Soto v. City of New York (132 F. Supp. 3d 424, 2015)

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

MARGO K. BRODIE, District Judge:

Plaintiff Rafael Soto commenced the above-captioned action on August 23, 2012. (Compl., Docket Entry No. 1.) On July 26, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, bringing claims against the City of New York, County of Kings, District Attorney Charles J. Hynes, Detective Daniel Bonilla, Police Officer Adam Feder, Assistant District Attorney John Giannotti, Assistant District Attorney Lindsay Gerdes, Lieutenant Christophe Marrow, and Detective Brian Meichsner as Defendants. (Am. Compl., Docket Entry No. 11.) Plaintiff brings claims for: (1) violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments in violation 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) unlawful stop and search; (3) false arrest; (4) denial of substantive due process; (5) malicious abuse of process; (6) malicious prosecution; (7) failure to intervene; (8) conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (9) violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (10) municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Defendants move for summary judgment, (Defs. Mot. for Summary Judgment, Docket Entry No. 54; Defs. Mem. in Support of Defs. Mot. for Summary Judgment (“Defs. Mem”), Docket Entry No. 55), and Plaintiff cross-moves for summary judgment and for sanctions. (Pl. Mots, for Summary Judgment and Sanctions, Docket Entry No. 58.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denies Plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment and sanctions.

I. Background

Plaintiff was arrested and charged with multiple counts of robbery in the second degree and burglary in the first and second degrees, and one count each of attempted assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, kidnapping in the second degree, and unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, stemming from the October 20, 2011 robbery and kidnapping of Masahiro Yoshida (the “robbery-kidnapping”). (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 66; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 66; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 71-73; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 71-73; Deposition of Lindsay Gerdes (“Gerdes Dep.”) 277:2-17, annexed to Decl. of Gregory Mouton (“Mouton Decl.”) as Ex. 27, Docket Entry No. 58-1.)

a. Attempted purchase of the bread route

In the summer of 2011, Masahiro Yoshi-da tried to purchase a bread delivery route from Plaintiff. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 29; Pl. Resp. 56.1¶ 29; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 31(a); Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 31(a).) The company, Mr. Route Incorporated (“Mr. Route”), brokered the transaction. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 30; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 30; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 33(a); Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 33(a).) As part of the process, Yoshida submitted various information to Mr. Route, including a “binder agreement” containing his home address, which was supposed to be sent to Plaintiff if “everything [was] done right.” (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 32-33; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 32-33; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 33(c); Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 33(c); Deposition of Masahiro Yoshida (“Yoshida Dep.”) 14:20-25, annexed to Francolla Decl. as Ex. C.) During the negotiations, to appear as a serious buyer, Yoshida falsely told Plaintiff that he kept $100,000 inside a safe in his apartment. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 33(a); Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 33(a); Defs. 56.1 ¶31; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 31.)

Yoshida also completed a “ride along” of the bread route with Plaintiffs employee, Jonathan Mena. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 34; Pl. Resp. 56.1¶ 34; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 31(b); Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 31(b).) As they drove the route, Yoshida and Mena discussed their personal lives, and Yoshida extended Mena an informal job offer contingent on the route purchase. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 34; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶34; Pl. 56.1¶ 34; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 34.) Yoshida may have told Mena about the purported $100,000 he had to make the purchase. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 33(d); Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 33(d).) Ultimately, negotiations broke down, and the purchase fell through. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 41; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 41.)

b. Kidnapping of Yoshida

In the early morning hours of October 20, 2011, Mena and his friend, Pablo Dickson, kidnapped Yoshida in an attempt to rob him. Earlier that night, Mena called Dickson with a plan to make $20,000 each by robbing someone who had a large sum of money. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 3-6, 24; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 3-6, 24.) Initially, Dickson could not speak with Mena at length, but he called Mena back, discussed the plan, and agreed to it. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶4, 8, 24; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 4, 8, 24.) Mena said it would happen that night. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 8, 24; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 8, 24.)

In the early morning hours of October 20, 2011, Mena picked Dickson up in a van. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 9-10, 24; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 9-10, 24.) At some point, Mena pulled over and covered the van’s license plate with a Minnesota license plate. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 13, 24; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 13, 24; Defs. 56.1 ¶ 40; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 40.) During the drive, Mena confirmed to Dickson that they would each receive a $20,000 “cut” of the money, but that the robbery target had more than $40,000. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 11-12, 24; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 11-12, 24.) Dickson suggested they take all of the money for themselves, but Mena explained that they could not because “the other guy gotta get his cut.” (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 21; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 21; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 11-12, 24; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 11-12, 24.)

At approximately 4:30 AM, Mena and Dickson arrived at an apartment complex where they donned ski masks and confronted their target, Yoshida, at gunpoint. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 14-15, 24; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 14-15, 24; Defs. 56.1 ¶ 3; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 3.) They hit Yoshida repeatedly with their guns, and demanded that Yoshida take them to his apartment. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 16-17, 24; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 16-17, 24; Defs. 56.1 ¶ 3.) Yoshida proceeded to the first-floor, but Mena knew that he actually lived on the second-floor. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 6, 22; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶6, 22.) Mena told Yoshida that he knew Yoshida had $100,000 in a safe in the apartment. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 17, 24; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 17, 24.) After Yoshida told them that there were other people in his apartment, and that he had money in his van, Mena and Dickson dragged him downstairs to the van. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 11-12; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 11-12.)

Mena and Dickson threw Yoshida into the back of his van and, using zip-ties, tied his ankles together and tied his hands behind his back. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 12; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 12.) With Yoshida bound in the back, Mena and Dickson left the area in Yoshida’s van. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 13; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 13.) After responding to a potential burglary, New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) officers discovered Yoshida’s van while canvassing the area around his Brooklyn apartment. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 18; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 18.) They stopped the van, found Yoshida tied up, and arrested Mena and Dickson. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 13; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 13.) The police officers took Mena and Dickson to the 76th Precinct, and Emergency Medical Services transported Yoshida to Long Island College Hospital (“LICH”) for treatment. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 18-19; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 18-19; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 20; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶20; Deposition of Daniel Bonilla (“Bonilla Dep.”) 31:2-32:3, annexed to Francolla Decl. as Ex. E.)

c. Mena and Plaintiffs communication on the day of the kidnapping

On October 19, 2011, approximately twelve hours before the attempted robbery, Plaintiff and Mena exchanged a series of text messages. At 4:09 PM, Mena messaged Plaintiff, “Hey, what’s up?” (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 54; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 54.) At 4:11 PM, Plaintiff asked Mena if he was “trying to deliver bread,” and, a minute later, Mena messaged Plaintiff, “No bro, I’m at home.” (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 55-56; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 55-56; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 60(c)-(d); Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 60(c)-(d).) In that message, Mena continued, “[I]’m just waiting on ya for the other thing. [A]ll the bread shit we can cover tomorrow man,” and, thereafter, Plaintiff messaged Mena, “Okay.” (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶56-57; Pl. Resp. 56.1¶¶ 56-57; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 60(d)-(e); Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 60(d)-(e).) At 4:32 PM, Plaintiff messaged Mena, in Spanish, what the parties agree states, “I just spoke to lo’s he told me that he will call me after 5:00 p.m.” (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 58; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 58; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 60(f); Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 60(f).) Defendants believe these are coded messages about plans for the attempted robbery.

Around 8:44 PM, Mena messaged Plaintiff stating in Spanish, “Socio, yay yo tengo un tiguere que puede vajar pa ya conmi-go.[] Yo le dije que nadamas'le podia dar 10 por que a mi me iban a dar 20 solamen-ta.” (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 59; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 59.) The parties dispute the translation of the Spanish word “tiguere,” but agree that the message otherwise said, “Partner, I already have a dude that can travel over there with me. I told him that I can only give him 10 because I was only going to get 20.” (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 59; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 59; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 60(g); Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 60(g).) Fifteen minutes later, Plaintiff messaged Mena, “I think 10 dollars an hour is fair, please let him know that it’s only for a couple weeks, until my wife recovers from surgery thanks.” (Defs. 56.1¶ 60; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶60; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 60(h); Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 60(h).)

d. The robbery investigation

Defendant Bonilla was assigned as the lead detective investigating Yoshida’s robbery-kidnapping. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 17.) Defendant Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) Gerdes was assigned to handle any prosecution arising from the robbery-kidnapping. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 23; Pl. Resp. 56.1¶ 23; Gerdes Dep. 14:14-15:22.) Defendant ADA Giannotti was assigned to assist with the investigation. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 27; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 27; Gerdes Dep. 15:18-17:3.)

i. Witness interviews

The day of the robbery, Yoshida, Dickson, and Mena were interviewed about the crime. Yoshida was interviewed twice that day: first by Bonilla at LICH, and then by Bonilla and Gerdes at the 76th Precinct. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 30; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 30; Defs. 56.1¶ 27; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶27.) Yoshida described the bread route transaction, explaining that he gave Mr. Route a “binder agreement” with his address and that he falsely told Plaintiff that he had $100,000 in his apartment safe. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 29, 31; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶29, 31; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 31(a), 33(a)-(c); Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 31(a), 33(a)-(e); Yoshida Dep. 15:12-16:4.) Yoshida explained that the binder agreement with his address was supposed to be sent to Plaintiff, and that Plaintiff might have told Mena about the alleged $100,000. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 33(c)-(d); Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 33(c)-(d); Defs. 56.1 ¶ 32; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 32; Yoshida Dep. 14:20-15:25.) Yoshida identified Mena at the Precinct as the person with whom he completed the “ride along” of the bread route. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 32; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 32; Defs. 56.1¶¶ 34-35; Pl. Resp, 56.1 ¶¶ 34-35.)

Yoshida suspected Plaintiff was involved in the robbery and kidnapping, and communicated those suspicions to Defendants; however, the parties dispute the reasons for his suspicions. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 28; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶28.) According to Defendants, Yoshida suspected Plaintiff because Plaintiff was one of only two people that knew: (1) Yoshida’s address and (2) Yoshi-da’s claim about having $100,000 in his apartment’s safe. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 28.) Plaintiff contends that Yoshida only stated that Plaintiff might have Yoshida’s address if Mr. Route provided it to him, and that Plaintiff may have also told Mena about the $100,000. (Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶28; Pl. 56.1¶ 33(d).) Yoshida thought it was possible that Mr. Route and Plaintiff were both involved in the robbery-kidnapping. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 33(f); Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 33(f); Yoshida Dep. 11:12-12:14.)

Dickson was interviewed twice, first by Bonilla, and then by Gerdes and Giannotti in a videotaped interview. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 18; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 18; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 27; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 27; Tr, of Videotaped Interview of Pablo Dickson (“Dickson Int. Tr.”) annexed to Mouton Decl. as Ex. 20.) Dickson discussed his phone calls with Mena about the crime and the “cuts” of the money going to him, Mena, and a third unknown person. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 19-21; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 19-21; Pl. 56.1 ¶24; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶24.) Dickson described the robbery, stating that Mena knew where Yoshida lived and that Yoshida had $100,000 in his safe. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 22; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 22; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 24; Defs. Resp. 56.1¶ 24.)

During his interview with Gerdes and Giannotti, Dickson stated, “[Mena] told me while we was in the van, he was like, “Yo, my boy told me about this.’ And I’m like, ‘Who’s that?’ And he was like Loco, that’s cool. He just told me but I, I think down deep inside he’s the one who knew.” (Dickson Int. Tr. 15; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 28; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 28.) According to Plaintiff, Dickson did not know who Mena was referring to in that statement, and Dickson did not believe there was a third person involved in the robbery. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 28.) Dickson stated he knew Plaintiff, but had not spoken to him since the last time they saw each other. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 29; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 29.) According to Defendants, Dickson also stated that he and Plaintiff grew up together. (Defs. Resp. 56.1¶ 29; Dickson Int. Tr. 28.)

Bonilla attempted to interview Mena, but Mena refused to speak, answering only preliminary background questions. (Defs. 56.1¶ 26; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 26.) It is undisputed that at some point prior to Plaintiffs arrest, Bonilla learned that Mena and Plaintiff were childhood friends and that Plaintiff hired Mena to work for him on his bread delivery route. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 38; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 38.) Bonilla and Gerdes also learned that Mena and Dickson grew up together. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 39; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 39.)

ii. Search of Plaintiffs van

On the night of the robbery, Defendants Marrow and Meichsner drove to Yoshida’s apartment and found the van' used by Dickson and Mena, which was towed back to the 76th Precinct that night. (Defs. 56.1¶¶ 36-37; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 36-37; Dep. of Brian Meichsner (“Meichsner Dep.”) 11:18-12:16, annexed to Francolla Decl. as Ex. I.) The van was registered to Plaintiff, and had a peeling FedEx logo on its side. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 37; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 37; Meichsner Dep. 31:11-16.) On October 21, 2011, when Plaintiff went to the 76th Precinct to retrieve his van, he had his photograph taken. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 42; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 42; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 40; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 40.)

On October 24, 2011, Bonilla, Marrow, and Meichsner searched Plaintiffs van pursuant to a search warrant. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 44; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶44; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 44; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 44.) The officers found zip-ties, zip-tie packaging, and a receipt dated October 17, 2011 from a Home Depot store in New Jersey. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 44-45; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 44-45; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 44; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 44.) The receipt listed a cash purchase of “24” “NAT TIE.” (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 45; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶45; Pl. 56.1¶ 45; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 45.) According to Defendants, this reflected the purchase of two packages of 24-inch zip-ties. (Defs. 56.1 ¶45.) Plaintiff disputes this, asserting that there is no evidence in the record to explain what “24” “NAT TIE” means. (Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 45.) Defendant Gerdes researched “NAT TIE” on the Home Depot website and believed it “stood for natural tie.” (Gerdes Dep. 196:15-18.)

One of the officers vouehered the zip-tie packaging and Home Depot receipt along with the other property recovered from Plaintiffs van. (Property Clerk Voucher Number S037732 (“Property Clerk Voucher”) annexed to Mouton Decl. as Ex. 8; Pl. 56.1¶ 44; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 44.) According to Plaintiff, during discovery in this civil action, he was unable to inspect the zip-tie packaging because it was missing. (Pl. Mem. 8.) On January 14, 2014, defense counsel informed Plaintiffs counsel that the evidence vouchered from Plaintiffs van, including the zip-tie packaging, was not available for inspection because they “were picked up on 8/15/13.” (Jan. 14, 2014 Email from B. Francolla to G. Mouton (“Jan. 14 Email”), annexed to Mouton Decl. as Ex. 29.) Defense counsel explained that he was not told who “picked up” this evidence. (Id.)

iii. Home Depot and surveillance footage

On October 25, 2011, Bonilla visited the New Jersey Home Depot store listed on the receipt. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 46; Pl. Resp. 56.1¶ 46; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 46; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 46.) Bonilla viewed packages of zip-ties on Home Depot’s shelves, and observed similar packaging to the zip-tie packaging recovered from Plaintiffs van. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 47-48; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 47-48.) Bonilla spoke to a Home Depot Loss Prevention Officer about the receipt, (Defs. 56.1¶ 47; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 47), who, according to Defendants, confirmed that the receipt reflected a purchase of 24-inch zip-ties. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶45^7; Defs. Reply. Mem. in Support of Mot. for Summary Judgment (“Defs. Reply”) 4, Docket Entry No. 63.) The Loss Prevention Officer retrieved video surveillance footage from the time and date Bonilla requested, October 17, 2011, and, according to Defendants, used the receipt to “isolate the exact footage” of Mena and Plaintiff purchasing the zip-ties. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 47; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 47.)

The footage shows two men at the Home Depot’s self-checkout aisle. (Defs. 56.1 1148; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 48.) Although neither man had any distinguishing marks or facial features, Bonilla believed that the larger man was Mena and “assumed” the smaller man was Plaintiff. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 56; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 56; Bonilla Dep. 94:2-95:13.)

The parties dispute the evidentiary value of the footage. According to Defendants, the footage showed Plaintiff and Mena purchasing the zip-ties before exiting the store and departing in the same van used in the robbery. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 48.) Plaintiff contends that Bonilla could only identify the items by referencing the receipt, and, because there is no evidence establishing what the receipt shows, Bonil-la did not observe the men purchasing zip-ties. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 51; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 48.) It is undisputed that viewing the footage, Bonilla was able to see two men purchasing two packages, and that the packages were white. (Bonilla Dep. 98:8-11.)

Bonilla had still photographs made from the footage of the two men. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 50; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 50.) Prior to Plaintiffs arrest, Gerdes and Bonilla compared the footage with the photographs and Plaintiffs October 21, 2011 photograph. (Pl. 56.1¶ 57; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 57; Defs. 56.1 ¶ 49; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 49.) They identified Plaintiff in the video based, at least in part, on similarities among all three. (Pl. 56.1¶ 57; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 57; Defs. 56.1 ¶ 49; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 49.) Specifically, the person’s hairline and black hoodie under a black jacket matched Plaintiffs clothing in the October 21, 2011 photograph. (Pl. 56.1¶ 57; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 57; Defs. 56.1 ¶ 49; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 49.) In addition, the footage showed a van with FedEx logo, matching Plaintiffs van, pulling to the Home Depot store’s parking lot. (Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 49; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 46; Bonilla Dep. 92:16-23; Gerdes Dep. 204:5-n.)

iv. Mena and Plaintiffs text messages

Prior to Plaintiffs arrest, Bonilla and Gerdes reviewed text messages between Mena and Plaintiff that were exchanged prior to the robbery-kidnapping, which were taken from Mena’s phone. (Defs. 56.1¶ 52; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 52; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 60; Defs. 56.1 ¶ 60; Copies of text messages (“Text Messages”) annexed to Francolla Decl. as Ex. P.) After reviewing Plaintiffs 4:32 PM message to Mena, which the parties agree translated to “I just spoke to lo’s he told me that he will call me after 5:00 p.m.,” Bonilla believed that “lo’s” referred to Pablo Dickson. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 58; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 58; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 60(f), 61-62 Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 60(f), 61-62; Text Messages.) Mena messaged Plaintiff before the robbery-kidnapping, stating, “Socio, yay yo tengo un tiguere que puede vajar pa ya conmigo. [ ]Yo le dije que nadamas le podia dar 10 por que a mi me iban a dar 20 solamenta.” (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 59; Pl. Resp. 56.1¶ 59; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 63; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 63.) Gerdes looked up the word “ti-guere” on “urbandictionary.com” and determined that it meant a “downhome, dirty dude who will go over there and, like, take care of business.” (PL, 56.1 ¶ 63; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 63; Gerdes Dep. 190:15-192:22.) Defendants assert that Bonilla was independently aware that “tiguere” was slang for a bad person or bad guy, and conveyed this to Gerdes. (Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 63; Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 53, 59.)

e. Plaintiffs arrest and interview

On November 7, 2011, Plaintiff was arrested at the 76th Precinct. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 71; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 71; Defs. 56.1 ¶ 61; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 61.) The parties dispute whether Gerdes, and Marrow and Bonilla jointly decided to arrest Plaintiff. According to Defendants, Bonilla received Gerdes’ approval prior to the arrest. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 62; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 70.) According to Plaintiff, Gerdes, Bonilla and Marrow jointly determined there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 70; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 62.)

At the Precinct, Plaintiff spoke with Bonilla about zip-ties, generally. (Dep. of Raphael Soto (“Pl. Dep.”) 116:17-25, annexed to Francolla Deck as Ex. D.) According to Plaintiff, he needed zip-ties for his bread route, and “[Mena] uses [zip-ties] for ... our bread racks, and to keep the bread racks from moving while he is driving.” (Pl. Dep. 116:17-25; Defs. 56.1 ¶ 63; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 63.) It is undisputed that the bread racks Plaintiff discussed were not in the van during the October 24, 2011 search of his van. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 65; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 65.) Plaintiff also stated that the zip-ties were for a piece of “metal that [was] collapsing” in his van. (Pl. Dep. 116:17-25; Defs. 56.1 ¶ 63; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 63.) Plaintiff asserts that the piece of metal was in the van during the October 24, 2011 search of his van. (Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 65.)

f. Indictment and dismissal

On November 10, 2011, after hearing evidence, including Plaintiffs testimony, a Grand Jury returned a “no true bill” on the single first-degree robbery charge, dismissing that charge. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 72; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 72; Gerdes Dep. 277:2-17.) Gerdes presented additional evidence, and on November 28, 2011, the Grand Jury indicted Plaintiff for multiple counts of robbery in the second degree, burglary in the first and second degrees, and one count each of attempted assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, kidnapping in the second degree, and unlawful imprisonment in the first degree. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 66; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 66; Pl. 56.1 ¶73; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶73; Gerdes Dep. 277:2-17.)

Three months later, Kings County Supreme Court Judge Ruth Shillingford, dismissed the indictment for. a defect in the grand jury proceedings under New York Criminal Procedure Law Section 210.35. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 68: PI. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 68; Feb. 28, 2011 Order of Hon. Ruth Shillingford (“Feb. 28 Order”) 1, annexed to Francolla Decl. as Ex. S.) In a written opinion, the court explained that after the first-degree robbery charge was dismissed and the prosecution presented additional evidence, the Grand Jury was deadlocked. (Feb. 28 Order 2-3.) The Judge concluded that when the prosecutor marshalled the evidence and instructed the jury further on the charges, the prosecutor went too far. (Id. at 3.) According to Judge Shillingford, these acts “resulted in extensive marshall-ing of the evidence to the point of deliberation in the process.” (Id.) Because the Grand Jury returned a “no true bill” on the first-degree robbery charge after Plaintiffs testimony, and continued having difficulty after “extensive additional evidence,” the court found that there was a possibility of prejudice. (Id. at 3-4.) As a result, even if the prosecution established a legally sufficient case, the conduct warranted dismissing the indictment. (Id. at 4.) The court granted the prosecution leave to re-present the evidence to another Grand Jury. (Id. at 5.) On April 2, 2012, the Kings County District Attorney dismissed all charges against Plaintiff. (Defs., 56.1 ¶ 69; Certificate of Disposition Dismissal No. 29456 (“Certificate of Disposition”), annexed to Francolla Decl. as Ex. T.)

II. Discussion

a. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper only when, 'construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 434 (2d Cir.2015); Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 843 (2d Cir.2013); Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 164-65 (2d Cir.2013). The role of the court is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A genuine issue of fact exists when there is sufficient “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Id. The court’s function is to decide “whether, after resolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, a rational juror could find in favor of that party.” Pinto v. Allstate Ins. Co., 221 F.3d 394, 398 (2d Cir.2000).

b. Absolute and Qualified Immunity

As a preliminary matter, Defendants Gerdes and Bonilla argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because they have absolute or qualified immunity from liability for Plaintiffs false arrest and malicious prosecution claims. (Defs. Mem. 15-20.)

i. Absolute immunity

Prosecutors performing duties related to their prosecutorial function are protected from liability under Section 1983 by absolute immunity. See e.g., Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) (“[P]rosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for their conduct in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Warney v. Monroe Cty., 587 F.3d 113, 120-21 (2d Cir.2009). The immunity extends not only to the District Attorney but to all employees engaged with the judicial process. Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 660-61 (2d Cir.1995) (“This includes not only officials performing discretionary acts of a judicial nature, but also individual employees who assist such an official and who act under that official’s direction in performing functions closely tied to the judicial process.”). 'However, “[p]olice and other law enforcement officers generally [only] enjoy absolute immunity from suit based on the substance of their testimony in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.” Sclafani v. Spitzer, 734 F.Supp.2d 288, 296-97 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 333, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) and Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir.2008)). Because absolute immunity “defeats a suit at the outset,” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n. 13, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), and bars its covered claims, it is a threshold issue and courts “are encouraged to determine” whether it is available to defendants at the start of a litigation. Anilao v. Spota, 774 F.Supp.2d 457, 476 (E.D.N.Y.2011); see Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (“[W]e repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.”).

“To determine whether an official enjoys absolute immunity [the Court] take[s] a ‘functional approach,’ examining ‘the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.’ ” Simon v. City of New York, 727 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir.2013), cert. denied — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1934, 188 L.Ed.2d 959 (2014) (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993)). “[T]he official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in question.” Simon, 727 F.3d at 172.

1. ADA Gerdes

Plaintiff argues that his false arrest claim may proceed against Gerdes because Gerdes does not have absolute immunity for her acts during the investigation of Plaintiff. (PL Opp’n 14-16.) According to Plaintiff, Gerdes was “intimately involved” in investigating the robbery-kidnapping and, during the investigation, “she made decisions construing evidence against [him].” (Id. at 16.) Gerdes asserts absolute immunity from Plaintiffs false arrest claim. Gerdes argues that the undisputed record reflects her role as an advocate, and establishes no conduct precluding absolute immunity from Plaintiffs false arrest claim. (Defs. Reply 7.) Because there are material factual disputes about Gerdes’ role in the investigation, the Court cannot determine as a matter of law that Gerdes has absolute immunity from Plaintiffs false arrest claim.

“A prosecutor acting in the role of an advocate in connection with a judicial proceeding is entitled to absolute immunity for all acts ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’ ” Simon, 727 F.3d at 171 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S.Ct. 984). However, “[Pjrosecutors receive only qualified immunity when performing ‘administrative duties and those investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate’s preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings.’ ” Id. at 172 (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606); Bernard v. Cty. of Suffolk, 356 F.3d 495, 502 (2d Cir.2004) (“[Ojnly qualified immunity applies to law enforcement officials, including prosecutors, when they perform investigative functions.”). This distinction follows because investigatory acts “have historically and by precedent been regarded as the work of police, not prosecutors,” Simon, 727 F.3d at 172, and “it is ‘neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not the other,’ ” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606.

“The line between a prosecutor’s advocacy and investigating roles might sometimes be difficult to draw.” Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 347 (2d Cir.2000). Indeed, “[g]ood prosecutors may — usually should — perform acts reasonably characterized as investigative at all phases of a criminal proceeding.” Giraldo v. Kessler, 694 F.3d 161, 166 (2d Cir.2012). However, although “[ajlmost any action by a prosecutor, including his or her direct participation in purely investigative activity, could be said to be in some way related to the ultimate decision whether to prosecute,” Simon, 727 F.3d at 174 (quoting Burns, 500 U.S. at 495, 111 S.Ct. 1934), the Second Circuit has emphasized that “absolute immunity is not so expansive,” Id. Generally, “evaluating evidence and interviewing witnesses ... fall[s] on the absolute immunity side of the line,” putting searches “for the clues and corroboration” leading to an arrest “on the qualified immunity side.” Giraldo, 694 F.3d at 166 (quoting Smith v. Garretto, 147 F.3d 91, 94 (2d Cir.1998) (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606)).

Context is critical, and “it is unhelpful to ascertain the prosecutors’ functional role by isolating each specific act done or not done.” Warney, 587 F.3d at 123. “The investigative acts that are entitled to only qualified immunity are those undertaken in the phase of law enforcement that involves the gathering and piecing together of evidence for indications of criminal activities and determination of the perpetrators.” Giraldo, 694 F.3d at 166. The focus is on whether the act was one at the “core of the prosecutorial function.” Simon, 727 F.3d at 173 n. 6 (citing Giraldo, 694 F.3d at 167).

To understand fully the functional approach to determining a prosecutor’s role, two Second Circuit cases are illustrative. In Wamey, the Second Circuit addressed, the prosecutor’s decision to conduct and disclose DNA testing in a post-conviction proceeding. Wamey, 587 F.3d at 123. The Court highlighted how the decision could vacillate between functions, stating, “[i]f the testing inculpated [plaintiff], it would be a potent tool of the advocacy; if it exculpated [plaintiff], it might be deemed administrative, in the sense that it would entail disclosure; if it inculpated someone else, it would be investigative, at least to the extent that it might identify the real killer.” Id. at 124. Nevertheless, absolute immunity applied because deciding to conduct DNA testing and disclosing the exculpatory results were “integral to the [prosecutor’s] overarching advocacy function of dealing with post-trial initiatives challenging an underlying criminal conviction.” Id. at 123-24. In particular, the prosecutor needed to determine if there was a basis to oppose the petition and if testing would exonerate the plaintiff. Id.

In Giraldo, the Second Circuit considered whether absolute immunity extended to a more traditional investigative function — a witness interview. Giraldo, 694 F.3d at 161. There, after police arrested the plaintiffs boyfriend for domestic abuse, she maintained that it was an accident. 694 F.3d at 164. The police took the plaintiff “against her will” to the District Attorney’s office, where the prosecutor interrogated her. Id. The Second Circuit reversed the denial of absolute immunity. Id. at 167. According to the Court, the interview was well within the “legitimate functions” of a prosecutor because once the police arrested the plaintiffs boyfriend, “legal decisions at the core of the prosecutorial function — pursuit of the charges, arraignment, bail, etc.— had to be made by [the prosecutors] and made quickly.” Id. at 167. The Court further explained that a reasonable prosecutor would need to observe and confirm the plaintiffs account and her credibility in connection with the boyfriend’s prosecution. Id.

Much of Gerdes’ conduct during the robbery investigation is undisputed. The parties agree that “Gerdes, Marrow, and Bon-illa met and discussed the evidence” and “jointly investigated” the. robbery. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 69; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 69.) The day of Mena and Dickson’s arrest,'Gerdes interviewed Dickson and, with Bonilla, interviewed Yoshida. (Pl. 56.1 ¶30; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 30.) Gerdes reviewed various pieces of evidence, including the Home Depot footage, still photographs of the footage and a photograph of Plaintiff. (Gerdes Dep. 185:11-189:22.) In addition, Gerdes reviewed Mena and Plaintiffs text messages, and researched the meaning of “tiguere” from those messages. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 63; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶63; Defs. 56.1 ¶ 52; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 52.) It is undisputed that she played some role in Plaintiffs arrest, although it is disputed whether Gerdes “approved” Plaintiffs arrest or “jointly decided” to arrest him. (Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 70; Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 62.)

Although Gerdes asserts that her conduct was focused on evaluating evidence supporting Mena and Dickson’s prosecution, the record before the Court is unclear. While some of Gerdes’acts, like her interview of Yoshida, appear to be prosecutorial functions, there are material factual gaps that bear on Gerdes’ function in performing other acts. For example, to the extent Gerdes reviewed the zip-tie receipt, Home Depot footage, and text messages to prepare for and proceed with charges against Mena and Dickson, it was a prosecutorial function entitled to absolute immunity. See Giraldo, 694 F.3d at 165 (absolute immunity attaches to “conduct ‘preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom.’ ” (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 33, 96 S.Ct. 984).) However, to the extent Gerdes directed law enforcement to obtain that evidence, and reviewed it to identify Plaintiff and develop probable cause to arrest him, such acts are more akin to a “seareh[] for the clues” or a “gathering and piecing together of evidence for ... determination of the perpetrators” entitled to qualified rather than absolute immunity. Giraldo, 694 F.3d at 166; see Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606 (distinguishing advocatory functions from “the detective’s role in searching for the clues and corroboration” to support an arrest); Flagler v. Trainor, 663 F.3d 543, 549-50 (2d Cir.2011) (prosecutor did not have absolute immunity for “allegedly accessing, or ordering someone to access, [suspect’s] voicemail without her consent, or from persuading [witness’] ex-wife to record telephone calls with [the suspect]” because those acts were “akin to investigatory acts”); see also Zahrey, 221 F.3d at 347 n. 2 (“The majority opinion in Buckley ... suggests that a prosecutor’s conduct prior to the establishment of probable cause should be considered investigative: ‘A prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself to be, an advocate before he has probable cause to have anyone arrested.’ ” (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274, 113 S.Ct. 2606)).

Gerdes’ testimony provides little clarity as to her function during the investigation of Plaintiff, at times suggesting she joined with law enforcement to discover Plaintiffs identity and develop probable cause. (See Gerdes Dep. 78:22-79:8 (“[F]rom day one, the idea that there was this third person involved came to light.... [T]he evidence was pointing towards it being Rafael Soto....”); id. at 187:18-188:10 (describing her review of various evidence at the time and stating “this gave me very, very probative, relevant and powerful evidence connecting Soto to this case”); id. at 188:14-17 (“I was urging the detective to get this video to me quick. To get the results of this information quickly. I mean, [Soto] wasn’t arrested.”); id. at 188:19-23 (“[T]here was a period from 10/20/11 until 11/7/2011, where we were seeing, you know, what direction the evidence pointed us in.” (emphasis added).) Bonilla’s testimony about Gerdes’ role is similarly unhelpful on this issue. (See Bonilla Dep. 19:18-20 (explaining that “ADA Gerdes” was “assisting in the investigation [of Plaintiff].”), id. at 100:25-101:17 (“Q. Was she involved in all the investigative steps taken in this matter? A. Pretty Much.... We were in constant contact in regard[s] to the steps being taken. If she had a suggestion, we would follow that.”).)

Because there are disputed factual issues about Gerdes’ role and conduct during Plaintiffs investigation, at this stage, the Court cannot resolve those disputes and conclude that she is entitled to absolute immunity as a matter of law. However, as discussed infra Part II.c.i., Plaintiffs false arrest claim is nevertheless dismissed as to all Defendants because there was probable cause for his arrest.

2. Detective Bonilla

Defendants assert that Bonilla is also entitled to absolute immunity from Plaintiffs false arrest and malicious prosecution claims. According to Defendants, because Gerdes is entitled to absolute immunity, her exercise of “independent judgment” entitles Bonilla to absolute immunity as well. (Defs. Mem. 19.) Plaintiff asserts that, because Gerdes lacked “independent judgment,” immunity does not apply. (PI. Opp’n 16.)

Because a Section 1983 claim is a constitutional tort, the claims are “guided by common-law principles of tort,” and a plaintiff must establish causation. See Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 193 (2d Cir.2007) (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)); Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 145 (2d Cir.1999). Applying those principles, the Second Circuit has held that an officer may escape liability for a constitutional harm where an intervening cause severs the causal connection between the officer’s unlawful conduct and the harm to the plaintiff. See Townes, 176 F.3d at 146-47. However, where an officer misled or pressured the official exercising judgment, that conduct may prevent an informed decision, and the officer may still be a proximate cause of the injury. See Bermudez v. City of New York, 790 F.3d 368, 375-76 (2d Cir.2015) (finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that investigating officers’ failure to inform the prosecutor “about problems in the initial questioning” of eyewitnesses “could have prevented [the prosecutor] from making an informed decision about the reliability of that evidence”); Zahrey, 221 F.3d at 344 (“[T]here is a constitutional right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of the fabrication of evidence by a government officer acting in an investigatory capacity, at least where the officer foresees that he himself will use the evidence with a resulting deprivation of liberty.”); Townes, 176 F.3d at 147 (Intervening exercise of independent judgment will break the causal chain “in the absence of evidence that the police officer misled or pressured the official who could be expected to exercise independent judgment.”).

Relying exclusively on a district court’s unpublished opinion in Lundt v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-1737, 2013 WL 5298458 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2013), Bonilla argues that he is entitled to absolute immunity because Gerdes exercised independent judgment. (Defs. Mem. 19-20.) In Lundt, the court considered, among other claims, a false arrest claim that “rest[ed] essentially on the assertion that [the arresting officer] ignored exculpatory evidence in his possession.” Lundt, 2013 WL 5298458, at *5. The prosecutor, who received absolute immunity, authorized the arrest with full knowledge of the exculpatory evidence. Id. The court noted that if the prosecutor “ha[d] absolute immunity from any false arrest charge premised on [the prosecutor’s] authorization of an arrest, then [the plaintiff] may not circumvent that immunity by bringing this claim against the investigating officer.” Id.

Bonilla’s reliance on Lundt is misplaced. First, unlike Lundt, where the prosecutor authorized the arrest, here, the parties dispute whether Gerdes authorized the arrest or if Gerdes, Bonilla, and Marrow jointly decided to arrest Plaintiff. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 62; PL 56.1 ¶70.) Second, Lundt involved claims based solely on the prosecutor-authorized arrest, whereas Plaintiff relies on Gerdes’ allegedly investigative acts, which would not be entitled to absolute immunity. As discussed above, given the unclear record, the Court cannot determine whether Gerdes is entitled to absolute immunity. As a result, unlike Lundt, where the court had already granted absolute immunity to the prosecutor, Plaintiff is not circumventing the prosecutor’s absolute immunity. Accordingly, Bonilla is not entitled to absolute immunity.

ii. Qualified Immunity

Even if absolute immunity does not apply, the doctrine of qualified immunity may bar a plaintiffs claims. That doctrine “shields public officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Southerland v. City of New York, 680 F.3d 127, 141 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). “[A] decision dismissing a claim based on qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage may only be granted when a court finds that an official has met his or her burden demonstrating that no rational jury could conclude ‘(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.’ ” Coollick v. Hughes, 699 F.3d 211, 219 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011)); see Morris v. Silvestre, 604 Fed.Appx. 22, 24-25 (2d Cir.2015); Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 164 (2d Cir.2010) (discussing the elements of qualified immunity). A right is “clearly established” when “the contours of the right are sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing, violates that right.” Southerland, 680 F.3d at 141 (alterations omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)); Gilles v. Repicky, 511 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir.2007). Defendants bear the burden of proof to establish that qualified immunity exists. Sudler v. City of New York, 689 F.3d 159, 174 (2d Cir.2012); Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 242 (2d Cir.2011).

Because the application of qualified immunity turns first on the existence of a constitutional violation, the Court addresses its applicability alongside Plaintiffs substantive claims below. Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir.2007) (“As in any § 1983 case on summary judgment, we first determine whether, ‘[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, [] the facts alleged show the [defendants’] conduct violated a constitutional right,’ and only thereafter consider whether qualified immunity shields .individual defendants.” (internal citations omitted) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001))).

c. Section 1983 claims

i. False Arrest

In assessing Section 1983 claims for false arrest, courts generally look to the law of the state in which the arrest occurred. Russo, 479 F.3d at 203. “Under New York law, ‘to prevail on a claim of false arrest a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.’ ” Nzegwu v. Friedman, 605 Fed.Appx. 27, 29 (2d Cir.2015) (quoting Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir.2003)).

“[P]robable cause is an absolute defense to a false arrest claim.” Stansbury v. Wertman, 721 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Torraco v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 615 F.3d 129, 139 (2d Cir. 2010)); Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir.1996). “A police officer has probable cause for an arrest when he has ‘knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime....'" Swartz v. Insogna, 704 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852); Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir.2013) (same). The reviewing court “must consider [only] those facts available to the officer at the time of the arrest and immediately before it.” Stansbury, 721 F.3d at 89 (alteration in original) (quoting Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395 (2d Cir.2006)). The question is whether the facts known to the arresting officer, at the time of the arrest, objectively provided probable cause to support the arrest. Gonzalez, 728 F.3d at 155. As the Second Circuit has held, “that an innocent explanation may be consistent with the facts alleged ... does not negate probable cause.” Panetta, 460 F.3d at 395-96 (internal citation omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir.1985)); see Stansbury, 721 F.3d at 94 (“John’s claim that the perpetrator was 5'5" tall is evidence indicating that Stansbury could be innocent, but this evidence was outweighed by the mountain of evidence to the contrary”)

1. There was probable cause for Plaintiffs arrest

Here, the undisputed facts, read in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, establish that after a nearly three-week investigation into the robbery-kidnapping, Defendants developed probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for conspiracy in the second degree, robbery in the first and second degrees, assault in the first and second degrees, or unlawful imprisonment in the first degree. Gerdes and Bonilla knew from one of the perpetrators that a third person was possibly involved, and that, immediately after the incident, Yoshida suspected Plaintiffs involvement. (Defs. 56.1¶¶ 21, 28; PI. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 21, 28; PI. 56.1¶¶ 12, 24; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 12, 24.) They knew that during the crime the perpetrators believed Yoshida had $100,000 in a safe, and that at least one of the perpetrators knew exactly where Yo-shida lived. (PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 21-22; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 21-22; Defs. 56.1 ¶¶6, 22; PI. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 6, 22) They knew that Yoshida had told Plaintiff about the $100,000 in his apartment safe, and that, if the then-pending purchase transaction had proceeded as expected, Plaintiff was supposed to have Yoshida’s address. (PL 56.1¶ 33; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 33; Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 31-33; PI. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 31-33.) They also knew that Mena and Dickson used Plaintiffs van for the crime, and had attempted to conceal its license plate with a decoy license plate to ensure it was untraceable. (PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 13, 24; Defs. Resp. 56.1¶¶ 13, 24; Defs. 56.1 ¶40; PL Resp. 56.1¶ 40.)

Prior to Plaintiffs arrest, Gerdes and Bonilla also knew that Dickson’s post-arrest statements and Plaintiff and Mena’s text messages from the night of the crime corroborated each other in important respects. Specifically, Gerdes and Bonilla knew that “in the early evening” before the crime, Dickson spoke with Mena briefly but called him back before agreeing to commit the robbery. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 19 Pl. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 19; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 3-7, 24; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶3-7, 24.) Based on Mena and Plaintiffs text messages, Bonilla and Gerdes knew that Dickson’s multiple telephone calls were consistent with Mena’s text messages to Plaintiff, stating that Mena had spoken with “Lo’s” who would have to call Mena back “after 5:00 p.m.” (PI. 56.1 ¶ 58; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 58.) Bon-illa and Gerdes also knew that Dickson’s description of his second call to Mena — in which Dickson learned about the $20,000 pay-outs — aligned, in part, with Mena’s message to Plaintiff that he found a “dude to travel over there” who would get “10” while Mena would get “20.” (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 59; PI. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 59.)

Gerdes and Bonilla also connected Plaintiff to evidence from the crime scene prior to Plaintiffs arrest. After discovering Yo-shida zip-tied, and finding zip-tie packaging and a Home Depot receipt in Plaintiffs van, Bonilla and Gerdes obtained and reviewed the video footage from Home Depot. (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 13, 45 — 49; PI. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 13, 45^9; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 46, 57; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 46, 57.) From that footage, they knew that two men went to Home Depot in a van with a FedEx logo, matching Plaintiffs van, made a purchase, and then left in the same van. After reviewing the footage alongside still frame images from the footage and a photograph of Plaintiff, they concluded that Mena and Plaintiff were the two men in the video. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 49; PI. Resp. 56.1 ¶49; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 50, 56-57; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶50, 56-57.)

Bonilla and Gerdes also concluded, prior to Plaintiffs arrest, Mena and Plaintiff purchased zip-ties at Home Depot based on the Home Depot surveillance footage. (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 48; Gerdes Dep. 187:18-188:10.) While Plaintiff challenges the reliability of the evidence that formed the basis of Bonilla and Gerdes’ conclusion that Mena and Plaintiff were the two individuals in the footage, Plaintiff does not challenge the fact that they reached this conclusion prior to his arrest. (PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 54-59; PI. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 49.) In addition, although Plaintiff argues that this conclusion was mistaken, unreasonable or unreliable, he fails to dispute facts supporting the reasonableness of their conclusion. First, Plaintiff does not dispute that Bonilla saw the zip-tie packaging recovered from Plaintiffs van. Second, Plaintiff does not dispute that Bonilla knew that the Home Depot receipt, also found in Plaintiffs van, listed a purchase of “24” “NAT TIE.” Third, Plaintiff does not dispute that Gerdes researched “NAT TIE” on the Home Depot website and believed it “stood for natural tie,” (Gerdes Dep. 196:15-18), or that after reviewing the receipt, Bonilla went to Home Depot and specifically looked at zip-ties, (PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 45^17; Défs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 45-47). Fourth, Plaintiff does not dispute that Bonilla observed the two men in the footage purchasing two packages that were “white,” although it was only through the receipt that Bonilla could “definitely” know what the men were purchasing. (Bonilla Dep. 98:4-11.) These undisputed facts support the reasonableness of Bonilla’s and Gerdes’ belief that the footage revealed Plaintiff and Mena purchasing zip-ties before the crime.

Based on the totality of facts known by Defendants prior to Plaintiffs arrest, they had probable cause to arrest him for conspiracy to kidnap and for the other substantive offenses he may have “solicited], requested], commanded importune[ed] or intentionally aid[ed].” N.Y. Penal Law § 20.00; N.Y. Penal Law § 105.15.

In arguing against probable cause, Plaintiff does not undercut — or even address — the totality of the undisputed facts. Instead, Plaintiff asks the Court to consider each fact in isolation, and proffers innocent or alternative explanations to undisputed facts, immaterial disputed facts, and alleged “failures to investigate” that he asserts vitiate probable cause. The Court addresses each of Plaintiffs arguments below.

A. Innocent and alternative explanations are insufficient

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ conclusions were unreasonable because they ignored alternative or innocent explanations for Plaintiffs conduct, particularly as to Mena and Plaintiffs text messages and Mena’s use of a decoy license plate the night of the robbery. (PI. Opp’n 6, 10-11.) As discussed below, these arguments are insufficient to defeat the reasonableness of Defendants’ conclusion that there was probable cause to believe Plaintiff was involved in criminal activity, because “[t]he fact that an innocent explanation may be consistent with the facts alleged ... does not negate probable cause.” Crowley, 460 F.3d at 395 (quoting Fama, 758 F.2d at 838).

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants ignored messages and statements that showed the text messages were about the bread route. However, Defendants’ conclusion to the contrary was not unreasonable. Defendants believed that after Plaintiff asked Mena if he was “trying to deliver bread?” Mena explicitly was discussing something else, responding one minute later: “No bro, I’m at home. I’m just waiting on ya for the other thing. [A]ll the bread shit we can cover tomorrow.” (Defs. 56.1 ¶¶ 55-56; PI. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 55-56.) Mena’s messages never return to the bread route. Further, because Defendants knew that Dickson and Mena were supposed to receive $20,000 each from the robbery, it was reasonable to interpret Mena’s text message about paying “20” to himself and “10” to another person as related to the robbery. Mena’s “$20,000” payout was consistent with the text message’s description of his payout as “20.” Although Mena described the second payout as “10” and not “20,” given the totality of the facts and similarities, this discrepancy did not render their conclusion unreasonable or negate probable cause. See United States v. Cancelmo, 64 F.3d 804, 808 (2d Cir.1995) (“Although the conversations may have had an innocent meaning, it can hardly be said that the agents’ interpretations were unreasonable or implausible.”); United States v. Jones, No. 00-CR-182, 2000 WL 1448640, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2000) (“[A]lthough the recorded conversations between Jones and the confidential informants an undercover agent may have had an innocent meaning, Mar-ko’s interpretations of the recorded conversations were reasonable and Magistrate Judge Eaton could rely on them in finding probable cause.”).

Plaintiff also argues that although Mena concealed the license plate on Plaintiffs van during the crime, this was only to conceal Mena’s identity. (PI. Opp’n 6.) However, it was reasonable for Defendants to infer Plaintiffs involvement from this fact. Bonilla and Gerdes knew (1) that concealing the license plate was to ensure the van was untraceable, (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 40; PI. Resp. 56.1 ¶ 40), and (2) that the van’s true owner was not Mena, but Plaintiff, (Defs. 56.1 ¶ 37; PL Resp. 56.1 ¶ 37). Concluding that Mena concealed the van’s license plates to help conceal Plaintiff was reasonable, and given the totality of all other facts, Defendants were not required to exclude the hypothetical innocent explanation that Mena was concealing his own identity. See Posner v. City of New York, No. 11-CV-4859, 2014 WL 185880, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2014) (“The fact that Plaintiff has innocent explanations for the information that was known to Defendants, however, does not mean that they lacked probable cause; it merely means that she might have had viable arguments and defenses to the charges at trial.”).

B. Alleged failures to investigate

Plaintiff also argues that Defendants’ alleged failures to investigate certain leads undermine probable cause. According to Plaintiff, Defendants failed to investigate (1) exculpatory information that the third person involved in the robbery-kidnapping was “Loco,” (2) whether Plaintiff actually received Yoshida’s address from Mr. Route, and (3) whether the broker from Mr. Route was involved. (PI. Opp’n 4-5.) “[T]he failure to make a further inquiry when a reasonable person would have done so may be evidence of a lack of probable cause.” Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 571 (2d Cir.1996). Indeed, “[r]easonable avenues of investigation must be pursued ... [to establish probable cause].” BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123, 128 (7th Cir.1986) (quoted approvingly in Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 647 (2d Cir.1994)). However, law enforcement is “not required to ‘explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest,”’ Wiltshire v. Williams, 576 Fed.Appx. 48, 49 (2d Cir.2014) (quoting Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir.2001)), and after establishing probable cause, “an officer is not required to continue investigating, sifting and weighing information,” Celestin v. City of New York, 581 F.Supp.2d 420, 432 (E.D.N.Y.2008) (citing Panetta, 460 F.3d at 396-98). See Weiner v. McKeefery, 90 F.Supp.3d 17, 32, 2015 WL 1055890, at *9 (E.D.N.Y.2015) (rejecting argument that officer’s failure to review tape recording of underlying incident eliminated probable cause where the sworn statements and interview of victim provided “reasonably trustworthy information” of Plaintiffs crime).

Here, Plaintiffs arguments about Defendants’ failures to investigate are insufficient to vitiate the probable cause for his arrest. Even assuming a jury would believe that Dickson told Defendants that “Loco” was the third person involved, the decision not to investigate “Loco” was reasonable. At the time, Defendants already knew that Yoshida suspected Plaintiffs involvement, and Dickson corroborated Yo-shida’s statements that the perpetrators believed he had $100,000 in his apartment safe. (PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 17, 24; Defs. Resp. 56.1 ¶¶ 17, 24.) Prior to arresting Plaintiff, Defendants obtained Plaintiff and Mena’s text messages and identified Plaintiff on the Home Depot footage, which all suggested Plaintiff was the third person involved with the crime.

Similarly, failing to obtain direct proof that Plaintiff obtained Yoshida’s address or that Mr. Route was not involved in the crime did not vitiate probable cause that Plaintiff was involved. These facts do not plainly exculpate Plaintiff such that further investigation was required — indeed, neither fact precluded the possibility of Plaintiffs involvement. See Jocks, 316 F.3d at 136 (holding that officer was neither “compelled to accept” nor to investigate plaintiffs “unsubstantiated claims” that could have exculpated his conduct); Lowth, 82 F.3d at 572 (refusing to hold that a reasonable police officer would have had to believe the plaintiffs exculpatory claim that “was not obviously true on its face”); accord Waldron, 541 Fed.Appx. at 9 (“Even if the officers had looked at the [allegedly exculpatory] receipt, it did not contain information i