Apex Frozen Foods Private Ltd. v. United States (144 F. Supp. 3d 1308, 2016)

OPINION

Kelly, Judge:

This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs Apex Frozen Foods Private Limited, et al.’s (collectively “Plaintiffs”) motion for judgment on the agency record pursuant to USCIT Rule 56.2. Plaintiffs contest various aspects of the U.S. Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce” or. “Department”) final determination in the eighth administrative review of the antidumping duty order on certain frozen warmwater shrimp from India, covering the period of February 1, 2012 through January 31, 2013. See generally Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp From India, 79 Fed. Reg. 51,309 (Dep’t Commerce Aug. 28, 2014) (final results of antidumping duty review; 2012-2013) {“Final Results”), as amended, 79 Fed.Reg. 55,430 (Dep’t Commerce Sept. 16, 2014) and accompanying Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Results of the Antidumping Duty Administrative Review of Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from India, A-533-840, (Aug. 20, 2014), available at http:// enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/india/ 2014-20401-l.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2016) (“Final I & D Memo”); see also Certain Frozen-Warmwater Shrimp From India, 70 Fed.Reg. 5,147 (Dep’t Commerce Feb. 1, 2005) (notice of amended final determination of sales at less than fair value and antidumping duty order) (“Order”). For the reasons set forth below, Commerce’s final results are supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law.

BACKGROUND

Commerce issued the antidumping duty order covering certain frozen warmwater shrimp from India on February 1, 2005. See Order, 70 Fed.Reg. at 5,147. After receiving timely requests to conduct an administrative review from several companies, including domestic producer Defendant-Intervenor Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Committee (“Defendant-interve-nor”), on April 2, 2013 Commerce initiated the eighth administrative review of the Order for the period of February 1, 2012 through January 31, 2013. See Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp From India and Thailand, 78 Fed.Reg. 19,639, 19,639 (Dep’t Commerce Apr. 2, 2013) (notice of initiation of antidumping duty administrative reviews); Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews and Request for Revocation in Part, 78 Fed.Reg. 25,418, 25,420 (Dep’t Commerce May 1, 2013); see also Request for Administrative Reviews at 1-2, PD 9 at bar code 3121314-01 (Feb. 28, 2013).

Pursuant to Section 777A(e)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c)(2) (2012), Commerce found it was not practicable to examine each of the known exporters and producers of subject merchandise and thus limited the review to the two companies that, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) import data, accounted for the largest volume of subject merchandise exported to the United States to serve as mandatory respondents for the administrative review — (1) Devi Fisheries Limited and its affiliates Satya Seafoods Private Limited and Usha Seafoods (collectively “Devi Fisheries”); and (2) Falcon Marine Exports Limited and its affiliate K.R. Enterprises (collectively “Falcon Marine”). See Selection of Respondents for Individual Review at 1-2, 4, PD 25 at bar code 3133307-01 (May 1, 2013); see also Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Results of the 2012-2013 Administrative Review of the Antidumping Duty Order o.n Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from India at 2, A-533-840, (Mar. 18, 2014), available at http://enforcement.trade.gov/ frn/summary/india/2014-06559-1.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2016) (“Prelim. I & D Memo”). Accordingly, Commerce issued questionnaires to and received responses from Devi Fisheries and Falcon Marine from May 2013 through January 2014. See Prelim. I & D Memo at 2-3.

Commerce published its preliminary results on March 25, 2014. See Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp From India, 79 Fed.Reg. 16,285, 16,285 (Dep’t Commerce Mar. 25, 2014) (preliminary results of anti-dumping duty administrative review; 2012-2013) (“Prelim. Results”); see also Prelim. I & D Memo at 1. After applying its differential pricing analysis, Commerce preliminarily found that the mandatory respondents’ sales revealed a pattern of significant export price differences among purchasers, regions, or time periods and determined that “comparing] ... the weighted average of the normal values to the export prices ... of individual transactions” (“A-T”) was appropriate to calculate dumping margins for both Devi Fisheries and Falcon Marine in the preliminary results. See Prelim. I & D Memo at 7; 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(b)(3) (2013); see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(c)(1). For Devi Fisheries, the results of the differential pricing analysis led Commerce to apply A-T to all of Devi Fisheries’ U.S. sales. See Calculations for Devi Fisheries Limited for the Preliminary Results at 1-2, CD 136 at bar code 3189206-01 (Mar. 18, 2014) (“Devi Fisheries’ Prelim. Calcs.”); see also Prelim. I & D Memo at 7. By contrast, the differential pricing analysis as applied to Falcon Marine led Commerce to apply AT only to the portion of Falcon Marine’s U.S. sales that constituted the observed pattern of significant price differences and compared “the weighted average of the normal values to the weighted average of the export prices” (“A-A”) for all of its other U.S. sales. See Calculations for Falcon Marine Exports Limited for the Preliminary Results at 1-2, CD 145 at bar code 3189251-01 (Mar. 18, 2014) (“Falcon Marine Prelim. Calcs.”) 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(b)(1); see also Prelim. I & D Memo at 7. Accordingly, Commerce preliminarily calculated weighted-average dumping margins of 1.97% for Devi Fisheries and 3.01% for Falcon Marine, from which Commerce assigned a rate of 2.49% to the other exporters and producers covered by the review. See Prelim. Results, 79 Fed.Reg. at 16,286-89.

Commerce published the final results on August 28, 2014. See generally Final Results, 79 Fed.Reg. 51,309. Commerce continued to find that the mandatory respondents’ sales exhibited a pattern of export prices of comparable merchandise that differ significantly among purchasers, regions, or time periods as per the results of the differential pricing analysis and made no changes to Devi Fisheries’ or Falcon Marine’s margin calculations from the preliminary results. See id. at 51,309; see also Final I & D Memo at 1, 22-26, 35-39. Additionally, Commerce reaffirmed its decision to reject portions of certain respondents’ (collectively “Respondents”) case brief for containing untimely filed new factual information. See Final I & D Memo at 40-42.

Plaintiffs now challenge Commerce’s determination in the final results on numerous grounds. First, Plaintiffs initially argued that Commerce did not have the legal authority to engage in a targeted dumping analysis or differential pricing analysis and thereafter apply A-T in the context of an antidumping duty administrative review. See Pis.’ Rule 56.2 Mot. J. Agency R. 10-15, Apr. 3, 2015, ECF No. 36 (“Pis.’ Mot.”). Plaintiffs concede in their reply papers that recent precedent from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit makes clear that Commerce has the authority to apply the alternative A-T method in reviews, however, Plaintiffs still contend that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision is not dispositive and controlling on all of the issues in this case. See Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief 3, Sept. 30, 2015, ECF No. 57 (“Pis.’ Reply”). Second, Plaintiffs contend Commerce violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) by not following the APA’s notice and comment rulemaking requirement before applying the differential pricing analysis. See Pis.’ Mot. 18-20. Third, Plaintiffs argue that Commerce failed to comply with the so-called “limiting rule” and “allegation requirement” as provided within its regulations. See id. at 15-18. Fourth, Plaintiffs challenge certain aspects of Commerce’s differential pricing analysis. See id. at 20-45. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that Commerce (i) failed to establish a discernable pattern of export prices of comparable merchandise that differ significantly among purchasers, regions, or time periods because of its use of averages and consideration of all sales in the analysis, see id. at 20-28, 43-45, (ii) failed to adequately explain why A-A could not account for such differences, see id. at 28-36, and (iii) improperly used, what Plaintiffs refer to as, “double-zeroing” in calculating Falcon Marine’s antidumping duty margin. See id. at 37-43. Finally, Plaintiffs maintain that Commerce wrongfully rejected portions of Respondents’ administrative case brief as untimely filed new factual information. See id. at 45-46. For these reasons, Plaintiffs argue that Commerce’s determinations in the final results are unsupported by substantial evidence and otherwise not in accordance with law.

Defendant United States (“Defendant”) argues that Commerce has the authority to engage in the differential pricing analysis and thereafter apply A-T in the context of administrative reviews, see Def.’s Resp. Opp’n Pis.’ Rule 56.2 Mot. J. Agency R. 10-13, Aug. 13, 2015, ECF No. 43 (“Def.’s Resp.”), the withdrawn regulations have never applied to administrative reviews, see id. at 14-17, the APA did not require Commerce to employ notice and comment rulemaking for its change in practice to the differential pricing analysis, see id. at 17-21, and Commerce properly rejected portions of Respondents’ administrative case brief as untimely filed new factual information. See id. at 45^6. Defendant also maintains that Commerce’s use and application of its newly implemented analysis in the final results are supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law. See id. at 21-44.

The court holds that Commerce’s final results are supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law and are therefore sustained.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § • 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2012), which grant the court authority to review actions contesting the final determination in an administrative review of an antidumping duty order. The court will uphold Commerce’s determination unless it is “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i).

DISCUSSION

I. Commerce Has Authority to Use the Differential Pricing Analysis and Apply A-T in Administrative Reviews

Plaintiffs’ Rule 56.2 motion argued that Commerce lacks authority to apply the alternative A-T methodology in administrative reviews. See Pis.’ Mot. 10-15. Defendant and Defendant-Intervenor respond that, contrary to Plaintiffs’ position, neither the antidumping duty statute nor the legislative history prohibit use of the differential pricing analysis or application of A-T in administrative reviews and in support cite to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in JBF RAK LLC v. United States, 790 F.3d 1358 (Fed.Cir.2015). See Def.’s Resp. 10-13; Def.-Intervenor Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Committee’s Resp. Pis.’ Rule 56.2 Mot. J. Agency R. 8, 13-15, Aug. 13, 2015, ECF No. 42 (“Def.-Intervenor’s Resp.”). The court holds that Commerce has the authority to engage in its differential pricing analysis to decide which comparison methodology to use for calculating dumping margins and thereafter apply A-T in the context of an administrative review when appropriate.

To determine whether merchandise is being sold in the United States at less than fair value and, if so, to calculate the anti-dumping duty rate for the individually examined exporters and producers, Commerce must compare normal value to the export price of each entry of subject merchandise. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(A)(ii); 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a); 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A). The statute provides that Commerce shall ordinarily use A-A to calculate dumping margins in an investigation, but may use A-T as an alternative to the default A-A method if certain conditions are met. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f — 1(d)(1)(A)—(B). Congress, however, has not dictated which comparison methodology Commerce must use in administrative reviews nor has it provided for when Commerce may use A-T in reviews. The only further guidance the statute provides with respect to Commerce’s use of A-T in a review is that when applying A-T, Commerce “shall limit its averaging of prices to a period not exceeding the calendar month that corresponds most closely to the calendar month of the individual export sale.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(d)(2). Commerce’s regulations provide that Commerce will apply A-A to calculate dumping margins in investigations and reviews unless another method is appropriate in a particular case, but do not provide further guidance regarding what those circumstances may be. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(c)(1).

As a result, to determine whether to employ an alternative method to calculate dumping margins in reviews, Commerce has by practice chosen to adopt the approach it uses in investigations, which follows the statutory directive under 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(d)(l)(B). In the preliminary results, Commerce explained that analogous to its approach in antidumping duty investigations, Commerce engages in an analysis consistent with § 1677f-1(d)(1)(B) in administrative reviews to “examine[ ] whether to use the [A-T] method as an alternative comparison method.” Prelim. I & D Memo at 5. Therefore, as a matter of practice, Commerce applies A-T instead of the default A-A method in an administrative review if there is a pattern of export prices for comparable merchandise that differ significantly among purchasers, regions, or time periods, provided that Commerce explains why the A-A method cannot account for those price differences. See Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted-Average Dumping Margin and Assessment Rate in Certain Antidumping Duty Proceedings; Final Modification, 77 Fed.Reg. 8,101, 8,102 (Dep’t Commerce Feb. 14, 2012) (announcing that Commerce intends to apply a comparison methodology in reviews in a manner that parallels investigations) (“Final Modification”). Accordingly, to evaluate whether the conditions for the A-T exception are met in a review, Commerce engages in the differential pricing analysis, which Commerce has used in recent investigations and reviews. See id.

In the preliminary results, Commerce stated that it employed the differential pricing analysis “pursuant to 19 CFR [§ ] 351.414(c)(1) and consistent with [19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(d)(l)(B) ]” and determined that the A-T comparison methodology was appropriate to apply to Devi Fisheries’ and Falcon Marine’s U.S. sales. See Prelim. I & D Memo at 5-7; see also Prelim. Results, 79 Fed.Reg. at 16,286. Commerce continued to apply the alternative A-T method to calculate Devi Fisheries’ and Falcon Marine’s dumping margins in the final results; See Final I & D Memo at 1-2; see also Final Results, 79 Fed.Reg. at 51,309.

Plaintiffs concede in their reply that JBF RAK LLC is determinative on the issue of whether Commerce has the authority to apply the alternative A-T method in reviews. See Pis.’ Reply 3. The appellant in JBF RAK LLC, a manufacturer and exporter of polyethylene terephtha-late film from the United Arab Emirates, appealed a U.S. Court of International Trade decision, see generally JBF RAK LLC v. United States, 38 C.I.T.-, 991 F.Supp.2d 1343 (2014), challenging Commerce’s targeted dumping analysis and disputing Commerce’s authority to apply A-T in the context of an administrative review. See JBF RAK LLC, 790 F.3d at 1360-62. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Commerce viewed its analysis in investigations as instructive for administrative reviews and reasonably exercised its gap-filling authority by using A-T to calculate dumping margins in administrative reviews in appropriate circumstances. See id. at 1364. In affirming Commerce’s decision to apply A-T in the context of an administrative review, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reasoned that “[t]he fact that the statute is silent with regard to administrative reviews does not preclude Commerce from filling gaps in the statute to properly calculate and assign antidumping duties.” See id. at 1365 (internal quotations omitted). Because the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has decided this very issue and the court is not presented with, nor does it observe, reasons that warrant dissimilar treatment, the court holds that Commerce had the authority to engage in an analysis to determine whether application of A-T was appropriate in this administrative review.

II. Commerce Complied with its Regulations

Plaintiffs argue that while Commerce may apply A-T in reviews, it must comply with its regulations codified at 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(f) (2008) here based on Plaintiffs’ position that those regulations were in full force and effect for this review. See Pis.’ Mot. 15-18. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that Commerce must comply with the “limiting rule” and the “allegation requirement.” See id; see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(f)(2) — (3) (2008). Plaintiffs contend that these regulatory provisions apply here because “[although Commerce’s [targeted dumping] regulations are, by them own terms, limited to investigations, Commerce consistently relies on its [targeted dumping] investigation policies in [antidumping duty] reviews.” Pis.’ Mot. 16.

Defendant disagrees with Plaintiffs’ contention because, regardless of whether the regulations were properly withdrawn, “the regulations by their explicit terms applied to investigations and not administrative reviews.” Def.’s Resp. 14. Defendant also argues that Commerce promulgated those regulations to implement the statutory provision in 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(d)(l) and there is no corresponding statutory directive with respect to reviews. See id at 16. Defendant-Intervenor adds that the regulations have since been revoked and nonetheless applied to the preceding targeted dumping analysis rather than the differential pricing analysis that was undertaken here. See Def.-Intervenor’s Resp. 15-16.

Plaintiffs’ argument is predicated upon the view that the regulation was in full force and effect for this proceeding. To support that view, Plaintiffs argue that the attempted withdrawal in 2008 was invalid according to Gold East Paper (Jiangsu) Co. v. United States, 37 C.I.T. -, 918 F.Supp.2d 1317 (2013). See Pis.’ Mot. 15-16. Plaintiffs further argue that the validity of the subsequent withdrawal in 2014 is irrelevant becausé it was applicable to cases initiated on or after May 22, 2014, whereas the instant review was initiated before that date. See Pis.’ Mot. 16 n.3. Defendant holds fast to its view that despite the decision in Gold East Paper, the regulations were properly withdrawn in 2008. However, whether the regulation was in full force and effect is of no consequence here.

The regulatory provisions that Plaintiffs argue Commerce failed to comply with do not apply to administrative reviews. The issue of whether the regulations were properly withdrawn is not before the court as the regulations by their terms only apply to investigations, which Plaintiffs concede in their argument. See Pis.’ Mot. 16 (conceding that “Commerce’s [targeted dumping] regulations are, by their own terms, limited to investigations ”); see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(f) (2008). Thus, there is no regulation that expressly requires Commerce to apply the limiting rule and the allegation requirement in a review.

Further, the regulations have not otherwise been implemented as part of Commerce’s current practice in reviews. As previously explained, Congress has not provided for when and how Commerce is to calculate dumping margins using A-T in reviews. ' Consequently, Commerce has developed a practice in administrative reviews of conducting an analysis that is guided by its approach in investigations to “examine[ ] whether to use the [A-T] method as an alternative comparison method.” Prelim. I & D Memo at 5.

Where Commerce has developed a practice it must follow that practice or explain why in a given case it was reasonable to deviate from that practice. See NMB Singapore Ltd. v. United States, 557 F.3d 1316, 1328 (Fed.Cir.2009). However, Commerce has decided from the outset not to incorporate the regulations as part of its practice of using the differential pricing analysis in reviews for the same reasons why it sought to withdraw the regulations altogether. Commerce explained that “the regulation was impeding the development of an effective remedy for masked dumping,” which Congress has charged Commerce to counteract by authorizing it to use A-T to calculate dumping margins under appropriate circumstances. See Final I & D Memo at 14. Commerce further provided that the regulations were “promulgated without the benefit of any experience on the issue of targeted dumping” and “prevented the use of this comparison methodology to unmask dumping.” Id. at 14. Thus, Commerce ultimately decided to withdraw the regulation because it “may have had the unintentional effect of preventing the Department from employing an appropriate remedy to unmask dumping” and “[s]uch an effect would have been contrary to congressional intent” as it would seemingly deny domestic producers the relief the antidumping duty scheme envisions for them. Id. at 16. Commerce’s reasons for withdrawing, or attempting to withdraw, the regulations suffice to demonstrate that it has not adopted the regulations as a matter of practice in its differential pricing analysis.

Plaintiffs, however, maintain that “Commerce itself has made its [targeted dumping] regulations relevant in [anti-dumping duty] reviews, and it must comply with them or explain why it is reasonable not to do so in this case.” Pis.’ Mot. 16. At oral argument, Plaintiffs argued that Commerce’s practice in reviews has incorporated the regulations applicable to investigations because its practice consistently relies upon the analysis used in investigations. See Oral Arg., 03:28-04:41, Dec. 11, 2015, ECF No. 62. However, as explained above, Commerce has not adopted the regulations as part of its practice of using the differential pricing analysis in reviews. The fact that Commerce looks to its approach in investigations as guidance for its practice in reviews does not mean that Commerce has made a wholesale adoption of every aspect, including statutory and regulatory constraints, of its approach in investigations. Although Commerce is permitted to extend particular statutory or regulatory provisions in other contexts, see JBF RAK LLC, 790 F.3d at 1364 (holding that Commerce’s application of A-T in reviews in a manner that mirrors investigations is a reasonable exercise of its gap-filling discretion), it is by no means obligated to do so. Therefore, Commerce was not required to comply with the limiting rule and the allegation requirement in the final results.

III. Commerce’s Change in Practice Did Not Trigger APA Rule Making Requirements

Plaintiffs contend that Commerce implemented its differential pricing analysis without following APA rule making requirements. See Pis.’ Mot. 18-20. Defendant and Defendant-Intervenor explain that Commerce’s shift from the Nails test to the differential pricing analysis was a change in Commerce’s practice rather than a rule and thus exempt from the APA’s notice and comment rule making requirement. See Def.’s Resp. 17-21; Def.-Intervenor’s Resp. 17-18. The court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument based on fundamental administrative law principles.

Absent statutory restraints, agencies are generally free to develop policy through either rulemaking or adjudication. SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 202, 67 S.Ct. 1760, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947). Courts will not impose more procedures than those imposed by Congress or the agency. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524-525, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978). Commerce is free to develop its approach for determining which comparison method to use in a given case through adjudication.

Nonetheless, Plaintiffs reason that the APA mandates notice and comment rule-making pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 553 because the differential pricing methodology is a “rule,” which is defined as “an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency.” See Pis.’ Mot. 19-20; 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). However, the APA’s notice and comment requirement applies to legislative rules and does not apply to “interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.” See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). While not binding on this Court, the court notes that the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has aptly addressed how to determine whether an agency rule is a legislative rule that must undergo notice and comment rulemaking by asking the following:

(1) whether in the absence of the rule there would not be an adequate legisla-five basis for enforcement action or other agency action to confer benefits or ensure the performance of duties, (2) whether the agency has published the rule in the Code of Federal Regulations, (3) whether the agency has explicitly invoked its general legislative authority, or (4) whether the rule effectively amends a prior legislative rule.

Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C.Cir.1993).

Adopting this framework, none of the questions raised are answered affirmatively in this context. Congress has afforded Commerce the basis for agency action absent any rulemaking. Commerce’s approach to uncovering dumping has developed, and continues to develop, over time as foreshadowed by the Supreme Court in Chenery.

Because Commerce’s approach has and continues to evolve, it is not appropriate to “rigidify[] [Commerce’s] tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule.” Chenery, 332 U.S. at 202, 67 S.Ct. 1760. Commerce’s approach for determining whether to utilize the A-T exception is precisely the type of situation where the agency “retain[s] power to deal with the problems on a case-to-case basis ... [allowing for] the case-by-case evolution of statutory standards.” Id. at 203, 67 S.Ct. 1760. Thus, Commerce’s shift from the Nails test to the differential pricing analysis is not subject to notice and comment requirements.

Plaintiffs additionally argue that by requesting comments on the differential pricing analysis Commerce acknowledged that the change is subject to APA notice and comment requirements. See Pis.’ Mot. 19 n.5; see also Differential Pricing Analysis; Request for Comments, 79 Fed.Reg. 26,720, 26,720 (Dep’t Commerce May 9, 2014) (“Request for Comments”). Plaintiffs’ assertion is erroneous. By simply requesting comment, Commerce did not in effect obligate itself to engage in notice and comment rule making. Commerce has not invoked its legislative authority simply by seeking input from interested parties.

Plaintiffs further argue that “Commerce arbitrarily changed from its so-called Nails Test to its new [differential pricing] analysis without adequate explanation or input.” Pis.’ Mot. 19. Plaintiffs are correct in that Commerce must adequately explain any changes to its practice to be entitled to deference. See SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 630 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2011); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48-49, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983) (explaining that “an agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner”); Nippon Steel Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 494 F.3d 1371, 1378 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.2007) (providing that “[w]hen an agency decides to change course, however, it must adequately explain the reason for a reversal of policy” to be afforded deference). However, the court finds that Commerce has provided an adequate explanation for its change in practice and sought input from interested parties.

Commerce’s explanation for the shift from the Nails test to the differential pricing analysis need not confirm that the change is a better policy or methodology than its predecessor. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515, 129 S.Ct. 1800, 173 L.Ed.2d 738 (2009). “[I]t suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious change of course adequately indicates.” Id. “Thus, Commerce need only show that its methodology is permissible under the statute and that it had good reasons for the new methodology.” Huvis Corp. v. United States, 570 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed.Cir.2009).

Commerce explained that it continues to develop its approach with respect to the use of A-T “as it gains greater experience with addressing potentially hidden or masked dumping that can occur when the Department determines weighted-average dumping margins using the [A-A] comparison method.” Final I & D Memo at 18 (internal quotations omitted). Commerce additionally explained that the new approach is “a more precise characterization of the purpose and application of [19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(d)(l)(B) ]” and is the product of Commerce’s “experience over the last several years, ... further research, analysis and consideration of the numerous comments and suggestions on what guidelines, thresholds, and tests should be used in determining whether to apply an alternative comparison method based on the [A-T] method.” Request for Comments, 79 Fed.Reg. at 26,722. Commerce developed its approach over time, while gaining experience and obtaining input. Under the standard described above, Commerce’s explanation is sufficient. Therefore, Commerce’s adoption of the differential pricing analysis was not arbitrary.

IV. Differential Pricing Analysis

The statute provides that Commerce must compare normal value to the export price of each entry of subject merchandise in order to calculate dumping margins. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(A)(ii); 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a); 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A). However, the statute does not dictate which comparison methodology Commerce must use in a review, nor when it may use A-T in a review. Commerce has stated in its regulations that it will apply A-A in reviews “unless another method is appropriate in a particular case.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(c)(1). Commerce has adopted a practice in reviews of using the differential pricing analysis based upon the statutory provision applicable to investigations to determine whether application of A-T is warranted. According to Commerce’s practice, it may use AT rather than A-A in a review when (1) there is a pattern of export prices that differ significantly among purchasers, regions, or periods of time and (2) Commerce provides an explanation for why the pattern of significant price differences cannot be taken into account using A-A. Plaintiffs challenge (i) Commerce’s use of weighted-average export prices to find prices that differ significantly, (ii) the inclusion of both higher and lower-priced sales in the analysis, (in) Commerce’s finding of a pattern of export prices that differ significantly, (iv) Commerce’s explanation as to why A-A cannot account for such differences, and (v) Commerce’s application of its mixed methodology. See Pis.’ Mot. 20-45. Each of Plaintiffs’ specific challenges to Commerce’s differential pricing analysis are unavailing as explained below.

A. Commerce’s Analysis for Finding a Pattern of Export Prices that Differ Significantly is Reasonable.

In the first stage of the differential pricing analysis, Commerce employs two tests — (1) the Cohen’s d test and (2) the ratio test — to identify a pattern of export prices that differ significantly. See Prelim. I & D Memo at 6-7. The Cohen’s d test assesses whether export prices differ significantly among purchasers, regions, or periods of time, whereas the ratio test evaluates whether the price differences measured by the Cohen’s d test are sufficient to exhibit a pattern. See id,.; Request for Comments, 79 Fed.Reg. at 26,-722. Plaintiffs argue Commerce’s finding that the mandatory respondents’ U.S. sales revealed a pattern of .export prices that differ significantly among purchasers, regions, or time periods is unsupported by substantial evidence and not in accordance with law. See Pis.’ Mot. 20-28. Plaintiffs argue Commerce improperly used averages to find significant price differences, see id. at 20-26, wrongly included higher-priced sales that passed the Cohen’s d test in the ratio test, see id. at 43-45, and erroneously found a pattern of significant price differences. See id. at 26-28.

i. Commerce’s Use of Averages in the Cohen’s d Test

Plaintiffs argue that Commerce’s use of weighted-average export prices as opposed to individual export prices in its Cohen’s d analysis conflicts with the statute, is distortive, and lacks an adequate explanation. See Pis.’ Mot. 21-26. Defendant explains that the statute does not restrict Commerce’s discretion to use weighted-average export prices. See Def.’s Resp. 25-28.

The language of the statute, .as implicated by Commerce’s practice, requires Commerce to identify whether there is “a pattern of export prices ... for comparable merchandise that differ significantly among purchasers, regions, or periods of time” before application of A-T is permitted. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(d)(l)(B)(i). The first stage of the differential pricing analysis answers this question by bifurcating the inquiry, i.e., separately addressing whether there are significant price differences and whether those price differences are such that they constitute a pattern. Commerce uses the Cohen’s d test to evaluate whether “the net prices [of comparable merchandise] to a particular purchaser, region, or period of. time differ significantly from the net prices of all other sales of comparable merchandise.” Prelim. I & D Memo at 6. To do so, Commerce preliminarily disaggregates the data collected from the individually examined respondents and sorts'the sales of each CON-NUM into sales to particular purchasers, regions, and periods of time. See id. Each grouping of CONNUM sales specific to a purchaser, region, or time period forms a test group and the remaining sales of that CONNUM to all other purchasers, regions, or time periods form a corresponding comparison group. See Final I & D Memo at 22.

Commerce performs the Cohen’s d test by calculating the difference between the weighted-average sales prices of a test group and its corresponding comparison group, and subsequently comparing that difference in relation to the pooled standard deviation of the two groups. See id. at 24. The resulting value is known as the Cohen’s d coefficient. See id. Commerce considers test group sales to pass the Cohen’s d test if the resulting Cohen’s d coefficient is equal to or greater than 0.8, which Commerce deems to be a strong indication of significant price differences. See Prelim. I & D Memo at 6. Conversely, Commerce views a Cohen’s d coefficient value less than 0.8 as an indication that the price differences are not significant. See id. Each CONNUM’s sales undergo several rounds of analysis to assess whether the export prices differ significantly by way of sales to particular purchasers, regions, or time periods. See generally Devi Fisheries’ Prelim. Calcs.; Falcon Marine Prelim. Calcs.; see also Prelim. I & D Memo at 6. If the weighted-average sales price of a test group pass any of the rounds of the Cohen’s d test, then all the sales within that test group are considered to have passed the Cohen’s d test as a whole. See Devi Fisheries’ Prelim. Calcs, at 84-85; Falcon Marine Prelim. Calcs, at 52. Thus, Commerce uses the Cohen’s d test to assess whether a respondent’s export prices differ significantly with respect to particular purchasers, regions, or periods of time.

Congress has granted Commerce considerable discretion to construct a methodology to apply in a review. Further, the court affords Commerce significant deference in determinations “in-volvfing] complex economic and accounting decisions of a technical nature.” Fujitsu General Ltd. v. United States, 88 F.3d 1034, 1039 (Fed.Cir.1996). Despite its wide discretion, Commerce “must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner,” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 48-49, 103 S.Ct. 2856, and the methodological approach must nevertheless be a “reasonable means of effectuating the statutory purpose” and its conclusions must be supported by substantial evidence in order to be afforded deference. Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A. v. United States, 10 C.I.T. 399, 404-05, 636 F.Supp. 961, 966 (1986), aff'd, 810 F.2d 1137, 1139 (Fed.Cir.1987).

Here, Commerce has reasonably exercised its discretion and considered weighted-average export prices in the Cohen’s d test. Neither the statute nor Commerce’s practice require it to identify significant price differences through the use of individual export prices rather than weighted-average export prices. Commerce reasonably determines whether export prices differ significantly among purchasers, regions, or time periods by evaluating the relative difference between the weighted-averages of two subgroups of sales. As described above, the test group is comprised of sales to a particular purchaser, region, or time period, and the comparison group is comprised of sales to the other purchasers, regions, or time periods outside of the test group. Commerce then calculates the weighted-average of the export prices that comprise each of these groups and if the difference between the weighted-averages reaches a certain level, Commerce finds that the price differences are significant. The court can discern from Commerce’s explanation that export prices differ significantly among purchasers (or regions or time periods) where Commerce observes significant price differences between the weighted-average of sales to a particular purchaser (or region, or time period) and the weighted-average of sales to all other purchasers (or regions, or time periods). The court finds the use of weighted-average export prices reasonable in this case. Significant price differences between the weighted-averages of export prices reasonably indicate that export prices differ significantly because the analysis “uses all of a respondent’s reported U.S. sales of subject merchandise” and the weighted-averages are therefore representative of and account for all the export prices. Final I & D Memo at 34. Commerce’s approach is thus able to effectuate the purpose of the analysis. While it may be possible in some situations that significant differences in the weighted-averages of export prices would not be indicative that the export prices of individual transactions differ significantly, there is no record evidence to suggest that is the case here. To show that Commerce’s use of weighted-averages was improper here, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that Commerce’s use of weighted-averages identified significant price differences where such price differences would not be found to be significant through use of individual export prices. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the case here is as such.

Plaintiffs’ text-based arguments do not stand up to scrutiny. To support its position, Plaintiffs claim that the language under 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(d)(l)(B)(i) as implicated in Commerce’s practice, “a pattern of export prices ... for comparable merchandise that differ significantly among purchasers, regions, or periods of time,” suggests that Congress intended that the requisite pattern finding must 'be based on individual export prices. See Pis.’ Mot. 21-22. Plaintiffs emphasize that the word “differ” in the statute is plural, so they argue that the word is meant to relate to “export prices” rather than to “pattern.” See id. At oral argument, Plaintiffs maintained that Commerce should instead conduct the Cohen’s d test using export prices of individual transactions in the test group and weighted-average export prices in the comparison group. See Oral Arg., 32:00-32:33.

Even accepting Plaintiffs’ assertion that the word “differ” modifies “export prices” does not lead to the conclusion that Commerce must use export prices of individual transactions rather than weighted-average export prices. Although Congress did not modify “export prices” with “weighted-average” in the statute, Congress similarly decided not to modify “export prices” with “individual transactions” as it had done in other provisions of the antidumping duty statute. Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(d)(1)(A)® ,, and 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(d)(1)(B) with 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(d)(1)(B)®. Moreover, even if Congress intended for Commerce to establish that individual export prices differ significantly, it is not unreasonable for Commerce to fulfill that goal by looking to averages. Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate why Commerce’s choice is unreasonable.

Plaintiffs also assert that Commerce’s use of averages in its Cohen’s d calculations distorts the differential pricing analysis. See Pis.’ Mot. 23-25. Plaintiffs argue that by using weighted-average export prices, Commerce masks individual sales prices and “smooth[s] out differences in individual export prices.” Id. Averaging prices by definition smooths out differences in individual prices. However, smoothing out differences is not necessarily distortive where Commerce is called upon to determine whether there is a pattern of prices that differ significantly. To show distortion in this context, the relevant question is whether the use of averages reveals significant price differences (or fails to reveal significant price differences) that would not be identified (or would be) without the use of averaging. Plaintiffs fail to make such a showing.

Plaintiffs alternatively argue that Commerce must use monthly weighted-average export prices instead of annual or quarterly weighted-average export prices. See id. at 26. For evaluating sales to purchasers and regions for differential pricing, Commerce uses annual weighted-average sales prices in the test groups and comparison groups. See Def.’s Resp. 22; Prelim. I & D Memo at 6. For evaluating sales in certain periods of time for differential pricing, Commerce uses quarterly weighted-average sales prices in the test groups and comparison groups. See Def.’s Resp. 23; Prelim. I & D Memo at 6. Plaintiffs argue that Commerce should instead use monthly weighted-average export prices because “[l]arger averaging period[s] tend[ ] to amplify distortions.” See Pis.’ Mot. 26. Plaintiffs ground their argument in Commerce’s regulations which require it to use monthly weighted-averages when applying A-A in reviews. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(d)(3).

The court is unconvinced. Plaintiffs fail to show why the use of monthly averages is either required by the statute or regulation, or why the use of annual or quarterly averages is unreasonable. Commerce’s regulation instructs Commerce to apply AA in reviews as follows:

(d) Application of the average-to-average method—

(3) Time period over which weighted average is calculated .... When applying the average-to-average method in a review, [Commerce] normally will calculate weighted averages on a monthly basis and compare the weighted-average monthly export price or constructed export price to the weighted-average normal value for the contemporaneous month.

19 C.F.R. § 351.414(d)(3). Plaintiffs’ argument misunderstands the function of the differential pricing analysis. The regulation cited by Plaintiffs is inapplicable in this context because it refers to Commerce’s use of averages in using the A-A comparison methodology to calculate dumping margins. The differential pricing analysis provides Commerce with a method to identify if a respondent’s sales exhibit a pattern of significant price differences, not calculate dumping margins. The regulation in no way restricts the time period over which Commerce calculates the weighted-averages it uses for purposes of finding significant price differences.

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Commerce has not adequately explained that its use of weighted-averages in the Cohen’s d test is consistent with 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(d)(l)(B)(i). See Pis.’ Mot. 25-26. Commerce explained “neither the statute nor the regulations specify how the Department should examine whether there exists a pattern of prices that differ significantly” and therefore its use of weighted-averages is reasonable in light of that silence. See Final I & D Memo at 23. While Commerce’s explanation could more completely articulate its rationale, Commerce’s path is reasonably discernable. It is within Commerce’s discretion to determine how to identify significant price differences. Commerce has found that the use of weighted-averages is able to reasonably accomplish its intended purpose of identifying significant price differences. See id. at 22-23. As stated above, Commerce reasonably concludes that export prices differ significantly among purchasers, regions, or time periods where it observes significant price differences between the weighted-average of test group sales and the weighted-average of comparison group sales. Implicit in Commerce’s explanation is that significant price differences between the weighted-averages of export prices indicates whether the export prices differ significantly. Further, Commerce relies upon its prior use of weighted-averages in its application of the Nails test and found that to be reasonable and appropriate. See id. Plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate why the use of weighted-averages is unreasonable and unable to identify significant price differences. Although Commerce’s explanation is not ideal, it is adequate.

Therefore, Commerce’s use of annual and quarterly weighted-averages in the Cohen’s d test to discern significant price differences is reasonable.

ii. Commerce’s Consideration of All Sales in the Ratio Test

Plaintiffs claim that Commerce must limit the ratio test to “lower priced” sales that pass the Cohen’s d test in order to comply with the statute. See Pis.’ Mot. 43-45. Plaintiffs argue “Commerce wrongly included ‘higher’ priced sales (i.e., sales with prices above the ‘mean’) in determining which sales ‘pass’ Cohen’s d under the first step ‘pattern’ stage of its [differential pricing] analysis.” Pis.’ Reply 27. In response, Defendant reiterates Commerce’s rationale for considering all sales explaining that Commerce was not required to limit its analysis because “ ‘higher-priced sales are equally capable as lower-priced sales of creating a pattern of prices that differ significantly.’ ” Defi’s Resp. 30 (quoting Final I & D Memo at 26).

Before Commerce may apply A-T to calculate a respondent’s dumping margin, Commerce’s practice in reviews requires that it first determine whether that respondent’s sales exhibit a pattern of export prices that differ significantly among purchasers, regions, and periods of time. As stated previously, Commerce answers this question by separately addressing whether there are significant price differences and whether those price differences are such that they constitute a pattern. For the second prong of the inquiry, made relevant by Plaintiffs’ claim here, Commerce applies the ratio test, which “assesses the extent of the significance of the price differences for all sales as measured by the Cohen’s d test” by comparing the combined value of the respondent’s U.S. sales that passed the Cohen’s d test in relation to the value of all U.S. sales. See Prelim. I & D Memo at 6.

To discern whether the sales passing the Cohen’s d test constitute a pattern, Commerce has devised the ratio test to categorize a respondent’s pricing behavior. Commerce has chosen to consider all sales, regardless of whether they are higher or lower-priced sales, to evaluate the extent of the differentially priced sales. Commerce explained that all sales are relevant to its analysis because “[h]igher-priced sales and lower-priced sales do not operate independently .... Higher- or lower-priced sales could be dumped or could be masking other dumped sales.... By considering all sales, both higher-priced and lower-priced, the Department is able to analyze an exporter’s pricing behavior and to identify whether there is a pattern of prices that differ .significantly.” Final I fe D Memo at 26. This practice is based upon a methodological approach that is reasonable and has been adequately explained. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 48-49, 103 S.Ct. 2856 (“[A]n agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner.”); Fujitsu General Ltd., 88 F.3d at 1039 (granting Commerce significant deference in determinations “involvfing] complex economic and accounting decisions of a technical nature”); Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A., 636 F.Supp. at 966, aff'd, 810 F.2d at 1139 (affording deference to Commerce’s methodology so long as it reasonably effectuates the statutory purpose and is supported by substantial evidence). Commerce’s practice in reviews requires it to identify a pattern of export prices that differ significantly among purchasers, regions, or periods of time. The inquiry is not limited to lower-priced export prices. It is appropriate for Commerce to consider all sales in its analysis because, in determining whether A-T is appropriate, Commerce is required to uncover significant differences in a respondent’s export prices, which necessarily calls for looking at the differences in higher and lower-priced sales to assess whether those differences are in fact significant. Considering all sales allows Commerce to fully assess the breadth of a respondent’s price differences. Thus, it is reasonable to examine all of a respondent’s sales in its differential pricing analysis.

Nonetheless, Plaintiffs argue that Commerce “improperly increasefd] the pool of sales to which Commerce applies its alternative A-T methodology” by “including] all sales that ‘passed’ the Cohen’s d test, regardless of whether the sales were priced higher or lower than sales in the test group.” Pis.’ Mot. 43. Plaintiffs argue that Commerce should only consider lower-price sales that pass the Cohen’s d test “for purposes of determining the 33/66 test” in order to be consistent with the statutory scheme. Id. at 45. Plaintiffs base their argument on the notion that Commerce must limit its analysis to dumped sales.

Plaintiffs’ argument is inapposite because it misconstrues the function of the test that Commerce has established. All sales are subject to the differential pricing analysis because its purpose is to determine to what extent a respondent’s U.S. sales are differentially priced, not to identify dumped sales. See Final I & D Memo at 25-26. Commerce is not restricted in what type of sales it may consider in assessing the existence of such a pattern so long as its methodological choice enables Commerce to reasonably determine whether application of A-T is appropriate. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.414(c)(1).

Plaintiffs’ reliance on legislative history to support their argument is unavailing. See Pis.’ Mot. 43 (citing Statement of Administrative Action Accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, vol. 1, at 843 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4178 (“SAA”)). Plaintiffs assert that, according to the SAA, “the whole point of Commerce’s [differential pricing] analysis and A-T remedy is to combat ‘targeted dumping.’ ” Id. Plaintiffs yet again fail to recognize that the subject of Commerce’s inquiry is differentially priced sales, not dumped sales. See Final I & D Memo at 25-26. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, the SAA also explains “an exporter may sell at a dumped price to particular customers or regions, while selling at higher prices to other customers or regions.” SAA at 4177-78. Therefore, the SAA also supports the view that consideration of both lower and higher-priced sales may be appropriate in determining whether application of A-T is necessary to unmask dumping. For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate that Commerce’s decision to consider all sales in the ratio test was unreasonable.

iii. Commerce’s Pattern Determination is Supported by Substantial Evidence

Because of the challenges discussed above, Plaintiffs argue that Commerce’s finding that the mandatory respondents’ U.S. sales exhibited a pattern of export prices that differ significantly among purchasers, regions, or time periods is not supported by substantial evidence. See Pis.’ Mot. 26-28; Pis.’ Reply 12-13. Plaintiffs insist that there is no particular reason why certain sales passed the Cohen’s d test while other sales did not pass because “pricing differences among sales that ‘passed’ Cohen’s d and those that failed were often minuscule.” Pis.’ Mot. 27. Defendant in response explains “that certain select prices that pass and fail the Cohen’s d test are close in value does not mean that the differences between the sales, as well as the thousands of other sales, are not statistically significant.” Def.’s Resp. 33.

The fact that the price differences between sales that pass and do not pass the Cohen’s d test were at times small in absolute terms does not undermine Commerce’s pattern determination. Indeed, “small differences may be significant for one industry or one type of product but not for another.” Final I & D Memo at 24 (quoting SAA at 843). Commerce explained that its analysis has been developed to identify significant price differences depending on what is considered significant for a particular industry or product. See id. “Specifically, the Cohen’s d coefficient measures the significance of the difference in the weighted-average sales price between the test and comparison groups relative to the variances of the individual sales prices within each group.” Id. Therefore, Commerce’s approach accounts for what degree of price differences is necessary to be deemed significant by comparing sales prices in relation to the average price variation between sales prices of a CONNUM, ie., the test group and comparison group. The significance of the price difference is determined by the “variance[ ] of the individual sales prices within each group.” Id. “Thus, if there is little variance in prices among purchasers in a particular industry, regions, or time periods, then small differences, in absolute terms, may be significant. On the other hand, if individual sale prices within each comparison group ... have a greater variability ... [,] then there must be greater differences in the weighted-average sale prices between the two groups for the difference to be significant.” Id. The fact that the price differences among the sales passing and not passing the Cohen’s d test are insignificant in absolute terms does not mean that the relative differences are not significant for purposes of identifying a pattern of significant price differences. Implicit in Commerce’s approach is that the relative significance of the differences is what matters. Accordingly, Commerce’s pattern determination is supported by substantial evidence.

B. Commerce Has Explained Why A-A Cannot Account for the Pattern of Significant Price Differences

Plaintiffs challenge Commerce’s determination that A-A cannot account for the pattern of significant price differences. See Pis.’ Mot. '28-36. Defendant responds that Commerce provided an adequate explanation by evaluating whether the differences in the A-A margin in comparison to the A-T margin are “meaningful.” See Def.’s Resp. 34. Commerce has adequately explained why A-A cannot account for the pattern of significant price differences.

Once Commerce establishes that there is a pattern of significant price differences, Commerce’s practice in reviews requires it to explain whether A-A cannot account for such price differences before deciding to apply A-T. Commerce has chosen to answer whether A-A cannot account for such price differences by engaging in its meaningful differences analysis, which is the second stage of the differential pricing analysis. See Prelim. I & D Memo at 7; Final I & D Memo at 3, 22. In its meaningful differences analysis, Commerce examines whether A-A can account for the significant price differences attributable to the subject sales that pass both the Cohen’s d test and ratio test. See Prelim. I & D Memo at 7. To answer this inquiry, Commerce determines whether the A-T margin, calculated in the manner suggested by the preceding Cohen’s d and ratio tests, yields a meaningful difference in comparison to the A-A calculated margin. See id. In other words, Commerce’s meaningful difference analysis calls for a comparison of margins calculated by applying A-A and A-T in the manner suggested by the ratio test. See id. Commerce finds a meaningful difference in the calculated margins if (1) the A-T calculated margin crosses the de minimis threshold while the A-A calculated margin remains de minimis, or, (2) if both calculated margins are above de minimis, the A-T calculated margin is 25% greater than the A-A calculated margin. See id. If such a finding is made, Commerce proceeds to apply A-T as dictated by the first stage of the analysis to calculate the respondent’s antidump-ing duty rate. See id. Put simply, Commerce finds that A-A cannot account for the significant price differences if there is a meaningful difference between the A-A calculated margin as compared to the A-T calculated margin. See id.; Final I & D Memo at 3, 22.

Here, Commerce calculated a margin of 0.00% for both respondents when using AA, however, it calculated a margin of 1.97% for Devi Fisheries and 3.01% for Falcon Marine when using A-T as directed by the ratio test. See Devi Fisheries’ Prelim. Calcs. at 2; Falcon Marine’s Prelim. Calcs, at 2. Thus, Commerce determined that the A-A method could not account for the significant price differences among the mandatory respondents’ U.S. sales because the A-T calculated margin resulted in a meaningful difference in relation to the AA calculated margin. See Devi Fisheries’ Prelim. Calcs, at 1-2; Falcon Marine’s Prelim. Calcs, at 1-2. For Devi Fisheries, Commerce explained that “when comparing the weighted-average dumping margins calculated using the average-to-average method for all U.S. sales and the average-to-transaction method for all U.S. sales, there is a meaningful difference in the results {i.e., the margin moves across the de minimis threshold).” Devi Fisheries’ Prelim. Calcs, at 2. Similarly, for Falcon Marine, Commerce explained that “when comparing the weighted-average dumping margins calculated using the average-to-average method for all U.S. sales and the ‘mixed alternative’ methodology, there is a meaningful difference in the results (i.e., the margin moves across the de minimis threshold).” Falcon Marine’s Prelim. Calcs, at 2. As a result, Commerce proceeded to apply A-T in some form to calculate the mandatory respondents’ dumping margins. See Devi Fisheries’ Prelim. Calcs, at 2; Falcon Marine’s Prelim. Calcs, at 2.

The court must address whether Commerce’s explanation for why A-A cannot account for the pattern of significant price differences is reasonable. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 48-49, 103 S.Ct. 2856; Fujitsu General Ltd., 88 F.3d at 1039; Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A., 636 F.Supp. at 966, aff'd, 810 F.2d at 1139. Commerce’s rationale presumes that A-A cannot account for the pattern of significant price differences if the difference in the margins calculated using A-A and A-T is meaningful. As stated previously, Commerce’s explanation posits that there is a meaningful difference where the A-A calculated margin is de minimis and the A-T calculated margin is not de minimis. Implicit in Commerce’s meaningful differences analysis is that AA can account for some degree of price differences. There