Vaher v. Town of Orangetown (133 F. Supp. 3d 574, 2015)

OPINION AND ORDER

RAMOS, District Judge.

Valdo Vaher (“Plaintiff’) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Town of Orangetown (“the Town”) and Chief Kevin Nulty of the Orangetown Police Department (“OPD”) in his personal capacity (“Defendants”). Plaintiff maintains that Defendants violated his constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”) (Doc. 10). He seeks compensatory and punitive damages for each alleged constitutional violation, and an order directing Defendants to return property that was confiscated from his home as a result of a March 2007 search and seizure, described below. Am. Compl. at 24-25.

Defendants have moved for summary-judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 62). For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

At all times relevant to this suit, Plaintiff was a federal police officer with the United States Department of Veteran Affairs (“VA”), residing in Orangetown, a town in Rockland County, New York. Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs Additional Allegations (“Defs.’ 56.1 Resp.”) (Doc. 72) ¶¶ 49-50.

While this action stems from several encounters between Plaintiff and various members of OPD starting in the early 2000s, Plaintiffs claims derive primarily from two events. First, in March 2007, OPD executed a search warrant and seized ammunition and magazines from Plaintiffs home, which Plaintiff has never recovered (“2007 Search and Seizure”). Two years later, in March 2009, OPD responded to a dispute between Plaintiff and a contractor at Plaintiffs home, in which Plaintiff pulled his gun on the contractor in response to perceived threatening behavior (“2009 Incident”).

1. Pre-2007 Search and Seizure

In the early 2000s, Plaintiff was a member of the New York Army National Guard’s 422nd Military Police Company, as was James Nawoichyk, who later became a Detective at OPD. Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 51-52. Plaintiff asserts that the two men had a tense relationship, primarily because Na-woichyk became suspicious about Plaintiffs previous work for the Estonian army. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff claims that Na-woichyk became interested in Plaintiffs collection of military firearms, but Plaintiff rebuffed Nawoichyk’s requests to see the collection. Id. ¶ 53. Plaintiff also asserts that he complained about Nawoichyk’s treatment towards him to the New York National Guard’s Inspector General Office and to the Commander of the 422nd Military Police Company. Id. ¶¶ 53-56. Plaintiff did not, however, file a formal written complaint or disciplinary proceeding against Nawoichyk while they served in the National Guard together. See Affirmation of Paul E. Svennson (Doc. 63), Ex. C at 36-37, 85.

2. The 2007 Search and Seizure

On March 7, 2007, Plaintiff lived with his mother in Orangetown, New York. Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 58-59. On that day, while Plaintiff was away attending military school in Fort Dix, New Jersey, Plaintiffs mother accidently locked herself out of the house and had to call a local locksmith. Id. ¶¶ 61-62. The locksmith managed to open a door to the garage, and when he looked inside the garage he saw what appeared to be seven or eight rifles, thousands of rounds of ammunition, and large, military-style ammunition boxes. Ex. G at 2. Plaintiff admits that at the time he had several military rifles and several thousand rounds of ammunition in the garage in plain view. Ex. C at 100-02. The locksmith alerted his boss to the large cache of firearms and ammo in Plaintiffs garage, and the following day his boss contacted the Orangetown Police Department. Id.

In response, Nawoichyk, who was by then a Detective at OPD, and his partner, Detective Thomas Hoffman, went to Plaintiffs residence, where they spoke to Plaintiffs mother and asked her about the complaint OPD received from the locksmith. The parties dispute the tenor of this exchange and Plaintiff claims that the Detectives put his mother under duress, but whether coerced or not, it is undisputed that the mother eventually allowed Nawoi-chyk and Hoffman to look around the garage. Plaintiffs Response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 (“Pl.’s 56.1 Resp.”) (Doc. 70) ¶ 3; Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 65-66.

Inside the garage, Nawoichyk saw in plain view several rifles and military-style ammunition cans and containers, some of which contained belts of three or four rounds of ammunition linked together. Ex. H ¶¶ 9-10. While Plaintiff maintains that these rounds were not readily capable of being restored and linked together to form belts of 10 rounds or more, Ex. C at 152, they appeared to Nawoichyk to be so capable, Ex. H ¶ 11. Nawoichyk thus suspected that Plaintiff was in violation of New York Penal Law (“NYPL”) § 265.02(8), Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree, outlawing possession of a “large capacity ammunition feeding device,” defined as “a magazine, belt, drum, feed strip, or similar device ... that has a capacity of, or that can be readily restored or converted to accept, more than ten rounds of ammunition,” § 265.00(23).

After hearing about the incident from his mother, Plaintiff called Nawoichyk to explain that he had the requisite firearm licenses, and to warn Nawoichyk that Plaintiff would not consent to another search of his home. Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 68-70. On March 19, 2007, Plaintiff went into OPD in person to meet with Nawoichyk and Hoffman. Plaintiff showed the Detectives his various firearm licenses. In the course of that conversation, Plaintiff freely admitted that he owned a large capacity ammunition feeding device, but asserted that his licenses allowed him to do so legally. Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 5; Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶ 74; Ex. C at 115-16.

Three days later, after consulting with his supervisor, Detective Lieutenant McAndrew, and the local Assistant District Attorney, Nawoichyk prepared an affidavit and applied for a warrant to search Plaintiffs premises, based on a belief that Plaintiff was in violation of NYPL § 265.02(8). Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶8; Ex. H ¶ 2. That same day, Justice Paul B. Phin-ney III of the Justice Court of the Town of Orangetown issued a warrant, pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”) § 690, authorizing the search of Plaintiffs premises for “a large capacity ammunition feeding device that consist of ammunition, linked together by belt and links such that it can be readily restored and converted to accept more than ten rounds of ammunition.” Ex. I; Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 10. After receiving the search warrant, Nawoichyk, Hoffman, and McAn-drew met to plan the coordination and execution of the search. Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 12; Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶ 78.

On March 26, 2007, Nawoichyk, Hoffman, and McAndrew, along with members of the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATFE) and the Rockland County Sheriffs Department, executed the search warrant. Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 80-81. Plaintiff maintains (and Defendants deny) that the search was conducted in an “abusive and disrespectful manner,” including the destruction of his property, threatening and insulting comments made by officers at the scene, and one member of OPD, Officer Sila, drawing his gun on Plaintiff in a menacing fashion. Id. ¶¶ 87-89, 91. Plaintiff twice tried to call OPD Chief Nulty on the day of the search to complain, but could not reach him and did not leave a message. Accordingly, Nulty never returned the calls. Id. ¶ 84; Ex. C at 182.

The search team seized ten ammunition cans and boxes containing hundreds of ammunition belts with links of three and four rounds, one belt with thirteen linked rounds, and a number of high capacity magazines. See Ex. J (Return Order listing seized items). While Plaintiff attests that the three-round belts were broken such that one could not link them together with other rounds, he also testified that the thirteen-round belt appeared to be multiple three-round links attached together, which he had not yet taken apart despite an intent to do so. See Ex. C at 151— 55.

The following day, Justice Phinney signed the Return Order, which contained a list of items removed from Plaintiffs residence, and was delivered to Plaintiff several weeks later. Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 19-20; Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶94; Ex. J. Upon filing the instant suit, Plaintiff now insists that the Return Order omitted two items that were seized, “a 20" barrel length AR-15 rifle kit consisting of a barrel and two plastic bags and a green military ammunition box with hinges.” Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶ 95. Plaintiff admits that he did not inform OPD of the missing rifle kit or ammunition box when he filed a formal complaint with OPD in January 2008, despite already having access to the Return Order. Ex. C at 164. Defendants deny taking the rifle kit and contend that all seized property was within the scope of the search warrant.

The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was never arrested for weapons possession, and that his seized property was never returned. Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶ 96. The Return Order was issued pursuant to CPL § 690.55(l)(b) and directed OPD to “retain custody of the 10 listed items seized” and “hold the same in a safe and secure place until such time as the court, or another court of competent jurisdiction, should direct the disposition or delivery of said items.” Ex. J. It does not appear from the record that Plaintiff ever petitioned the Justice Court, or any other court, for an order directing the return of his property.

Following the search, Plaintiff contends, and Defendants deny, that Nawoichyk told officials at the 442nd Military Policy Company and the Department of Veterans Affairs that he believed Plaintiff was a “foreign spy and assassin” and a “member of the Estonian Army and terrorist.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 50-52; Ex. C at 69.

As a result of the entire incident, on January 16, 2008, Plaintiff served a Notice of Claim (“2008 Notice of Claim”) on OPD, alleging a violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ex. N. The 2008 Notice of Claim stated that Plaintiff never recovered his seized property, but it did not contain any allegation about a missing rifle kit or ammunition box. Id.

Roughly a year after the 2008 Notice of Claim was served, Plaintiff claims he ran into Nawoichyk at a home improvement store, and Nawoichyk made a “rude and provocative” comment, telling Plaintiff he did not “have a case.” Defendants deny that this encounter took place. See Defs.’ 56.1Resp. ¶ 100; Ex. C at 182-83.

3. The 2009 Incident

Plaintiffs next encounter with OPD did not occur until March 3, 2009. On that day, Plaintiff was engaged in a dispute with a contractor over work the contractor, had done on Plaintiffs home. The dispute escalated when Plaintiff refused to pay the contractor on the basis that the work done was deficient and not up to code. Defs.’ 56.1Resp. ¶¶ 101-02. According to Plaintiff, the contractor cursed at him and picked up a five-foot level, swinging it “in close proximity” to Plaintiffs head, id. ¶ 104, while the contractor claims that he picked up the level in order to show Plaintiff that the work was adequate, Ex. L (Box 74).

Whatever the intent, the swinging level caused Plaintiff to call the OPD and retrieve ' a handgun from inside his house. When he approached the contractor again, Plaintiff maintains that the contractor charged at him with the level and swung a steel tile cutter “in the vicinity” of Plaintiffs head, which then caused Plaintiff to pull his gun and order the contractor to halt. Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 104-05. Plaintiff admits that he pulled the gun because he felt he was being threatened with a deadly instrument. Id. ¶ 109; Ex. C at 202-04.

Shortly thereafter, Officer Robert Sick arrived at Plaintiffs home, after being dispatched in response to Plaintiffs complaint. Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 29. Sick first spoke with the contractor, who was waiting outside of Plaintiffs home, and got his side of the story, including a denial that he wielded a level in order to threaten Plaintiff. Ex. L (Box 74); Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 31-32. Sick inquired whether the contractor wanted to file a charge against Plaintiff for “menacing,” but the contractor declined and just wanted to be paid. Pl.’s 56.1Resp. ¶ 35. Sick then spoke with Plaintiff, and the two men have conflicting accounts of that conversation. Plaintiff claims that Sick “falsely accused him of menacing,” did not give Plaintiff a chance to explain his side of the story, and repeatedly threatened Plaintiff with the prospect of arrest and losing his home if he did not pay the contractor what was owed. Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶ 108. Sick denies making any such threats, but rather maintains that he told Plaintiff that the contractor would not press charges so long as he was paid, and Plaintiff voluntarily agreed to pay. Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 36; Ex. E at 42-45, 54-55. Plaintiff admits that he paid, but says he only agreed to do so under duress. Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶ 110.

Later that day, Sick wrote up and filed an incident report describing the events at Plaintiffs home. Even though he was dispatched in response to the call placed by Plaintiff, Sick put “menacing” under the “Incident Type” category of the report form, and listed the contractor as the “Complainant/Victim” rather than Plaintiff. Ex. L (Boxes 16, 26). Plaintiff was listed as the “Person Reporting.” Id.; Ex. E at 65-66.

Because Plaintiff had told Sick that he was a federal police officer for the Department of Veterans Affairs, Sick told his supervisor, Sergeant Bottari, about the incident, and Bottari then called Plaintiffs supervisors at the VA regarding the incident. Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 37. Plaintiff asserts that as a result of this contact, he was “placed on modified duty,” “ordered to undergo psychological testing,” and was eventually terminated. Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶ 111. Plaintiff was reinstated only s‘after a hearing before the Merit Systems Protection Board.” Id. Plaintiff concedes that he has no documentation of his termination or reinstatement. Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 39.

4. Post-2009 Incident

On March 11, 2010, Plaintiff alleges that an OPD officer pulled him over in his car and approached Plaintiff with his gun drawn and pointed at him. The officer eventually told Plaintiff to leave, and Plaintiff felt “menaced and threatened as a result of this incident.” Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶ 114. Defendants deny that this incident' occurred.

Plaintiff also recounts a number of similar encounters with Sick and other unidentified OPD officers up through 2013, alleging intimidating and intrusive behavior, such as shining bright lights into Plaintiffs home and car on multiple occasions. See Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 113-21. These allegations, however, are not in the Amended Complaint, have never been added to a supplemental complaint, and are relied upon for the first time in Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. They will therefore not be considered by the Court for purposes of the instant motion.

5. Orangetown Police Department

At all times relevant to this suit, Chief Kevin Nulty was the first in command at OPD and reported directly to the Town Board. Reporting directly to Chief Nulty was Captain Robert Zimmerman, second in command. Below Zimmerman were roughly six Lieutenants, including Detective Lieutenant McAndrew, head of the Detectives Bureau. Roughly a dozen Sergeants reported to the Lieutenants, and b'elow them, Officers reported to the Sergeants. Detectives Nawoichyk and Hoffman reported directly to Det. Lt. McAndrew, who would regularly advise on applications for, and executions of, search warrants. See Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 41, 45; Ex. F at 11-13.

Nawoichyk, Hoffman, and McAndrew did not report directly to Nulty. Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶ 41. Nulty testified that his only knowledge of Plaintiff prior to Plaintiffs lawsuit was in regards to the 2009 Incident. Id. ¶ 42. Nulty does not know Plaintiff, never spoke or communicated with him directly, and does not recall receiving Plaintiffs calls during the 2007 Search and Seizure. Id. ¶ 43; Ex. F at 20-21. Nulty had no involvement in the application for, or execution of, search warrants, was not personally involved with the retention and return of seized property, and had no knowledge of any OPD policy of notifying employers when investigating the criminal conduct of one of its employees. Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 44-47; Plaintiff either concedes these facts or lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to their truth.

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff commenced this action on March 1, 2010, by filing a Verified Complaint alleging various constitutional violations by Defendants the Town of Orange-town, the Orangetown Police Department, Kevin Nulty, James Nawoichyk, Thomas Hoffman, “John” Sullivan, and John Does 1-10. (Doc. 1). After encountering problems with serving Nawoichyk, Hoffman, and Sullivan, Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint and a Motion to Permit Late Service, which he did on October 26, 2010 (Doc. 10) and November 2, 2010 (Doc. 13), respectively. The service issues continued over the next year, however, and this Court granted Plaintiff leave to file another motion for an extension of time for service and a motion to compel Defendants to provide the information necessary to complete service (Minute Entry dated Feb. 21, 2012), which Plaintiff filed on March 6, 2012 (Doc. 28). On March 14, 2012, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc.33).

On January 2, 2013, this Court denied Plaintiffs request for a third extension of time to serve Nawoichyk, Hoffman, and Sullivan, and also denied Plaintiffs motion to compel without prejudice, for renewal during discovery. Vaher v. Town of Orangetown, 916 F.Supp.2d 404, 422 (S.D.N.Y.2013). The Court thus dismissed Plaintiffs claims against Nawoichyk, Hoffman, and Sullivan in their entirety, leaving the Town in its municipal capacity and Nulty in his personal capacity as the only remaining Defendants. Id. The Court also dismissed Plaintiffs claims under the Second Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for failure to state a claim. The Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss, however, with respect to Plaintiffs claims under the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 426-41.

Defendants filed their Answer on January 18, 2013. (Doc. 42). After completing discovery, Defendants filed the instant motion on December 12, 2014. (Doc. 62).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment

To prevail on summary judgment, the movant must show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(a). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Senno v. Elmsford Union Free Sch. Dist., 812 F.Supp.2d 454, 467 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (citing SCR Joint Venture L.P. v. Warshawsky, 559 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir.2009)). “A ‘material’ fact is one that might ‘affect the outcome of the litigation under the governing law.’” Id. “The function of the district court in considering the motion for summary judgment is not to resolve disputed questions of fact but only to determine whether, as to any material issue, a genuine factual dispute exists.” Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir.2010). On a summary judgment motion, the district court “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.... ‘Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.’ ” Id. at 545-46 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)).

The party moving for summary judgment is first responsible for demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Like here, where “the burden of proof at trial would fall on the nonmoving party, it ordinarily is sufficient for the movant to point to a lack of evidence to go to the trier of fact on an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim.” Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 204 (2d Cir.2009) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548). If the moving party meets its burden, “the non-moving party must come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to avoid summary judgment.” Jaramillo v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 536 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir.2008) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must “ ‘construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.’ ” Brod v. Omya, Inc., 653 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir.2011) (quoting Williams v. R.H. Donnelley, Corp., 368 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir.2004)). In opposing a motion for summary judgment, however, the non-moving party must do more than simply show “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” or rely on “factual arguments based on conjecture or surmise.” McClellan v. Smith, 439 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir.2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, “the non-moving party must set forth significant, probative evidence on which a reasonable fact-finder could decide in its favor.” Senno, 812 F.Supp.2d at 467-68 (citation omitted).

B. Municipal Liability and Personal Liability Under Section 1983

Plaintiffs constitutional claims against the Town are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). “[Mjunicipalities may be sued directly under § 1983 for constitutional deprivations inflicted upon private individuals pursuant to governmental custom, policy, ordinance, regulation, or decision.” Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir.1983) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018). “[T]o hold a [municipality] liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of its employees, a plaintiff is required to plead and prove three elements: (1) an official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.” Id. Thus, a Monell claim is not “a stand-alone cause of action under which á plaintiff may sue over a governmental policy, regardless of whether he suffered the infliction of a tort resulting from the policy.... Establishing the liability of the municipality requires a showing that the plaintiff suffered a tort in violation of federal law committed by the municipal actors and, in addition, that their commission of the tort resulted from a custom or policy of the municipality.” Askins v. Doe No. 1, 727 F.3d 248, 253 (2d Cir.2013) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018).

A plaintiff can prove the first “policy, custom, or practice” prong in one of four ways:

(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2) actions taken by government officials responsible for establishing the municipal policies that caused the particular deprivation in question; (3) a practice so consistent and widespread that, although not expressly authorized, constitutes a custom or usage of which a supervising policymaker must have been aware; or (4) a failure by policymakers to provide adequate training or supervision to subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of those who come into contact with the municipal employees.

Brandon v. City of New York, 705 F.Supp.2d 261, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (citations omitted). As for the second and third prongs, “Plaintiff must also prove a causal link between the policy, custom or practice and the alleged [constitutional] injury in order to find liability against a municipality.” Id. at 277 (citing Batista, 702 F.2d at 397).

Plaintiff also brings claims against Chief Kevin Nulty in his personal capacity. Personal-capacity suits “seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of state law.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991). Such suits must be premised on a certain level of personal involvement. See Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir.1994) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that ‘personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.’ ”) (quoting Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir.1991)). “An individual cannot be held liable for damages under § 1983 ‘merely because he held a high position of authority,’ but can be held liable if he was personally involved in the alleged deprivation.” Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 127 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir.1996)). A plaintiff can prove personal involvement with evidence that:

(1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference ... by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.

Id. (citation omitted); see also Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir.2013). Additionally, “[wjhile the plaintiff in a personal-capacity suit need not establish a connection to governmental ‘policy or custom,’ officials sued in their personal capacities, unlike those sued in their official capacities, may assert personal immunity defenses.... ” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25, 112 S.Ct. 358.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Fourth Amendment

Plaintiff first alleges that the 2007 Search and Seizure violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 65-69; Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Defs’ Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) 7-11. The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST, amend. IV. The text of the Fourth Amendment “expressly imposes two requirements. First, all searches and seizures must be reasonable. Second, a warrant may not be issued unless probable cause is properly established and the scope of the authorized search is set out with particularity.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff here does not contest that there was probable cause for the warrant to issue, but rather focuses exclusively on the reasonableness of the search and seizure. He claims that the 2007 Search and Seizure was unreasonable because Defendants searched areas that were outside the scope of the warrant, because Defendants seized property that was outside the scope of the warrant, because Defendants conducted the search in a “disrespectful manner” and failed to restore the premises to the condition it was in prior to the search, and because Defendants procured the warrant in bad faith. See Pl.’s Opp’n 7-11.

“A search is presumptively reasonable when executed pursuant to a warrant. A search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate, upon a finding of probable cause, must be afforded great deference and creates a presumption that the officers executing the warrant acted in an objectively reasonable fashion.” Merriweather v. City of New York, No. 12 CIV. 5258(KPF), 2015 WL 57399, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2015) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Murtaugh, 382 Fed.Appx. 83, 85 (2d Cir.2010) (“Warrant-based searches are presumptively reasonable.”) (citing Golino v. New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir.1991)). Warrant-based searches, however, are restrained in scope by the terms of the warrant. See, e.g., Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656-57, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980). “The scope of a search pursuant to a valid warrant is defined by the warrant’s description of the premises and the objects of the search, and by the places in which the officers have probable cause to believe those objects may be found.” United States v. Kyles, 40 F.3d 519, 523 (2d Cir.1994) (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987)). As such, “the Fourth Amendment does not authorize the seizure of items other than those identified in or reasonably covered by the terms of the search warrant, unless it is ‘immediately apparent’ that such items are contraband or illegal on their face.” Merriweather, 2015 WL 57399, at *7 (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135-36, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)). In addition, because “reasonableness” is “the touchstone” of the Fourth Amendment, “[ejxcessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the search are not subject to suppression.” United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71, 118 S.Ct. 992, 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1998).

Plaintiff first argues that the search was unreasonable because Defendants searched the entire premises, including Plaintiffs bedroom dressers and closets, “despite the fact that the property they were seeking was clearly located in the basement/garage.” Pl.’s Opp’n 10-11; Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶ 88. The text of the warrant, however, plainly authorized a search of Plaintiffs entire premises and nowhere purported to limit the search to the garage. See Ex. I (authorizing search of “the premises described as 254 Betsy Ross Drive”); see also United States v. Bershchansky, 788 F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir.2015) (instructing the Court to “look directly to the text of the search warrant to determine the permissible scope of an authorized search”) (citation omitted). Even if the warrant did not explicitly provide for a search of the entire premises, because the warrant authorized the seizure of ammunition, the police “were accordingly permitted to look in any place within the premises where the subjects of the warrant ... might be found.” Merriweather, 2015 WL 57399, at *10 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) (“A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search. Thus, a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home for illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets, chests, drawers, and containers in which the weapon might be found.”). A reasonable juror thus could not conclude that the search was unreasonable simply because it extended beyond the basement and garage.

Plaintiff next argues that Defendants violated his rights when they “seized material not subject to the search warrant and omitted certain other items that were seized.” Pl’s. Opp’n 10. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants improperly seized “a 20” barrel length AR-15 rifle kit consisting of a barrel and two plastic bags and a green military ammunition box with hinges. Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶ 95.

Seizure of items outside the scope of a search warrant is unconstitutional, absent an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Horton, 496 U.S. at 139, 110 S.Ct. 2301. “Officials executing a warrant have some discretion, however, in interpreting the scope of the warrant.” United States v. Salameh, 54 F.Supp.2d 236, 277 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (citing United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263, 1268 (2d Cir.1970)), aff'd, 16 Fed.Appx. 73 (2d Cir.2001). “Their interpretation of the scope of the warrant need not be ‘hyper-technical,’ but rather should be ‘commonsensieal.’” Id. (citation omitted). In addition to items explicitly listed in the warrant, the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement “authorizes seizure of illegal or evidentiary items visible to a police officer whose access to the object has some prior Fourth Amendment justification and who has probable cause to suspect that the item is connected with criminal activity.” United States v. Gamble, 388 F.3d 74, 76 (2d Cir.2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The rifle kit was plainly not within the scope of the warrant. Defendants do not claim as much. Instead, Defendants argue that the rifle kit was never seized, pointing to Plaintiffs lack of documentary evidence establishing that he owned the kit, and to the fact that neither the Return Order nor Plaintiffs 2008 Notice of Claim included mention of a rifle kit. Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Mem.”) 10-11. Plaintiff testified under oath, however, that he purchased the kit at a gun show two years prior to the search, and that Defendants seized the kit from the back shelf of his garage. Ex. C at 160-62. Plaintiff also described the kit in detail. Id. A jury would be entitled to credit such testimony. Resolving all ambiguities and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, Brod, 653 F.3d at 164, there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the rifle kit was improperly seized from Plaintiffs home.

The same cannot be said for seizure of the green ammunition box. It is commonsense that the warrant authorized the officers at the scene to at least seize ammunition boxes that contained linked ammunition rounds or large-capacity magazines. See Doc. 63, Ex. I (authorizing search for “a large capacity feeding device that consists of ammunition, linked together by belt and links”). Based on his testimony that the green ammunition box was empty, Ex. C at 157, Plaintiffs contention seems to be that the box was outside the scope of the warrant because it did not contain any ammunition or magazines, though nowhere does he clearly articulate such an argument. Regardless of whether a reasonable juror would credit such a “hyper-technical” interpretation of the warrant, it is also the case that the “plain view” exception allowed the seizure of the ammunition box as probative evidence. Cf. Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 160 n. 21 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that seizure of “ammunition, gun clips, and related firearm paraphernalia” was permitted under plain-view doctrine where warrant simply authorized seizure of “firearms”); United States v. Cooper, 19 F.3d 1154, 1163 (7th Cir.1994) (permitting warrantless seizure under plain-view doctrine of suspected drug dealer’s empty ammunition box because the box was “not discovered in a vacuum” and an “ammunition box, unlike a cigar box, is probative of weapons possession and drug dealing”).

Next, Plaintiff argues that the search was unreasonable because it was done “in an abusive and disrespectful manner.” Am. Compl. ¶42. These allegations fall into two general categories: excessive physical damage to Plaintiffs property, and insulting or threatening comments and gestures made by officers at the scene towards Plaintiff. Neither is supported by evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.

While “[ejxcessive or unnecessary destruction of property” in the course of an otherwise valid search “may violate the Fourth Amendment,” Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 71, 118 S.Ct. 992, “it is well recognized that ‘officers executing search warrants on occasion must damage property in order to perform their duty.’ ” Cody v. Mello, 59 F.3d 13, 16 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258, 99 S.Ct. 1682, 60 L.Ed.2d 177 (1979)). Indeed, “it is settled that some disarray in conducting a search, including the tangential destruction of items that could not contain the object of the search, does not state a claim of constitutional magnitude.” Dockery v. Tucker, No. 97-CV-3584 (ARR), 2008 WL 2673307, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. June 26, 2008) (citing cases). To prevail, Plaintiff must establish that Defendants acted “unreasonably or maliciously in bringing about the damage.” Cody, 59 F.3d at 16 (“Mere negligence is not enough.”) (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333-34, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986)); see also Green v. City of Mount Vernon, 96 F.Supp.3d 263, 290 (S.D.N.Y.2015) (requiring “more than ordinary disarray and damage incident to the execution of the warrant”) (citation omitted).

Determining whether a particular instances of property damage was “unreasonable or malicious” is ordinarily not amenable to resolution at the summary judgment stage. See, e.g., Koller v. Hilderbrand, 933 F.Supp.2d 272, 279 (D.Conn.2013) (“Applying the Cody standard to motions for summary judgment, courts in the District have been reluctant to resolve the issue at summary judgment.”). Nonetheless, where a “plaintiff has not produced any documentary evidence to support his allegations,” such as photos of broken property, receipts documenting repairs, or sworn testimony attesting to specific damages, he fails to meet his burden to “set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial” and thus cannot survive a summary judgment motion. Smith v. City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 3286(TPG), 2010 WL 3397683, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)), aff'd sub nom. Smith v. Tobon, 529 Fed.Appx. 36 (2d Cir.2013); see also Lewis v. City of Mount Vernon, 984 F.Supp. 748, 756 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (“[P]laintiffs have presented no evidence that the officers wantonly damaged or destroyed property or conducted the search in a manner inconsistent with its professed purpose.... Rather, the only inference that can be drawn is that the officers conducted a thorough search, as they are permitted to do in executing a warrant.”). That is the case here. Plaintiff points to only one specific instance of interference with his property — Nawoi-chyk’s admission that he removed some crates from a closet and failed to return them to their original place. See Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶ 89 (citing Ex. D at 89). Other than that, Plaintiff does not provide any documentary or testimonial evidence to support his allegation that the search party “destroyed and damaged items belonging to plaintiff’ and “left the house in a state of disarray.” Id. ¶ 91 (citing Am. Compl. ¶ 44). Plaintiff cannot rest solely on these allegations to establish a genuine issue of material fact. See Rogers v. Cartagena, No. 10 Civ. 9285(JPO), 2013 WL 1285169, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013) (granting summary judgment because there was “no record evidence to support” claims of property damage during search); Pina v. City of Hartford, No. 07-CV-0657 (JCH), 2009 WL 1231986, at *8 (D.Conn. Apr. 29, 2009) (“Plaintiffs have put forth no evidence of the destruction of property. [The executing officer] admits that personal property was thrown around during the search ... but there is no indication that the detectives damaged the plaintiffs property beyond what was necessary to effectuate a complete search of the apartment.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Lynch ex rel. Lynch v. City of Mount Vernon, 567 F.Supp.2d 459, 469 n. 5 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (“As for the fact that the officers emptied dresser drawers during the search, we do not doubt that this resulted in inconvenience to plaintiffs, but the argument that it was a constitutional violation is baseless.”) (citing Lewis, 984 F.Supp. at 756).

Nor can Plaintiff establish a genuine issue of material fact based on alleged threatening conduct and disrespectful comments by officers at the scene. Plaintiffs testimony that Orangetown Police Officer Sila menaced him by drawing his gun “half out,” Ex. C at 146, could not lead a reasonable juror to conclude that the search was objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., Lynch, 567 F.Supp.2d at 468 (“We do not doubt that the presence of police officers with guns drawn in their home was a traumatic experience for plaintiffs. But the officers’ decision to draw their weapons while searching the Residence for guns, drugs and a drug dealer was objectively reasonable.”). And while Plaintiffs dismay at the disrespectful comments allegedly made by officers in the course of the search is understandable, Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 82, 87-88, Plaintiff does not cite to any legal authority in arguing that disrespectful comments from police can render a search objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, nor is the Court aware of any.

Finally, Plaintiff questions Defendants’ good faith in procuring the search warrant, implying a type of retaliatory motive for the search. See Pl.’s Opp’n 9-10. “[T]he subjective motivations of the individual officers,” however, “ha[ve] no bearing on whether a particular [search or] seizure is ‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment.” Spinelli v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)). The relevant standard is objective reasonableness, and thus Plaintiffs “claim that one or more officers had an ulterior motive for the search is irrelevant to the issue of whether the search itself violated the Fourth Amendment.” Id.

Since there remains a genuine issue of material fact only as to whether Defendants improperly seized Plaintiffs rifle kit, the Court proceeds to discuss whether Plaintiff can hold the Town or Nulty liable for this constitutional violation.

(i) Municipal Liability

Unable to demonstrate any explicit policy that was causally related to the seizure of his rifle kit, see, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (requiring a “direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation”), Plaintiff argues that the Town can be held liable for two reasons. Neither theory, however, is supported by the record.

First, Plaintiff maintains that he “has presented sufficient evidence establishing that the March 2007 encounter and the March 2009 encounter were part of a pattern, practice, policy and custom of the Town to harass, target and intimidate [him].” Pl.’s Opp’n 4. Defendants retort that, at least with respect to the Fourth Amendment claim, Plaintiff “has not identified any Town-wide custom or policy to target, harass or intimidate [him] in March 2007.” Defs.’ Rep. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Rep.”) 11 (emphasis added). The Court agrees with Defendants.

A municipality may be liable under Monell for a “custom” that is so widespread as to have the force of law, even though it has “not received formal approval through the body’s official decision-making channels.” 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018; see also Sorlucco v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 971 F.2d 864, 870-71 (2d Cir.1992). Here, however, no reasonable juror could conclude that OPD had a custom of harassing Plaintiff in place prior to executing the search warrant, which is the only way in which such a custom could fairly be described as the “moving force” behind violations occurring during the 2007 Search and Seizure. See Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 37 (2d Cir.2008) (requiring plaintiff to “demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged injury”) (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997)). Indeed, Plaintiff justifies its “custom” argument with allegations describing conduct that occurred at least two years after the 2007 Search and Seizure. See Pl.’s Opp’n 4 (citing Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 113-21). The record contains no evidence that anyone in OPD besides Nawoichyk even knew who Plaintiff was in March 2007, which falls far short of the requisite evidence of a “longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of the local governmental entity” or a practice “so widespread as to have the force of law.” Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 61 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989); Brown, 520 U.S. at 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382).

Next, Plaintiff argues that the “involvement and participation of Detective Lieutenant McAndrew” in the 2007 Search and Seizure “is sufficient to bind the Town,” because McAndrew “had the final decision making authority with reference to the procurement of the warrant” and “actually participated in the events.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 5. Defendants respond that McAndrew was not a final policymaker and thus his involvement in the search cannot lead to liability for the Town itself under Monell. Defs.’ Rep. 5-8.

In order to hold a municipality liable for a “single decision by [a] municipal policymaker[ ],” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986), a plaintiff must demonstrate the decisionmaker’s “final policymaking authority” over the specific area of government behavior that is being challenged. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (requiring that “the challenged action” be “taken pursuant to a policy adopted by the official or officials responsible under state law for making policy in 'that area of the city’s business”) (emphasis added). “Whether an official has final policymaking authority is a legal question, determined on the basis of state law.” Roe, 542 F.3d at 37.

“As a matter of New York law, the town board and police board ‘are the only entities which may be considered responsible for establishing rules and regulations pertaining to police conduct.’ ” Green, 96 F.Supp.3d at 308 n. 13 (quoting Polite v. Town of Clarkstown, 120 F.Supp.2d 381, 384-85 (S.D.N.Y.2000)). Plaintiff cannot assert municipal liability against the Town under § 1983 “based on the status of police officers as policymaking officials.” Polite, 120 F.Supp.2d at 385 (citing New York Town Law § 150). Plaintiff thus cannot hold the Town liable simply because McAndrew was a high-ranking OPD official and supervised this particular search and seizure. See Green, 96 F.Supp.3d at 303 (“Although Plaintiffs allege that Scott was supervising the search, they do not allege any facts that would allow the Court to plausibly infer that Scott was a final policymaker... .[or] had final policymaking authority with respect to how Mount Vernon police officers were to carry out searches.”) (citations omitted).

Additionally, Plaintiff has not even alleged a “deliberate choice to follow a course of action” by McAndrew, Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292, let alone created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether McAndrew made an explicit decision or order to seize the rifle kit. There is thus no way for Plaintiff to prove that McAndrew’s deliberate choice caused the rifle kit to be seized, which is an essential element of Plaintiffs claim. See Jeffes, 208 F.3d at 61 (requiring proof that “the official who is a final policymaker in the area directly committed or commanded the violation of the plaintiffs federal rights or ... indirectly caused the misconduct of a subordinate municipal employee”) (citation omitted).

(ii) Personal Liability

The same is true for Plaintiffs claim against Chief Nulty in his personal capacity. Plaintiff does not point to any evidence contradicting Nulty’s testimony that he had no knowledge of the 2007 Search and Seizure, that he did not participate in the application or execution of the search warrant, and that he had no involvement in the retention or return of seized property. See Ex. F at 25-34; Pl.’s 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 42, 44, 46. Plaintiff thus has no proof that Nulty “participated directly” in the seizure of the rifle kit or “created a policy or custom” that allowed the seizure to occur. Back, 365 F.3d at 127; see also Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217, 234 (2d Cir.2014) (“In this Circuit, a ‘direct participant’ includes a person who authorizes, orders, or helps others to do the unlawful acts, even if he or she does not commit the acts personally.”) (citing Provost v. City of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 155 (2d Cir.2001)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1842, 191 L.Ed.2d 723 (2015). Furthermore, Plaintiffs testimony that he called Nulty twice during the 2007 Search and Seizure does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Nulty “failed to remedy” a reported constitutional violation, was “grossly negligent” in his supervision, or “exhibited deliberate indifference,” Back, 365 F.3d at 127, because there is no evidence that Nulty received any information about the incident given Plaintiffs failure to leave a message. See Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶ 85; Ex. C at 182 (Plaintiffs testimony that he failed to leave Nulty a message); Ex. F at 25, 28-29 (Nulty’s testimony that he did not hear about the seizure until Plaintiff filed the instant suit). Absent facts demonstrating that Nulty “knew or should have known of the events of which [Plaintiff] complains[,] ... there is no basis for a jury finding of gross negligence (or deliberate indifference), and summary judgment is proper.” Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873-74 (2d Cir.1995).

Despite raising a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his rifle kit was improperly seized, therefore, Plaintiff cannot hold the Town or Chief Nulty liable for that possible constitutional violation on the record before this Court.

B. First Amendment Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have subjected him “to harassment, discriminatory actions and other retaliation” as a result of his “protests, complaints, comments and opposition,” including the 2008 Notice of Claim. Am. Compl. ¶ 78. While Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to identify specific instances of retaliation that were causally related to Plaintiffs exercise of free speech, see Defs.’ Mem. 12-15, Plaintiffs response consists exclusively of identifying specific instances of protected speech and repeating the Court’s prior holding that chilled speech is not the only type of retaliation injury, see Pl.’s Opp’n 11-12. Plaintiff does not provide any concrete evidence or arguments supported by legal authority to establish Defendants’ intent to retaliate against him for engaging in protected speech. Summary judgment is thus granted on Plaintiffs First Amendment claim.

“[T]he law is settled that as a general matter the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions ... for speaking out.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 164 L.Ed.2d 441 (2006). “A plaintiff asserting a First Amendment retaliation claim must establish that: ‘(1) his speech or conduct was protected by the First Amendment; (2) the defendant took an adverse action against him; and (3) there was a causal connection between this adverse action and the protected speech.’ ” Matthews v. City of New York, 779 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir.2015) (quoting Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 272 (2d Cir.2011)); see also Gagliardi v. Vill. of Pawling, 18 F.3d 188, 194 (2d Cir.1994) (requiring plaintiff to prove that “defendants’ conduct was motivated by or substantially caused by his exercise of free speech”).

“Specific proof of improper motivation is required in order for plaintiff to survive summary judgment on a First Amendment retaliation claim.” Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir.2001) (citing Blue v. Koren, 72 F.3d 1075, 1082-83 (2d Cir.1995)). Direct evidence of retaliatory intent is not required, such that “circumstantial evidence may be ... sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding the grant of summary judgment.” Barrington v. New York, 806 F.Supp.2d 730, 747 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (quoting Gayle v. Gonyea, 313 F.3d 677, 684 (2d Cir.2002)). Evidence of a retaliatory motive “may include expressions by the officials involved regarding their state of mind, circumstances suggesting in a substantial fashion that the plaintiff has been singled out, or the highly unusual nature of the actions taken.” Blue, 72 F.3d at 1084.

Defendants do not dispute that the Plaintiff has engaged in protected speech. Plaintiffs conduct — for example, the 2008 Notice of Claim — is plainly protected under the First Amendment. See Dougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir.2002) (“The rights to complain to public officials and to seek administrative and judicial relief from their actions are protected by the First Amendment.”) (citing Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 589 (2d Cir.1988)).

That said, no reasonable juror could conclude that Defendants acted with a retaliatory motive given the paucity of evidence. Plaintiff nowhere contends that he has produced any direct evidence of intent, nor has the Court identified any, meaning Plaintiff relies exclusively on circumstantial evidence. “Circumstantial evidence of retaliation may be found when defendants are aware that plaintiff has engaged in protected speech and defendants’ challenged behavior closely follows that protected speech.” Econ. Opportunity Comm’n of Nassau Cnty., Inc. v. Cty. of Nassau, 106 F.Supp.2d 433, 437 (E.D.N.Y.2000); see also Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir.2009). None of the supposed retaliatory behavior that Plaintiff challenges, however, provides sufficient circumstantial evidence.

To start, Plaintiff implies that Nawoichyk and his OPD colleagues instigated the 2007 Search and Seizure based on Plaintiffs previous complaints about Nawoichyk during their time together in the National Guard. See Pl.’s Opp’n 9 (“This history could certainly have been a motivating factor in the Town’s procurement of the warrant.”). While Plaintiff testified that he submitted various complaints about Nawoichyk to the Office of Inspector General of both the state- and federal-level National Guard and to Plaintiffs company commander, see Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 53-56; Ex. C. at 36-37, 85-88, there is no evidence that Nulty or anyone else at OPD (besides Nawoichyk) had knowledge of these complaints. See Deal v. Seneca Cty., No. 07-CV-6497 (MAT), 2012 WL 13661, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2012) (“To prove a causal connection, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the individuals who engaged in retaliation had knowledge of the protected conduct.”). Furthermore, the challenged behavior took place over three years after the protected speech, rendering an inference of causation close to untenable. See Morisseau v. DLA Piper, 532 F.Supp.2d 595, 617 & nn. 141-42 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (“While the Second Circuit has not drawn a bright line to define the outer limits beyond which a temporal relationship is too attenuated to establish a causal relationship, the weight of authority supports the view that ten or twelve months is too long.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd, 355 Fed.Appx. 487 (2d Cir.2009). In contrast to Plaintiffs pure speculation about motive, there is the undisputed existence of probable cause supporting the search warrant, as well as the fact that Nawoichyk and Hoffman instigated the search only after (i) they received a third-party complaint from the locksmith, and (ii) Plaintiff admitted in person that he owned a large-capacity ammunition feeding device, see Ex. C at 115— 16. In sum, Plaintiff provides no evidence that the 2007 Search and Seizure was retaliation for his previous speech.

While Plaintiff again exercised his free speech rights shortly after the 2007 Search and Seizure by filing the Notice of Claim in January 2008, Ex. N, he cannot point to any adverse action taken by OPD until the 2009 Incident, approximately fourteen months later, in March 2009. See Defs.’ Mem. 12. Here again, it was Plaintiff, and not OPD, that instigated this interaction, when he reported a civilian complaint based on his altercation with the contractor. Plaintiff points to various missteps that he believes Officer Sick took in responding to the complaint, but nowhere does he dispute Sick’s testimony that he had no knowledge of Plaintiffs 2008 Notice of Claim or any of his other previous complaints. See Ex. E at 87-88. Plaintiffs offhand speculation that Sick had a “preconceived disposition” based on Plaintiffs earlier encounters with OPD, Ex. C at 224-25, does not sufficiently describe a motive to retaliate for the past exercise of free speech, nor is it proof sufficiently “tangible” to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 108 (2d Cir.2004) (“[W]e have held that a plaintiff may not rely on conclusory assertions of retaliatory motive to satisfy the causal link. Instead, he must produce some tangible proof to demonstrate that [his] version of what occurred was not imaginary.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, there is no evidence that Sick or Sergeant Bottari intended to retaliate against Plaintiff for his previous speech when they alerted the Department of Veteran’s Affairs about the 2009 Incident.

Following the 2009 Incident, Plaintiff describes an altercation one year later, in March 2010, in which an unidentified officer pulled Plaintiffs vehicle over and pointed a gun at him multiple times, Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶ 114, but Plaintiff fails to proffer any direct or circumstantial evidence about the intent of this unidentified officer. Plaintiff also testified to other instances of protected speech and a number of additional encounters with unidentified OPD officers that have occurred since March 2010. See Defs.’ 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 113-21. Setting aside the fact that Plaintiff makes no effort to causally connect any instance of protected speech with any specific adverse action, the Court cannot consider these remaining facts on the instant motion because Plaintiff never moved to include them in a supplemental complaint, relying on them for the first time in his opposition to summary judgment. See, e.g., Tomlins v. Vill. of Wappinger Falls Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 812 F.Supp.2d 357, 363 n. 9 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (“[T]he complaint may not be amended simply by raising new facts in opposition to Defendants’ motion”); Kearney v. County of Rockland, 373 F.Supp.2d 434, 440-41 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (collecting cases).

The Court therefore grants summary judgment on Plaintiffs First Amendment claim.

C. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process: “Stigma Plus” Interest

While the Court has previously struggled to discern the exact nature of Plaintiffs “liberty interest” claim, see Vainer, 916 F.Supp.2d at 433, Plaintiffs opposition brief clarifies that he is pursuing a so-called “stigma plus” procedural due process claim. See Pl.’s Opp’n 12-13 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-02, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976)). A “stigma plus” claim “involves an ‘injury to one’s reputation (the stigma) coupled with the deprivation of some ‘tangible interest’ or property right (the plus), without adequate process.’ ” Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 212 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292, 302 (2d Cir.2003)).

Plaintiff points to two instances of “stigma.” First, after the 2007 Search and Seizure, Nawoichyk told officials at the 442nd Military Policy Company and the Department of Veterans Affairs about the 2007 Search and Seizure, and accused Plaintiff of being a “foreign spy and assassin” and a “member of the Estonian Army and terrorist.” Am. Com