Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION (Public Version of ECF No. 82) KETANJI BROWN JACKSON, United States District Judge Incarceration inherently involves the relinquishment of many privileges; however, prisoners still retain certain civil rights, including protections against disability discrimination. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 126 S.Ct. 877, 163 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006); Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998). Plaintiff William Pierce — who is profoundly deaf and communicates with American Sign Language — claims that prison officials in the District of Columbia violated his right to be free from unlawful disability discrimination in 2012, when Pierce was incarcerated in the District’s Correctional Treatment Facility following his guilty plea to a simple assault that arose out of a domestic dispute with his then-partner. The District’s prison staff was indisputably aware that Pierce was deaf; however, during the entire 51-day period in which Pierce was held in custody, no staff person ever assessed Pierce’s need for accommodation or otherwise undertook to determine the type of assistance that he would need to communicate effectively with others during his incarceration. Instead, according to Pierce, the District’s employees and contractors merely assumed that lip-reading and exchanging written notes would suffice, and they largely ignored his repeated requests for an interpreter to assist him in interacting with other people. As a result, Pierce asserts that he was forced to serve his prison time in abject isolation, generally unaware of what was going on around him and unable to communicate effectively with prison officials, prison doctors, his counsel- or, his teacher, or his fellow inmates. Pierce has filed the instant lawsuit against the District under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub.L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796, seeking damages for allegedly having been denied an effective means of receiving or imparting information at various critical points during his period of incarceration, including medical appointments, rehabilitative classes, and meetings with prison officials. {See Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶22, 49-50.) Pierce also maintains that he was held in solitary confinement as punishment for his repeated requests for an interpreter, and thus, that the District’s employees and contractors retaliated against him in violation of federal law. {See id. ¶¶ 30, 45, 51.) Before this Court at present are the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. {See Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. as to Claims I and II of the Compl., ECF No. 47; Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 49.) The parties vehemently disagree about many of the facts related to this case-most notably, whether Pierce actually had the ability to communicate effectively through lip-reading and written notes, and also whether Pierce actually requested an interpreter as an accommodation for his hearing disability. But in this Court’s view, only one fact is truly material to the question of whether or not Pierce was discriminated against on the basis of his disability and is thus entitled to summary judgment on his discrimination claims (Claims I and II of the complaint), and that fact is entirely undisputed: when Pierce first arrived at the prison facility, the District’s employees and contractors did nothing to evaluate Pierce’s need for accommodation, despite their knowledge that he was disabled. They did not ask Pierce what type of auxiliary aids he needed. They did not hire an expert to assess Pierce’s ability to communicate through written notes or lipreading as opposed to sign language, They did not even consult the Department of Corrections’ own policies to figure out what types of accommodations are ordinarily provided to inmates with hearing disabilities. Instead, they figuratively shrugged and effectively sat on their hands with respect to this plainly hearing-disabled person in their custody, presumably content to rely on their own uninformed beliefs about how best to handle him and certainly failing to engage in any meaningful assessment of his needs. This Court finds that, in so doing, the District denied Pierce meaningful access to prison services and intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of his disability in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Thus, Pierce is entitled to summary judgment and compensatory damages on Claims I and II of his complaint. With respect to the District’s motion for summary judgment on Pierce’s retaliation claim (Claim III), this Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether or not Pierce’s placement in solitary confinement was an act of unlawful retaliation — Pierce contends that prison employees were responding to his repeated requests for an interpreter and the complaints he had made about the prison’s failure to provide accommodations, while the District claims that Pierce was segregated from the general prison population in order to protect him from the violent threats of other inmates. Pierce’s retaliation claim thus involves a genuine dispute of fact that is not appropriately resolved on summary judgment. Accordingly, Pierce’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Claims I and II of the complaint will be GRANTED, and the District’s motion for summary judgment as to Claims I, II, and III will be DENIED. A separate order consistent with this memorandum opinion will follow. I. BACKGROUND A. Basic Facts William Pierce is a resident of the District of Columbia who is profoundly deaf and has other serious medical conditions. (See Pl.’s Stmt, of Undisputed Material Facts (“PL’s Stmt, of Facts”), ECF No. 48-1, ¶ 1; Compl. ¶ 4.) Pierce can make sounds that are audible, but he cannot speak words, and American Sign Language (“ASL”) is his native language. (See PL’s Stmt, of Facts ¶¶ 2, 3.) Pierce relies on ASL to communicate with others-either by interacting directly with other persons who are using ASL themselves, or through the use of a video conferencing device that involves a remote interpreter. (See id. ¶¶ 8-9.) Pierce cannot, and does not, use a traditional telephone; instead, he ordinarily uses ASL via videophone to communicate with hearing individuals. (See id.) Moreover, because Pierce’s proficiency in reading and writing English is far below that of a hearing person, he rarely writes notes and only uses cellphone texting to convey simple, short messages. (See id. ¶¶ 7, 9.) Also, as with many deaf individuals, Pierce has limited lip-reading ability. (See id. ¶¶ 10-11.) At some point prior to February of 2012, Pierce was involved in a domestic dispute with his then-partner, David Holder, after which Pierce was arrested and charged with simple assault. (See id. ¶ 46.) On February 1, 2012, a D.C. Superior Court Judge sentenced Pierce to 60 days in jail, and committed him to the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections (“DOC”) to serve out his sentence in the District’s Correctional Treatment Facility (“CTF”). (See id.; see also Def.’s Stmt, of Facts, ECF No. 50, ¶ 2.) Pierce was then incarcerated at CTF from February 2, 2012, until March 22, 2012. (See PL’s Stmt, of Facts ¶ 51; Def.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶ 6.) He resided in three different units during his incarceration: Medical 96 while he was in general population, and then Medical 82 and the Special Management Unit when he was placed into protective custody. (See PL’s Stmt, of Facts ¶ 50; Def.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶¶ 159-165.) Pierce was in protective custody from February 23, 2012, to March 7, 2012. (See PL’s Stmt, of Facts ¶¶ 102, 112; Def.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶¶ 164,172.) It is undisputed that the District’s employees and contractors were all fully aware that Pierce is deaf. (See PL’s Stmt, of Facts ¶ 69; Def.’s Controverting Stmt, of Facts (“Def.’s Cont. Facts”), ECF No. 61, ¶ 69.) However, no prison staff member assessed whether, or to what extent, Pierce would need accommodations to ensure that he could communicate effectively with others during his incarceration. (See Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 80, at 52:3-4, 53:1-12.) Furthermore, Pierce was not provided with a qualified ASL interpreter at any point during the entire 51-day period he spent in custody, including the 14-day period that Pierce served in solitary confinement-like conditions. B. Disputed Issues . The parties vigorously disagree about how-and, more specifically, whether-Pierce was actually able to communicate effectively with prison officials, health care providers, teachers, and counselors during his incarceration. Pierce claims that he is not skilled at reading lips when people are speaking English, nor can he skillfully interpret notes that people have written to him in English. (See Pl.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶¶ 3, 5, 7, 9, 11.) Accordingly, Pierce asserts that he needs ASL interpretation in order to communicate effectively with people who do not know ASL. (See id. ¶ 12.) The District disagrees, asserting that Pierce can communicate effectively in written English and through lip reading, primarily because Pierce appeared to understand what prison officials said and wrote to him during his incarceration. (See Def.’s Cont. Facts ¶¶ 5, 7, 8, 9; Def.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶¶ 12-17, 28.) In the District’s view, then, exchanging written notes and lip reading were, adequate means of effective communication for .Pierce while he was in custody. (See Def.’s Cont. Facts ¶¶8,11,82,90.) ' ,. The parties also .disagree about when- and whether-Pierce actually asked prison officials, health care providers, and class instructors to accommodate his hearing disability by providing an interpreter to translate for him. . Pierce claims that he requested an interpreter at his initial medical intake interview, at inmate orientation, in his rehabilitation classes, and at all medical appointments. (See Pl.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶¶ 60, 88, 98.) By contrast, the District insists that Pierce only requested a sign language interpreter for certain sessions of his anger management/substanee abuse class. (See Def.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶¶ 19-21, 54, 57.) From the District’s perspective, having not requested an interpreter for most of the interactions that he had with prison officials and others, Pierce is not entitled to contend that the District violated the law by failing to provide him with an interpreter for those interactions. (See Def.’s Opp’n to PL’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (“Def.’s Opp’n”), ECF No, 60, at 1-3.) These two issues — Pierce’s ability to .communicate effectively in English and the extent to which he requested an ASL interpreter — lie at the heart of the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. As explained fully in the analysis section below, this Court ultimately finds that these disputed issues are immaterial to the Court’s conclusion that Pierce was subjected to disability discrimination while he was in DOC custody. (See Part III.A.1, infra.) However,' for present purposes, the parties’ opposing views regarding Pierce’s linguistic abilities and requests for accommodation provide important context for understanding the parties’ allegations regarding Pierce’s prison experience. The specific disputes of fact center on whether .Pierce had communication difficulties with respect to (1) the prison facility’s medical intake and health services, (2) his inmate rehabilitation clashes, (3) the protective custody procedures that were employed in his case, and (4) the prison’s provision of telecommunications, official notifications, and visitation. What follows is a brief summary of the parties’ conflicting descriptions of Pierce’s custodial experience in regard to these matters. 1. Pierce’s Ability To Communicate Effectively During Medical Intake And Health Processes Immediately after Pierce was sentenced and taken into DOC custody, he was sent to the District’s Central Detention Facility for a medical screening and examination, in accordance with ordinary inmate intake procedures. (See PL’s Stmt, of Facts ¶¶47, 88; Def.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶¶8, 9.) This physical was conducted by medical professionals from Unity Healthcare — a private, non-profit entity that contracts with the District of Columbia to provide comprehensive health care services to inmates. (See PL’s Stmt, of Facts ¶ 88; Def.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶ 8, 9.) The parties disagree about whether Pierce requested, or even needed, an ASL interpreter at this initial intake evaluation and also at the many subsequent interactions that Pierce had with prison medical professionals in order to manage his significant and chronic medical conditions. (See PL’s Stmt, of Facts ¶¶ 87-90; Def.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶¶ 27-31.) According to Pierce, during the initial intake process and at his subsequent medical appointments and interventions, prison medical personnel simply assumed they were effectively communicating with him through the exchange of written notes and gestures, despite his request for an ASL interpreter. (See PL’s Stmt, of Facts ¶¶ 88-89, 97-98, 101; see also PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Stmt, of Facts (“PL’s Cont. Facts”), ECF No. 59-2, ¶¶ 28-29.) For example, Pierce claims that, at the initial intake meeting, Pierce wrote to Dr. Fidelis Doh (the doctor who conducted his intake interview) that he needed an ASL interpreter because he had complicated health issues to explain, such as HIV, [******], and new medications. (See PL’s Stmt, of Facts ¶ 88.) Dr. Doh wrote back that they could use written communication. (See id.) Pierce continued- to write that he needed an interpreter, but the doctor did not arrange for one to be provided. (See id.) Instead, Dr. Doh simply turned his computer screen toward Pierce to show him the questions that were written there. (See id. ¶ 89.) Pierce wrote to Dr. Doh that he could not understand the complicated vocabulary and medical jargon on the screen, but the doctor wrote back that Pierce should not worry about it. (See id.) Dr. Doh continued to point at words on the screen; to ask questions orally under the assumption that Pierce could read lips; and to write notes to Pierce throughout the initial intake process. (See id. ¶ 90.) Pierce asserts that, as a result of Unity’s failure to provide him with an ASL interpreter at the initial intake, he was not able to communicate the fact that, prior to his incarceration, he had been taking five prescription medications and had a history of [******]. (¿;60 id' ¶¶ 91_93.) without this information, Unity allegedly failed to give him any [******] me(jication (see id. ¶ 94), and without that medication, Pierce allegedly experienced [******] in prison (see id. ¶ 96). Pierce concedes that he ultimately received treatment for this problem; however, he claims that there was no ASL interpreter to help him communicate with the doctors about his symptoms or chronic condition (see id. ¶ 97), nor was he provided with ah interpreter to facilitate his conversation with the doctor who treated him for a different medical crisis he subsequently experienced (see id. ¶¶ 100-01 (claiming that Pierce suffered from [******] while he was in protective custody and that no interpreter was provided)). For its part, the District maintains that Pierce never requested an ASL interpreter for his medical intake interview or any of his medical appointments, and this was likely so because, in the District’s view, no interpreter was necessary. (See Def.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶¶ 20, 27, 31, 35, 39.) According to the District, Dr. Doh was able to communicate effectively with Pierce in writing and specifically reported that Pierce could read lips. (See id. ¶¶ 27-28.) The District admits that Dr. Doh showed Pierce the medical intake questions on the computer screen rather than getting an interpreter to translate Dr. Doh’s spoken questions, but the District argues that the fact that Pierce answered the questions through gestures and writing shows that Pierce must have understood the questions that he read off the screen. (See id. ¶ 30.) The District also contends that, even if Pierce did have trouble communicating with Dr. Doh, Pierce did not suffer any adverse consequences as a result of those alleged miscommunications. For example, the District points out that the medical professionals at Unity were aware of Pierce’s pre-existing conditions because Pierce signed a written release allowing Unity to obtain Pierce’s medical history from former health care providers. (See id. ¶¶ 32-33.) Moreover, although Pierce was not prescribed preventative medication for [***** *], Pierce did receive prescription [* * * * * *] medication after he [***** *]. (See id. ¶42.) Similarly, the District notes that although Pierce claims he was not able to communicate with his doctors about the [******], the doctor was able to develop a diagnosis ([******]) and prescribed the appropriate treatment ( [******]). (See id. ¶ 44.) 2. Pierce’s Access To Rehabilitative Classes Pierce was enrolled in two inmate programs while at CTF: a class intended to help him with anger management and substance abuse issues, and a class about graphic design. (See Pl.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶ 49; Def.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶¶ 55, 74.) The anger management/substance abuse course consisted of lectures, videos, and group discussion during six or seven class sessions. (See PL’s Stmt, of Facts ¶ 65; Def.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶ 56.) The graphic arts class involved each inmates’ completion of computer-based modules containing written instructions, written tests, and hands-on projects- assignments that were undertaken by the inmates individually and at their own pace, while a CTF employee monitored their progress and made himself or herself available to answer questions and to provide assistance. (See PL’s Stmt, of Facts ¶ 66; Def.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶¶ 77-78.) The parties disagree about the extent to which Pierce was able to understand, and benefit from, these classes. According to Pierce, in the absence of an interpreter, he had great difficulty following the courses; so much so that, dining the first anger management/substance abuse group session that Pierce attended, he allegedly became increasingly agitated and, at one point, even walked out of the session. (PL’s Stmt, of Facts ¶ 64.) Pierce claims that, after this first session, he wrote to the instructor that he was frustrated because he could not understand the lecture without an interpreter. (See id.) And, according to Pierce, this was one of many requests for an interpreter that he made related to his classes; Pierce says that his partner also asked prison officials about securing an interpreter for Pierce for this purpose. (See id. ¶¶ 63, 68.) Pierce also makes allegations regarding prison officials’ responses to these requests — for example, he claims that, in response to the entreaties his partner made on his behalf, Assistant Warden Fulton eventually contacted Gallaudet University — a university for the deaf located in Washington, D.C.— to see if Gallaudet could provide an ASL interpreter for Pierce. (See id. ¶ 71.) According to Pierce, when Fulton learned that Gallaudet interpreters would need to be paid for their services, prison officials demurred, and started looking for other potential ways of accommodating Pierce. (See id. ¶¶ 71-72.) Pierce asserts that, ultimately, the District neither sought, nor found, any outside ASL interpreter for Pierce’s classes. (See id. ¶ 73.) Instead, near the end of his term of incarceration and after some of the sessions had been completed, a chaplain- at CTF volunteered to provide interpretive services for Pierce’s last few anger management/substance abuse classes. (See id. ¶ 75.) With respect to the graphics arts course, another inmate (Justin Clary) allegedly was asked to volunteer to sign for Pierce in approximately two or three classes (see id. ¶ 79); however, according to Pierce, Clary was not a qualified interpreter-he just happened to be severely hard of hearing and also happened to be enrolled in the class (see id. ¶¶ 79, 81)-and thus, Clary was not able to interpret effectively and accurately the written or oral statements that were being made in the class (see id. ¶ 80). The District contests these representations, and maintains that Pierce successfully participated in both the anger management/substance abuse program and the graphic arts course. (See Def.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶¶ 68, 80.) With respect to the anger management/substance abuse program, the District maintains that Pierce was provided with an interpreter for all of the program sessions that took place after he requested one. (See id. ¶ 57.) First, the District says, Assistant Warden Fulton employed Clary to attend program sessions with Pierce and to interpret for him. (See id. ¶¶ 59-60.) Then, after Pierce informed his counselor that Clary was not an adequate interpreter (see id. ¶ 61), the District says that Assistant Warden Fulton contacted Gallaudet University and the ADA Coordinator for DOC in an effort to find an interpreter for Pierce-, but ultimately did not have to hire an interpreter because the chaplain volunteered, and interpreted for Pierce in four classes. (See id. ¶¶ 63-65.) The District also asserts that Pierce received three days of good time credit for his participation in the anger management/substance abuse program, and that he ultimately experienced positive behavioral changes, including less drinking and an increased ability to control his anger. (See id. ¶¶ 68-70.) With respect to the graphic arts vocational programming,. the District insists that Pierce did not request an interpreter for the program, and that an interpreter was not necessary for. him to participate in that particular program. (See id. ¶¶ 83-84.) In fact, according to the District, Pierce’s instructor reported that he was a quick learner and had performed better than some of the non-hearing impaired students enrolled in the course. (See id. ¶ 82.) The District also emphasizes that Pierce completed six modules of the graphic arts course and received six days of good time credit for his efforts. (See id. ¶¶ 80-81.) 3. The Circumstances Surrounding Pierce’s Time In Protective Custody Pierce spent approximately 25% of the total time he was in the custody of the DOC in solitary confinement conditions based on his alleged request for “protective custody” after he was assaulted by another inmate. The parties have a stark disagreement about the circumstances surrounding Pierce’s entrance into protective custody, and also how he was eventually released from that status. Pierce maintains that, on February 23, 2012, he was shoved to the floor by another inmate and that he reached out to Tutwiler, his assigned case manager, to complain about the incident. Tutwiler allegedly wrote a note to Pierce, asking him if he would like to be placed in protective custody. (See Pl.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶ 102.) Pierce contends that he did not understand what protective custody meant or entailed; he wrote back “If necessary.” (See id. ¶¶ 102, 104.) Pierce was then taken to Medical 82, where a unit manager named Points came to Pierce’s new cell and allegedly wrote to Pierce that Pierce needed to handwrite out “I fear for my safety” on a form Points was providing. (See id. ¶ 105.) Pierce was confused by the request and initially refused, but allegedly at Points’s insistence, Pierce copied that statement onto the form. (See id.) Pierce was then placed in protective custody for fourteen days. (See id. ¶¶ 105, 112.) Pierce claims that, because there was no ASL interpreter to facilitate his conversations with Tutwiler and Points, Pierce did not understand that protective custody meant 23 hours per day of solitary confinement; that it would last for at least seven days; that it was voluntary; or that there were procedures by which he could promptly end protective custody status. (See id. ¶¶ 103-04.) According to Pierce, four days after he was placed into protective custody, Pierce allegedly notified Allen, the Facilities Grievance Coordinator, that he had not understood what protective custody meant. (See id. ¶ 107.) Pierce also allegedly stated his belief that his case manager should have discussed the meaning of protective custody with him. (See id.) Allen allegedly responded in writing: ‘You should have read it before you signed it.” (See id.) Pierce allegedly replied in writing, “I had no choice because they told me to sign.” (See id.) At some point, Pierce told Griffin, another case manager, that he wanted to leave protective custody and return to the general population. (See id. ¶ 108.) Griffin passed Pierce’s request on to other staff, and on March 1, 2012, Assistant Warden Fulton learned that Pierce wanted to leave protective custody. (See id. ¶¶ 108, 109.) Fulton was also allegedly told that Pierce had asked to have a lawyer present before signing the waiver form that was necessary for release back into the general population, and although Fulton apparently thought this was unusual, he purportedly did not ask why Pierce would not sign the form despite wanting to leave protective custody. (See id. ¶ 109.) Instead, Pierce alleges that Fulton advised the staff to keep Pierce in protective custody and to review his status in one week. (See id.) Thereafter, according to Pierce, CTF employees moved Pierce to a different segregation cell, this time in the Special Management Unit (“SMU”). (See id. ¶¶110-111.) Pierce felt that SMU was much worse than Medical 82; in SMU, Pierce was still on 23-hour lockdown, but he did not have a roommate and could only see out of his cell through a small window in the metal door. (See id. ¶ 111.) Pierce was not released from SMU until March 7, 2012. (See id. ¶ 112.) The District has an entirely different view of the circumstances preceding Pierce’s confinement in protective custody. First of all, according to the District, Points fully explained to Pierce in writing what “protective custody” meant. (See Def.’s Cont. Facts ¶ 104.) The District claims that Points also told Pierce that, if Pierce wanted to be placed in protective custody, Pierce would need to write on the protective custody request form why Pierce wanted to be placed in protective custody. (See id. ¶ 105.) Pierce then allegedly voluntarily wrote out on the form, “I fear for my safety. HIV + ” and signed it. (See id.) Thus, the District maintains that Points did not require Pierce to -write on the form at all, much less to make any specific statement. (See id.) The District also claims that, once Pierce filled out the protective custody request form, Assistant Warden Fulton was prohibited from removing Pierce from protective custody status until Pierce signed a protective custody waiver indicating that Pierce no longer feared for his safety. (See id. ¶ 109.) According to the District, Pierce knew that he needed to sign the waiver if he wanted to be removed from protective custody, but Pierce refused to sign the waiver form anyway. (See id.) Moreover, the District claims that, per CTF policy, inmates in protective custody are subject to review every seven days and thus Fulton’s direction to the staff to review Pierce’s status in seven days was in accordance with facility policy. (See id.) The District also contends that Pierce was confined under the same conditions in both Medical 82 and the Special Management Unit. (See id. ¶ 111.) 4. Deaf Inmates’ Rights To Telecommunications, Official Notifications, And Visitation Finally, and not surprisingly, the parties tell completely different stories regarding certain privileges that inmates ordinarily receive at CTF and the extent to which deaf inmates such as Pierce are afforded equal access to them. For example, according to Pierce, hearing inmates in the general population in the prison’s medical unit have access to telephones seven days a week, are permitted to use the telephone for 10 minutes at a time, and do not need to request permission in advance to use the telephones. (See Pl.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶ 114.) Pierce, on the other hand, allegedly had much more limited access to telecommunications, even apart from the fact that CTF provides deaf inmates with an outmoded TTY device instead of a modern videophone. Pierce claims that his access to the TTY device varied depending on where he was housed because, in order for him to place a call, DOC officials required him to make an appointment in advance to use the TTY, which was available only in his case manager’s office. (See id. ¶¶ 115, 124.) Moreover, according to Pierce, prison officials demanded the presence of his case manager or another CTF employee while he was using the TTY device. (See id. ¶ 124.) Pierce alleges that his case manager’s hours were typically only Monday through Friday from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., which substantially restricted his TTY usage window, and even when his case manager was on duty, she allegedly would only grant Pierce’s requests to use the TTY machine at her convenience. (See id. ¶¶ 124-25.) Pierce also alleges that his calls were strictly limited to 10 minutes, even though communicating using a TTY device takes substantially more time than communicating using a telephone. (See id. ¶ 126.) In response to Pierce’s accusations regarding his unequal access to telecommunications, the District maintains that Pierce was provided access to the TTY device when he requested it (see Def.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶ 110), and that he did not request use of a videophone while at CTF (id. ¶ 22). Furthermore, the District contends that the TTY device must be kept in the case manager’s office “for security reasons” (id. ¶ 112), and that the practical differences between using a TTY device and using a telephone justify the different access policies that apply to hearing and hearing-disabled inmates. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 115 (“The TTY device cannot be left unsecured in the housing unit, where it could pose a security risk or become contraband.”); id. ¶ 116 (“CTF staff must be present during TTY calls, which are not subject to security monitoring and recording like the regular inmate telephones.”).) Pierce alleges that inequities also exist with respect to both the visitation processes that are afforded to deaf inmates at CTF and the official notification announcements that CTF staff make. Regarding visitation, Pierce claims that he was handcuffed during at least one visit from his partner and his mother (see Pl.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶ 137), which is problematic because Pierce communicates with his mother using ASL and needs to have his hands free in order to speak. The District responds that Pierce did not request any accommodations with respect to visitation while he was at CTF (see Def.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶ 150), and that it is standard CTF policy that all inmates in protective custody be restrained when they are outside their cells. (See id. ¶ 139.) Thus, the District claims that it was merely following policy when Pierce was restrained during a visit with his mother and Holder. (See id. ¶ 148.) The District also points out (and Pierce concedes) that an exception was made in Pierce’s case, and that his handcuffs were removed once Pierce’s mother explained the problem to CTF authorities. Pierce’s alleged concern about official notifications remained unresolved, however. Pierce asserts that, because there was no visual alarm to alert him to announcements or to notify him of an emergency lockdown, fire, or other emergency when his cell door was closed, he was constantly anxious and worried about missing important information. (See Pl.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶¶ 134-135.) The District contends that Pierce’s anxiety was unfounded, because each housing unit at CTF has alarms in the hallways consisting of a very loud alarm and strobe lights that are visible from inside each of the cells, including the cells that Pierce occupied during his incarceration at CTF. (Def.’s Stmt, of Facts ¶¶ 123-24.) Furthermore, with respect to Pierce’s claim that he was not provided access to a visual alarm for other notifications, the District claims that CTF does not use a loud speaker or other type of auditory system for making notifications or announcements to inmates (see id. ¶ 129), and that, instead, written notifications and announcements are posted on the bulletin boards in the housing units, which are accessible to all inmates when they are out of their cells. (See id. ¶ 127.) C. Procedural History On February 1, 2013 — exactly one year after Pierce was first committed to the custody of the DOC — Pierce filed the instant three-count complaint against the District. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Claims I and II of Pierce’s complaint allege that the District “intentionally” discriminated against Pierce in violation of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act “by failing to provide Mr. Pierce adequate access to a qualified ASL interpreter, telecommunications devices, visual alarms[,] and visitation.” (Id. ¶ 49 (Claim I, Title II of the ADA); id. ¶ 50 (Claim II, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).) In Claim III, Pierce alleges that the District also violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act by “retailat[ing] against [him] for asserting his rights” under those statutes. (See id. ¶ 51.) After the parties engaged in discovery and attempted to resolve the case through mediation (see Order Referring Case for Mediation, ECF No. 40), Pierce filed a motion for summary judgment as to Claims I and II of his complaint (see PL’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. as to Claims I and II of the Compl., ECF No. 47). Pierce argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on Claims I and II because the District violated Title II and Section 504 by (1) failing to provide Pierce with a qualified ASL interpreter for his rehabilitation classes, medical treatment, and the grievance process (see PL’s Mem. in Supp. of PL’s Mot (“PL’s Mot.”), ECF No. 48-2 at 18-32); (2) providing a TTY machine to Pierce to make phone calls rather than a videophone and limiting the times at which and duration for which Pierce could make phone calls (see id. at 32-35); (3) not providing a visual or tactile alarm to Pierce for both routine and emergency notifications (see id. at 35-36); and (4) handcuffing Pierce during a visit with his mother and partner (see id. at 36). Pierce asserts that he did not move for summary judgment with respect to Claim III of his complaint because there is a material factual dispute regarding whether he was placed in protective custody because he requested accommodations for his disability. (See PL’s Mem. in Opp’n to Defi’s Mot. (“PL’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 59-1, at 45-48.) The District has not only opposed Pierce’s motion for summary judgment (see Def.’s Opp’n to PL’s Mot. (“Def.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 60), it has also filed one of its own (see Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defi’s Mot.”), ECF No. 49). The District contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on Claims I and II because, in the District’s view, the only accommodations that Pierce requested during his time at CTF were an interpreter for his anger management/substance abuse class, the use of a TTY device, and to be un-euffed during his visit with his mother and partner-accommodations that the District says it readily provided. (See Def.’s Mot. at 7-16.) To the extent that Pierce argues that the District should have accommodated him by providing an ASL interpreter at other times, the District contends that it cannot be held liable for its failure to provide accommodations that were not requested. (See id. at 5, 6, 16, 21.) The District also argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Pierce’s retaliation claim (Claim III) because, in the District’s view, the prison staff did not take any adverse action against Pierce as a result of his requests for accommodation. (See id. at 17-18.) This Court held a hearing on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment on April 23, 2015. (See Minute Entry for Proceedings dated Apr. 23, 2015.) II. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Motions for Summary Judgment Under Rule 56 The parties’ cross motions for summary judgment compel this Court to undertake “the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is a need for trial — -whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact - because they may reasonably be resolved in: favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the “initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, such “evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.Cir.2011). This is because “[cjredi-bility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge[.]” Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 330 n. 2, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (“If ... there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference in the [nonmoving party’s] favor may be drawn, the moving party simply cannot obtain a summary judgment[.]” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). That being said, the mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is not. sufficient to bar summary judgment. See Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The contested fact must be material and the dispute must be genuine. A fact is only material- if it could establish an element of a claim or defense and, therefore, “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law[.]” See id: at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (noting that where a nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient- to establish an element essential to that party’s-case ... there can-be no gériuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case- necessarily renders all other' facts immaterial” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Likewise, a dispute is only genuine if “the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (“If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” (citations omitted).) Where — as here — the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, “each must carry its own burden under the applicable legal standard.” Ehrman v. United States, 429 F.Supp.2d 61, 67 (D.D.C.2006). Accordingly, “[c]ross-mo-tions for summary judgment are treated separately[,]” Act Now to Stop War & End Racism Coal. v. District of Columbia, 905 F.Supp.2d 317, 327 (D.D.C.2012), such that “[a] cross-motion for summary judgment does not concede the factual assertions of the opposing motion[,]” CEI Washington Bureau, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 469 F.3d 126, 129 (D.C.Cir.2006). Indeed, “ ‘neither party waives the right to a full trial on the merits by filing its own motion; each side concedes that no material facts are at issue only for the purposes of its own motion.’ ” See Sherwood v. Washington Post, 871 F.2d 1144, 1147 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.1989) (quoting McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62, 68 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1982) abrogated on other grounds by Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen, 170 F.3d 1111 (D.C.Cir. 1999)). B. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act & Title II of the ADA Pierce has filed the instant lawsuit under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA. Congress enacted Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”) and its companion legislation Title II of the ADA (“Title II”) in 1973 and 1990, respectively, in.order'to address the “lengthy and tragic history of segregation and discrimination” that people with disabilities have faced in the United States. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 461, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (Marshall, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Statement of Representative Van-ik, 117 Cong. Rec. 45974 (1971) (denouncing the disregard for the rights of handicapped citizens in our country as a “shameful oversight]” and noting that handicapped people are “often shunted aside, hidden and ignored”); Statement of Senator Humphrey, 118 Cong. Rec. 525 (1972) (stating that “[t]he time has come when we can no longer tolerate the invisibility of the handicapped in America”). Section 504 and Title II resulted from years of public protests, marches, acts of civil disobedience, and court filings in the 1960s and 1970s-activities that were part of a movement aimed at securing for disabled people the same rights and privileges afforded to able-bodied people. See Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans mth Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of A Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.Rev. 413, 426 (1991). Participants in this civil rights movement insisted that society recognize disabled people not as “unfortunate, afflicted creatures” but as “equal citizens, individually varying across the spectrum of human abilities, whose over-riding needs are freedom from discrimination and a fair chance tó participate fully in society.” Id. at 426-27. With respect to the programs, services, and activities that are provided by, or funded through, government entities, Congress responded by enacting legislation “to provide a clear and comprehensive. national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities” as well as “strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l)-(2) (2012); see also 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)(5) (2012) (acknowledging that “individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination in ... critical areas” of life). To this end, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act specifically states that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Similarly, Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Significantly for present purposes, because Congress was concerned that “[discrimination against the handicapped was ... most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference — of benign neglect[,]” Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295, 105 S.Ct. 712, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985), the express prohibitions against disability-based discrimination in Section 504 and Title II include an affirmative obligation to make benefits, services, and programs accessible to disabled people. That is, an entity that provides services to the public cannot stand idly by while people with disabilities attempt to utilize programs and services designed for the able-bodied; instead, to satisfy Section 504 and Title II, such entities may very well need to act affirmatively to modify, supplement, or tailor their programs and services to make them accessible to persons with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (requiring entities that provide services to the public to (1) make “reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices”; (2) “remov[e] ... architectural, communication, or transportation barriers”; and (3) “provi[de] auxiliary aids and services” so as to enable disabled persons to participate in programs or activities). Moreover, these modifications — called “accommodations” in Section 504 and Title II parlance — must be sufficient to provide a disabled person with an “equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement” as a person who is not disabled. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 305, 105 S.Ct. 712 (quoting regulations implementing Section 504 (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(l)(ii) (2014) (stating that a public entity discriminates in violation of Title II if qualified individuals with disabilities are given an “opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others”). III. ANALYSIS As explained fully below, this Court will grant Pierce’s motion for summary judgment with respect to his Section 504 and Title II discrimination claims (Claims I and II of his complaint) and will deny the District’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety. The Court reaches this conclusion because it finds that the District violated Section 504 and Title II as a matter of law when it failed to evaluate Pierce’s need for accommodation at the time he was taken into custody. (This legal conclusion is entirely independent of the hotly disputed issues regarding whether or not Pierce was, in fact, able to communicate effectively with prison officials, and whether or not Pierce did, in fact, request an ASL interpreter for his interactions while in custody; however, as discussed below, the Court finds that no reasonable jury could agree with the District on these issues, and thus, the District violated Section 504 and Title II on this basis as well.) The Court also finds that, because the District’s failure to evaluate Pierce’s needs amounted to deliberate indifference to Pierce’s rights and the District’s obligations under Section 504 and Title II, the District’s conduct constituted intentional discrimination, and thus, Pierce is entitled to compensatory damages for the mental, emotional, and physical injuries he sustained. However, with respect to Pierce’s retaliation claim, the Court concludes that there are genuine issues of material fact that still need to be resolved; consequently, the District’s motion for summary judgment on the retaliation claim must be denied. A. The District Intentionally And Unlawfully Discriminated Against Pierce When It Eschewed Its Duty To Assess His Need For Accommodation And Denied Him Meaningful Access To Prison Programs And Services To establish disability-based discrimination under Section 504 and Title II, a plaintiff must prove (1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he is being excluded from participation in, or is being denied benefits, services, programs, or other activities for which a public entity is responsible, or is otherwise being discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination is by reason of his disability. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999); Alston v. District of Columbia, 561 F.Supp.2d 29, 37 (D.D.C.2008). Only the second element is at issue here, because the District does not deny that Pierce is a qualified individual with a disability, or that the DOC is a public entity. (See Def.’s Opp’n at 5); see also Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998) (holding that a disabled inmate can state a claim under Title II if, by reason of his disability, he is denied participation in an activity provided in state prison). With respect to the question of whether or not Pierce was excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits of, prison services by reason of his disability in violation of Section 504 and Title II, both parties maintain that they are entitled to summary judgment on the record here, and as discussed above, they have highlighted as “material” certain facts that are primarily related to Pierce’s alleged need for an ASL interpreter and other accommodations, and the circumstances under which Pierce may or may not have requested those accommodations. {See, e.g., PL’s Mot. at 26 (“Without a qualified interpreter in any of his graphics arts classes, and without an interpreter in all but his last three or four anger management/substance abuse classes, Mr. Pierce was clearly denied meaningful access to these programs and was unable to derive any of the benefits from them.”); Def.’s Opp’n at 11 (“Pierce did not request an interpreter for his medical .intake and appointments, [and] his providers were able to communicate with him in writing.”).) However, there is an undisputed threshold fact that, in this Court’s view, so clearly establishes intentional discrimination in violation of Section 504 and Title II that summary judgment must be issued in Pierce’s favor notwithstanding the factual disputes over Pierce’s actual requests and needs: the District took Pierce — an obviously disabled inmate — into custody without undertaking any ex ante evaluation of his accommodation requirements, and when he later requested aid, either rebuffed his inquiries entirely or provided him with whatever auxiliary tools it had on hand. As explained below, this Court holds that the failure of prison staff to conduct an informed assessment of the abilities and accommodation needs of a new inmate who is obviously disabled is intentional discrimination in the form of deliberate indifference and violates Section 504 and Title II as a matter of law. Moreover, the Court concludes that even if the District is correct to contend that the Section 504 and Title II duty to provide accommodations for disabled inmates is triggered only if the inmate requests and ultimately needs accommodation, no reasonable jury could find that Pierce failed to request an ASL interpreter, or that he could communicate effectively without one, on the record presented here. 1. The District Had An Affirmative Duty To Evaluate Pierce’s Accommodation Requirements, And Its Failure To Do So Constituted Disability Discrimination As A Matter Of Law It is clear beyond cavil that the core principle that underlies the protections of Section 504 and Title II is equal access. As explained above, Congress has required entities to provide reasonable accommodations that would permit disabled individuals to access programs and services in addition to prohibiting discriminatory animus, see Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295, 105 S.Ct. 712, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985), and the regulatory scheme that undergirds the anti-discrimination statutes reinforces this reasonable accommodations mandate. Thus, without regard to whether persons with disabilities who seek the benefit of public services have requested accommodation, a public entity that is covered by Title II must “operate each service, program, or activity so that the service, program, or activity, when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by, people with disabilities[,]” 28 C.F.R. § 35.150 (2014), and to satisfy Section 504, recipients of federal funding “shall provide appropriate auxiliary aids to qualified handicapped persons with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills where a refusal to make such provision would discriminatorily impair or exclude the participation of such persons in a program or activities receiving Federal financial assistance[,]” 28 C.F.R. § 42.503(f). Given Congress’s unmistakable intent to create “clear, strong, consistent, [and] enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities” in various aspects of life, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2), and also its recognition that “benign neglect” is a particularly pernicious form of disability discrimination, Alexander, 469 U.S. at 295, 105 S.Ct. 712, the District’s insistence here that prison officials have no legal obligation to provide accommodations for disabled inmates unless the inmate specifically requests such aid — and even then, only if it actually turns out that the inmate really needs the requested accommodation — is untenable and cannot be countenanced. First of all, nothing in the disability discrimination statutes even remotely suggests that covered entities have the option of being passive in their approach to disabled individuals as far as the provision of accommodations is concerned. Quite to the contrary, as explained above, Section 504 and Title II mandate that entities act affirmatively to evaluate the programs and services they offer and to ensure that people with disabilities will have meaningful access to those services. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2); 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a); 28 C.F.R. § 35.150. This affirmative duty is seemingly at its apex in the context of a prison facility, in light of the uneven power dynamic between prison officials and inmates that inherently and appropriately exists, and also the fact that departments of corrections have complete control over whether prison inmates (disabled or not) receive any programs or services at all. Cf. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1928, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011) (explaining that, “to incarcerate, society takes from prisoners the means to provide for their own needs” and thus prisons must provide for prisoners); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (referring to “the common-law view that ‘it is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself ”) (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 191 N.C. 487, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (1926)). Put another way, given that Section 504 and Title II require all entities that provide public services to act affirmatively to ensure that disabled individuals have meaningful access, prisons seemingly have even more responsibility in this regard, because inmates necessarily rely totally upon corrections departments for all of their needs while in custody and do not have the freedom to obtain such services (or the accommodations that permit them to access those services) elsewhere. What is more, the District’s suggestion that a prison facility need not act to accommodate an obviously disabled inmate if the inmate does not ask for accommodations (see Def.’s Mot. at 5) is truly baffling as a matter of law and logic. The District does not explain how inmates with known communications-related difficulties (such as Pierce) are supposed to communicate a need for accommodations, or, for that matter, why the protections of Section 504 and Title II should be construed to be unavailable to such disabled persons unless they somehow manage to overcome their communications-related disability sufficiently enough to convey their need for accommodations effectively. The implications of the District’s analysis are troubling, and they sweep broadly — by the District’s reasoning, it would appear that only a specific request for a wheelchair would trigger any duty to accommodate an inmate who cannot walk, and a blind inmate would need to make a specific request for a cane or a guide if he desired to move about the prison grounds; meanwhile, prison officials could sit idly by, taking no affirmative steps to accommodate such disabled prisoners and expecting to be able to wield the inmate’s failure to request accommodation like some sort of talisman that wards off Section 504 and Title II liability in any future legal action. This imagined state of affairs is unquestionably inconsistent with the text and purpose of the Rehabilitation Act and' the ADA, which means that the District must now face a stark reality: no matter how fervently it holds the belief that a public entity’s duty to provide accommodations arises only by request, there is neither legal nor logical support for that proposition. To be sure, there are times in which courts have held that a disabled person must. request accommodation. See, e.g., Flemmings v. Howard Univ., 198 F.3d 857, 858, 861-62 (D.C.Cir.1999) (holding that an employer did not violate an employee’s rights under Title I of the ADA by failing to accommodate employee’s vertigo-related disabilities because employee failed to request an accommodation). But it is equally clear that the legal significance of the request requirement is merely to put the entity on notice that the person is disabled; it does not serve as a means of shifting the burden of initiating the accommodations process to the disabled individual. See Paulone v. City of Frederick, 787 F.Supp.2d 360, 403-04 (D.Md.2011) (explaining that the “ ‘request requirement’ ... is a function of the fact that ‘a person’s disability and concomitant need for accommodation are not always known ... until the [person] requests an accommodation’ ”) (quoting Kiman v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 451 F.3d 274, 283 (1st Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, the request performs a signaling function — i.e., it alerts the public entity to the disabled person’s need for an accommodation — and where, as here, the inmate’s disability is obvious and indisputably known to the provider of services, no request is necessary. See Robertson v. Las Animas Cnty. Sheriffs Dep’t, 500 F.3d 1185, 1197-98 (10th Cir.2007) (“[A] public entity is on notice that an individual needs an accommodation when it knows that an individual requires one, either because that need is obvious or because the individual requests an accommodation.”); Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir.2001) (“When the plaintiff has alerted the public entity to his need for accommodation (or where the need for accommodation is obvious, or required by statute or regulation), the public entity is on notice that an accommodation is required.... ”). The second overarching reason that the District’s legal position is untenable is that, by reading the antidiscrimination statutes as mandating that public entities provide needed accommodations but not as requiring those entities to take any affirmative steps to ascertain what accommodations might be needed, the District suggests that Section 504 and Title II permit reliance on guesswork and happenstance with respect to the provision of accommodations, when the law clearly requires otherwise. It is well-established (albeit in the employment context) that it violates the ADA if an employer with a duty to provide reasonable accommodations responds to the known disabled condition of an employee by giving that employee whatever aids the employer alone thinks might do the trick, without any actual assessment of the employee’s individual condition or needs in consultation with the employee. See, e.g., Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 315 (3d Cir.1999) (reversing grant of summary judgment to employer because notwithstanding fact that employee’s son “requested accommodations [for plaintiff], informed [the employer] about [employee’s] condition, and provided [the employer] with the means to obtain more information if neededf,]” employer “offered no accommodations or assistance in finding them, made [employee’s] job more difficult, and simply sat back and continued to document her failures”). To the contrary, “[o]nce an employer i