Lujan v. City of Santa Fe (122 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 2015)

United States District Court for the District of New Mexico 2015-08-15

Citations

Full opinion text

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES O. BROWNING, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Petitioner Martin Lujan’s Motion for Reconsideration, filed March 24, 2015 (Doc. 63)(“Motion”). The Court held a hearing on June 18, 2015. The primary issues are: (i) whether the Court should reconsider its .ruling that PlaintiffiFetitioner Martin Lujan waived his argument that Hearing Officer Paula Maynes was imper-missibly biased when he failed to raise the issue in his complaint or petition for writ of certiorari; (ii) whether the Court should reconsider its rulings that Ms. Maynes’ decision that M. Lujan attempted to obtain the Defendant/Respondent City of Santa Fe’s funds by. false pretenses was not fraudulent, arbitrary, or capricious, and that substantial evidence supported it; and (iii) whether the Court should reconsider its ruling that the City Qf Santa Fe had just cause .to terminate M. Lujan’s employment. Although M. Lujan has presented some new law and arguments regarding whether he waived his argument that Ms. Maynes was impermissibly biased, the Court remains persuaded that its ruling on the issue is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will not alter its prior ruling on that issue. Similarly, although M. Lujan has presented some new argument and law whether Ms. Maynes’ decision that he attempted to obtain City of Santa Fe funds by false pretenses was fraudulent, arbitrary, or capricious, or substantial evidence supported it, the Court remains persuaded that its ruling on that issue is correct. As for Court’s ruling that the City of Santa Fe had just cause to terminate M. Lujan’s employment, although M. Lujan presents some new authority and argument on the Court’s authority to remand a case, he has not presented any new authority, evidence, or arguments regarding whether the City of Santa Fe had just cause to terminate his employment. The Court will therefore leave that ruling intact. Consequently, the Court "will deny the Motion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the City of Santa Fe’s termination of M. Lujan’s employment after he allegedly attempted to embezzle City pf Santa Fe funds. The Court set forth detailed findings of fact in the Memorandum Opinion and Order, filed February 24, 2015 (Doc. 62)(“MOO”), and neither party has expressly challenged those- findings or offered additional evidence to contradict them. Accordingly, the Court will not set forth new findings of fact or reproduce the MOO’s findings of fact here.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 18, 2013, M. Lujan filed an amended. Petition for Writ of Certiorari and a Complaint in the First Judicial District Court for the State of New Mexico, County of Santa Fe. See First Amended Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Complaint for Violation of First Amendment Rights, Retaliatory Discharge and the Whistle Blower Act, filed in state court on April 18, 2015, filed in federal court on May 9, 2013 (Doc. 1-2). On May 9, 2013, the Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, asserting that the District of New Mexico has federal-question jurisdiction over the case. See Civil Cover Sheet, filed May 9, 2013 (Doc. 1-1). On October 11, 2013, M. Lujan filed an amended Petition for Writ of Certiorari and an amended Complaint. See Second Amended Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Complaint for - Violation of First Amendment Rights, Retaliatory Discharge and the Whistle Blower Act, filed October 11, 2013 (Doc. 39)(“Complaint & Petition”).

--M. Imjan asks the Court to issue a Writ of Certiorari, pursuant to Constitution of the State of New-Mexico, and reverse Ms. Maynes’ decision, for three reasons. -See Complaint- & Petition at 8-9. First, M. Lujan contends that there is not substantial evidence that lie committed theft, • attempted theft, or carelessly or negligently used City of Santa Fe funds under .the City of Santa Fe’s Personnel Rules and Regulations. See . Complaint & Petition at 8. M. Lujan points out .that Ms. Maynes questioned her own finding on the issue of theft and stated that the evidence demonstrated only “statements showing an intent to steal.” Complaint & Petition at 8.(cita-tion omitted)(internal quotation marks omitted). M. Lujan notes-that City Manager Robert Romero testified at M. Lu-jan’s post-termination hearing that the City of Santa Fe never paid the Santa Fe Junior Wrestling Association (“SFJWA”) or any other entity that it agreed to pay under the purchase order that it issued to the SFJWA. Complaint & Petition at 8.

Second, M. Lujan asserts that Ms. Maynes “misinterpreted and/or misapplied the law or rules which govern[ed]” his alleged conduct. Complaint & Petition at 8. M. Lujan points out that the City has not presented any evidence that it paid money either to the SFJWA or to the Amateur Athletic Union (“AAU”) because of M. Lujan’s actions. Complaint & Petition at 8-9. M.- Lujan says: “Therefore it is inconsistent as a matter' of law for Martin to have been careless, negligent or improper with City funds.” Complaint & Petition at 8. M. Lujan also argues that the electronic mail transmissions between him and his brother — Larry Lujan — on which Ms. Maynes relied “do not demonstrate that Martin handled any City funds.” Complaint' & Petition at 9. M. Lujan states that there is no evidence that he incurred any personal expenses, purchased an airline ticket, or received reimbursement for any expenses. See Complaint & Petition at 9.

Third, M. Lujan asserts that the City of Santa Fe acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, and capriciously. See Complaint & Petition at 9. M. Lujan argues that R. Romero was his friend until M. Lujan began investigating concerns about R. Romero’s girlfriend violating “time clock” policies. Complaint & Petition at 9. M. Lujan explains that he “instituted measures to control the abuses that were being carried out regarding employees clocking in for other employees,” and that R. Romero’s “subordinates. and cronies” granted R. Romero’s ghifriend an exemption from those measures. Complaint & Petition at 9. M. Lujan concludes:

When Robert Romero became aware that Martin was investigating the legal requirements concerning the exemption of Robert Romero’s girlfriend from the time clock policy and the nepotism of Robert Romero to a relative of his girlfriend, Robert Romero retaliated against Martin and violated his First Amendment Rights to Free Speech and Liberty, Violated the City’s Anti-Fraud Policy, and retaliated against Martin for being a Whistle Blower.

Complaint & Petition at 9.

M. Lujan also alleges that the Defendants: (i) violated his rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America when they retaliated against him for exercising his right to free speech, see Complaint & Petition ¶¶ 1-14, at 11-12 (“Count I”); (ii) unlawfully discharged him for raising issues of public concern, see Complaint & Petition ¶¶ 15-24, at 12-13. (“Count II”); and (iii) violated the New Mexico Whistle-blower Protection Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 10-16C-2(1) and 10-16C-2(4)(“WPA”), when they terminated him after he raised concerns that City of Santa Fe officials had violated the City of Santa Fe’s Personnel Rules, Regulations, and Policies, Complaint & Petition ¶¶ 25-45, at 14-17 (“Count III”).

1. The Appeal Brief.

M. Lujan filed a brief on the Petition for Writ of Certiorari on September 18, 2013. See Petitioner Martin Lujan’s Appeal Brief at l, filed September 18, 2013 (Doc. 29)(“Appeal Brief’). ■ In the Appeal Brief, M. Lujan asked the Court to overturn Ms. Maynes’ decision for five reasons. First, M. Lujan argued that Ms. Maynes was an impermissibly biásed hearing officer and violated Ms due process rights by presiding over his post-termination hearing. See Appeal Brief at 13-27. Second, M. Lujan addressed together three of Ms. Maynes’ conclusions of law — that M. Lujan attempted to obtain City of Santa Fe funds under false pretenses; that M. Lujan carelessly, negligently, or improperly used City of Santa Fe funds; _ and that M. Lujan intentionally falsified or mishandled City of Santa Fe records — arguing that all three conclusions were arbitrary and capricious, and that substantial evidence did not support them. See Appeal Brief at 17-20. Third, M. Lujan asserted that Ms. Maynes’ finding that he stole City of Santa Fe funds is arbitrary and capricious, and that substantial evidence does not support the finding. See Appeal Brief at 20-22. Fourth, M. Lujan contended that there was no just cause for his termination under the City of Santa Fe’s Personnel Rules. See Appeal Brief at 22-23. Fifth, and finally, M. Lujan urged that Ms. Maynes’ decision was not in accordance with the law. See Appeal Brief at 23-24.

2. The MOO.

On February 24, 2015, the Court issued the MOO, which granted in part and denied in part M. Lujan’s requests in the Appeal Brief. First, the Court held that M. Lujan waived his dué process claim when he failed to raise it in his Complaint or in his Petition' for Writ of Certiorari. See AMOO at 54-56. The Court added that, even if M. Lujan had properly asserted his due process-claim, the claim would not go forward, because “the Court does not think ‘a reasonable person would have serious doubts about whether the hearing officer could be fair.’ ” AMOO at 59 (quoting City of Albuquerque v. Chavez, 1997-NMCA-054, ¶ 16, 123 N.M. 428, 941 P.2d 509). Second, the Court held that Ms. Maynes’ decision that M. Lujan attempted to obtain City of Santa Fe funds by authorizing the payment of two submitted invoices is not fraudulent, arbitrary, or capricious, and that substantial evidence supports it. See AMOO at 65-71. Third, the Court concluded that M. Lujan waived the issue whether Ms. Maynes’ decision that he intentionally falsified or mishandled City of Santa Fe records was fraudulent, arbitrary, and capricious, and that substantial evidence did not support it. See AMOO at 73-74 (citing N.M.R.A. Rule 1-075(K)(3) (“A contention that a decision or finding of fact is not supported by substantial evidence shall be deemed waived unless the argument identifies with particularity the fact or facts that are not supported by substantial . evidence.”)). Fourth, the' Court agreed with M. Lujan that Ms. Maynes’ decision that he stole City of Santa Fe funds was arbitrary and capricious and that substantial evidence did not support it. See AMOO. at 74-77. Fifth, the Court held that the City of Santa Fe had just cause to terminate M. Lujan’s employment, because his actions “ ‘reflect poorly upon the integrity of the City of Santa Fe.’ ” AMOO at 78 (quoting City of Santa Fe’s Personnel -Rules § 7.50(E)(13)). Sixth, and finally, the Court concluded that Ms. Maynes’ decision was in accordance with the law. See AMOO at 82.

3. The Motion.

M. Lujan filed the Motion on March 24, 2015; M. Lujan asks the Court to reconsider five of its rulings in the MOO under the Court’s inherent “equitable power to process litigation to a just and equitable conclusion,” or under the Court’s authority to alter or amend a judgment under rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Motion at 2. See id. at 5. First, M. Lujan asserts that he did not waive his due process claim by failing to raise it in the Complaint or in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, because whether Ms. Maynes was impermissibly biased is a jurisdictional question that “may be raised at any point in the proceedings.” Motion at 6-7. M. Lujan contends that,

in the administrative hearing setting, the hearing officer and the City of Santa Fe owed Petitioner a duty not to appoint Ms. Maynes as the hearing officer. This duty is similar to the obligations placed upon the federal courts‘on the issue of jurisdiction. All Federal Courts have an “independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” . . ■

Motion at 7-8 (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583, 119 S.Ct, 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999)).

Second, M; Lujan says that the Court applied the incorrect standard in the MOO to determine whether “there was an impermissible conflict in Ms. Maynes[’] authority to hear Petitioner’s appeal.” Motion at 8-9. M. Lujan points out that the Court improperly relied on Flores v. State, 1986-NMCA-017, 79 N.M. 47, 439 P.2d 565, as the closest analogy to this case, and inaccurately held that M. Lujan “must demonstrate a direct connection between actual bias and the matter submitted to Ms. Maynes for her consideration.” Motion at 9. M. Lujan contends:

In the United States Supreme Court decision, Caperton v. [A.T.] Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009), the Court held that the failure of a state supreme court justice -to recuse himself when a party had made extraordinary and disproportionate contributions in support of the justice’s candidacy in the previous election violated the opposing party’s due process rights. The Court applied an objective standard and stated “that there is a serious risk of actual bias — based on objective and reasonable perceptions— when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.” Id. at 2263-64, In the instant case the City had a significant and disproportionate influence in .placing Ms. Maynes on the case as the hearing officer.

In Caperton there was no ... direct evidence either cited or found by the Court upon which it disqualified the judge. Using the objective standard the ■Supreme Court held that the objective standard’s reasonable perceptions were sufficient enough to create a “serious risk of actual bias” given the campaign contributions. This was the holding even where the political contributions had been made in a previous year’s election. The ruling is more analogous to the facts found in the-instant case than the facts, found in the Flores case.

Motion at 9-10.

M. Lujan asserts that the- Court of Appeals of New Mexico adopted Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.’s objective bias -standard in City of Albuquerque v. Chavez. See Motion at 10. According to. M. Lujan, in City of Albuquerque v. Chavez, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico said that the bias inquiry does not focup on “ yhether the Board members, are .actually biased or prejudiced,’ ” but on whether, “ ‘in the natural course of events, there is an indication of a possible temptation to an average man [or woman] sitting as a judge to try the case with bias for or against any issue presented to him [of her].’ ”' Motion át 10 (quoting City of Albuquerque v. Chavez, 1997-NMCA-054, ¶ 16, 123 N.M. 428, 941 P.2d 509) (emphases omitted)(altera;tions in Motion but not in quoted case). M. Lujan argues that the MOO “requires that Petitioner not only prove actual bias but also the bias or conflict must be connected to the specific matter pending before Ms. Maynes.” Motion at 12. In M. Lujan’s view, “this is inconsistent with the standard announced by the -United States Supreme Court, the New Mexico Supreme Court and the New Mexico Court of Appeals subsequent to the.Flores opinion.” Motion at 12. M. Lujan adds that City of Albuquerque v. Chavez “is more on point and correctly applied the ‘objective standard test’ to the facts of that case.” Motion at 13. M. Lujan says that “the authority of the Board members [in City of Albuquerque v. Chavez ] was' identical to Ms. Maynes’ authority to act as the hearing officer having been appointed by the City of Santa Fe.” Motion at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). M. Lujan says that, under the objective bias standard, the City of Santa Fe “should not have appointed Ms. Maynes and Ms. Maynes should have refused to hear Petitioner’s appeal.” Motion at 13.

Third, ,M. Lujan challenges the .MOO’s conclusion that M. Lujan’s proposed impermissible-bias standard “ ‘is unworkable.’ ” Motion at 14 (quoting MOO at 61). M. Lujan says that the -Court’s holding “does [not] reflect the reality of the legal community in Santa Fe and the availability of un-biased attorneys that could have heard Petitioner’s administrative appeal and the voluntary disclosures of potential conflicts before agreeing to hear any case.” Motion at 14. M. Lujan then lists a number of retired judges who could have served as his hearing officer, asserting that “[t]hese are only a few of a number of legal professionals who were available to act as the .hearing officer regarding Petitioner’s appeal and who would not have presented a possible bias — based on objective and reasonable perceptions.” Motion at 15.

- Fourth, M, Lujan contends that the MOO wrongly held that- he attempted to obtain City of Santa Fe funds' under false pretenses. See Motion at 16 (citing MOO at 81-82). M. Lujan says that “the evidence does not support a finding of the prerequisite intent required for there to have been intent to obtain funds under false pretenses” and that “there was ... no overt act with respect to the $750 SFJWA invoice.” Motion at 16; M. Lujan says that he “refuted every 'e-mail from Larry Lujan and does not, in any instance, confirm the existence of a scheme to fraudulently obtain funds from the City of Santa Fe.” Motion at 20.

Fifth, and finally, M. Lujan asks. the Court to remand his case to the City of Santa Fe “for a determination of whether a less severe discipline, other than dismissal, is warranted in this case.” • Motion at 21 (capitalization removed for, readability). M. Lujan points out that the MOO reversed, Ms. Maynes’ findings that M. Lu-jan: (i) stole from the City of Santa Fe; (ii) carelessly, negligently, or improperly used City of Santa Fe funds; and (iii) intentionally falsified or mishandled City of Santa Fe records. See Motion at 23. M. Lujan argues that, because -Ms. Maynes’ decision “expressly relies upon all of her findings and conclusions of law, it is proper for this Court to remand the matter back to the City for further consider7 ation.” Motion at 23. M. Lujan then provides the following colorful collection of authority to support his argument:

“When the United States Supreme Court grants certiorari, and reverses a decision of a state supreme court or a Federal appeals court, it may remand the case. Likewise, an appeals court may remand a case to a trial court. A remand may be a full remand, essentially ordering an entirely new trial; when an appellate court grants a full remand, the lower court’s decision is ‘reversed and remanded.’ ” See http://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Remand court procedure 29# United States.

“Alternatively, it may be ‘with instructions’ specifying, for example, that the lower court must use a different legal standard when considering facts already adduced at trial. It may also be a partial remand as when an appellate court affirms a conviction while directing the lower court to revisit the sentencing phase. Finally, it may remand a case upon concluding that the lower court not only made a mistake but also did not adjudicate issues that must be considered.” Id.

In Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424 (10th Cir.1984) the Federal District Court for the District of New Mexico, “remanded an action back to an administrative law judge (ALJ) for a determination of whether the plaintiff/appellee adequately showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the United States Geological ■ Survey (USGS) erred in finding that a particular tract of federal land contained a known geologic structure (KGS).” Id; at 1425. The 10th Circuit affirmed the decision of the District remanding the case back to the ALJ for consideration of the issues directed on remand. Id. at 1430.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.Code § 2106, “[t]he Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may ... remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.” Id. Circuit Appeal Courts, based upon the need to avoid the operation of bias or mindset which seems likely to have developed from consideration of decisions will remand the case to another judge or ..administrative law judge. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals uses its’ Rule 36 which provides, in relevant part that:

Whenever a case tried in a district court is remanded by this court, for a new trial, it shall be reassigned by the district court for trial before a judge other than the judge who heard the prior trial unless the remand order directs or all parties request that the same judge retry the case.

Id. In the Ninth Circuit, like the Tenth Circuit, there is no specific rule regarding reassignment and therefore the Federal Circuit looked to the standard established under Ninth Circuit case law.

The court held that “[i]n the Ninth Circuit, reassignment is appropriate if personal bias or unusual circumstances are shown.” Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir.1987). When determining whether unusual circumstances exist, the Ninth Circuit considers the following factors:

(1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected upon remand to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously-expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be rejected, (2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and (3) whether reassignment .would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness.

Id. at 563. Petitioner based upon the sound reasoning of the above-referenced Appellate Courts, request that the matter, if remanded, be remanded to a different Hearing Officer.

Motion at 23-25 (bold in original).

4. The Response.

The City of Santa Fe responded to the Motion on April 17, 2015, attacking the Motion on five grounds. See Respondent City of Santa Fe’s Response to Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, filed April 17, 2015 (Doc. 65)(“Response”). First, the City of Santa Fe argues that rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the Court discretion to revise interlocutory orders at any time before the entry of final judgment. See Response at 3. The City of Santa Fe says that, when evaluating whether to reconsider an interlocutory order under rule 54(b), courts apply the same legal standard used for a motion to alter or amend a judgment under rule 59(e). See Response at 3. Second, the City of Santa Fe contends that M. Lujan has failed to demonstrate that the Court should reconsider its decision that M. Lujan waived his due process claim by faffing to raise it in his Complaint or Petition for Writ of'Certiorari. See Response at 4. The City of Santa Fe points out that M. Lujan does not dispute that he raised his due process claim for the first time in the Appeal Brief; he similarly does not challenge “the well-established rule that courts should not consider issues that were not presented in a complaint or petition for writ of certiorari.” Response at 5 (citing Rule 12-505(D)(3) N.M.R.A.; San Pedro Neighborhood Ass’n v. Santa Fe Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2009 NMCA-045, ¶ 29, 146 N.M. 106, 206 P.3d 1011, 1019). The City of Santa Fe contends that M. Lujan attempts to avoid waiver by arguing that having an impartial hearing officer is a jurisdictional issue that cannot be waived. See Motion at 5. The City of Santa Fe says that, although it agrees with M. Lujan that jurisdictional issues are not subject to waiver, M. Lujan fails to cite any support for his contention that “a ' conflictffree hearing officer ... is a jurisdictional prerequisite.” Response at 5. The City of Santa’Fe also points out that one of the Court’s prior opinions appears to implicitly foreclose M. Lujan’s argument, because, in that case, the Court treated the questions of impermissible conflict and,jurisdiction as two separate and unrelated issues. See Response at- 6 (citing Kassabji v. Baca, No. CIV 07-0710 JB/ACT, 2007 WL 505345, at *6 (D.N.M. Jan. 8, 2007) (Browning, J.)(“[E]ven if Judge Campbell had a conflict of interest, he had jurisdiction over the case.”)).

Second, the City of Santa Fe asserts that the MOO applied the proper impermissible-bias standard. See Response at 6. The City of Santa- Fe contends that, although the Court “clearly applied the objective standard advocated by Petitioner,” it “simply did not reach the conclusion that Petitioner had hoped for.” Response at 7. The City of Santa Fe says that, “[i]n reviewing the conflict issue, the Court indicated that it had not found any evidence of ‘potential’ bias on the part of the hearing officer, and stated that Petitioner had not offered any ‘evidence demonstrating even the appearance of bias.’ ” Response at 7 (quoting MOO at -59, 61). The City of Santa Fe also highlighted the Court’s holding that it “‘does not.think a reasonable person would have serious doubts about whether the hearing officer could be fair:’ ” Response at 8 (quoting MOO at 59). The City of Santa Fe asserts: that “[t]his is unmistakably employing the objective standard advocated by Petitioner, and taking the standard from the same case cited by Petitioner”: City of Albuquerque v. Chavez. Response at 8. The City of Santa Fe says that the Court rejected M; Lujan’s reliance on that case, “because it was factually inapposite, not because it was applying an objective standard.” Response at 8. The City of Santa Fe.added that the MOO properly, relied upon Flores v. State in rejecting M. Lujan’s impermissible-bias argument, because that case used an objective standard and did not require proof of actual bias. See Response at 8.

The City of Santa Fe also attacks M. Lujan’s reliance on Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. Response at 9. The City of Santa Fe asserts:

Nor are the facts of Caperton remotely similar to those of this case.- Caper-ton involved a situation in which the head of a company facing a $50 million jury verdict, knowing that the verdict would be appealed to the state Supreme Court, donated $3 million to support the election of a candidate that he believed would .be more supportive of the appeal than the incumbent. This $3 million donation was more than the total amount spent by all other supporters of this candidate, put., together,, and three times- the' amount spent by the candidate’s own committee. Despite the “extraordinary situation” ■ of this “extreme ease[],” fueled by this remarkable attempt to get his preferred candidate on the bench prior to the court’s hearing' of the appeal, four of the Justices on the CapeHon Court' still did not find that recusal should have been required.

Response at 9. The City of Santa Fe asserts that Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. would only be analogous if Ms. Maynes “had received a large percentage of her revenues from representing the City in the past, with an expectation of receipt of a similar percentage- of work in the future.” Response at 10. The- City of Santa Fe argues that, “if anything, the contrast with CapeHon demonstrates how extreme the appearance of a conflict must be before disqualification is required, and just how far from this extreme conflict the circumstances of this case presented.” Response at 10.

Third, the City of Santa Fe contends that, in the MOO, the Court considered all of the.evidence in the record and all of the parties’ legal arguments in- upholding Ms. Maynes’ determination that M. Lujan attempted to obtain City of Santa Fe funds under false pretenses. See Response at 11. The City of Santa Fe maintains that, although M. Lujan contends that the evidence in the record does not support the Court’s ruling, “his argument is based on the same spin and implausible explanations for his emails and actions that were already made and rejected” in, the MOO. Response at 12. . Fourth, the City of .Santa Fe urges that, because M. Lujan’s attempt to obtain City of Santa Fe funds under false pretenses provided just cause to terminate, his employment, remand, to consider other potential discipline is unwarranted. See .Response at 14. The City of Santa Fe asserts that, as the Court recognized in the MOO, M. Lujan “ ‘had a responsibility to manage the City of Santa Fe’s funds with honesty and integrity, set an example to his subordinates, and maintain the public’s trust in the City of Santa Fe. Because of his misconduct, he failed on all- counts.’ ” Response at 15 (quoting MOO at 79).

5. The Reply.

M.' Lujan replied to the Response on May 18, 2015. See Petitioner Martin Lu-jan’s Reply Brief, filed May 18, 2015 (Doc. 68)(“Reply”). Aside-from reiterating the arguments from the Motion, M. Lujan asserts that his impermissible-bias argument “is not ma[d]e of whole cloth,” because Flares v. State requires a finding of “actual conflict of interest.” Reply at 6. M. Lujan adds that the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Caperton v. AT. Massey Coal Co. did not use the impermissible-bias standard from the Court of Appeals of New Mexico’s decision in Flores v. State. See Reply at 6. M. Lujan says that, although the City of Santa Fe argues that the cumulative evidence in the case supports the Court’s holding that M. Lujan attempted to obtain City of Santa Fe funds by false pretenses, the Court relied only upon the two invoices which L. Lujan sent regarding the AAU’s 2012 Grand National Wrestling Tournament — one for $6,000.00 and another for $750.00. See Reply at 7. Finally, M. Lujan reiterates that the Court should remand the case to the City of Santa Fe for further consideration of less drastic disciplinary measures in light of the Court’s reversal of Ms. Maynes’ determination that M. Lujan stole City of Santa Fe funds. See Reply at 8.

6. The Hearing.

The Court held a hearing on the Motion on June 18, 2015. See Transcript of Hearing (taken June 18, 2015)(“June 18, 2015, Tr.”). The Court kicked off the hearing by explaining that “rule[s] 59 and 60 are irrelevant” to the Court’s resolution of the Motion, because the Court has not entered final judgment in this case. Tr. at 2:2-14 (Court). The Court explained that, consequently, if M. Lujan can convince the Court that it was wrong, the Court has discretion to alter its rulings in the MOO. See Tr. at 2:14-15 (Court). Although the parties agreed with the Court’s position, the City of Santa Fe clarified that, “generally, ... courts would look to whether there was an intervening change in controlling law or new evidence not previously available, or the need to correct clear error or manifest injustice” to determine whether reconsideration is appropriate. Tr. at 3:8-4:5 (Court, Thompkins, Roman).

Next, the Court sáíd that it did not see how a hearing officer’s bias' is a jurisdictional issue and that it was inclined to conclude that M. Lujan waived his due process claim. See Tr. at 4:1024 (Court). Without addressing the waiver issue — or expressly conceding it — M. Lujan proceeded to his argument that the'MOO used the wrong impermissible-bias standard. See Tr. at 5:11-18 (Thompkins). M. Lujan and the Court then had. an exchange over whether hearing officers and judges must recuse themselves in cases involving a party that they have previously represented, with the Court suggesting that M. Lujan’s standard would require the Court to re-cuse itself in a large number of cases. See Tr. at 6:17-8:20 (Court, Thompkins); id. at 8:7-14 (Court).- M. Lujan pushed back¡ noting that Ms. Maynes was impermissibly biased not only, because of her prior representation of the City of Santa Fe, but also because her firm — Miller Stratvert, P.A.— has “an ongoing relationship with the City [of Santa Fe].” Tr. at 8:21-24 (Thompkins); id. at 9:19-23 (Thompkins); id. at 10:5-10 (Court, Thompkins). M., Lujan ultimately said that whether recusal is required turns on “the facts and the circumstances” of each case, Tr. at 7:1-2 (Thompkins), and suggested that courts look to the following factors to determine if recusal is warranted:

How recent was [the prior representation]? Is there an ongoing or a possible ongoing relationship that could be had from the hearing officer’s perspective which he believed that if she took this work or rendered her decision, it would prohibit them from coming back to her and hiring her as a hearing officer again, or even doing her work? Would a reasonably] prudent person believe that those would be factors that the hearing officer might weigh in her mind as reasons to render a decision one way or another?

Tr. at 20:4-16 (Thompkins).

When the City of Santa Fe took the lectern, it repeated its arguments from the Response: the Court correctly held that M. Lujan waived his due process claim, and, even if M. Lujan did not waive that claim, the Court applied' the proper impermissible-bias standard. See Tr. at 14:14-15:16 (Roman). The City of Santa Fe argued that M. Lujan was “misinformed” about Miller Stratvert having an ongoing relationship with the City of Santa Fe and clarified that Miller Stratvert “is [currently] suing the City of Santa Fe rather than representing” it. Tr. at 15:15-19 (Roman); id. at 17:4-12 (Court, Roman). The City of Santa Fe pointed out that Ms. Maynes has represented it in only two cases—one in 2005 and another in 2008. See Tr. at 15:20-17:3 (Court, Roman). The City of Santa Fe argued that such a tenuous relationship between Ms. Maynes and the City of Santa Fe would not lead a reasonable person to believe that Ms. Maynes could not be impartial in M. Lujan’s post-termination hearing. See Tr. at 17:15-20 (Roman). Although the Court agreed with the parties that the objective appearance-of-bias standard applies, it said that it was inclined to stick with its ruling in the MOO that Ms. Maynes’ sparse history with the City of Santa Fe and the lack of an ongoing relationship between her firm and the City of Santa Fe did not give rise to an impermissible bias. See Tr. at 22:4-17 (Court). The parties then repeated their arguments from the briefing on the remaining issues, and the Court said that it was not inclined to alter any of the MOO’s remaining holdings. See Tr. at 24:15-38:7 (Court, Roman, Thompkins).

LAW REGARDING MOTIONS TO ALTER OR AMEND THE JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 59(e)

Rule 59(e) provides: “A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Rule 60 provides in relevant part:

(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding.

On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

(c) Timing and Effect of the Motion.

(1) Timing. A motion under Rule

60(b) must be made within a reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.

(2) Effect on Finality. The motion does not affect the judgment’s final- • ity or suspend its operation.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)-(c). The Tenth Circuit has recognized:

Generally, a “motion for reconsideration, not recognized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Clough v. Rush, 959 F.2d 182, 186 n. 4 (10th Cir. 1992), may be construed in one of two ways: if filed within 10 days of the district court’s entry of judgment, it is treated as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e); if filed more than 10 days after entry of judgment, it is treated as á motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b).” Computerized Thermal Imaging, Inc. v. Bloomberg, LP, 312 F.3d 1292, 1296 n. 3 (10th Cir.2002).

Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1167 n. 9 (10th Cir.2005). The time limit in rule 59(e) is now twenty-eight days rather than ten days. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e).

A motion for reconsideration under rule 59(e) is an “inappropriate vehicle[] to reargue an issue previously addressed by the court when the motion merely advances new arguments, or supporting facts which were available at the time of the original motion.” Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir.2000). “Grounds warranting a motion to reconsider include (1) ah intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable, and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d at 1012. “Thus, a motion for reconsideration is appropriate where the court has misapprehended the facts, a party’s position, or the controlling law.” Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d at 1012. A district court has considerable discretion in ruling on a motion to reconsider under rule 59(e). See Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997).

Rule 60 authorizes a district court to, “[o]n motion and just terms[,] ... relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons,” including “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). A court cannot enlarge the time for filing a rule 59(e) motion. See Brock v. Citizens Bank of Clovis, 841 F.2d 344, 347 (10th Cir.1988) (holding that district courts lack jurisdiction over untimely rule 59(e) motions); Plant Oil Powered Diesel Fuel Sys., Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. CIV 11-0103, 2012 WL 869000, at *2 (D.N.M. Mar. 8, 2012) (Browning, J.)(“The Court may not extend the time period for' timely filing motions under Rule 59(e)____”). “A motion under rule 59 that is filed more than 28 days after entry of judgment may be treated as a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment.” 12 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 59.11[4][b], at 59-32 (3d ed.2012) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, a court will not generally treat an untimely rule 59(e) motion as a rule 60(b) motion when the party is seeking “reconsideration of matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits’ contemplated by Rule 59(e).” Jennings v. Rivers, 394 F.3d 850, 854 (10th Cir.2005).

Under some circumstances, a party can rely on rule 60(b)(1) to rectify a mistake by his or her -attorney, or when their attorney acted without the party’s authority. See Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th. Cir.1999) (“Rule 60(b)(1) motions premised upon mistake are intended to provide relief to a party ... when the party has made an excusable litigation mistake or an attorney has acted ■without authority....”). Mistake in this context entails either acting without the client’s consent or making a litigation mistake, such as failing to file or comply with deadlines. See Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d at 1231. If the alleged incident entails a mistake, then it must be excusable, meaning that the party was not at fault. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. LP, 507 U.S. 380, 394, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (“This leaves, of course, the Rule’s requirement that the party’s neglect be ‘excusable.’ ”); Cashner v. Freedom Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 572, 577 (10th Cir.1996) (“If the mistake alleged is a party’s litigation mistake, we have declined to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(1) when the mistake was the result of a deliberate and counseled decision by the party.”); Pelican Prod. Corp. v. Marino, 893 F.2d 1143, 1146 (10th Cir.1990) (holding attorney carelessness is not a basis for relief under rule 60(b)(1)).

Courts will not grant relief when the mistake of which the movant complains is the result of an attorney’s deliberate litigation tactics. See Cashner v. Freedom Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d at 577. This rule exists because a party

voluntarily chose [the] attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with-our system of representative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer agent and is considered to have notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.

Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. LP, 507 U.S. at 397, 113 S.Ct. 1489 (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962))(intemal quotation marks omitted). The Tenth Circuit has held that there is nothing “novel” about “the harshness of penalizing [a client] for his attorney’s conduct” and has noted that those “who act through agents are customarily bound,” even though, when “an attorney is poorly prepared to cross-examine an expert witness, the client suffers the consequences.” Gripe v. City of Enid, Okla., 312 F.3d 1184, 1189 (10th Cir.2002). The Court has previously stated:

There is a tension between' how the law treats attorney actions that are without authority, thus permitting relief under rule 60(b), and how the law treats those attorney actions which are inexcusable litigations decisions, thus failing to qualify for relief; although the distinction between those actions may not always be logical, it is well established.

Wilson v. Jara, No. 10-0797, 2012 WL 1684595, at *7 (D.N.M. May 10, 2012) (Browning, J.).

Rule 60(b)(6) is a “grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case.” Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir.1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If the reasons offered for relief from judgment could be considered under one of the more-specific clauses of Rule 60(b)(l)-(5), those reasons will not justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6).” Moore, supra § 60.48[2], at 60-182. Accord Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 n. 11, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (“This logic, of course, extends beyond clause (1) and suggests that clause (6) and clauses (1) through (5) are mutually exclusive.”). “The Rule does not particularize the factors that justify relief, but we have previously noted that it provides courts with authority ‘adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice,’ while also cautioning that it should only be applied in ‘extraordinary circumstances.’ ” Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. at 863, 108 S.Ct. 2194. Generally, the situation must be one beyond the control of the party requesting relief under rule 60(b)(6) to warrant relief. See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 202, 71 S.Ct. 209, 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950) (“The comparison [of prior ' precedent] strikingly points up the difference between no choice and choice; imprisonment and freedom of action; no trial and trial; no counsel and counsel; no chance for negligence and inexcusable negligence. Subsection 6 of Rule 60(b) has no application to the situation of petitioner.”). Legal error that provides a basis for relief under rule 60(b)(6) must be extraordinary, as the Tenth Circuit discussed in Van Skiver v. United States:

The kind of legal error that provides the extraordinary circumstances justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is illustrated by Pierce [v. Cook & Co., 518 F,2d 720, 722 (10th Cir.1975) (en banc) ]. In that case, this court granted relief under 60(b)(6) when there had been a post-judgment change in the law “arising out of the same accident as that in which the plaintiffs ... were injured.” Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d at 723. However, when the post-judgment change in the law did not arise in a related case, we have held that “[a] change in the law or in the judicial view of an established rule of law” does not justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Collins v. City of Wichita, 254 F.2d 837, 839 (10th Cir.1958).

952 F.2d at 1244-45.

LAW REGARDING MOTIONS TO RECONSIDER

Considerable confusion exists among the bar regarding the proper standard for a district court to apply when ruling on a motion to reconsider one of its prior “interlocutory” or “interim” orders, i.e., an order that a district court issues while the case is ongoing, as distinguished from a final judgment. This confusion originates from the fact that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure — the normal starting point for figuring out how to use various procedural devices in the-federal courts — do not mention motions to reconsider, let alone set forth a specific procedure for filing them or a standard for analyzing them. A loose conflation in terminology in Servants of the. Paraclete v. Does, which refers to rule 59(e) motions — “motion[s] to alter or amend a judgment ” — as “motions to reconsider,” compounds that baseline confusion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) (emphasis added); Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005 passim.

Final judgments are different from interlocutory orders. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 54(a) (“‘Judgment’ as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies.” (emphasis added)). In addition to ripening the case for appeal, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“The courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts____”), the entry of final judgment narrows the district court’s formerly plenary jurisdiction over the case to: (i) for the first twenty-eight days after the entry of judgment, motions under rules 50(b), 52(b), 59, and 60 — the district court’s jurisdiction, while limited, trumps that of the Court of Appeals during this time period, and, even if a party files a notice of appeal, the Court of Appeals will wait until after the district court has ruled on the post-judgment motion to touch" the case, see Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(B); (ii) after twenty-eight days, if a party has filed a notice of appeal, motions under rule 60— the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction trumps the district court’s during this period, and the district court needs the Court of Appeals’ permission even to grant a rule 60 motion; and (iii) after twenty-eight days, if no party has filed a notice of appeal, motions under rule 60.

Final judgments implicate two important concerns militating against giving district courts free reign to reconsider their judgments. First, when a ease is not appealed, there is an interest in finality. The parties and the lawyers expect to go home, quit obsessing about the dispute, and put the case behind them, and the

final judgments — especially once the twenty-eight day window of robust district court review and the thirty-day window of appeal have both closed — is the. disposition upon which they are entitled to rely. Second, when a case is appealed, there is the need.for a clean jurisdictional handoff from the district court to the Court of Appeals. “[A] federal district court and a federal court of appeals should not attempt to assert jurisdiction oyer a ease simultaneously,” as doing so produces a “danger [that] a district court and a court of appeals w[ill] be simultaneously analyzing the same judgment.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58-59, 103 S.Ct. 400, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982). The Court of Appeals needs a fixed record on which to base its decisions — ¿specially given the collaborative nature of appellate decisionmaking — and working with a fixed record requires getting some elbow room from the district court’s continued interference with the case. The “touchstone document” for this jurisdictional handoff is the notice of appeal, and not the final judgment, see Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. at 58, 103 S.Ct. 400 (“The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance — it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” (citations omitted)); Garcia v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 818 F.2d 713, 721 (10th Cir.1987) (“Filing a timely notice of appeal pursuánt to Fed. R.App. P. 3 transfers the matter from the district court to the court of appeals. The district court is thus divested of jurisdiction. Any subsequent action by it is null and void.” (citations omitted)); Kirtland v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 568 F.2d 1166, 1170 (5th Cir.1978) (“[I]t is the filing of the appeal, not the entering of a final judgment, that divests the district court of jurisdiction.” (citations omitted)), but, because the final judgment starts the parties’ thirty-day clock for filing a timely notice of appeal, the Federal Rules and the Tenth Circuit have chosen, to curtail the ■ district court’s jurisdiction over the case in .the roughly month-long period of „ potentially , overlapping trial- and appellate-court jurisdiction that immediately follows the entry of final judgment, see Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d at 1009 (noting that post-final judgment motions at the district court level are “not intended to be a substitute for direct appeal”). .

■ Basically, rather than suddenly divesting the district court of all jurisdiction over the case — potentially resulting in the district court being unable to rectify easily fixable problems with the final judgment before the ease goes to the Tenth Circuit, or even requiring appeal of a case that might otherwise not need to be appealed— the Federal .Rules set' forth a jurisdiction phased de-escalation process, wherein the district court goes from pre-final judgment plenary jurisdiction, to limited review for the first twenty-eight days post-final judgment, and, finally, to solely rule 60, review after twenty-eight days. In defining the “limited review” that rule 59(e) allows a district court to. conduct in the 28-day flux period, the Tenth Circuit, in Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, incorporated traditional law-of-the-case grounds — the same grounds that inform whether a court should depart from an, appellate court’s prior decision in the same case — into rule 59(e).

[W]e will depart from the law of the, case doctrine in three exceptionally narrow circumstances:. (1) when the evidence in a subsequent trial is substantially different; (2) when controlling authority, has subsequently made a contrary decision of the law applicable to such issues; ,or (3) when the decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.

United States v. Alvarez, 142 F.3d 1243, 1247 (10th Cir.1998) (citation. ■ omitted). See Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d at 1012 (incorporating those grounds into rule 59(e)).

Neither of these concerns — finality or jurisdictional overlap — is implicated when a district court reconsiders one of its own interlocutory orders. The Federal Rules do not specifically mention motions to reconsider interlocutory orders, but rule 54(b) makes the following open-ended proclamation about their mutability:

When an action presents more than one claim for relief — whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim-r-or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the pai-ties’ rights and liabilities.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) (emphases added). Rule 54(b) thus (i) provides that a district court can freely reconsider its prior rulings; and (ii) puts no limit or governing standard oh the district court’s ability to do so, other than that it must do so “before the entry of judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b)/

The Tenth Circuit has not cab-ined district courts’ discretion beyond what rule 54(b) provides: “[District courts generally remain free to reconsider their earlier interlocutory orders.” Been v. O.K. Indus., 495 F.3d at 1225. In the Tenth Circuit, “law of the case doctrine has no bearing oh the revisiting of interlocutory orders, even when a case has been reassigned from one judge to another.” Rim-bert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 647 F.3d 1247, 1252 (10th Cir.2011) (emphasis added)(citing Been v. O.K. Indus., Inc., 495 F.3d at 1225). In this context, “the doctrine is merely a ‘presumption,' one whose strength varies with the circumstances.’ ” Been v. O.K. Indus., Inc., 495 F.3d at 1225 (quoting Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chi., Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1227 (7th Cir.1995)). In short, a district court can use whatever standard it wants to review a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order. It can review the earlier ruling de novo and essentially reanalyze the earlier motion from scratch, it can review the ruling de novo but limit its review, it can require parties to establish one of the law-of-the-case grounds, or it can refuse to entertain motions to reconsider altogether.

The best approach, in the Court’s eyes, is to analyze motions to reconsider differently depending on three factors. Cf. Been v. O.K. Indus., Inc., 495 F.3d at 1225 (“[T]he' doctrine is merely a ‘presumption, one whose strength varies with the circumstances,’” (citation omitted)). The Court set forth these factors in Anderson Living Trust v. WPX Energy Prod., 308 F.R.D. 410 (D.N.M.2015) (Browning, J.).

First, the Court should restrict its review of a motion to reconsider a prior ruling in proportion to how thoroughly the earlier ruling addressed the specific findings or conclusions that the motion to reconsider challenges. How “thoroughly” a point was addressed depends both on the amount of time and energy the Court spent on it, and on the amount of time and energy the parties spent on it — in briefing and orally arguing the issue, but especially if they developed evidence on the issue. A movant for reconsideration thus faces a steeper uphill challenge when the prior ruling was on a criminal suppression motion, class certification motion, or preliminary injunction, [] than when the prior ruling is, e.g., a short discovery ruling. The Court should also look, not to the overall thoroughness of the prior ruling, but to the thoroughness with which the Court addressed the exact point or points that the motion to reconsider challenges. A movant for reconsideration thus faces an easier task when he or she files a targeted, narrow-in-scope motion asking the Court to reconsider a small, discrete portion of its prior ruling than when he or she files a broad motion to reconsider that rehashes the same arguments from the first motion, and essentially asks the Court to grant the movant a mulligan on its earlier failure to present persuasive argument and evidence.

Second, the Court should consider the case’s overall progress and posture, the motion for reconsideration’s timeliness relative to the ruling it challenges, and any direct evidence the parties may produce, and use those factors to assess the degree of reasonable reliance the opposing party has placed in the Court’s prior ruling. See 18B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper, Vikram David Amar, Richard D. Freer, Helen Hershkoff, Joan E. Steinman & Catherine T. Struve, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4478.1 (2d ed.)(“Stability becomes increasingly important as the proceeding nears final disposition____ Reopening should be permitted, however, only on terms that protect against reliance on the earlier ruling.”). For example, if a defendant (i) spends tens of thousands of dollars removing legacy computer hardware from long-term storage; then (ii) obtains a protective order in which the Court decides that the defendant need not produce the hardware in discovery; thén (iii) returns the hardware to long-term storage, sustaining thousands more in expenses; and (iv) several months pass, then the plaintiffs should face a higher burden in moving the Court to reconsider its prior ruling that they faced in fighting the motion for protective order the first time,

Third, the' Court should consider the Servants of the Paraclete v. Does grounds. The Court should be more inclined to grant motions for reconsideration if the movant presents (i) new controlling authority — especially if the new authority overrules prior law or sets forth an entirely new analytical framework; (ii) new. evidence — especially if the movant has a good reason why the evidence was not presented the first time around; or (iii) a clear indication— one that manifests itself without the need for in-depth analysis or review of the facts — that the Court erred.

Anderson Living Trust v. WPX Energy Prod., 2015 WL 4040616, at *21-22.

ANALYSIS

The Court will deny.the Motion. Although M. Lujan has presented some new law and arguments regarding whether he waived his claim that Ms. Maynes was impermissibly biased, the Court remains persuaded that its ruling on the issue in the AMOO is correct. Although M. Lujan has presented some new argument and new law whether Ms. Maynes’ decision that M. Lujan attempted to obtain City of Santa Fe funds by false pretenses was fraudulent, arbitrary, or capricious, and that substantial evidence supported it, the Court remains convinced that its conclusion on the issue in the AMOO . is correct, and will not alter its previous ruling. As for Court’s ruling that the City of Santa Fe had just cause to terminate M. Lujan’s employment, although M. Lujan presents some new authority and argument on the Court’s authority to remand a case, he has not presented any new authority, evidence, or arguments regarding whether the City of Santa Fe had just cause to terminate his employment. The Court will therefore leave that ruling intact; Consequently, the Court will deny the Motion.

I. THE COURT WILL NOT ALTER THE AMOO’S HOLDING THAT MS. MAYNES DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY OR CAPRICIOUSLY WHEN SHE FAILED TO RECUSE HERSELF FROM M. LUJAN’S POST-TERMINATION HEARING.

Because M. Lujan has presented new .arguments and new law regarding whether Ms. Maynes acted arbitrarily or capriciously when she failed to recuse herself from M. Lujan’s post-termination hearing, the Court will reconsider that portion of its AMOO. Despite reconsidering this issue, however,- the Court will stick with the AMOO’s conclusions. First, the Court will not alter the AMOO’s holding that M. Lu-jan waived his due process claim by failing to raise it either in his Complaint or in his Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Second, the Court will not alter the AMOO’s holding that, even if M. Lujan had included his due process challenge in his Complaint or in his Petition for Writ of Certiorari, he would not have a valid due process claim.

A. THE COURT WILL NOT ALTER THE AMOO’S HOLDING THAT M. LUJAN WAIVED HIS DUE PROCESS CLAIM.

In the AMOO, the Court held that M. Lujan waived his due process claim when he failed to raise it in either his Complaint or his Petition for Writ of Cer-tiorari.

The Court of Appeals of New Mexico has liberally construed due-process challenges raised in appeals of administrative decisions as being brought under district courts’ original jurisdiction. See Los Chavez Cmty. Ass’n v. Valencia Cnty., 2012-NMCA-044, ¶ 11, 277 P.3d 475 (“The fact that Los Chavez’s original appeal to the district court invoked only that court’s appellate jurisdiction is not fatal to our. analysis.”); State v. Roybal, 2006-NMCA-043, 1117, 139 N.M. 341, 132 P.3d 598, 605 (“It is the substance of the [pleading], and not its form or label, that controls.”). Where a party fails to mention an issue entirely in either its Complaint or Petition for Writ of Certio-rari, however, New Mexico courts will not consider, it. See N.M.R.A. Rule 12-505(D)(3) (stating that a peti