Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM Hon. John E. Jones, III, District Judge Presently before the Court are the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment, and the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Docs. 27, 29. For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the Plaintiffs’ motion in its entirety and grant Defendants’ motion for Summary Judgment. 1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. The Affordable Care Act In March 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. Ill— 148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. Li No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (collectively, the “ACA”) passed into law. The ACA requires non-grandfathered group health, care plans and insurance providers offering non-grandfathered coverage to supply four categories of recommended preventive health services, without requiring copayments or deductibles from plan participants and beneficiaries. Doc. 1, ¶¶ 49-53; see Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under .the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,622-23 (Aug. 3, 2011). The four categories of preventive health services include: (1) items or services that have an “A” or “B” rating from the United States Preventive Services Task Force; (2) immunizations as recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; (3) preventive care and screenings for, infants, children and adolescents as provided for by the guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”); and (4) preventive care and screenings for women, also as provided by guidelines supported-by the HRSA. 76 Fed. Reg. 46,622-28 (Aug. 3,2011). - At the time that the ACA passed into law, no guidelines regarding preventive care and screenings for women existed. Doc. 27, p. 4. Thus, the HHS requested recommended guidelines from the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”), a nonprofit organization established by the National Academy of Sciences and funded by Congress. Doc. 1, ¶ 56; Doc. 27, p. 4. In response to this request, the IOM recommended that the HRSA adopt guidelines endorsing, among other measures, 'breastfeeding support, domestic violence screening, and also “the full range of [FDA]approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for women with reproductive capacity.” Doc. 27, p. 5. FDA-approved contraceptive methods include diaphragms, oral contraceptives, intrauterine devices, and emergency contraceptives (such as “Plan B,” also known as the “morning-after pill,” and ulipristal, also known as “Ella” or the “week-after pill”). Id. The IOM asserts that the services recommended by its proposed guidelines are “shown to improve well-being, and/or decrease the likelihood or delay the onset of a targeted disease or condition.” Id. at 4-5. On August 1, 2011, the HRSA adopted the IOM’s recommended guidelines regarding preventive care and screenings for women in full. Doc. 1, ¶ 66. In doing so, the HRSA required every non-exempt employer to provide these services for their employees in their health insurance coverage plans (the “Contraceptive Mandate”). Id. On the same day, an exemption from the Contraceptive Mandate for certain- religious employers was proposed as an interim final regulation. Doc. 1, ¶¶ 71-72. The Departments of Treasury, Labor, and the HHS (collectively, the “Departments”) explained that certain commenters to the proposed guidelines had suggested that requiring religious employers to sponsor group health plans for their employees that provide contraceptive services could impinge upon those employers’ religious freedom. 76 Fed, Reg. 46,621, 46,624 (Aug. 3, 2011). In light of these comments, the Departments determined that: it is appropriate that HRSA, in issuing these Guidelines, takes into account the effect on the religious beliefs of certain religious employers if coverage of contraceptive services were required in the group health plans in which employees in certain religious' positions participate. Specifically, the Departments seek to provide for a religious accommodation that respects the unique relationship between a house of worship and its employees in ministerial positions. Such an accommodation would be consistent with the policies of States that require contraceptive services coverage, the majority of which simultaneously provide for a religious accommodation. Id. To qualify for the religious employer exemption as it was set forth in the 2011 regulations, an employer was required meet criteria consistent with the exemptions adopted in most states. A religious employer was required to: (1) have as its purpose the inculcation of religious values; (2) primarily employ persons who share its religious tenets; (3) primarily servé persons who share'its religious tenets; and (4) be a non-profit organization under Section 6033(a)(1) and Section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Code. Id. Though the religious employer exemption went into effect immediately, the Departments requested comments on this definition, as well as alternative definition submissions. Id. The Departments also noted that “[bjecause the HRSA’s discretion to establish an exemption applies only to group health plans sponsored by certain religious employers and group health insurance offered in connection with such plans, health insurance issuers in the individual health insurance market would not be covered under any such exemption”.Id. at 46,623-24. In February 2012, the Departments formally adopted the exemption set forth in the 2011 interim final regulations. 77 Fed. Reg. 8,725 (Feb. 15, 2012). The Departments also provided a “temporary enforcement safe harbor,” a one-year period of non-enforcement for non-exempted, nonprofit organizations with religious objections to providing coverage for contraceptive services, ' and whose group health plans were not grandfathered. Id. During the safe harbor period, the Departments announced that they would “plan to develop and propose changes to these final regulations that would meet -two goals — providing contraceptive coverage without cost-sharing -to individuals who would want it and accommodating non-exempted, nonprofit organizations’ religious objections to covering contraceptive services — ” Id. In August 2013, the final rules regarding the religious employer exemption went into effect. 78 .Fed. Reg. 39,874 (July 2, 2013). The new rules significantly shortened the definition of an exempt religious employer and expanded it to ensure that “an otherwise exempt plan is not disqualified because the employer’s purposes extend beyond the inculcation of religious values or because the employer serves or hires people of- different religious faiths.” Id. Instead of the four-pronged definition, the final rules clarified that any “employer that is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity and is referred to in section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the [Internal Revenue] Code” is considered a-religious employer for ■ purposes of the religious employer exemption. Id. The Departments further noted that: the simplified and clarified- definition of religious employer continues to respect the religious interests, of houses of worship and their integrated auxiliaries in a way that does not undermine the governmental interests furthered by the contraceptive coverage requirement. Houses of worship and.their integrated auxiliaries that object-to contraceptive coverage on religious grounds are more likely than other employers to employ people of the same faith who share the same objection, and who would therefore be less likely than other people to use contraceptive services even if such services were covered under their plan. Id. at 39,874-75. Due . to this exemption, ahd others, “the contraceptive mandate presently does not apply to tens of millions of people.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2764, 189 L.Ed.2d 675 (2014). Rather, insurance providers supply contraceptive coverage to individual employees independently of .the plans sponsored by exempted employers -with religious objections to contraceptive care. Doc. 27, pp. 30-31 (explaining that “the grandfathering provision applies at the plan level.... Likewise, the religious .employer ex: emption operates on a plan-wide basis, see 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a), and does not permit individual plan participants and beneficiaries to opt out of contraceptive coverage.”). Since the time that the final rules went into effect, dozens of lawsuits similar to the one presently before: this Court have challenged both the Contraceptive Mandate and the dimensions of its exemptions. See Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, 929 F.Supp.2d 402, 411 (W.D.Pa.2013) (similarly commenting on the vast array of litigation surrounding the Contraceptive’ Mandate). B. Real Alternatives Plaintiff Real Alternatives is a non-profit, non-religious, pro-life organization formed under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Doc. 1, ¶6. Real Alternatives does not hold itself out as a religious entity, is not incorporated as such, and has not adopted any religious views or positions. Id. ¶ 17. Rather, its views are based on “science, reason, and non-religious philosophical principles.” Id. ¶18. Real Alternatives avers that its primary purpose is to provide “life-affirming alternatives to abortion services throughout the nation.” Id. ¶16. It offers pregnancy and parenting support programs, ás well as abstinence ‘education services, to- women and families thróughout Pennsylvania, Michigan and Indiana. Id. ¶ 19. The programs are administered through networks of social service agencies, which Real Alternatives hires as subcontractors. In all three state programs, Real Alternatives requires its subcontracting organizations to share its views, to Contractually agree to promote childbirth rather than abortion, and to refrain from performing abortions and from counseling women to have abortions. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. Real Alternatives also requires its subcontractors to contractually promise not to recommend or provide contraceptives that Real Alternatives believes can destroy human embryos, including all IUDs and hormonal birth control methods. Id. ¶¶ 1,21, 23. Real Alternatives perceives these drugs to be morally wrong and alleges that they may' cause abortions and potentially inflict negative side effects upon the women who use them. Id. ¶24. Real Alternatives further alleges that, because of its pro-life commitment, it only hires employees who share the company’s beliefs concerning abortion and contraceptive drugs. Id. ¶ 33. Since 2008, Real Alternatives has excluded contraceptive care from its health insurance plan. Id. ¶ 32. However,, the plan to which Real Alternatives subscribed was cancelled by its insurance provider during 2014. Id. ¶ 36. Real Alternatives alleges that the ACA’s Contraceptive Mandate caused its insurer to no longer be willing to omit contraceptive' care from coverage. Id. As a result of the cancellation, Real Alternatives’ current health care plan does not qualify for grandfathered status. Id. ¶ 35. Real Alternatives alleges that “morally acceptable coverage” would be available for purchase if providing such coverage to Real Alternatives were legally permissible. Specifically, Real. Alternatives believes that the coverage would .be available if Real Alternatives received a court order permitting it to obtain such coverage. Id. ¶ 37. Real Alternatives further asserts that it desires to provide its full-time employees with health insurance in order to maintain a responsible business practice, as an essential employment benefit, and so employees will have a pro-life health insurance option. Id. ¶ 38. C. Plaintiffs Kevin I. Bagatta, Esq., Thomas A. Lang, Esq., and Clifford W. McKeown, Esq. Plaintiffs Kevin- I. Bagatta, Esq. (“Ba-gatta”), Thomas A. Lang, Esq. (“Lang”), and ■ Clifford W. McKeown, Esq. (“McKeown”) work for Real Alternatives (collectively the “Real Alternatives Employees”). They are, respectively, the President, Vice President of Operations and the Vice President of Administrations. Id. ¶¶ 7-9. They are the only full-time employees currently with Real Alternatives, and they aver that they share in the company’s beliefs concerning contraceptive drugs. Id. ¶¶ 33-34. Each employee receives health insurance coverage through Real Alternatives, as do their wives and a total of seven minor children, three of whom are female. Id. ¶ 39. - Bagatta and Lang are both' Catholic Christians. Id. ¶ 40. McKeown is án Evangelical Christian. Id. All of the Real Alternatives Employees claim moral as well as religious objections to participating in a health insurance' plan that provides coverage for services that they believe contradict their-religious values. Id. ¶¶ 45-46. They further believe that “part of God’s command to take card of one’s health includes maintaining health insurance,” id. ¶ 47, and therefore forcing the- Real Alternatives employees to participate in an objectionable health insurance plan “places numerous substantial burdens on the reli.gious beliefs .and exercise of each-individual employee.” Id. ¶ 48. II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiffs commenced this action with the filing of a Complaint on January 16, 2015, Doc. 1, challenging the constitutionality of the Contraceptive Mandate and the religious employer exemption under the Fifth Amendment, and asserting additional claims under the Administrative Procedure Act and Religious Freedom Restoration Act. In their first Count, Plaintiffs argue that the religious employer exemption imper-missibly treats certain religious organizations that object to complying with the Contraceptive Mandate differently than other similarly situated but non-religious organizations, such as Real Alternatives. Id. ¶¶ 136-40. This unequal treatment, according to Real Alternatives, “furthers no governmental interest and is not tailored to advance any governmental interest” and is thus in violation of - the Due Process Clause of .the Fifth -Amendment. Id. ¶¶ 142-43. Plaintiffs’ second Count alleges that the. Contraceptive Mandate is in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), because it is contrary to existing federal law, including the Weldon Amendment of the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, Die. A, Sec. 101, 122 Stat. 3574, 3575 (Sept. 30, 2008), the Church Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d), the Religious Freedom Restoration. Act, the ACA itself, and the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In their third Count, Real Alternatives Employees allege a substantial burden to their religious exercise in violation of Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, Plaintiffs seek judgment declaring the Contraceptive Mandate and its application to Plaintiffs to be a violation of the Fifth Amendment, the APA and Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Doc. 1, p. 39 ¶A. They further request a permanent injunction ordering Defendants to offer the religious employer exemption to organizations such as Real Alternatives; namely nonreligious, non-profit, pro-life organizations that hire employees who share their beliefs. Id. ¶ B. Plaintiffs also request a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from applying the Contraceptive Mandate to Plaintiffs and their insurers in any way that requires them to maintain coverage for services that contradict their moral and religious beliefs, or that penalizes them for not offering such coverage. Id. ¶ C. Finally, Plaintiffs also request injunctive relief for other pro-life groups, similarly situated but not before the Court, nominal damages, court costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees, and such other relief as the Court deems necessary. Id. ¶¶ D, E. On May 28, 2015, Defendants submitted the instant Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 27, along with supportive filings/ Docs. 28, 33, 34. In response, Plaintiffs submitted their own Motion for Summary Judgment on July 1, -2015. Doc. 29; Supportive filings' followed Plaintiffs’ submission- as well.-.Docs. 30, 35, '36. The Court- has- thus -had the- benefit of a full complement of -submissions, and the case is ripe for review. III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW A. Motion to Dismiss A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) contends that the complaint has failed to assert a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R.' Crv. P. 12(b)(6). In considering the motion, courts “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may'be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. Cnty. Of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n. 7 (3d Cir.2002)). To resolve'the motion, a court generally should consider only the allegation's in, the complaint, as well as “any matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, [and] items appearing in the record of the case.” Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir.2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In general, a'Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a). Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, “in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the-claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (alteration omitted)). While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss need not contain detailed factual allegations, it must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Tivombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). To survive a motion to dismiss, “a civil plaintiff must allege facts that ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level____’” Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir.2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Accordingly, to satisfy the plausibility standard, the complaint must indicate that the defendant’s liability is more than “a sheer possibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “Where' a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Under the two-pronged approach articulated in Twombly and later formalized in Iqbal, a district court must first identify all factual allegations that constitute nothing more than “legal conclusions” or “naked assertion[s].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Such allegations are “not entitled to the assumption of truth” and must be disregarded for purposes of resolving a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Next, the district court must identify “the ‘nub’ of the... complaint — the well-pleaded, non-conclusory factual allegation[s].” Id. at 680, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Taking these allegations as true, the district judge must then determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. See id. However, “a complaint may not be dismissed merely because it appears unlikely that the plaintiff can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on the merits.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at .231 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Rule 8 “‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” Id. at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). B. Motion for Summary Judgment Also applicable here is the standard of review pertaining to summary judgment motions. Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party establishes “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute, is “genuine” only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party, and a fact is “material” only if it might affect .the outcome of the action under the governing law. See Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 172 (3d Cir.2008) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A court should view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, and should not. evaluate credibility or weigh the evidence. See Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 772 (3d Cir.2013) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)). Initially, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. See id.- at 773 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Upon satisfaction of that burden, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings,-pointing, to' particular facts that evidence a genuine dispute, for trial. See id. In’advancing their positions, the parties must support their factual assertions by citing to specific parts of the record or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence- of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed, R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). A court should not grant summary judgment when there is a disagreement about the facts or the proper inferences that a factfinder could draw from them. See Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir.2010) (citing Peterson v. Lehigh Valley Dist. Council, 676 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir.1982)). Still, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary- judgment.” Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 211 (3d Cir.2011) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505) (internal quotation marks omitted). IV. DISCUSSION* The questions raised by the parties are matters of law,, and they have been fully briefed. There are no material factual disputes contained within the pleadings. Accordingly, the record is sufficient for a determination on the merits under the summary judgment standard, or, where reliance on the record is unnecessary, under the motion'to dismiss standard. A. Standing At the outset, Defendants argue that Plaintiff Real Alternatives lacks standing to bring the constitutional claims alleged in the instant suit. In order to- establish standing pursuant to Article III, Real Alternatives must allege an injury that is redressable by a favorable ruling from this Court. Defendants -argue that Real Alternatives has failed to do so because any redressability of its claim is- contingent upon the actions of a third party, its insurer.- Without independent proof that the insurer is willing to provide the requested coverage, and thus permit the redressability that Plaintiffs, seek, Defendants assert that Real Alternatives lacks standing to sue. For the reasons enumerated below, we disagree.' In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), the Supreme Court explained [o]ver the years, our cases have established thát the, irreducible constitutional mininuun of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact — an invasion of a legally protected . interest — Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the. conduct complained of.... Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.” The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976)). “At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury. . .may suffice,” but in response to a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must provide “specific facts” that establish standing by affidavit or other evidence, “which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true.” Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (citation omitted). The specific facts enumerated by Real Alternatives in regards to its alleged injury are as follows: due to the ACA’s Contraceptive - Mandate, it cannot provide a health insurance plan to its employees that conforms with its beliefs. As a result, Real Alternatives is forced to pay for a plan that provides coverage for contraceptive care, thereby creating the possibility that some of its funds may be diverted into paying for .this care, or else provide no insurance at all. Real .Alternatives neither requests nor receives health insurance from the government. Rather, it wishes to purchase health coverage that complies with its beliefs from a private insurer. As noted in the Factual Background, Real Alternatives alleges that a court order enjoining the Contraceptive Mandate would cause an insurer to craft and sell group health coverage that does not provide coverage for contraceptive services. Therefore, it asserts, a favorable ruling from this Court would indirectly provide Real Alternatives with the redress that it seeks. Doc. 1, ¶37. When, as argued here, “[t]he existence of one or more of the essential elements of standing ‘depends on the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to control , or to predict,’.. .it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in such a manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal citations omitted). “When*'the plaintiff is not himself the object of' the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded,” but is ordinarily “substantially more difficult to establish.” Id. As evidence of the likelihood of redress-ability, Plaintiffs point to the specific past practice of Real Alternatives’ insurer. Until 2014, that insurance provider supplied Real Alternatives with a plan that omitted 'the objected-to services. Plaintiffs allege that because of.the requirements instituted by the ACA, however, the insurance provider was no longer willing to omit those services from coverage. Doc. 1 ¶ 36. Plaintiffs present “uncontested evidence that they specifically and successfully negotiated with their insurer to sell them a morally acceptable plan until the mandate came along, and thus that the insurer would ‘ do so again”’ were this Court to hold the Contraceptive Mandate inapplicable to Plaintiffs. Doc. 35, p. 4. In arguing that the Plaintiffs’ averment alone, without specific proof supplied by the insurer, is sufficient to establish standing, Plaintiffs point to Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 122 S.Ct. 2191, 153 L.Ed.2d 453 (2002). There, the Supreme Court held that the state of Utah had standing to challenge a census counting method that allegedly caused it to lose a Congressional Seat in the House of Representatives. However, a favorable ruling on the. merits would have only caused the Secretary of Commerce to generate a new report of the results of the census, the results of which were at that time • unknown. The ruling would not immediately cause the reassignment of the Congressional Seat. The Court determined thát a favorable ruling would constitute “a change in a legal status,.. and the practical consequence of that change would amount to a significant increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff would obtain relief that directly redresses the injury suffered.” Id. at 464, 122 S.Ct. 2191. This significant increase caused the Court to find that the Plaintiff, Utah, had established standing. Plaintiffs here argue that, as in Utah, an injunction preventing the government from enforcing the contraceptive coverage requirement against Real Alternatives’ insurance provider would result in a change of legal status. That change would, according to Plaintiffs, greatly increase the chance that the provider would supply insurance of the sort that complies with Plaintiffs’ beliefs. Admittedly, the causal link between a favorable ruling and the ultimate procurement of redressability for Plaintiffs here is more attenuated than that described in Utah v. Evans. However, given that the provider was willing to provide the sort of insurance Plaintiffs desire before the Contraceptive Mandate was enforced, we find Plaintiffs’ evidence persuasive. Furthermore, there are other insurance providers in Pennsylvania that already supply similarly acceptable plans to organizations currently either covered by grandfathered plans or that fall within the exemption for houses of worship as described above. It is therefore likely that. either Real Alternatives’ original insurer or another would provide the same service again were the Contraceptive Mandate determined to be inapplicable to Real Alternatives. • Defendants call our attention to Annex Medical, Inc. v. Burwell, 769 F.3d 578, (8th Cir.2014), a case with similar facts to those presented here. There, plaintiffs were required to supply proof from their insurer that it would be willing to provide insurance as requested if an injunction were granted. There, the Eighth Circuit held that plaintiffs lacked standing due to a failure to provide this proof. Wé find the facts in Annex distinguishable from those here on two key grounds. First, the plaintiffs insurer in Annex had not been willing to provide plaintiffs with the desired insurance plan, even before the Contraceptive Mandate required coverage for contraceptive services. Annex, 769 F.3d at 582. Regarding whether the insurer would be willing to do so in the future, the court noted that “[w]hat few indications appear on the record are to the contrary.” Id. In contrast, Plaintiffs here have submitted proof of their insurer’s past willingness to provide a suitable group health plan and there are no indications that the insurer would be unwilling to do so in the future. We find the second differentiating factor in Annex to be that “the pleadings and record contain[ed] no indication any Minnesota health insurer [was] willing, but for the mandate, to sell a plan allowing a small employer such as Annex to prohibit coverage for a handful of-healthcare products and services.” Id. However, here, Plaintiffs allege that “Real Alternatives could have multiple vendors to choose from if it obtained injunctive relief.” Doc. 29, p. 14. They point out that the government’s own regulations allow insurers to sell coverage that omits contraceptive care to churches in Pennsylvania. Id. Thus, were they to attain a favorable ruling from this Court, it is appropriate to conclude that Real Alternatives could purchase a contraceptive-free plan from these providers just like any church.. In another ease with facts similar to those of the instant scenario, the same court distinguished its ruling in Anne stand arrived at a similar conclusion. In Wieland v. United States Department of Health and Human Services, 793 F.3d 949, 957 (8th Cir.2015), the Eighth Circuit held that “it is more than merely speculative that the [plaintiffs’] injury would be redressed if they were granted the injunctive relief they seek — Before the threatened enforcement of the Mandate, the State and [insurer] were willing to offer the [plaintiff] a contraceptive-free healthcare plan, which is persuasive evidence that they would do so again if the [plaintiffs] obtain their requested* "relief.” Wieland, 793 F.3d at 957 (overturning the district court ruling that the plaintiffs' lacked standing). Defendants argue that Wieland is inapplicable because it-was decided on a motion to dismiss and not under, the more strenuous standard of summary judgment. As noted above, in response to a summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs must allege specific facts and not mere conclusory allegations. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. We disagree with Defendants and find the specific proof that Plaintiffs submitted verifying that they obtained a policy in accordance with their beliefs pri- or to the Contraceptive Mandate’s enforcement sufficient to satisfy the summary judgment standard. While it is true that evidence that Plaintiffs were able to secure coverage in the past does not conclusively show that Plaintiffs would be able, to secure it again in the future, Plaintiffs need not present conclusive evidence. They need only show that it is likely that they would be able to obtain the insurance they desire. Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. We conclude that they have met this burden and that Real Alternatives has established standing to bring its constitutional claim. B. Substantive Claims Having established Real Alternatives’ standing to sue, we how turn to the substantive arguments of this case. As afore-stated, no factual issues exist that would •prevent the'parties from receiving summary júdgment, and we shall now consider their arguments on the merits. 1. Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Claim Plaintiffs argue that the Contraceptive Mandate violates Real Alternatives’ right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment; They assert that the Mandate’s exemption’ for religious employers makes an impermissible distinction between employers that object to contraceptives on moral or philosophical grounds, and employers that object on religious grounds. The distinction, Plaintiffs argue, has no.rational relationship to.a legitimate government interest. Doc. 1, ¶ 2. For the following reasons, we . disagree. a. Applicable Standard While the Fifth Amendment contains no express equal protection guarantee, “the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits the federal government from engaging in discrimination that is ‘so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.’ ” Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir.2001) (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500 n. 3, 95 S.Ct. 572, 42 L.Ed.2d 610 (1975)). Thus, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment to contain a guarantee of equal protection. Id. (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991)). To prevail on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must show that “the government has treated it differently from a similarly situated party and that the government’s explanation for the differing treatment ‘does not satisfy the relevant level of scrutiny.’ ” Muwekma Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar, 708 F.3d 209, 215 (D.C.Cir.2013) (quoting Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1102 (D.D.C. 2008)). “Statutes that substantially burden a fundamental right or target a suspect class must be reviewed under ^strict .scrutiny....’” Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 317 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982)). However, if a statute neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, “it does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, as incorporated through the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, so long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate end.” Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996)). In the instant' case, the parties concur that the relevant level of scrutiny is rational basis review. Real Alternatives avers that it is “not incorporated as a religious entity, does not hold itself out as religious, and has not adopted any religious views or positions.” Doc. 1, 1117. As noted above, Real Alternatives’ objections to the contraceptive care imposed on its health insurance plan by the Mandate are purely “moral,” and “based on science, reason, and non-religious philosophical principles.” Id. ¶ 18. As such, the Contraceptive Mandate does not burden a fundamental right held by Real Alternatives, and Real Alternatives does not belong to a suspect class. See Hassan v. N.Y.C., 804 F.3d 277, 298-99 (3d Cir.2015) (discussing suspect classifications). We thus concur that rational basis review applies. ■ : [11,12] “Under rational-basis review in an equal protection context, ‘a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.’ ” U.S. v. Pollard, 326 F.3d 397, 407 (3d Cir.2003) (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993)). Rational basis review is extremely deferential to the government. “Under rational basis review, legislation enjoys a presumption of validity, and the plaintiff must negate every conceivable justification for the classification in order to prove that the classification is wholly irrational.” Brian B. v. Pa.Dep’t of Educ., 230 F.3d 582, 586 (3d- Cir.2000); see Lehn-hausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 35 L.Ed.2d 351 (1973) (“[T]he burden is on the one attaching the legislative arrangement.....”). Thus, Plaintiffs, have a. difficult hurdle to overcome, However, a reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court-is powerless to affirm the- administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis. To do so would propel the court into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1760, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947). b. Defendants’ First Justification Fails Rational Basis Review Here, , the administrative agencies ¡responsible for the ACA. classify and provide an exemption for religious employers that other employers do not enjoy. Real Alternatives argues that- the distinct treatment for religious employers bears no rational relationship to a legitimate, government interest. The Departments of Labor, Treasury and the HHS, however, give two reasons for classifying -religious employers separately. The first is that [hjouses of worship and them integrated auxiliaries that object to contraceptive coverage on religious grounds are more likely than other employers to employ people of the same faith who share the same objection, and who would therefore be less likely than other people to use contraceptive services even if such services were covered under their plan. 78 Fed. Reg. 39,874-75 (July 2, 2013). Because it is simply inaccurate, we concur with Plaintiffs that this first justification fails rational basis review. Though non-precedential, March for Life v. Burwell, No. 14-cv-1149, 128 F.Supp.3d 116, 2015 WL 5139099 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2015), deals with facts that bear a striking resemblance to those presented in the instant case. There, Judge Leon of the District Court for the District of Columbia determined that the Departments’ justification fails rational basis, review because it is simply counter factual. See March for Life, 128 F.Supp.3d at 127, 2015 WL 5139099, at *6 (the Departments have “erred..\in assuming that this trait is unique to such organizations. It is not.”). We agree. Simply put, there are other employers more likely than religious.^employers to hire people who share an objection to contraceptive coverage. For example, any employer, religious or not, who discourages the use of contraceptive care and actively seeks to: employ those who share its objections would be moré likely to hire employees who do not want to use contraceptive care than employers who are merely religious. Indeed, this déscriptión neatly matches Real Alternatives. In its reasoning, the Departments mistakenly conflate faith with an aversion to contraceptive care. There are many religious institutions and practitioners of religious faith who nonetheless condone certain uses of contraceptive care. Likewise, there are many non-religious employers, like Real Alternatives,. that do not subscribe to a particular faith.but adamantly discourage the use of contraceptives. As Judge Leon points out, under this justification “it is not the belief or non-belief- in God that warrants safe harbor from the Mandate. The characteristic that warrants protection [is] an employment relationship based in part on a shared objection to abortifacients____” March for Life, 128 F.Supp.3d at. 126-27, 2015 WL 5139099, at *6. That characteristic is displayed by Real Alternatives, and if this were Defendants’ sole rationale for the classification, Real Alternatives’ Fifth Amendment claim would succeed. c. Defendants’ Second Justification Survives Rational Basis . Review However, the Defendants provide another justification for the classification. The Departments explain that the religious employer exemption exists due to “the effect on the religious beliefs of certain religious employers if coverage of contraceptive services were required in the group health plans in which employees in certain religious positions participate.” 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,624 (Aug. 3, 2011). The' Departments also note that the exemption exists “to respect the religious interests of houses of worship and their integrated auxiliaries.” 78 Fed. Reg. 39,874-75 (July 2, 2013). Finally, the Departments state them concern that .“[ijncluded coverage of contraceptive services could impinge upon the religious freedom of certain religious employers.” 76 Fed. Reg. 46,624 (Aug. 3, 2011). These three statements combine to express an idea that is paramount to this Court’s analysis today. The effect of the Contraceptive Mandate upon religious beliefs, respect for religious groups, and the valúe of religious freedom are all central to the Departments’ rationale in crafting the exemption. These words stand for an ideal that is of predominant importance to lawmaking in the United States. Indeed, it occupies a prominent role in the. Constitution itself. For the reasons expressed below, we hold that the Departments have sufficiently articulated a legitimate interest in< protecting religious freedom, and the Contraceptive Mandate and its exemption therefore survive rational basis review, i. Religious Freedom Constitutes a Legitimate Governmental Interest In March for Life, Judge Leon . cogently explains that the issue at hand is not whether the plaintiffs are the same as religious employers, but whether they are similarly situated. March for Life, 128 F.Supp.3d at 125-26, 2015 WL 5139099, at *5. While he is correct in discerning that the two are similarly situated in their beliefs regarding the Contraceptive Mandate and contraceptive care, id., it is not by them, beliefs that the Departments have elected to differentiate the two. Rather, it is by the foundations for those beliefs. Where objections to the Contraceptive Mandate are.grounded in religious views, courts and the legislature alike have held that accommodation is warranted. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2786 (“[N]o person may be restricted or demeaned in exercising his or her religion.”). In support of this view, a vast history of legislative protections exists to safeguard religious- freedom. Moral philosophies, however, have been historically unable to enjoy the5 same privileged state. See Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 2015 WL 5692512 (D.C.Cir. May 20, 2015) (statement of Kavanaugh, J., dissenting'from the denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasizing that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act '“does not provide protection to philosophical, policy, political or personal beliefs”). Though large, organized secular belief systems have been gaining protected treatment as well, see Center for Inquiry v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk, 758 F.3d 869 (7th Cir.2014), the majority of precedent continues to support preferential treatment for religion under the law, without explicitly extending that treatment to include secular beliefs. Certainly, no legislative or judicial ruling has as of yet declared a moral belief such as that espoused , by Real Alternatives to be entitled to. accommodations historically provided to religion with the exception of March for Life. In Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987), the. Supreme Court reasoned that- Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act, which allows religious-organizations to engage in discriminatory employment practices on the basis of religion, does not violate the equal protection doctrine. There, plaintiffs argued that the government impermissibly distinguished between religious and secular employers. The Court found there, as we do now, that the classification was “rationally related to the legitimate purpose of alleviating significant interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 339, 107 S.Ct. 2862. The Court further emphasized that, to be enforceable under the law, “[rjeligious accommodations. . .need not ‘come packaged with benefits to secular entities.’ ” Id. Real Alternatives argues that this rationale does not appear in the Departments’ record as a justification for the exemption. It states that “the government has not said churches must be exempt as a matter of religious freedom.” This is an egregious misstatement. Page 46,624 of the Federal Register explains that commenters drew the Departments’ attention to the issue that “included coverage of contraceptive services could impinge upon the religious freedom of religious employers.” 76 Fed. Reg. 46,624 (Aug. 3, 2011) (emphasis added). The ensuing amendments which directed the HRSA to draft the religious employer exemption were provided specifically “to allow HRSA the discretion to accommodate, in a balanced way,.. these commenter concerns.” Id. While perhaps not as succinctly expressed as this Court would like, this language nohetheless indicates the Departments’ real concerns over religious freedom, and, contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, emphasizes respect for religious missions as a justification for the distinct and separate classification of religious employers. Additionally, Real Alternatives suggests that Amos does not apply because plaintiffs there “tried to negate the religious group exemption, not expand it.” Doc. 29, p. 24. It is true that Real Alternatives argues that it too should benefit , from the exemption, and not, as the Amos plaintiffs argued, that the exemption should not apply at all. However, the overarching argument — that the exemption impermissibly violates the equal protection doctrine of the Fifth Amendment — is identical. Further, while Plaintiffs request that the exemption be expanded to apply to Real Alternatives, they also request a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from applying the Contraceptive Mandate to Plaintiffs and their insurers in any way that requires them to maintain coverage for services that contradict their beliefs. Doc. 1, p. 40 ¶ B. By enjoining the Contraceptive Mandate, the exemption would be moot, thus negating, it in the .same way that' the Amos plaintiffs requested. The parity of this result, and the identical analysis involved in each case,, therefore makes the holding in Amos applicable here. A Third -Circuit case that the parties failed to reference in their briefings is also instructive. In Wilkins v. Penns Grove-Carneys Point Regional School District, 123 Fed.Appx. 493 (3d Cir.2005), the Penns Grove-Carneys Point Regional School District adopted a mandatory school uniform policy, with an exemption for objections based on sincerely held religious beliefs. Wilkins, 123 Fed.Appx. at 494. Sherrie Wilkins, an Atheist, alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, sought, and was denied a uniform exemption for her two children. As we too must ask, the Third Circuit there inquired “whether the religious exemption to the school uniform policy is a rational mean's of achieving a legitimate state end.” Id. at 495. Citing Amos, our Court of Appeals held that “[t]he religious exemption is rationally drawn to further the legitimate interest in accommodating stüdents’ free exercise of religion....” Id: There, as here, protecting free exercise rights- constitutes a legití-mate government concern that overcomes rational basis review. ii. Plaintiffs’ Reliance on Center for Inquiry is Misplaced Plaintiffs allege that March for Life and Center for Inquiry v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk, 758 F.3d 869 (7th Cir.2014), argue against the ’ stance we take here today. Plaintiffs are correct' in their analysis of March for Life. However, for- the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ reliance on Center for Inquiry is misplaced.’ March for Life and Center for Inquiry take similar positions, as they both hold that “religiosity ‘cannot be a complete answer’ where... two groups with a shared attribute are similarly situated ‘in everything except a belief in a deity.’ ” March for Life, 128 F.Supp.3d at 127 n. 8, 2015, WL 5139099, at *6 n. 8 (quoting Ctr. For Inquiry, 758 F.3d at 872). We understand and appreciate the cogent points that those thoughtful opinions draw with respect t.o this difficult issue. However, at the outset we emphasize that both opinibns are nonbinding on this Court, and that Judge Easterbrook’s rationale in Center for Inquiry, though persuasive, may well ran afoul of Supreme Court precedent. See generally, Amos, 483 U.S. 327 at 338-39, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (“[rjeligious accommodations... need not ’come packaged with benefits to secular entities’ ”). Judge Leon chose to extend Judge Easter* brook’s persuasive reasoning over the facts presented in March for Life. However, as with Plaintiffs, we feel that Judge Leon’s reliance upon Judge Easterbrook’s rationale in Center for Inquiry is misplaced. Center for Inquiry is rightly distinguishable from the .facts at hand. Though we do not .question the sincerely held beliefs of the Plaintiffs, we detect a. difference in the “philosophical views” espoused by Real Alternatives, and the “secular moral system[s],. .equivalent to religion except for non-belief in God” that Judge Easterbrook describes in Center for Inquiry, 758 F.3d at 873. There, the Seventh Circuit references organized groups of people who subscribe to. belief systems such as Atheism, Shintoism, Jan-ism, Buddhism, and secular humanism, all of which “are situated similarly to religions in everything except belief in a deity.” Id. at 872. These systems are organized, full, and provide a comprehensive code by which individuals may guide their daily activities. Here, in stark contrast, we. confront only. Real Alternatives’ mission statement — a brief, single sentence explaining that Real Alternatives is a business which “exists to provide life-affirming alternatives to abortion services throughout the nation.” Doc. 1, ¶ 30. Though based on moral beliefs, this single mission statement is not “equivalent to religion.” Ctr. for Inquiry, 758 F.3d at 873. It does not provide a comprehensive code to guide individuals in their day-to-day life challenges. It does not operate to fill the same position in one’s mind that religion can occupy. More akin to a political position with moral underpinnings than a coherent ideology, Real Alternatives’ single mission statement is simply not comparable to a philosophic belief system such as Janism or Buddhism, which Judge Easter-brook-argues cannot be distinguished from religion based on the absence of a belief in a deity alone. Real Alternatives’ belief, however, can and will be distinguished here today. Like the Seventh Circuit, Judge Leon similarly asserts that “religiosity ‘cannot be a complete answer’ where...two groups with a shared attribute are similarly situated ‘in everything except a belief in a deity.’ ” March for Life, 128 F.Supp.3d at 127 n. 8, 2015 WL 5139099, at *6 n. 8 (quoting Ctr. For Inquiry, 758 F.3d at 872) (emphasis added). The first characteristic noted by Judge Leon is satisfied — here, we have two groups. The second characteristic is also satisfied, as the two groups do indeed share an attribute — their aversion to contraceptives. But the analysis breaks down when we ask whether the third characteristic, whether these two groups are similarly situated in everything, except belief in a deity, has been met. They are not. They share only one, albeit vehemently held, opinion. In every other respect they are different. Real Alternatives is an employer, a company, and not a belief system like those referenced above, and its single mission statement cannot guide believers comprehensively throughout life as a religion can. For - this reason, we feel that Center for Inquiry’s rationale, is not applicable to the instant facts. Thus, Judge Leon’s reliance on Center for Inquiry shall not be duplicated here. iii. Deleterious Effects if Singular Statements of Morality Were Held Akin to Religion If we presume that Judges Easterbrook and Leon are correct,in holding certain moral philosophies on par with religion, we emphasize that Plaintiffs’ reasoning should still fail today. Allowing adherence to a single moral belief, even one with philosophical underpinnings, to ' be indistinguishable from religion or an entire moral creed such as Atheism or Buddhism leads us down a slippery slope. If a singular moral view cannot be distinguished here, where else will such a classification fail? This is but one small inclusion — that moral, as, well as religious employers with objections to contraceptive care should have an exemption. But many exemptions exist for religious groups and philosophic groups alike in order to respect their religious freedom, doctrines and missions. As Judge Leon notes, if an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are , purely ethical or moral in source and content.. .those beliefs, certainly occupy.in the life of that individual a place parallel to that filled by God in traditionally religious persons. Recognizing the role morality plays in the lives of citizens, courts prohibit regulatory ‘distinctions between religious and secular beliefs that hold the same place in adherents’ lives. March for Life, 128 F.Supp.3d at 127-28, 2015 WL 5139099, at *6 (quoting Welsh v. U.S. 398 U.S. 333, 340, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 26 L.Ed.2d 308 (1970)). A finding such' as that which Plaintiffs would have us make today ultimately leads to an all or none scenario: either the determination that any singular moral objection to a law that contains religious exemptions also has standing, or else that all such exemptions should fail. We find support for this extended analysis in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005). There, the Supreme Court reversed a Sixth Circuit decision that would have invalidated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) as “impermissibly advancing religion by giving greater protection to religious rights than other constitutionally protected rights.” Cutter, 544 U.S. at 724, 125 S.Ct. 2113. The Supreme Court stressed that the “[wjere the Court of Appeals’ view the correct reading of our decisions, all manner of religious accommodations would fall. Congressional permission for members of the military to wear religious apparel while in uniform would fail,” along with other accommodations, such as the provision of chaplains for inmates, and allowances for “prisoners to assemble for worship, but not for political rallies.” Id. Though Cutter focused primarily on whether RLUIPA violated the Establishment Clause, and did not involve a Fifth Amendment concern, we nonetheless find the Court’s analysis instructive here in that finding a singular moral objection to law on par with a religious objection suggests that a watershed of similar objections may follow, d. Conclusions Pursuánt to Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment Claim Ultimately, we do not, and need not, decide whether philosophic creeds should obtain standing akin to religion in the eyes of the law. Rather, we reject Plaintiffs’ argument and conclude that Real Alternatives’ objection to contraceptive care does not similarly situate it to religious employers with religious objections to the Contraceptive Mandate. Further, the government’s stated interest in protecting religious freedom, which this non-religious employer is not entitled to, serves a legitimate, government purpose. No one can question that religious groups are placed upon a pedestal of protection by this nations’ law makers. See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 677 (7th Cir.2013) (acknowledging that the religious-liberty doctrine as expounded by the RFRA “ ‘gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations as religious organizations, respecting their autonomy to shape their own missions, conduct them own ministries, and generally govern themselves in accordance with their own doctrines.... ’ ”). The Contraceptive Mandate, without the religious exemption, would run headlong into such legislative protections for religion. It would not survive the confrontation. Similar protections do- not, and should not, exist for singular moral objections, and arguably do not yet exist for objections grounded in' overarching moral philosophies. Thus the Departments, in drafting the Contraceptive Mandate, had no reason to treat groups that espouse these views as equivalents to religion. The long history of precedent supporting respect for and deference to religious freedom as a legitimate government interest supports the Departments’ classification. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 334, 107 S.Ct. 2862 (“This Court has long recognized that the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices” (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144-45, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987))); Wilkins, 123 Fed.Appx. at 495. As such, the Departments’ decision is certainly not “wholly irrational,” as a classification must be in order to wither under Fifth Amendment scrutiny. Brian B. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 230 F.3d 582, 586 (3d Cir.2000). Nor is the discrimination between religious employers and non-religious employers “so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.” Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500, 95 S.Ct. 572, 42 L.Ed.2d 610 (1975). Rather, accommodation for religious beliefs has long been a pillar of our legal foundation, and if it is to be torn down, it is not the role of this District Court to, do so today. 2. Claims Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act In a claim similar to Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment violation allegation, Plaintiffs allege that the Contraceptive Mandate is arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Plaintiffs also allege that the Contraceptive Mandate is contrary to existing federal law, including the Weldon Amendment of the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act of" 2009, Pub. L. 110-329, Die. A, Sec. 101,122 Stat. 3574, 3575 (Sept: 30, 2008), the Church Amendment,