United States v. Maricopa (151 F. Supp. 3d 998, 2015)

ORDER

Honorable Roslyn O. Silver, Senior United States District Judge

Before the Court are, the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment (Doc. 332, 334, 345).

BACKGROUND

I. The Parties

Plaintiff the United States brought the present action alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination against Latinos in Maricopa County, Arizona by Defendants Joseph M. Arpaio (“Arpaio”) and Maricopa County in violation of the Constitution and federal statutes. Defendant Arpaio is the Sheriff of Maricopa County and.heads the Maricopa County Sheriffs Office (“MCSO”). As MCSO’s chief officer, Ar-paio directs law enforcement throughout Maricopa County. He is responsible for MCSO’s policies and operations, which include all facets of policing and prison administration. MCSO is a subdivision of Maricopa County. Maricopa County’s primary governing body is the Board of Supervisors (the “Board”).- The Board consists of five Supervisors, each of .whom is elected from one of Maricopa County’s five districts. Maricopa County determines the budgets and provides the funding for its subdivisions, including municipal courts, public . schools, and law enforcement (i.e.MCSO).' Maricopa County receives federal financial assistance from the United States, which it distributes to various county subdivisions, including MCSO.

II. The Prior Litigation: Melendres v. Arpaio

In 2007, private individual plaintiffs initiated a class action lawsuit against Arpaio, MCSO, and Maricopa County, alleging MCSO officers engaged in racial discrimination against Latinos “under the guise of enforcing, immigration law.” Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, 836 F.Supp.2d 959, 969 (D.Ariz.2011), aff'd sub nom. Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990 (9th Cir.2012) (hereinafter “Melendres”). The case focused on “saturation patrols,” which were described as “crime suppression sweeps” in which officers saturate a given area and target persons who appeared to be Latino for investigation of their immigration status. (2:07-CV-02513-GMS, Doc. 26 at 10). Jose, de Jesus Ortega-Melendres, the named plaintiff, was stopped in his vehicle by members of the MCSO’s Human Smuggling Unit and detained without probable cause while officers investigated his immigration status, along with those of his passengers. Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F.Supp.2d 822, 880 (D.Ariz.2013); (2:07-CV-02513-GMS, Doc. 26 at 17). The certified class of plaintiffs ¿ncompassed “[a]ll Latino persons who,' since January 2007, have been or will be in the future stopped, detained, questioned or searched by [the defendants’] agents while driving or sitting in a vehicle on a public roadway or parking area in. Maricopa .County, Arizona,’.’ Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir.2012). See also Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, 836 F.Supp.2d 959, 994 (D.Ariz. 2011).

In May 2009, Maricopa County requested a stay pending the outcome of the United States’ investigation of Arpaio’s practices, which had begun one month earlier. The United States opposed 'the motion, as did Arpaio, and the court denied the stay due to the timing and uncertainty regarding the outcome of the United States’ investigation. Melendres v. Maricopa Cnty., No. 07-CV-02513, 2009 WL 2515618, at *4 (D.Ariz. Aug. 13, 2009). Over the course of the Melendres litigation, the United States requested deposition transcripts and filed motions for protective orders regarding discovery.' It also sought to transfer a 2010 Title VI enforcement action to the Melendres court.

In October 2009, the Melendres court granted a joint motion and stipulation to dismiss Maricopa County without prejür dice. (2:07-CV-02513-GMS, Doc. 194). The stipulation stated, “Defendant Marico-pa County is not a necessary party at this juncture for obtaining the complete relief sought.” (2:07-CV-02513-GMS, Doc.178).

On May 24, 2013, the Melendres,court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F.Supp.2d 822 (D.Ariz.2013) (“Melendres Order”). The court held MCSO’s “saturation patrols all involved using traffic stops as a pretext to detect those- occupants .of automobiles who may be in this country without authorization,” id. at 826, and “MCSO’s use of Hispanic ancestry or race as a factor in forming reasonable suspicion that persons have violated stateriáws relating to immigration status violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 899y The court also found MCSO conducted discriminatory traffic stops outside of saturation patrols. Id. at 844-845, 889-890. The Melendres Order enjoined MCSO from “using Hispanic ancestry or race as [a] factor in making law enforcement decisions pertaining to whether a person is authorized to be in the country, and [ ] unconstitutionally lengthening [vehicle] stops.” Id. at 827.

After thé ruling; the United States filed a statement of interest concerning potential forms of relief. On October 2, 2013, the court issued its Supplemental Permanent Injunction/Judgment Order. Melen-dres v. Arpaio, No. CV-07-02513-PHX-GMS, 2013 WL 5498218, at *1 (D.Ariz. Oct. 2, 2013) (“Supplemental Order”). The order permanently enjoined Defendants from: 1) “[detaining, holding or arresting Latino occupants of vehicles in Maricopa County based on a reasonable belief, without more, that such ' persons are in the country without authorization”; 2) “[u]sing race or' Latino ancestry as a factor in deciding whether to stop any vehicle” or in deciding whether a vehicle occupant was in the United' States Without authorization; (3) “[detaining Latino occupants of vehicles stopped for traffic violations for a period longer than reasonably necessary to resolve the .traffic violation in the absence of reasonable suspicion that any of the vehicle’s occupants have committed or are committing a violation of federal or state criminal law”; (4) “[d]etaining;. holding or arresting'Latino, occupants of a vehicle . i. for violations of the Arizona Human Smuggling- Act without a reasonable basis for believing the necessary -elements of the crime are present”; and (5). “[detaining, arresting or holding persons based on a reasonable suspicion that they are conspiring with their employer to violate the Arizona Employer Sanctions Act'.” Id. The Supplemental Order also contained numerous provisions regarding the implementation of bias-free policing, including standards for- bias-free detention- and arrest policies and training, as well-as detailed policies and procedures for ensuring and reviewing MCSO’s .compliance with the Melendres Order. The procedures included the appointment of an independent monitor to report on Arpaio and MCSO’s compliance and collection of traffic stop data. Id.

Arpaio and MCSO appealed the Melen-dres Order and the Supplemental Order (collectively, the “Melendres injunction”), challenging provisions which addressed non-saturation patrol activities and arguing the evidence was insufficient -to sustain the district court’s conclusion that Arpaio and MCSO’s unconstitutional policies extended beyond the context of saturation patrols.. Melindres v. Apraio, No. 13-16285, Opening Brief of Defendant/Appellant Arpaio, Doc. 32-1, at 2, 13-15, 17-18 (March 17, 2014). MCSO also argued it was . not a proper party in the. case. Id.

On April 15, 2015, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion holding MCSO was not a proper party because it is a non-jural entity lacking separate legal status from Mari-copa County. Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir.2015). The Ninth Circuit ordered Maricopa County substituted as a party in lieu of MCSO. Id. at 1260. But the court also stated, “[o]n remand, the district court may consider dismissal of Sheriff Arpaio in his official capacity because ‘an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.’ ” Id. In addition, the court held the Melendres injunction was not overbroad because it applied to activities beyond saturation patrols: “Although the evidence largely addressed [the] use of race during saturation patrols, the district court did not clearly err in finding [Arpaio’s] policy applied across-the-board to all law enforcement decisions — not just those made during saturation patrols.” Id. However, the court found the requirements for the independent monitor “to consider the ‘disciplinary outcomes for any violations of departmental policy* and to assess whether Deputies are. subject to ‘civil suits or .criminal charges ... for off-duty conduct” were not narrowly tailored and ordered the district court “to tailor [these provisions] to address only the constitutional violations at issue.” Id. at 1267.

III. The Litigation Before This Court: U.S. v. Maricopa County

' On March 10, 2009, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) sent Ar-paio a letter notifying him it was commencing an investigation of his office. (Doc. 333-3 at 6). Over a year later, on August 3, 2010, DOJ issued a “Notice of noncompliance with the obligation to cooperate with the Department of Justice investigation pursuant to. Title VI of. the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” (Doc. 333-3 at 9) (“Notice Letter”). Although the Notice Letter appears to have been mailed only to counsel for MCSO, counsel for Maricopa County responded to it. (Doc. 333-3 at 9). On August 12, 2010, Maricopa County’s private counsel wrote to the United States to express Maricopa County’s “desire[ ] to cooperate in any way possible with the [United States’] investigation referenced in the Notice Letter,” emphasizing, “[a]s a recipient of Title VI funds, Maricopa County believes it has an obligation to cooperate.” Id. Maricopa County offered to use its subpoena power to procure documents in aid of DOJ’s investigation. Id. at 10. The letter also stated Maricopa County would “[notify] MCSO that it [could] not expend any public funds, including-on outside counsel, to resist any DOJ Title VI inquiry,” and that “Maricopa County [would] not pay those bills as resisting a Title VI inquiry is outside the scope of the employment of any elected or appointed official.” Id.

On December 15, 2011, DOJ sent Mari-copa County Attorney Bill Montgomery (“Montgomery”) a 22-page letter notifying him of the investigation into MCSO and announcing “the findings of the Civil Rights Division’s .investigation into civil rights violations by the [MCSO].” (Doc. 333-2 at 2) (“Findings Letter”). The Findings Letter did not reference Marico-pa County, specifically. Montgomery immediately responded that DOJ had “noticed the wrong party.!’ (Doc. 33373 at 12). On January 17, 2012, DOJ responded it would continue to include. Maricopa County in all correspondence because its “investigation potentially. affect[ed] Mari-copa County as the conduit of federal financial assistance to MCSO.” (Doc. 333-3 at 14).

On May 9, 2012, DOJ advised Maricopa County:

[I]n accordance with the: notice requirements set forth in DOJ’s Title VI regulations, 42 C.F.R; § 108(d)(3), it is. the intention of the Department of Justice to file a civil action against Maricopa Coun- - ty, the Maricopa County Sheriffs Office, and Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio in order to remedy the serious Constitutional and federal law violations, including noncompliance with Title VI, as noted in our December 15, 201[1] ■ Findings Letter.

(Doc. 333-3 at 25). The following day, the United States filed a complaint in this Court, - outlining six claims for 'relief against Arpaio, MCSO, and Maricopa County:

(1) Intentional discrimination on the basis of race, color or national origin in violation of the Violent Crime. Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C.- § 14141 (“Section 14141”) and the Due Process and Equal' Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

(2) Unreasonable searches, arrests and detentions lacking probable cause or reasonable suspicion in violation of Section 14141 and the Fourth Amendment.

(3) Disparate impact and intentional discrimination on the basis of race, color or national origin in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§: 2000d-2000d~7 (“Title VI”).

(4) Disparate impact and' intentional discrimination against limited English proficient (“LEP”) Latino prisoners in violation of Title VI.

(5) Disparate impact and intentional discrimination in violation of Defendants’ contractual assurances under Title. VI.

(6) Retaliation against .Defendants’ critics in violation of Section 14141 and the First Amendment.

(Doc. 1).

Arpaio, MCSO, and Maricopa County moved to dismiss.. On December 12, 2012, the Court denied Maricopa County’s motion and granted Arpaio and MCSO’s motion in part. (Doc. 56). MCSO was dismissed from the case based on the Arizona Court of Appeals decision, Braillard v. Maricopa County, which held MCSO is a non-jural entity, lacking the capacity to sue and be sued. 224 Ariz. 481, 487, 232 P.3d 1263 (Ariz.Ct.App.2010).

The remaining parties proceeded with discovery. The United States and Arpaio now each move for partial summary judgment. (Doc. 332, 345). Maricopa County moves for summary judgment on all claims. (Doc. 334).

ANALYSIS

I. Legal Standard

Under Rule 56, summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A fact is material when, under governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); United States v. Kapp, 564 F.3d 1103, 1114 (9th Cir.2009). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The moving party can satisfy this burden in two ways: either (1) by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating the nonmoving party failed to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case on which the nonmoving party bears.the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23, 106 S:Ct. 2548. “Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not .preclude a grant of summary judgment.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.1987).

Once the moving party establishes the absence of genuine disputes of material fact, 'the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth facts showing a genuine dispute remains. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party cannot oppose a properly supported summary’ judgment motion by “resting] on mere allegations. or .denials of his pleadings.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The party opposing summary judgment must also establish the admissibility of the evidence on which it relies. Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir.2002) (a court deciding summary judgment motion “can only consider admissible evidence”); see also Beyene v. Coleman Sec. Services, Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir.1988) (“It is well settled that only admissible evidence may be considered by the trial court in ruling ón a motion for summary judgment.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, 2010 Advisory Committee Notes (“The burden is on the proponent to show- that the material is admissible as presented or to explain the admissible form that is anticipated.”).

‘ When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must' view every inference drawn from the Underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 601, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The court does not make credibility determinations with'respect to evidence offered. See T.W. Elec., 809 F.2d at 630-631 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348). Summary judgment is therefore not appropriate, “where contradictory, inferences may reasonably be drawn from undisputed evidentiary facts.” Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324, 1335 (9th Cir.1980).

II. Justiciability

A. Justiciability of Claims Against Arpaio

Arpaio argues the United States’ claims involving discriminatory traffic stops in Counts One, Two, Three, and Five are moot. He argues the Melendres injunction eliminated all threat of immediate and future discriminatory traffic stops, as well as the ability of this Court to provide redress for those claims. The United States argues its traffic stop claims are not moot for four reasons: (1) the Melendres injunction does not reach all of the conduct challenged in the present suit because it is necessarily tied to and based upon the immigration-related operations at issue in Melendres; (2) the federal government has unique interests which warrant providing it with its own enforcement mechanism for the types of. reforms and controls in the Melendres injunction; (3) Arpaio appealed the scope of the-Melendres injunction; and (4) the Melendres injunction is years away from full implementation, .

Mootness doctrine prevents courts from ruling “when the issues presented are no longer live and therefor the parties lack á cognizable interest for which the-courts can grant a remedy.” Alaska Ctr. For Envt v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 854 (9th Cir.1999). “The party asserting mootness bears the burden of establishing that there is no effective relief that the court can provide.” Forest Guardians v. Johanns, 450 F.3d 455, 461 (9th Cir.2006). And “[t]hat burden is ‘heavy’; a case is not moot where any effective relief may be granted.” Id. “Partial .relief in another proceeding cannot moot an action that legitimately seeks additional relief.” Flagstaff Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Sullivan, 962 F.2d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 1992).

As a general principle, “the government is- not bound by private litigation when the government’s action seeks to enforce a federal statute that implicates both public and private interests.’’ ' California v. IntelliGender, LLC, 771 F.3d 1169, 1177 (9th Cir.2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Hathom v. Lovom, 457 U.S. 255, 268 n. 23, 102 S.Ct. 2421, 72 L.Ed.2d 824 (1982); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 373 n. 6, 95 S.Ct. 2296, 45 L.Ed.2d 245 (1975). For example,. in E.E.O.C. v.- Goodyear Aerospace Corp., the Ninth Circuit held the.Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) “interests in determining the legality of specific conduct and in ’deterring future violations are distinct from the employee’s interest in a personal remedy.” 813 F.2d 1539, 1542 (9th Cir. 1987). For that reason, the Court held the EEOC’s enforcement action was not mooted by a private plaintiffs lawsuit and settlement based on the sáme facts. Id. at 1543 (“[The private plaintiffs] settlement does not moot the EEOC’s right of action seeking injunctive relief to protect employees as a class and to deter the employer from discrimination.”).

Goodyear Aerospace Corp. involved a previous suit by an individual private plaintiff. But the court’s analysis relied in part on Secretary of Labor v. Fitzsimmons, where the prior suit was a private class action. 805 F.2d 682 (7th Cir.1986). In Fitzsimmons, the Seventh Circuit held the Secretary of Labor was not barred by res judicata’ from bringing an ERISA enforcement action based on the same facts as a previously settled class action in which the Secretary had intervened. Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d at 699. The decision was based in part on the history and structure of ERISA. The court noted ERISA arose out of concern over the “increasingly interstate” “operational scope and eeonomic impact” of employee benefit plans and the direct effect such plans had on the “well-being and security of millions of employees and their dependents.” Id. at 689 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)). Employee benefit plans were also thought to “substantially affect the revenues of the United States” and therefore to" be “affected with a national public interest.” Id. The statute provided the Secretary of Labor the right to intervene in any action brought by a participant, beneficiary* or fiduciary,. Id.

The defendants in Fitzsimmons argued the right' to intervene in private lawsuits created privity between the Secretary of Labor and the private plaintiffs so as to bar the Secretary from bringing a separate enforcement action. In determining no privity existed between the government and the private class of plaintiffs, the court articulated compelling and unique government interests, which justified the Secretary’s separate, second lawsuit:

[I]t is. clear that the Secretary does have a unique, distinct, and separate public interest, duty and responsibility in bringing this ERISA action to enforce the trustees’ fiduciary obligations and duties, to ensure public confidence in the private pension system that provides billions of dollars of capital for investments affecting federal tax revenues and interstate commerce, and most importantly, to protect the income of the retired workers and beneficiaries. Further, the Secretary of Labor has a separate interest when he intervenes so-as to prevent the establishment of harmful legal precedent as well as to ensure uniformity in the enforcement and application of ERISA laws.

Id. at 696, See also Herman v. S. Carolina Nat. Bank, 140 F.3d 1413, 1424 (11th Cir.1998) (same) (citing Beck v. Levering, 947 F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir.1991)); Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1462-63 (5th Cir.1983).

The Supreme Court has addressed' the situation where the government seeks in-junctive relief which is potentially duplica-tive of relief already afforded to a private party. In United States v. Borden Co., the Supreme Court-held a private plaintiffs injunctive relief did not bar the federal government from bringing suit for. injunc-tive relief under the Clayton' Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25. 347 U.S. 514, 520, 74 S.Ct. 703, 98 L.Ed. 903 (1954). The district court had held the violations described in the government’s complaint and shown at thfe trial were, “for the most part, old violations .. -.- [and] the [private injunction] assure[d], as completely as any decree can assure, that there will be no new violations.” Id. at 517-518, 74 S.Ct. 703 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court’s reasoning ignored “the prime object of civil decrees secured by the Government — the continuing protection of the public, by means of contempt proceedings, against a recurrence of [] violations.” Id. at 519, 74 S.Ct. 703. The Court continued:

Should a private decree be violated, the Government would have no right to bring contempt proceedings to enforce compliance; it. might succeed in intervening in the .private action but only at the court’s discretion, . The private plaintiff might find it to his advantage to refrain from seeking enforcement of a violated-decree; for example, where the defendant’s violation operated primarily against plaintiffs competitors. Or the plaintiff might agree to modification of the decree, again looking only to his own interest. In any of these events it is likely that the public interest would not be adequately- protected by the mere existence of the private decree. It is also clear that Congress did not intend that the efforts of a private litigant should supersede the duties of the Department of Justice -in policing an industry. “Yét the effect of the decision below is to place on'a private litigant the burden of policing a major part of the milk industry in Chicago, a task beyond its ability* even assuming it to- be Consistently so inclined.” Id. at 519, 74 S.Ct. 703. .

Thus, the Supreme Court recognized the government’s interest in-enforcing the provisions of á privately-held injunction, as well as its duty to enforce its laws may justify a second' injunction. ‘ The private decree was to be considered in determining whether the government could show a likelihood of recurring illegal activity, but it was not dispositive of that question. Id. at 520, 74 S.Ct. 703.

The Supreme Court also determined that, in stating the United States district attorneys and the Attorney General had a duty to institute equity proceedings to enforce antitrust laws while also allowing private plaintiffs to obtairi injunctive relief, the Clayton Act created a scheme in which “private and public actions were designed to be cumulative, not mutually exclusive.” Id. at 518, 74 S.Ct. 703.

A similar conclusion applies to Title VI, one of the' statutes under which the United States’ brings its claims. Title VI is part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a sweeping piece of legislation which banned racial discrimination in voting, schools, workplaces, and public accommodations and created mechanisms through which the federal government could enforce each provision. The Act was passed in the context of widespread conflict and unrest regarding racial desegregation, including resistance to desegregation by-state and local governments and 'private individuals. Its purpose was to harness the power of the federal government to eradicate racial discrimination throughout the United States, regardless of local bias. The Supreme Court has held private plaintiffs may bring suit under .Title VI for violations caused by intentional discrimination but not disparate impact discrimination. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001). The federal government, by contrast, may sue for either intentional or disparate impact discrimination. See infra, Part 111(A). And federal agencies which extend federal financial assistance are both “authorized and directed to effectuate [its] provisions.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (emphasis added). Just as in Borden Co., the statutory scheme of Title VI and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 lends itself to and is enhanced by viewing private enforcement action as supplemental and cumulative to government enforcement action.

The other statute under which the United States brings these claims, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, may be best known for its crime prevention measures, including a federal ban on assault weapons and increased federal funding of local law enforcement.- See Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 870, 883 n. 35-36 (2015). But the Act also contains provisions directed at reforming law enforcement. For instance, under § 14141, the relevant section here, the Attorney General has discretion to bring civil actions to obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice of law enforcement that violates constitutional rights and privileges.

Portions of the United States’ claims of discriminatory policing involve conduct addressed in Melendres —discriminatory vehicle stops related to immigration enforcement. :-But the United States’ claims also include allegations regarding discriminatory home raids, worksite raids, and non-motor vehicle related arrests and detentions, which are different in important respects from those presented in Melendres. For one, the United States’ claims are not confined to immigration enforcement, but extend to discrimination, in general law enforcement.

Despite this overlap, the United States possesses a unique interest, which supports the finding of a live controversy as to allegations regarding discriminatory traffic stops. Furthermore, the purposes of Title VI and § 14141 would be served by permitting the United States to bring its own enforcement actions, régardless of previous action taken by private plaintiffs. The United States’ interest in this case is distinct from those of private plaintiffs’ in Melendres. As with the Secretary Of Labor in Fitzsimmons, the federal government has an interest in the uniform and robust enforcement of federal civil rights legislation nationwide. Its interest- in preventing the type of discrimination charged in this case extends beyond the well-being of a defined class of plaintiffs to the safety, security, and just and harmonious coexistence of all citizens. The . United States likewise has an interest in ensuring confidence in law enforcement activities which utilize federal funding and may affect interstate commerce. In addition, the findings in Part 111(A), infra, show congressional intent to permit. the federal government to bring an enforcement action. To paraphrase Fitzsimmons, to hold mootness doctrine bars the Attorney General from independently pursuing enforcement of Title VI would effectively limit the authority of the Attorney General under the statute — something a court will not do in the absence of an explicit legislative directive. See Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d at 691.

In addition, the Melendres injunction does not moot the portions of the United States’ claims which overlap with Melen-dres because continued" violations by Ar-paio and MCSO following the issuance of the injunction demonstrate a real and immediate threat of future harm, as well as the importance of granting the United States authority to enforce injunctive relief addressing MCSO’s discriminatory traffic stops. See Borden Co., 347 U.S. at 519, 74 S.Ct. 703; (2:07-CV-2513-GMS, Doc. 948) (Arpaio’s stipulation to violations of the Melendres injunction by Arpaio and MCSO); (2:07-CV-2513-GMS, Doc. 0127 at 118-125). In addition, in the context of the United States’ broader claims, its claims regarding traffic stops may lead to different injunctive measures than those put forth in Melendres, where the allegations of discriminatory traffic stops were brought in isolation. In other words, the Melendres injunction may afford some, but only partial relief for the United States’ claims. See Flagstaff Med. Ctr., Inc., 962 F.2d at 885.

In sum, it is premature for the Court to conclude the United States’ allegations would lead to a replica of the Melendres injunction. And, even if portions of- the order were replicated, the United States’ unique interest in enforcing those provisions and the continuing threat.of future harm it faces render the claims justiciable.

B. Justiciability of Claims Against Maricopa County

Maricopa County argues the United States .does not. have standing because it has failed to show “the harms it alleges are ’likely to be redressed’ by a judgment against the County." (Doc. 334 at 8). The United States contends it has shown a likelihood-of redress and that the “law of the case” precludes the County’s argument.. (Doc. 348 at 8).

To . havé Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) it has suffered “injury in fact — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is ... concrete and particularized”; (2) “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of’; and (3) the likelihood “the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In a previous. order, the Court held, “Under Arizona law, the Sheriff has final policymaking authority with respect to County law enforcement and jails, and the County can be held responsible for constitutional violations resulting from these policies,” (Doc. 56 at 13), and denied Maricopa County’s motion to dismiss, including the allegation of lack of standing.

“Lhw of the case” doctrine “preclude[s a court] from reexamining an issue previously decided by the samé court, or a higher court, in the same case.” United States v. Jingles, 702 F.3d 494, 499 (9th Cir.2012) (citation omitted). The doctrine applies where.an issue was “decided explicitly or by necessary implication in [the] previous disposition.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In finding Maricopa" County could be held responsible for Arpaio’s constitutional violations, the Court ruled, by necessary implication, the County was capable ofire-dressing those violations. Nonetheless, Maricopa County now claims the Court’s previóus analysis was flawed 'because it relied on precedents from § 1983" cases involving claims for monetary, rather than injunctive relief. Maricopa County acknowledges A.R.S. § 11-201 gives it the power to determine MCSO’s budget, but maintains that aüthority is insufficient to influence or control hovv MCSO is run. Maricopa County also claims: 1) the County cannot “cure the alleged violations here” (Doc. 356 at 10); 2) the United States has failed to show Arpaio and MCSO engage in “assessing, collecting, safekeeping, managing or disbursing the public revenues” such that they would fall under Maricopa County’s supervisory authority pursuant to A.R.S. § 11-251(1); and 3) A.R.S. § 11-444 severely limits its authority to withhold funding.

Although the cases on which the Court’s previous order relied involved claims under § 1983, which allows for monetary as well as injunctive relief, the reasoning applied to find Maricopa County potentially liable for MCSO’s constitutional violations was not premised on the form of relief sought, but rather on the bases for “policymaker” liability. See Flanders v. Maricopa Cnty., 203 Ariz. 368, 378, 54 P.3d 837 (Ariz.Ct.App.2002).

As will be discussed at greater length in Part III(B)(i), infra, the logic of “policymaker” liability under § 1983 applies to produce institutional liability under Title VI and its sister statute, Title IX, as well. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979) (holding that a successful showing of a Title VI violation rests on the actions of a decisionmaker). The Court’s previous order relied on numerous state court decisions identifying the sheriff as a policymaker for Maricopa County, United States v. Maricopa Cnty., Ariz., 915 F.Supp.2d 1073, 1082-84 (D.Ariz.2012), (Doc. 56), and that determination is the law of this case. See United States v. Jingles, 702 F.3d 494, 499 (9th Cir.2012).

Regarding Maricopa County’s argument that its inability to “cure the alleged violations” destroys " the United States’ standing, the United States is correct that it need only show the potential for partial redress. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 476, 107 S.Ct. 1862, 95 L.Ed.2d 415 (1987).

The sheriff is independently elected. Ariz. Const, art.. XII, § 3. And his duties are statutorily required. A.R.S. § 11-441. Those duties range from “[p]reserve[ing] the peace” to “[a]rrest[ing] ... persons who attempt to commit or who have committed a public .offense” to “[t]ak[ing] charge of and keeping] the county jail.” A.R.S. § 11-441.

However, A.R.S. § 11-251(1) provides:

The board, of supervisors, under such limitations and restrictions as are prescribed by law, may: ... Supervise the official conduct of all county officers and officers of all districts and other subdivisions of the county-charged with assessing, collecting, safekeeping, managing or disbursing the public revenues, see that such' officers faithfully perform their duties and direct prosecutions for delinquencies. ■

A.R.S. § 11-251(1). And the Arizona Court of Appeals has held the sheriff is an “officer” within the definition provided in this subsection. Fridena v. Maricopa Cnty., 18 Ariz-App. 527, 530, 504 P.2d 58 (Ariz.Ct.App.l972). Therefore, the Board of Supervisors is charged with supervising the sheriff under the statute.

The Board’s authority over the sheriffs budget is somewhat constrained by A.R.S. § 11-444(A), which states: “The sheriff shall be allowed actual and necessary expenses incurred by the sheriff in pursuit of criminals, for transacting all civil or criminal business.” But the statute also provides that the Board meet monthly to allocate funds to the sheriff for the payment of such expenses and that the sheriff “render a full and true account,of such expenses” every month to the Board. A.R.S. § 11-444(B)-(C).

In 1965, the Arizona Attorney General’s Office issued ah opinion interpreting A.R.S. § 11-444, which stated:

[T]he board of supervisors, being the agency of the county vested with respom sibility for allowing claims, must be satisfied in each instance when examining the claims of sheriffs ... that the expenses claimed are for a public purpose and are the actual and ■ necessary expenses'thereof.

Op. Atty. Gen. No. 65-18. This reading harmonizes the funding requirements of A.R.S. § 11-444 with the Board’s duty under A.R.S. § 11 — 251(1) to “see that such officers faithfully perform their 'duties and direct prosecutions for delinquencies.” A.R.S. § 11-251(1). Cf. Pinal Cnty. v. Nicholas, 20 Ariz. 243, 179 P. 650, 651-52 (1919) (holding, in executing its duty to pay “necessary expenses” of the County Attorney, “the board of supervisors is charged with the duty of supervising all éxpenditures incurred by him, and rejecting payment of those which are illegal or unwarranted”). Therefore, the Board can refuse to fund inappropriate activities, which is exactly what the United States wants Maricopa County to do.

. Maricopa County’s argument centers on its purported inability to initiate any authorized action to affect Arpaio’s compliance with the law or a court order, given the sheriffs statutory duties and electoral independence and the Board’s statutory obligation to'fund his activities. But Mari-copa County admits it has the ability and duty “to facilitate compliance of the Sheriff and other constitutional officers with judicial orders.” (Doc. 334 at 9, n. 2). And the United States identified .numerous ways in which Maricopa County could, within its authority, exercise oversight and influence oyer Arpaio.. For instance, Mari-copa County could .put the sheriff qn a line-item budget and use its power to withhold approval for capital expenditures, sab ary increases and the like to encourage compliance with court orders. (Docs. 348 at 10 — 12; 349 at ¶ 13-26). The United States also discussed actions. Maricopa County has already taken to oversee and control MCSO’s fiscal management, to ensure its compliance with county policy. (Docs. 348 at 13; 349 at ¶ 13). In the name of sound fiscal management, and at least partially in response to constituent complaints, the Board has, in the past, ordered audits and “operational efficiency reviews” of MCSO’s vehicle use, extradition and travel policy, and staffing practices and ordered “oversight functions” be performed- by the County Office of Management and Budget. (Docs. 349-2, 349-3). In fact, Maricopa County’s own initial response to DOJ’s investigation stated the County could deny MCSO reimbursement for funds expended in an effort to resist the investigation, as such resistance was “putside the scope of the employment of any elected or appointed official.” (Doc. 333-3 at 10). This evidence and the Arizona Attorney General’s interpretation of the relevant statutes, show Maricopa County has the ability to afford at least partial redress for violations committed by Arpaio, MCSO, and Maricopa County.

In addition, another district court recently upheld taxpayers’ standing to sue Maricopa County'in challenging the expenditure of municipal funds for MCSO’s enforcement of an allegedly discriminatory statute. Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, 76 F.Supp.3d 833, 853 (D.Ariz.2015) (“[A] favorable decision would .., prevent[] further expenditures for enforcement of the identity theft laws.”) (citing Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393, 397-98 (7th Cir.2006) (“Such an injury is redressed not by giving the tax money back ,.. but by ending the unconstitutional spending practice.”)). See also We Are Am/Somos Am., Coal. of Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 809 F.Supp.2d 1084, 1104 (D.Ariz. 2011) (finding plaintiffs had alleged injury sufficient to confer standing to sue county/Board of Supervisors, the sheriff, and others in action seeking suspension of the use of municipal funds for MCSO enforcement of discriminatory policy). In Puente, as here, Maricopa County argued its inability to control the County’s criminal law enforcement meant that allowing Maricopa County to remain a party “could result in it being ‘bound by an injunction that is not within its authority to comply with under Arizona law.’ ” 76 F.Supp.3d at 868. The court held “[t]his fact might limit [Marico-pa County’s] exposure to contempt or other remedies if -an injunction is disregarded, but it does not alter the fact that the County is a proper defendant.” Id.

Even assuming Maricopa County’s control over MCSO’s operations is limited to control -over-funding, as opposed to direct and complete oversight and control of enforcement operations, that control establishes Maricopa County could contribute to the-requested relief, which is all the law requires to create - standing. Therefore, summary judgment-on this issue will be denied.

III. Maricopa County’s Liability Under Title VI and 42 U.S.C. § 14141

Maricopa County advances several arguments for granting summary judgment in its favor with respect to the United States’ claims under Title VI (Counts Three, Four, and Five) and § 14141 (Counts One, Two, and Six). First) Maricopa County claims Title VI does not authorize the United States to file suit to enforce its provisions. Next, Maricopa County claims neither Title VI nor § 14141 authorize imputation of liability from Arpaio and MCSO to Maricopa County. Alternatively, Maricopa County argues even if the statutes authorize imputation, the County would not be liable for the alleged violations. Finally, Maricopa County claims the United States failed to comply,with the notice requirements of Title VI.

A. Authorization to File Suit Under Title VI

Maricopa County argues summary judgment in its favor as to Counts Three, Four, and Five is required because Title VI does not authorize the United States to bring suit to enforce its provisions. Maricopa County draws a comparison between Title VI and Title IV, the latter of which explicitly authorizes the Attorney General “to institute ... in the name of the United States a civil action ... against such parties and for such relief as may be appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6. Maricopa County claims that because “Congress knew how to authorize- a lawsuit by [the United States],” there is ‘“strong evidence’ that no lawsuit was . authorized here.” (Doc. 334 at 6). The United States challenges this assertion through interpretation of the phrase “any other means authorized by law” in Title VI. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.

Under Title VI, compliance may be effected “by termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance” or “by any other means authorized by law.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l. The parties focus-, on the interpretation of the phrase “any other means authorized by law.” The United States relies on National Black Police Association Inc. v. Velde, 712 F.2d 569, 575 (D.C.Cir.1983) and United States v. Baylor University Medical Center, 736 F.2d 1039, 1050 (5th Cir.1-984), each of which recognizes “any other means authorized by law” as including enforcement options beyond administrative action. See also Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 630, 103 S.Ct. 3221, 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983) (J. Marshall, dissenting) (“[I]n extending grants the United States has always retained an inherent right to sue for enforcement of the recipient’s obligation.”). Maricopa County claims Velde and Baylor University Medical Center do not represent the current approach to statutory interpretation which was abandoned by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Sandoval. 532 U.S. 275, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001).

In Sandoval, the Supreme Court condemned lower courts’ liberal implication of private rights of action “to provide remedies as are necessary to make effective [ ] congressional purpose” and established a stricter standard requiring more explicit findings of congressional intent to support such causes of action. 532 U.S. 275, 287, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001). In determining the congressional intent behind § 602 of Title VI the Court endeavored to discern the “focus” of the provision. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288-289, 121 S.Ct. 1511. The Court held: “Statutes that focus on the person regulated rather than the individuals protected create ‘no implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular class of persons.’ ” Id. at 289, 121 S.Ct. 1511. It found § 602 focused neither on persons regulated nor individuals protected, but instead exclusively on federal agency enforcement. Id. (“[Section] 602 is ‘phrased as a directive to federal agencies engaged in the distribution of public funds,’ When this is true, ‘[t]here [is] far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons.’”). The implication, then, is that whei-e a- statutory provision focuses on a particular party, it is more likely Congress intended to confer a right of action on that party to enforce the provision. The logic of Sandoval, therefore, supports finding a right of action for federal agency enforcement under § 602 of Title VI.

The Sixth Circuit appears to be the only federal court of appeals to have addressed the meaning of “any other means authorized by law” as it applies to means of government enforcement following Sandoval. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged the gve-Sandoval understanding of the phrase and found it authorized the government to bring suit to enforce a statutory provision. United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 808 (6th Cir.2002) (“We believe that the fourth alternative [‘take any other action authorized by law with respect to the recipient’] expressly permits the [agency] to bring suit'to enforce the [statutory] conditions in lieu of its administrative rém-edies.”) (citing Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 736 F.2d at 1050; Nat’l Black Police Ass’n, 712 F.2d at 575). Cf. United States v. Marion Cnty. Sch. Dist., 625 F.2d 607, 611 (5th Cir.1980) (“[T]he government's right to sue to enforce its contracts exists as' a matter of federal common law, without necessity of & statute ... Congress may nullify the right, but, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, courts are entitled to conclude that Congress has done so only , if the evidence of Congress’ intent is extremely, even unmistakably, clear.”).

Maricopa County claims Congress rejected an amendment to Title VI explicitly authorizing public judicial enforcement of Title VI. The rejected amendment provided that a recipient of federal funds “assume[d] a legally enforcible [sic] undertaking ... [and the] United States,.district courts [would] have jurisdiction [over] civil actions brought in connection with such undertakings, by either the United States or by any recipient aggrieved by action take under any such undertaking.” 110 Cong. Rec. 2493-94 (1964). The author of the proposed amendment, Congressman Meader, envisioned such disputes being governed by the' law of contracts. 110 Cong. Rec. 2493 (1964). But the amendment was rejected in favor of the broader provision for enforcement of contractual obligations not only through the courts, but by “any .., means authorized by law.” In the words of Congressman Celler, the Meader Amendment would have “denfied] much" needed 'flexibility to the Federal agencies to effectuate their nondiscrimination policy ... [in contrast to the version using ‘any other means authorized by law’ which] seeks to preserve [ ] the maximum [ ] existing procedures ... including any judicial review.” 110 Cong. Rec. 2494 (1964). The- record of the congressional debate surrounding this amendment clearly shows Congress’s intent that the provisions of Title VI be enforceable through lawsuits to allow enforcement by judicial review.

Furthermore, to the extent the phrase “any other means authorized by law” may be ambiguous as it appears in Title VI, the Court must defer to DOJ’s interpretation. See City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C., — U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 1863, 1868, — L.Ed.2d - (2013) - (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). DOJ regulations interpret the phrase “any other means authorized by law” in Title VI to include “[appropriate proceedings brought by the Department to enforce any rights of the United States under, any law of the United States (including other titles of the Act), or any assurance or other contractual undertaking.” 28 C.F.R. § 42.108(a)(1).

Based on the foregoing, summary-judgment for Maricopa County regarding the United States’ ability to enforce Title VI through lawsuits will be denied.

B. Imputation of Liability

Maricopa County claims .neither Title VI nor § 14141 authorize imputation of liability from Arpaio and MCSO to Maricopa County. It contrasts these statutes with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which explicitly creates liability for entities which cause others to commit - constitutional violations. The United States claims the Court already decided Maricopa County can be held liable for Arpaió’s violations in its order on the early motion to dismiss. It also contends Arpaio’s actions constitute the actions of Maricopa County for purposes of liability under § 14141 and Title VI.

i. Title VI (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-7)

Maricopa County refers to itself as “the Board,” as in, the Board of Supervisors. (Doc. 334 at 12). The United States argues for a broader understanding of persons comprising county government for purposes of Title VI liability. -It argues Maricopa County’s policymakers constitute the County under the statute and that Maricopa County violated Title VI in two ways: First, through the Board, by failing to live up to its contractual obligations, and second, through the pattern, practice, and policy of discrimination prpmulgated by Arpaio, the County’s policymaker.

Section 1983 explicitly provides liability for government entities which cause others to violate constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. §. 1983. Under § 1983, municipal liability for officers’ actions is not automatic but attaches “when execution of [the] government’s, policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). In other words, a violation caused by a municipal policy, e.g. a policy made by a. municipal policymaker, is a violation by the municipality. See Flanders v. Maricopa Cnty., 203 Ariz. 368, 378, 54 P.3d 837, 847. (Ariz.Ct.App.2002) (“Liability [under § 1983] is imposed, not on the grounds of respondeat superior, but because the agent’s status cloaks him with the governmental body’s authority.”).

“To hold a local government liable for an official’s conduct [under § 1983], a plaintiff, must first establish that the official (1) had final policymaking authority ‘concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue’ and (2) was the policymaker for the local governing body for the purposes of the particular act.” Weiner v. San Diego Cnty., 210 F.3d 1025, 1028- (9th Cir.2000) (citing McMillian :v. Monroe County Alabama, 520 U.S. 781, 785, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997)). In analyzing the second question — whether a policymaker may be associated with a particular government entity for purposes of liability — the amount of control the government entity, i.e. the county board of supervisors, possesses over the official is but one factor. Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 715 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir.2013) cert. denied sub nom. Cnty. of Los Angeles, Cal. v. Goldstein, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 906, 187 L.Ed.2d 778 (2014). ‘ Other factors include the county’s obligation to defend or indemnify the official, the scope of the official’s duties, and the official’s definition in the state constitution. Goldstein, 715 F.3d. at 755-762. The Court’s previous order held Arpaio “has final poli-cymaking authority with respect to County law enforcement and jails, and [based on that,] the County can be held responsible for constitutional violations resulting from these policies.” United States v. Maricopa Cnty., Ariz., 915 F.Supp.2d 1073, 1082-84 (D.Ariz.2012); (Doc.56).

Title VI does not explicitly provide liability for entities which cause others to violate the statute. Title VI provides: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. The section- is enforceable through termination or refusal of federal funding or “by any other means authorized by law.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l. Termination or refusal of funding is “limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient -as -to whom [an express finding on the record ... of a failure to comply] has been made and, shall be limited in its effect to the particular- program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l.

No court has directly confronted the question of whether “policymaker” liability applies under Title VI. But case law on Title IX, which parallels Title VI, is instructive. Like Title VI, Title IX does not explicitly provide liability for causing others to violate the statute, nor for classic respondeat süperior liability. In Geb-ser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, the Supreme Court held “Congress did not intend to allow recovery [under Title "IX] where liability rests solely on principles of vicarious liability or constructive notice.” 524 U.S. 274, 288, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998). See also Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999) (“[A] recipient of federal funds may be liable in damages -under Title IX only for its own misconduct.”). Instead, a principal can be held liable for “employees’ independent actions” Only if, after actual notice to an “appropriate person,” the principal fails to adequately respond to the employees’ violations, thus demonstrating “deliberate indifference” to the alleged violation. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 289-291, 118 S.Ct. 1989 (“It would be unsound, we think, for a statute’s'’eatress system of enforcement to require notice to the recipient and an opportunity to come into voluntary compliance while a judicially implied system of enforcement permits substantial liability without regard to the recipient’s knowledge.or its corrective actions upon receiving notice.”) (emphasis in original). This sort of “deliberate indifference” is a form of intentional discrimination by the employer/principal directly, not a form of vicarious liability. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 182, 125 S.Ct. 1497, 161 L.Ed.2d 361 (2005).

An institution is also directly .liable for its “own official decision[s].” Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290-291, 118 S.Ct. 1989. The Ninth Circuit and others have held a separate finding of “deliberate indifference” is not necessary when an institutional policy violates the statute. Mansourian v. Regents of Univ. of California, 602 F.3d 957, 967-969 (9th Cir.2010). See also Simpson v. Univ. of Colorado Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1178 (10th Cir.2007) (“[A] funding recipient can be said to have ‘intentionally ácted in clear violation of Title IX,’ when the violation is caused by official policy.”) (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 642, 119 S.Ct. 1661). Because a “policymaker” is not acting individually, but on behalf of the institution/entity, and his policies are the policies of the entity, no imputation takes place in charging the entity with violations stemming .from those policies — they are the policies of the entity, not merely the individual.

This logic parallels the reasoning that undergirds- the law establishing “policymaker” liability under § 1983 and applies with equal- force to Title VI. Maricopa County is directly liable for violations resulting from its official policy, which includes policy promulgated by Arpaio. See United States v. Maricopa Cnty., Ariz., 915 F.Supp.2d 1073, 1082-84 (D.Ariz.2012). These policies constitute intentional acts by Maricopa County for which no imputation is required. Therefore, summary judgment on the grounds of impermissible imputation (i.e. vicarious liability) under Title VI will be denied.

ii. 42 U.S.C. § 14141

Maricopa County claims § 14141 imposes liability only on an entity which engages directly in conduct that results in constitutional injury; ■ ■ -

The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of which § 14141 is a part provides, among other things, grants for state and local law enforcement agencies tq. improve police training .and .practices and help prevent crime. Pub.L. 103 — 322, 42 U.S.C. Ch. 136, §§ 13701-14223. Section 1414, specifically, provides: „

It shall be-unlawful for any. governmental 'authority, or any agent thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage m a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers or by officials ... that deprives persons of rights, privileges,, or immunities secured or protected by the ‘Constitution or laws of the United States.

42 U.S.C. § 14141 (emphasis added).

The Court is unable to find a case speaking directly to the question of vicarious or imputed liability under § -14141. However, again, the logic of policymaker liability discussed in the preceding section would render Maricopa County directly, not indirectly liable under the, statute. In addition, the United States has sued and settled under the statute with various governments for violations committed by law enforcement departments. See United States v. State of New Jersey, et al., 3:99-cv-05970-MLC-JJH; United States v. City of New Orleans, 731 F.3d 434 (5th Cir.2013); United States v. Puerto Rico, 922 F.Supp.2d 185 (D.P.R.2013). All of these cases, ended in, settlement and in none did the defendant government challenge liability by arguing vicarious or imputed liability was unavailable under § 14141. Therefore, the case law suggests liability is available to sue governments whose law enforcement violates the statute. Summary judgment will not be granted to Maricopa .County on this issue of imputation of liability under § 14141.

C. Liability Under Title VI and 42 ... . U.S.C. § 14141

Maricopa County argues it is entitled to summary judgment regarding its liability under Title VI and § 14141, even if imputation is permitted because “the County cannot control the Sheriffs policies and practices relating to law enforcement or jailing.” (Doc. 334 at 18). This argument was addressed in Part 11(B), supra. Maricopa County has sufficient authority to provide some redress for violations committed--by Arpaio and MCSO. Therefore, the argument is without merit.

Maricopa County further claims its contractual assurances under Title VI must be read in accordance’with Arizona law, including' statutory limitations on the Board of Supervisors’ authority regarding the Sheriff. To the extent Maricopa County entered into-a contract for which it lacked the authority'to agree, Maricopa County argues, the contract is void. (Doc. 351 at 13).

The ' Unitéd States has the power to sue to enforce its contracts. See Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. 229, 231, 11 How. 229, 13 L.Ed. 675 (1850); Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 151, 76 S.Ct. 219, 100 L.Ed. 149 (1956). And “jjf]ederal law governs the interpretation of contracts entered pursuant to federal law where the federal government is a party.” Chickaloon-Moose Creek Native Ass’n., Inc. v. Norton, 360 F.3d 972, 980 (9th Cir.2004).

. Neither party offered authority addressing how courts.treat the enforcement of an ultra vires contract between a county and the federal government. But the Court rejected the contentio