudential standing limit against third party standing, as well as the Erie doctrine. Id. Achal disagrees, that constitutional- and prudential standing limits and the Erie doctrine preclude the Court from hearing his PAGA representative claims, because PAGA is primarily a law enforcement action and because PAGA creates substantive,- and not merely procedural, rights. Opp’n at 15-18.

Second, Gate Gourmet argues that Claims Six through Seven should be dismissed because Achal has failed to allege sufficient facts in support of his PAGA claims to satisfy the pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure '8(a). Mot. at 2 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). In particular, Gate Gourmet contends that Achal fails to factually allege the elements of his claims. Id. Achal asserts that the allegations pleaded in his FAC satisfy the liberal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) and therefore should not be dismissed. Opp’n at 13-15.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rulés of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir.1983): Generally, a plaintiffs burden at the pleading stage is relatively light. Rulé 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[a] pleading whieh sets forth a claim for relief ... shall contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court analyzes the complaint and takes “all allegations of material fact as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir.1995). Dismissal may be based on a lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of facts that would support a valid theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1988). A plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Swierkiewiez v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514-15, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir.2011) (reaffirming 'the holding of Swierkiewiez in light of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) and Twombly). A complaint must however “contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable’legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir.1984)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of thé elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion^]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Rather, the claim must be “ ‘plausible on its face,’ ” meaning that the plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations to “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the' misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

B. California Fair Employment and Housing Act Claims

1. Administrative Exhaustion .

Under California law “an employee must éxhaust the ... administrative remedy” provided by FEHA, by filing an administrative complaint with the DFEH and obtaining a right to sue letter- from the DFEH. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12960, 12965; Romano v. Rockwell Int’l, 14 Cal.4th 479, 492, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 20, 926 P.2d 1114 (1996). Once the DFEH has issued a right to sue letter (whether, or. not the agency investigated the charge), a claimant has one year from the date of the letter to bring a civil action based upon the charge. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12960(d).

In determining whether the exhaustion requirement has been met, California law dictates that FEHA provisions are to be liberally construed to accomplish its purposes, including the resolution of potentially meritorious claims on the merits. Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 26 Cal.4th 798, 819, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 87, 29 P.3d 175 (2001); 2 Cal.Code Regs. § 10003 (“The department shall liberally construe all complaints to effectuate the purpose of the; laws the department enforces to safeguard the. civil right of all persons to seek, obtain and hold employment without discrimination.’’); see also Stearns v. Fair Emp’t Practice Comm’n, 6 Cal.3d 205, 214, 98 Cal.Rptr. 467, 490 P.2d 1155 (1971) (holding that DFEH charges should be construed liberally for same reasons that federal EEOC complaints should be construed liberally). California courts have held that when submitting allegations to the DFEH, “claimants are not held to specify the charges with literary exactitude.” Soldinger, 51 Cal.App.4th at 381, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 747; See Baker v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 209 Cal.App.3d 1057, 1064, 257 Cal.Rptr. 768 (1989). California courts may adjudicate claims not specifically made in DFEH complaints so long as the new claims are “like or reasonably related” to the allegations of the original administrative charge. Okoli v. Lockheed Technical Operations Co., 36 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1614, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 57 (1995); Sandhu v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 26 Cal.App.4th 846, 859, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 617 (1994); Cal.Code Regs. § 10003 (“Where the facts alleged in a disciimination complaint support ... any other claim over which the department has jurisdiction, the department shall construe the complaint to include those claims within the scope of a discrimination claim, regardless of whether such other claims are expressly stated.”). The Ninth Circuit has held that to do otherwise, requiring employees to return to the DFEH to amend the administrative .complaint, would impose a “needless procedural barrier” to FEHA’s enforcement. Oubichon v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir.1973).

In reviewing the exhaustion question in this case, the Court is required by Ninth Circuit law to construe Achal’s DFEH complaint liberally. In light of this directive, the Court finds that Achal has adequately pleaded administrative exhaustion under FEHA, and declines to dismiss Claims One through Five on the basis of failure to exhaust administrative remedies under FEHA.

Achal attaches both the DFEH Complaint and the right to sue letter to the FAC, both of which.become part of the pleading. FAC ¶ 15; Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c). FEHA requires very little in the way of information that must be included in a DFEH complaint in order to obtain a right to sue letter. With respect to the charges alleged, .'California law only requires that a DFEH complaint include the following: (1) a description of the alleged act or acts of discrimination, harassment, or retaliation; (2) the date or dates of each alleged act of discrimination, harassment, or retaliation; and (3) each protected basis upon which the alleged discrimination or harassment was based. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12965; CaLCode Regs. §§ 10002(a), 10005(d).

Achal has satisfied these requirements. As to the first requirement, Achal. describes his attendance, at a religious observance and subsequent negative comments made to him by his supervisor in response. DFEH Complaint (FAC Ex. A). Achal also describes his injury and how he was terminated shortly thereafter, on his information and belief, due in part to his disability and his religion. Id. He also states that Gate Gourmet did not reasonably accommodate his disability or engage him in a good faith interactive process to do so. Id. As to the dates of these acts, Achal includes the relevant dates surrounding his claim of disability discrimination, including the date of his injury and the date of his termination. Id.' While Achal does not include the specific dates surrounding his religious discrimination claim, the DFEH Complaint states that all relevant facts occurred “on or around October 06, 2014.” Id. Liberally construed, the Court accepts this as properly setting forth the dates of the alleged act of religious discrimination.' The DFEH Complaint also .states the protected, bases upon which the alleged discrimination was based: “Complainant believes respondent committed these actions because of their: Disability, Religion, Other religious belief and observance.” Id.

Gate -Gourmet contends that Achal has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under FEHA because his DFEH Complaint is vague and conelusory, and fails to allege specific factual details to support his allegations. Mot. at 5-6. Gate Gourmet cites the language of Cal. Gov’t Code § 12960(b), which states that “[a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged unlawful practice may file with the department a verified complaint, ... that shall set forth the particulars thereof and contain other information as may be required by the department.” Mot. at 5 (quoting Cal. Gov’t Code § 12960(b)) (emphasis added). Gate Gourmet asserts that “particulars” for the purpose of FEHA should be construed to impose a level of factual specificity akin to the Twombly and Iqbal pleading standard. Mot. at 5-6.

Gate Gourmet cites two cases in support of this interpretation, Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 29 Cal.App.4th 1718, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 181 (1994), and Vizcaino v. Areas USA Inc., No. CV 15-417-JFW (PJWx), ECF Dkt. No. 30 (C.D.Cal. Apr. 17, 2015). Mot. at 5-6. Both are inapplicable to the present ease for similar rea-soné. Gate Gourmet cites Martin for its “holding that before á plaintiff can sue on an allegedly unlawful act, the plaintiff ‘must [have] specified] 'that ’ act in the administrative complaint.’” Martin, 29 Cal.App.4th at 1724, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 181. However, Martin does not stand for the proposition which Gate Gourmet contends, that acts must be specified with particularity In Martin, the plaintiffs claims were dismissed not because she failed' to allege the dismissed claims' in her DFEH complaint in sufficient detail, but rather because she failed to allege them in the DFEH complaint at all. Martin, 29 Cal.App.4th at 1725-27, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 181. The plaintiff in Martin had filed separate administrative complaints, one with the DFEH for FEHA violations, and another with the EÉOC for violations of Title VII. Id. at 1726, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 181. When the plaintiff sought judicial relief for FEHA claims on allegations that she had made only in the EEOC complaint, but not in the DFEH complaint, the court dismissed those claims for failure to administratively exhaust her remedies under FEHA. Id. at 1724, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 181. That the plaintiff in Martin failed to “specify” the charges, as Gate Gourmet suggests, refers to making the claim itself, not to a level of detail required in setting forth one’s allegation. Mot. at 5; id.

Gate Gourmet also cites Vizcaino to argue that conclusory language will not suffice in DFEH complaints. Indeed, Gate Gourmet appears to have derived the bulk of its administrative exhaustion argument directly from that order. However, like in Martin, the primary issue in Vizcaino was the disconnect between the claims in the DFEH complaint and those alleged in the judicial complaint. Vizcaino, EOF Dkt. No. 30, at 4 (“Plaintiff’s DFEH complaint contains only vague and conclusory allegations of sexual harassment, a claim that is not even alleged in the FAC.”). To the extent that the Vizcaino court may have also applied an Iqbal-like pleading standard to judge the sufficiency of a DFEH complaint, the Court respectfully disagrees.

The Court declines to impose a high degree of specificity into DFEH complaints for purposes of administrative exhaustion, as Gate Gourmet suggests, because to do so would defy the well-established directive to interpret DFEH complaints liberally. The purpose of filing a charge with an administrative agency pri- or to filing a civil lawsuit is merely to enable that agency to investigate the charges and attempt to obtain voluntary compliance with the law. Soldinger, 51 Cal.App.4th at 381, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 747. The FEHA administrative exhaustion requirement is not to be construed as an impediment to judicial vindication of employees’ right to work free from diserimi-nation. Oubichon, 482 F.2d at 571; Richards, 26 Cal.4th at 821, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 87, 29 P.3d 175. Although Achal’s DFEH complaint was sparsely pleaded, given the legislative directive to liberally construe DFEH complaints, the Court finds that it was sufficient to satisfy section 12960(b).

The Court declines to dismiss Achal’s FEHA claims for failure to adequately plead exhaustion of remedies.

2. Sufficiency of the Pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

A plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514-15, 122 S.Ct. 992; see also Starr, 652 F.3d at 1215-16 (reaffirming the holding of Swierkiewicz in light of Iqbal and Twombly); Sheppard v. David Evans & Assocs., 694 F.3d 1045, 1050 n.2 (9th Cir.2012) (same). The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Iqbal and Twombly to hold that (1) to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively; and (2) the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. While a plaintiff need not plead facts constituting' all elements of a prima facie employment discrimination case in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts nevertheless look to- those elements to analyze a motion to dismiss, so as to decide, in light of judicial experience and common sense, whether the challenged complaint contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Sheppard, 964 F.3d at 1050 n.2; Jianjun Xie v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., No. C 12-02950 CRB, 2013 WL 812425, at *4 n. 3 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 5, 2013) (quoting Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir'2012)).

a. Disability Discrimination in Violation of Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a)

FEHA provides, in pertinent part, that it is an unlawful émployment practice “[f]or an employer, because of the ,.. physical disability ... of any person, to refuse to hire or employ the person or ... discharge the person from employment ... or to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a). A prima facie disability discrimination case requires that Achal show that he (1) suffered from a disability,' or was regarded as suffering from a disability; (2)' could perform the essential duties of the job with or without reasonable accommodations; and (3) was subjected to’an adverse employment action because'of the disability or perceived disability. Wills v.Super. Ct., 195 Cal. App.4th 143, 159-60, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 (2011). FEHA defines “physical disability” as a condition that both affects one or more bodily system and limits a major life activity, including working. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(m)(l). “Essential duties” are defined as' “the fundamental job duties of the employment position of -the individual with a disability holds or desires.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(f)(1). Determining the essential" functions of a position requires a highly fact-intensive inquiry. Lui v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 211 Cal.App.4th 962, 971, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 385 (2012). The standard for determining whether an employee has been subjected to “adverse employment action” 'is whether employment action materially affected “terms and conditions ■ of employment,” with that term being liberally construed in order to afford employees “appropriate protection against employment discrimination.” Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12940(a) and (h); Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1054, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 436, 116 P.3d 1123 (2005). California courts have held that termination, dissemination of a negative employment reference, and issuance of a negative performance evaluation all constitute adverse employment actions. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928-29 (9th Cir.2000). To satisfy the third element of a section 12940(a) disability discrimination claim, the plaintiffs disability must have been a “substantial motivating factor” in the particular employment decision. Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 56 Cal.4th 203, 233, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 392, 294 P.3d 49 (2013).

Achal specifically alleges that he fell from a platform at work, sustaining orthopedic injuries. FAC ¶ 10. Achal then alleges that Gate Gourmet filed a workers’ compensation form in response to his injury. Id. at ¶ 11. While not explicit, the Court can infer that the disability for which Achal filed a workers’ compensation ■claim is the collection of physical limitations he suffered as a result of his fall. -He further alleges that this injury interfered with a major life function, as it caused lifting and bending restrictions that impaired his ability to work. Id. Achal alleges that because Gate Gourmet received periodic updates on his condition, Gate Gourmet was aware of his disability. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 13. While Achal does not set forth what the essential duties of his position with Gate Gourmet were, he specifically alleges that Gate Gourmet stated that Achal performed “in good standing” and that there was “never any question” as to his job performance, even after returning to work from medical leave. Id. at ¶¶ 12. The Court can infer from these allegations that Achal was capable of performing the essential duties of his position with reasonable accommodation. Achal then describes the circumstances, surrounding his termination, including the allegation that despite admitting that it had not pursued independent investigation into the matter,. Gate Gourmet terminated him for purportedly causing his own disability. Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.

Achal’s FAC sufficiently pleads specific, non-conclusory facts that place Gate Gourmet on notice of the disability discrimination claim against it and that, taken as true, plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Although Achal’s FAC is thin on this claim, it does make factual allegations that go beyond reciting the elements of a claim of disability discrimination. These allegations are neither'“bald” nor “conclu-sory,” and hence are entitled to the presumption of truth. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681, 129 S.Ct. 1937). The allegations süpport a plausible inference that Achal had a disability, could nevertheless perform the essential duties of his position, and suffered an adverse employment action (termination) on the basis of his disability. Although Achal’s own allegations reveal, that Gate Gourmet offered a non-discriminatory reason for Achal’s termination — specifically, that Gate Gourmet believed Achal was fraudulently seeking benefits — Achal alleges that Gate Gourmet conducted no investigation ■ that would serve as a basis for making this accusation. FAC ¶ 13, This gives rise to a plausible inference, at least for purposes of this motion, that the proffered reason was pretextual, and that his disability was at least a substantial motivating factor in his termination. See Earl v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 658 F.3d 1108, 1112-13 (9th Cir.2011) (“A plaintiff may demonstrate pretext ... by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence because it is internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable.”). For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Achal’s claim for disability discrimination adequately states a claim,

b. Failure to Make Reasonable Accommodations in Violation of Cal Gov’t Code § 1294-0(m)

FEHA makes it unlawful “for an employer ... to fail to make reasonable accommodation for the known physical ... disability of an applicant or employee.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(m). Under FEHA, an employer’s failure to reasonably accommodate a disabled employee is a violation of the statute in and of itself. The elements of a prima facie claim for failure to make reasonable accommodation claim are: (1) the plaintiff has a disability covered by FEHA; (2) the plaintiff is qualified to perform the essential functions of the position; and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiffs disability. Scotch v. Art Inst. of Cal.—Orange Cnty., Inc., 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1010, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 338 (2009). “Reasonable accommodation” means a “modification or adjustment to the workplace that enables a disabled employee to perform the essential functions of the job held or ■desired.” Taylor v. Trees, Inc., 58 F.Supp.3d 1092, 1111 (E.D.Cal.2014); see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(p). The reasonableness of an accommodation is generally a question of fact. Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 74 Cal.App. 4th 215, 228 n. 11, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 487 (1999). A claim under section 12940(m) differs from a section 12940(a) discrimination. claim in that an adverse employment action need not be shown, nor is any showing of a causal nexus between' one’s disability and an adverse employment action required. Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 85 Cal.App.4th 245, 255-56, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 55 (2000).

To face liability under section 12940(m), an employer must have been aware of the employee’s disability. King v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 152 Cal. App.4th 426, 443, 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 359 (2007) (“ ‘[The] employee can’t expect the employer to read his mind and know he secretly wanted a particular accommodation and sue the employer for not providing it. Nor is an employer ordinarily liable for failing to accommodate a disability of which it had no knowledge.’ ” (quoting Prilliman v. United Air Lines, Inc., 53 Cal.App.4th 935, 954, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 142 (1997))). Or dinarily, an employee is responsible for requesting accommodation for his or her disability, unless the employer itself recognizes that an employee has a need for such accommodation. Brown v. Lucky Stores, 246 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir.2001). Once aware, the employer has an affirmative duty to reasonably accommodate, which is not extinguished by one effort. Swanson v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 232 Cal.App.4th 954, 969, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 553 (2014). It is the employee’s responsibility to understand his own condition well enough to present the employer at the earliest opportunity with a concise list of restrictions which must be met to--accommodate the employee. Id. An employee seeking reasonable accommodation cannot, however, make an employer provide one specific accommodation if another is provided instead, so long as that accommodation is reasonable and effective. Hanson, 74 Cal.App.4th at 228, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 487. Nor are employees entitled to the “best” accommodation. Id.

Achal has alleged sufficient facts to support his claim that Gate Gourmet failed to make reasonable accommodations for his disability. Here, while Achal’s claim is thin, Achal does allege that Gate. Gourmet was aware of his disability, and that he returned to work with lifting and bending restrictions. FAC ¶¶ 11-12. As described above in the context of his disability discrimination claim, Achal has alleged sufficient facts to plausibly suggest, at least for the purposes of this motion, that Gate Gourmet terminated him at least in part because of his disability. Regardless of whether Gate Gourmet accommodated Achal’s disability at any one point, Gate Gourmet had a continuous duty to make these accommodations so long as Achal’s disability required them. Swanson, 232 Cal.App.4th at 969, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 553. Achal has alleged facts suggesting that instead of upholding its duty to make reasonable accommodations for his disability, Gate Gourmet “[sought] a pretextuál reason for terminating [him].” FAC ¶ 12. The Court is persuaded that Achal’s second claim, failure to make reasonable accommodations for his disability, meets the minimum pleading requirements set forth by Iqbal and Twombly. The Court therefore denies Gate Gourmet’s motion to dismiss with regard to Claim1 Two of Achal’s FAC.

c. Failure to Engage in Interactive Process in Violation of Cal. Gov’t Code § 129J/,0(n)

Under FEHA, an employer’s failure “to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee ... to determine effective reasonable accommodations” is a violation of the statute separate from any failure to make reasonable accommodations for a qualified employee’s disability. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(n); Wilson v. Cnty. of Orange, 169 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1193, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 439 (2009). FEHA imposes on employers a mandatory obligation to engage in the interactive process once an employee requests an accommodation for his or her’ disability, or when the employer itself recognizes the need for' one. Brown, 246 F.3d at 1188. Once initiated, the employer has a continuous obligation to engage in the interactive process in good faith. Swanson, 232 Cal.App.4th at 971, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 553. The interactive process “requires communication and good-faith exploration of possible accommodations between employers and individual employees with the goal of identifying an accommodation that allows the employee to perform the job effectively.” Yeager v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 944 F.Supp.2d 913, 919 (E.D.Cal.2013). To prevail on a section 12940(n) claim, an employee must identify a reasonable accommodation that would have been available at the time the interactive process should have occurred. Nealy v. City of Santa Monica, 234 Cal.App.4th 359, 379, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 9 (2015). Plaintiffs are not required to identify such a reasonable accommodation at the pleading stage, however, because often “[e]mployees do not have at their disposal the extensive information concerning possible alternative positions or possible accommodations which employers have.” Id. (quoting Scotch, 173 Cal.App.4th at 1018, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 338).

The Court finds that Claim Three of Achal’s FAC pleads sufficient non-con-clusory facts to plausibly state a claim for relief. Achal alleges that Gate Gourmet failed to engage him in “timely, good faith, or interactive discussions.” FAC ¶ 39. While also thin on this claim, Achal has sufficiently alleged that he had a disability of which Gate Gourmet was aware. He has also sufficiently alleged facts suggesting that Gate Gourmet’s proffered reason for his termination was pretextual, and that his disability was actually a substantial motivating factor in his termination. As discussed above in the context of Achal’s failure to accommodate claim, Achal has sufficiently alleged a need for reasonable accommodations for his disability, which would give rise to Gate Gourmet’s obligation to engage him in a good faith interactive process. Achal alleges that instead of doing so, Gate Gourmet “[sought] a pretextual basis to terminate him,” and ultimately did terminate him. Id. at ¶ 12-13. This suffices at the pleadings stage to give Gate Gourmet fair notice of the claim against it and to allow Gate Gourmet to prepare an effective defense. The Court therefore denies Gate Gourmet’s motion to dismiss with regard to Claim Three of Achal’s FAC.

d. Religious Discrimination in Violation of Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 129JpO(a) and (l)

i. § 12940(a)

FEHA provides, in pertinent part, that' it' is an unlawful employment practice “[fjor an employer, because of the ... religious creed ... of any person, to refuse to hire or employ the person or .., discharge the person from employment ... or to discriminate against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a). To establish a prima facie , discrimination claim under FEHA, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he is qualified for his position; (3) he experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) other similarly situated employees outside of the protected class were.treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination. Slatkin v. Univ. of Redlands, 88 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1158, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 480 (2001) (applying this standard to FEHA religious discrimination claim).. The requirement that the employee be able to perform the essential duties of the position and the requirement that the employee suffer an adverse employment action are the same as those for a disability discrimination claim, as discussed above. As to the fourth element, discrimination can be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221-22 (9th Cir.1998). Applying California law, the Ninth Circuit has held that a mere comment suggesting the existence of bias can be direct evidence of discriminatory animus, “which, if believed,, proves the fact [of discriminatory animus] without inference of presumption.” Id. at 1221 (“Godwin produced evidénce of direct discrimination ____ She presented a statement ... that Guthier ‘did riot want to deal with another female after having dealt with ... Louise De PreFontaine.’ This comment directly suggests the existence of bias and no inference is necessary to find discriminatory animus.”) (citations omitted). Where direct evidence of discriminatory motive is unavailable, a plaintiff may offer circumstantial evidence of discrimination that tends to show that the employer’s proffered motives were not the actual motives because they are inconsistent or otherwise not believable. Id. at 1222.

As to his religious discrimination claim, Achal alleges that he is a member of the Hindu faith. FAG ¶ 7. Achal alleges that he requested time off from work to return to Fiji for a Hindu funeral and religious observance. Id. Achal further alleges that Gate Gourmet granted this time off, and that Achal was not at'work from April 26, 2014 through May 16, 2014. Id. Upon his return, Achal alleges that his supervisor, Adolfo Clavo, made disparaging comments regarding his absence, including his opinion that it was “ridiculous for a religious ceremony to take so long.” Id. at ¶ 8. From the above allegations, the Court can infer that Gate Gourmet was aware of Achal’s Hindu faith. Achal alleges that, following these comments, Clavo gave him unfavorable scheduling and made unreasonable work demands. Id. at ¶9. Achal specifically allegés that Clavo set him up for failure on a particular assignment, resulting in a negative write-up. Id. While Achal does not explicitly set forth his qualifications for his position with Gate Gourmet, he does allege that Gate Gourmet conceded that Achal performed “in good standing” and that there was “never any question” as to his job performance during his employment with Gate Gourmet. Id. at ¶ 12. The Court can infer from • these allegations that Achal was qualified for the position. Achal describes the circumstances surrounding his termination, includirig his allegation that despite admitting that it had not pursued independent investigation into the matter, Gate Gour-mét terminated him for purportedly fraudulently seeking beriefits.' Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.

Claim Four of Achal’s FAC regarding section .12940(a) sufficiently pleads specific, non-conclusory facts that place Gate Gourmet on notice of the religious discrimination claim against it and that, taken as true, plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Although Achal’s FAC is also relatively thin on this claim, it does make factual allegations that go beyond reciting the elements of a religious discrimination claim. The allegations set forth in Claim Four of Achal’s FAC as regards section 12940(a) are neither “bald” nor “concluso-ry,” and hence are entitled, to the presumption of truth. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681, 129 S.Ct. 1937). The allegations support a plausible inference that Achal is a member" of a protected class, that he was qualified for his position; that he suffered adverse employment actions (at the Very least, a negative performance review "and termination), and that these employment decisions were made, at least in part, on the basis of his membership in the protected class. Achal has alleged facts, taken as true, that qualify as both direct and circumstantial allegations of discriminatory animus. First, Achal has alleged that his supervisor made disparaging comments that explicitly refer-, enced his religion. FAC ¶ 8. Second, although Achal’s own allegations reveal that Gate Gourmet offered a nondiscriminatory reason for Achal’s termination — specifically, that Gate Gourmet believed Achal was fraudulently seeking benefits — Achal alleges that Gate Gourmet conducted no investigation that would serve as a basis for making this accusation. Id. at ¶ 13. This gives rise to a plausible inference, at least for purposes of this motion, that the proffered reason was pretextual, and — in conjunction with Clavo’s alleged comments— that his religion was at least a significant motivating factor in his termination. Earl, 658 F.3d at 1112-13. These incidents are sufficiently detailed to give notice to Gate Gourmet of the nature of Achal’s religious discrimination claim against it and to give it a fair opportunity to defend against it. The Court therefore declines to dismiss this cause of action.

ii. § 12940(i)

FEHA also makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to discharge a person from employment ... or to discriminate against a person ,.. because of a conflict between the person’s religious belief and observance and any employment requirement, unless the employer . ■.. demonstrates that it has explored any available reasonable alternative means of accommodating the religious belief or observance ... but is unable to reasonably accommodate the religious belief or observance without undue hardship.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(Z). While not required to plead all the elements of a prima facie ease at the pleading stage, a successful section 12940(i) claim requires that a plaintiff show (1) the employee sincerely held a religious belief; (2) the employer was aware of that belief; and (3) the belief conflicted with an employment requirement. Friedman v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 102 Cal.App.4th 39, 45, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 663 (2002). A plaintiff must also show that he suffered an adverse employment action to. establish a prima facie ■ FEHA discrimination claim. Flait v. N. Am. Watch Corp., 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 476, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 522 (1992).

While FEHA does not explicitly define “conflict” as it regards an employment requirement, applicable California regulations and both federal and state case law establish that an employee’s attendance at a religious observance that requires him to be absent from work during normally scheduled hours or that requires'him to work a different schedule altogether qualifies as a “conflict” for purposes of FEHA religious discrimination claims. See Cal. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n v. Gemini Aluminum Corp., 122 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1016, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 906 (2004) (employment conflict existed sufficient to support section 12940(7) claim where employee required to work from Monday to Friday sought leave to attend religious convention beginning .on Friday); see also Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, (9th Cir.1990) (employer’s scheduling arrangement satisfied its duty to reasonably accommodate employee’s religious observance, which prevented him from working from sunset Friday to sunset Saturday); Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir.1993) .(plaintiffs attendance at his wife and son’s Jewish conversion ceremony was a protected religious observance, which created a conflict with his employment duty to be at work during those days regardless of whether plaintiff attempted to reschedule); 2 Cal. Code Regs. § 11062 (defining reasonable accommodation for purposes - of section 12940(Z) to include “allowing time off '... to avoid a conflict with [an employee’s] religious observance”). The statute, however, does allow an employer to discharge or take other adverse action against an employee on the basis of a conflict between the employee’s religious belief or observance and-an employment requirement if the employer is able to show that it cannot reasonably accommodate the employee’s religious needs without undue hardship. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(Z); Cook, 911 F.2d at 241.

Achal has alleged sufficient facts to state a section 12940(Z) religious, belief or observance discrimination claim. Achal’s allegations made with regards to his section 12940(2) claim support a plausible inference that Gate Gourmet discharged him at least partially on the basis of a conflict between his religious belief or observance and his employment duties. Specifically, Achal pleaded that he is a member of the Hindu faith, and that he took time off from work to attend a Hindu funeral and Hindu religious observance. FAC ¶7. Achal also alleged that his supervisor “questioned the religious observance by stating that it was ‘ridiculous for a religious ceremony to take so long.’ ” Ld. at ¶ 8. From this, the Court can infer that Gate Gourmet was aware both of Achal’s belief and that his absence was to attend a religious observance. Further, because attendance at work is considered an employment requirement, Achal’s allegations sufficiently plead that an employment-conflict arose as a result of Achal’s religious need to be absent. ’ Achal further pleads that he suffered an adverse employment action— he was terminated. Id. at ¶¶ 12-14.

Gate Gourmet argues that because Achal’s time off request was granted, “Plaintiffs time away ¡could not conflict with any requirement that Plaintiff be at work.” Reply at 7. This argument, however, speaks only to the issue of whether the employer made reasonable accommodations of that religious belief or observance. That Gate Gourmet may have provided reasonable accommodation for Achal’s religious needs does not preclude the possibility that Gate Gourmet later discriminated against Achal on the basis of the conflict.. Although neither party cited authority addressing this issue directly, it would significantly undermine the purpose of the statute if merely accommodating a conflict in the first instance could serve to insulate an employer from liability for terminating an employee based on the conflict. To use a hypothetical example based loosely on the Cook case discussed briefly above, ■ section 12940(Z) would be-ineffective if an employer could comply by excusing an employee from work on his Saturday sabbath but greeting him with a termination notice when he returned to work Sunday morning. Accordingly, all that is required at this stage is that Achal plead sufficient facts to suggest that he suffered an adverse -discrimination action based on- a conflict between his religious needs and his employment duties. The allegations made-in Claim Four of Achal’s FAC regarding section 12940(i) are sufficiently detailed to plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief and to give Gate Gourmet notice of the claim and a fair opportunity to defend against it. The Court therefore denies Gate Gourmet’s motion to dismiss Achal’s claim for section 12940(Z) religious discrimination.

e. Failure to Prevent Discrimination.. in Violation of Cal. Gov’t Code § imo(k)

FEHA makes it unlawful “[f]or an employer ... to fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment ... from occurring.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(k). A plaintiff seeking to recover on a failure to prevent discrimination claim under FEHA must show that (1) he was subjected to discrimination; (2) defendant failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination; and (3) this failure caused plaintiff to suffer injury, damage, loss or harm. Lelaind v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 576 F.Supp.2d 1079, 1103 (N.D.Cal.2008). The employer’s duty to prevent harassment and discrimination is affirmative and mandatory. Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 103 Cal.App.4th 1021, 1035, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 285 (2002). No liability can arise for failing to take necessary steps to prevent discrimination, however, except where discriminatory conduct actually took place and was not prevented. Trujillo v. N. Cnty. Transit Dist., 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 289, 73 Cal. Rptr.2d 596 (1998) (“[T]he statutory language [does -not] support[] recovery on such a. private right of action where there has been a specific factual finding that no such discrimination or harassment actually occurred.”). Some examples of “reasonable steps” available to remedy harassment, discrimination,- or retaliation under FEHA include “affirmatively raising the subject of harassment, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under California law, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.” 2 CaLCode Regs. § 11019(b). Other reasonable steps an employer might take include the establishment and promulgation of antidiscrimination policies and the implementation of effective procedures to handle discrimination-related complaints and grievances. Gemini Aluminum Corp., 122 Cal.App.4th at 1025, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 906. The causation element of a section 12940(k) claim requires an employee show that the discriminatory conduct was a “substantial factor” in causing his harm. CACI No. 2527; Alamo v. Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp., 219 Cal.App.4th 466, 480, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 758 (2013). Termination from employment is an. injury sufficient to support recovery under a section 12940(k) failure to prevent discrimination claim. See Gemini Aluminum Corp., 122 Cal.App.4th at 1025, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 906.

The Court finds that Gate Gourmet is not entitled to a dismissal with respect to Achal’s claim for failure to prevent discrimination. As Achal correctly points out in his Opposition, a failure to prevent discrimination claim is “essentially derivative of a discrimination claim.” Opp’n at 13 (citing Trujillo, 63 Cal.App.4th at 289, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 596). As discussed above, Achal pleaded sufficient facts to support his claims of both disability and religious discrimination. Achal has therefore adequately pleaded the requisite foundation of discrimination required for a section 12940(k) claim. Further, Achal pleaded several facts, that taken as true, support a plausible inference that while Gate Gourmet was aware of at least the alleged disability discrimination, it nevertheless took no steps to remedy it. Specifically, Achal alleges that Brett Appleberg, a human resources director at Gate Gourmet, issued him a letter on October 6; 2014 in which Gate Gourmet set forth its given reason for Achal’s termination — making a fraudulent claim for benefits. FAC ¶ 13. Achal further alleges that neither Appleberg nor any other Gate Gourmet representative conducted an independent investigation of this claim, and therefore it had no basis for making this accusation. Id. Achal also alleges that the termination decision was reviewed and/or approved by Appleberg, Appleberg’s direct supervisor, and the Regional Worker’s Compensation Manager, Paula Morales. Id. at - ¶ 14. Although somewhat of" a close call, construing the allegations in' the light most favorable to Achal, these allegations support a plausible inference that Gate Gourmet was aware of Achal’s disability, that Achal was discriminated against on the basis of his disability, that Gate Gourmet did not take all reasonable measures to prevent the discrimination from occurring, and that this discriminatory conduct was a “substantial factor” in causing his termination. The Court therefore denies Gate Gourmet’s motion to dismiss Claim Five of Achal’s FAC. '

C. California Private Attorneys General Act Claims

The California legislature- enacted PAGA to allow aggrieved employees, acting as private attorneys general, to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations when the labor law enforcement agencies could not keep pace with the growth of the labor market. Halliwell v. A-T Solutions, 983 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1182 (S.D.Cal.2013). The statute was not enacted as a means of recovering damages or restitution, but rather as a means of “deputizing” citizens as private attorneys general to énforce the Labor Code. Reyes v. Macy’s, Inc., 202 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 832 (2011). A PAGA plaintiff, therefore, may not' bring a claim on his' own behalf, but must bring it as a representative action including other current or former employees of the alleged violator. Id.

. PAGA defines “aggrieved employee” as “any person who was employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.” Cal. Lab.Code § 2699(c). Prior to bringing a civil action, an aggrieved employee is required to fulfill the administrative exhaustion prerequisites set forth by Labor . Code section 2699.3. Id. § 2699(a). Where the Labor Code does not set forth its own penalty, PAGA sets forth a civil penalty of one hundred dollars for each aggrieved employee per pay period for the initial violation and two hundred dollars for each aggrieved employee per pay period for each subsequent violation. Id. § 2699(f)(2). In cases where the plaintiff brings a representative PAGA action and prevails, the aggrieved employees are statutorily entitled to 25%- of the civil penalties- recovered while the LWDA is entitled to 75%. Id. § 2699(i); Urbino v. Orkin Servs., of Cal., 726 F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir.2013).

1. Representative PAGA Actions and Rule 23'

Gate Gourmet argues that Achal’s PAGA claims are barred by his failure to plead satisfaction of the class certification requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Mot. at 17-22. According to Gate Gourmet, allowing PAGA representative claims to proceed outside of Rule 23 would violate Article III and prudential standing requirements, as well as the Erie doctrine. Id.

Althoügh the Ninth Circuit has not yet decided whether class certification under Rule 23 is required to bring a representative PAGA claim in federal court, the majority of courts in this district that have addressed the issue have held that “representative PAGA claims need not be certi-, fied under Rule 23 to proceed” in light of the purpóse of á PAGA representative action, which is “to' vindicate the public through the imposition of civil penalties as opposed to conferring a private benefit upon the plaintiff and the represented employees.” Gallardo v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 937 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1137 (N.D.Cal. 2013) (citing cases) (internal quotation marks omitted). Speaking on the issue of whether PAGA actions are sufficiently similar to Rule 23 to trigger Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit declared that “Rule 23 and PAGA aré1 more dissimilar than alike.” Baumann v. Chase Inv. Servs. Corp., 747 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir.2014). Before and after Baumann, courts in this district have routinely held that “PAGA actions, though representative, need • not be brought as, class actions under Rule 23.” See , Willner v. Manpower Inc., 35 F.Supp.3d 1116, 1135 (N.D.Cal.2014) (“[T]he vast majority of courts in this district ... have held that representative PAGA claims need not be certified under Rule 23 to proceed ....”) (internal citations and quotation' marks omitted); Villalpando v. Exel Direct Inc., No. 12-CV-04137 JCS, 2014 WL 1338297, at *20-21 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 28, 2014); Ortiz v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. C-12-05859 EDL, 2014 WL 1117614, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2014); Gallardo v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 937 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1138 (ND.Cal.2013); Moua v. Int’l Bus. Machines. Corp., No. 5:10-CV-01070 EJD, 2012 WL 370570, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 31, 2012). Likewise, the California Supreme Court has conclusively held that PAGA claims do not need to satisfy class action requirements to proceed in state court. See Arias v.Super.Ct., 46 Cal.4th 969, 981-86, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 209 P.3d 923 (2009). The Arias court recognized that state class-certification requirements did not apply to PAGA claims because, unlike a class action, which seeks recovery on behalf of individual employees, an employee suing under PAGA steps into the shoes of California’s labor law enforcement agencies. Id. at 986, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 209 P.3d 923.

Gate Gourmet argues that this Court should adopt the minority opinion — that because PAGA is a procedural statute allowing for recovery to unnamed non-parties, an individual plaintiff lacks standing to recover on behalf of these third parties absent class certification. See, e.g., Taylor v. W. Marine Prods., Inc., No. C 13-04916 WHA, 2014 WL 1248162, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014) (applying the.,more stringent Rule 23 standard , to representative PAGA claims, “because Article III ‘require[s] a plaintiff to show, inter alia, that he has actually been injured by the defendant’s challenged conduct.’”); Halliwell, 983 F.Supp.2d at 1184; Fields v. OSP, Inc., No. CV 12-1238 CAS, 2012 WL 2049528, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2012); Ivey v. Apogen Techs., Inc., No. 11CV366 DMS NLS, 2011 WL 3515936, at *3 (S.D.Cal. Aug. 8, 2011); Thompson v. APM Terminals Pac. Ltd., No. C 10-00677 JSW, 2010 WL 6309364, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 26, 2010) (“To the extent Plaintiff here seeks to bring á representative PAGA action on behalf of other non-party, unnamed aggrieved employees in federal court, such a claim must meet the requirements of Rule 23.”); Adams v. Luxottica U.S. Holdings Corp., No. SA CV 07-1465 AHS, 2009 WL 7401970, at *2 (C.D.Cal. July 24, 2009) (“Having failed