Gibbons v. McBride (124 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 2015)

United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia 2015-08-21

Crimes and Criminal Procedure

Citations

Full opinion text

ORDER

J. RANDAL HALL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In this action, Plaintiff Frederick Gibbons asserts claims against the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia and seven named officers of the Georgia . Regents University (“GRU”) Police Bureau, among others unnamed, for deprivation of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as violations of various state laws, when Officer Wesley Martin tásed him five times during a traffic stop for an alleged tag violation. In lieu of answering Mr. - Gibbons’ Amended Complaint (Doc. 40), Defendant's move for partial dismissal on multiple grounds, including various immunities; failure'to comply with the procedural requirements of the Georgia Tort Claims Act (“GTCA”), and failure to state claims upon which the Court can grant relief.' For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 42.)

J. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Mr. Gibbons, an African-American male, owns and operates two small businesses in Augusta, Georgia—a used car dealership and the café-lounge Soultry Sounds. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 20, 22, 49.) The instant suit arises out of two' incidents with the GRÜ Police Bureau. The Court summarizes each in turn.

1. September 23, 2010 Traffic Stop

In the early hours of September 23, 2010, Mr. Gibbons closed down Soultry Sounds, collected the night’s receipts, and left downtown Augusta in a vehicle with a Dollar Down Auto Sales (“Dollar Down”) dealer tag to drive to his .house in southern Richmond County, Georgia. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 21, 23.) While driving on Wrightsboro Road past the Medical College of Georgia, Officer Martin stopped Mr. Gibbons because of an alleged problem with his paper dealer tag. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 27, 28.) In response, Mr. Gibbons advised Officer Martin that' the tag was valid and showed him the proper insurance verification and identification. (Id. ¶¶ 28-29.) Officer Martin then decided to ticket Mr. Gibbons for driving an unregistered vehicle, but requested that another officer, Jonathan Bennett, sign the citation. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 31.) Mr. Gibbons objected, requesting that Officer Martin sign the citation because Officer Martin made, the stop and he wanted to be able to identify Officer. Martin in the future. (Id. ¶¶32, .33.) Officer Martin refused.to sign the citation and, in turn, Mr. Gibbons also refused. (Id. ¶¶ 33, 34.) Mr. Gibbons then changed his mind, but Officer Martin and another officer, Zachary Skinner, refused to allow him to sign the ticket. (Id. ¶¶ 34, 35.) After “snatch[ing]” Mr. Gibbons’ cell phone, “Defendants” put cuffs on Mr. Gibbons so tightly that his wrists began to bleed. (Id. ¶¶ 35, 36.)

Four days later, on September 27, 2010, Mr. Gibbons filed an internal affairs complaint against Officers Martin, Skinner, and Bennett about being stopped for a valid dealer tag. (Id. ¶¶37, 38.) William McBride, Chief of Police for the GRU Police Bureau and Director of Public Safety at GRU, appointed Kymyatta Turner, a Police Operations Specialist (“POS”), to conduct an investigation into the,September 23, 2010 incident. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 14, 39.) According to Mr. Gibbons, POS Turner had no prior training or experience in internal affairs investigations. (Id. ¶40.) POS Turner’s investigation concluded that Officer Martin “did not break the law, violate any policies of correct police conduct, or otherwise breach any duties to Gibbons in his acts, or failures to act, as to Gibbons.” (Id. ¶ 43.) POS Turner passed on her findings - to Chief McBride, and Chief McBride took no action to sanction or punish Officer Martin for his conduct during the September 2010 stop. (Id. ¶¶ 44, 45.)

On December 1, 2010, the Augusta-Richmond County Solicitor General dismissed the citation issued to Mr. Gibbons as a result of the September 2010 stop. (Id. ¶ 46.)

2. March 1, 2012 Traffic Stop

In the early hours of March 1, 2012, Mr. Gibbons closed down Soultry Sounds, collected the night’s receipts and cash, and left downtown Augusta to drive home in a vehicle with a dealer tag listing Soultry Sounds. (Id. ¶¶ 48, 50.) While driving on Wrightsboro Road at around 3:00 AM past the Medical College of Georgia, Officer Martin stopped Mr. Gibbons because “[he] saw the paper dealer tag.” (Id. ¶¶ 51-53, 64.) Officer Martin directed Mr. Gibbons to turn onto a dark side road. (Id. ¶ 64.) Once Officer Martin stepped out of his patrol car, Mr. Gibbons recognized him. (Id. ¶¶65, 66.) As Officer Martin approached his car, Mr. Gibbons rolled down his window “a couple inches,” asked if they could proceed to a well-lit convenience store nearby, and upon Officer Martin’s refusal, called 911 to request assistance “because he had been pulled over [for] a paper dealer tag” and “had trouble with [Officer Martin] before.” (Id. ¶¶ 68-70.) Officer Martin saw Mr. Gibbons through the window, recognized him from the September 2010 stop, and heard him requesting emergency assistance. (Id. ¶¶ 67, 71.) Officer Martin began to yell, repeatedly demanding that Mr. Gibbons get out of the car and open the door. (Id. ¶¶ 72, 73.) Officer Martin then announced Mr. Gibbons was under arrest for obstruction, reached inside the cracked driver’s side window, and tased Mr. Gibbons five times in rapid succession, thereby delivering 50,-000 volts. (Id. ¶¶ 76, 77, 95, 96, 98.) Officer Martin did not give Mr. Gibbons a warning before deploying the taser as required by policy. (Id. ¶ 106.) Mr. Gibbons remained on the phone with 911 during at least the first trigger pull. (Id. ¶ 79.) Eventually the taser wires disintegrated, stopping transmission of the current. (Id. 1199.) The electrodes burned Mr. Gibbons, which resulted in a trip to the hospital. (Id. ¶¶ 78, 97.) During that trip, Officer Martin “taunted” Mr. Gibbons and “talked about how the officers could keep the cash from his business” that was in .his car. (Id. ¶ 78.) Mr. Gibbons later was arrested and jailed. (Id.)

The second internal investigation into Officer Martin’s conduct, again carried out by POS Turner, and Mr. Gibbons’ subsequent criminal trial on the obstruction charge revealed that Officer Martin lied on an official form about Mr. Gibbons’ alleged failure to engage, him in dialogue during the March 2012 stop. (Id. ¶ 107.) According to Mr. Gibbons, Officer Martin also “perjured himself while trying to justify his stop by telling the jury Gibbons had no paper tag at all.” (Id. ¶ 136.) Officer Martin further explained “that he pulled the trigger of the taser the first time because Mr. Gibbons was non-compliant, and the second time was to frighten Mr. Gibbons into rolling the window down.” (Id. ¶ 104.) This explanation is consistent with the fact that Officer Martin did not identify any safety threats or concerns in his police report following the incident. (Id. ¶ 80.) At the same time, GRU Police Bureau policy forbids using a taser to coerce. (Id. ¶ 105.) Officer Martin contended that the final three pulls of the taser trigger “were inadvertent and caused by his hand being stuck in the window.” (Id. ¶ 109.) Mr. Gibbons further, alleges that another officer, Brian Jackson, likewise perjured himself when he told the jury that Mr. Gibbons “had shot Martin the bird right before the 2012 traffic stop” and had no tag on his car. (Id. ¶¶ 139, 140.)

POS Turner again found nothing wrong with Officer Martin’s actions and Chief McBride “ratified Turner’s finding about Martin not committing any policy violations and his triple ' inadvertent trigger pulls.” (Id. ¶¶ 108, 118.)

On July 11, 2013, a Richmond County Superior Court jury acquitted Mr. Gibbons of obstruction. (Id. ¶ 135.)

B. Procedural Background

On February 28, 2014—only‘two days prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations on claims arising out the March 2012 arrest—Mr. Gibbons filed this § 1983 action against Defendants. In lieu of answering Mr. Gibbons’ 31-page, 272-para-graph Complaint, Defendants moved on July 3, 2014 for a more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rule , of Civil Procedure 12(e),. or in the alternative for partial dismissal. (Doc. 12.) In that motion, Defendants identified a laundry list of. pleading deficiencies, including that each of Mr. Gibbons’ thirteen claims fully incorporated every paragraph that preceded it, and some counts in fact double incorporated the preceding facts and other claims; Mr. Gibbons referred to Defendants collectively, and certain individual Defendants were referenced only in the paragraphs purporting to set forth the underlying facts; and Mr. Gibbons did not consistently designate the constitutional or statutory source of his claims, or if designated, he did not clarify which Defendants were named under that claim. (Doc. 38 at 6-7.) Shortly thereafter, Defendants sought, and the United States Magistrate Judge granted, a stay of discovery pending resolution of Defendants’ dispositive motion. (Doc. 27.)

Mr. Gibbons and Defendants then agreed to extensions of the briefing schedule for Defendants’ Rule 12(e) motion. (Docs. 18, 22.) During the course of briefing, Mr. Gibbons additionally filed a “Motion to Address Conflict of Interests” (Doc. 23), in which he urged that “Defendants should either have different attorneys or should waive their rights to assert their individual and contrary defenses on the record” (Doc. 23-1 at 6). He also filed an objection to the Magistrate Judge’s order granting the stay of discovery even though he failed to oppose that motion at the appropriate time. (Doc. 34.) All these motions finally ripened for the Court’s consideration on September 30, 2014. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Gibbons filed yet another motion and brief: a preemptive Motion for Leave to Amend, focusing on his supervisory liability claims, in the event the Court granted Defendants’ - alternative Partial Motion to Dismiss. (Doe. 36.) He also moved for a hearing on all the aforementioned pending matters. (Doc. 37.)

Oh October 27, 2014) the Court granted Defendants’ 12(e) motion and required Mr. Gibbons to re-plead his case with explicit instructions to clearly specify within each count (1) one source of law and/or one legal theory upon which he asserts liability; (2)' each defendant against whom he asserts liability oh that theory; and (3) the factual allegations that form the basis of each claim against each defendant. (Doc. 38.) Finding that it did-not have a well-pleaded complaint before it from which discovery could proceed, See Carter v. DeKalb Cnty., Ga., 521 Fed.Appx. 725, 729 (11th Cir.2013), the Court overruled Mr. Gibbons' objection to the Magistrate Judge’s imposition of the stay. (Doc. 38.) The Court similarly found Mr. Gibbons’ “Motion to Address Conflict of Interests,” which the Court construed as a disqualification motion, to be wholly conjectural and, accordingly, premature. (Doc. 39.)

After Mr. Gibbons filed his Amended Complaint on November 10, 2014— slimmed to 27 pages and 183 paragraphs— Defendants renewéd their partial motion to .dismiss. (Doc. 42.) The motion is ready for disposition and, for the reasons explained below, is due to be granted in part.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Dismiss on Jurisdictional Grounds

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be either a “facial” or “factual” attack. Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 924-25 n. 5 (11th Cir.2003). Defendants’ motions, as they relate to immunity, are facial attacks on the Complaint because the Court’s resolution of the immunity question does not depend on adjudicating the merits of the case. Haven v. Bd. of Trs. of Three Rivers Reg’l Library Sys., 69 F.Supp.3d 1359, 1363 (S.D.Ga.2014) (“In the Eleventh Circuit, the defense of sovereign immunity is not merely a defense on the merits. An assertion of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity essentially challenges a court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Johnson v. Georgia, No. 1:13-CV-3155-WSD, 2014 WL 1406415, at *2 (N.D.Ga. Apr. 9, 2014) (treating the state’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs § 1983 and state law claims on immunity grounds as a facial attack in the absence of citations to extrinsic evidence by the state). In a facial attack on subject matter jurisdiction, the Complaint’s allegations are deemed presumptively truthful, and.the “court is required merely to look and see .if the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction.” Stalley ex rel. United States v. Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1233 (11th Cir.2008) (quoting McElmurray v. Consol. Gov’t of Augusta-Richmond Cnty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir.2007)).

B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ to give the defendant fair notice of both the claim and the supporting grounds. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). To survive a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, therefore, a plaintiffs complaint must include enough “factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and those facts must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Although a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion need not be buttressed by detailed factual allegations, the plaintiffs pleading obligation “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The Rule 8 pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

At the same time, a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim “unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of circumstances that would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Kabir v. Statebridge Co., No. 1:11-CV-2747-WSD, 2011 WL 4500050, at *2 (N.D.Ga. Sept. 27, 2011) (citing Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir.1993)). At this stage, the Court must accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint and construe all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hoffman-Pugh v. Ramsey, 312 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir.2002).

C. Qualified Immunity

“Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1254 (11th Cir.2010) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) and Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir.2002)) (alteration and. internal quotation marks omitted). “Qualified immunity from suit is intended to allow government officials to carry out their discretionary duties without the fear, of personal liability or harassing litigation, protecting from suit all but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal law.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, “[o]fficials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines.” Robinson v. Payton, 791 F.3d 824, 829 (8th Cir.2015) (citing Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 712 (8th Cir.2004)).

To receive qualified immunity, the government official must first prove that he was acting within his discretionary authority. Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir.2003)(citing Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1346). “Once the defendants establish that they were acting within their discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir.2006) (quoting Lumley v. City of Dade City, Fla., 327 F.3d 1186, 1194 (11th Cir.2003)). Courts then utilize a two-part framework to evaluate the qualified immunity defense. First, as a threshold inquiry, the Court addresses whether the plaintiffs allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). If the facts, construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that a constitutional right has been violated, then the Court asks whether the right violated was “clearly established.” Id.

In suits pursued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “the qualified immunity inquiry and the Rule 12(b)(6) standard become intertwined.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1366 (11th Cir.1998), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir.2010); Wooten v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 696, 699 (11th Cir.1995) (accord). In order to protect public officials from meritless claims, the complaint must contain “specific, non-conclusory allegations of fact that will enable the district court to determine that those facts, if proved, will overcome the defense of qualified immunity.” Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 996 (11th Cir.2003); see also Randall, 610 F.3d at 709-10 (“Pleadings for § 1983 cases involving defendants who are able to assert qualified immunity as a defense shall now be held to comply with the standards described in Iqbal. A district court considering a motion to dismiss shall begin by identifying conclusory allegations that are not entitled to an assumption of truth—legal conclusions must be supported by factual allegations.”); Staco v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 536 F.Supp.2d 1301, 1304 (S.D.Fla.2008) (“[A] claim can be dismissed where a plaintiff pleads facts or makes admissions that demonstrate that a defense is applicable on the face of the pleadings.”)(citing Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir.2001)). Thus, “[i]f a defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court should grant qualified immunity if the plaintiffs complaint fails to allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional or statutory right.” Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1300 (11th Cir.2007) (citing Williams v. Ala. State Univ., 102 F.3d 1179, 1182 (11th Cir.1997) (per curiam)).

III. DISCUSSION

Mr. Gibbons has alleged virtually every possible variation of a § 1983 claim, as well as numerous state law claims, against eight named Defendants. At the -outset, for the sake of clarity, the Court outlines what it understands those claims to be.

• In Count I, Mr. Gibbons seeks to hold Officer Martin liable for carrying out an unlawful stop and claims all other Defendants were “deliberately indifferent to the need to train Martin that a paper dealer tag, without more, does not authorize a traffic stop” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 58-63);

• In Count II, Mr. Gibbons seeks to hold Officer Martin liable for falsely arresting him for obstruction and claims all other Defendants “proximately caus[ed] out of deliberate indifference the unlawful stop,” and “it was so obvious that an unlawful stop would lead to a false arrest for obstruction, so each supervisor proximately caused the false arrest of Plaintiff for obstruction by deliberate indifference or reckless disregard” (Id. ¶ 93);

• In Count III, Mr. Gibbons seeks to hold Officer Martin liable for the use of any force because “Martin did not have probable cause to arrest Gibbons for obstruction” and claims all other Defendants “are liable ..., as shown by and incorporated herein ..., because false arrests will highly foreseeably cause force to be used in effectuating the arrest” (Id. ¶¶ 100, 101);

• In Count IV, Mr. Gibbons alternatively seeks to hold Officer Martin liable for using excessive force if the Court finds there was probable cause to arrest for misdemeanor obstruction and claims all other Defendants “proximately caused due to deliberate indifference the challenged excessive force by failing to train Martin how to appropriately use the taser despite Martin’s prior history of excessive taser use” (Id. ¶ 119);

• In Count V, Mr. Gibbons alternatively seeks to hold Officer Martin liable for using excessive force if the Court finds there was probable cause to arrest for felony obstruction and claims all other Defendants “are liable under § 1983 for the deprivation of Gibbons’ Fourth Amendment right,” incorporating by reference 23 other paragraphs (Id. ¶¶ 120-23);

• In Count VI, Mr. Gibbons seeks to hold Officer Martin liable for retaliating against him in violation of the First Amendment;

• In Count VII, Mr. Gibbons seeks to hold Officer Martin, Officer Jackson, POS Turner, Chief McBride, and John or Jane Doe liable “for causing, the obstruction charge, misdemeanor and/or felony, to go to trial, and for a conspiracy to present false evidence during the trial” (Id. ¶ 130);

• In Count VIII, Mr. Gibbons contends that the ‘conspiracy to prosecute Plaintiff in Count VII ‘was also meant to chill protected First Amendment activity to the right to a fair public trial' (Id. If 148);

• In Count IX, Mr. Gibbons only says, “the same facts underlying Claim I ... supports a claim for a deprivation of a First Amendment right of Gibbons’ freedom of movement and travel” (Id. ¶ Í54);

• In Count X, Mr. Gibbons seeks to hold Officer Martin liable for “unreasonable seizure in violation of ministerial duty” under Georgia law;

• In Count XI, Mr. Gibbons seeks to hold Officer Martin liable for false arrest;

• In Count XII, Mr. Gibbons seeks to hold Officer Martin liable for “abuse during arrest;”

• In Count XIII, Mr. Gibbons seeks to hold Officer Martin liable for “intentionally eaus[ing] or attempting] to cause Plaintiff physical injury” pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-1-13 and O.C.G.A. § 51-1-14, statutes which define the scope of tort law in Georgia;

• In Count XIV, Mr. Gibbons seeks to hold Officer Martin liable for false imprisonment; and-

• In Count XV, Mr. Gibbons states ‘[t]his claim is against Defendants Martin, McBride, Turner, Jackson, and John or Jane- Doe, because they caused a criminal prosecution to be instigated against Plaintiff under process, out of malice to get a wrongful conviction, prevent a future civil suite [sic], and to cover up their own misdoings' (Am. Compl. ¶ 178),

As Defendants summarize in response,

Defendants seek dismissal of all damage claims against any of them in their official capacity. All defendants other than [Officer] Martin seek dismissal of all claims against them in their individual capacity. Defendant Martin seeks dismissal of, all claims against him in his individual capacity except for Claims I thrdughV. '

(Defs,’ Br., Doc. 42-1, at 3 n.4, 23-24.) Utilizing the motion to dismiss standards articulated in Part II, supra, the Court now addresses the parties’ specific arguments in logical fashion.

A. Mr. Gibbons Cannot Sustain Any Claims Against Fictitious John or Jane Doe Actors

“As a general matter, fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in federal court.” Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir.2010); see also Fitzpatrick v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., No. CV 612-022, 2012 WL 5207474, at *8 (S.D.Ga. Sept. 12, 2012), R & R adopted as modified, No. CV 612-022, 2012 WL 5207472 (S.D.Ga. Oct. 22, 2012). A limited exception to this rule exists “when the plaintiffs description of the defendant is so specific as to be ‘at the very worst, surplusage,’ ” and thus discovery would uncover the unnamed defendant’s identity. Richardson, 598 F.3d at 738 (quoting Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215-16 (11th Cir.1992)); Daleo v. Polk Cnty. Sheriff, No. 8:11-CV-2521-T-30 TBM, -2012 WL 1805501, at *4-5 (M.D.Fla. May 17, 2012) (citing Dean, 951 F.2d at 1215-16).

In this ease, Mr. Gibbons does not describe John Doe or Jane Doe with any specificity. In some instances, he merely states that John Doe or Jane Doe is a ‘supervisor/ (See id. ¶¶ 56, 63, 92, 93, 94, 101, 116, 119, 122.) In the caption, he identifies John Doe- and Jane Doe ’as ‘officers/ (See Ani. Compl. at 2.) In other paragraphs of the Amended Complaint, John Doe or Jane Doe were delegated supervisory -authority (id. ¶ 57), ‘caused [Mr. Gibbons’] obstruction charge' (id. ¶ 130), ‘conspired to cause the malicious prosecution* (id. ¶ 131), conspired with other officers (id. ¶ 146), were aware of certain facts and ‘engaged in conspiratorial activity' (id. ¶ 150), and ‘caused a criminal prosecution' (id. ¶ 178). These bare descriptions and conclusory allegations ‘do[ ] not equate to the real possibility that these unknown individuals’ identities will be revealed during discovery, and the Court will not enable a fishing expedition on account of Mr. Gibbons’ use of placeholders. See Fitzpatrick, 2012 WL 5207474, at *8.

In the very last of forty-four footnotes, which is wholly unrelated to the appended text, Mr. Gibbons responds that “[n]ew Defendants can be brought in at least until the two year statute of limitations has passed, so if new evidence or discovery reveals that an unnamed Defendant participated in the malicious prosecution of Gibbons in 2013, he or she can still be added as a party.” (Pl.’s Resp., Doc. 44, at 25 n.44.)- Mr. Gibbons’ argument is unresponsive to the Eleventh Circuit’s clear standards for fictitious-party pleading. Nevertheless, it does reflect Mr. Gibbons’ understanding of his right to move to join additional parties at the appropriate time, if any such time remains in this case. Until then, the Court DISMISSES all claims against John Doe and Jane Doe. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk, as well as the parties, to terminate them as. Defendants in this case.

B. Mr. Gibbons Cannot Sustain Any Claims Against Defendants in Their Official Capacities

Defendants argue that the Board of Regents and any of its agents sued in their official capacities are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment from claims for monetary damages and otherwise are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983. (Defs.’ Br. at 3-5.) Mr. Gibbons failed to respond to Defendants’ clearly identified argument on this issue, which indicates that he does not oppose dismissal on these grounds. See LR 7.5, SDGa.

Indeed, in this case, Mr. Gibbons’ § 1983 claims against Defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state brought' by both citizens of another state and the state’s own citizens. McClendon v. Ga. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir.2001). State agencies, like the Board of Regents' of the University System of Georgia, share this Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Fonche v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 713 F.2d 1518, 1520-23 (11th Cir.1983); Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Barnes, 322 Ga.App. 47, 743 S.E.2d 609, 611 (2013). By extension, the Eleventh Amendment also bars § 1983 lawsuits against state officials in their official capacities, because in such cases, the state is considered to be the real party in interest. Cross v. State of Ala., 49 F.3d 1490, 1503 (11th Cir.1995). A defendant need not be labeled a “state officer” or “state official” to receive Eleventh Amendment, immunity, but instead need only be acting as an “arm of the State,” which includes the state’s agents and instrumentalities. Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir.2003) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429-30, 117 S.Ct. 900, 137 L.Ed.2d 55 (1997)). There is no dispute that Chief McBride, the Officer Defendants (Wesley Martin, Zachary Skinner, and Brian Jackson), the Supervisor Defendants (Ernest Black, Jr. and Eugene Maxwell), and POS Turner, in their official roles as members of the GRU Police Bureau, constitute “state officers” or “state agents” entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection.

Moreover, in order to succeed on a § 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must show that he or she was deprived of a federal right by a .person acting under color of state law.” Griffin v. City, of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir.2001) (emphasis added). In Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), the Supreme Court held that neither a state nor its officials acting -in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1933. Therefore, Mr. Gibbons cannot sue Chief McBride, the Officer Defendants, the Supervisors Defendants, or POS Turner in their official capacities insofar - as he' seeks damages, and those claims are due to be DISMISSED. The Court DIRECTS the parties -to amend the caption in all filings going forward.

C. Mr. Gibbons Failure to Comply with the GTCA Bars His State Law Claims

The GTCA provides for a limited waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23(b) (“The state waives its sovereign immunity only to the extent and in the manner provided in this article ....”); see also O.C.G.A. § 50-21-21(a) (“[T]he state shall only be liable in tort actions within the limitations of this article and in accordance with the fair and uniform principles established in this article.”). In order to effectuate this waiver, plaintiffs must satisfy certain prerequisites. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-35 provides in pertinent part:

In all civil actions brought against the state under this article, to perfect service of process the plaintiff must both: (1) cause process to be served upon the chief executive officer of the state government entity involved at his or her usual office address; and (2) cause process to be served upon the director of the Risk Management Division of the Department of Administrative Services at his or her usual office address.'

Id. The procedural components of the GTCA, like its other terms, are strictly construed. Green v. Cent. State Hosp., 275 Ga.App. 569, 621 S.E.2d 491, 494 (2005) (citing Curry v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 232 Ga.App. 703, 503 S.E.2d 597, 598 (1998)).

In this case, Defendants contend Mr. Gibbons did not meet the second requirement: the director of the Risk Management Division of the Department of Administrative Services has not been served at all. (Defs.’ Br. at 10 (citing Docs. 7, 8).) Mr. Gibbons’ failure to respond to Defendants’ clearly identified argument on this point again indicates that he does not oppose dismissal on these grounds., See LR 7.5, SDGa.

Failure to serve the director of the Department of Administrative Services, Risk Management Division precludes compliance with the condition precedent to waiver of sovereign immunity and renders void Mr. Gibbons’ action such that the statute of limitations is not tolled. Green, 621 S.E.2d at 493-94; see also Henderson v. Dep’t of Transp., 267 Ga. 90, 475 S.E.2d 614, 615 (1996); Sylvester v. Dep’t of Transp., 252 Ga.App. 31, 555 S.E.2d 740, 741 (2001). Although a plaintiff may cure ineffective service in some instances, the Court DISMISSES Counts X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, and XV of Mr. Gibbons’ Amended Complaint.

The statute of limitations expired on Mr. Gibbons’ state law claims on March I, 2014 (Claims X—XIV based on Mr. Gibbons’ March 1, 2012 arrest) and July II, 2015 (Claim XV based on Mr. Gibbons July 11, 2013 acquittal). See O.C.G.A. § 50-21-27(c). When service is accomplished after the statute of limitation expires, as would be the case here, the timely-filed complaint tolls the statute only upon a showing that the plaintiff acted reasonably and diligently in effecting proper service as quickly as possible. Curry v. Georgia Dep’t of Corr., 232 Ga.App. 703, 503 S.E.2d 597, 598 (1998) (citing Patterson v. Johnson, 226 Ga.App. 396, 486 S.E.2d 660, 661 (1997)). Mr. Gibbons became aware of the service defect on July 3, 2014 when Defendants filed their first motion to dismiss (Doc. 12 at 1516) and received renewed notice on December 1, 2014 (Defs.’ Br. at 10). Mr. Gibbons’ failure to effect service on the director of the Department of Administrative Services, Risk Management Division, for over a year after filing the complaint, knowing of Defendants’ attack on the sufficiency of service of process, precludes him from establishing lack of fault for the delay. See Curry, 503 S.E.2d at 598-99. Thus, without a basis to toll the statute of limitations on his state law claims, granting Mr. Gibbons leave to cure service of process and re-file his state law claims would be futile.

D. Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Challenge to the Federal Counts

1. Counts I through V: Unlawful Stop, False Arrest, and Excessive Force

All Defendants except Officer Martin seek dismissal of Counts I through V for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Within these counts, Mr. Gibbons seeks to hold the Board of Regents liable prospectively for “[t]aser training and supervision, and officer misconduct supervision, adequate internal investigation and training for the manner in which officers are to respond to persons with paper, or dealer tags, and office retention and termination policies” (Am. Compl. ¶ 16) based on facts scattered over 101 paragraphs. Based on the same facts, Mr. Gibbons also attempts to assert claims against five additional Defendants (Chief McBride, Supervisors Black and Maxwell, POS Turner, and Officer Skinner). -It remains unclear—even after the original Complaint’s sufficiency was specifically challenged and the.qualified immunity defense expressly advanced by opposing counsel—upon what legal theories relief is sought and in what specific manner these five Defendants acted or failed to act. (See Defs.’ Br. at 1-3.) Notwithstanding the persistent deficiencies, it is incumbent upon the Court to identify the precise constitutional violation charged and explain what the violation requires before discussing liability in this § 1983 suit. Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1250 (11th Cir.2013) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d. 433 (1979)); Tolbert v. Trammell, No. 2:13—CV-02108-WMA, 2014 WL 3892115, at *2 (N.D.Ala. Aug. 4,2014);

To harrow down this task, the Court first DISMISSES Counts II and III against Chief McBride, Supervisors-Black and Maxwell, POS Turner, and Officer Skinner for failure to state a claim. Count II contends Mr. Gibbons’ arrest for obstruction lacked probable cause and that “it is obvious that an officer will need to -be trained to not make the unlawful stop in the first place in order to avoid a false arrest for perceived obstruction.” (Am; Comply 89.) Stripping away Mr. Gibbons’ conclusory allegations (id. ¶¶ 89, 92, 93, 94), there are no well-pleaded facts to support a supervisory liability claim of any kind against Chief McBride, Supervisors Black and Maxwell, POS Turner, or Officer Skinner related to the obstruction arrest. Moreover, Officer Martin’s alleged disagreeable disposition (id. ¶¶ 90, 91) simply is not a matter of constitutional concern.

Count III is based on Mr. Gibbons’ assertion that Officer Martin did not have probable cause to make the challenged traffic stop or the arrest for- obstruction, and accordingly could not use any. degree of force. (Am.Compl.¶ 100.) “Under this Circuit’s law[, however,] ... a claim that any force in an illegal stop or arrest is excessive is subsumed in the illegal stop or arrest claim and is not a discrete excessive force claim.” Bashir v. Rockdale Cnty., 445 F.3d 1323, 1331-32 (11th Cir.2006) (emphasis and citation omitted). Accordingly, Claim III fails as a matter of law., Moreover, to the extent Mr. Gibbons intends to append a supervisory liability to Count III, it is inadequately pleaded. The sole allegation related to Chief McBride, Supervisors Black and Maxwell, POS Turner, and Officer Skinner is an endless maze of incorporations by reference that lead to the following legal conclusion: these Defendants “are liable under § 1983 for the deprivation of Gibbons’ Fourth Amendment right as claimed in ¶ 100,” which contends Officer Martin tased Mr. Gibbons without probable cause for arrest, “because false arrests will highly foreseeably cause force to be used in effectuating the arrest.” (Am. ComplJ 101.)

That leaves Count I, as well as Counts IV and V, which Mr. Gibbons frames in the alternative to Count III if the Court later finds that Officer Martin made a lawful arrest for either misdemeanor or' felony obstruction. As the Court did above, stripping away Mr. Gibbons’ conclusory allegations, the remaining counts appear to hinge only on the following:

(1) Defendants McBride, Black, and Maxwell, based on position and rank, are plausibly supervisors who had the responsibility or had been delegated the responsibility to correct, train, or retrain officers who deprive citizens of constitutional rights, even though it is also plausible that with respect to McBride, Black and Maxwell they did not have that responsibility or delegated it to one of the other Defendants including John or Jane Doe (Am. Compl. ¶ 57 (emphasis added));

(2) Defendant Skinner is plausibly a direct supervisor of Martin based on his signature as Martin’s supervisor on a Taser use of force report concerning an incident on 09-09-11, even though it is also plausible that Skinner is not Martin’s direct supervisor because John or Jane Doe is his supervisor” (Id. ¶ 57);

(3) Officer Martin stopped Mr. Gibbons in September 2010 solely for having a paper tag and the charges ultimately were dismissed, facts his supervisors “must have known” (Id. ¶¶44, 58-62);

(4) During the September 2010 traffic stop, Officers Martin and Skinner cuffed Mr. Gibbons so tightly that his wrists bled (Id. ¶ 36);

(5) Officer Martin was not sanctioned or punished as a result of the September 2010,traffic stop (Id. ¶45);

(6) Officer Martin’s testimony during Mr, Gibbons’ criminal trial on the March 2012 obstruction charge revealed that “GRU officers regularly pulled over cars because they had a paper tag* without more, making the citizen produce paper and often charging them with improper registration or no tag” (Id. ¶ 47 (empha-, sis added));

(7) “Before [Officer] Martin’s 2012 stop of Gibboná, none of the Defendant Supervisors ... trained or informed Martin that a paper tag without more does not authorize him to conduct a traffic stop” (Id. ¶ 56);

(8) “[B]efore March 1, 2012, Gibbons [sic] had numerous encounters with citizens revealing a tendency to Overreact and fail to reasonably communicate with citizens, that Martin caused to escalate to the point where he unlawfully justified his use of force” (Id. ¶ 91);

(9) “Defendant Supervisors ... knew ... of [Officer] Martin’s tendency to overreact and fail to reasonably communicate, yet failed to take corrective action including either training, transferring ,or terminating him, as shown by [Officer] Martin’s continued employment” (Id. ¶ 94);

(10) “[POS] Turner who had had no training relative to conducting an investigation found nothing wrong with [Officer] Martin’s actions during the 2012 stop of Gibbons, despite the several policy violations readily discernible from [Officer] Martin’s admissions and the video of the incident” (Id:. ¶ 108);

(11) “[POS] Turner incompetently believed [Officer] Martin’s story about inadvertently pulling the trigger by failing to compare [Officer] Martin’s story to the video of the incident” (Id. ¶ 111);

(12) “[POS] Turner passed on her finding, that [Officer] Martin did nothing wrong in the challenged accident, to the chief of the entire department, Chief McBride, who reviewed it and did not object” (Id. ¶ 114); and

(13) “[u]pon information and belief, [Officer] Martin has prior incidents of use of the taser that is or could be excessive, based on the high frequency of. use” (Id. ¶ 115).

Mr. Gibbons does not allege that Chief McBride, Supervisors Black and Maxwell, Officer Skinner, and POS Turner personally participated in or otherwise ordered the unlawful stop, false arrest, or use of excessive force in March 2012. Thus, from the allegations above and Mr. Gibbons’ briefs, the Court understands Mr. Gibbons to claim that these Defendants did nothing by way of training or supervision to ensure that Officer Martin no longer (1) initiated stops solely on the basis of a paper tag or (2) used excessive force—specifically, “excessive tasing”—in carrying out stops or arrests. Because Mr. Gibbons’ Fourth Amendment claims are asserted against these Defendants in their capacity as supervisors, the Court will assume—without deciding—that Officer Martin violated Mr. Gibbons’ Fourth Amendment rights. See Dalrymple, 334 F.3d at 995 (articulating the methodology for resolving claims of supervisory liability); McDaniel v. Yearwood, No. 2:11-CV-00165-RWS, 2012 WL 526078, at *15 (N.D.Ga. Feb. 16, 2012). “The question then becomes whether [these Defendants’] 'supervisory actions’ caused the alleged deprivation of those rights.” McDaniel, 2012 WL 526078, at *15 (citing Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1234).

a. The Legal Standard for Supervisory Liability Claims

It is well-established that supervisors are not subject to § 1983 liability under theories of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1047 (11th Cir.2014) (citing Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir.2003)). Instead, supervisors can violate federal law and be held individually liable for the conduct of their subordinates only “when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between the actions of the supervising- official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id. (quoting Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff can establish a causal connection by alleging that: (1) a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so; (2) á supervisor’s custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; or (3) facts support an inference-that the supervisor directed subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing-so. Williams v. Santana, 340 Fed.Appx. 614, 617 (11th Cir.2009) (citing Mathews v. Crosby, 480 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir.2007)); see also Easley v. Macon Police Dep’t, No. 5:12-CV-148 MTT, 2013 WL 5592514, at *2 (M.D.Ga. Oct. 10, 2013). “The deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.” Santana, 340 Fed.Appx. at 617 (quoting Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir.1990)). “In short, the standard by which a supeiwisor is held liable in his individual capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Keith, 749 F.3d at 1048 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Mr. Gibbons’ claims for relief in Counts I and Counts IV/V—that Chief McBride, Supervisors Black and Maxwell, Officer Skinner, and POS Turner failed to adequately train or supervise Officer Martin—implicates a different, albeit very similar, rule: “under § 1983, a supervisor can be held liable for failing to train his or her employees only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the officers come into contact.” Keith, 749 F.3d at 1052 (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). “Failure to train can amount to deliberate indifference when the need for more or different training is obvious, ... such as when there exists a history of abuse by subordinates that has put the supervisor on notice of the need for corrective measures, ... and when the failure to train is likely to result in the violation of a constitutional right.” McDaniel, 2012 WL 526078, at *16 (quoting Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1397-98 (11th Cir.1994)). “Thus, a plaintiff alleging a constitutional violation premised on a failure to train must demonstrate that the supervisor had ‘actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their training program causes [his or her] employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights,’ and that armed with that knowledge the supervisor chose to retain that training program.” Keith, 749 F.3d at 1052 (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1360, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011)).

b. Analysis

As a preliminary matter, the Court DISMISSES Mr. Gibbons’ supervisory liability claims against Supervisors Black and Maxwell, Officer Skinner, and POS Turner. With respect to Supervisors Black and Maxwell and Officer Skinner, Mr. Gibbons essentially alleges that because of their titles, they “must have known” about the (1) “regular practice” of stopping vehicles based on paper tags, (2) internal affairs complaints filed against Officer Martin, and (3) dismissal of Mr. Gibbons’ citation in 2010. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 59-61 (emphasis added).) The only allegations in relation to Officer Martin’s use of excessive force that involve these Defendants are wholly conclusory. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 116 (“Defendant supervisors ... are liable under § 1983 for the deprivation of Gibbons’ Fourth Amendment right as claimed in ¶ 113.”); ¶ 119 (“Defendant supervisors ... proximately caused due to deliberate indifference the challenged excessive force by failing to train Martin how to appropriately use the taser despite Martin’s prior history of excessive taser use.”); ¶ 122 (“Defendant supervisors ... are liable under § 1983 for the deprivation of Gibbons’ Fourth Amendment right as claimed in ¶ 121).)

Simply, Mr. Gibbons “alleges nothing about the significance of [these Defendants’] titles, their individual roles .,., their personal interactions or familiarity with [Officer Martin], their length of service, their management policies, or any other characteristics that would bear on whether they knew about [or] were deliberately indifferent to [Officer Martin’s] conduct and the risk he posed.” See Franklin, 738 F.3d at 1251-52. Indeed, the manner in which Mr. Gibbons first identifies these individuals as “supervisors” reflects that he simply does not know any details about their responsibilities. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 57 (“Defendants ... Blaek[] and Maxwell, based on position and rank ... are plausibly supervisors ... [,] even though it is also plausible that ... they did not have that responsibility.... Defendant Skinner is plausibly a direct supervisor of Martin based on his signature ... [,] even though it is also plausible that Skinner is not Martin’s direct supervisor.”).) “Far from excusing [his] insufficient-pleadings, this admission only reinforces [the Court’s] conclusion” that Mr. Gibbons’ claims against them are due to be dismissed, as there are no individualized allegations from which the Court could infer their subjective awareness of the risk of harm that- Officer Martin purportedly posed and that each of them exhibited deliberate indifference through own actions sufficient to state a claim. Franklin, 738 F.3d at 1252 n. 6; Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 763 (11th Cir.2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937).

Unlike Supervisors Black and Maxwell and Officer Skinner, Mr. Gibbons’ does not allege outright that POS Turner was a supervisor. Rather, Mr. Gibbons asserts that Chief McBride appointed POS Turner to undertake the internal affairs investigation of Officer Martin’s conduct in 2010 and 2012, POS Turner had no training respective to internal investigations, and that Chief McBride previously selected a parking attendant to carry out such work. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39-41, 108 111.) The only other relevant, non-conclusory allegations are that POS Turner passed on her findings to Chief McBride and Chief McBride ratified those findings. (Id. ¶¶44, 114, 118.) Thus, based on the fact that POS Turner investigated Officer Martin, Mr. Gibbons contends POS Turner “was deliberately indifferent to- the need to train Martin, or cause Martin to be trained by the appropriate supervisor, that a paper dealer tag,- without more; does not authorize a traffic stop” and “proximately .caused due to deliberate indifference the challenged excessive force by failing to train Martin how to appropriately use the taser....” (Id. ¶¶62,119.)

The Court likewise-finds these allegations insufficient to state a claim. Not only does Mr. Gibbons fail to allege that POS Turner is a supervisor of Officer Martin, there are no other facts from which the Court could infer that POS Turner is in the GRU Police Bureau chain of command or had any authority to institute corrective measures or make recommendations with respect to Officer Martin’s behavior beyond passively reporting the results of her investigation to Chief McBride. The claims for supervisory liability against POS Turner, therefore, are also DISMISSED.

The Court now turns to' the last man standing, Chief McBride, and whether the Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges a causal connection between Chief McBride’s failure to supervise or train and the purported constitutional violations carried out by Officer Martin in March 2012. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Gibbons—as the Court must do—the Court examines the Amended Complaint to determine what allegations, if any, address Chief McBride’s (1) knowledge of Officer Martin’s allegedly unlawful practices at the point of his misconduct in March 2012 and (2) actions that raise an inference of indifference.

With respect to Mr. Gibbons’ failure to train claim surrounding the traffic stop, the Amended Complaint reflects that Officer Martin pulled Mr. Gibbons oyer twice, solely on .account of his paper dealer tag, over the course of -approximately eighteen months. Chief McBride knew that Officer Martin had -done so as a result of an investigation into the 2010 stop, carried out by POS Turner at the direction of Chief McBride and ultimately approved by Chief. McBride. Officer Martin also explained that GRU officers regularly pulled over cars.solely because they had a paper tag. Chief McBride then purposefully selected an incompetent investigator in 2010 so as to clear Officer Martin of any wrongdoing. Lastly, despite the dismissal of Mr. Gibbons’ 2010 charges post investigation, a nearly identical unlawful stop in 2012, Mr. Gibbons’ renewed internal complaint with the GRU Police Bureau, and Mr. Gibbons’ subsequent acquittal on charges stemming from the 2012 stop, Chief McBride retained Officer Martin on the force.

Similarly, with respect Mr. Gibbons’ failure to train claim surrounding Officer Martin’s use of excessive force, the Amended Complaint reflects that Officer Martin was involved in two incidents of force during traffic stops over the course of approximately eighteen months: Mr. Gibbons was cuffed too tightly by Officers Martin and Skinner in September 2010 and Officer Martin tased Mr. Gibbons five times in March 2012. Chief McBride' knew the September 2010 stop resulted in severe cuffing because of the'previously-described internal affairs complaint filed by Mr. Gibbons and investigation carried out at Chief McBride’s direction. Mr. Gibbons further alleges that before March 2012 Officer Martin had “numerous encounters with citizens revealing a tendency to overreact ... that Martin caused to escalate to the point where he unlawfully justified his use of force,” and he used his taser with alarmingly “high frequency,” statistics about which were reported. (Doc. 19 at 11 n.8). As in 2010, Chief McBride purposefully selected an incompetent investigator in 2012, whose results Chief McBride ratified, resulting in zero discipline.

Mr. Gibbons has not adequately alleged that there was a history of widespread prior abuse, as defined in Brown, 906 F.2d at 671, that put Chief McBride on notice of the need for improved training or supervision. The question is, therefore, whether Chief McBride’s failure to train or supervise Officer Martin when faced with (1) a significant, but single concrete complaint about an unlawful stop carried out by Officer Martin during which Mr. Gibbons was cuffed to the point of bleeding; (2) testimony that suggests GRU Police Bureau officers had a “regular” practice of stopping citizens for paper tags during the relevant time period; (3) Officer Martin’s high frequency of taser use; and (4) arid Officer Martin’s “numerous” escalated confrontations with the public constitute a pattern of behavior as to which Chief McBride showed deliberate indifference.

The Court concludes that Mr. Gibbons’ allegations.are narrowly sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. This is the rare case in which the same conduct recurred. between the same citizen and the same, law enforcement officer, which was. investigated by the same individual at the .direction of the same superior, and this recurrence allegedly resulted in the violation of constitutional rights. Accepting the foregoing allegations as true, a reasonable jury could infer that Chief McBride—as the head of the department, initiator of the investigation into Mr. Gibbons’ specific internal complaint in September 2010, and ultimate décision maker with respect to approval of the resulting investigative report and the department’s response thereto—knew or should have been aware of Officer Martin’s and other deputies’ stops for paper tags (Count I), as well as Officer Martin’s use of unreasonable force (Counts IV/V) See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Israel, No. 15-CIV-60060, 2015 WL 1143116, at *14 (S.D.Fla. Mar. 13, 2015) (finding the-plaintiff s allegations—a “string of facts to effect that [the officer] was unqualified -for his position” and that the officer previously-engaged in activity identical to that-complained of by the plaintiff—sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss on his municipal liability claim for failure to train or supervise); Hooks v. Rich, No. CV 605-065, 2006 WL 565909,. at *4 n. 6 (S.D.Ga. Mar. 7, 2006) (noting, in. the § 1983 context, that “[r]epeated abuse, by. a single officer may be sufficient, to constitute a pattern of abuse” (citing Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 972-73 (3d, Cir.1996) (finding prior complaints about an officer involving violent behavior in arresting citizens identical to those at issue-were sufficient for the jury to infer that 'municipality had knowledge of that officer’s propensity for misbehavior and could support the conclusion that municipality had a pattern of -tacitly approving the use of excessive force))); Wilson ex rel. Estate of Wilson v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 04-23250-CIV, 2005 WL 3597787, at *4 (S.D.Fla. Sept. 19, 2005) (denying county’s motion to dismiss where the plaintiff alleged that it was aware of other incidents of similar conduct by an individual. employee that supported a theory that there was a failure to supervise that employee); see also Geist v. Ammary, No. CV 11-07532, 2012. WL 6762010, at *7 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 20, 2012) (finding § 1983 claims, based on failure to train and deliberate indifference, sufficiently pleaded where the. plaintiff alleged that the city provided a particular officer a taser despite inadequate training and with actual notice that the officer had, used excessive force in the past). Cf. Sigler v. Bradshaw, No. 13-80783-CIV, 2015 WL 1044175, at *3 (S.D.Fla. Mar. 10, 2015) (dismissing the plaintiffs claim that state agency violated her constitutional rights by failing to properly train one specific investigator because she failed to allege any other misconduct apart from her own situation; such an “isolated occurrence” did not put the agency on notice of an omission in its training program); Owens v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 174 F.Supp.2d 1282, 1297 (S.D.Fla.2001) (granting the city’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claim that it was deliberately indifferent by way of a failure to train on the use of chokeholds because plaintiffs presented only two similar, unsubstantiated previous incidents, thereby failing to present the kind of pattern or series of violations which would place the city on notice that its training program was inadequate); Dowdell v. Chapman, 930 F.Supp. 533, 546 (M.D.Ala.1996)(“[A] single and isolated occurrence ... cannot be the basis of a viable action predicated on § 1983 because such an unusual occurrence does not rise to the level of ‘deliberate indifference’ necessary to succeed on a claim for failure to adequately train police officers.”).

These findings, however, do not end the Court’s inquiry, as Chief McBride argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Although Chief McBride’s failure to train or supervise,- as alleged, could constitute a constitutional violation, the Court must still evaluate (1) whether his challenged acts or omissions were within his discretionary authority and (2) whether such a violation was clearly established at the time. Maggio v. Sipple, 211 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir.2000).

i. Whether Chief McBride Acted Within His Discretionary Authority

“A government official proves that he acted within the purview of his discretionary authority by showing ‘objective circumstances which would compel the conclusion that his actions were undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties and within the scope of his authority.’” Hutton v. Strickland, 919 F.2d 1531, 1537 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir.1988)); Hudgins v. City of Ashburn, Ga., 890 F.2d 396, 404 (11th Cir.1989)); see also Hatcher ex rel. Hatcher v. Fusco, 570 Fed.Appx. 874, 877 n. 3 (11th Cir.2014) (“In the qualified immunity context, a government official acts within the scope of [his] discretionary authority when [he] pursues a job-related goal through means that are within [his] power to utilize.” (citing Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265-66 (11th Cir.2004))); O’Rourke v. Hayes, 378 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th Cir.2004) (explaining the discretionary authority inquiry looks, to whether defendant’s activity “is a part of his job-related powers and responsibilities”); Crosby v. Monroe Cnty., 394 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir.2004) (“To determine whether an official was engaged in a discretionary function, we consider whether the acts the official undertook are of a type that fell within the employee’s job responsibilities.”).

Here, Mr. Gibbons specifically alleges that Chief McBride was acting under color of state law in his capacity as the Chief of Police for the GRU Police Bureau and Director of Public Safety at all times relevant to the claims asserted against him. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 7.) As Defendants point out, “[supervising a subordinate officer, assigning an investigator to investigate a citizen complaint, investigating a citizen complaint ..., implementing a policy ..., and training officers ... are all job related functions” that Chief McBride carried out only as a result of his employment with and authority within the GRU Police Bureau. (Defs.’ Reply, Doc. 48, at 7-8.) Accordingly, the first prong of the qualified immunity inquiry is satisfied. See, e.g., Daniels v. City of Hartford, Ala., 645 F.Supp.2d 1036, 1057 (M.D.Ala.2009) (noting “courts have uniformly held that supervision of a jail and training of corrections of officers [sic] is an activity within the discretionary authority” of sheriffs); Btesh v. City of Maitland, Fla., No. 6:10-CV-71-ORL-19DAB, 2011 WL 3269647, at *37 n. 34 (M.D.Fla.2011) (finding police chiefs “alleged failure to train and supervise police officers is a matter within his discretionary authority”), aff'd sub nom., 471 Fed.Appx. 883 (11th Cir.2012); Herrick v. Carroll Cnty., No. 1:09-CV-0161-JEC, 2009 WL 3094843, at *9 (N.D.Ga. 2009) (“There is no question that Sheriff Langley was acting within his discretionary authority in training and supervising his subordinates....