Evans v. U.S. Department of the Interior (135 F. Supp. 3d 799, 2015)

OPINION and ORDER

ROBERT L. MILLER, JR., District Judge.

Cheryl Evans brings this suit against the National Park Service and the U.S. Department of the Interior, alleging that these agencies (collectively, “the government”) violated the Freedom of Information Act by refusing to release or releasing in redacted form documents in response to six of her FOIA requests. The court’s jurisdiction over a FOIA suit arises under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), which requires the court to “determine the matter de novo” and puts “the burden ... on the agency to sustain its action.” If the agency has- unlawfully withheld records, the court can enjoin the agency from withholding them and order their production. See id.

I. Facts

The essential facts of this case aren’t in dispute.

In 2012 and 2013, Ms. Evans, a licensed attorney representing herself in this case, made a series of FOIA requests to the Park Service seeking documents relating to the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore (“Lakeshore”). Ms. Evans asked for documents about the extent to which the Park Service has law enforcement authority and/or jurisdiction within specific areas of the Lakeshore. Because much of the parties’ dispute concerns timing as it relates to requests, responses, and appeals, the court reviews the timeline of Ms. Evans’s six FOIA requests in some detail.

Request 12-360:

Ms. Evans made her first request on February 25, 2012. This request sought three specific-categories of records:

1.Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, Standard Operating Procedure #2420, Traffic Enforcement — Jurisdiction of Roadways (Updated 02-012006).

2. Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore Law Enforcement General Agreement with Porter County.

3. Two records written ’by the Park Service in October 1977 and May 1994 which requested concurrent jurisdiction over Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore and Indiana Dunes State Park, as well as two' records written by the State of Indiana in May 1978 and August 1994 which conferred such-jurisdiction by the State over those two properties; including any supporting documents the State included with the documents that conferred this authority.

This request was assigned the tracking number NPS-2012-00360 (“request 12-360”). The Park Service acknowledged receipt of this request on March 6, 2002, and responded on April 5, 2012 with a letter informing Ms. -Evans that the agency had found five documents responsive to the request. The agency produced four of the documents immediately but indicated it was still reviewing whether to release the requested Traffic Enforcement Standard Operating Procedure' (“Traffic SOP”). On April 20, 2012, the Park Service sent Ms. Evans a letter advising her that it would only release the Traffic SOP in a heavily redacted form, based on FOIA Exemption 7(E). The version of the Traffic SOP initially released to Ms. Evans contained un-redacted sections stating the “Purpose,” “Definitions,” and “Scope” of the Traffic SOP, but the final four pages of the document under the section “Procedure” were blacked out completely. This letter informed Ms. Evans of her appeal rights and how to exercise them, noting that she would have to appeal (if at all) within 30 days of the agency’s response.

Ms. Evans appealed the partial denial of request 12-360 — specifically, the redac-tions to the Traffic SOP — on. May 21, 2012. The appeal letter , contended that the Park Service hadn’t ■ adequately demonstrated that Exemption 7(E) covered the informar tion that.was withheld.. It.also argued that the agency hadn’t segregated exempted material from what could be disclosed, because the redactions to the Traffic SOP were overly broad. The Department of the Interior (acting on behalf of the Park Service) responded to Ms. Evans’s appeal by letter on June 26, 2012. This letter told Ms. Evans ■ that the agency couldn’t make a determination on her appeal within the 20 working days required by statute, so Ms. Evans had the right to seek judicial review.

Request 12-5IS

On April 6, 2012 (the day after the Park Service’s initial response to request 12-360), Ms. Evans sent the Park Service two emails asserting that the agency’s response to request 12-360 was deficient. Ms. Evans complained that while the Park Service had 'turned over three of the four requested letters between Indiana and the Lakeshore, it hadn’t produced the final letter or produced four attachments originally included with those 'letters: The Park Service treated these emails as a new FOIA request, acknowledged the request in a letter dated April 17, J2012, and assigned it the tracking number NPS-2012-00513 (“request 12-513”).

The Park Service issued a final response to request 12-513 on August 2, 2012, providing Ms. Evans with the requested letter and one of the four requested attachments. The agency stated that park staff had searched for the remaining three attachments but couldn’t find them. This letter advised Ms. Evans about her appeal rights and how to appeal the agency’s determination/ Ms. Evans never administratively appealed the response to request 12-513.

Request 12-514

Ms. Evans made another email' FOIA request to the Park Service on April 13, 2012, asking for:

1. Any documents or electronic records in which the Lakeshore and either the field solicitor, U.S. Attorney’s Office, or another federal agency discussed enforcement authority issues or discussed clarification of the extent of National Park Service jurisdiction relative to the Lakeshore — particularly any correspondence in which authority was concurred with or denied.

2. Any correspondence between the Lakeshore and the Town of Porter concerning buoys in Lake Michigan — particularly those records in which the Lakeshore discussed removing those buoys.

3. Any correspondence between the Lakeshore and the State of Indiana or one of its agencies concerning buoys in .Lake Michigan — particularly those records in which the Lakeshore discussed removing those buoys from Porter Beach.

4. Any correspondence between the Lakeshore and the Coast Guard concerning swimming buoys in Lake Michigan at Porter Beach — particularly those records in which the Lakeshore discussed.removing those buoys from Porter Beach.

5.- Any correspondence between the Lakeshore and the State of Indiana or one of its agencies concerning the opera- , tion of jet skis on Lake Michigan.

The Park Service acknowledged receipt of this request on April 17, 2012,-assigned it number NPS-2012-00514 (“request 12-514”), and told Ms. Evans that processing of the request would begin after the Park Service received an advance processing fee.

The Park Service provided Ms. Evans with 27 documents in respohse to request 12-514 on August 28, 2012. The letter also said that fifteen additional responsive documents were being withheld pending consultation with the Department of the Interior' Solicitor’s Office, and" informed Ms. Evans of her right to appeal and the procedures necessary to do’so. The Park Service sent a “final response” to Ms. Evans on September 27, 2012 releasing in full one of the fifteen documents under consideration, releasing one other in redacted form, and withholding the remaining thirteen documents entirely. This letter told Ms. Evans about her appeal rights and how to exercise them, and included an index listing the withheld - documents and the exemptions the Park, Service asserted applied to them.

On July 3,. 2013 (after this litigation began), the Park Service informed Ms. Evans by email that the agency had reconsidered two of the originally withheld documents and now believed that they were public records to which Ms. Evans was entitled. Attached to the email were the two records in unredacted form. Ms. Evans appealed the response to réqüest 12-514 on July 17, 2013. On December 12, 2013, the Park Service again emailed additional documents to, Ms. Evans in what it styled a “revised release determination.” Some of the nine documents released with this email were responsive to request 12-514, and many were released only in redacted form. The email advised Ms. Evans that she could appeal this response. She appealed the response to request 12-514 again on July 5,2014, claiming that the Park Service hadn’t provided a written response to her first appeal.

Request 12-999 ■

In an August 31, 2012 email to the Park Service, Ms. Evans asserted that the response to request 12-514- was deficient. She identified five types' of documents that were referred to by some: of the 27 documents the Park Service had released to her on August 28; none of these referenced documents were included in the agency’s response to request 12-514. The Park Service again treated this as a new FOIA request, assigning it tracking number NPS-2012-Ó0&99 (“request 12-999”).

The Park Service issued-.a partial response to this new request by letter on December 21, 2012, after this suit was filed. This letter said- that of the five requested records, two were being released to her, one- didn’t exist, and one couldn’t be located. The remaining record requested was a binder regarding jurisdictional issues. The Park Service included a list of the 77 documents in the binder and released some of- them to Ms. Evans, informing her that sixteen of the documents were-still under consideration for release. The letter said Ms. Evans was entitled to treat the delayed response to her request ás a denial, and could appeal it immediately. On June 19, 2013, the Park Service issued a final response concerning the sixteen remaining documents from the binder. The agency released some of the documents to Ms. Evans in their entirety, and released others in redacted form. The final response letter informed Ms. Evans of her right to appeal - the partial denial.

Ms. Evans appealed the response to request 12-999 on July 16, 2013. On December 12, 2013, the Park Service emailed more documents to Ms. Evans, some of which were responsive to request 12-999 but were partially redacted. This email told Ms. Evans that she could appeal the response. She appealed the response to request 12-999 again on July 4, 2014, claiming that the Park Service hadn’t provided a written response to her first appeal.

Request 12-515

On April 13, 2012 (the same day she made request 12-514), Ms. Evans made another request for:

1. A copy of any Environmental Assessment and/or Environmental Impact Statement relative to the Lakeshore that involves the use of jet skis within the Lakeshore, and any subsequent determinations or findings that the Park Service or the Lakeshore reached relative to the same.

2. A copy of any Environmental Assessment and/or Environmental Impact Statement relative to the Lakeshore that involves the use of off-road vehicles within the Lakeshore, and any subsequent determinations or findings that NPS or the Lakeshore reached relative to the same.

3. A copy of the General Agreement, Law Enforcement between the Lake-shore and the Town of Porter.

4. A copy of the General Agreement, Law Enforcement between the Lake-shore and the Town of Ogden.

The Park Service acknowledged receipt of this request on April 17, 2012, and assigned the request tracking number NPS-2012-00515 (“request 12-515”). The agency issued a final response on August 2, 2012. That response provided the General Agreement between the Lakeshore and Ogden, and stated that no Environmental Assessments or Impact Statements existed. It also stated that “there is currently no general agreement in force between the park and the Town of Porter.” This letter informed Ms. Evans of her right to appeal. She didn’t appeal the partial denial of request 12-515.

Request 13-60

On September 1, 2012, Ms. Evans made another request for a copy of an 1830 government land survey of the then-Northwest Territory, as well as the surveyor’s field notes. The Park Service originally got this request mixed up with request 12-999, informing Ms. Evans by email on October 19, 2012 that staff were working on a fee estimate for it. Ms. Evans objected by email that fees couldn’t be charged because the agency had taken too long to respond to the request.

The Park Service sent Ms. Evans a letter on October 23, 2012 acknowledging receipt of the new request and assigning it tracking number NPS-2013-00060 (“request 13-60”). The agency issued a final response to this request on November 28, 2012, telling Ms. Evans that the actual survey and notes she requested were maintained on record by the State of Indiana. This letter informed Ms. Evans that she had the light to appeal if she considered the Park Service’s response to be a denial of her request. Ms. Evans didn’t appeal this response.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper only if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to the interrogatories, and admissions on file, to-

gether with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists whenever “there is sufficient .evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In deciding whether a genuine dispute exists as to any material fact, a court must view all the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Weber v. Univ. Research Assoc., Inc., 621 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir.2010). The existence of an alleged factual dispute, by itself, won’t defeat a summary judgment motion; “instead, the nonmovant must present definite, competent evidence in rebuttal,” Parent v. Home Depot U.S.A, Inc., 694 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir.2012), and “must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial.” Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir.2007). It isn’t appropriate for the court to judge the credibility of the witnesses or evaluate the weight of the evidence; the only question on summary judgment is “whether there is a genuine issue of fact.” Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir.2009). Summary judgment is “not a dress rehearsal or practice run; it Is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events.” Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir.2005) (internal citations omitted).

Because the question in FOIA cases often involves whether certain undisputed actions by an agency violated statutory requirements, “FOIA cases typically and appropriately are decided on motions for summary- judgment.” Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 828 F.Supp.2d 325, 329-330 (D.D.C.2011). A court can award summary judgment in such cases solely on the basis of affidavits or declarations from, agency employees, so long as they are “relatively detailed and non-conclusory.” SafeGard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C.Cir.1991) (internal citation omitted). When an agency moves for summary judgment, the essential question is -whether “each document that falls within the class requested either has been produced, is unidentifiable, or is wholly [or partially] exempt from the Act’s inspection requirements.” Goland v. C.I.A., 607 F.2d 339, 352 (D.C.Cir.1978) (internal citation omitted).

III. Discussion

Ms. Evans lias filed five motions to strike, asking the court to disregard seven of the government’s ten exhibits. Before evaluating whether genuine issues of material fact exist, the court must decide what evidence is properly before it by resolving these motions to strike.

A. a Ms. Evans’s Motions to Strike

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure .56 provides that an affidavit or declaration offered to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment “must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4). An affidavit or declaration that contains information that couldn’t be admissible at trial can neither lend support to, nor defeat, a summary júdgment motion. See Zayre Corp. v. S.M. & R. Co., Inc., 882 F.2d 1145, .1148-1149 (7th Cir.1989); Palucki v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 F.2d 1568, 1572 (7th Cir.1989). A court considering a motion to strike should “only strike and disregard the improper portions of the affidavit and allow all appropriate recitations of fact to stand.” Paniaguas v. Aldon Companies, Inc., No. 2:04 CV 468 PRC, 2006 WL 2568210, at *4 (N.D.Ind. Sept. 5, 2006).

The government asks the court to disregard much of the argument presented in Ms. Evans’s motions' to strike. The government accuses Ms. Evans of evading this district’s'page limit' on briefs in opposition to summary judgment by placing additional arguments in her motions to strike (and incorporating them by reference in her opposition brief). Under the court’s local rules, briefs in opposition to a summary judgment motion “must not exceed 25 pages.” N.D. Ind. L.R. 7-l(e)(l). As will be discussed, much of Ms. Evans’s argument in her motions to strike effectively supplements her opposition brief rather than legitimately presenting purely evidentiary challenges to the government’s exhibits.

A district court is entitled to strictly enforce its local rules regarding summary judgment pleadings, even if enforcement results in a party forfeiting potentially meritorious arguments. See Yancick v. Hanna Steel Corp., 653 F.3d 532, 537 (7th Cir.2011) (“This court has ‘routinely held that a district court may strictly enforce compliance with its local rules regarding summary judgment’motions.’ ”) (quoting Schmidt v. Eagle Waste & Recycling, Inc., 599 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir.2010)). Additional pleadings that improperly circumvent page limits are therefore subject to being stricken by the court. See Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Peter Stone Co., U.S.A, No. 08 C 3908, 2015 WL 228209, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 14, 2015) (striking a defendant’s “supplemental” summary judgment brief as an attempt to skirt the court’s page limit rules).

To hold the government to the page limitations of the Local Rules yet allow Ms. Evans to evade them would be unfair to the government. Page limits serve an important function: these rules are “designed as much for the benefit of the litigants as for the benefit of the court. If extra pages mean stronger argument, enforcement of the page limit protects those who obey the rules.” Morgan v. South Bend Community School Corp., 797 F.2d 471, 480-481 (7th Cir.1986). Apart from the harm to the government, letting Ms. Evans circumvent the page limits would waste valuable judicial,resources by inviting Ms. Evans to take a shotgun approach to opposing summary judgment and make every conceivable argument, rather than assisting the court in its task by focusing her pleadings on the critical remaining disputes of fact. Consistent with the local rules, the court will strictly enforce its page limits and will consider arguments raised in Ms. Evans’s motions to strike only as they relate to the admissibility issues raised in those motions. The court won’t consider merits arguments raised in the motions to strike when ruling on the summary judgment motion.

Ms, Evans has moved to strike: (1) portions of the declaration of Michael Bremer (Def.Ex. 6); (2) both declarations of Elizabeth McConnell (Def.Exs. 4, 5); (3) both declarations of Patricia Rooney (Def.Exs. 2, 3); (4) the revised Vaughn index submitted by the government (Def.Ex. 9); and (5) the declaration of Dana Jacobsen (Def.Ex. 10). The court considers each motion separately below.

Defense Exhibit 6: Declaration of Michael Bremer

Ms. Evans moves to strike several paragraphs of Defense Exhibit 6 — the declaration of Lakeshore Chief Ranger Michael Bremer — on the basis that Mr. Bremer testifies to matters not within his personal knowledge. Mr. Bremer’s declaration states that he recommended the Park Service redact most of the Traffic SOP before turning it over to Ms. Evans. His declaration justifies the redaction on the grounds that “the procedures or techniques described below are not well known to the public. [The Park Service] routinely does not release these techniques.” (DefiEx. 6, ¶ 5). Ms. Evans argues that Paragraph 5 isn’t based on personal knowledge, because Mr. Bremer isn’t- qualified to comment on either what the public does (or doesn’t) know, or what the Park Service as a whole does (or doesn’t do). Ms. Evans also objects to Paragraphs 7 through 12 of the declaration, which list ways in which release of the information in the Traffic SOP could be exploited and mentions possible negative impacts of such exploitation on park- safety, security, and law enforcement. Ms. Evans makes the same objection to all of these paragraphs: that they aren’t based on personal knowledge and are speculative,. because Mr. Bremer “is not competent or qualified to testify to what the public would or would not do.”

A witness can testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal’ knowledge of the matter. See Fed.R.Evid. 602; United States v. Joy, 192 F.3d 761, 767 (7th Cir.1999). Still, “personal knowledge can include inferences— most of our personal knowledge is inferential.” Ani-Deng v. Jeffboat, LLC, 777 F.3d 452/454 (7th Cir.2015) (internal citations Omitted). Similarly, affidavits can contain a lay witness’s opinions, so long as those opinions are “grounded in observation or other firsthand personal experience.” Visser v. Packer Eng’g Associates, Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir.1991) (noting that opinioris‘and inferences are permissible in an affidavit but “must not be flights of fancy, speculations, hunches, intuitions, or rumors about matters remote from that experience.”).

Mr. Bremer’s statements in Paragraph 5 are permissible inferences based on his 26 years of personal experience as a Park Service law enforcement officer. His statement that the contents of the Traffic SOP* aren’t publicly-known is a permissible inference based on his testimony that-in his experience with the Park Service, the Traffic SOP'has never been released to the public. Mr. Bremer is also qualified to comment on whether the Park Service routinely releases these sorts of documents. As a long-time employee of the Park Service’s law enforcement department, Mr. Bremer has abundant personal experience with the Park Service’s disclosure policies' and is knowledgeable about which internal law enforcement documents his employer does or does not release publicly. . The court denies Ms. Evans’s motion to strike Paragraph 5.

With regard to Paragraphs 7-12, Mr. Bremer’s assessment of what members of the public could or might do with the information in the Traffic SOP are speculative. While an experienced law enforcement- officer might in some cases be able to infer the ways in which criminal behavior could change based on the public release of information, Mr. Bremer’s declaration doesn’t establish a sufficient basis-/to support his inferences. Nowhere in the declaration does Mr., Bremer suggest the personal observations or. experiences on which this speculation is based; he doesn’t, for example, state that he has been involved in such disclosures in the past and saw their repercussions. See Visser v. Packer Eng’g Associates, Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir.1991) (holding that district court properly struck affidavits which speculated about an individual’s motivations for taking an action, without including “primary facts from which a reasonable person in'their position would infer” that the motivation existed). The portions of Paragraphs 7-12 that speculate oh the possible future consequences of disclosure aren’t sufficiently “grounded in. observation or other first-hand personal experience” to be admissible.

The court therefore GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Ms. Evans’s motion to strike the declaration of Michael Bremer. The motion is granted with regard to those portions of Paragraphs 7-12 which speculate as to the possible consequences of releasing Traffic SOP information to the public. The motion is denied with regard to the rest of Mr. Bremer’s declaration, including the portions of Paragraphs 7-12 that describe the contents of the Traffic SOP.'

Defense Exhibits I and 5: Declarations of Elizabeth McConnell

- Ms. Evans also moves to strike Defense Exhibits 4 and 5, two declarations by Lakeshore employee Elizabeth McConnell that describe the search efforts made by the Park Service in response to Ms. Evans’s FOIA requests. First, Ms. Evans challenges the. declarations in their entirety based on their introductory paragraphs, which include the following language:

All information herein is based upon my personal knowledge and/or experience and/or my personal review of plaintiffs Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests and documents or upon information furnished to me in my official capacity.

(Def. Ex. 4, ¶ 1; Def. Ex. 5, ¶1). Ms. Evans argues that the final portion of that sentence (“information furnished to me”) proves that the. contents of the declarations aren’t based on Ms. McConnell’s personal knowledge. Because these introductory paragraphs qualify the entire declarations, Ms. Evans takes the position that the lack of personal knowledge hinted at infects the declarations in their entirety and renders them wholly inadmissible.

The inclusion of this language at the beginning of both declarations usually is improper, but doesn’t justify striking the declarations completely. Parts of the declarations indisputably refer to Ms. McConnell’s own personal efforts in searching for records. It would be improper to strike such unquestionably competent and admissible testimony simply due to introductory boilerplate. See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure §'2738 (Civ.3d ed. 2006) (“The court will disregard only the inadmissible portions of a challenged affidavit and consider the rest of it”). Ms. Evans’s motion identifies several specific portions of the declarations that she believes aren’t based on personal knowledge, and the court will consider her arguments in light of Ms. McConnell’s statement that some of the material in- the declaration might be based on information provided to her rather than personal knowledge. ■

Ms. Evans’s second argument for striking the entire declarations relates to some confusion about Ms. McConnell’s job tifié. In her first declaration, Ms. McConnell describes herself as “the FOIA officer of Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore ... for the past two and one half (2}f¿) years.” (Def.Ex. 4, ¶ 1). In her second declaration, Ms. McConnell refers to herself as the “Chief of Administration and Business Services for Indiana Dunes National Lake-shore ... for the past four (4) years.” (Def.Ex. 5, ¶ 1). In Ms. Evans’s 'view, this discrepancy casts doubt on whether Ms. McConnell is actually the FOIA officer for Lakeshore, and so renders her incompetent to testify to FOIA procedures there. Even if Ms. McConnell is in fact a FOIA officer, Ms. Evans argues that the brevity of the time she has held the position — two and a half years — means she doesn’t hate sufficient personal knowledge about Lake-shore FOIA practices and must be “merely repeating hearsay told to her ,by others” or “stating opinion.”

Neither of these contentions has merit. Employees- frequently have multiple titles within an office or agency; that Ms. McConnell is the Chief of Administration and Business Services for the Lakeshore in no way precludes her from also being the designated FOIA officer. " That' she identifies herself by different job-titles in her two declarations provides no reason to toss out her testimony. That Ms. McConnell had only been the FOIA officer for two and a half years at the time of her first declaration is also irrelevant. Ms. Evans’s first FOIA request was filed in February 2012, and Ms. McConnell’s declaration is dated June 2013. Ms. McConnell was, therefore, the FOIA officer for Lakeshore for roughly one year before Ms. Evans even made her requests, and there is no reason to think she wasn’t knowledgeable about Lakéshore’s FOIA practices throughout the time Ms, Evans re- . quested documents.

Ms. Evans next argues that Ms. McConnell lacks credibility and/or personal knowledge of the documents at issúe, because McConnell’s first declaration says in Paragraph 10 that only one of the documents Ms. Evans requested had ever been distributed to parties outside the Park Service. Ms. Evans insists that some of the other documents, actually had been shared with a U.S. Magistrate Judge or discussed at a public meeting, and the government doesn’t directly address whether this alleged disclosure happened. Ms. Evans has offered no authority suggesting that a single factual error (assuming this to be one), in a declaration, renders the entire declaration inadmissible. That Ms. McConnell inaccurately claimed some documents weren’t released publicly might be reason for a factfinder to question her credibility or assign her testimony less weight, but neither of those considerations undermines the admissibility of her declaration.

Ms. Evans also challenges Paragraphs 4, 8, and 9 of Ms. McConnell’s first, declaration and Paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of Ms. McConnell’s second declaration. These paragraphs say that-eleven staff members at Lakeshore conducted searches for the requested documents, these .searches were done in good faith, the Park Service searched the relevant files, and the relevant documents weren’t found. Ms. Evans argues that these statements “demonstrate a lack of'personal knowledge and are unclear, vague, conclusory, and should be struck” because they don’t identify which staff members or specific document requests were involved, state legal conclusions, and are based on the search efforts of other staff members about which Ms. McConnell lacks personal knowledge.

As the Lakeshore FOIA officer, Ms. McConnell is competent to testify through personal knowledge regarding what efforts she and her staff undertook in response to Ms. Evans’s FOIA requests. That Ms. McConnell didn’t specifically name the staff members who helped in the searches doesn’t compel a conclusion (or even an inference) that she lacked personal knowledge of the searches she oversaw, and Ms. Evans has identified no precedent in support of her argument that vagueness alone renders otherwise, competent testimony inadmissible., Like arguments about the accuracy of Ms. McConnell’s declarations, arguments regarding .their specificity and level of detail go not to admissibility but to weight; if Ms. Evans thinks the government hasn’t adequately described its search efforts, that argument belongs in her response to- the summary judgment motion. ■

Ms. Evans cites to Bright v. Ashcroft, 259 F.Supp.2d 494, 498 (E.D.La.2003), for the proposition that a court can strike portions of an affidavit that aren’t based on personal knowledge or constitute improper opinion testimony. In Bright, however, the court struck the affidavit of a high-level FBI official based in Washington D.C. because his testimony concerned topics — such as the identity of a confidential source and the conduct and thought processes of other agents in a field-level investigation in New Orleans — about which the official could not have had personal knowledge. Ms. Evans identifies no comparable testimony in Ms. McConnell’s declarations. As a Lakeshore employee and FOIA officer, she had adequate first-hand knowledge of the investigation her office undertook in response to Ms. Evans’s requests for documents. Nowhere in her declarations does she opine on the state of mind of others or describe events in which she didn’t participate. The only arguably improper portion of the declarations is Paragraph 4' of the first declaration, in which Ms. McConnell states that the searches were'conducted “in good faith” and were “reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” These statements represent legal conclusions rather than factual testimony, and the court will therefore strike these statements from Defense Exhibit 4.

Finally, Ms. Evans argues that Ms. McConnell’s declarations show bad faith, insofar as statements in them conflict with later statements by the government or with -the .facts as Ms. Evans understands them. This section of the motion isn’t a motion to strike; it doesn’t ask the court to strike Ms. McConnell’s declaration on this basis, instead merely asserting that bad faith exists and that “Plaintiff wishes to understand why she was not given these documents.” As noted above, a litigant can’t escape this court’s page limits on briefs in opposition to summary judgment simply by treating motions to strike as addenda in which to raise merits arguments that wouldn’t fit in a response brief. The arguments regarding bad faith are irrelevant to a motion to strike and the court will disregard them.

•For the reasons above, the court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Ms. Evans’s motion to strike Elizabeth McConnell’s declarations. The motion is denied with regard to all portions of the declarations other than the sentence “These searches were conducted in good faith and were reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents” in Paragraph 4 of the Defense Exhibit 4, which is stricken as ah improper legal conclusion.

Defense Exhibits 2 and 3: Declarations of Patricia Rooney

Ms. Evans also moves to strike Defense Exhibits 2 and 3, two declarations by Patricia Rooney, a Park Service employee responsible for managing the agency’s Midwest Region FOIA program.

Many of Ms. Evans’s arguments for striking Ms. Rooney’s, declarations are the same as her arguments for striking Ms. McConnell’s declarations, so they, can be disposed of briefly. Ms. Rooney’s declarations begin with the same precatory language as Ms. McConnell’s, including the statement that the information in the declarations is based on her personal knowledge “and/or experience and/or [her] personal review of plaintiffs’ FOIA requests and documents or upon information furnished to [her] in [her] official capacity.” (Def.Ex. 2, ¶ 1). As already noted, this language does not render the declaration inadmissible absent some indication that specific statements in it are not based on personal knowledge. Ms. Evans also argues that several parts, of Ms. Rooney’s declarations are vague, indicative of bad-faith, or inconsistent with other evidence in the record such that they raise questions about Ms. Rooney’s credibility. These arguments go to the weight of the challenged evidence rather than its admissibility, and present no basis for striking otherwise admissible testimony.

Ms. Evans makes two new arguments specific ' to Ms. Rooney’s declarations. First, Ms. Evans takes issue with the part of Defense Exhibit 2 that lists statistics about how many FOIA requests the Park Service’s Midwest Region receives and how many requests Ms. Evans herself has submitted in the past. Ms. Evans argues that this information has no relevance to this case and that it is unfairly prejudicial to her, as “Defendants appear to be deriding Plaintiff for exercising her legal right to request information from her government by painting her as a frequent requester.” (Pl,’s Mot. Strike Rooney, at 2).

Evidence is relevant if it “has a tendency to make a fact more or less probable that it would be without the evidence” and that fact “is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed.R.Evid. 401. Irrelevant evidence is generally not admissible. Fed. R.Evid. 402. The “low relevance threshold” is easy to satisfy, and the Rules reflect a policy generally in favor of admission. See United States v. Boros, 668 F.3d 901, 907 (7th Cir;2012) (“A party faces a significant obstacle in arguing that evidence should be barred because it is not relevant”). Under Rule 403, even relevant evidence can be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by, among other things, the danger of unfair prejudice. Fed.R.Evid. 403.

The evidence of the Midwest Region’s general FOIA workload is relevant, given that Ms. Evans asks the court to find bad faith based on the Park Service’s delay in responding to her requests. A large •• number of FOIA requests doesn’t excuse an agency from complying with the statute’s deadlines, but it lends some credence to the agency’s claim that long delays flow from understaffing rather than malice. Ms. Rooney’s testimony about Ms. Evans’s own history of FOIA requests is of more questionable relevance, but the fact that the agency has processed Ms. Evans’s requests in the past similarly has some arguable relevance to whether the Park Service’s responses to the requests in this suit was made in bad faith. It isn’t entirely clear why Ms. Evans thinks this evidence of her relatively modest history of FOIA requests — a total of nine requests over a two-year period — is in any way prejudicial to her. As she herself states, making FOIA requests of a government agency is a citizen’s right under federal law. That she has exercised this right doesn’t reflect poorly on her such that the relevance of this fact is substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudice , to her. The court won’t strike Ms. Rooney’s testimony on relevance or prejudice grounds.

Finally, Ms. Evans argues that two specific portions of Ms. Rooney’s testimony aren’t based on personal knowledge. Ms. Rooney’s first declaration stated that she “coordinated the search for and the review of documents responsive to the plaintiff’s nearly half dozen FOIA requests relating to various subject areas.” (Def.Ex. 2, ¶ 3). Ms. Evans insists' that because there are exactly six FOIA requests at issue in this suit, the use of the phrase “nearly half dozen” suggests that Ms. Rooney didn’t oversee all of the relevant requests and justifies striking any statements in the declaration that don’t clearly specify which request they refer to. This argument is frivolous. Ms. Rooney testifies that she coordinated the responses to “the FOIA requests that are the basis of this litigation,” and a single marginally imprecise numerical statement does not undermine Ms. Rooney’s testimony that she handled the requests at issue.

Ms. Evans also argues that Ms. Rooney lacks personal knowledge with regard to two specific statements in the declarations. In her first declaration, Ms. Rooney testified that searches performed by five named Park Service employees “encompassed both paper records and electronic records” and “were done by various Lake-shore staff.” (Def.Ex. 2, ¶ 7). In her second declaration, Ms. Rooney testified that “Relative to NPS-2012-00513, Lakeshore staff were unable to locate three of the four records requested.” (DefiEx. 3, ¶ 6). Ms. Evans argues that Ms. Rooney lacked the personal knowledge of these searches necessary -to make such statements, because elsewhere in her declarations she states: “Because the Lakeshore conducted the search of the Lakeshore’s files, I am not in a position to know what files were searched by Lakeshore staff.” (Def.Ex. 3, ¶ 4).

Ms. Rooney coordinated these searches, giving rise to an inference that she has personal knowledge of what broad types of files were searched and who performed the searches, even if she did not • know the specific files searched. Ms. Rooney makes clear that she requested specific records related to request 2012-00513, and that Lakeshore staff responded to her request by providing some documents and indicating that others could not be located. Ms. Rooney is competent in her role as Park Service Midwest Region’s FOIA administrator to testify as to the result of those searches as provided to her by Lakeshore staff.

For the reasons above, the court DENIES Ms. Evans’s motion to strike the declarations of Patricia Rooney.

Defense Exhibit 9: Revised, Vaughn Index

Ms. Evans also moves to strike Defense Exhibit 9, .the revised Vaughn index prepared by the government. A Vaughn index (named for Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C.Cir.1973)) is an index prepared when an agency withholds material relevant to a FOIA request, which lists each withheld document and states the FOIA exemption that the agency asserts is applicable to that document.. See Solar Sources, Inc. v. United States, 142 F.3d 1033, 1039 (7th Cir.1998); Wright v. OSHA, 822 F.2d 642, 645 (7th Cir.1987).

■ Ms. Evans first argues that no foundation has been laid for the revised Vaughn index, because, unlike the five previous in-dices the government provided to Ms. Evans, the most recent was filed without an accompanying affidavit identifying who prepared it. After Ms. Evans filed her motion, the government acknowledged the oversight and moved for leave to file a supplemental exhibit consisting of a declaration by Department of the Interior attorney Dana Jacobsen. The court granted this motion and Ms. Jacobsen’s declaration has beefi filed as Defense Exhibit 10. Ms. Jacobsen’s declaration’ states that she and Ms. Rooney prepared thé'revised Vaughn index together, and that the index is an accurate description of the documents withheld from the responses to Ms. Evans’s FOIA requests. In light of the supplemental. declaration, Ms. Evans’s arguments regarding lack of foundation are moot.

Ms. Evans’s remaining arguments about the Vaughn index include that it: (1) contains “organizational issues” that Ms. Evans thinks make the . index confusing; (2) contains various errors, including misspellings and incorrect dates and sender names; (3) doesn’t adequately describe how disclosure of -withheld documents would harm the interests protected by the claimed exemptions; (4) doesn’t include an accompanying declaration stating that all nonexempt material has been released; (5) is supported by the “dated” declaration of Ms. Rooney which is over one year old; and (6) doesn’t satisfy the requirements for withholding documents under the attorney-client and deliberative process privileges.

Once again, these are merits’arguments with no clear connection to admissibility; Ms. Evans essentially argues that the index is insufficient to carry the government’s burden on summary judgment, that the court should not credit it, and that the government wasn’t entitled to withhold the documents identified in it. The issue on a motion to strike is admissibility, and evidence isn’t made inadmissible by virtue of being inaccurate, untrustworthy, or non-compliant with a statutory requirement under FOIA.

The court DENIES Ms. Evans’s motion to strike the revised Vaughn index.

Defense Exhibit 10: Declaration of Dana Jacobsen

Finally, Ms. Evans moves to strike the declaration of Dana Jacobsen; as already explained, the government submitted Ms. Jacobsen’s declaration to cure the foundational defects with the revised Vaughn index that Ms. Evans identified in her motion to strike that index.

Ms. Evans first “questions the convenience of Jacobsen now stepping forward to state that the Revised Vaughn Index was prepared by her and Rooney.” A party’s suspicion that a declarant is lying isn’t a basis for striking that declaration: any argument about allegedly suspicious timing- goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. In a related vein, Ms. Evans argues that “Ja-cobsen’s declaration should be struck, and her testimony ■discredited” because the declaration attests to the accuracy of an index that Ms. Evans believes contains errors. Again, arguments that testimony isn’t credible or consistent with other evidence go not to admissibility but to weight. The court DENIES Ms. Evans’s motion to strike the declaration of Dana Jacobsen.

B. Summary Judgment Merits

Congress enacted FOIA with the purpose of promoting government transparency. See 5 U.S.C. § 552; Nat’l Archives & Records Admin, v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171-172, 124 S.Ct. 1570, 158 L.Ed.2d 319 (2004) (describing FOIA as “a means for citizens to know what their Government is up' to”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). With this view in mind, FOIA requires federal agencies to search for and release almost any agency record upon a citizen’s request. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). FOIA authorizes federal district courts to enforce this mandate by empowering them to “enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). When a FOIA requester files a civil .action challenging an agency’s response to his or her document request, the agency generally bears the, burden of demonstrating that its response to the request was appropriate. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 755, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 103 L.Ed.2d 774 (“Unlike the review of other agency action that must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious, the FOIA expressly places the burden on the agency to sustain its action”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Ms. Evans’s amended’ complaint includes six causes of action, which allege that: (1) the Vaughn indexes produced by the government are deficient; (2) the government’s search for documents in response to her FOIA requests was inadequate; (3) the government improperly redacted portions of the documents it released based on Exemption 5, FOIA’s attorney-client and deliberative process privileges; (4) the government wrongfully withheld documents based on Exemption 7, FOIA’s exemption protecting law enforcement investigations and procedures; (5) the government didn’t adequately segregate exempt from nonexempt portions of documents and so redacted documents too broadly; and (6) the government unreasonably delayed releasing documents in response to Ms.' Evans’s requests. Ms. Evans’ seeks a court order directing the government to produce all the documents she requests, an injunction prohibiting the government from “ignoring FOIA’s deadlines and mandates,” a written finding under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(F) that the government acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, and capriciously in withholding the documents at issue, and an award of fees and costs under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E).

The government seeks summary judgment. on all of Ms. Evans’s ■ claims. It argues that Ms. Evans’s claims about the adequacy of the Park Service’s search must be dismissed because Ms. Evans didn’t exhaust her administrative remedies for such claims before filing suit. It also argues that no. cause of action can be maintained for a deficient Vaughn index or for delays in a FOIA response, that its use of Exemptions 5 and 7 to redact documents was proper, and that the redactions at issue weren’t overbroad. The court considers each of these arguments in turn, and agrees that the government is entitled to summary judgment on all of Ms. Evans’s claims.

Failure to Exhaust

A FOIA requester must exhaust the available administrative remedies by appealing an agency’s FOIA response within that agency before seeking judicial review. See Hidalgo v. FBI, 344 F.3d 1256, 1258-1259 (D.C.Cir.2003)., Failure to properly exhaust administrative remedies is grounds for dismissal of a requester’s lawsuit. See Marino v. Dep’t of Justice, 993 F.Supp.2d 1, 11, (D.D.C.2013); Dale v. I.R.S., 238 F.Supp.2d 99,103 (D.D.C.2002). In addition to actually filing an appeal with the agency, a requester may be deemed to have constructively exhausted administrative remedies where the agency misses certain statutory deadlines for responding to a FOIA request. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i) (“Any person making a request to any agency for records ... shall be deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to such request if the agency fails to comply with the applicable time limit provisions of this paragraph.”).

Ms. Evans never filed an administrative appeal regarding requests 12-513, 12-515, and 13-60. The government submits that Ms. Evans never 'gave the Park Service a chance to fully adjudicate these requests internally, and her failure to exhaust these remedies dooms any claim she might raise regarding these three FOIA requests. Ms. Evans argues that these requests are subject to constructive exhaustion because the Park Service didn’t respond to her requests within the statutory time limits. Specifically,. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) requires an agency to “determine within 20 [business] days ... whether to comply” with a FOIA request and inform the requester of both the decision and his or her right to appeal.

Ms. Evans is correct that the Park Service’s responses were untimely with regard to each of the three requests at issue. For requests 12-513 and 12-515, Ms. Evans made her initial requests on April 6, 2012 and April 13, 2Ó12 respectively, but the Park Service issued a final response to both requests on August' 2, 2012 — roughly four months later, and well outside the 20r day window FOIA provides. Similarly, request 13-60 was made on September 1, 2012, and the Park Service didn’t respond until November 28, 2012.' Under” FOIA’s statutory scheme, the Park Service’s failure to meet its obligations meant that Ms. Evans was entitled to immediately file suit once the statutory deadlines for a response had passed.

But Ms. Evans didn’t file suit immediately after the agency’s nonresponse; she waited until a response came in, then filed suit without appealing it. While FOIA “allows immediate recourse to the courts” after an agency doesn’t make a timely response, “once the agency responds to the FOIA request, the requester must exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial review.” Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 64 (D.C.Cir.1990). A FOIA requester who chooses to wait for an untimely response rather than immediately filing suit does so at the risk of losing the right to bypass the administrative appeal process; as long as the agency responds before a suit is filed, the exhaustion requirement is revived and appeal to the agency is again mandatory. See Oglesby v. Army, 920 F.2d at 63 (holding that “an administrative appéal is mandatory if the agency cures its failure to respond within the statutory period by responding to the FOIA request before suit is filed.”). Other courts have consistently followed the approach in Oglesby, including district courts in this circuit. See, e.g., Nelson v. U.S. Army, No. 12 C 4718, 2013 WL 5376650, at *6 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 25, 2013) (“Regardless of the timeliness of the Army’s initial response to Plaintiffs FOIA requests, Plaintiff has also failed to constructively exhaust his administrative remedies, as Defendant issued its IDA decision ... prior to Plaintiffs filing suit”); Goulding v. I.R.S., No. 97 C 5628, 1998 WL 325202, at *8 (N.D.Ill. June 8, 1998) (“When an agency fails to comply in a timely fashion to a proper FOIA request, it may not insist on actual exhaustion of administrative remedies unless the agency responds to the request before suit is filed.”) (emphasis added); Almy v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 2:90-CV-362, 1995 WL 476255, at *5-6 (N.D.Ind. Apr. 13, 1995) (citing Oglesby and dismissing non-exhausted claims, because “as [the requester] failed to actually exhaust his administrative remedies ... even though he received belated responses on these requests, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction”).

Once Ms. Evans allowed the Park Service to make a final response, she was obliged to appeal that response internally before filing suit. Ms. Evans suggests that the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 711 F.3d 180, 184-185 (D.C.Cir.2013) changed the law in a way that excuses her from the exhaustion requirement permanently once the agency misses a deadline. See Citizens v. FEC, 711 F.3d at 189-190 (“if the agency does not adhere to FOIA’s explicit timelines, the ‘penalty’ is that the agency cannot rely on the administrative exhaustion requirement to keep cases from getting into court.”). In Citizens, the FOIA requester filed suit immediately once the agency had missed its deadline for responding; the agency issued an appealable response only after litigation had begun in the district court, and the D.C. Circuit held that under those circumstances the agency couldn’t move to dismiss the suit for failure to exhaust. Oglesby and Citizens, then, deal with different situations; the first applies where the agency misses a deadline yet the requester waits for an untimely response before suing, while the latter controls when a requester files suit without waiting for a response. Because Ms. Evans didn’t file this lawsuit until after the Park Service had issued an ap-pealable final response to the three requests at issue, any claim she raises premised on the Park Service’s response. to those requests must be dismissed.for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Ms. Evans filed an administrative appeal regarding the Park Service’s response to request 12-514. The government contends that claims regarding this request must also be dismissed because Ms. Evans’s appeal was untimely. The Department of the Interior’s FOIA regulations in effect when Ms. Evans made her requests provided that a requester must file an administrative appeal of a, FOIA response no later than 30 business days after the agency’s final response. See 43 C.F.R. § 2.29(a) (2012). A “final .response” for purposes of starting the appeal time limit is one that includes the agency’s decision whether to comply with the FOIA request, the reasons for that decision, and a notice of the right to appeal that decision to the- head of the agency. See Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 65 (D.C.Cir.1990).

Ms. Evans made request 12-514 on April 13, 2012, the Park Service partially responded on August 28, 2012, and then the Park Service issued a letter purporting to be a “final response” on September 27, 2012. This letter met the requirements necessary to trigger the exhaustion requirement. It communicated that the Park Service would release one of the fifteen documents at issue in full, release another with redactions, and withhold the final thirteen documents. The letter gave reasons for the redacted and withheld documents, and it notified Ms. Eyans of her right to appeal. Ms. Evans didn’t file a timely appeal of this denial; she appealed the Park Service’s response on July 17, 2013, after she had already filed, suit. Because Ms. Eyans was informed of the 30-day appeal window in the Park Service’s final response to request 12-514 but didn’t timely appeal the agency’s decision, she hasn’t exhausted her remedies relative to the September 27, 2012 final response.

Ms. Evans makes three arguments in response to-the contention that her appeal of request 12-514 was untimely. First, she argues that because FOIA establishes a requester’s “right to appeal,” an agency can’t curtail that right by enacting regulations that limit that right-.(such as the time limit provisions at issue here). She cites no authority supporting her assertion that validly enacted agency regulations can’t regulate the appeals process by establishing time limits, and her argument ignores the many cases in which -.courts have specifically, recognized that an agency can enforce its requirement that a requester timely -exhaust his or her appeals. See, e.g., Wilbur v. C.I.A., 355 F.3d 675, 676 (DiC.Cir.2004) (noting that “a [FOIA] requester ... must file an administrative appeal within the time limit specified in an agency's FOIA regulations or face dismissal of any lawsuit complaining about the agency’s response.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Citizens For Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Dep’t of Interior, 503 F.Supp.2d 88, 98 (D.D.C.2007) (holding “indisputably untimely” a requester’s appeal filed outside the Department of the Interior’s 30-day limit).

Second, Ms. Evans argues that the appeal notices in the agency’s final responses to her various requests were “confusing” and internally inconsistent, excusing her compliance with the 30-day limit. She points out that in addition to stating ‘Tour appeal must be received no later than 30 workdays after the date of this letter,” some of the response letters also stated that she “may file an appeal for nonres-ponse at" any time after the statutory time limit’? for the agency’s response. These statements are in no way confusing or inconsistent; they make clear that while appeals* from an agency’s response must be received within 30 days, a requester may appeal a non-response at any time' after the agency’s response was due. In other words, if the Park Service hadn’t issued a response at all, Ms. Evans was free to appeal even if it had been longer than .30 days since the agency’s response was due. After she waited for and received an urn timely- agency response, however, Ms. Evans was obliged to abide by the 30-day time limit and promptly appeal. .

Finally, Ms. Evans notes that the Park Service’s “final” response of. September 27, 2012 didn’t actually prove to be final; the agency made two “revised release determinations” on July 3, 2013 and December 12, 2013,' both after Ms. Evans had filed suit. The first of .these new determinations stated that the agency had reconsidered and was releasing in full two of the documents it had previously withheld. The second released nine more documents, though many of these had redactions. As- Ms. Evans sees it, the Park Service’s release of additional documents after this litigation began means that the agency must have reviewed all the documents again and come to a new determination; that the Park Service decided to release some previously withheld - documents means the agency implicitly decided anew to withhold the others, and this adverse determination resets the appeals clock such that Ms. Evans’s July 17, 2013 appeal was timely.'

Ms. Evans cites no support for her contention that any later partial revision of an agency’s decision can revive claims that a requester hasn’t, timely exhausted, and nothing in the statute or the Department of the Interior’s, implementing regulations suggests that an agency’s revisiting of a denied request excuses a requester from the requirement of timely appealing the initial denial. That the statute doesn’t provide for this result is unsurprising: it would create a strong disincentive for agencies to negotiate in good faith and attempt to settle — or avert — lawsuits with compromise disclosures. Were Ms. Evans’s view correct, once a requester neglects to appeal an adverse decision in timely fashion, the agency would be foolish to revisit and release any documents even if it decided they had been wrongly withheld; to do so would open the agency to a lawsuit it might otherwise have escaped at the motion to dismiss stage on non-exhaustion grounds. Given FOIA’s strong policy preference in favor of disclosure and'open' government, it’s unlikely that Congress intended Ms. Evans’s interpretation that would penalize agencies for correcting their mistakes and making previously denied disclosures.

If Ms. Evans took issue with the Park Service’s refusal to release the thirteen documents withheld by the September 27, 2012 letter, she was required to timely appeal that refusal. That the Park Service later changed its mind and released some of those documents doesn’t change the fact that Ms. Evans had her chance to contest the withholding and didn’t do so. Ms. Evans’s claims regarding request 12-514 that concern the adequacy of the search or the Park Service’s decision to withhold documents weren’t timely appealed and so are not properly exhausted. Still, because the documents released in the .July .2013 and December 2013 revised determination were