Citations
- 127 F. Supp. 3d 17
Full opinion text
DECISION AND ORDER
VICTOR MARRERO, District Judge.
I.BACKGROUND..........................................................23
A. THE UNDERLYING FACTS..........................................23
B. THE CUBAN ASSET CONTROL REGULATIONS (THE “CACRS”) AND THE OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL (“OFAC”)......24
C. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT (“FSIA”) AND THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT (“TRIA”) ................24
D. THE TRANCHE VI PETITION........................................25
E. THE INTERPLEADER PETITION....................................26
F. THE 2012 CORRESPONDENCE AND STATUS CONFERENCE.........28
G. THE 2015 CORRESPONDENCE.......................................29
II. DISCUSSION............................................................33
A. THE IMPACT OF THE VILLOLDO FLORIDA PROCEEDINGS AND THE FLORIDA ORDER.......................................33
1. The Florida Order: Legal Findings and Context.......................33
2. Estoppel, Admissions, and Standing: The Effect of the Villoldo Florida Proceedings and the 2015 Correspondence...................34
a. Judicial Estoppel ..............................................34
b. Judicial Admissions............................................36
e. Standing......................................................39
3. Hausler’s Request that the Court Strike the Fundación Claimants Interpleader Answer from the Record..............................41
4. Request of Counsel for the Fundación Claimants to Withdraw...........41
5. The (Lack of) Preclusive Effect of the Florida Order on the Fundación......................................................42
6. Request of JPM Chase for Leave to Amend the Interpleader Petition ........................................................43
7. Request of the Fundación Claimants and JPM Chase for a Stay......43
8. Request for the Fundación Claimants and JPM Chase Pre-Motion Conference .....................................................44
B. INTERPLEADER PETITION.........................................44
1. The Appropriateness of Interpleader Relief...........................45
a. Interpleader as to the Fundación Trustees................ 46
b. Interpleader as to the Fundación........................ 46
2. Adjudication of Adverse Claims............................. 47
C. TRANCHE VI PETITION................................... 47
1. Are the Blocked Assets “Assets of That Terrorist Party” Under TRIA? ................................................ 48
a. Was the Fundación Nationalized?....................... 49
b. Are the Blocked Assets Property of the Republic of Cuba? . 53
2. Hausler’s Right to Execute Upon the Blocked Assets.......... 57
D. OFAC AS A NECESSARY PARTY............................ 57
III. ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS . 58
IV. ORDER......................... 59
Petitioner Jeannette Hausler (“Haus-ler”) brought the underlying action as the successor and personal representative of the Estate of Robert Otis Fuller (“Fuller”) pursuant to Section 201(a) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, 28 U.S.C. Section 1610 note (“TRIA”). Hausler now seeks to execute a default judgment for $100,000,000 in compensatory damages obtained by Hausler in Florida state court (the “Florida Judgment”) against the Republic of Cuba, Fidel and Raul Castro, and the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Services (collectively, the. “Judgment Debtors”) in an action alleging the torture and extrajudicial killing of Fuller, Hausler’s brother. To enforce the Florida Judgment in this Court, Hausler has brought multiple turnover petitions against various garnishee banks.
On July 13, 2011, Hausler filed a notice of petition and petition (the “Tranche VI Petition,” Dkt. No. 421), pursuant to Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as incorporating Section 5225(b) of the New York. Civil Practice Law and Rules. In the Tranche VI Petition, Hausler requested an order to compel respondent JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“JPM Chase”) to turn over to the United States Marshal for the Southern District of New York (the “Marshal”) identified funds in accounts currently in the possession of JPM Chase, together with an award of the costs of this proceeding in favor of Hausler, and for such other and further relief as may be just. JPM Chase answered (“JPM Chase Tranche VI Answer,” Dkt. No. 431) on August 18, 2011.
JPM Chase then filed a third-party petition alleging claims in the nature of inter-pleader (the “Interpleader Petition,” Dkt. No. 440) on September 1, 2011, seeking to interplead Hausler and adverse claimants/respondents Fundacion Benefica Nicolas S. Acea (the “Fundacion”), and Pablo Alcazar, Mayra Bustamante, and Rene Silva, Jr., as Trustees of the Fundacion (collectively, the “Fundacion Trustees” and, collectively — the Fundacion Trustees and the Fundacion together — the “Fundación Claimants”) pursuant to Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Sections 5239 and 6221 of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules, and Section 134 of New York’s Banking Law with regard to the Tranche VI Petition. Hausler answered (“Hausler Interpleader Answer,” Dkt. No. 449) on September 22, 2011, and the Fun-dacion Claimants answered (“Fundacion Claimants Interpleader Answer,” Dkt. No. 505) on January 24, 2012.
In recent months, further correspondence from the parties has brought to light additional issues for the Court’s consideration related to the Tranche VI Petition and the Interpleader Petition. Taking into account all relevant correspondence and filings, the Court now considers the Tranche VI Petition, the Interpleader Petitions, and various other requests from the parties.
I. BACKGROUND
Familiarity with the basic facts from which this action arises, as discussed in greater detail in previous Orders from this Court and from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, is presumed. However, the Court will briefly outline the underlying facts, as well as discuss the facts specific to the Tranche VI Petition and Interpleader Petition.
A. THE UNDERLYING FACTS
In 2005, Hausler sued the Judgment Debtors under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (“FSIA”), in the Eleventh Judicial District, Miami-Dade County, Florida. The Florida state court rendered the Florida Judgment, awarding Hausler $100,000,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000,000 in punitive damages for the torture and extrajudicial killing of Fuller. None of the Judgment Debtors appeared in the Florida proceedings. Hausler then sought a full faith and credit determination for the Florida Judgment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and that request was granted on August 20, 2008. Hausler then registered the Florida Judgment in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on September 22, 2008.
Hausler, acting on her own behalf and as a representative of Fuller, now seeks to enforce the Florida Judgment for compensatory damages against the Judgment Debtors by requesting, pursuant to TRIA, the turnover of various assets held in the United States by various garnishee banks and financial institutions that are in possession of funds blocked or frozen pursuant to the Cuban Asset Control Regulations (the “CACRs”).
B. THE CUBAN ASSET CONTROL REGULATIONS (THE “CACRS”) AND THE OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL (“OFAC”)
The CACRs, 31 C.F.R. Part 515, were issued by the United States Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) in 1963, and they remain in effect today. See Hausler I, 740 F.Supp.2d at 527. The CACRs were enacted pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act (“TWEA”), and have been extended each year since 1977 pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”). See id.
Among other things, the CACRs seek to block transactions in which Cuba has “any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect.” 31 C.F.R. § 515. 201(a). The CACRs “plainly define” what constitutes Cuban property or interests in property for the purpose of blocking Cuba’s assets (Hausler I, 740 F.Supp.2d at 532), and the definition includes “money, checks ... bank deposits, savings accounts ... stocks, bonds, ... and other financial securities” (31 C.F.R. § 515.311). Moreover, the CACRs impress that “[t]he term ‘interest’ when used with respect to property shall mean an interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect.” Id. § 515.312.
The CACRs also explicitly provide administrative procedures for unblocking transactions that have been blocked as the result of a mistake. See Hausler I, 740 F.Supp.2d at 529; 31 C.F.R. § 515. 201(e). When a party believes that “funds have been blocked due to mistaken identity,” the party may submit a written request to release funds to OFAC, as prescribed by 31 C.F.R. Section 501.806, and the Director of OFAC then makes a determination regarding whether to release the funds. 31 C.F.R. § 515. 201(e); 31 C.F.R. § 501.806.
C. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT (“FSIA”) AND THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT (“TRIA”)
FSIA “provides the exclusive basis for subject matter jurisdiction over all civil actions against foreign state defendants, and therefore for a court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a defendant the action must fall within one of FSIA’s exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.” Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 609 F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir.2010). Section 1605A of FSIA
abrogates immunity for those foreign states officially designated as state sponsors of terrorism by the Department of State where the foreign state commits a terrorist act or provides material support for the commission of a terrorist act and the act results in the death or personal injury of a United States citizen.
Id. at 48. Cuba was continuously designated as a state sponsor of terrorism under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 by the United States Department of State from March 1, 1982 to May 29, 2015. See Hausler III, 770 F.3d at 210; Cuba: Implementing Rescission of State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation, 80 Fed.Reg. 4331401 (July 22, 2015) (to be codified at 15 CFR Parts 734, 736, 740, 742, 746, 748, 750, 758, 772, 774).
Furthermore, even where a valid judgment has been entered against a foreign sovereign pursuant to FSIA, property of that foreign state is still immune from attachment and execution except as provided by Sections 1610 and 1611 of FSIA. 28 U.S.C. § 1609; Levin v. Bank of New York, No. 09 CV 5900, 2011 WL 812032, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2011) (citing Weinstein, 609 F.3d at 48). TRIA, which is codified as a note to Section 1610 of FSIA, provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law ... in every case in which a person has obtained a judgment against a terrorist party on a claim based upon an act of terrorism, or for which a terrorist party is not immune under Section 1605(a)(7) of Title 28, U.S.Code, the blocked assets of that terrorist party (including the blocked assets of any agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party) shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of execution in order to satisfy such judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages for which such terrorist party has been adjudged liable.
TRIA § 201(a) (emphasis added). The dispute in the case at hand largely centers around whether the funds in question can properly be considered “the blocked assets of’ the judgment debtor Republic of Cuba under TRIA.
D. THE TRANCHE VI PETITION
On March 26, 2009, the Clerk of this Court issued a writ of execution, permitting Hausler to proceed with execution to satisfy the compensatory component of the Florida Judgment in the amount of $99,000,000 against the Judgment Debtors. On or about May 12, 2009, the Marshal, in accordance with Section 201 of TRIA, levied the writ upon certain financial institutions, including JPM Chase, believed to be holding funds on behalf of the Judgment Debtors. Hausler caused document and information subpoenas to be served on JPM Chase in or about October and November 2009 and June and December 2010. In response, JPM Chase produced copies of schedules it had filed with OF AC, detailing property blocked pursuant to the CACRs, including the property (the “Blocked Assets”) in the three blocked accounts (the “Blocked Accounts”) that would later become the subject of the of Tranche VI Petition. JPM Chase took the position that the CACRs and FSIA prevented it from effecting a turnover of the relevant funds to the Marshal without a determination that the funds are subject to execution and turnover pursuant to TRIA.
On July 13, 2011, Hausler filed the Tranche VI Petition (Dkt. No. 421) pursuant to Rule 69 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as incorporating Section 5225(b) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. Hausler sought turnover, pursuant to TRIA, of the Blocked Assets in Blocked Accounts, all of which are held by JPM Chase and have the Fundación as the named account holder. The Blocked Accounts are:
1. Account Number 362511271, which JPM Chase alleges was established to benefit a hospice in the City of Cienfuegos, Cuba, and had a value of approximately $1,180,388.00 as of June 30, 2009;
2. Account Number 362511371, which JPM Chase alleges was established to benefit a school in the City of Cienfuegos, Cuba, and had a value of approximately $1,251,382.00 as of June 30, 2009; and
3. Account Number 362511471, which JPM Chase alleges was established to benefit a school in the City of Cienfuegos, Cuba, and had a value of approximately $848,572.00 as of June 30, 2009.
JPM Chase holds all three accounts in its capacity as corporate successor to the Chemical Bank New York Trust Company.
Hausler alleged that the Fundación was “organized under the laws of Cuba prior to Judgment Debtor Fidel Castro taking power in Cuba but ... was subsequently nationalized by the Judgment Debtor the Republic of Cuba.” (Tranche VI Petition ¶22.) Therefore, Hausler asserted, the funds in the accounts are the property of an agency or instrumentality of a terrorist state, and thus subject to execution and turnover to Hausler pursuant to TRIA Section 201(a). Hausler asked that the Court issue an order directing JPM Chase to turn over to the Marshal all the funds in the Blocked Accounts in partial satisfaction of the Florida Judgment, together with all accumulated interest and marshal’s fees, awarding fees and costs of this proceeding, and awarding any such other and further relief the Court deems just. Docket Numbers 432-39, dated August 24-25, 2011, reflect that proper service of the Tranche VI Petition was effectuated upon the Judgment Debtors.
JPM Chase answered (Dkt. No. 431) on August 18, 2011. JPM Chase asserted two counterclaims. First, JPM Chase averred that a judgment should be entered in its favor denying the Tranche VI Petition. In the alternative, however, JPM Chase argued that JPM Chase is entitled to a judgment making a number of findings that would insulate JPM Chase from further liability, including, among other things: the identity of the funds made subject to execution and turnover and the identity of the party to whom the funds should be turned over; a number of findings demonstrating that the blocked property can properly be executed upon by Hausler pursuant to TRIA; that service of the Florida Judgment was properly made on the Judgment Debtors; and that JPM Chase would be discharged from further liability or obligation to all parties, as well as the Judgment Debtors, in respect to the amount turned over; and that JPM Chase would be discharged in interpleader pursuant to Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to any adverse claimants named in any third-party petition filed by JPM Chase. Second, JPM Chase averred that it is entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in responding to Hausler’s enforcement efforts, any such amount to be awarded out of the amount turned over pursuant to judgment — if any — entered under TRIA in Hausler’s favor.
E. THE INTERPLEADER PETITION
JPM Chase filed the Interpleader Petition (Dkt. No. 440) on September 1, 2011. JPM Chase stated that it was aware of additional claimants to the Blocked Assets, and sought to “bring before the Court all known parties with claims to these funds and to obtain discharge in interpleader” (Interpleader Petition ¶ 17) pursuant to Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 5239 and 6221 of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules, and Section 134 of New York’s Banking Law. The adverse claimants/respondents JPM Chase sought to bring into the suit were the Fundacion Claimants. JPM Chase named the Fundacion itself, as the named account holder of the Blocked Accounts, and each of the Fundacion Trustees, describing the Fundacion Trustees as “the three known trustees of the Fundación, who reside in the United States.” (Id. ¶ 3.) JPM Chase further alleged that “these three trustees and their predecessors have maintained contact with JPM Chase — and their claim to the blocked accounts that are targeted for turnover — for several decades.” (Id.)
JPM Chase argued that “there may be conflicting claims to the funds in the Blocked Accounts, thereby exposing JPM Chase to the risk of double or multiple liability,” and asserted that, under such circumstances, “federal and state law recognize JPM Chase as a disinterested or neutral stakeholder and provide mechanisms for it to bring before the Court any person or adverse claimant with a claim to the same funds who may not already be a party to the action.” (Interpleader Petition ¶ 18.) JPM Chase sought an order making various findings that would insulate it from future liability, many of which overlap with the findings it sought in its answer to the Tranche VI Petition. (Compare Interpleader Petition pp. 9-12 with JPM Tranche VI Answer ¶ 35.) JPM Chase asked that judgment fie entered in its favor pursuant to Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Procedure, restraining and enjoining any of the Fundacion Claimants from pursuing any claim against JPM Chase related to any of the Blocked Assets if the Blocked Assets are turned over pursuant to court order, and dismissing JPM Chase as a party to the proceeding and requiring the Fundacion Claimants and Hausler to litigate amongst themselves regarding the Blocked Assets to the extent necessary. JPM Chase also asked for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, with such award to be paid out of any amount turned over pursuant to the Tranche VI Petition, as well as any such other and further relief as may be appropriate.
Hausler answered (Dkt. No. 449) on September 22, 2011. Hausler asserted two affirmative defenses: (1) that Hausler is entitled to full relief and recovery under TRIA; and (2) that Hausler reserves the right to amend or supplement Hausler’s answer to the Interpleader Petition “on account of the fact that much of the Interpleader [Petition] is overly vague, nonspecific, and subject to competing interpretations.” (Hausler Interpleader Answer ¶ 24.)
On January 17, 2012, the Fundacion Claimants submitted a letter (“Fundacion Claimants January 2012 Letter,” Dkt. No. 502) to the Court, indicating that they anticipated filing a motion to dismiss the Interpleader Petition for failure to join a required party. The Fundacion Claimants sought either (a) confirmation from the Court that the time to respond to the Interpleader Petition had been stayed by their filing of a pre-motion letter, or (b) an extension of time to respond. (Fundacion Claimants January 2012 Letter 1-2.) By endorsement, the Court denied the request, stating that “[t]he Court believes that it would serve judicial economy if any further motions in the actions involved in this case are withheld until after the Court’s ruling as rendered on various motions pending. That decision may clarify remaining issues or obviate further proceedings herein.” (Id. 2.)
The Fundacion Claimants then submitted an answer (“Fundacion Claimants In-terpleader Answer,” Dkt. No. 505) to the Interpleader Petition on January 24, 2012. The Fundacion Claimants “affirmatively state[d] that they have a claim to the funds in the [Blocked Accounts], of which the Fundación is the named account holder, and that the funds in the [Blocked Accounts] are not funds that are subject to execution by [Hausler].” (Fundacion Claimants Interpleader Answer ¶ 17.) The Fundación Claimants also represented that the Fundacion Trustees were, indeed, trustees of the Fundacion. (Id. 14(b)-(d).) The Fundacion Claimants asserted six affirmative defenses: (1) that the funds in the Blocked Accounts are not subject to execution pursuant to TRIA; (2) that the funds in the Blocked Accounts were not confiscated by the Republic of Cuba following the Cuban Revolution, and thus do not constitute assets of the Republic of Cuba or any agency or instrumentality thereof as provided by TRIA; (3) that, because “the public policy of the United States is that it does not recognize confiscatory takings ... the purported confiscation by the Cuban government of the assets of the Fundación should not be given effect”; (4) that the Tranche VI Petition should be dismissed for failure to join a necessary party, because OFAC is a required party to the suit as per Rule 19(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (5) that the funds in question “were improperly blocked, as they did not constitute ‘transactions’ and/or ‘transfers’ as defined by the [CACRs]”; and (6) that the Fundación Claimants reserve the right to amend or supplement their answer and affirmative defenses based upon information obtained in discovery.
F. THE 2012 CORRESPONDENCE AND STATUS CONFERENCE
In response to Hausler II, Hausler submitted a letter to the Court on March 2, 2012. (“Hausler March 2, 2012 Letter,” Dkt. No. 509.) Discussing the status of the Tranche VI Petition, Hausler asserted that the affirmative defenses raised by the Fundación Claimants in the Fundación Claimants Interpleader Answer “are not well grounded in law” and indicated that Hausler would “address these accounts in a separate submission seeking dispositive relief.” (Hausler March 2, 2012 Letter 4.)
On March 15, 2012, Hausler submitted a letter (“Hausler March 15, 2012 Letter,” Dkt. No. 515) to the Court, raising arguments in opposition to the defenses raised in the Fundación Claimants Interpleader Answer, declaring Hausler’s intention to file a motion for summary judgment with regard to the Tranche VI Petition, and requesting a pre-motion conference. The Fundacion Claimants then submitted a letter on March 19, 2012 (“Fundacion Claimants March 2012 Letter,” Dkt. No. 529), maintaining that “[t]he Fundación Claimants will oppose any motion for summary judgment filed by Petitioner.” (Fundacion Claimants March 2012 Letter 1.)
The Court held a status conference via telephone on April 10, 2012, with Hausler, JPM Chase, and the Fundacion Claimants present, in order to discuss the correspondence between the parties related to the Tranche VI Petition and the Interpleader Petition. (See Dkt. Minute Entry dated April 10, 2012.) Following the status conference, the parties were to “confer regarding the scope and timing of discovery necessary to develop a full factual record supporting disposition of the dispute between petitioner and the Fundacion adverse claimants.” (Id.)
Following the April 10, 2012 status conference, the docket reflects no further filings related to the Tranche VI Petition or the Interpleader Petition until February 13, 2015.
G. THE 2015 CORRESPONDENCE
On February 13, 2015, the Fundacion Claimants wrote a letter (“Fundacion Claimants February 13 Letter,” Dkt. No. 621) to the Court requesting a status conference with regard to the funds, currently held in accounts at JPM Chase, which are the subject of the Tranche VI Petition. The Fundación Claimants reported that judgment creditor Gustavo Villoldo, an individual involved in separate but related proceedings before the Honorable Judge Hellerstein in the Southern District of New York, had filed a motion (the “Villol-do Application”), individually and on behalf of the Estate of Gustavo Villoldo, to commence supplementary proceedings in Alfredo Villoldo, et al. v. Fidel Castro Ruz, et al., Case No. 08-14505 CA 25, a Florida state court proceeding in Miami-Dade County, against the Fundacion Trustees, challenging their standing to act as trustees of the Fundacion. (Fundacion Claimants February 13 Letter 2.) By memo endorsement, the Court directed Hausler to respond by February 20, 2015. (Fundacion Claimants February 13 Letter 2.)
Hausler then submitted a letter to the Court dated February 20, 2015. (“Hausler February 20 Letter,” Dkt. No. 622.) Hausler attached Orders showing that the Villoldo court had denied the Fundacion Trustees’ motion to dismiss the Villoldo Application, and had “scheduled an eviden-tiary hearing to determine whether the Fundacion Trustees have any authority to proceed on behalf of the Fundación, including with respect to the blocked assets that are the subject of the Tranche VI Turnover Petition.” (Hausler February 20 Letter 2, Ex. D.) Hausler also attached the transcript (the “Villoldo Transcript”) of a hearing before the Villoldo court in the Florida proceedings, during which counsel for the Fundación Trustees in Florida stated on the record that his clients are trustees not of the Fundación, but of a separate foundation established in Miami in 1970, called the Nicolas S. Acea Eleemosynary Foundation. (Hausler February 20 Letter Ex. A, at 4-5.) Counsel for the Fundacion Trustees further stated in the hearing that the Fundación was established to benefit a number of properties that were ultimately taken over by the Cuban government. (Id. at 5.) By memo endorsement, this Court indicated that it was “persuaded that no action is necessary at this time” and directed the parties to “inform the Court of any material developments and ultimate resolution of the Florida proceedings described above.” (Hausler February 20 Letter 2.)
On March 4, the Fundacion Claimants submitted another letter (“Fundacion Claimants March 4 Letter,” Dkt. No. 624) to the Court, attaching a copy of the Notice of Consent to Relief (“Notice of Consent to Relief”) the Fundacion Trustees had filed in the Villoldo Florida proceedings on February 26, 2015 to “give notice of their consent to the imposition of the relief ... determining that Alcazar, Bastamante and Silva have no authority to act on behalf of the Fundacion controlled by Defendant Cuba.” (Fundacion Claimants March 4 Letter 2-4.) Counsel for the Fundacion Claimants also requested a pre-motion conference, stating that they “intend[ed] to seek leave of court to withdraw from the representation of the Fundación [Claimants] and also to seek a stay of the action in order for an appropriate representative to appear on behalf of the Fundacion going forward.” (Fundacion Claimants March 4 Letter 2.) Counsel for the Fundacion Claimants further explained that they “underst[oo]d there [we]re discussions underway with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in that regard and that the New York State Attorney General’s Office may be approached.” (Id.)
Later in the day on March 4, Hausler submitted a letter to the Court (“Hausler March 4 Letter,” Dkt. No. 625), arguing that “the Court should deny the Fundacion Claimants’ request for a pre-motion conference, strike the Fundacion Claimants’ answer to [the] interpleader petition, and grant Petitioner’s Tranche VI turnover application.” (Hausler March 4 Letter 1.) Hausler explained that the Villoldo court in Florida had issued an Order (the “Florida Order”), which Hausler attached to the Hausler March 4 Letter as Exhibit 1,
holding that the Fundacion Claimants:
(a) are not Trustees of the Fundacion; (b) have no authority to act on behalf of the Fundacion; (c) have no interest in the assets of the Fundacion; and (d) have no relationship with the Fundacion. The court further ruled, based on proof-presented to it, that the Fundacion and its assets, including the funds in the blocked accounts that are the subject of this proceeding were nationalized by the Republic of Cuba and, thus, are Cuban assets.
(Id. 1.) Hausler asserted that, given the findings of the Villoldo court in the Florida Order, the Fundacion Claimants have no interest at stake and no standing in the current proceedings. The Court should not consider the motion of counsel for the Fundacion Claimants’ to withdraw, Hausler argued, because consideration of the motion “assumes that there is a client properly before the eourt.” (Id. 2.) Hausler also characterized motion of counsel for the Fundacion Claimants to withdraw and the request for a stay as an “improper delay tactic.” (Id.) Hausler requested that the Court deny the requests of counsel for the Fundación Claimants and grant the Tranche VI Turnover Petition. (Id.) By endorsement, the Court ordered “[c]ounsel for the Fundacion Claimants, as well as any other party to this litigation having any interest in the matter” to respond by March 10, 2015. (Id.)
On March 5, 2015, JPM Chase submitted a letter (“JPM Chase March 5 Letter,” Dkt. No. 634) to the Court. JPM Chase joined in the request of counsel for the Fundacion Claimants’ for a pre-motion conference regarding their application to withdraw as counsel. (JPM Chase March 5 Letter 1-2.) JPM Chase expressed that it had “not had the opportunity to evaluate the evidence” that led to the Villoldo court’s Florida Order and had also not yet had the
opportunity to evaluate the procedural posture of the pending turnover proceeding should this eourt determine that the trustees of the trust in the name of Fundación Benéfica Nicolas S. Acea ... named as third-party Respondents do not have standing to defend the turnover proceeding, whether on the basis of the order now submitted to the court or otherwise.
(Id. 1.) JPM Chase further stated that it “needs an opportunity to evaluate any further responsibilities it may have in respect to the Fundacion’s deposits” in light of the recent developments in the Villoldo Florida court proceeding. (Id.)
Counsel for the Fundacion Claimants then submitted a letter to the Court dated March 10, 2015 (“Fundacion Claimants March 10 Letter,” Dkt. No. 627), in further support of their request for a pre-motion conference and again seeking leave to withdraw as counsel for the Fundacion Claimants. Counsel for the Fundacion Claimants explained that, given the developments in the Villoldo Florida case, “the Fundacion has no trustee with whom we can confer, [and] we believe that the Rules of Professional Conduct do not allow us to take any steps with respect to the Fundacion.” (Fundacion Claimants March 10 Letter 1.) The letter also reiterated that “[a] stay is necessary to allow time for an appropriate representative to appear for the Fundacion because a trust does not fail for want of a trustee.” (Id. 2.) Counsel for the Fundacion Claimants attached an affidavit from
Kai Jacobs, counsel of record for Im-pleader Defendants Pablo Alcazar, Maya Bustamante and Rene Silva Jr. [ (the Fundacion Trustees) ] in the Villoldo Matter, ... attesting that he has recently been in touch with the United States Attorney’s Office regarding whether that office or some other appropriate representative may appear on behalf of the Fundación going forward. We understand that the New York Attorney General’s Office may be interested in appearing for the Fundación as well. A period of 90 days should be sufficient for these determinations to be made.
(Id.)
Also on March 10, JPM Chase submitted another letter (“JPM Chase March 10 Letter,” Dkt. No. 629) to the Court. In this letter, JPM Chase asserted that it is a “neutral stakeholder” and “takes no position as to whether [Hausler —as judgment-ereditor[ ] of the Republic of Cuba—or the Fundación and its beneficiaries— are entitled to the funds held in the Accounts.” (JPM Chase March 10 Letter 1.) However, JPM Chase questioned the findings of the Villoldo court in Florida in a number of ways, suggesting that the Fundacion’s interests may not have been properly represented in the Villoldo proceeding, and arguing that
neither the Florida Orders nor any of the papers made available to this Court and JPM Chase establish the evidentia-ry basis supporting the court’s findings that the Trustees represent a separate, U.S.-based charity — the Nicolas S. Acea Foundation — and not the Fundación.... Nor do the papers made available to this Court and JPM Chase reflect the evi-dentiary basis for the Florida court’s determination that the Fundación accounts were expropriated by the Castro Government.
(Id. 2.) JPM Chase argued that “these legal and factual issues should be presented to and resolved by this Court ... in the context of a motion on notice, brought by [Hausler], for partial summary judgment or to strike the answer of the Fundacion and the Trustees.” (Id.) Furthermore,
should the Court determine that the Trustees lack standing to represent the Fundacion, JPM Chase respectfully requested] leave to file, within a reasonable time, an Amended Third-Party Petition naming either the proper successor representatives of the Fundacion or the beneficiaries of the accounts opened by the Fundacion for their benefit.
(Id. 3.) JPM Chase explained that
JPM Chase has had a good-faith basis for believing that the Trustees were the Fundacion’s representatives since the 1960s and before. If that is not correct, equity and the interests of justice should permit JPM Chase to amend its Third-Party Petition and to locate the Fundacion’s true representatives, if any, and its beneficiaries.
(Id.)
Counsel for Alfredo Villoldo, individually, and Gustavo E. Villoldo, individually and as Administrator, Executor, and Personal Representative of the Estate of Gustavo Villoldo Argilagos (collectively, the “Villoldo Plaintiffs”) also submitted a letter to the Court on March 10, 2015 (“Villoldo Plaintiffs Letter,” Dkt. No. 626). The Villoldo Plaintiffs wrote in response to the Court’s endorsement of the Hausler March 4 Letter, which had directed all parties with an interest in the matter to respond. (Villoldo Plaintiffs Letter 1.) The Villoldo Plaintiffs explained that they had entered into a sharing agreement with other judgment creditors of Cuba, including Hausler, such that the turnover of any blocked assets in the instant action would also benefit the Villoldo Plaintiffs. (Id.) The Villoldo Plaintiffs also asserted that counsel for the Fundacion Claimants should have withdrawn their pleadings in the instant action in order to comply with the Florida Order. (Id. 2.) Echoing Hausler’s entreaty that the Fundación Claimants’ request for a stay and the request of the Fundacion Claimants’ counsel to withdraw be denied, the Villoldo Plaintiffs argued that the requests from the Fundacion Claimants’ counsel “were wholly inappropriate and should be rejected outright,” given the injunction imposed by the Florida Order and considering that the Fundacion Trustees, “[b]y their own admission ... are not, nor do they any longer claim to be, trustees of the [Fundacion].” (Id. 2.)
On March 12, 2015, Hausler submitted a letter (“Hausler March 12 Letter,” Dkt. No. 630), responding to the JPM Chase March 10 Letter and the Fundacion Claimants March 10 Letter. Hausler stressed that, despite JPM Chase’s statements to the contrary, there are no legal or factual issues to be resolved by the Court, given that counsel for the Fundacion Trustees in the Villoldo Florida proceedings have confirmed on the record in those proceedings that (1) the Fundacion Trustees are not actually trustees of the Fundacion; and (2) that the Fundacion was nationalized. (Hausler March 12 Letter 2 (citing Hausler February 20 Letter, Ex. A at 4-5; Fundación Claimants Interpleader Answer ¶ 25).) Hausler also attached an affidavit from Jaime Suchlicki, submitted in the Vil-loldo proceedings, purporting to convey an expert opinion that the Fundacion has indeed been nationalized. (Hausler March 12 Letter 2, Ex. B. (“Suchlicki Affidavit”).) Hausler again asserted that there was no longer any basis to delay disposition of the Tranche VI Petition, since there are “no other bona fide claimants and there is no serious question whether Cuba nationalized the blocked assets at issue.” (Hausler March 12 Letter 3.)
JPM Chase responded on March 13, 2015 (“JPM Chase March 13 Letter,” Dkt. No. 628), reiterating its position that, “[g]iven the[ir] complexity, ... these issues should be properly and fully briefed in a motion on notice brought by Petitioner.” (JPM Chase March 13 Letter 1.)
On June 10, 2015, Hausler submitted a letter (“Hausler June 15 Letter,” Dkt. No. 635) to the Court. Hausler noted that more than 90 days had passed since the Fundación Claimants requested a 90-day stay in the Fundación Claimants March 10 Letter, and no new appearances had been entered in this matter. (Hausler June 15 Letter 1.) Hausler also stated that Hausler is “being seriously prejudiced by the delay,” because “[a]s Judge Hellerstein recently recognized in the Vera, 12 CV 01596, enforcement proceedings, in view of the Executive branch’s recent rapprochement with Cuba, there is a ‘risk of diplomatic change affecting the judgment creditors.’ ” (Id. 2 (citing Vera v. Republic of Cuba, 12-cv-01596, Dkt. No. 767 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2015)).) Hausler also attached the referenced Order from Judge Hellerstein to the Hausler June 15 Letter. Hausler again urged that the Court grant the Tranche VI Petition. (Id. 2.)
In light of all the filings in the public record of this matter, the Court now considers the Tranche VI Petition, the Inter-pleader Petition, and the requests from various parties presented by the 2015 correspondence.
II. DISCUSSION
A. THE IMPACT OF THE VILLOLDO FLORIDA PROCEEDINGS AND THE FLORIDA ORDER
As is clear from the factual background described above, the parties sharply dispute the impact of the Florida Order, as well as the Villoldo proceedings from which the Florida Order stemmed, on this Court’s adjudication of the Turnover Petition and the Interpleader Petition.
Specifically, counsel for the Fundacion Claimants requests a conference and a stay of the proceedings “in order for an appropriate representative to appear on behalf of the Fundacion going forward,” and seeks to “withdraw from the representation of the Fundacion [Claimants]” (Fundacion Claimants March 4 Letter 2; see also Fundacion Claimants March 10 Letter); Hausler argues that, in light of the Florida Order, the Court should “strike the Fundación Claimants’ answer to [the] Interpleader Petition and grant the Petitioner’s Tranche VI turnover application” (Hausler March 4 Letter 1.), deny the Fundación Claimants’ request for a stay, and decline to even consider the request of counsel for the Fundacion Claimants to withdraw, because consideration of the request “assumes that there is a client properly before the Court (id. 2); the Villoldo Plaintiffs aver that the actions of counsel for the Fundación Claimants, in requesting to withdraw as counsel and asking for a stay of proceedings and failing to withdraw the Fundacion Claimants Interpleader Answer, are actually violating the injunction imposed by the Florida Order (Villoldo Plaintiffs Letter 2); and JPM Chase not only joins in the request of counsel for the Fundacion Claimants’ for a stay and a conference, but also entreats the Court to have the factual and legal issues decided upon by the Villoldo court “presented to and resolved by this Court ... in the context of a motion ... brought by Petitioners, for partial summary judgment or to strike the answer of the Fundacion and the Trustees” (JPM Chase March 5 Letter 2; see also JPM Chase March 10 Letter).
1. The Florida Order: Legal Findings and Context
Broadly speaking, the Florida Order made two legal findings that are of particular import to the case at hand. First, the Florida court found that the Fundacion Trustees “are not trustees of the Fundacion Benefica Nicolas S. Acea and have never had any authority to act on behalf of the Fundacion.” (Florida Order 3.) The Villoldo court further elaborated that “[t]he [Fundación Trustees] are not and have never been trustees of the Fundacion Benefica Nicolas S. Acea” and “have no legal authority to act on behalf of the Fundacion.” (Id.) Second, the Villoldo court found that “[t]he Fundacion ... was a Cuban foundation nationalized by the Cuban government in 1959” and “[t]he assets of the Fundación, wherever located, including the funds in the accounts located in New York at JP Morgan Chase, N.A., which have been blocked pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 55, are owned by the Republic of Cuba.” (Id. 2.) The Villoldo court ordered that the Fundacion Trustees
are hereby restrained and enjoined from interfering with any effort by the Plaintiffs to execute on their judgment against the Republic of Cuba entered in Case No. 08-14505 CA 25 by this Court in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida, which has been given full faith and credit by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in Aldo Vera, et. al. v. The Republic of Cuba, No. 1:12-cv-01496 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y), by its Order of August 22, 2014, including restraining and enjoining the [Fundacion Trustees] from asserting or further pursuing any claims to the Accounts in the name of the Fundacion Benefica Nicolas S. Acea.
(Florida Order 3-4.)
The Villoldo Plaintiffs have described the supplementary proceeding in which the Florida Order was issued as “a precursor to a suit for tortious interference with judgment collection.” (Villoldo Plaintiffs Letter 2.) Notably, although the Villoldo Plaintiffs have entered into a sharing agreement with other judgment creditors of Cuba including Hausler (id. 1), Hausler was and is not a party to the Villoldo Florida proceedings. While the three Fundación Trustees were named as third-party defendants in the Villoldo proceeding, the Fundación itself was also not a party, nor was JPM Chase.
2. Estoppel, Admissions, and Standing: The Effect of the Villoldo Florida Proceedings and the 2015 Correspondence
The Fundacion Claimants Interpleader Answer, though filed years before the rendering of the Florida Order, remains on the docket and is before the Court for consideration. In that document, the Fundacion Trustees repeatedly assert that they do have an interest in the Blocked Accounts, that they are the trustees of the Fundacion and represent the Fundacion’s interests, and that the Fundacion was not nationalized. (See generally Fundacion Claimants Interpleader Answer.) These circumstances present the question: given the Villoldo Florida proceedings, are the Fundacion Trustees estopped or otherwise precluded or barred from making such assertions, and from making claims that depend upon such assertions?
a. Judicial Estoppel
“Judicial estoppel ‘prevents a party from asserting a factual position in a legal proceeding that is contrary to a position previously taken by [that party] in a prior legal proceeding.’ ” Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 781 F.3d 42, 45 (2d Cir.2015) (quoting Bates v. Long Island R.R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028, 1037 (2d Cir.1993)). The doctrine has “two distinct objectives”: “First, ... to preserve the sanctity of the oath by demanding absolute truth and consistency in all sworn positions .... Second, ... to protect judicial integrity by avoiding the risk of inconsistent results in two proceedings.” Bates, 997 F.2d at 1038 (footnote omitted). See also Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 128 F.3d 68, 71-72 (2d Cir.1997). “Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
There are no “inflexible prerequisites [and there is no] exhaustive formula for determining the applicability of judicial estoppel”; rather, the inquiry into its application depends heavily on the “specific factual contextf].” New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 751, 121 S.Ct. 1808. However, as a general rule, the application of judicial es-toppel requires that
(1) the party against whom the estoppel is asserted took an inconsistent position in a prior proceeding and (2) that-position was adopted by the first tribunal in some manner, such as by rendering a favorable judgment.
Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 6 (2d Cir.1999) (internal citations omitted) (quoted by Robinson, 781 F.3d at 45). A typical application of judicial estoppel also “requires showing unfair advantage against the party seeking estoppel,” but the Second Circuit has not required this element in all circumstances. Adelphia Recovery Trust v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 748 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir.2014) (quoting New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 751, 121 S.Ct. 1808). However, because the primary purpose of judicial estoppel is to protect the judicial process, “relief [under the doctrine of judicial estoppel] is granted in the Second Circuit only when the risk of inconsistent results with its impact on judicial integrity is certain.” Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Carp., 638 F.3d 384, 397 (2d Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court finds that the Fundacion Trustees are judicially estopped from asserting that they are the trustees of the Fundacion and attempting to act on behalf of the Fundacion in any way. In the course of the Villoldo Florida proceedings, the Fundacion Trustees clearly asserted on the record that they are not and never were trustees of the Fundacion, but instead are merely Cuban exiles who started their own foundation in the United States after the Cuban Revolution. In explaining the history of the Fundacion and his clients’ role in the Villoldo dispute, Kai Jacobs, counsel for the Fundacion Trustees in the Villoldo Florida proceedings, averred,
[t]he brief history is that Nicolas S. Acea, who died in the 1920s, probated his will there in New York. That will provided for the establishment of the Fundacion Benefica Nicolas S. Acea. The money for that foundation ... [is] now in stocks or housed in the account at JP Morgan Chase in New York. In or about 1970, certain Cuban exiles here in Miami established the Nicolas S. Acea Eleemosynary Foundation, to carry on the Foundation’s work, to work on protecting those funds and try to provide aid to those persons that the Fundación was initially established to assist.
(Villoldo Transcript 4.) Those Cuban exiles, counsel went on to explain, are the three individuals identified by this Court as the Fundacion Trustees. (Id. at 4-5.) Counsel for the Fundacion Trustees later elaborated, stating,
I don’t think we ever disputed that we— as to the actual Fundación, itself, we are the trustees of the — I call it the Foundation, the one that was created by the exile community. Nicolas Acea did not name these three persons as you will be my successor trustees, and I don’t want to lead the Court down that path, and that is where we have gone. These are persons who said there is this foundation. It’s intended to benefit these people and these properties and these assets are in New York, and we are part of the exile community, too. These people — this money is there for a purpose. We would like to see it applied to that purpose. So they established this Foundation to make that happen.
(Id. at 10-11.) The Fundacion Trustees then submitted the Notice of Consent to Relief to the Villoldo Florida court, stating that the Fundación Trustees
hereby give notice of their consent to ... a restraining order ... preventing [them] from interfering with Plaintiffs’ judgment collection efforts and determining that [the Fundacion Trustees] have no authority to act on behalf of the Fundacion controlled by Defendant Cuba.
(Notice of Consent to Relief 1-2.) The Villoldo court then clearly “adopted” the position put forth by the Fundacion Trustees in issuing the Florida Order, which found — in relevant part—that the Fundacion Trustees: “have not acquired any interest in the assets of the Fundacion, and have no legal authority to act on behalf of the Fundacion”; “are not and never have been trustees of the Fundacion”; and “are not trustees of the Fundacion ... and have never had any authority to act on behalf of the Fundación.” (Florida Order 3.)
It bears mention that the Florida Order, while “adopting” the position of the Fun-dación Trustees as described above, was not a “favorable judgment” for the Fundacion Trustees. See Mitchell, 190 F.3d at 6. To the contrary, the Florida Order granted the relief sought by the Villoldo Plaintiffs against the Fundacion Trustees. In this sense, the case at hand presents somewhat unusual circumstances for the application of judicial estoppel. Judicial estoppel is frequently justified as a means to “prevent[ ] a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.” Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 227 n. 8, 120 S.Ct. 2143, 147 L.Ed.2d 164 (2000) (emphasis added). The doctrine seeks to “proteet[] the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment.” New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 749-50, 121 S.Ct. 1808 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
However, as discussed above, judicial es-toppel is a flexible doctrine, and its application depends upon an inquiry into the specific factual context presented. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 751, 121 S.Ct. 1808. Moreover, the primary purpose of judicial estoppel is to protect the judicial process, and “the risk of inconsistent results with its impact on judicial integrity is certain” in the case at hand. Republic of Ecuador, 638 F.3d at 397. The Fundacion Trustees have indisputably taken an “inconsistent position” in the Florida proceedings, as described above, as compared to the Fundacion Claimants Interpleader Answer submitted to this Court. Mitchell, 190 F.3d at 1. See generally Fundacion Claimants Interpleader Answer. The Villoldo court in Florida, adopting the position asserted by the Fundacion Trustees in that matter, issued the Florida Order, finding that the Fundacion Trustees are not the trustees of the Fundacion and have no authority to act on the Fundacion’s behalf. If this Court were now to entertain the widely differing position — put forth by the Fundacion Trustees in the Fundacion Claimants Interpleader Answer — that the Fundacion Trustees are the trustees of the Fundacion and do have the authority to act on behalf of the Fundacion in asserting an interest to the Blocked Assets, judicial inconsistency would clearly result.
The Court therefore finds the Fundación Trustees are now estopped, pursuant to the doctrine of judicial estoppel, from asserting that they are or ever were the trustees of the Fundación, from claiming any interest in the purported assets of the Fundación, and from in any way attempting to act on behalf of the Fundación in the course of the instant action.
b. Judicial Admissions
Judicial admissions are
formal concessions ... by a party or counsel that have the effect of withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing wholly with the need for proof of the fact. Thus, a judicial admission ... is conclusive in the case.
Hoodho v. Holder, 558 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting 2 McCormick on Evid. § 254 (6th ed.2006) (footnote omitted)). Judicial admissions “obviate the need for debate, discussion or discovery regarding particular factual issues because the parties make concessions or stipulations regarding those issues that remove them from dispute.” Banks v. Yokemick, 214 F.Supp.2d 401, 405-07 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (citing Keller v. United States, 58 F.3d 1194, 1198 n. 8 (7th Cir.1995) (“The significance of a judicial admission is precisely that it has the effect of withdrawing a fact from contention.”)). Judicial admissions must be “clear and unambiguous admission[s] of fact” (Kregler v. City of New York, 821 F.Supp.2d 651, 656 (S.D.N.Y.2011) aff'd, 604 Fed.Appx. 44 (2d Cir.2015)) and must
relate to factual assertions made by one party concerning matters peculiarly within its knowledge or control, that is, facts the declarant is best situated to know and attest to in managing its affairs, as opposed to facts uniquely known or controlled by an adversary party.
Banks, 214 F.Supp.2d at 406-07.
When a party makes a judicial admission, that party “normally is bound [by that admission] throughout the course of the proceeding” (Bellefonte Re Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 757 F.2d 523, 528 (2d Cir.1985) (quoting White v. ARCO/Polymers, Inc., 720 F.2d 1391, 1396 (5th Cir.1983))), a practice that “facilitate[s] resolution of disputes and promote[s] judicial economy” (Banks, 214 F.Supp.2d at 406). However,
while research discloses no Second Circuit authority on point, the general rule seems to be that a judicial admission only binds the party that makes it in the action in which it is made, not “in separate and subsequent cases.”
Am. Tissue, Inc. v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 351 F.Supp.2d 79, 96 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 405 F.2d 683, 686 (8th Cir.1968); citing Universal Am. Barge Corp. v. J-Chem, Inc., 946 F.2d 1131, 1142 (5th Cir.1991)). See also Fed. Treasury Enter. Sojuzplodoimport v. Spirits Int’l B.V., 56 F.Supp.3d 383, 387 n. 22 (S.D.N.Y.2014). Nevertheless, “a court may [still] consider a judicial admission as evidence in another case. Such evidence may, however, be contradicted by other evidence when presented.” In re United Mine Workers of Am. Employee Ben. Plans Litig., 782 F.Supp. 658, 674 (D.D.C.1992), amended on denial of reh’g sub nom. United Mine Workers of Am.1974 Pension Trust v. Pittston Co., 793 F.Supp. 339 (D.D.C.1992), aff'd and remanded sub nom. United Mine Workers of Am. 1974 Pension v. Pittston Co., 984 F.2d 469 (D.C.Cir.1993) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (citing Universal American Barge Corp. v. J-Chem, Inc., et al., 946 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir.1991); State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 405 F.2d 683 (8th Cir.1968)). See also In re Budnick, 469 B.R. 158, 170 (Bankr.D.Conn.2012) (“[A] judicial admission only binds the party that makes it in the action in which it is made. Unless the elements of estoppel are present, in the later action the judicial admission in the earlier action is treated as an evidentiary admission.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
There is some discussion in the case law regarding in which form judicial admissions may be made. It is clear that under federal law, “stipulations and admissions in the pleadings are generally binding on the parties and the Court” as judicial admissions. PPX Enterprises, Inc. v. Audiofidelity, Inc., 746 F.2d 120, 123 (2d Cir.1984). “A court can [also] appropriately treat statements in briefs as binding judicial admissions of fact.” Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir.1994). Some courts have taken a broader approach, explaining that “parties to a lawsuit generally make and are held to judicial admissions expressed as formal acts by means of affirmative concessions or stipulations.” Banks, 214 F.Supp.2d at 406. This Court has held that, “ ‘absent egregious circumstances, a distinct and formal admission made before, during, or even after a proceeding by an attorney acting in his professional capacity binds his client as a judicial admission.’ ” Kregler, 821 F.Supp.2d at 656 (quoting Haywood v. Bureau of Immigration, 372 Fed.Appx. 122, 124 (2d Cir.2010)).
In the case at hand, the Fundación Trustees have clearly made multiple admissions, both in the Villoldo Florida proceedings and in the case at hand. The Court must examine whether these admissions are judicial admissions and, if they are, what binding effect they have on the current proceedings.
(i) Admissions in the Villoldo Florida Proceedings
The statements made in the Villol-do Florida proceedings and the Notice and Consent to Relief submitted in those proceedings, discussed in the preceding section of this Decision and Order, clearly represent judicial admissions. The statements were “clear and unambiguous admissions of fact.” Kregler, 821 F.Supp.2d at 656. The factual assertions made also relate to matters that are “peculiarly within [the] knowledge or control” of the Fundacion Trustees (Banks, 214 F.Supp.2d at 406—407); it would seem that no one is more equipped to say whether or not the Fundacion Trustees are the trustees of the Fundacion than the Fundación Trustees themselves.
Furthermore, though not made in briefs, stipulations, or pleadings (see PPX Enterprises, 746 F.2d at 123; Purgess, 33 F.3d at 144), the statements made by the Fun-dación Trustees in the Villoldo Florida proceedings certainly constitute “affirmative concessions” (Banks, 214 F.Supp.2d at 406). Counsel for the Fundación Trustees affirmatively came forward in court in the Florida proceedings and made the statements described above on the record, and the Notice of Consent to relief was affirmatively submitted to the Villoldo Florida court of the Fundacion Trustees’ own accord. The statements made in court (see Villoldo Transcript 4-5, 10-11) are “distinct and formal admissions [that] were made ... during ... a proceeding by an attorney acting in his professional capacity,” arid the Notice of Consent to Relief was made by the Fundación Trustees’ counsel “after ... [such] a proceeding.” Kregler, 821 F.Supp.2d at 656.
Yet, because the judicial admissions made in the Florida proceedings were made in a prior proceeding, they are not binding on the parties and the Court in the instant action, but rather may be considered as evidentiary admissions. See Am. Tissue, 351 F.Supp.2d at 96; In re United Mine, 782 F.Supp. at 674.
(ii) Admissions in the Current Proceedings
In the case at hand, counsel for the Fundacion Trustees have now affirmatively come forward and effectively admitted to the Court that the Fundacion Trustees are not actually the trustees of the Fundacion. The Fundacion Claimants March 4 Letter provided the Court with a copy of the “Notice of Consent to Relief’ filed by the Fundacipn Trustees in the Villoldo proceeding and discussed above. In the same letter, counsel for the Fundacion Claimants stated that they wish to withdraw as counsel “in light of’ the Notice of Consent to Relief. (Fundacion Claimants March 4 Letter 2.) Fundacion Counsel then further explained in the Fundacion Claimants March 10 Letter that they are seeking withdrawal because “the Funda-cion has no trustee with whom we can confer,” making clear that the Fundacion Trustees are not trustees of the Fundacion. Like the admissions made in the Florida proceedings, these letters constitute “affirmative concessions” (Banks, 214 F.Supp.2d at 406) that make “clear and unambiguous admissions of fact” (Kregler, 821 F.Supp.2d at 656) regarding matters that are “peculiarly within [the] knowledge or control” of the Fundacion Trustees (Banks, 214 F.Supp.2d at 406-07).
Although counsel for the Fundacion Claimants is seeking to withdraw as counsel, they are currently the counsel of record for the Fundacion Trustees. Normally, the Court can impute the actions and statements of an attorney to his or her clients and, “[a]s a general matter, ‘statements made by an attorney concerning a matter within his employment may be admissible against the party retaining the attorney.’ ” Ceglia v. Zuckerberg, 287 F.R.D. 152, 162 (W.D.N.Y.2012) (quoting Purgess, 33 F.3d at 144). However, because counsel for the Fundación Claimants is seeking to withdraw from representation on the basis that counsel has “no client representative with whom [counsel] can confer,” it is not entirely clear that the statements in the Fundacion Claimants March 4 and March 10 letters were actually m