Sharette v. Credit Suisse International (127 F. Supp. 3d 60, 2015)

DECISION AND ORDER

VICTOR MARRERO, District Judge,

I. BACKGROUND............... 68

A. TWO OFFERINGS OF ECD STOCK...................................68

B. SHORT SALES OF ECD STOCK SKYROCKET WHILE THE PRICE OF ECD STOCK PLUMMETS, SENDING ECD INTO BANKRUPTCY....................................................69

C. THE CREDIT SUISSE DEFENDANTS’ ALLEGED MISREPRESENTATIONS AND MANIPULATIVE SCHEME..........................................................70

1. Convertible Notes, Short Sales, and “Hedging”........................70

2. Short Sales With Almost No Risk; Misaligned Investor And Shareholder Interests............................................71

3. Allegations Against the Credit Suisse Defendants......................73

II. CHOICE OF LAW........................................................74

III. JUDICIAL NOTICE ......................................................74

IV. LEGAL STANDARD......................................................75

A. RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS..................................75

B. THE EXCHANGE ACT...............................................76

1. Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and Section 9..............................76

2. Market Manipulation...............................................77

3. Misstatements or Omissions of Material Fact..........................78

4. Scienter..........................................................79

5. Loss Causation....................................................80

V. DISCUSSION............................................................80

A. ACTS OF MARKET MANIPULATION.................................80

1. Manipulative Acts Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.................81

a. ATSI and Cohen...............................................81

b. “Something More”......... 82

c. “Legitimate” Hedging..........................................83

2. The Credit Suisse Defendants’ Participation in Manipulative Acts Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5................................84

B. MISSTATEMENTS OR OMISSIONS OF MATERIAL FACT.............86

1. The Existence of Misleading Statements Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5......................................................86

a. Accuracy and Disclosure........................................87

b. False When Made..............................................89

2. Misstatements “Made” by the Credit Suisse Defendants under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5......................................90

C. SCIENTER.......... 93

1. Motive and Opportunity............................................94

2. Strong Circumstantial Evidence of Conscious Misbehavior or Recklessness....................................................96

a. Structure of Offerings..........................................97

b. Solicitation Conversations Prior to the Offerings...................99

c. High-Volume Short Selling After the Offerings...................100

3. Facts Considered Collectively......................................100

D. LOSS CAUSATION..................................................102

1. Loss Causation With Regard to Market Manipulation.................103

2. Loss Causation with Regard to Misstatements and Omissions ..........103

VI. ORDER ......................... ......................................104

Lead plaintiffs Willard A. Sharette, David Goldman, and Esta Goldman (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), three former shareholders of Energy Conversion Devices, Inc. (“ECD”), brought this suit on behalf of a putative class of “all other persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired common stock of [ECD] between June 18, 2008 and February 12, 2012 (the “Class Period”).” (Cons.Am. Class Action Compl. (“CACAC”), Dkt. No. 48, at ¶ 1.) They named defendants Credit Suisse International and Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC (collectively, the “Credit Suisse Defendants”) and asserted various claims pursuant to Sections 9 (“Section 9”) and 10(b) (“Section 10(b)”) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (the “Exchange Act”), and Rule 10b-5 (“Rule 10b-5”) promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. Section 240.10b-5.

Plaintiffs commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California on June 17, 2013 (Dkt. No. 1), and filed the CACAC in that court on February 3, 2014. However, on October 14, 2014, The Honorable Saundra Brown, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, issued an Order, sua sponte, requiring the parties to show cause as to why the action should not be transferred to the Southern District of New York, or, in the alternative, to file a stipulation requesting that the ease be transferred to the Southern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a) (“Section 1404(a)”). (Dkt. No. 68.) The parties stipulated to an Order (Dkt. No. 69), granted by Judge Brown (Dkt. No. 70), pursuant to which the case was transferred to this Court.

Prior to such transfer, the Credit Suisse Defendants had filed a Motion to Dismiss the CACAC (“Motion” or “Mot.” Dkt. No. 53) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”), and that Motion is presently before the Court. Accompanying their Motion, the Credit Suisse Defendants also filed a Request for Judicial Notice in support of the Motion (“Request for Judicial Notice” or “Req. Jud. Not.,” Dkt. No. 54), asking the Court to take judicial notice of eight public documents (Dkt. No. 55). The Request for Judicial Notice, which Plaintiffs have not opposed, is also presently before the Court.

I. BACKGROUND

A. TWO OFFERINGS OF ECD STOCK

ECD was a manufacturer of solar power technology. Specifically, it manufactured photovoltaic solar laminates that generated renewable energy by converting sunlight into electricity. ECD’s products were particularly suitable for rooftop application, and were manufactured using a proprietary process and technology developed by ECD through almost 30 years of research.

In 2008, to boost production as demand for its products grew, ECD needed to raise capital. To this end, ECD entered into a share lending agreement (the “Share Lending Agreement”) with the Credit Suisse Defendants, who agreed to serve as the lead underwriters for two offerings of ECD stock that were made in tandem. The principal offering (the “Convertible Notes Offering”) involved $316 million in notes convertible into ECD common stock (the “Convertible Notes”) and the second securities offering (the “Common Stock Offering,” collectively the “Offerings”) involved 4,714,975 shares of ECD common stock (“ECD Stock”). Through the Common Stock Offering, ECD created a pool of 3,444,975 shares that were made available to the Credit Suisse Defendants to lend out pursuant to the Share Lending Agreement, while the remaining 1,270,000 shares were sold by the Credit Suisse Defendants directly to investors. In the Share Lending Agreement, the Credit Suisse Defendants agreed that the Credit Suisse Defendants would use the ECD stock

solely for the purpose of directly or indirectly ... facilitating the sale and the hedging of the Convertible Notes by the holders thereof or, ... with the prior consent of the Lender, facilitating the sale and the hedging of any additional convertible securities the Lender may issue from time to time by the holders thereof.

(CACAC ¶ 25 (quoting the Share Lending Agreement).)

The Share Lending Agreement was described in two ECD Prospectus Supplements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and dated June 18, 2008, one titled “Common Stock” (the “Common Stock Prospectus”) and the other titled “3.00% Convertible Senior Notes due 2013” (the “Convertible Notes Prospectus,” collectively the “Prospectuses”). As described in the Common Stock Prospectus,

in advance of the [0]ffering[s], [the] Credit Suisse [Defendants] “solicited indications of interest, based on the purchase price negotiated with those potential purchasers, from convertible notes investors seeking to establish a hedge position” and “established a ‘clearing price’ for a number of borrowed shares at which both purchasers of our common stock were willing to purchase borrowed shares offered hereby and investors in our convertible notes were willing to establish hedge positions.”

(Id. ¶ 41 (quoting the Common Stock Prospectus).)

B. SHORT SALES OF ECD STOCK SKYROCKET WHILE THE PRICE OF ECD STOCK PLUMMETS, SENDING ECD INTO BANKRUPTCY

The Offerings occurred on June 18, 2008, and the Credit Suisse Defendants lent out for short sales almost all of the 3,444,975 shares ECD had provided, retaining less than 200,000 shares. At the time of the Offerings, the short interest in ECD stock was approximately 6.7 million shares, so the additional approximately 3.2 million shares shorted after the Offerings represented an increase of roughly 48 percent in short interest in ECD stock.

As the volume of short sales of ECD stock rose sharply, the price of ECD stock dramatically plunged, dropping from approximately $72 per share on June 18, 2008, to less than $1 per share in February 2012. In February 2012, ECD filed for bankruptcy protection, causing massive losses to investors.

C. THE CREDIT SUISSE DEFENDANTS’ ALLEGED MISREPRESENTATIONS AND MANIPULATIVE SCHEME

Plaintiffs allege that the rampant shorting of ECD stock after the Offerings, followed by ECD’s eventual bankruptcy, was all part of a scheme, orchestrated by the Credit Suisse Defendants, to allow “predatory hedge funds” (see, e.g., CACAC ¶ 2) to reap enormous profits while sending ECD stock into a downward spiral. According to the CACAC, the Share Lending Agreement and the Prospectuses misrepresented that the purpose of the Offerings and the related Share Lending Agreement was to promote the sale of the Convertible Notes by assisting investors in “hedging” their investment in these securities. The CA-CAC alleges, however, that the Credit Suisse Defendants intended all along to allow predatory hedge funds to place massive negative bets on ECD stock with very little risk, shorting huge amounts of ECD Stock, such that the short sales effectuated could not be considered part of the “legitimate hedging strategy” (id. ¶ 28) contemplated by the Share Lending Agreement and described in Prospectuses. Plaintiffs allege that the Credit Suisse Defendants were the “architects] of and key participants] in” this manipulative scheme. (Id. ¶ 5.)

1. Convertible Notes, Short Sales, and “Hedging ”

A “convertible note” is a hybrid security with characteristics of both stocks and bonds. “Like bonds, convertible notes pay interest (in this case 3%) and have a maturity date (here, June 15, 2013).” (Id. ¶ 3.) However, “like stock, the price of convertible notes is more sensitive to the earnings prospects of the issuer than an ordinary bond because each note can be converted to equity.” (Id.) If the price of a company’s stock rises enough, it becomes advantageous to an investor in convertible notes to convert its notes into stock at the maturity date. The interests of a company and a purchaser of its convertible notes are therefore aligned.

“Shorting” or “short selling” stock refers to a process whereby an investor borrows stock from a third party and makes a promise to return the stock to the lender at a later date. The investor then sells the stock, which puts downward pressure on the stock. If the stock price goes down, the investor eventually buys the stock back at the new, lower price and then returns the stock to the lender, having turned a profit. However,

a short sale exposes the investor to potentially unlimited downside risk because there is theoretically no limit to how high the price of a shorted stock can rise, and the short seller is obligated to purchase the stock at the prevailing market price on the agreed date and return it to its lender

regardless of whether the stock price drops, rises, or stays the same. (Id. ¶ 6.) Thus, short selling is essentially a bet against a company’s stock; the more a stock price drops, the greater a short seller’s profit, but the more a stock price rises, the greater a short seller’s loss.

Given the properties of convertible notes and short sales, an investor is able to “hedge” against the risk of purchasing a company’s convertible notes by coupling the purchase of such notes with short sales of the same company’s common stock. When the two investments are made in tandem, if a company’s stock prices do drop, causing investors in the company’s convertible notes to lose money in the long term, those, same investors are able to minimize or recover that loss in the short term when they buy back, at a reduced price, the common stock shares they have shorted.

Plaintiffs allege that “the term ‘hedge’ in the context of convertible notes specifically refers to a market neutral investment strategy.”. (Id. ¶ 4. (emphasis added).) According to the CACAC, when “hedging,” investors do not make “rampant short sales.” (Id. ¶ 26.) Rather, they

short only the number of shares necessary to protect against the downside risk to the notes created by swings in the equity price of the underlying stock, thereby creating a market neutral position. The appropriate number of shares necessary to do this is called the “hedge ratio.”

(Id.)

In the case at hand, each individual Convertible Note had a face value of $1,000 and could be converted into 10.892 shares of ECD stock. This valuation meant that a purchaser of a Convertible Note effectively paid $91.80 per share of ECD stock. Since the price of ECD stock was approximately $72 at the time of the Offerings, the price of ECD stock would have had to rise significantly — to a value of at least greater than $91.80 — in order for a holder of a Convertible Note to have an incentive to convert the note to ECD stock. The CACAC posits that under conditions such as these, when the market price of the underlying stock is substantially below the conversion price, the hedge ratio is “less than 50 percent of the number of shares that a note can be converted into.” (Id.) (citing Thoma, Beat, “Convertible Bonds— Strategies and Concepts,” Fisch Asset Management (2013).) Furthermore, the CACAC alleges that

the hedge ratio declines as the price of underlying stock goes down because under these circumstances the convertible note behaves more like a bond and less like a stock. For this reason, an investor pursuing a strategy of hedging an investment in convertible notes will actually start buying the stock of a company when the price of the stock declines, taking downward pressure off the stock and creating buy-side demand that would support the price of the stock.

(CACAC ¶ 26.)

Thus, when an investor in convertible notes pursues a “legitimate hedging strategy” by engaging in short sales, even though short sales in isolation constitute a short term bet against a company,

the interests of [the hedging] investor ... are [actually] aligned with those of the underlying company’s shareholders because both are ‘long’ on the Company, that is, both are betting on the Company and hoping for its profitability.

(Id. (emphasis added).) In other words, the CACAC alleges, as part of a “hedge,” an investor does not short sell in excess of the hedge ratio, attempting to drive down the price of a company’s stock and make a profit through buying the stock back at a lower price. Instead, an investor pursuing a hedging strategy shorts only a limited amount of stock in accordance with the hedge ratio, offsetting the risk of investment in that company’s convertible notes while maintaining its “long” investment in the company’s success.

2. Short Sales With Almost No Risk; Misaligned Investor And Shareholder Interests

The CACAC asserts that two considerations traditionally limit investors’ ability to make short sales. First, as discussed above, short sales have potentially unlimited downside risk because there are technically no bounds to how high the price of a stock can rise. Second, an investor must pay a fee to the lender in order to borrow the stock and short it, and “[t]his fee can be quite high, especially as interest in shorting a stock increases.” (Id. ¶ 6.)

Plaintiffs allege that both of these risks were purposefully eliminated by Credit Suisse when it structured the Offerings. A short seller’s potentially unlimited risk due to the possibility of rising stock prices was effectively removed by the conversion option embedded in the Convertible Notes, since investors could ultimately change their Convertible Notes into stock to cover losses incurred through short sales if the price of ECD stock rose. Since each Convertible Note could be converted into 10.8932 shares of ECD stock,

a hedge fund could short up to this number of shares without running any risk that the price of ECD stock would go up and cause the hedge fund to lose money on its short position. This conversion right acted as an insurance policy on hedge funds’ shorting.

(7<£¶ 30.)

Additionally, the borrowing costs traditionally associated with short sales were also all but eliminated, because the Share Lending Agreement provided that the Credit Suisse Defendants would lend ECD stock to investors to short for the nominal fee of only one cent. This fee was allegedly far below market rates, as — according to the CACAC—

a short seller ordinarily may have to pay a significant percentage of the value of a stock that is difficult to borrow (such as one where the share price is declining as was the case with respect to ECD), see, e.g., D’Avolio, Gene, “The Market For Borrowing Stock,” Journal of Financial Economics 66 (2002) ... Thus, whereas it [typically] would have cost ... millions of dollars a year to borrow the roughly 3.4 million ECD shares loaned pursuant to the Share Lending Agreement, the [total] borrowing cost was just $34,000.

(Id. ¶ 29.)

The CACAC alleges that this arrangement “created a perfect ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ investment vehicle [for the Credit Suisse Defendants] to sell to hedge funds.” (id. ¶ 31.) This result follows because, as the CACAC further alleges with the support of detailed calculations, pursuant to the structure of the Offerings “a hypothetical hedge fund that purchased a single Convertible Note and who sold short 10.8932 shares, the number of ECD shares that the Note could be converted into[,]” stood to earn more money the further ECD’s stock declined, and actually lost money if the stock rose. (Id.) In fact, Plaintiffs assert, if such a hedge fund shorted 10.8932 shares of ECD stock at the market price of $72 per share, and ECD’s stock price then fell to only $0.02 per share, that hedge fund would make a profit of 519% on its initial investment, with almost all the profit coming from the short sales. In contrast, in the event that ECD’s stock prices rose significantly to $150 per share, such a hedge fund would suffer a 19% decline in its investment.

Thus, the CACAC alleges, unlike with a traditional “hedge,” in which the interests of shareholders and noteholders are aligned, here those interests were opposed. In fact, according to Plaintiffs, the potentially massive profits for a hypothetical hedge fund purchasing one Convertible Note and shorting 10.8932 shares would accrue even in the event of ECD’s bankruptcy' — which ultimately did occur — because

ECD was a capital — intense Company whose assets allowed for a substantial recovery on the Convertible Notes in bankruptcy. Thus even if the bankruptcy only paid fifty cents on the dollar, an investor in the Note-short sale scheme would still double its money.

(Id. ¶ 33.) Furthermore, the relatively low risk to investors of a significant rise in ECD’s stock price when shorting 1(18932 shares of ECD stock (only 19% loss if the stock rose to $150 per share) combined with the potential for massive gains if ECD’s stock price plummeted (a generous 519% profit if the stock fell to $0.02 per share and a 100% profit even if ECD fell into bankruptcy), made the Offerings — and the prospect of shorting shares well in excess of the hedge ratio — even more attractive to investors and even more ripe for exploitation by the Credit Suisse Defendants and the “predatory hedge funds.” (Id. ¶ 5.)

In contrast, the CACAC asserts that if investors had engaged in proper “hedging” of the convertible notes, the incentives would have been drastically different. According to Plaintiffs, who again support their allegations with a detailed set of calculations, a hypothetical hedge fund purchasing one Convertible Note and shorting 5.4466 shares would have a 99% return on its investment if the price of ECD stock plummeted to $0.02 per share and a 67% return on its investment if the price rose to $150. Additionally, such an investor would likely not profit, and could potentially even lose money, in the event ECD declared bankruptcy.

3. Allegations Against the Credit Suisse Defendants

Plaintiffs allege that the Credit Suisse Defendants, were the “architect[s] of and key participants] in” a scheme to manipulate the price of ECD stock to ECD’s detriment. (Id. ¶ 5.) According to the CACAC, the Credit Suisse Defendants — although hired by ECD to advance ECD’s interests as the underwriters of the Offerings (id. ¶3) — “carried out a plan which was intended to and did (a) deceive the investing public, including Plaintiffs and the Class; and (b) artificially drive down the price of ECD stock” (id. ¶ 56). The CACAC alleges that, while it was “predatory hedge funds” who actually conducted the massive short sales that decimated ECD’s stock price,, the Credit Suisse Defendants orchestrated the Offerings, as outlined above, for the very purpose of creating an investment vehicle that would allow those hedge funds to make a windfall while sending the price of ECD stock into a downward spiral.

According to the CACAC, the Credit Suisse Defendants — who solicited and negotiated with interested investors prior to the Offerings — “knew in advance of the Offerings how hedge funds planned to exploit the financing scheme to make large sales of ECD stock.” (Id. ¶ 41.) They misled investors by representing in the Share Lending Agreement, to which they were parties, and in the Prospectuses, which they “prepared and/or substantially contributed to” (id. ¶ 14), that they would use borrowed ECD shares only to facilitate investors’ hedging of their investments in ECD’s convertible notes. Then, in their capacity as lead underwriter of the Offerings and contrary to the representations made in the Share Lending Agreement and the Prospectuses, the Credit Suisse Defendants facilitated the market manipulation and destruction of ECD’s stock price by lending out far more shares of common stock for short sales than was actually necessary for investors to “hedge” their positions in ECD’s convertible notes. The actions of the Credit Suisse Defendants, who were allegedly “on both sides of the [0]fferings, simultaneously selling the stock and Notes to investors while soliciting hedge funds to make giant bets against the stock,” allowed hedge funds to make “huge, coordinated” short sales of ECD stock. (Id. ¶ 5.)

The price of ECD stock then “predictably” collapsed in response (id. ¶ 45), sinking from approximately $72 per share on June 18, 2008 to less than $1 per share in February 2012. The “sharp decline” in the value of ECD stock hindered ECD’s ability to secure further financing to run its business, and so “inhibited ECD’s ability to continue operate.” (Id. ¶ 46.) Ultimately, in February 2012 — allegedly as a result of the Credit Suisse Defendants’ market manipulation and misrepresentations — ECD filed for bankruptcy protection, causing ECD shareholders to suffer tremendous losses, even as the Credit Suisse Defendants’ hedge fund clients reaped enormous rewards.

II. CHOICE OF LAW

Before deciding the Motion or the Credit Suisse Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice, the Court must determine which application of the law it must employ in doing so. As described above, the instant action originated in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California and was transferred to this Court pursuant to Section 1404(a). It is well settled that when a suit involving state-law claims is before a district court based on diversity jurisdiction, and is then transferred to a different venue pursuant to Section 1404(a), the transferee court must apply the state law of the transferor court; a transfer of venue under such circumstances “ ‘does not change the law applicable to a diversity case.’ ” Liberty Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., 718 F.3d 138, 154 n. 16 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 530, 110 S.Ct. 1274, 108 L.Ed.2d 443 (1990)).

However, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in the instant action because they arise out of substantive federal law, specifically, the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. (See CACAC ¶¶ 18-19). Under such circumstances, the transferee court must apply its own interpretation of federal law in adjudicating the dispute. See Ctr. Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York, 808 F.Supp. 213, 224 (S.D.N.Y.1992) aff'd, 99 F.3d 401 (2d Cir.1995). When an action is transferred pursuant to Section 1404(a),

[t]he weight of well-reasoned authority supports the application of the substantive federal law of the transferee court.... Federal courts are competent to decide issues of federal law and should not be placed in the awkward position of having to apply the federal law of another circuit when it conflicts with their own circuit’s interpretation.

Id. See also Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36, 40-41 (2d Cir.1993) (“[A] transferee federal court should apply its interpretations of federal law, not the constructions of federal law of the transferor circuit.”).

Consequently, the Court will apply the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the applicable federal law to the adjudication of the Motion and the Request for Judicial Notice.

III. JUDICIAL NOTICE

Because the Court’s ruling on the Credit Suisse Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice affects the information available to the Court in ruling on the Motion, the Court will address the Request for Judicial Notice prior to examining the Motion. The Credit Suisse Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of eight public documents: (1) “[ECD]’s Prospectus Supplement for Convertible Senior Notes filed with the [SEC] on June 18, 2008 (referenced in the [CACAC] at ¶¶ 4-5, 38)”; (2) “ECD’s Prospectus Supplement for Common Stock filed with the SEC on June 18, 2008 (referenced in the [CACAC] at ¶¶ 4-5, 3839)”; (3) “ECD’s Form 10-K filed with the SEC on August 27, 2009”; (4) “ECD’s Form 10-K filed with the SEC on August 31, 2010”; (5) “ECD’s Form 8-K filed with the SEC on August 31, 2010”; (6) “ECD’s Form 10-K filed with the SEC on August 25, 2011”; (7) “ECD’s Form 8-K filed with the SEC on August 25, 2011”; (8) “ECD’s Form 8-K filed with the SEC on February 13, 2012.” (Req. Jud. Not. at 1.)

Under Rule 201(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a court may take judicial notice of “a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it ... can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” See Island Software & Computer Serv., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d 257, 261 (2d Cir.2005). Moreover, matters of which the Court takes judicial notice are not considered matters outside the pleadings; the Court may consider them when adjudicating a motion to dismiss without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Staehr v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 547 F.3d 406, 426 (2d Cir.2008); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007) (“[CJourts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular ... matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”). Additionally, in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint that contains a nondisclosure or misrepresentation claim alleging that “document[s] filed with the SEC failed to disclose certain facts,” it is appropriate for the Court to take judicial notice of and consider those documents, as long as the Court considers them “ ‘only to determine what the documents stated,’ ” and “ ‘not to prove the truth of their contents.’” Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting Kramer v. Time Warner, 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir.1991)). Having been publicly filed with the SEC, these documents “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned” (Fed.R.Evid.201(b)) and “no serious question as to. their authenticity can exist” (Kramer, 937 F.2d at 774).

The case at hand involves a misrepresentation claim, and the documents of which the Credit Suisse Defendants seek judicial notice are public SEC filings discussed in the CACAC. It is therefore appropriate for the Court to take judicial notice of the requested documents and to consider them in adjudicating the Motion, examining the documents only to determine what statements they contain rather than to prove the truth of the documents’ contents. Plaintiffs have been “put on notice by the [Credit Suisse] [Defendants’ proffer of the documents that the district court might consider them” (Kramer, 937 F.2d at 774), and have neither objected to the Court taking judicial notice of the documents nor contested their authenticity in any way. Accordingly, the Credit Suisse Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice is granted.

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

A. RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS

The Motion argues that the CACAC should be dismissed because it fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). This standard is met “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A court should not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim if the factual allegations sufficiently “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The task of a court in ruling on a motion to dismiss is to “assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.” In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 383 F.Supp.2d 566, 574 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd sub nom. Tenney v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., No. 05-3430-CV, 2006 WL 1423785 (2d Cir. May 19, 2006). The court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002).

However, plaintiffs claiming fraud, including securities fraud, must satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) (“Rule 9(b)”) by “stat[ing] with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 9(b); see ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir.2007). A complaint alleging securities fraud must also meet the requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b), which requires that a complaint “specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an 'allegation regarding the statement or omission is based on information or belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.” Id.

B. THE EXCHANGE ACT

Plaintiffs assert two claims against the Credit Suisse Defendants: (1) misrepresentations or omissions of material fact and market manipulation in violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder and (2) misrepresentations or omissions of material fact and a scheme to depress the price and induce the sale of ECD stock in violation of Section 9 of the Exchange Act. The Motion argues that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because: (1) Plaintiffs have failed to allege that the Credit Suisse Defendants engaged in any market manipulation or made a false or misleading statement; (2) Plaintiffs have failed to allege that the Credit Suisse Defendants acted with scienter; and (3) Plaintiffs have failed to allege loss causation. The Court will limit its discussion of the legal standards, as well as its analysis of the merits of the Motion, to that which is relevant to the specific deficiencies alleged.

1. Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and Section 9

Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful “[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance.... ” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder, provides that it is unlawful, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, “(a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact ... or (c) [t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates ... as a fraud or deceit....” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Section 10(b) operates as a “broad” prohibition against manipulation, whether in the form of false statements or market manipulation. United States v. Royer, 549 F.3d 886, 900 (2d Cir.2008); see ATSI, 493 F.3d at 99.

Plaintiffs do not indicate in the CACAC the provisions of Section 9 out of which their claims arise. However, based upon the facts alleged, the Court will construe the CACAC to allege misrepresentations or omissions of material fact in violation of Section 9(a)(4), and a series of manipulative market transactions in violation of Section 9(a)(2). Section 9(a)(4) of the Exchange Act closely parallels Section 10(b), and makes it unlawful for any person selling or offering for sale or purchasing or offering to purchase a security

to make ... any statement which was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it was made, false or misleading with respect to any material fact, and which that person knew or had reasonable ground to believe was so false or misleading.

15 U.S.C. § 781(a)(4); Panfil v. ACC Corp., 768 F.Supp. 54, 59 (W.D.N.Y.1991) aff'd, 952 F.2d 394 (2d Cir.1991); Salvani v. ADVFN PLC, 50 F.Supp.3d 459, 475-77 (S.D.N.Y.2014). Section 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act prohibits the making of a “series of transactions in any security ... creating actual or apparent active trading in such security or raising or depressing the price of such securities, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others.” 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2); Cohen v. Stevanovich, 722 F.Supp.2d 416, 424 (S.D.N.Y.2010). “The central purpose of [S]ection 9(a) is not to prohibit market transactions which may raise or lower the price of securities, but to keep an open and free market where the natural forces of supply and demand determine a security’s price.” S.E.C. v. Malenfant, 784 F.Supp. 141, 144 (S.D.N.Y.1992) (quoting Trane Co. v. O’Connor Securities, 561 F.Supp. 301, 304 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (citing Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 383 (2d Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910, 94 S.Ct. 231, 38 L.Ed.2d 148 (1973))).

2. Market Manipulation

A claim of market manipulation under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 “requires a plaintiff to allege (1) manipulative acts; (2) damage (3) caused by reliance on an assumption of an efficient market free of manipulation; (4) scienter; (5) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities; (6) furthered by the defendant’s use of the mails or any facility of a national securities exchange.” ATSI, 493 F.3d at 101. “In order for market activity to be manipulative, that conduct must involve misrepresentation or nondisclosure.” Wilson v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 671 F.3d 120, 130 (2d Cir.2011). However, allegations of misrepresentations or omissions alone cannot support a claim of market manipulation. ATSI, 493 F.3d at 101. Rather, there must be “wash sales, matched orders, rigged prices, or some other manipulative act intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity.” Cohen, 722 F.Supp.2d at 424 (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476, 97 S.Ct. 1292, 51 L.Ed.2d 480 (1977)). Essentially, a claim of market manipulation

requirefs] a showing that an alleged manipulator engaged in market activity aimed at deceiving investors as to how other market participants have valued a security.... The gravamen of manipulation is deception of investors into believing that prices at which they purchase and sell securities are determined by the natural interplay of supply and demand, not rigged by manipulators.

Wilson, 671 F.3d at 130 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In order to satisfy the heightened pleading standards for fraud, a complaint alleging market manipulation must “plead with particularity the nature, purpose, and effect of the fraudulent conduct and the roles of the defendants.” ATSI, 493 F.3d at 102.

A claim of manipulation, however, can involve facts solely within the defendant’s knowledge; therefore, at the early stages of litigation, the plaintiff need not plead manipulation to the same degree of specificity as a plain misrepresentation claim. See Internet Law Library[, Inc. v. Southridge Capital Mgmt., LLC], 223 F.Supp.2d [474,] 486 [ (S.D.N.Y.2002) ]; [S.E.C. v.] U.S. Envtl., 82 F.Supp.2d [237,] 240 [ (S.D.N.Y.2000) ]; cf. Rombach [v. Chang], 355 F.3d 164,] 175 n. 10 [(2d Cir.2004) ] (relaxing the standard where information was likely to be in the exclusive control of the defendants and analysts).

Id. Accordingly, a plaintiff has adequately pleaded market manipulation when

the complaint sets forth, to the extent possible, what manipulative acts were performed, which defendants performed them, when the manipulative acts were performed, and what effect the scheme had on the market for the securities at issue.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

To assert a claim under Section 9(a)(2), a plaintiff must show “ ‘(1) a series of transactions in a security creating actual or apparent trading in that security or raising or depressing the price of that security, (2) carried out with scienter and (3) for the purpose of inducing the security’s sale or purchase by others ...’” Malenfant, 784 F.Supp. at 144 (quoting Chemetron Corp. v. Bus. Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149, 1164 (5th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 460 U.S. 1007, 103 S.Ct. 1245, 75 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), on remand, 718 F.2d 725, 728 (5th Cir.1983) (footnotes omitted) (iciting Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir.1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822, 91 S.Ct. 41, 27 L.Ed.2d 50 (1970))).

3. Misstatements or Omissions of Material Fact

To state a claim under Section 10b and Rule 10b-5 for misrepresentation, a plaintiff must allege “ ‘(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.’ ” Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 157, 128 S.Ct. 761, 169 L.Ed.2d 627 (2008) (quoted by Fezzani v. Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc., 716 F.3d 18, 27 (2d Cir.2013)); see also ATSI, 493 F.3d at 105.

In order to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements, “[a] securities fraud complaint based on misstatements must (1) specify the statements that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when the statements were made, and (4) explain why the statements were fraudulent.” ATSI, 493 F.3d at 99. Furthermore, in accordance with the PSLRA, “the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.” ATSI, 493 F.3d at 99 (internal quotation marks removed). An omission is actionable “only when the [defendant] is subject to a duty to disclose the omitted facts.” In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir.1993). Although “Rule 10b-5 imposes no duty to disclose all material, nonpublic information, once a party chooses to speak, it has a ‘duty to be both accurate and complete.”’ Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F.Supp.2d 166, 180 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (quoting Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., N.Y., 295 F.3d 312, 331 (2d Cir.2002)).

Section 9(a)(4) “closely parallels” Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, though “at least one court in this Circuit has noted that Section 9(a)(4) creates a higher burden of proof than Section 10(b).” Salvani, 50 F.Supp.3d at 477 (citing Panfil, 768 F.Supp. at 59) (quoting Chemetron, 682 F.2d at 1162). A claim of misstatements under Section 9(a)(4) “ ‘requires a(1) misstatement or omission (2) of material fact (3) made with scienter (4) for the purpose of inducing a sale or purchase of a security (5) on which the plaintiff relied (6) that affected plaintiffs purchase or selling price.’” Salvani, 50 F.Supp.3d at 476 (quoting Chemetron, 682 F.2d at 1161-62 (footnotes omitted)).

4. Scienter

Scienter is defined as “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud” (Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 319, 127 S.Ct. 2499 (internal quotation marks omitted)), and is a required element of fraud, whether accomplished by misrepresentation or market manipulation, and whether in violation of Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, Section 9(a)(2), or Section 9(a)(4) (see, e.g., ATSI, 493 F.3d at 101, 105; Salvani, 50 F.Supp.3d at 476-77; Malenfant, 784 F.Supp. at 144). In order to plead a “strong inference” of scienter, plaintiffs, must allege with particularity either (a) “facts to show that the defendant had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud,” or (b) “facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.” Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). A strong inference of scienter may arise when a plaintiff pleads that a defendant: “(1) benefitted in a concrete and personal way from the purported fraud; (2) engaged in deliberately illegal behavior; (3) knew facts or had access to information suggesting that their public statements were not accurate; or (4) failed to check information they had a duty to monitor.” Employees’ Ret. Sys. of Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Blanford, 794 F.3d 297, 306 (2d Cir.2015) (quoting ECA, 553 F.3d at 199 (quoting Novak, 216 F.3d at 311)). See also S. Cherry St., LLC v. Hennessee Grp. LLC, 573 F.3d 98, 109-10 (2d Cir.2009). In assessing whether a plaintiff has pleaded scienter, courts consider whether all of the facts, taken together, give rise to an inference of scienter that is “at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.” Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 314, 127 S.Ct. 2499.

A complaint has sufficiently alleged “motive and opportunity to commit fraud” if it pleads facts showing that the defendant “benefitted in some concrete and personal way from the purported fraud.” Novak v. Kasaks, 216. F.3d 300, 307-08 (2d Cir.2000). “Motives that are common to most corporate officers ... do not constitute ‘motive’ for the purpose[]” of establishing scienter. ECA Local 134. IBEW Joint Pension Trust of Chicago v. JP Morgan Chase Co., 553 F.3d 187, 198 (2d Cir.2009). The opportunity to commit fraud is generally assumed where the defendant is a corporation or corporate officer. See, e.g., In re AstraZeneca Sec. Litig., 559 F.Supp.2d 453, 468 (S.D.N.Y.2008); Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 446 F.Supp.2d 163, 181 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (“Regarding the ‘opportunity’ prong, courts often assume that corporations, corporate officers, and corporate directors would have the opportunity to commit fraud if they so desired.”).

A plaintiff pleading the “conscious misbehavior or recklessness” theory of scienter must allege conduct which is “highly unreasonable and which represents an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care to the extent that the danger was either known to the defendant or so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.” Kalnit, 264 F.3d at 142 (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, a complaint sufficiently pleads scienter where it alleges defendants had “ ‘knowledge of facts or access to information contradicting their public statements.’ ” Id. (quoting Novak, 216 F.3d at 308).

5. Loss Causation

A plaintiff claiming securities fraud under the Exchange Act — regardless of whether the plaintiff claims misrepresentations or market manipulation, and whether the claims arise out of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 or Section 9(a)— must “adequately allege and prove the traditional elements of causation and loss.” Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 (2005); see also, e.g., ATSI, 493 F.3d at 106; Cohen, 722 F.Supp.2d at 431 (citing Fezzani v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 384 F.Supp.2d 618, 637 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (Under Section 9(a), the alleged manipulative act must have “affected plaintiffs purchase or selling price.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Loss causation is “ ‘the causal link between the alleged misconduct and the economic harm ultimately suffered by the plaintiff.’ ” Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 172 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir.2003)). In the case of a misstatement claim, a plaintiff must plead that “the loss [was] foreseeable and that the loss [was] caused by the materialization of the concealed risk.” Lentell, 396 F.3d at 173.

In the wake of Dura, the Circuit Courts have split over whether loss causation is subject to PSLRA’s heightened pleading standard, and the Second Circuit has explicitly left the question unresolved. See Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.2012). However, courts in this District have historically evaluated loss causation under the notice pleading standard of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 8”) (see, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., 753 F.Supp.2d 206, 234 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“Loss causation need not be pleaded with particularity.”)), and have continued to use the notice pleading standard after Acticon (see, e.g., In re Magnum Hunter Res. Corp. Sec. Litig., 26 F.Supp.3d 278, 292-93 (S.D.N.Y.2014)).

In keeping with the prevailing practice of this District, a short and plain statement that provides the defendant with notice of the loss and its causal connection to the alleged misconduct is therefore sufficient to assert loss causation; pleading the elements with particularity is not required.

V. DISCUSSION

A. ACTS OF MARKET MANIPULATION

The Credit Suisse Defendants assert a two-pronged argument with regard to the Plaintiffs’ claims of market manipulation under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. First, the Credit Suisse Defendants posit that the CACAC fails to plead facts demonstrating the existence of any market manipulation of ECD stock. (Mot. 6-9.) Second, the Credit Suisse Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts supporting the inference that the Credit Suisse Defendants participated in any market manipulation of ECD stock, even if such manipulation did occur. (Mot. 9-10.)

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have pleaded enough facts to support a reasonable inference that market manipulation of ECD stock occurred, and that the Credit Suisse Defendants participated in it.

1. Manipulative Acts Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5

As discussed above in Section rV(B)(2) of this opinion, a claim of market manipulation under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder requires that a plaintiff plead “manipulative acts.” See, e.g., ATSI, 493 F.3d at 101. The Credit Suisse Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege such manipulative acts.

a. ATSI and Cohen

The Motion, relying heavily on ATSI and Cohen, claims that the CACAC fails to allege facts giving rise to an inference of manipulative activity. The Motion argues that in the case at hand — as in ATSI— Plaintiffs have based their allegations of market manipulation on “high-volume selling of ... stock with coinciding drops in the stock price” and- “trading patterns,” and that such allegations are merely “speculative inferences” and insufficient to state a claim. (Mot. 7 (quoting ATSI, 493 F.3d at 102-03).) The Credit Suisse Defendants draw parallels between Plaintiffs in the instant action and the ATSI plaintiffs, who failed to “particularly allege what the defendants did — beyond simply mentioning common types of manipulative activity — or state how this affected the market in ATSI’s stock.” (Mot. 7-8; ATSI, 493 F.3d at 104.) The Credit Suisse Defendants further argue that, like the plaintiffs in Cohen, Plaintiffs “fail to allege even the most basic details of the ... purported illegal short selling,” and that such groundless allegations are the type of claims prohibited by Twombly. (Mot. 8; Cohen, 722 F.Supp.2d at 432.)

However, Plaintiffs are correct that the case at hand is clearly distinguishable from ATSI and Cohen. (See Opp’n 12-13.) (In ATSI, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had manipulated the price of ATSI stock by engaging in “death spiral financing,” which was defined as making high-volume short sales and then converting convertible securities into common stock to cover their short positions). ATSI, 493 F.3d at 96. The ATSI plaintiffs attempted to support their allegations by claiming, that the ATSI defendants had participated in such schemes in the past, as evidenced by “searches in the SEC’s Edgar database!] which] reveal[ed] that of the 38 companies that reported the Levinson Defendants as investors, 30 experienced stock price declines indicative of a ‘death spiral’ financing scheme.” ATSI, 493 F.3d at 97. The ATSI plaintiffs also did not allege any specific acts of short selling or other transactions, but rather argued that the occurrence of high-volume selling and a drop in ATSI stock prices indicated that short selling — as part of “death spiral financing”— had taken place. Id. at 103. The ATSI plaintiffs then “narrow[ed] the list of potential culprits to the defendants because ATSI’s major shareholders said that they were not selling stock, leaving only the defendants with large enough blocks of shares to trade at the observed volumes.” Id.

The Cohen plaintiffs’ pleadings suffered from similar weaknesses. The plaintiffs in Cohen alleged that the defendants had engaged in “naked short selling,” a practice that involves executing short sales of stock without first borrowing the stock or ensuring that the stock can be borrowed to settle the short sale. Cohen, 722 F.Supp.2d at 421. However, the Cohen plaintiffs could not point to any specific short sales made by any particular defendants, and in support of the occurrence of “naked short sales” only alleged that a particular seller was unable to deliver a security on a settlement date. Id. at 421-24.

In contrast, in the case at hand, Plaintiffs have alleged how many shares were made available to the Credit Suisse Defendants through the Offerings and how many shares the Credit Suisse Defendants lent out for short sales, and these allegations are based on data rather than on circumstantial evidence. (See, e.g., CACAC ¶ 42.) Plaintiffs have also alleged the number of ECD convertible notes sold, demonstrating that investors were shorting on average more than 10 shares of ECD common stock for each convertible note. (Id. ¶ 43.) The CACAC explains in some detail how the Credit Suisse Defendants allegedly structured the Offerings to allow for manipulation (id. ¶¶ 29-36) and how the price of ECD stock then plummeted as ECD’s short volume steadily rose after the Offerings (id. ¶ 45). Plaintiffs’ allegations as to how the alleged manipulative scheme operated are therefore far less speculative than the allegations made by the plaintiffs in ATSI and Cohen.

b. “Something More ”

The Motion further contends that Plaintiffs have merely alleged high-volume short selling, and that “courts have recognized that there is nothing ‘manipulative’ about short selling, even in large volumes.” (Mot. 7 (citing ATSI, 493 F.3d at 103).) This argument mischaracterizes both ATSI and the CACAC. The ATSI court stated that

short selling — even in high volumes — is not, by itself, manipulative ... To be actionable as a manipulative act, short selling must be willfully combined with something more to create a false impression of how market participants value a security. Similarly, purchasing a floor-less convertible security is not, by itself or when coupled with short selling, inherently manipulative.

ATSI, 493 F.3d at 101 (internal citations removed) (emphasis added). Consistent with ATSI, other courts in this district have found that open-market transactions that are not, in and of themselves, manipulative or illegal, may constitute manipulative activity within the meaning of Section 10(b) when coupled with manipulative intent. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Masri, 523 F.Supp.2d 361, 372 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (“The Court concludes ... that if an investor conducts an open-market transaction with the intent of artificially affecting the price of the security, and.not for any legitimate economic reason, it can constitute market manipulation.”); ATSI, 493 F.3d at 102 (“[I]n soipe cases scienter is the only factor that distinguishes legitimate trading from improper manipulation.”).

In the case at hand, Plaintiffs have clearly alleged that short selling was “willfully combined with something more” as required by ATSI and Rule 10(b). Plaintiffs allege that the Credit Suisse Defendants were the “architects and key participant[s] in [a] manipulative scheme.” (CACAC ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs further allege that the Credit Suisse Defendants orchestrated the Offerings for the purpose of allowing their hedge fund clients to make huge profits while sinking the price of ECD stock, hid this purpose from ECD and its investors, and then intentionally lent out far more shares of common stock for short sales than was necessary for investors to “hedge” their positions in ECD’s convertible notes, facilitating the market manipulation—and depression—of ECD’s stock price. (See, e.g., Id. ¶¶ 5, 41, 45, 56.) Plaintiffs have therefore alleged not only high-volume short selling, but also a coordinated scheme engineered by the Credit Suisse Defendants to use short selling to manipulate the price of ECD stock, “creat[ing] a false impression of how market participants value a security.” ATSI, 493 F.3d at 101.

It bears consideration that many of the allegations in the CACAC regarding how the alleged scheme actually operated— how, for example, the hedge funds worked together to engage in “coordinated” short sales (CACAC ¶¶ 5, 8)—and from which manipulative intent can be inferred, do not contain extensive factual detail (see, e.g., id. ¶ 5). Moreover, Plaintffs’ allegations of manipulation must meet the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b)—Plaintiffs must “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b); ATSI, 493 F.3d at 101.

However, where factual detail is absent from the CACAC, it is important to note that a manipulation claim need not be pleaded to the same degree of specificity as a misrepresentation claim when relevant information is likely to be solely within the defendant’s knowledge. ATSI, 493 F.3d at 102. Undoubtedly, the private communications between the Credit Suisse Defendants and their clients as they allegedly collaborated carry out an unlawful scheme to manipulate the price of ECD stock fall squarely in the purview of information that is likely to be in the exclusive control of the Credit Suisse Defendants and their clients, and that may be resolved only through discovery, making dismissal of the action inappropriate at this stage of the proceedings.

c. ‘‘Legitimate’’Hedging

The Motion also criticizes the CACAC for “hing[ing] entirely on the fact that the volume of short sales after the Offerings exceeded what Plaintiffs’ claim was ‘necessary’ for ‘legitimate’ hedging activity.” (Mot. 8.) The Motion points out that the CACAC cites only to a single source for its contention that the appropriate “hedge ratio” under circumstances such as those alleged in the case at hand would have been less than 50 percent of the number of shares the ECD convertible notes could be converted into, and the cited source is “a knowledge-based document prepared by an asset management firm located in Switzerland, and serving primarily clients in the German-speaking region of Europe. The Motion further avers that “[w]hy, or how, this European-based asset management firm serves as any authority whatsoever for what a ‘legitimate hedging’ strategy would be is a mystery — that is unexplained by Plaintiffs [sic] conclusory allegations on such.” (Mot. 8 n. 3 (citing CACAC ¶ 26).)

It is true that many of Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding manipulation are heavily dependent on what they claim the term “hedging” means in the finance world. Essentially, Plaintiffs argue that “hedging” is defined as a market neutral strategy, the employment of such — in the context of the facts at issue — would have resulted in investors shorting far fewer shares per convertible note than they ultimately did. Plaintiffs argue that the Credit Suisse Defendants covenanted and represented that they would use the ECD shares only to facilitate hedging, all the while intending to — and then actually — lending out far more stock for short sales to investors than would be required for hedging, allowing their investors to engage in massive short sales and manipulate the price of ECD stock. If the term “hedging” does not in fact refer to the specific, market neutral strategy alleged by Plaintiffs, and if the strategies employed by the Credit Suisse Defendants’ hedge fund clients can appropriately be characterized as “hedging,” then the Credit Suisse Defendants’ “scheme” entailed little misrepresentation. See Wilson, 671 F.3d at 130 (“In order for market activity to be manipulative, that conduct must involve misrepresentation or nondisclosure.”)

In questioning the definition of “hedging” and “hedge ratio” used in the CA-CAC, however, the Credit Suisse Defendants have merely raised a factual dispute inappropriate for resolution at the pleading stage, before the development of a fuller factual record of discovery, including the opinion of other experts whose testimony may shed better light on these complex economic and industry practice issues. Resolving a disagreement over the interpretation of terminology instrumental to the alleged manipulative scheme — as well as the alleged misstatements and omissions — would require “assaying] the weight of the evidence,” which is not permitted when adjudicating a motion to dismiss. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 383 F.Supp.2d at 574.

The Court therefore finds that the Plaintiffs have alleged enough facts to support a reasonable inference of the occurrence of mani