United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. An Easement & Right-of-Way Over 6.09 Acres of Land (140 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 2015)

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

JOHN E. OTT, Chief United' States Magistrate Judge

Acting upon the relation and for the use of the Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”), the United States (hereinafter the “Government”) filed these two condemnation actions pursuant to Fed, R. Civ. P. 71.1 and the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 831-831ee. In connection therewith, the Government has condemned an easement and a right-of-way over adjoining parcels of real property located in Madison County, Alabama. In one case, 5:14-cv-0032-JEO (the “Moores Mill Case”), the parcel is owned by defendant Moores Mill Communities, LLC (“MMC”). In the other case, 5:14-cv-0048 (the “Fanning Case”), the parcel is owned by defendant Fanning School Communities, LLC (“FSC”). The two cases have been consolidated, with the parties reserving the right to seek separate trials (Doc. 34; Fanning Case Doc. 35), and the parties have consented to the exercise of plenary jurisdiction by a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. 'R. Crv. P. 73. (Doc. 23, ¶ 4(H); id. Docs. 33-1, 33-2; Fanning Case Doc. 34). Now before the court are the Govern- ■ ment’s substantially identical motions in limine in each case, which seek to preclude MMC and FSC (collectively “Defendants”) from offering at trial portions of the testimony of Defendants’ retained expert or any opinions from two of Defendants’ principals on the value or the highest and best use of the land. (Doc. 37; Fanning Case Doc. 39). The parties have briefed the motions and filed evidentiary materials in support of their respective positions. (Docs. 38, 41, 45; Fanning Case Does. 40, 43, 46) Upon consideration, the court concludes that the Government’s motions in limine are due to be granted in part and denied in part.

I.

Wayne Bonner, Jeff Enfinger, and Bland Warren are principals of both Defendant entities. In August 2006, Defendant MMC entered into a Development Agreement with the owners of approximately 407 acres of raw land in unincorporated Madison County (the “Moores Mill tract”), with the parties declaring their intent that the land would be developed according to a site plan to be created by MMC. (Doc. 41-5 (“Development Agreement”) ¶ 2). Pursuant to the Development Agreement, MMC paid the sellers $2 million at the closing in January 2007 and promised to pay an additional 20% of the net price of each residential lot as it was developed and sold by MMC. (Development Agreement ¶ 5(a)). MMC, however, also reserved the right to sell any or all of the property as undeveloped land. (Id.) For any such sales, MMC would pay the owners the greater of either 33% of the net sale price or a per-acre amount that increased over time, from $10,000 for closings through February 14, 2007, to $18,200 for closings occurring, during calendar 2016. (Id) And finally, if any of the Moores Mill tract were to remain undeveloped on December 31, 2016, MMC would be obligated to buy it from the owners for an additional $18,200 per acre. (Id.)

In 2007, Defendant FSC purchased an adjoining 80-acre tract to the northwest of the Moores Mill tract. The two properties together formed an approximately 480-acre rectangle, bounded on the west by a section of Moores Mill Road, a two-lane thoroughfare also designated as County Road 58, running north/south.. Moores Mill 'Road also marked the southern boundary of the Moores Mill tract, after having taken a- 90-degree easterly turn upon meeting with Steger Road. (See Doc. 38-2 at 20, 59; Doc. 38-14 at 9, 25, 28).

In the period leading up to the purchases and in the year or so afterwards, Defendants took a number of preliminary steps under the Development Agreement and otherwise towards developing the properties as a residential subdivision. Such steps included evaluation of a soils map and having certain environmental assessments and surveys performed to map topography and to determine whether any areas were wetlands or in a floodplain. Defendants hired an engineering firm to create a site master plan with over 1,200 residential lots to be developed in several phases, and Defendants created proposed schedules for completing phases and a cash flow analysis for the project, based on projected annual lot sales. They also-conducted a sewer availability analysis, entered into a . sewer service agreement, and commissioned a survey to analyze the property for wetlands and flood plains and map topography.- In late 2007 and early 2008, Defendants also compiled a marketing catalog for the property that included a plan that incorporated a lot reserved for commercial development at the southwest corner of the Moores Mill tract. (See Docs. 41-2, 41-3, 41-4).

In about the spring of 2008, however, the financial crisis hit. Defendants’ plans were put on hold indefinitely as the recession dragged on and the real estate market continued to sag. Nothing material appears to have occurred for several years until, in November 2011, FSC entered into a land swap agreement with the Madison County Board of Education (“BOE”). Under that .agreement, FSC traded about a 25-acre rectangular lot, in the northwest corner of the Fanning tract to the BOE for the purpose of having it build a school there. The BOÉ later did just that, and it opened the Moores Mill Intermediate School on the site in August 2014. Following the swap, FSC was left with an approximately 55-acre tract (the “Fanning tract”) adjoining the Moores Mill tract. According to Defendants, FSC agreed to the'trade for a similarly sized piece of property elsewhere because they believed the. addition of a nearby school would make the planned residential development more attractive to families and add value to the Fanning and Moores Mills tracts on the whole.

In about January 2012, however, TVA notified Defendants that TVA intended to condemn an easement on the subject properties for the purpose of erecting and maintaining electric transmission lines. According to Defendants, TVA revised its plans for the location of the power line easement several times throughout 2012 and 2013, during which Defendants tried to convince TVA to locate the lines elsewhere. Those efforts failed, however, and TVA eventually finalized the location of its power line easement: a 100-foot-wide strip starting about 25 feet inside and running essentially parallel to Moores Mill Road on the western edge of each tract. The easement would start in the north at the BOE property line of the Fanning tract and run south onto the Moores Mill tract, with a “dog leg” to the southeast as the easement approaches the Steger Road intersection. (Doc. 38-2 at 23; Doc. 41-6 at 18). When the parties were unable to agree as to the amount of just compensation, the Government filed the Moores Mill Case with a declaration of taking on January 8,2014, condemning a permanent easement and right-of-way over 6.09 acres on the Moores Mill tract. (Docs.l, 2, 3). The next day, the Government filed the Fanning Case with a declaration of taking, similarly condemning a permanent easement and right-of-way over 1.04 acres on the Fanning tract. (Fanning Case Docs. 1, 2,3).

It is undisputed that Defendants have not sold, improved, or developed any of the land on either the Moores Mill tract or the Fanning tract, either before or since the takings. Instead, the properties have continued to be leased year-to-year as farmland. And since their early efforts in 2007 and early 2008, Defendants have not done anything else towards actually subdividing, improving, or selling any of the land.. In particular, no lots have been staked out, and no subdivision plat has been recorded or submitted for approval by the County Planning Commission. Nor have Defendants installed any sewer, water, or utility hook ups. Defendants claim, however, that they were effectively prevented from developing or selling the land ever since becoming aware in 2012 of TVA’s intention to take an easement because Defendants were uncertain where the easement would be located. And they claim that, even after the location of the easements was fixed by the takings in January 2014, they have still been unable to proceed because, they say, until it is determined how much compensation they will receive in this litigation, they cannot perform the financial analysis required to apply to banks for the financing they will need to develop the land.

II.

A.

Under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, “private property shall not be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const, amend. V. The instant cases revolve around the question of what amount of compensation is “just” for the Government’s condemnation of the respective power line easements taken on the Moores Mill tract and the Fanning tract. “The [Supreme] Court has explained that the underlying principle is that the dispossessed owner ‘is entitled to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken. He must be made whole but is not entitled to more.’ ” United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, More or Less in Monroe Cnty., State of Fla., 605 F.2d 762, 780 (5th Cir.1979) (quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255, 54 S.Ct. 704, 78 L.Ed. 1236 (1934)); see also A.A. Profiles, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 253 F.3d 576, 583 (11th Cir.2001). The burden at trial of establishing the amount of just compensation for a taking -is on the landowner. United States v. 8.41 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in Orange Cnty., State of Tex., 680 F.2d 388, 394 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Smith, 355 F.2d 807, 809 (5th Cir.1966).

When the property interest taken from a parent tract is a permanent easement, as here, the proper measure of damages is the difference in between the market value of the land free of the easement and the value as encumbered, as of the date of the taking. United States for Use of TVA v. Robertson, 354 F.2d 877, 880 (5th Cir.1966); see also United States v. 158.24 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Bee Cnty., Tex., 515 F.2d 230, 232 (5th Cir.1975); United States v. 8.41 Acres of Land, 680 F.2d at 392. Also, if a partial taking reduces the market value of the remainder of the parent tract, the owner is entitled to additional compensation for that diminution, which is loosely known as “severance damages.” See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376, 63 S.Ct. 276, 87 L.Ed. 336 (1943); United States v. 101.88 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in St. Mary Parish, State of La., 616 F.2d 762, 768-69 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. 2,997.06 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Marion Cnty., State of Fla., 471 F.2d 320, 335 n. 16 (5th Cir.1972).

Market value is defined as the price that a willing buyer would pay a willing seller in cash. United States v. 480.00 Acres of Land, 557 F.3d 1297, 1306-07 (11th Cir.2009); Alabama Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 1357, 1368 (11th Cir.2002). That is, “the price that the property would bring when offered for sale by one who wants to sell but is not forced to sell, and sought by one who would like to buy but is not required to buy, with’ the seller being allowed a reasonable time to find a purchaser.” United States ex rel. TVA v. Harralson, 43 F.R.D. 318, 319 (W.D.Ky. 1966). “Market value is not, of course, a quality which inheres in the' property itself, but is rather a reflection of the state of mind of the public with respect to the property.” Smith, 355 F.2d at 809: It generally excludes, however, frustration of contract rights or opportunities, lost profits, or any other value that the land might have that is specific or subjective to the condemnee. See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 35-36, 105 S.Ct. 451, 83 L.Ed.2d 376 (1984); United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 281-82, 63 S.Ct. 1047, 87 L.Ed. 1390 (1943); A.A. Profiles, 253 F.3d at 585; United States ex rel. TVA v. Easement & Right of Way 100 Feet Wide Over Certain Lands in Gibson Cnty., Tenn., 447 F.2d 1317, 1319-20 (6th Cir.1971).

However, “since a hypothetical, ‘reasonable man’ buyer will purchase land with an eye to not only its existing use but to other potential uses as well, fair market value takes into consideration ‘(t)he highest and most profitable use for which the property is adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future ... to the full extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the market value while the property is privately held.’ ” 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d at 781 (quoting Olson, 292 U.S. at 255, 54 S.Ct. 704); see also A.A. Profiles, 253 F.3d at 583. The highest' and best use of a parcel is “the reasonably probable and legal úse of vacant land or improved property, which is physically possible, appropriately-supported, financially feasible, and that results in the highest value.” Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3d 1111, 1118 (Fed.Cir.2015). “The fact that the most profitable use of a parcel can be made only in combination with other lands does hot necessarily exclude that use from consideration if the possibility of combination is reasonably sufficient to affect market value.” Olson, 292 U.S. at 256, 54 S.Ct. 704. It is presumed, however, that the actual use of the land is also its highest and best, “because economic demands normally result in an owner’s putting his land to the most advantageous use.” United States v. Buhler, 305 F.2d 319, 328 (5th Cir.1962), The burden at trial of establishing a highest and best use other than the existing use is on the landowner. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d at 826. Further, courts in this circuit have an obligation “to screen the proffered potential uses and exclude from the jury’s consideration evidence those which have not been demonstrated to be practicable and reasonably probable uses.” Id., 605 F.2d at 815. That is, the court is to exclude evidence of proposed future uses unless the landowner makes a preliminary, prima facie showing that such “use [is] practicable and that there [is] reasonable likelihood that the land would be so used in the reasonably near future.” Id., 605 F.2d at 814.

B.

Defendants have disclosed in discovery that they intend to solicit opinions from three witnesses as it relates to highest and best use of the two tracts and their diminished value. First, Defendants have produced a report pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) from a retained expert, Scott B. Maddox, a certified real estate appraiser. (Doc. 38-2). Maddox’s initial report is based upon an appraisal dated November 10, 2014, which opined that the just compensation for the taking is $827,000.00. (Id. at 3). In arriving at that figure, Maddox made the following loss-value determinations-and added them together:

(1)$340,000 (rounded from 5.22 acres @ $65,000 per acre) for the inability to develop a proposed “commercial corner”' lot on the southwest corner of the Moores Mill tract, where Moores Mill Road meets Steger Road (see id. at 33);

(2) $426,000 for' the inability to develop 28 proposed residential lots on the western edge of the tracts, along Moores Mill Road where the power lines abe located, based on an assumption that such lots would be sold at an average price of $20,000 each over a period of 2.25 years (id. at 39); and

(3) $61,000 for the inability to develop a 5.1-acre “buffer” area between the power lines and the first line of proposed residential development to the east. (Id, at 40).

On January 2, 2015, Maddox issued a supplemental expert report. (Doc. 38-13). Maddox acknowledged therein that he had made a miscalculation in his original report as it related to the location of the buffer relative to the easement, which resulted in an increase in the size of the buffer on the remainder from 5,1 acres to 12,74 acres. (Id. at 2). That translated to. an increase in Maddox’s opinion on the loss attributed to- the buffer from $61,000 to $153,000; and correspondingly bumped his assessment of just compensation by the same amount, from $827,000 to $919,000. (Id. at 4, 7).

Defendants also disclosed that two of their principals, Enfinger and Warren, may offer opinions on highest and best use and on damages (See Doc. 38-11 at-5). Defendants indicated that such opinions would be

based on their experience and observations as developers;- their familiarity with residential and commercial development markets in > Northern Alabama; their' -familiarity with the process through which such developments are designed, marketed, and sold; their familiarity with the subject property; and their familiarity with the purpose for which the subject property was acquired.

(Doc. .38-4 at 4; see also Doc. 38-11 at 5 (supplemental disclosure stating that En-finger and Warren’s opinions were “based on their familiarity with the subject parcels, their experience developing land, and their familiarity with land values.”). In their disclosures, Defendants calculated their combined damages associated with the takings on the Moores Mill tract and the Fanning tract at $1,824,533, comprising the sum of the following:

(1) a $522,000 loss (5.22 acres @ $100,000 per acre) ’ associated with the inability to develop the “commercial corner” of the Moores Mill tract;

(2) a $615,630 loss for the 28 proposed residential lots on the western edge of the tracts, at a projected sale price of $32,500 per lot, with sales spread over 2.25 years; •

(3) a loss of $254,752 as it relates to the development of 26.89 acres that would serve as a buffer area between power lines and proposed residential lots to the east; and

(4) $432,152 for’ “delays caused by the TVA,” specifically including “interest payments that [Defendants] have been required to make pending the TVA’s final decision as to the location of the transmission lines and pending [Defendants’] receipt of compensation for the damages they have suffered” (Doc. 38-11 at 7).

(See also Doc. 38-11 at 13, 15, 17, 21-22).

Enfinger also testified at his deposition about some of these calculations and related opinions about lost market value. He stated, for example, that the loss related to the inability to develop the commercial corner is as set forth above and that, in his estimation, the market value for the 28 lots on the western edge of the property is between $30,000 and $50,000 per lot. With regard to the “buffer” area to the east of the 28 hypothetical residential lots, En-finger estimated that the land was worth about $15,000 per acre. (See Doc. 38-11 at 6; Doc. 38-9, Deposition of Jeffrey Enfinger (“Enfinger Dep.”) at 148-49, 158). He further submitted that the first 200 feet from the transmission lines, comprising about 7.08 acres, have lost 100% of their value, while the next 350 feet, comprising about 19.82 acres, have lost about 50% of their value. (Id. at 159).

Like Defendants, the Government also retained a certified appraiser, Richard D. Pettey, to testify as an expert on its behalf. Pettey, however, takes a different approach than Defendants’ witnesses to calculating diminished value. Pettey produced two separate expert imports, one for the Moores Mill tract and the for the Fanning tract, but only the former appears to be included in the record thus far. (Moores Mill Case Docs. 38-14, 38-15, 38-16, and 38-17). In any event, Pettey initially examined the characteristics of the Moores Mill tract and concluded that, given present market demand, its only financially feasible use for the immediately foreseeable future is agricultural but that a purchaser would still make a bid in consideration of the land having a “long term [h]ightest and [b]est use ... for residential development.” (Doc. 38-16 at 5). Pettey then looked to five sales of area property that he deemed comparable, leading him to conclude that the Moore’s Mill tract was worth $7,500 per acre, or $3,055,950 for all 407.46 acres, before the taking. (See Doc. 38-15 at 11-30, Doc. 38-16 at 1-5). To find the post-taking diminution in value, Pettey first adjusted the value of the entire tract based upon the estimated amount required to construct two short access roads across the easement from Moores Mill Road. Petty explained that a potential purchaser would factor that cost, approximately $60,500, into a bid for the subject tract because such access points would be viewed as necessary for future residential development. (Doc. 38-16 at 17). As a result, he reduced the value of the entire 400-plus acres after the taking by 2%, to $7,350 per acre. (Id.) From there, Petty opined that the taking further reduced by 96% the value of both the 6.09-acre easement and an additional 2.79-acre “uneconomic remnant” between the western boundary of the easement and Moores Mill Road, to $294 per acre ($7,350 X .04), ( $2,611 for those 8.88 acres. (Doc. 38-16 at 14, 17, 20, 21), Next, looking to other developments in the area with residential lots backing up to a TVA power line easement, Pettey rejected that there was any additional damage to the remainder as it might relate to a buffer for any similar long-term development on the Moores Mill tract. (Doe. 38-16 at 22-29, Doc. 38-17 at 1-21). Pettey therefore considered the remaining 398.58 acres to retain their per-acre value of $7,350, making them worth $2,929,563 after the taking. (Doc. 38-16 at 20). Adding that to the $2,611 for the other 8.88 acres yielded total a post-taking value for the entire tract of $2,932,174. (Id.) And subtracting that sum from his pre-taking value estimate of $3,055,950, Pettey concluded that Defendants are entitled to $123,776 in just compensation for the Moores Mill tract. (Doc. 38-14 at 5, Doc. 38-17 at 22).

III.

As stated previously, the Government has filed substantially identical motions in limine in each case seeking to exclude certain portions of Maddox’s testimony and to preclude Enfinger and Warren from giving any opinions on market value. In support, the Government contends that any opinion testimony.from Enfinger and Warren as non-retained experts is inadmissible because Defendants’ disclosures do not, the Government claims,, sufficiently set forth “a summary of the facts and opinions to which [they] are expected to testify,” as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C)(ii). The Government also contends that the testimony of Defendants’ experts, both retained and non-retained, is subject to exclusion under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), on the theory that such opinions are based upon a flawed methodology that assigns separate values to (a) 28 hypothetical residential lots fronting on Moores Mill Road, (b) a 5.22-acre “commercial corner” development at the intersection of Moores Mill Road and Steger Road, and (c) a buffer between the power lines and the first line of would-be residential development to the east. The Government also contends that damages claimed by Defendants for delays in developing the properties,' including interest payments on Defendants’ loans, are not compensable' under the Fifth Amendment and that any testimony as to such losses is inadmissible. Finally, the Government contends that the Development Agreement between MMC and the sellers of that tract is not a com-pensable property interest under the Fifth Amendment and is legally irrelevant to the just compensation determination.

Defendants have dispute all of the Government’s arguments. (See Doc. 41, Doc. 44). Defendants take the position that Maddox, Enfinger, and Warren are all qualified; that their proposed opinions are adequately disclosed, reliable, and admissible in their entirety; and that any purported deficiencies cited by the Government are merely issues for the jury to consider in assigning weight to their testimony. Defendants also insist that they are entitled to recover for interest payments they made during the period they were unable to develop the property while they waited for TVA to decide where it would locate its power line easement. Finally, Defendants maintain that evidence regarding the Development Agreement is relevant and admissible. The court now proceeds to consider the parties’ respective arguments oh these issues in greater detail.

A. Federal Rule op Evidence 702 and Daubert

Defendants make several attacks on the admissibility of the testimony of Maddox, Énfinger’ and Warren based on Fed. R. Evid. 702 and. Daubert. Rule 7Ó2 controls the admission of expert testimony in the federal courts. It provides:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized, knowledge will help . the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; .

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that' Fed. R. Evid. 702 imposes a “gatek-eeping” obligation upon a trial judge to “ensure that any and all scientific testimony ... is not only relevant, but reliable.” 509 U.S. at 589 & n. 7, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The Court later clarified that this function applies to all expert testimony under Rule 702, not just “scientific”-testimony. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). “The objective of that requirement is to ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony. It is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir.2004) (en banc) (quoting Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167).

In determining the admissibility of expert testimony, the court is to “engage in a rigorous three-part inquiry,” considering

whether: . (1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he'intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is' sufficiently’ reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert-, and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260 (quoting City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir.1998)). While there is “some overlap” among these requirements, “they remain distinct concepts and the courts must take care not to conflate them.” Id. The proponent of expert testimony bears the burden at trial to establish these elements of admissibility. Id. However, a party moving in limine under Daubert to preclude testimony by his opponent’s expert must first make a threshold showing sufficient to indicate that his adversary will be unable to meet his burden at trial with regard to the testimony. See Gottstein v. Flying J, Inc., 2001 WL 36102297, at *1 (N.D.Ala. Aug. 22, 2001); see also Andrew I. Gavil, Defining Reliable Forensic Economics in the Post-Daubert/kumho Tire Era: Case Studies from Antitrust, 57 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 831, 849 & n.76 (2000); cf. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991) (recognizing that, even where a party has the burden of proof at trial, that party need not produce proof supporting his claim in response to a motion for summary judgment unless the movant has first presented evidence that would negate an element of the non-mov-ant’s claim or indicates that the non-mov-ant will be unable to meet his burden at trial; “it is never enough simply to state that the non-moving party cannot meet its burden at trial”).

As to the first element, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that “experts may be qualified in various ways. While scientific training or education may provide possible means to qualify, experience in a field may offer another path to expert status.” Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1261. “Of course, the unremarkable observation that an expert may be qualified by experience does not mean that expeiience, standing alone, is a sufficient foundation rendering reliable any conceivable opinion the expert may express.” Id. Rather, “while an expert’s overwhelming qualifications may bear on the -reliability of his proffered testimony, they are by no means a guarantor of reliability.... [O]ur caselaw plainly establishes that one may be considered an expert but still offer unreliable testimony.” Id. (quoting Quiet Technology DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1341-42 (11th Cir.2003)). Further,

“[i]f the witness is-relying solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts. The trial court’s gatekeeping function requires more than simply ‘taking the expert’s word for it.’ ” If admissibility could be established merely by the ipse dixit of an admittedly qualified expert, the reliability prong.would be, for all practical purposes, subsumed by the qualification prong..

Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 Advisory Committee Notes (2000 amends.) (emphasis in Frazier).

Turning to the second requirement, the trial judge must evaluate the reliability of expert opinion by assessing “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and' ,.. whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Id. at 1262 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93, 113 S.Ct. 2786). In this inquiry,, .-courts generally consider: “(1) whether the expert’s theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been Subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the particular sciéntifie technique; and (4) whether the technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.”' Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262, However, “these factors aré illustrative, not exhaustive; not all of them will apply in every case, and in some cases other factors will be’ equally important in evaluating the reliability of proffered expert opinion.” Id. “The same criteria that are used to assess the reliability of a scientific opinion may be used to evaluate the reliability of non-scientific, experience-based testimony.” Id. (citing Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167; Clark v. Takata Corp., 192 F.3d 750, 758 (7th Cir. 1999)). “Exactly how reliability is evaluated may vary from case to case, but what remains constant is the requirement that the trial judge evaluate the reliability of the testimony before allowing its admission at trial.” Id.

And finally, on the third requirement, the Eleventh Circuit has stated, that expert testimony must “assist the trier of fact” by shedding light on matters “that are beyond the understanding of the average lay person.” Id. (citing United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 985 (11th Cir.1985)). “Proffered expert testimony generally will not help the trier of fact when it offers nothing more than what lawyers for the parties can argue in closing arguments. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262-63.

While undertaking these analyses, however, it must be recalled that “[a] district court’s gatekeeper role under Daubert ‘is not intended to supplant the adversary system or the role of the jury.’ ” Quiet Technology, 326 F.3d at 1341 (quoting Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 666 (11th Cir.2001), quoting Allison v. McGhan, 184 F.3d 1300, 1311 (11th Cir.1999)); see also Adams v. Laboratory Corp. of Amer., 760 F.3d 1322, 1334 (11th Cir.2014); United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, More or Less Situated in Leflore Cnty., State of Miss., 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir.1996). Instead, “[vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary, evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786; see also United States v. 0.161 Acres of Land, more or less, situated in City of Birmingham, Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 837 F.2d 1036, 1042 (11th Cir.1988). Accordingly, while the court must determine that expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be admissible, once it has done so, “it is not the role of the district court to make ultimate conclusions as to the persuasiveness of the proffered evidence.” Quiet Technology, 326 F.3d at 1341; see also 0.161 Acres of Land, 837 F.2d at 1040-41 (“Importantly, the jury is instructed that it is completely free to accept or reject an expert’s testimony, and to evaluate the weight given such testimony in light of the reasons the expert supplies for his opinion.”).

B. Applicability of Gatekeeping and Screening Requirements to the Testimony of Enfinger and Warren as Landowners

The Government’s primary argument is that the court should exclude opinions by Maddox, Enfinger, and Warren to the extent that they assign separate values for (1) the lost opportunity to develop 28 residential lots running along the easement, (2) the lost opportunity to develop a 5.22-acre “commercial corner” and (3) lost value of land needed as a “buffer” between the power ‘ lines and the nearest residential development on the remaining property. (Doc. 38 at 14). The Government contends that such opinions are all based on prospective residential and commercial development that is unsupported by market data and is otherwise overly speculative. In effect, the Government takes the position that the only valid valuation method is to determine the difference in price that a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the entirety of each of the two tracts. Alternatively, the Government contends that, even if it might be appropriate to assume that the tracts might be divided and sold as residential lots and/or with the “commercial corner,” the opinions of Defendants’ witnesses as to the lost value of such lots and for a “buffer” are still due to excluded as overly speculative because they are not based on comparable sales or other market data and are otherwise flawed in their' methodology.

At the outset, Defendants respond that all of the Government’s arguments raising purported deficiencies in methodology and foundation as it relates to testimony by Enfínger and Warren are due to be rejected because those witnesses, as Defendants’ principals and designated Rule 30(b) corporate representatives, are effectively owners of the subject properties. That status, Defendants say, entitles Enfínger and Warren to give opinions on the value of the land “without further qualification due to the special knowledge that arises from ownership.” (Doc. 41 at 15). Indeed, Defendants take the position that, Enfínger and Warren have an “inherent ability” to testify as owners of the land (id. at 23) such that any opinions they might offer on its value are essentially immune from attack on their admissibility based upon any purported deficiency in methodology or foundation. (See id. at 17, 19).

The Government concedes in its reply that it is not now contesting that Enfínger and Warren might testify as landowners as to the value of the properties. (See Doc. 44 at 10 n. 5). The Government insists, however, that Defendants are improperly using Enfínger and Warren’s status as landowners to circumvent the requirements of Rule 702 and Daubert. “Despite Defendants protestations to the contrary,” says the Government, “the gate-keeping function of Rule 702 applies to all expert testimony, including landowner testimony.” (Doe. 44 at 4) (emphasis original).

A long line of precedent establishes a general rule in this circuit that “an owner of property is competent to testify regarding its value.” Neff v. Kehoe, 708 F.2d 639, 644 (11th Cir.1983); see also Hessen for Use & Benefit of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 915 F.2d 641, 646 (11th Cir.1990); Gregg v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 887 F.2d 1462, 1469 (11th Cir.1989); Electro Servs., Inc. v. Exide Corp., 847 F.2d 1524, 1526 (11th Cir.1988); T.D.S., Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520, 1533 (11th Cir.1985); J & H Auto Trim Co. v. Bellefonte Ins. Co., 677 F.2d 1365, 1369 (11th Cir.1982); Dietz v. Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., 643 F.2d 1088, 1094 (5th Cir.1981); South Central Livestock Dealers, Inc. v. Security State Bank of Hedley, Tex., 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir.1980); Meredith v. Hardy, 554 F.2d 764, 765 (5th Cir.1977); Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690, 698-99 (5th Cir.1975); Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moffett, 378 F.2d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir.1967). The owner is generally presumed to be qualified to give such an opinion based on “his ownership alone.” Moffett, 378 F.2d at 1011; see also United States v. 68.94 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate in Kent Cnty., State of Del., 918 F.2d 389, 397 (3d Cir.1990) (“[T]he owner is deemed to have sufficient knowledge of the price paid, the rents or other income received, and the possibilities of the land for use, to render an opinion as to the value of the land.” (quoting Nichols on Eminent Domain § 23.03 at 23-30 (1990) (citations omitted)); United States v. 329.73 Acres of Land, Situated in Grenada & Yalobusha Counties, State of Miss., 666 F.2d 281, 284 (5th Cir.1982) (“[Ojpinion testimony of a landowner as to the value of his land is admissible without further qualification. Such testimony is admitted because of the presumption of special knowledge that arises out of ownership of the land.” (citations omitted)); LaCombe v. A-T-O, Inc., 679 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir.1982); Christopher Phelps & Associates, LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 542 (4th Cir.2007); United States v. 10,031.98 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate in Las Animas Cnty., Colo., 850 F.2d 634, 636 (10th Cir.1988); District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency v. Thirteen Parcels of Land, 534 F.2d 337, 339 (D.C.Cir.1976). In fact, the Eleventh Circuit has gone so far as to suggest that a witness’s opinion of value of his personal property is generally admissible even- if “self-serving and unsupported by other evidence.” Neff, 708 F.2d at 644 (quoting J & H Auto Trim Co., 671 F.2d at 1369). Similarly, our court of appeals has rejected-arguments contesting the admissibility of an owner’s testimony on the value of his property on the ground that it lacks a sound basis, concluding’that such matters go only to the weight of the testimony and thus are to be challenged through cross-examination and refuting evidence. See Gregg, 887 F.2d at 1469; Electro Services, Inc., 847 F.2d at 1526-27; Neff, 708 F.2d at 644; J & H Auto Trim Co., 677 F.2d at 1369; Meredith, 554 F.2d at 765; see also 329.73 Acres of Land, Situated in Grenada & Yalobusha Counties, State of Miss., 666 F.2d at 284 (“[Ajppellant 'attacks the probative value of [the landowner’s] testimony on the ■ grounds that it was not based ■ on any accepted method- of valuation, but this overlooks-the fact that the opinion testimony of a landowner as to the value of his land is admissible without further qualification.”).

It is fair to say that Defendants are claiming that the opinions of Enfinger and Warren on the value of the land are exempt from the strictures of Rule 702 and Daubert because they are owners of the property. There is no doubt that Rule 702, from’ which Daubert’s gatekeeping function springs, may apply to testimony on property valuation. See Fed. R. Evid. 702, Advisory Committee Note to 1972 Proposed Rule (“[Wjithin the scope of [Rule 702] are not only experts in the strictest sense of the word, e.g., physicians, physicists, and architects, but also the large group sometimes called “skilled” witnesses, such as bankers or landowners testifying to land values” (emphasis added); id. Advisory Committee Note to 2000 Amendments (“Whether the [expert] testimony concerns economic principles, accounting standards, property valuation or other non-scientific subjects, it should be evaluated by reference to 'the ‘knowledge and experience’ of that particular field” (quoting American College of Trial Lawyers, Standards and Procedures for Determining the Admissibility of Expert Testimony after Daubert, 157 F.R.D. 571, 579 (1994) (emphasis added)).

Nonetheless, -contrary to the Government’s assertion, Rule 702 does not always apply to opinion testimony- by a witness as it relates to the value of his own land or property. Although not cited by Defendants, Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits a lay witness, i.e., a witness who is “not testifying as an expert,” also to give opinion testimony, subject to the conditions that the opinion is:

(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception;

(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and

(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

Fed, R. Evid. -701. Rule- 701 thus authorizes “a lay witness to testify in the form of opinions or inferences drawn from her observations when testimony in that form will be helpful to the trier of fact.” Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169, 109 S.Ct. 439, 102 L.Ed.2d 445 (1988); see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (“Unlike an ordinary witness, see Rule 701, an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation. See Rules 702 and 703.”).

Further, it is established that testimony by a witness relating the value of his own land or property may be admissible as a lay opinion. See Neff, 708 F.2d at 643-44 (holding that even though the plaintiff was “not tendered as an expert,” he should have been permitted to give his “lay opinion” as to the value of his coin collection, which was “based upon coin collector publications, upon appraisals he received from various collectors and upon his own experience as owner of the collection”); Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Sartor, 78 F.2d 924, 927 (5th Cir.1935) (“It is also well settled that value may be shown by the opinion of any competent person having knowledge of the facts, whether an expert or an ordinary witness.”); United States v. Durrett, 524 Fed.Appx. 492, 497 (11th Cir. 2013); Galloway, 492 F.3d at 542; United States v. Wiseman, 339 Fed.Appx. 196, 199 (3d Cir.2009); James River Ins. Co. v. Rapid Funding, LLC, 658 F.3d 1207, 1215 & n. 1 (10th Cir.2011); Cunningham v. Masterwear Corp., 569 F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir.2009); Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1197-98 & n. 8 (3d Cir.1995) (citing “value of one’s property” among examples of “quintessential Rule 701 opinion testimony”); Greenwood Ranches, Inc. v. Skie Const. Co., 629 F.2d 518, 522 (8th Cir.1980); District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency v. Thirteen Parcels of Land, 534 F.2d 337, 339 (D.C.Cir.1976); see also J.E. Macy, Competency of Witness to Give Expert or Opinion Testimony as to Value of Real Property, 159 A.L.R. 7 (1946) (“Broadly speaking, the rules which govern opinion evidence as to value in the case of real property are those which govern such evidence in the case of property in general. And the view which still widely prevails is that in either case the witness need not be an expert.”); Model Eminent Domain Code § 1103 (2002 Supplement) (distinguishing between an owner of real property and an expert “witness qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” and recognizing that either may testify to opinions' on value). This*' approach is also supported by' the Advisory Committee Note to the 2000 Amendment to Rule 701, which states in relevánt part:

[M]ost courts have permitted the owner or officer of a business to testify to the value or projected profits of the business, without the necessity of qualifying the witness as an accountant, appraiser, or similar expert.' See, e.g., Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153 (3d Cir.1993). Such opinion testimony is admitted not because of experience, training or specialized knowledge withih the realm of an' expert, but because of the particularized' knowledge that the witness has by virtue of his-or herposition in the business. - The amendment does not purport to change this analysis.

See also Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Cedar Shipping Co., Ltd., 320 F.3d 1213, 1217-23 (11th Cir.2003),

However, Rule 701 “does not distinguish between expert and lay witnesses, but rather between expert and lay testimony.” Fed. R. Evid. 701, Advisory Committee Note to the 2000 Amendment (emphasis original). Thus, within the testimony of a single witness, one opinion may fall under Rule 701 and another under Rule 702- Id.; see also. Lebron v. Secretary of Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 772 F.3d 1352, 1372 (11th Cir.2014) (recognizing that while a “lay witnesses may testify about their own immediate perceptions [under Rule 701], testimony that blurs into supposition -and extrapolation crosses the line into expertise”); Wilson v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 303 Fed.Appx. 708, 712 (11th Cir.2008). And distinguishing between lay and expert opinion testimony in this respect is critical. In contrast to expert opinion testimony, lay opinion testimony admissible under Rule 701 is not subject to the gatekeeping requirements of- Daubert, see Williams v. Mast Biosurgery USA, Inc., 644 F.3d 1312, 1317-18 (11th Cir.2011), or to expert, disclosure requirements under rules of court. See Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair Co., 320 F.3d at 1217-23; United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1119 (11th Cir.2002). .This is so because “[l]ay opinion testimony is admissible only to help the jury or the court to understand the facts about which the witness is testifying and not to provide specialized explanations or interpretations that an untrained layman could not make if perceiving the same acts or events.” United States v. Conn, 297 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 641 (8th Cir.2001)); see also Fed. R. Evid. 701, Advisory Committee Note to 2000 Amendments (recognizing that Rule 701 as amended incorporates the distinction set forth in State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 549 (Tenn.1992), in which the court stated that lay testimony “results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life” whereas expert testimony “results from a process of reasoning which can bé mastered only by specialists in the field”). However, courts must be vigilant to ensure that the gatekeeping requirements of Rule 702 aré not “ ‘evaded through the simple expedient of proffering an' expert in lay witness clothing.’ ” Williams, 644 F.3d at 1317 (quoting United States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir.2005) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 701 Advisory Committee Note to the 2000 Amendment)).

Accordingly, that Rule 701 may authorize a witness to give a lay opinion on the value of his property does not mean that a landowner has carte blanche to espouse any opinion he pleases on the value of his land, free from the constraints of Rule 702 and Daubert. If an owner’s testimony on value is based not upon commonly understood considerations of worth flowing from his perceptions and knowledge of his property but instead upon technical or specialized knowledge more broadly, it crosses into expert testimony for purposes of Rule 702 and cannot be admitted under Rule 701(c). See James River Ins. Co., 658 F.3d at 1213-16 (holding that district court abused its discretion in allowing member of LLC that owned building to testify to its value under Rule 701 where his opinion had relied upon technical depreciation calculations, the principal’s professional experience as a real estate broker, and a detailed technical report created by a retained appraisal company); Compania Administradora de Recuperacion de Activos Administradora de Fondos de Inversion Sociedad Anonima v. Titan Int’l, Inc., 533 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir.2008) (“Taylor’s valuation attempt was based on his special experience in the tire industry, not on his personal knowledge of the goods in question; therefore, it falls within the purview of Rule 702”); LifeWise Master Funding v. Telebank, 374 F.3d 917, 929-30 (10th Cir.2004) (CEO’s testimony about his business’s lost profits were expert, not lay, opinion because his results were based on sophisticated economic models concerning “moving averages, compounded growth rates, and S-curves”); United States v. 242.93 Acres of Land More or Less, 2012 WL 579503, at *3 n. 2 (S.D.Cal. Feb. 22, 2012) (recognizing that the Advisory Committee Notes suggest that “a landowner’s opinion as to the value of the property could be offered under either FRE 701 or FRE 702, presumably depending on the level of ‘experience, training or specialized knowledge’ that went into formulating the opinion” (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702)); 5 Handbook of Fed. Evid. § 701:1 (7th ed.) (hypothesizing that “if Bill Gates were to testify that divestiture of a segment of Microsoft’s business would result in a- loss of one billion dollars over five years,” he would be testifying as an expert under Rule 702 because “projecting such loss is not based upon the types of experiences common to human beings”); Bankr.Evid. Manual § 701:2 (2014 ed.) (“If testifying under 701, the owner may merely give his opinion based on his personal familiarity of the property, often based to a great extent on what he paid for the property. On the other hand, if he is truly an expert qualified under the terms of Rule 702 ‘by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education ..then he may also rely on and testify as to facts “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject ...” pursuant to Rule 703”).

Further, “the owner’s qualification to testify does not change the ‘market value’ concept and permit him to substitute a ‘value to me’ standard for the accepted rule [in condemnation cases], or to establish a value based entirely upon speculation.” United States v. Sowards, 370 F.2d 87, 92 (10th Cir.1966). “Qualified and knowledgeable witnesses may give them opinion or estimate of the value of the property taken, but to have probative value, that opinion or estimate must be founded upon substantial data, not mere conjecture, speculation or unwarranted assumption. It must have a rational foundation.” Id.; see also Snowbank Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 6 Cl.Ct. 476, 486 (1984). Thus, if a landowner’s testimony reveals that his opinion of value rests upon a legally invalid foundation, such as the price upon which he personally would insist to sell the land, his opinion would lack any probative value. Smith, 355 F.2d at 810; see also United States v. Trout, 386 F.2d 216, 223 n. 10 (6th Cir.1967); King v. Ames, 179 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir.1999) (recognizing that an owner’s opinion testimony on the value of his property “cannot be based on naked conjecture or solely speculative factors”); Dietz, 643 F.2d at 1094 (“[W]here the owner bases his estimation [of the value of his property] solely on speculative factors, the owner’s testimony may be of such minimal probative force to warrant a judge’s refusal even to submit the issue to the jury.” (quoting Kestenbaum, 514 F.2d at 699)); United States v. Nall, 437 F.2d 1177, 1187 (5th Cir.1971); United States v. 158.24 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate in Ashley, Bradley & Union Counties, State of Ark., 696 F.2d 559, 564-65 (8th Cir.1982) (“a trial court has an independent obligation, to a reasonable extent, to see that the landowner’s claim is submitted only on competent evidence”); also cf. Smith, 355 F.2d at 813-14 (valuation testimony of a local landowner who claimed generally to have sufficient knowledge to give an opinion was of no probative value where it appeared to be based merely upon “undisclosed assumptions”). It goes without saying that an opinion that lacks material probative value may be subject to exclusion, either because it is not relevant, see Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402; because any marginal probative value it might possess is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice or a tendency to mislead the jury, see Fed. R. Evid. 403; or because the opinion does not assist the trier of fact, see Fed. R. Evid. 701(b), 702(a). See generally 0.161 Acres of Land, 837 F.2d at 1040-42 (discussing the relationship between relevancy, Rule 403, and expert testimony on land valuation).

Finally, the court’s obligation in condemnation cases to screen evidence of proposed highest and best uses under 320.0 Acres of Land also may at times dovetail with the court’s gatekeeping responsibilities under Daubert and may call for exclusion of a witness’s opinion on the value of his own land because of its underlying basis. That is, if a landowner’s value opinion is shown to be. founded upon the land’s suitability for a particular proposed use, the opinion may be subject to exclusion .if the .landowner has not made a . preliminary showing that such proposed “use [is] practicable and that there [is] reasonable likelihood that the land would be so used in the reasonably near future;” 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d at 814. See United States v. 99.66 Acres of Land, 970 F.2d 651, 656 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that landowner’s testimony based on “lot method” was properly excluded in condemnation case involving property ■ that owner proposed to develop as mobile home park where subdivision development, was speculative); Olson, 292 U.S. at 257, 54 S.Ct. 704 (“Elements affecting value that depend upon events or combinations of occurrences which, while, within the realm of possibility, are not fairly shown to be reasonably probable, should be excluded from consideration, for that would be to allow mere speculation and conjecture to become a guide for ascertainment of value.”); 158.24 Acres of Land, 696 F.2d at 562 (“The uses considered must be so reasonably probable as to have an effect upon the present market value of the land, and a speculative value cannot be considered.”). With the above general framework in mind, the court now turns to consider the Government’s arguments in support of exclusion of opinions of Maddox, Enfinger, and Warren.

C. Disclosures under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C)

The Government first makes a procedural argument aimed at excluding any opinion testimony by Enfinger or Warren, based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C). Under that provision, a party must supply a disclosure as it relates to non-retained expert witnesses, stating “the subject matter on which the witness is expected to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705” and “a summary of the facts and opinions to which , the witness is expected to testify.” Fed. R. Civ. Pi 26(a)(2)(C). '■ Defendants - have provided disclosures that outline opinions that En-finger and Warren might be expected to give as it relates to highest and best use of the land, lost value, and other claimed damage. (See Doc. -38-4; Doc. 41-6). The Government argues generally that Defendants’ disclosures do not contain the information required by Rule 26(a)(2)(C); precluding Enfinger and Warren from giving any opinion testimony.

However, insofar as Enfinger or Warren’s testimony relative to value might qualify as lay opinion under Fed. R. Evid. 701, -Defendants need not provide a Rule 26(a)(2) expert disclosure at all. See Fisher v. Ciba Specialty Chemicals Corp., 2007 WL 2995525, at *7-8 (S.D.Ala. Oct. 11, 2007); see also Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair Co., 320 F.3d at 1217-23. But evén if their testimony encompasses expert opinions, disclosure under Rule 26(a)(2)(C) for non-retained experts “is considerably less extensive than the report required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B)” for retained experts, and “[c]ourts .must take care against requiring undue detail, .keeping in mind that these witnesses have not been specially retained and may not be as responsive to counsel as those who have.” Advisory Committee Note to the -2010 Amendments to Rule 26, Fed. R. Civ. P. In that light, the court concludes that Defendants’ disclosures were adequate, to put the Government on notice of the facts and opinions upon which Enfinger and Warren are expected to testify. The court would further note that the Government also took extensive depositions of both witnesses, during which counsel explored both the substance and the basis for their opinions. (See generally Doc. 38-9, Doc. 38-12). The Government’s motions in limine are therefore denied to the extent based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C).

D. Opinions Ascribing Separate Losses for Discrete Areas of the Land

The Government broadly challenges the valuation methodology used by Enfinger, Warren, and Maddox, characterizing it as “inherently flawed”-because it assigns and aggregates distinct loss values for the 28 “residential lots, the commercial corner, and a buffer area as separate parcels.” (Doc. 38 at 13). The Government contends that this “is not a proper application of methodology” because,' the Government maintains, compensation in a partial takings'case like this one must be based on the difference in value of the entire parcel as a whole, before and after the taking. (Id. at 13-14). Defendants do not dispute that their valuation witnesses have assigned separate loss values for particular parcels within the tract. Defendants respond, however, that the Government’s insistence upon a “before-and-after” approach that examines the entire parcel only as a whole is overly rigid and not mandated by law.

“Where the property interest permanently taken is an easement, the ‘conventional’ method of valuation is the ‘before-and-after’ method, ie., ‘the difference between the value of the property before and after the Government’s easement was imposed.’ ” Otay Mesa Prop., L.P. v. United States, 670 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed.Cir.2012) (quoting United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 632, 81 S.Ct. 784, 5 L.Ed.2d 838 (1961)); see also 2,997.06 Acres of Land, 471 F.2d at 334 n. 16; Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. O’Brien, 418 F.2d 15, 21 (5th Cir.1969); United States v. 33.92356 Acres Of Land, 585 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2009); 8.41 Acres of Land, 680 F.2d at 392. “Under the before and after theory, the tract is considered as a whole; that is, compensation is -fixed by determining the difference between the value of the owner’s entire tract, including the parcel taken, before the taking by the condemning authority, and the value of his remaining property.” 2,997.06 Acres of Land, 471 F.2d at 334 n. 16; see also Transwestern Pipeline, 418 F.2d at 21; Slattery Co. v. United States, 231 F.2d 37, 45-47 (5th Cir.1956); United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Rapides Parish, La., 149 F.2d 81, 82 (5th Cir.1945). However, it may be-more-practical-in a partial takings case to examine the lost value of the land actually taken and then determine whether the landowner is entitled to an additional amount of “severance damages” for any amount'by which the taking has diminished the value of the remainder. See 4A Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 14.31; United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192, 198, 84 S.Ct. 639, 11 L.Ed.2d 629 (1964); O’Brien v. United States, 392 F.2d 949, 953-54 (5th Cir.1968); United States v. 97.19 Acres of Land, More or Less, 582 F.2d 878, 881 (4th Cir.1978); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4651(3) (providing that a federal agency seeking to condemn land shall estimate the amount due as just- compensation and make an offer of such amount to the owner, accompanied' by a written statement summarizing the agency’s basis for the amount offered- and noting - that “[w]here appropriate the just compensation for the real property acquired and for damages to remaining real property shall be separately stated.”). Indeed, the “before-and-after” approach and the “value-plus-severance” approach are in substance just different ways of expressing the same idea: t