Ehrlich v. Kovack (135 F. Supp. 3d 638, 2015)

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Greg White, United States Magistrate Judge

Currently before the Court is Defendants Medina County, Medina County Commissioners, Michael Kovack and Joan Heller’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.- (Doc. No. 42.) Plaintiff Annette Ehrlich filed a Brief in Opposition on August 10, 2015, to which Defendants replied. (Doc. Nos.46, 47.)

For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion (Doc. No. 42) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. Procedural Background

On October 24, 2014, Plaintiff Annette Ehrlich filed a Complaint in the Medina County Court of Common Pleas against the following defendants: (1) Medina County Auditor Michael Kovack; (2) Medina County Chief Deputy Auditor Joan Heller; (3) Medina County; and, (4) the Medina County Commissioners. (Doc. No. 1-3.) The Complaint asserted the following five claims: (1) violation of the Ohio Whis-tleblower Act, Ohio Rev.Code § 4113.52(B) (against Defendant Kovack and the Medina County Defendants only); (2) First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (against Defendant Kovack -and the Medina County Defendants only); (3) defamation (against Defendant Heller only); (4) malicious prosecution (against Defendant Heller only); and, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress (against all Defendants).

Defendants removed the action to this Court on November 20, 2014.' (Doc. No. 1.) The next day, Defendants Kovack and Heller, and the Medina County Defendants filed separate Answers. (Doc. Nos. 3, 4.) On January 5, 2015, pursuant to Local Rule 16.3(b), a Parties’ Planning Report was filed. (Doc. No. 9.) Therein, the parties advised as follows:

Upon information and belief,, the Medina County Sheriffs Department is presently investigating Defendant Michael Kovack. At this point in time, Defendant Kovack is unable to determine when the investigation will be concluded. As a result, Defendant Kovack may be required to seek a stay of any discovery directed to him until the investigation is concluded. , Should Defendant Kovack seek such a stay, and the,Court determines that Defendant Kovack’s stay request is ■ granted;- Plaintiff may ■be seeking a stay of all discovery until the completion of the investigation.

(Doc. No. 9 at 4.)

A case management conference was conducted on January 16, 2015, at which time certain deadlines were set. (Doc. No. 12.) In addition, the Court ordered Defendants Kovack and Heller to file a Report by March 16, 2015 updating the status of the criminal investigation of Defendant Kovack and advising whether a stay of discovery would be necessary. (Doc. No. 11.)

The Medina Municipal Court docket reflects that, on January 22, 2015, Defendant Kovack was charged with first degree misdemeanor violations of Ohio Revised Code § 9.03(D)(1) (Misuse of Public Funds) and Ohio Revised Code § 102.03(D) (Using a Public Office to Obtain Something of Value). See State v. Kovack, Medina Municipal Court No. 15CRB0085, Docket. Kovack entered a plea of no contest and, on February 6, 2015, was referred to a pretrial diversion program pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 2935.36. Id.

On February 12, 2015, Plaintiff served subpoenas on the Medina County Special Prosecutor and the Medina County Sheriff, seeking the entire investigatory file regarding the underlying criminal case against Defendant Kovack. (Doc. Nos.15-1, 15-3.) The Medina County Defendants moved to quash these subpoenas on both procedural and substantive grounds. (Doc. No; 18.)

The Court conducted a status conference regarding the Medina County Defendants’ Motion to Quash' on February 26, 2015. (Doc. No. 21.) At that time, the Court ordered counsel for the Medina County Defendants to redact personal identifiers from the Medina County Sheriff report at issue and provide a copy of that report to Plaintiff by no later than March 30, 2015. Id. at 1. The Court also' indicated that issues relating to the information subpoenaed from the Medina, County Special Prosecutor would be addressed at a later date, if necessary. Id. at 2.

Qn March 16, 2015, Defendants Kovack and Heller filed a Motion to Stay the instant case pending the conclusion of the criminal proceedings against him. (Doc. No. 23.) Plaintiff filed a. Brief in Opposition (Doc. No. 24), to which Defendants Kovack and Heller replied. (Doc. No. 29.) On March 23, 2015, the Court ordered the Medina County Defendants to refrain from producing the Sheriff report at issue until after the Court had ruled on the pending Motion to Stay. (Doc. No. 27.)

On May 1, 2015, the Court met with counsel to discuss the Motion to Stay, and oral argument was thereafter conducted on the record. (Doc. No. 34.) At that time, the Court denied the motion on the record, and indicated a written order would be forthcoming. Id. The parties then agreed to a Stipulated Protective Order containing an Attorney Eyes Only provision regarding the Medina County Sheriff Report at issue and submitted it for the Court’s review. The . Stipulated Protective Order was entered that day. ■ (Doc. No. 35.) On May 5, 2015, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion & Order denying Defendants Kovack and Heller’s Motion to Stay. (Doc. No. 36.)

On July 21, 2015, Defendants filed a joint Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Doc. No.‘42.) Plaintiff filed a Brief in Opposition on August 10, 2015 (Doc. No. 46), to which Defendants jointly replied. (Doc. No. 47.) Meanwhile, Defendants jointly-filed another Motion to Stay Discovery, this time seeking a stay pending a ruling on their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Doc. No. 43.) Plaintiff did not oppose the motion. On August 20, 2015, Defendants’ Motion to Stay was granted as unopposed.

II. Factual Allegations

The Complaint alleges the following. Plaintiff was formerly employed as an Information Technology Manager in Defendant Kovack’s Medina County Auditor’s Office. (Doc. No. 1-3 at ,¶ 3.) On July 21, 2011, Defendant Kovack provided his County laptop to Plaintiff for repairs. Id. at ¶ 9. While working on Defendant Ko-vack’s computer, Plaintiff discovered “thousands of pornographic images” and reported her discovery to Defendant Ko-vack. Id. at ¶ 10. Defendant Kovack stated his son" had used the computer and downloaded the images. Id. at ¶ 11.

Years later, in September 2013, Plaintiff discovered Auditor’s Office print logs indicating Defendant Kovack had printed campaign materials for his Wine , and Cheese political fund raiser. Id. at ¶ 12. In February 2014, Plaintiff discovered Auditor’s Office print- logs indicating Defendant Ko-vack had printed campaign materials for his Chili Cook Off political fund raiser. Id. at ¶ 13.

On March 19, 2014, Plaintiff presented a letter to Defendant Kovack, reporting her discovery that he had used the County printer to print campaign literature. Id. at ¶ 14. This letter was copied to the Medina County Human Resources Department, as well as to Plaintiffs supervisors Defendant Heller and Lisa Nichols. Id. at ¶¶ 14-15. In addition, Plaintiffs letter (attached to the Complaint as Exhibit A) addressed Plaintiffs .concerns about the denial of her request to use her vacation time to attend a computer training seminar (“Pictometry training”). In her letter, Plaintiff states she felt Defendants Kovack and Heller had been “picking on her;” failing to treat her as a valued employee; and, creating a hostile work environment. (Doe. No. 13 at pp. 13-14.)

The next day, on March 20, 2014, Defendant Kovack, Defendant Heller, and Nichols met with Plaintiff and presented her with a letter dated March 17, 2014 scheduling a -pre-disciplinary conference on March 21, 2014 regarding Plaintiffs “insubordination” relating-to the Pictometry training incident. (Doc. No. 1-3 at ¶ 18). At the pre-disciplinary hearing, Defendant Kovack failed to address Plaintiffs allegation that Kovack “had committed, a felony under Ohio law.” Id. at ¶20, According to the Complaint, Kovack also failed to make a reasonable and good faith effort to correct his “felony violations of Ohio law” within twenty-four hours or the close of business, on the next business day following receipt ■ of Plaintiffs report. , Id. at ¶ 21.

On March 20,' 2014, Plaintiff filed a report with the Medina County' Sheriff describing Defendant Kovack’s alleged use of County resources to print campaign literature. Id. at ¶ 23. She allegedly included “proof’ in this report. Id. at ¶24. At Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing, Defendant Kovack advised Plaintiff that he was probably going to suspend her for three days for the Pictometry training incident. Id. at ¶ 25. On March 24, 2014, Kovack advised Plaintiff that, instead of suspension, her punishment was to be a written reprimand for disrespect and insubordination. Id. at ¶ 26.

In July 2014, Plaintiff requested leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) to care for her mother, who had been diagnosed with Lymphoma and was scheduled to undergo chemotherapy. Id. at ¶ 27. When she returned from leave on August 25, 2014, Defendant Kovack informed Plaintiff she was being placed on paid administrative leave without explanation until September 3, 2014. Id. at ¶ 28. Thereafter, in a letter dated August 29, 2014, Defendant Kovack advised Plaintiff she was being placed on administrative leave until further notice and asked her to report to the Auditor’s Office on September 5, 2014 to discuss concerns Kovack had prior to Plaintiffs FMLA leave. Id. at f 29.

The meeting was conducted on September 5, 2014. During the meeting, “Kovack expressed concerns alleging that Ehrlich did not inform the Auditor’s Office that Ehrlich was assisting another county department to set up Pictometry training, and that Ehrlich had collected the information regarding Kovack that Ehrlich previously provided to the Medina County Sheriff.” Id. at ¶ 30. Plaintiff denied the allegations. Id. at ¶ 31. She remained on administrative leave following the meeting. Id. at ¶ 32.

On September 17, 2014, Medina County Gazette reporter Nick Glunt informed Plaintiff that the Auditor’s Office had contacted him to request that he make a public records request for Plaintiff’s employment file. Id. at ¶ 33. Glunt advised Plaintiff her employment file contained “interesting and defamatory” information, including information from Defendant Heller alleging Plaintiff had been violent on March 21, 2014. Id. at ¶ 34. The next day, September 18, 2014, Plaintiff went to the Auditor’s Office; requested her employment file; and, asked Defendant Heller about the negative information “inserted” into her file. Id. at ¶ 36. Defendant Heller refused to answer. Id. at ¶37. Upon receipt of her employment, file, Plaintiff discovered that “positive accolades regarding her employment performance had also been removed.” Id. at ¶ 38.

That same day, Defendant Heller filed a Petition in the Medina County Court of Common Pleas for Civil Stalking Protection against Plaintiff, pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.214. Id. at ¶ 40. Therein, Defendant Heller alleged Plaintiff had thrown papers at her; exhibited aggres-sivé and agitated behavior; and, “taunted” her. Id. at ¶41. Defendant Heller also alleged Plaintiff had requested FMLA leave for “anxiety issues.” Id. at ¶ 42. At an ex parte hearing, Defendant Heller voluntarily dismissed the Petition. Id. at ¶ 43.

On September 19, 2014, Defendant Ko-vack sent Plaintiff a pre-disciplinary hearing letter. Id. at ¶ 44. Plaintiff appeared for the hearing on September 26, 2014, at which time she was accused of being violent toward Defendant Heller on September 18, 2014. Id. at ¶ 45. Plaintiffs employment was terminated on September 27,2014. Id. at ¶ 46.

The Complaint alleges the following claims. Count I alleges the Medina County Defendants and Defendant Kovack violated Ohio’s Whistleblower Act, Ohio . Rev. Code § 4113.52, when they terminated Plaintiff in retaliation for reporting Defendant Kovack’s use of County resources to print campaign literature. Count II alleges § 1983 claims against the Medina County, Defendants and Defendant Kovack based on these Defendants’ alleged retaliation against Plaintiff for exercising her federal constitutional right to free speech and expression. Count III alleges a defamation claim against Defendant Heller based on Heller’s statement that Plaintiff was violent and took FMLA leave for “anxiety issues.” Count IV alleges a malicious prosecution claim against Defendant Heller on the basis that Heller’s Petition for Civil Stalking Protection was “made with malice and without probable cause.” Count V alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against all Defendants.

III. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), “[ajfter the pleadings are closed — but early enough not to delay trial — a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” “For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir.2007) (internal citation and- quotation marks omitted).

The same standard for deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim applies to a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Roth v. Guzman, 650 F.3d 603, 605 (6th Cir.2011). In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain (1) ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible,’ (2) more than ‘formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements,’ and (3) allegations that suggest a ‘right to relief above a speculative level.’ ” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir.2009) (quoting in part Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

The measure of a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge — whether the Complaint raises a right to relief above the speculative level— “does not ‘require heightened, faet.pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting in part Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Deciding whether a complaint states a claim for relief that is plausible is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679,129 S.Ct. 1937;

Consequently, examination of a complaint for a plausible claim for relief is undertaken in conjunction with the “well-established principle that ‘Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain statement of the claim showing .that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair, notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Gunasekera. v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir.2009) (quoting in part Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007)) (quoting Twom-bly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964). Nonetheless, while “Rule 8. marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime pf a prior era ... it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. ,

IV. Analysis

A. Whistleblower Claim (Count I)

In her first claim, Plaintiff asserts Defendant Kovack and the Medina County Defendants terminated her employment “in retaliation for [Plaintiffs] filing of reports pursuant to R.C. 4113.52(A)(1)(a) and R.C. 4113.52(A)(1)(b).” (Doc. No. 1-3 at ¶ 48.) Plaintiff further aheges that “[t]he Defendants’ actions in terminating [her] employment are in violation of R.C. 4113.52(B)” and, thus, she is. “entitled to bring a civil action for relief as set forth in R.C. 4113.52(D) for the relief set forth in R.C,‘4113.52(E).” Id. at ¶¶ 49, 51.

Defendants argue this claim fails as a matter of law. Specifically, Defendants assert-the whistleblower statute relied on by Plaintiff, Ohio Rev.Code § 4113.52, provides protection for private sector employees who report information about their employer. (Doc. No. 42.,at 10.) Because Plaintiff worked for Medina County, Defendants maintain the applicable statute for Plaintiffs claim is Ohio Rev.Code § 124.341, which provides whistle blower protections for public sector employees. Id. Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs sole and exclusive remedy for claimed whistle-blower violations was to seek relief through R.C. § 124.341 and file an appeal with the [State Personnel Board of Review].” Id. at 11. Because Plaintiff failed to do so, and the deadline has now expired, Defendants argue the remedies contained within § 4113.52 “áre not 'available' to Plaintiff’ as a matter of law and her whis-tleblower claim should be dismissed.

While Plaintiff acknowledges that “[a] terminated employee may not seek redress under both statutes,” she maintains “it is incorrect to assume that the terminated employee’s action necessarily falls under the parameters of R.C. 124.341 because the employee is a public sector employee.” (Doe. No. 46 at 11.) Highlighting the differences between the two statutes, Plaintiff argues § 4113.52 applies to public sector employees and ardas not covered by § 124.341. Id. at 12. She maintains Ohio courts have found “the nature of the ‘wrongdoing’ reported is dispositive” in determining which statute applies. Because the Complaint alleges wrongdoing constituting a felony,' Plaintiff asserts Ohio law allows her to' assert a' claiin urider § 4113.52 even though she was a public sector employee. ■

Ohio Revised Code Section 4113.52 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:'

(A)(1)(a) If an employee becomes aware in the course of the employee’s employment of a violation of any state or federal statute or any ordinance or regulation of a political subdivision that the employee’s employer has authority to correct, and the employee reasonably believes that the violation is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety, a felony, or an improper solicitation for a contribution, the employee orally shall notify the employee’s supervisor or other responsible officer of the employee’s employer of the violation and subsequently shall file with that supervisor or officer a written report that provides sufficient detail to identify and describe the violation. If the employer does not correct the violation or make a reasonable and good faith effort to correct the violation within twenty-four hours after the oral notification or the receipt of the report, whichever is earlier, the employee may file a written report that provides sufficient detail to identify and describe the violation with the prosecuting authority of the county or municipal corporation where the violation occurred, with a peace officer, with the inspector general 'if the violation is within the inspector general’s jurisdiction, or with any other appropriate public official or agency that has regulatory authority over the employer and the industry,.-trade, or business in which the employer is engaged.

(b) If an employee makes á report under division (A)(1)(a) of this section, the employer, within twenty-four hours after the oral notification was made or the report was received or by the close of business on the next regular business day following the day on which the oral notification was made or the report was received, whichever is later, shall notify the employee, in writing, of any effort of the employer to correct the alleged violation or hazard or of the absence of the alleged violation or hazard.

Hs H*

(B) Except as otherwise provided in division (C) of this section, no employer shall take any disciplinary or retaliatory action against an employee for making any report authorized by division (A)(1) or (2) of this section, or as a result of the employee’s having made any inquiry or taken any other action to ensure-.the accuracy of any information reported under either such division. No employer shall take any disciplinary or retaliatory action against an employee, for making any report authorized by division (A)(3)'of this section if the employee made a reasonable and good faith effort to determine the accuracy of any information so reported, or as a result of the employee’s having made any inquiry or taken any other action to ensure the accuracy of any information reported under that division. . For purposes, of this division, disciplinary or retaliatory action by the employer includes, without limitation, doing any of the following: (1) Removing or suspending the employee from employment;

(D) If an employer takes any disciplinary or retaliatory. action against an employee as a result of the employee’s having filed a report under division (A) of this section, the employee may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or for the remedies set forth in division (E) of this section, or both, within one hundred eighty days after the date the disciplinary or retaliatory action was taken, in a court of common pleas in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. A civil action under this division is not available to an employee as a remedy for any disciplinary or retaliatory action taken by an appointing authority against the employee as a result of the employee’s having filed a report under division

(A) of section 124.341 of the Revised Code.

■■

Ohio Rev.Code § 4113.52 (emphasis added). " ’

Courts interpreting the above statute have found that, “[t]o prove, a claim under § 4113.52, a ’plaintiff must show that: (1) he is entitled to protection under the [Whistleblower] act; (2) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Dobrski v. Ford Motor Company, 698 F.Supp.2d 966, 978 (N.D.Ohio 2010). See also Klepsky v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 489 F.3d 264, 271 (6th Cir.2007). With regard to the first of these elements, § 4113.52 sets forth three circumstances in which an employee is protected for whistleblowing activity: Section (A)(1) addresses reports of violations of law “that the employee’s employer has authority to correct;” Section (A)(2) deals with the reporting of criminal violations of the State’s environmental laws; and Section (A)(3) addresses an employee’s complaints of ‘Violations by a fellow employee.” See Ohio Rev.Code § 4113.52(A).

Here, the Complaint alleges Plaintiffs employment was terminated “in retaliation for [Plaintiffs] filing of reports pursuant to R.C. 4113.52(A)(1)(a) and R.C. 4113.52(A)(1)(b).” (Doc. No. 1-3 at ¶48.) For claims under § 4113.52(A)(1), an, employee must have a reasonable belief that the violation is either a felony or “a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety.” See § 4113.52(A)(1)(a); Dobrski, 698 F.Supp.2d at 979. The employee is then required to “orally notify his or her. supervisor or other responsible officer of the employer of the violation and subsequently file with that person a written report that provides sufficient detail to identify and describe the violation.” Contreras v. Ferro Corp., 73 Ohio St.3d 244, 652 N.E.2d 940, 943 (1995) (emphasis in original). If. the employee satisfies these requirements, and the employer fails to correct the violation or to make a good faith effort to correct the violation within twenty-four hours after the oral notification or the receipt of written notice, whichever is earlier, the employee may file a written report with the prosecutor, peace officer, inspector general or certain other appropriate persons identified in § 4113.52(A)(1)(a). Failure to strictly comply with these statutory requirements “prevents the employee from claiming the protections embodied-in the statute.” Contreras, 652 N.E.2d at 946syllabus,

The language of Ohio Revised Code § 124.341 is somewhat different than § 4113.52. Section 124.341 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(A) If an employee in the classified or unclassified civil service becomes aware in the course of employment of a violation of state or federal statutes, rules, or regulations or the misuse of public resources, and the employee’s supervisor or appointing authority has authority to correct the violation or misuse, the employee may file a written report identifying the violation or misuse with the supervisor or appointing authority. In addition to or instead of filing a written report with the supervisor or appointing authority, the employee may file a written report with the office of internal audit created under section 126.45 of the Revised- Code or file a complaint with the auditor of state’s fraud-reporting system under section 117.103 of the Revised Code.

If the employee reasonably believes that a violation or misuse of public resources is a criminal offense, the employee, in addition to or instead of filing a written report or complaint with the supervisor, appointing authority, the office of internal audit, or the auditor of state’s fraud-reporting system, may report it to a prosecuting attorney, director of law, village solicitor, or -similar chief legal officer of a municipal corporation, to a peace officer, as defined in section 2935.01 of the Revised Code, or, if the violation or misuse of public resources is within the jurisdiction of the inspector general, to 'the inspector general in accordance with section 121.46 of the Revised Code. In addition to that report, if the employee reasonably believes the violation or misuse is also a violation of Chapter 102., section 2921.42, or section 2921.43 of the Revised Code, the employee may report it to the appropriate ethics commission.

(B) Except as otherwise provided in division (C) of this section, no officer or employee in the classified or unclassified civil service shall take any disciplinary action against an employee in the classified or unclassified civil service for making any report or filing a complaint as authorized by division (A) of this section, including, without limitation, doing any of the following:

(1) Removing or suspending the employed from employment;

* # *

(D) If an appointing authority takes any disciplinary or retaliatory action against a classified or unclassified employee as a result of the employee’s having filed a report or complaint under division (A) of this section, the employee’s sole and exclusive remedy, notwithstanding any other provision of law, ,is to file an appeal with the state, personnel board of review within thirty days after receiving actual notice of the appointing authority’s action. If the employee files such an appeal, the board shall immediately notify the employee’s appointing authority and shall hear the appeal. The board may affirm or disaffirm the action- of the appointing authority or may issue any other order as is appropriate. The order of the board is appealable in accordance with Chapter 119. of the Revised Code.

Ohio Rev.Code § 124.341 (emphasis added).

As noted above, Defendants herein argue that Plaintiff, as a public sector employee, was required to bring her claim under § 124.341 (rather than § 4113.52) and to file an appeal with the state personnel board of review. Because she did not do so, Defendants maintain her claim fails as a matter of law. Relying on Robins v. State, Ohio Dept. of Liquor Control, 1996 WL 362067 (10th App.Dist. June 25, 1996), Plaintiff asserts she was entitled to bring her claim under § 4113.52 because she had a good faith belief that Defendant Kovack had committed a felony, a circumstance which is expressly accounted- for in § 4113.52 but not in § 124.341.

In Robins, the plaintiff asserted he was terminated from his position as deputy director of enforcement at the State of Ohio, Department of Liquor Control because he had reported or “caus[ed] to be made known what he believed possible and inappropriate and/or possible illegal conduct on the part of others including his supervisors and/or superiors.” Robins, 1996 WL 362067 at * 1. Defendants moved to dismiss under Ohio Civ. R. 12(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(6). In response, plaintiff relied on § 4113.52, asserting it provided him a remedy for wrongful termination. Defendants “countered with the language of R.C. 4113.52(D), asserting plaintiffs sole remedy lay in the provisions of ,R.C. 124.341.” Id.

The state trial court granted defendants’ motion, finding plaintiffs claim “necessarily fell within the parameters of R.C. 124.341, and pursuant to 'the mandate of R.C. 4113.52(D) a-civil action was not available to plaintiff.” Id.' The state appellate court reversed, explaining as follows:

Generally, R.C. 124.341 and 4113.52 provide remedies to an’ employee who is terminated in retaliation for the employee’s disclosing specified wrongdoing in the workplace. R.C. 124.341' applies to state employees in the classified or unclassified civil service. R.C. 4113.52 applies to employees as defined in R.C. 4113.51(A), and includes “any person who' performs a service for wages or other remuneration for an employer.” “Employer,” in turn, is defined under R.C. 4113.51(B) to include “the state or any agency or instrumentality of the state, and any municipal corporation, county, township, school district, or other political subdivision or any agency or instrumentality thereof.” Given those definitions, both R.C. 124.341 and 4113.52 may apply to state employees, including plaintiff. ' Further,'while each section provides a separate statutory remedy to terminated employees, provisions in each nonetheless prevent an employee from pursuing remedies under both. Specifically, R.C. 4113.52(D) provides:

“* * * A civil action under this division is not available to an employee as a remedy for any disciplinary or retaliatory action taken by an appointing authority against the employee as a result of the employee’s having filed a report under division (A) of section 124.341 of the Revised Code.”

Similarly, in compatible language, R.C. 124.341(D) provides:

“If an appointing authority takes any disciplinary or retaliatory action against a classified or unclassified employee as a result of the employee’s having filed a report under division (A) of this section, the employee’s sole and exclusive remedy, notwithstanding any other provision of law, is to file an appeal with the state personnel board of review within thirty days after receiving actual notice of the appointing authority’s action. * * *” (Emphasis added.)

As a result, although the trial court correctly concluded a terminated employee may not seek redress under both statutes, it incorrectly assumed plaintiffs action necessarily falls under the parameters of R.C. 124.341 because he was a state employee. Rather, in determining whether plaintiff is limited to the remedies set forth in R.C. 124.341, we must examine the specifics of each section.

The scope of R.C. 124.341 is clearly different than that of R.C. 4113.52. For example, R.C. 124.341 concerns violations only of state or federal statutes, rules or regulations, or.the misuse of public resources. - However, unlike.R.C. 4113.52, it does not limit violations of those statutes, .rules or regulations to specific instances of felony conduct or circumstances likely to cause imminent harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety. By contrast, R.C. 4113.52 embraces violations of more than state or federal statute, and includes ordinances or regulations of a political subdivision. However, with the exception of those violations specified in R.C. 4113.52(A)(2), the violation alone is insufficient to trigger the remedy provided; rather, the violation must also be either a felony or present a criminal offense likely to cause imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety. Moreover, while R.C. 124.341(A) provides that the employee may file a written report with the employee’s supervisor identifying the violation or misuse, R.C. 4113.52(A), with the exception of R.C. 4113.52(A)(2), requires that the employee file with the supervisor a .'written report that provides sufficient detail to identify and describe the alleged violation.

Because R.C. 4113.52 covers state employees and areas not covered by R.C. 124.341, the nature of the “wrongdoing” reported is dispositive.

Id. at * 1-2 (emphasis added). The court went on to find that “plaintiffs- allegations are very general” and “we are unable to ascertain [from the face of the complaint] whether his report was filed pursuant to R.C. 124.341(A) or R.C. 4113.52(A).” Id. at * 2. Thus, the court found it could not yet determine whether his complaint under R.C. 4113.52 was precluded and remanded the case to the state trial court for further proceedings. Id.

Defendants acknowledge that Robins “stands for the proposition that public sector employees may have remedies under either R.C. 124.341 or 4113.52” and that “the applicable statute ... depends on the nature of the ‘wrongdoing’ that the plaintiff is reporting.” (Doc. No. 47 at 2.) However, Defendants maintain that “[i]t is only when 124.341(A) fails to apply because a plaintiff engaged in whistleblowing not otherwise included in 124.341(A) that 4113.52 becomes available as a potential remedy to public sector employees.” Id. at 3. Defendants go on to assert that Plaintiffs alleged whistleblowing activity “very clearly fell within the scope of.that described in 124.341(A)” and, therefore, her sole and exclusive remedy was under, that statute.

Here, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff “presented her employer Kovack with a letter reporting to Kovack that she had discovered that Kovack had printed his ‘Auditor Kovack Chili Cook Off campaign literature from the Medina County Auditor’s Office computers and printers” and that “[t]he use of public resources to produce campaign literature is a felony under Ohio law.” (Doc. No.. 1-3 at ¶¶ 14, 17.) The Complaint further alleges that “Kovack failed to correct or make a reasonable and good faith effort to. correct Kovack’s felony violations of Ohio . law within twenty-four (24) hours or the close of business on the next business day following the receipt of- Ehrlich’s report.” Id. at ¶ 21. Plaintiff then claims that “[i]n compliance with R.C. ,4113.52(A)(1)(a), Ehrlich also filed a report describing Ko-vack’s unlawful use of the Auditor’s Office resources to produce Kovack’s campaign literature with the Medina County Sheriff.” Id. at ¶ 23. The report submitted by Ehrlich to the Sheriff (attached to the Complaint as Exhibit D) specifically references § 4113.52. Id. at Exh. D. Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendants later “terminated Ehrlich’s employment in retaliation for Ehrlich’s filing of reports pursuant to, R.C. 4113.52(A)(1)(a) and R.C. 4113.52(A)(1)(b).” Id. at ¶ 48.

Thus, the Complaint clearly alleges that Plaintiff reported Kovack’s alleged use of County resources to print campaign materials because she believed Kovack’s actions constituted a felony under Ohio law. As set forth above, § 4113.52(A)(1)(a) contains language expressly protecting employees who report activities they reasonably believe constitute a felony, while § 124.341 does not. Defendants nevertheless suggest that Plaintiffs claim should be dismissed because § 124.341 references situations where “an employee reasonably believes that a violation or misuse of public resources is a criminal offense” and, therefore, Plaintiff could have sought a remedy under § 124.341. Defendants assert that “124.341(D) and 4113.52(D) define the primacy of 124.341(A) — it applies first and exclusively ‘notwithstanding'any other provision of law* when it can be applied.” (Doc. No. 47 at 3.)

While reports regarding the misuse of public resources fall within the language of both statutes, only § 4113.52 expressly covers situations where an employee reasonably believes that the suspected wrongdoing constitutes a felony. Here, the Complaint clearly alleges that Plaintiff believed Dáfendant Kovack’s’use of the Auditor’s Office printers to print campaign materials constituted a felony under Ohio law. Defendants cite no case law indicating that a public sector employee is limited to § 124.341 where she believes her supervisor’s actions constitute a felony. Indeed, this Court has found at least one case where a state trial court rejected the argument that a state employee’s sole and exclusive remedy was § 124.341, where the employee asserted, a claim under § 4113.52 that he was wrongfully terminated after reporting that his supervisor submitted falsified time sheets charging state time to personal campaign activities. See Dargart v. Ohio. Department of Transportation, 171 Ohio App.3d 439, 442 fn„2 (Ohio App. 6th .Dist.2006) (explaining as, follows: “ODOT maintained that appellant’s sole remedy was an appeal to the State Personnel Board of Review . under R.C. 124.341(D).- Appellant argued that depending upon the type of violation allegedly admitted by the state agency or instrumentality, he was provided with alternate remedies under R.C. 4113.52 and 124.341, The trial court found in favor of appellant on this issue.”)

Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs “sole and exclusive” remedy under the ■ circumstances presented was to pursue a claim under § 124.341. Thus, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Plaintiffs whistleblower claim under § 4113.52 is denied.

B. Section 1983 First Amendment Retaliation Claim (Count Two)

To maintain a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); Simescu v. Emmet County Dep’t of Soc. Services, 942 F.2d 372, 374 (6th Cir.1991). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights,” but merely provides “a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). The first step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989); Baker, 443 U.S. at 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689.

Here, the Complaint alleges that “Ehrlich’s speech and expression in revealing Kovack’s unlawful acts as stated above was speech involving a matter of public concern as Kovack is an elected public official.” (Doc. No. 1-3 at ¶ 53.) The Complaint further alleges that Ehrlich’s speech and expression “was made as a private citizen outside of Ehrlich’s duties with the Auditor’s Office” and that it “outweighs any government interest relating to the operation of the Auditor’s Office.” Id. at ¶¶ 54, 55. Plaintiff then claims that “[t]he Defendants, Kovack, the Auditor’s Office, the County and the Commissioners acting under the color of law, took actions which were in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the State of Ohio Constitution as said actions constituted retaliation against the Plaintiff for exercising her constitutional right of free speech and expression.” Id. at ¶ 56. Plaintiff further alleges Defendants’ retaliatory conduct was the proximate cause of her damages. Id. at ¶ 57,

Thus, Plaintiffs § 1983 claim is predicated on the allegation that Defendants terminated her employment in retaliation for her exercise of speech and expression protected under the First Amendment. To succeed on a First Amendment retaliation claim, the following elements must be proven: “(1) the plaintiff engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiffs protected conduct.” Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 723 (6th Cir.2010). See also Paterek v. Village of Armada, Mich., 801 F.3d 630, 645, 2015 WL 5210554 at * 12 (6th Cir. Sept. 8, 2015); Scarbrough v. Morgan County Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 255 (6th Cir.2006).

1. Elrod/Branti Exception: Policy-making or Confidential Employee

Defendants first maintain that Plaintiffs March 18, 2014 and March 20, 2014 letters regarding Defendant Kovack’s alleged misuse of County resources are not “constitutionally protected” speech under the First Amendment because Plaintiff constitutes a “confidential or policymaking employee” under the Supreme Court’s decisions in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). Plaintiff disagrees and asserts that, in her position as “Information Technology Manager” for the Medina County Auditor’s Office, she had no policy-making authority and did not serve as a confidential advisor to Defendant Ko-vack. Thus, Plaintiff argues the so-called “Elrod/Branti exception” does not apply and her speech is protected by the First Amendment.

The Sixth Circuit employs a two-part inquiry to determine whether the discharge of a public employee violates the First Amendment. See e.g., Rose v. Stephens, 291 F.3d 917, 920 (6th Cir.2002); Latham v. Office of the Attorney General of the State of Ohio, 395 F.3d 261, 265 (6th Cir.2005). The threshold question is “whether the employee’s ‘speech may be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern.’ ” Rose, 291 F.3d at 920 (quoting Dambrot v. Central Michigan University, 55 F.3d 1177, 1186 (6th Cir.1995)). See also Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 318 (6th Cir.2006). If the speech relates to a matter of public concern, the court employs the balancing test set forth in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), “to determine if the employee’s free speech interests outweigh the efficiency interests of the government as an employer.” Rose, 291 F.3d at 920.

However, “[w]hile Pickering provides the basic framework for analyzing a § 1983 First Amendment claim, this circuit employs a different test when a claim is brought by an employee who held a policymaking or confidential position.” Silberstein, 440 F.3d at 319. Specifically, in Rose v. Stephens, supra, the Sixth Circuit held that “where a' confidential or policymaking public employee is discharged on the basis of speech related to [her] political or policy views, the Pickering balance favors the government as a matter of law.” Rose, 291 F.3d at 921. As another Court in this District observed, “[t]his holding is an extension of the Elrod/Branti line of cases, - in which the Supreme Court recognized that, although patronage dismissals ordinarily are unconstitutional, a public employer may terminate a public employee in a policy-making or confidential position solely because -of her political affiliation without violating the First Amendment.” Marsilio v. Vigluicci, 924 F.Suppüd 837, 849 (N.D.Ohio 2013).

The Supreme Court has observed that “no clear line can be drawn between policymaking and non-policymaking positions.” Elrod, 427 U.S. at. 367, 96 S.Ct. 2673. In an effort to clarify this determination, the Sixth Circuit has articulated four categories of employees who will always fall within, the Elrod/Branti policy-making or confidential employees exception:

Category One: positions specifically named in relevant federal, state, county, or municipal law to which discretionary authority with respect to the enforcement of that law or the. carrying out of some other policy of political concern is granted; ....

Category Two: positions to which a significant portion of the total discretionary authority available to category one position-holders has been delegated; or positions not named in law, possessing by virtue of the jurisdiction’s pattern or practice the same quantum or type of discretionary authority commonly held by category one positions in other jurisdictions;

Category Three: confidential advisors who spend a significant .portion of their time on the job advising category one or category -two position-holders on how to exercise their statutory or delegated pol-icymaking authority or- other confidential employees who control the lines of communications to category one positions, category two positions or confidential advisors; and < • ■

Category Four: positions that are part of a group of positions filled by balancing out political party representation, or that are filled by balancing out.selections made by different governmental agents or bodies. .

Latham, 395 F.3d at 267 (citing McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1557-1558 (6th Cir.1996)). See also Silberstein, 440 F.3d at 319; Rose, 291 F.3d at 924; Marsilio, 924, F.Supp.2d at 850851. “In determining whether an employee falls into one of these categories, [courts] must examine the inherent duties of the position, rather than the actual tasks undertaken by the employee.” Latham, 395 F.3d at 267. See also Silberstein, 440 1 F.3d at 319; Williams v. City of River Rouge, 909 F.2d 151, 155 (6th Cir.1990); Monks v. Marlinga, 923 F.2d 423, 425 (6th Cir.1991) (stating that the “relevant focus of analysis is the inherent duties of the position’in question, not the work actually performed by the person who happens to occupy the office”). -

Here, Defendants maintain that, as Medina County Auditor, Defendant Ko-vack constitutes a Category One policymaker. Defendants then assert Plaintiffs “role as the Information Technology Manager, as alleged in her Complaint, absolutely meets [the] criteria” for a Category Three confidential employee. (Doc. No. 42 at 14.) Relying on cases finding that elected officials’ secretaries, law clerks, and bailiffs constitute Category Three employees, Defendants maintain Plaintiff falls within this category because she had “exclusive and pervasive access to all of Mr. Kovack’s electronic communications and files.” Id. Indeed, Defendants assert that “[o]ne could not fathom a greater saturation of access to an elected official’s communications than the one alleged by Plaintiff — the degree of confidentiality is substantially greater than the positions the Sixth Circuit has already held lacked First Amendment protection.” Id.

Plaintiff notes “there is nothing in [the] Complaint to substantiate” Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiff had “exclusive and pervasive access” to all of Kovack’s electronic communications. (Doc. No. 46 at 15.) Moreover, Plaintiff asserts she did not control the lines of communication to Kovack, arguing that “[c]ommunications from Ko-vack or to Kovack did not flow through Ehrlich, or require Ehrlich’s review in order to reach its requested destination.” Id. Plaintiff further claims she does not constitute a Category Three employee because she “had no control of Kovack’s calendar, email or telephone, such as are the required duties of a personal secretary, law clerk or personal bailiff.” Id. Finally, Plaintiff argues that “access to Kovack’s computer and email communications -do not establish Ehrlich was a ‘confidential policymaking employee’ as contemplated in the four categories” set forth above. ■ Id. at 15-16.

The Court finds that, at this stage in the litigation, it cannot say Plaintiff constitutes a Category Three confidential or policy-making employee for purposes of the El-rod/Branti exception as a matter of law. As noted supra, in determining whether Plaintiffs- First Amendment claim should be dismissed under Rule 12(c), this Court is limited to the allegations in the Complaint and the documents attached thereto. There is nothing in the record currently before the Court that describes the “inherent duties” of Plaintiffs position as Information Technology Manager for the Medina County Auditor’s Office. Moreover, Defendants do not.direct this Court’s attention to any authorizing statute or written job description that defines the duties of the position- of “Information Technology Manager”- for a County Auditor’s Office.

Defendants, however, -argue that the Complaint alleges Plaintiff had “exclusive and pervasive access to all of Mr. Kovack’s electronic communications and files;” “complete access to Kovack’s laptop;” and that she occupied a “unique position to review all of [Kovack’s] email communications.” (Doc. No. 42 at 14.) In addition, Defendants point to references in documents attached to the Complaint that they allege indicate Plaintiff had “access and the ability to review print logs (ECF 1-3, Exs. D, E), and both work files and personal files that were unrelated to work (ECF 1-3, ¶¶ 10-14.)” (Doc. No. 47 at 5.)

As an initial matter, the Court does not construe the Complaint as alleging Plaintiff had “exclusive and pervasive access to all of Kovack’s electronic communications and files.” Rather, thé Complaint asserts only that: (1) in July 2011, Defendant Kovack “provided thé County’s Dell laptop computer to Ehrlich for repairs and Ehrlich backed up the computer data to an Auditor’s Office.external hard drive;” and, (2) Plaintiff discovered Auditor’s Office print logs in September 2013 and February 2014 that allegedly showed Kovack had printed campaign materials using County resources. (Doc. No; 1-3 at ¶¶ 9, 12-13.) Attachments to the Complaint also indicate Plaintiff backed up Defendant Kovack’s county laptop on at least one occasion at his request and “reviewed logs for our print server as part of my-job as Network Administrator.” (Doc. No,: 1-3, Exh. D.) Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, the Court finds that none of these allegations suggest Plaintiff had “exclusive access” to all of Kovack’s electronic communications and files. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff had access to Kovack’s County laptop, the Complaint and its attachments suggest such .access was limited to those occasions when Defendant Kovack asked Plaintiff to repair or “back up” his laptop. The frequency of these requests is not clear from the Complaint.

More importantly, regardless of any allegations in the Complaint regarding the particular tasks Plaintiff may have performed while employed, at the Auditor’s Office, Defendants do not direct this Court’s attention to anything in the record that sheds light on the “inherent duties” of Plaintiffs position; i.e., Information Technology Manager. As noted above, in determining whether a plaintiff constitutes a confidential or policymaking employee for purposes of the Elrod/Branti exception, the “relevant focus of analysis is the inherent duties of the position in question, not the work actually performed by the person who happens to occupy the office.” Monks, 923 F.2d at 425. See also Latham, 395 F.3d at 267; Silberstein, 440 F.3d .at 319; Williams, 90.9 F.2d at 155. Here, the current record is devoid of any information regarding the “inherent duties of the position in question.” Thus, the Court finds it is unable,: at this stage in the litigation, to render a determination as to whether Plaintiff constituted a confidential or poli-cymaking employee for purposes of El-rod/Branti. See e.g: McCloud, 97 F.3d at 1558 (noting that “in the situation where the inherent duties of the plaintiffs’ positions are not apparent and the facts are not yet fully developed] it is not possible for us to decide, when reviewing in an interlocutory posture the denial of a motion for summary judgment, whether a defendant should be granted qualified immunity”).

. Accordingly, the Court .rejects as premature Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff is not entitled to First Amendment protection because she constituted a confidential or policymaking employee under El-rod/Branti.

2. Duty Speech

Defendants acknowledge Plaintiffs allegation that she was acting as a private citizen when she reported Defendant Ko-vack’s suspected wrongdoing to the Medina County Sheriff. Defendants argue, however, that “to the extent Plaintiff could allege that her speech was taken as part of her work duties — and -was not private speech — it would still lack protection because the First Amendment does not shield public employees from discipline related to expressions made by employees-pursuant to their' professional duties.” (Doc. No. 42 at 19.) Defendants maintain that, because Plaintiff discovered Defendant Kovaek’s alleged conduct while performing her work duties, her subsequent reporting of that conduct is deemed- duty speech and is not protected by the First Amendment. Id.

. Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition is not clear, but it doe's appear to suggest that Plaintiffs act of reporting Defendant Ko-vack’s suspected wrongdoing does not constitute duty speech because she reported" it “outside the chain of command” to the Medina County Sheriff. (Doc. No. 46 ’at 17.)

The Supreme Court has explained that “the First Amendment protects a public employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.” Garceta v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006). See also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). To establish that' speech is constitutionally protected, a public employee must show that (1) her speech was made ás a private citizen, rather than pursuant to her official duties; (2) her speech involved a matter of public concern; and (3) her interest as’ a citizen in commenting on the matter outweighed the state’s interest, as an employer, in “‘promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.’ ” Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 695 F.3d 531, 540 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Garcett, 547 U.S. at 417, 126 S.Ct. 1951). See also Westmoreland v. Sutherland, 662 F.3d 714, 719 (6th Cir. 2011).

With respect to the first of these three elements, the Sixth Circuit has explained as follows:

The Supreme Court recently clarified what it means for a public employee to speak as a “citizen” for First Amendment purposes in Garceta. The Court observed that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951. Justice Kennedy explained:

Restricting, speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itsejf has commissioned or created.

Id. at 421-22, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (citation omitted). We thus look to the content and context of the plaintiffs speech to determine whether her statements were made pursuant merely to her professional duties. Fox v. Traverse City Area Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 605 F.3d 345, 348 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 562 U.S. 1062, 131 S.Ct. 643, 178 L.Ed.2d 478 (2010).

[8] We have identified a number of factors to consider in this determination, including “the impetus for her speech, the setting of her speech, the speech’s audience, and its general subject matter.” Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 546 (6th Cir.2007). Relevant considerations include whether the statements were made to individuals “up the chain of command,” Fox, 605 F.3d at 350 (quoting Davis v. McKinney, 518 F.3d 304, 313 (5th Cir.2008)), and whether the content of the speech is “nothing more than ‘the quintessential employee beef: management has acted incompetently.’ ” Haynes v. City of Circleville, 474 F.3d 357, 365 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting Barnes v. McDowell, 848 F.2d 725, 735 (6th Cir.1988)). Factors that may be relevant but are not dispositive include whether the speech was made inside or outside of the workplace and whether it concerned the subject-matter of the speaker’s employment. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (“Employees in some cases may receive First Amendment protection for expressions made at work.”); id. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (“The First Amendment protects some expressions related to the speaker’s job.”).

Handy-Clay, 695 F.3d at 540-541. See also Keeling v. Coffee County, Tenn;, 541 Fed.Appx. 522, 526 (6th Cir.2013).

In their Reply Brief, Defendants point to allegations within the Complaint that: (1) on February 28, 2014, Plaintiff was directed to move an office printer to another location; (2) as a result of this direction, she conducted a study using the print server logs to see how many jobs were being sent to that printer on March 3, 2014; (3) while conducting that study, Plaintiff noticed that Defendant Kovack had sent documents to the printer about a personal campaign fund raiser; and, (4) Plaintiff thereafter sent a letter to Defendant Ko-vack stating that, during the course performing that study, she noticed that he had utilized office printers to print campaign literature. (Doc. No. 47 at 9) (citing Doc. No. 1-3, Exh. D.) Based on these allegations, Defendants assert that “[t]his discovery was made pursuant to her official duties; and her subsequent report of that discovery therefore occurred within the course of Plaintiffs’ employment duties.” (Doc. No. 47 at 9.) Thus, Defendants assert Plaintiffs speech does not constitute constitutionally protected speech under Garcetti, supra.

The Court disagrees, and finds Garcetti to be distinguishable from the instant case. In Garcetti,. plaintiff Richard Ceballos had been employed as a calendar deputy district attorney for the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office. Garcetti .547 U.S. at 413, 126 S.Ct. 1951. A defense attorney contacted Ceballos and expressed concern about possible inaccuracies in an affidavit that had been used to obtain a critical search warrant in one of the cases the District Attorney’s Office was actively prosecuting. Id. at 414, 126 S.Ct. 1951. Ceballos investigated and wrote a memo to his supervisor that expressed concerns over the affidavit. Id. Ceballos’ supervisor nevertheless decided to continue prosecuting the case, and Ceballos was ultimately called by thé defense to testify about his concerns over the warrant. Id. at 414-415,126 S.Ct. 1951. Ceballos was thereafter subjected to a series of allegedly retaliatory employment actions, including reassignment, transfer to another courthouse, and denial of a promotion. Id. at 415, 126 S.Ct. 1951.

The Supreme Court found Ceballos’ speech was not protected under the First-Amendment, explaining as follows:

The controlling factor in Ceballos’ case is that his expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy. See Brief for Respondent 4 (“Ceballos does not dispute that he prepared the memorandum- ‘pursuant to his duties as a prosecutor’ ”), That consideration — the fact that Ceballos spoke ,as a prosecutor fulfilling a responsibility to advise his supervisor about how best to proceed with a pending case — distinguishes Ceballos’ case from those in which the First Amendment provides protection against discipline. We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.

Ceballos wrote his disposition memo because that is part of what he, as a calendar deputy, was employed to do. It is immaterial whether he experienced some personal gratification from writing the memo; his First Amendment rights do not depend on his job satisfaction. The significant po