United States v. American Home Assurance Co. (151 F. Supp. 3d 1328, 2015)

OPINION

EATON, Judge:

This matter is before the court on the cross-motions lor summary judgment of plaintiff United States (“plaintiff’ or “the Government”), on behalf of the United States Customs and Border Protection Agency (“Customs”), and defendant American Home Assurance Company (“defendant” or “AHAC”). ' See Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF Pkt. No. .76); Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF Dkt. No. 78). Jurisdiction Jjes pursuant to,,28 U.S.C. § 1582(2) (2012) (“The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action which arises out of an import transaction and which is commenced by the United States ... to recover upon a bond relating to the importation of merchandise required by the laws of the United States or by the Secretary of the Treasury.”).

In this consolidated action, the United States seeks to recover on bonds issued by AHAC securing unpaid duties on garlic, mushrooms, and potassium permanganate imported into the United States from the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”). Specifically, the Government claims that AHAC is liable for duties up to the amounts of the.bonds, and for (1) pre-liquidation interest pursuant to 19 U..S.C. § 1677g (2006); (2) prejudgment statutory interest pursuant to, § 580; (3) post-liquidation interest under § 1505(d) for non-payment of the duties; (4) equitable prejudgment interest; and (5) post-judgment interest under 28 ; U.S.C. § 1961,. See Mem. in Supp. of PL’s Mot. for Summ. J. 6 (ECF Dkt. No. 76) (“PL’s Br.”). By its cross-motion, with the exception of post-judgment interest, defendant disputes these claims. See Mem. of. Law in,Supp. of Defi’s Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF Dkt. No. 78) (“Def.’s Br.”).

For the reasons set forth below, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted, in part, and defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted, in part.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” USCIT R. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “When both parties move for summary judgment, the' court' must evaluate each motion on its own merits, resolving all reasonable inferences against the' party whose motion is under consideration.” JVC Co. of Am., Div. of U.S. JVC Corp. v. United States, 234 F.3d 1348, 1351 (Fed. Cir.2000).' To defeat summary judgment “all that is required is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury of judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

BACKGROUND

The facts described below have been taken from the parties’ statements of undisputed material facts. See Def.’s Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Is No Genuine Issue to Be Tried (ECF Dkt. No. 78) (“Def.’s Statement”). Citation to the record is provided where a fact, although not admitted, in the parties’ papers, is uncontroverted by record evidence.

’ In each of these seven cases, the bonds under which the.Government seeks recovery were issued by AHAC — a company authorized to issue surety bonds — to secure the.duties due on entries for four, different importers between February 2001 and March 2002. See Def.’s Statement ¶¶7, 9. Each importer defaulted on payment of antidumping duties owed to Customs and has since disappeared. According to AHAC, the defaults were intentional and part of “a massive scheme..of fraud by the exporters of the Chinese products and their importers” to avoid an-tidumping duties by obtaining surety bonds for entries made by new shippers and importers, which had no intention of remaining in business long enough to pay the assessed duties. See Def.’s Br. 2.

Until 1999, AHAC issued customs bonds through, an underwriting agent, C.A. Shea & Company, Inc. (“Shea”,). See Def.’s Statement ¶ 1. Beginning in 1999, AHAC engaged a different underwriting agent, Global Solutions Insurance Services, Inc. (“GSIS”), to “underwrite bonds covering regular customs duties and antidumping duties for AHAC.” Def.’s Statement ¶2. GSIS underwrote all-of-the bonds for AHAC-at issue in this case. .See Def.’s Statement ¶ 2.

An important statutory provision in this case pertains to notice that liquidation of imported merchandise has been suspended. See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(c). The subsection states, “[i]f the liquidation of any entry is suspended, the Secretary[ ] shall by regulation require that' notice of the suspension be provided, in such manner as the Secretary considers appropriate, to the importer of record or drawback claimant, as the' case may be, and to any authorized agent and surety of such importer of record or drawback claimant.” Id. (emphasis added). The -significance of such notice is that it would have alerted AHAC to the potential for increased antidumping duty liability following the completion of the administrative reviews.

According to Customs, its automated commercial system was, and continues to be, programmed to generate notices of suspension of liquidation to sureties. Def.’s Statement ¶24. Prior to May 11, 2005, however, the system was not programmed to issue Customs Form 4333TA notices of suspension of liquidation to sure: ties other than to those sureties issuing continuous bonds unless the sole bond in the system was a single transaction bond. See Def.’s Statement ¶24. In other words, in those situations where multiple sureties insured individual entries, only the surety that issued a continuous bond would receive a notice of suspension. Thus, under circumstances where there were multiple entries each secured by a single transaction bond and a continuous bond, the sureties that issued single transaction bonds would not have been given the statutorily-required notice.

In five of the seven consolidated cases (court numbers 09-401, 09442, 09491, 10-002, and 10-311), AHAC issued only single transaction bonds, while another surety issued the continuous bonds. ■ ■ See Def.’s Statement ¶8. Thus, no notice of suspension of liquidation was provided to AHAC by Customs’ automated system in these five cases. See Def.’s Statement ¶¶ 25-26, 4445, 62-63, 80-81, 99-100.’ In the two remaining cases (court numbers 10-003 and 11-206), AHAC issued both single transaction bonds and continuous bonds to secure- the entries at issue. Def.’s Statement ¶ 8. In these eases, Customs’ automated system generated notices to AHAC because it had issued a continuous bond. Neither AHAC nor GSIS, its underwriting agent for the applicable bonds,i however, directly received such no: tice.. - See Def.’s Statement ¶¶ 114, 128. Rather, in these two cases, notice was sent to Shea, AHAC’s previous underwriter for unrelated bonds, who had no relationship to the bonds at issue in this case. Def.’s Statement ¶¶ 114,128.

All of the bonds issued by AHAC secured the duties eventually owed on imported merchandise that was subject to antidumping duty orders issued by the United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce” or “the Department”). See Def.’s Statement ¶6. In 2004 and 2005, after the importers defaulted on the anti-dumping duties owed on all of the entries in this action, Customs demanded payment from AHAC, which AHAC timely protested. See Def.’s Statement ¶ 10. AHAC filed Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests for “all the documentation relevant” to the demands for payment, to which, according to AHAC, Customs was slow in responding. See Def.’s Br. 8. Once AHAC supplemented ■ its protests with the information received in response to its FOIA requests, and' after additional' delays, Customs denied the protests in all but two cases. See Def.’s Statement ¶ 11. AHAC did not appeal any of these protest denials to this Court. Customs commenced these collection actions -in this Court between September 2009 and October 2010, close to the six-year statute of limitations for filing collections action. See 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a). Shortly after the Government brought these collection actions to recover the unpaid duties on the bonds, AHAC executed time-limited waivers of the statute of limitations for the entries covered by court, numbers 09-491 and 10-311. Def.’s Statement ¶¶ 160, 162. .

Earlier in these proceedings, AHAC sought dismissal of the Government’s action, arguing the case should be dismissed because the company did not receive notice of the- suspension of liquidation of some entries. See United States v. Am. Home Assurance Co. (AHAC I), 35 CIT -, -, Slip Op. 11-57, at 5, 2011 WL 1882635 (2011). - Specifically, AHAC argued that, because it failed to. receive notice of suspension as required by 19 U.S.C. § 1504(c), liquidation of .the entries was not actually suspended. Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot, to Stay Discovery and in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for .Stay 2-3 (ECF Dkt.' Ño. 28) (“Def.’s Mot. to Stay”). Because, according to AHAC, there was no suspension of liquidation, the entries were deemed liquidated by operation of law one year after entry pursuant • to § 1504(a)(i )(A). Def.’s Mot. to Stay 3.- Consequently, AHAC insisted the Government’s claims were barred by the six-year statute of limitations that started to run when the entries were deemed liquidated.' Def.’s Mot", to Stay 3.

The court disagreed, holding that a failure of Customs to provide a surety notice of suspénsion of liquidation does not vitiate a valid suspension. See AHAC I, 35 CIT at-," Slip Op.” 11-57, at 11 (“Because it is clear that’ the giving of notice is not a condition precedent to a suspension of liquidation, the failure to give notice does not preVenf an otherwise valid suspension.”). The court further held, however, that failure to provide notice could give a surety an affirmative defense to liability on the bonds if the surety could demonstrate it was prejudiced by the lack of notice. See id. at-, Slip Op. 11-57, at 13-14.

DISCUSSION

I. Certain of the Government’s Claims Are Barred

A. Lack of Notice Does Not Invalidate a Suspension of Liquidation

Notwithstanding the court’s prior ruling that a lack of statutory notice does not vitiate a suspension of liquidation, AHAC renews its argument here, asking the court to reconsider its holding. See id'. at-, Slip Op. 11-57, at 8. For AHAC, the lack of notice rendered all of the entries in this action “deemed liquidated by operation of law one year from the dates of entry, and Customs’ causes of action accrued op those datés.” Def.’s .Br. 19. According to AHAC, because “Customs faded to file any of its complaints within the six-year statute of limitations running from those deemed liquidation dates[,] .. .> the [G]overnment’s claims are time-barred.” Def.’s Br. 19-20.

The court declines AHAC’s invitation to reconsider its prior ruling, and reaffirms its holding in AHAC I. See AHAC I, 35 CIT at -, Slip Op. 11-57, at 13-14. The proper vehicle by which to raise these arguments was a motion for reconsideration pursuant to USCIT R. 59(e) within “30 days after the entry of the judgment” in AHAC I, not at the summary judgment phase. See USCIT R. 59(e). Further, it should be noted that in its papers, AHAC makes no new arguments for the court to consider. Accordingly, the court continues to find its ruling in AHAC I to be correct and will not disturb it now. See AHAC I, at-, Slip Op. 11-57, at 9-10; see also United States v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y. (Great Am. II), 738 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir.2013).

B. Because the Entries Subject to the Department’s Notices of Rescission Were Deemed Liquidated Following Publication of the Notices, the Government’s Suit Is Untimely As to Those Entries

AHAC argues the Government’s claims in court numbers 10-002 and 10-003 and as to certain entries in 10-311 are untimely. See Def.’s Br. 20. In these three cases, Commerce partially rescinded its administrative reviews of the antidumping duty orders covering preserved mushrooms from the PRC exported by Raoping Xingyu Foods Co., Ltd. and fresh garlic from the PRC exported by Clipper Manufacturing Ltd. See] Certain Preserved Mushrooms from the PRC, 67 Fed.Reg. 53,914 (Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 20, 2002) (notice of partial rescission of antidumping duty administrative review); Fresh Garlic from the PRC, 68 Fed.Reg. 4,758 (Dep’t of Commerce Jan. 30, 2003) (final results of antidumping duty administrative review and rescission of administrative review in part).

AHAC claims that' publication of the notices of the partial rescissions of these administrative reviews triggered the beginning of the six-month period in which Customs must liquidate entries. See Def.’s Br, 23. According to AHAC, because Customs did not liquidate the entries within this six-month period, they were deemed liquidated, which, in turn, commenced the six-year statute of limitations for pursuing collection of duties on the .entries. See Def.’s Br. 23 (citing United States v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y. (Great Am. I), 35 CIT -, 791 F.Supp.2d 1337, 1367-68 (2011), rev’d in part, 738 F.3d 1320 (Fed.Cir.2013)). For AHAC, because Customs failed to file its collection actions in court numbers 10-002, 10-003, and 10-311 within the six-year limitations period from the dates of deemed liquidation, “Customs is time-barred from collecting any monies pertaining to the respective entries.” Def.’s Br. 23 (citing Great Am. I, 35 CIT at -, 791 F.Supp.2dat 1368).

The Government maintains, however, “the notices of partial rescission did not lift the statutory suspension, nor did they notify Customs that the statutory suspension was lifted.” Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 13-14 (ECF Dkt. No. 92) (“PL’s Resp. Br.”). Rather, for plaintiff, the notice that lifted the suspension and notified Customs “came later in the form of notice of the final results of the administrative review.” PL’s Resp. Br. 14.

The court finds plaintiffs arguments to be meritless and thus holds that the publication of the notices of partial rescission in the Federal Register lifted the suspension of liquidation as to the relevant entries for purposes of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d). This being the case, the statute of limitations began to run at the time the entries were deemed liquidated.

The statute “requires Customs to liquidate entries within six months of receiving ‘notice’ that a suspension of liquidation of such entries has been removed.” NEC Solutions (Am.), Inc. v. United States (NEC II), 411 F.3d 1340, 1344 (Fed.Cir.2005) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d)). “If Customs fails to timely liquidate the entries under the statute, the entries are deemed liquidated at the rate asserted at the time of entry.” Id. (citing Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed.Cir.2002)). “Thus, in order for a deemed liquidation to occur, (1) the suspension of liquidation that was in place must have been removed; (2) Customs must have received notice of the removal of the suspension; and (3) Customs must not liquidate the entry at issue within six months of receiving such notice.” Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1376. The Federal Circuit has explained, “[t]o be sufficient for purposes of § 1504(d), the ‘notice’ must be ‘unambiguous’ that the suspension of liquidation has been lifted, but does not need to include specific liquidation instructions from Commerce to Customs.” NEC II, 411 F.3d at 1344 (citing Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1364; Int’l Trading Co. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed.Cir.2002)). The proper inquiry is therefore whether “a reasonable Customs official would have read the [notice] to provide notification that any suspension of liquidation on the [subject] entries had been removed.” See id. at 1346.

Moreover, in Great American I, this Court held that a suspension is actually removed when a notice of partial rescission is published in the Federal Register. See Great Am. I, 35 CIT at-, 791 F.Supp.2d at 1364-65. The Great American I Court adopted its rule based on the Federal Circuit’s rationale that “the suspension of liquidation was removed when the mechanism by which the suspension was initiated was no longer in effect.” Id. at 1363.

The notice of partial rescission that AHAC contends provided unambiguous notice to Customs that the suspension of liquidation had been lifted on the entries of preserved mushrooms states:

Accordingly, we are rescinding in part this review of the antidumping duty order on certain preserved mushrooms from the [PRC] as to Compañía Envasa-dora, China Processed and Raoping Xin-gyu. This review will continue with respect to Gerber, Green Fresh, Shantou Hongda and Shenxian Dongxing.

Certain Preserved Mushrooms, 67 Fed. Reg. at 53, 914. Similarly, the notice of partial rescission of the review of the anti-dumping duty order on fresh garlic from the PRC reads:

[W]e are rescinding this administrative review as it applies to Clipper. With this rescission, we will instruct the Customs Service to liquidate the entries during the period of review of subject merchandise from Clipper in accordance with [19 C.F.R. § 351.213(d)- (2003).]

Fresh Garlic, 68 Fed.Reg. at 4,759. The notice of partial rescission of the review of the antidumping duty order on potassium permanganate from the PRC, affecting only court number 09-442, provides:

The Department is rescinding its review of the companies named in Cants’ request for review because Cams has withdrawn its request.;.. Because Groupstars Chemicals, LLC is' not a PRC exporter of the subject merchandise, and failed to identify any PRC exporter(s) of the subject merchandise in its review request, and with Cants’ withdrawal of its review requests, the Department is rescinding this review with respect to Groupstars Chemicals, LLC.

Potassium Permanganate From the PRC, 68 Fed.Reg. 58,307 (Dep’t of Commerce Oct. 9, 2003) (rescission of antidumping duty administrative review). For AHAC, these notices had the effect of both removing the suspension and giving Customs notice of the removal. See Defi’.s Br. 14-15, 23-24.

The Government disputes-AHAC’s claim that the publication of the rescissions in the Federal Register served as unambiguous notice. Rather, plaintiff argues “[t]he notice that actually lifted the- suspension and served to notify Customs came later in the form of notice of the final results of the administrative review as to cases 10-002 and 10-003, and in the form of liquidation instruetions from Commerce as to the 30 entries in 10-311.” See Pl.’s Resp. Br. 14. The Government concedes that “a notice of partial rescission[].can lift-the suspension of liquidation and give notice to Customs, similar to Commerce’s notice of the final results of the administrative review,” and points to Great American I as one of the “rare cases” where this is true. See Pl.’s Resp. Br. 14; see Great Am. I, 35 CIT -, 791 F.Supp.2d 1337. Specifically, plaintiff claims that, in order to satisfy the statute, the notice must explicitly state the suspension has been lifted.

The courts, however, have clarified that explicit language stating that'a suspension has been lifted is hot required to remove a suspension of liquidation so long as “a reasonable Customs official, with knowledge in these matters, would have read the message to provide unambiguously that any suspension - of liquidation on [the importer’s] entries had been removed.” NEC Solutions (Am.), Inc. v. United States (NEC I), 27 CIT 968, 977, 277 F.Supp.2d 1340, 1348 (2003); see also Great Am. I, 35 CIT at —, 791 F.Supp.2d at 1364 (“Language explicitly stating-that a suspension is removed is not required to remove a suspension of liquidation.”).

' In addition, the Government argues that, unlike here, in Great American I, “the notice'of partial rescission contained language indicating' that - liquidation instructions should follów,” which served as an indication that the suspension of liquidation had' been lifted. Pl.’s Resp. Br. 17 (citing Freshwater Crawfish Tail Meat From the PRC, 67 Fed.Reg. 50,860, 50,861 (Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 6, 2002) (noticé of rescission, in ‘part, of antidumping duty administrative review for the period.-September 1, 2000, through August 31, 2001)). The Government, however, has pointed to no case, and = the court can find none, to support its claim that to. end the suspension of liquidation, proper notice must “contain[] indicia that liquidation should follow.” . See PL’s Resp. Br. 17. Moreover, it can hardly be the case that the omission of a statement that liquidation instructions would follow the lifting of the suspension would have any real meaning because the intent to issue such instructions could be presumed. Therefore, despite the Government’s claims to the contrary, it is apparent that to be effective, the notice need not contain language directing Customs that liquidation instructions are forthcoming.

Next, the Government contends it is significant that the partial notice of rescission in Great American I “provided Customs with the, appropriate duty rate to apply to the relevant.entries.’-’ Pl.’s Resp. Br. 17. According to the Government, “[b]y contrast, the notices of partial rescission in cases 10-002,10-003, and the' 30 entries in 10-311, contained no such information and, thus, -could not and did not lift-the suspension.” Pl.’s Resp. Br. 17. The Federal Circuit, however, has rejected this argument, holding that the duty rate need not be included in the notice for purposes of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d). See NEC II, 411 F.3d at. 1345 (“[Njeither the statute nor our precedent requires that the.duty rate be included in the notice in order to satisfy the requirements of'19 U.S.C. § 1504(d).”). Moreover, this argument is. inconsistent with the Government's assertion that, to be sufficient to lift the suspension of liquidation, the notice must contain language that liquidation instructions (and hence the rate) will be forthcoming.

Further, the Góvernment makes a related argument that, “unlike a,.notice of final results or a notice of total- rescission, which conclude aii administrative review as to all parties, a notice of partial rescission suffers from a.- contextual ambiguity — the administrative review will continue as to some exporters.” Pl.’s Resp. Br. 14. Thus, for plaintiff,- without clear direction to Customs that liquidation should follow, “Customs has no way of knowing whether the exporters named in the notice of partial rescission remain subject to a countrywide antidumping rate,” and therefore “must await the results of the administrative review.” See PL’s Resp. Br. 15. Why alerting Customs to the rate to which the merchandise is subject should be a prerequisite to starting the deemed liquidation clock* however, is unclear. As noted, explicit language directing Customs that liquidation will follow is unnecessary, as is the specific duty rate at which the entries will be assessed. All the law requires is that Customs be given notice that the suspension has been lifted. Thus, while the context.may be ambiguous, the effect of these notices of partial rescission is not. See NEC II, 411 F.3d at 1345, Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1381-83; Int’l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1275-76; Great Am. I, 35 CIT at -, 791 F.Supp.2d at 1364.

Accordingly, the court holds that Commerce’s publication of the notices of partial rescission in the Federal Register was sufficient, for purposes of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d), to remove the suspension of liquidation of the entries in court numbers 10-002 and 10-003 and certain entries in 10-311. In addition, the publication of the notices in the Federal Register constituted notice to Customs that the suspensions of liquidation had been lifted as to those entries. Thus, the first two requirements of § 1504(d) were satisfied. Because Customs failed to liquidate within six months of the date of publication of the notices of rescission in the Federal Register, these entries were, liquidated by operation of law at the entered rates, at which time the Government’s cause of action on the bonds began to accrue. Having failed to bring its collection actions within six years of the dates these entries were deemed liquidated, the Government’s right to collect any duties from AHAC on the entries in court numbers 10-002, 10-003, and thirty of the seventy-nine entries of fresh garlic in court number 10-311 is * time-barred. See 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a).

C. Waivers of the Statute of Limitations .

As noted, AHAC executed time-limited waivers of the statute of limitations in court numbers 09-491 and 10-311, covering a total of 190 'entries. In accordance with the waivers’ terms, the Government was permitted to file its collection actions on the bonds covering these 190 entries within an extended period beyond the six-year statute of limitations. The statute providing the six-year limitations period on a collection action reads, in relevant part:

[E]very action for money damages brought by the United States or an officer or agency thereof which is founded upon any contract express or implied in law or fact, shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action accrues or within one year after final decisions have been rendered in applicable administrative proceedings required by contract or by law, whichever is later.

28 U.S.C. § 2415(a). AHAC now claims its waivers were ineffective because the statute of limitations set forth in § 2415(a) is jurisdictional in nature, and therefore cannot be waived. Def.’s Br. 25. As a result, for AHAC, the Government’s suit seeking recovery on the bonds is untimely.

The court finds AHAC’s argument' unconvincing and holds the limitations period in § 2415(a) is non-jurisdictional, and therefore waivable. Accordingly, the Government’s suits in court numbers 09-491 and 10-311 were timely brought.

The primary purpose'of most statutes of limitations is “to protect defendants against stale or unduly delayed claims. Thus, the law typically treats a limitations defense as an affirmative defense that the defendant must raise ' at the pleadings stage and that is subject to rules of forfeiture and waiver.” John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133, 128 S.Ct. 750, 169 L.Ed.2d 591 (2008) (citing United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979)). On the other hand, if a statute of limitations is jurisdictional, it is not waivable because the court is divested of subject matter jurisdiction at the expiration of the limitations period.

A statute of limitations is not jurisdictional “unless Congress provides a ‘clear statement’ to that effect.” United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, — U.S.-, 135 S.Ct. 1625, 1632, 191 L.Ed.2d 533 (2015) (quoting Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 817, 824, 184 L.Ed.2d 627 (2013) (describing the court’s adoption of “a ‘readily administra-ble bright line’ for determining whether to classify a statutory limitation as jurisdictional. We inquire whether Congress has ‘clearly state[d]’ that the rule is jurisdictional.” (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097. (2006)) (alteration in original))). “[I]n case after ease, we,have emphasized ... that jurisdictional statutes speak about jurisdiction,, or more generally phrased, about a court’s powers.” Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S.Ct. at 1633 n. 4. Brother words, for a statute of limitations to be jurisdictional, “Congress must do something special, beyond setting an exception-free deadline,, to tag a statute of limitations as jurisdictional.” Id. at 1632.

In Kwai Fun Wong, in evaluating the statute of limitations governing claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), the Supreme Court found “no clear statement” that the statute was jurisdictional. Id. In analyzing the text of the statute, the Court explained that the language of the provision “does not define a federal court’s jurisdiction ... [or] address its authority to hear untimely suits.” Id. at 1633. The Supreme Court held the statute of limitations at issue contained “run-of-the-mill” language, a jurisdictional provision was not included in the text of the statute’s limitations provision, and the legislative history equally failed to provide a “clear statement” specifying the statute’s jurisdictional nature. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court concluded § 2401(b) is non-jurisdictional. Id.

In like mariner, the court finds that § 2415(a) is non-jurisdictional and thus' subject to waiver. ABAC argues the statutory text demonstrates the subsection’s provisions are mandatory, requiring the sanction of dismissal. Def.’s Br. 25-26. But, as the Government points out, statutes of limitations are by their nature characterized by language that mandates the dismissal of a claim if the time limits are not adhered to. See Pl.’s Resp. Br. 22. ABAC insists that the language in the statute “shall be barred unless” mandates dismissal. Def.’s Br. 25-26. This same argument, however, was 'found unconvincing in Kwai Fun Wong. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S.Ct. at 1632.' The Supreme Court explained that statutes including “shall be forever barred” language have been found to be both jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional statutes of limitations; the inquiry is not based' on words alone. Id. at 1634; see also Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 439, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011) (finding that even though the statute at issue was cast in mandatory language, it provided “no clear indication that Congress wanted that provision to be treated as having jurisdictional attributes”); Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413, 124 S.Ct. 1856, 158 L.Ed.2d 674 (2004).

Next, ABAC claims the jurisdictional nature of the subsection is demonstrated by the intents and purposes behind its enactment outlined in the statute’s legislative history. Def.’s Br. - 26-27. The Supreme Court indicated in Kwai Fun Wong, however, that legislative history may only rebut the non-jurisdictional presumption when it evidences a “clear statement” of jurisdiction. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S.Ct. at 1631-33 (“Finally, even assuming legislative history, alone could provide a clear statement (which we doubt), none does so here.”). ABAC has failed to point to anything in the statute or its legislative history that constitutes a “clear statement” that Congress intended to divest the court of jurisdiction through this limitations period.

Defendant next contends the legislative history for the subsection demonstrates that the provision sought to achieve equality of treatment between the contract claims of private individuals and those of the United' States Governrnent. See Def.’s Br. 27 (quoting S.Rep. No. 89-1328, at 2 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2502, 2503 (“ ‘At that hearirig it was noted that the Government litigation covered by the bill arises out of activity which is very similar to commercial- activity. Many of the contract and tort claims asserted by the Government are almost indistinguishable from claims made by private individuals against the Government. Therefore it is only right that the law should provide a period of time within which the Government must bring suit on claims just as it now does’ as to claims of private individuals'. The committee agrees that the equality of treatment in this regard provided by this bill is required by modern standards of fairness and equity.’ ” (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 89-1534, at 4 (1966)))). ' ”

The Supreme Court, however, has found that a statutory provision with similar intents and purposes was not jurisdictional, and the same is true here. See Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S.Ct. at 1636 — 37. That is, just as the Supreme Court in Kwai Fun Wong found the Federal Tort Claims-Act “treats the United States more like a commoner than like the Crown,” the legislative history AHAC cites to defeats its own .argument. See id. at 1637. “[I]n stressing the Government’s equivalence to a private party, the [statute] goes further than the typical statute waiving sovereign immunity to indicate that its time bar allows a-court to hear late claims.” Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S.Ct. at 1638. That a statute, of limitations constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity is a common justification for finding a statute to be jurisdictional in nature. The Supreme Court has held, however, that where a statute is intended to put the United States on equal footing with private parties, the purpose of the statute is to treat the Government as a regular litigant. In other words, when enacting a statute of limitations, if Congress’s intent is to treat the United States as any party engaged in commercial activity, the argument that the statute creates a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, and thus is jurisdictional, loses its persuasiveness. Indeed, it cuts against the idea that the statute is jurisdictional by expressing an intent to treat the Government like any other party.

Further, AHAC contends that, where statutes of limitations have the purpose of achieving a broader system-related goal, as distinct from the ordinary purpose of protecting defendants against aged claims, the Supreme Court has found those statutes to be jurisdictional in nature. See Def.’s Br. 26 (citing John R. Sand & Gravel, ,552 U.S. at 133-34, 128 S.Ct. 750). Goals articulated for jurisdictional statutes of limitations -thus encourage “facilitating the administration of claims” against the Government and “limiting the scope of a governmental waiver of sovereign immunity.” John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 133, 128 S.Ct. 750; see also United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 352, 117 S.Ct. 849, 136 L.Ed.2d 818 (1997) (holding a statute of limitations was jurisdictional because, among other reasons, “reading] an ‘equitable tolling’ exception into [the statute] could create serious administrative problems by forcing the [Internal Revenue Service] to respond to, and perhaps litir gate, large numbers of late claims”). These considerations, however, are not of particular concern where, as here, the Government's bringing suit against a private entity, not the other way around.

Finally, this Court has previously suggested that the limitations period set forth in 28.U.S.C. § 2415(a) is waivable and thus non-jurisdictional. See United States v. Canex Int’l Lumber Sales Ltd., 32 CIT 407, 410, 2008 WL 1911173 (2008) (“[The defendant] was therefore notified of the possibility of further proceedings with regard to liquidated damages and had ample opportunity to execute the statute of limitations waiver or petition for mitigation proceedings as necessary.” (emphasis added)).

Based on the forgoing, the court holds the six-year statute of limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) is non-jurisdictional and therefore subject to waiver. Accordingly, the time-limited waivers executed by AFLAC in court numbers 09-491 and 10-311 were effective and the Government’s collection actions with respect to the 190 entries covered by these two cases were therefore timely brought.

II. AHAC May Raise its Defenses

The Government contends that AHAC may not interpose its contractual defenses to liability on the bonds because the surety failed to appeal Customs’ denials- of its protests to this Court. For plaintiff, the matters-raised by AHAC in this - suit were decided by the unappealed protest denials, and therefore “became ‘final and coriclu-sive’ under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)[] when AHAC failed to'... contest the denial of its protests.” See Pl.’s Resp. Br. 23. Specifically, the Government argues:

• AHAC is precluded from defending the Government’s claims on the basis of Customs’ failure to issue personal notices of suspension of liquidation pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1504(c) and from challenging Customs’ ■ interest charges under 19 U.S.C. §§ 1505(d) and 1677g. These Customs decisions became “final and conclusive” under 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) when AHAC failed to protest these issues or contest the denial of its protests in this Court.

PL’s Resp. Br. 23. Thus, the Government maintains that AHAC’s failure to bring suit challenging Customs’ denial of its protests prevents the surety from raising prejudicial lack of notice as a defense in this action, and further prevents AHAC from objecting to certain interest amounts charged to its bonds. See PL’s Resp. Br. 23-24. ' ' '

The court finds AHAC is not foreclosed from arguing as defenses in this collection action that: (1) it was prejudiced by failing to receive § 1504(c) notice; (2) § 1677g interest does not accrue on outstanding duties secured by the bonds; (3) § 1505(d) interest does not apply to anti-dumping duties; and (4) the Government is not entitled to § 580 and equitable prejudgment interest.

A surety, of course, may protest Customs’ liquidation determinations on the merchandise for which it undertakes to secure the payment of duties. See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a). In doing so, however, it largely stands in the shoes of the importer, making arguments the importer could make, such as the correct amount the importer owes on the entries secured by its bond. See id. If the protest is denied with respect to these protestable matters, the surety must appeal to this Court or be bound, along with the importer, by the rule of finality as to the liquidation itself (i.e., the amount owed by the importer). See United States v. Utex Int’l Inc., 857 F.2d 1408, 1414 (Fed.Cir.1988).

As to defenses related to its contractual obligations under a bond, however, a surety is not precluded from raising them in a collection action brought by the Government. This is the case even if the defenses replicate claims it made, or could have made, in a protest brought to determine an importer’s liability on liquidation. See id. (“Once the administrative decision represented by a liquidation is made, the importer must file such a protest in order to secure further administrative review, as well as to preserve his right to judicial review. However, the issue at bar does not relate to administrative review of liquidation, brought by the importer or surety, for the time for such review is long past.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

AHAC may raise its defenses because a cause of action of the kind presented here is on the contract of insurance, not on the entry of goods into the United States. That is, the subject of a protest brought by or- in the shoes of an importer covers matters contained in the Tariff Act of 1930. See 19 U.S.C. ch. 4. The cause of action in a collection action on a bond, on the other hand, does not arise under the Tariff Act of 1930; rather, its jurisdiction is separately provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1582(2) (“The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action which arises out of an import' transaction and which is commenced by the United States ... to recover upon a bond relating to the importation of merchandise required by the laws of the United States’ or by the Secretary of the Treasury.”).

Although expressed differently at times, courts have long recognized that appeals following protest denials, and collection. actions brought by the Government, travel on different tracks and have separate jurisdictional bases. See United States v. Sherman & Sons Co., 237 U.S. 146, 35 S.Ct. 520, 59 L.Ed. 883 (1915). “[W]e hold that the importer is not con-' eluded by the - reliquidation order, and when suit is brought, for the amount claimed to be due he may file his plea and be heard in his defense as in other cases, even though he did not file a protest and make the payment required in the case of the original liquidation.” - Id. at 158, 35 S.Ct. 520:

Customs’ power to liquidate

is an. incident of the fact "that the assessment and collection of duties is an administrative matter,—no notice or hearing being necessary, since the assessment is in- rem and against the foreign goods which are sought to be entered.... [I]f ... it should be discovered that ... the'United States has been deprived of its just dues, and if •the goods themselves cannot be found, -so as to be forfeited, the inability to proceed in rem would not prevent-the [Government from bringing a suit in personam to enforce the importer’s personal liability for the debt which accrued and which rightfully should have been paid when the foreign merchandise was entered at the domestic port.

Id. at 153, 35 S.Ct. 520.

The concept that an importer’s liability is fixed (i.e., “subsumed”) by liquidation, but that a surety’s- defenses to liability on its bond are preserved, was affirmed by the Federal Circuit’s .holding that, under contracts of insurance, defenses necessarily “are personal to [the surety] and are separate and distinct from [an importer’s] protest.” See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States (St. Paul I), 959 F.2d 960, 964 (Fed.Cir.1992).

[T]he [G]overnment argues that St. Paul’s claims are barred because it failed to file a timely protest. However, the [Government admits that if St. Paul had not -filed a protest and had refused to comply with the [Government’s demand for payment, and the [Government had proceeded to sue St. Paul, no protest would have been required to assert contractual defenses against the [Government’s claim.... The justicia-bility of St. Paul’s claims is not dependent on [the importer’s] protest, nor is it prejudiced by not being part of that protest. One way to clear away the fog is simply to look at the contract claim only — that is, apart from the appeal of [the importer’s] protest.

Id. (citing Utex, 857 F.2d at 1413-14).

More recently, in United States v. Cherry Hill Textiles, Inc., the Court recognized that, although Customs has the authority to make decisions impacting liquidation directly, it does not have authority to make determinations other than those authorized by § 1514. United States v. Cherry Hill Textiles, Inc., 112 F.3d 1550, 1554 (Fed.Cir.1997) (“Congress did not ‘authorize the Collector to make findings of fraud’ and compel the importer to defend against the fraud determination through the protest mechanism.” (quoting Sherman, 237 U.S. at 155, 35 S.Ct. 520)).

In Utex, moreover, the Court held that a surety need not file a protest and deposit the demanded duties before its claims (or defenses) could be heard in a collection action. See Utex, 857 F.2d at 1414 (“Sentry states,' without contravention, that protest and advance payment of liquidated damages were not required of defendants in a district court action for damages, prior to enactment of the Customs Courts Act -of 1980, which transferred jurisdiction of actions on a surety bond from the district courts to the Court of International Trade, 28 U.S.C. § 1582. There is no suggestion in the legislative history that Congress intended to change the status of the surety in such suits. Indeed, Sentry points out that the Customs Courts Act of 1980 contained a new provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1583, that authorized sureties to implead third parties or file cross-claims in actions on a bond brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1582, an opportunity that is not readily harmonized with the [Government's position that the surety must pay all claimed damages in full before raising any defense.”); see also id. (“It is-not characteristic of either the law of suréty or the law of contracts that a defendant must routinely pay,” as it must do in order to file a protest, “the amount demanded prior to judicial determination of contractual liability. Absent statutory directive or clear Congressional intent to the contrary, we do not impose it. The cases cited by the [Government referring to finality-of assessment absent a timely protest all refer to duties and related exac-tions subsumed in- final liquidation. We entirely agree that both sides to this action are now barred from challenging the liquidation. But in a suit for damages brought by the [G]overnment, it appears clear that historically the surety was not required to file a protest and pay the full demanded damages in advance, in order to preserve its right to defend on the issue of liability. We.conclude that the 1980 legislative enactments did not change the right of the surety to defend against a claim for liquidated damages. Under the circumstances that here prevail the surety was pot rer quired to file an administrative protest and pay the damages assessed, as prerequisites to defending against the charge.” (emphases added)); United States v. Toshoku Am., Inc., 879 F.2d 815, 818 (Fed. Cir.1989) (explaining that, even following liquidation, “[p]roof that the importer has complied with the conditions of the bond has traditionally been and still remains a complete defense to a collection suit brought on the bond”).

Thus, the rule found in both law and custom remains that, in a case brought by the Government to collect under a contract of insurance, the surety is not prevented from raising defenses to defeat the Government’s claims, even thosé that would be protestable matters if raised by or on behalf of an importer.

It is also worth noting that the rule found in Utex and other cases is a sensible one. First, there are thousands of protests every year and the great majority are- resolved at the administrative level using Customs’ administrative procedures. By way of contrast, there are only a handful of collection actions brought by the Government to recover on bonds securing the payment of duties. These suits procfeed without any prior administrative proceedings and, like the one now beforé the court, may involve a great deal of money and are subject to the usual discovery arid motion practice typical of lawsuits. Moreover, these cases will normally result in a reasoned decision at summary judgment and, in some cases, a subsequent decision with findings of fact and conclusions of law following trial. It would be a peculiar situation indeed if the unreasoned determination of an administrative agency could preclude a party "in an action before this Court from interposing its defenses to insurance coverage and thereby circumvent normal court procedures^ Nor would it "make much practical ’ sense in these commercial cases to require a surety to establish certain of its contractual rights in one forum, and then require the' surety to establish other rights under the same contract of insurance as defenses elsewhere. Therefore, it is apparent that, despite AHAC’s failure to appeal the protest denials, it is not bound by the rule of finality and may interpose its defenses here.

III. . AHAC’s Claims of- Prejudice

A. Legal Framework

As noted in AHAC I, “although Customs’ failure to provide notice does not invalidate the suspensions, if AHAC was actually harmed as a result of Customs’ omission, it would be entitled to appropriate relief.” AHAC I, 35 CIT at-, Slip Op. 11-57,, at 13. Generally, under insurance law, if a surety is prejudiced by the actions of the insured, then the contract of insurance may be voided in -whole or in part. See generally Chapman v. Hoage, 296 U.S. 526, 531, 56 S.Ct. 333, 80 L.Ed. 370 (1936); Restatement (First) of Security § 128 (Am., Law Inst.1941).

AHAC argues it--was prejudiced by Customs’ failure to provide the statutorily-required notice of suspension of liquidation and, had it known of the suspensions, it would have taken measures to mitigate its liability under the bonds. Def.’s Br. 32-35. Because this claim is raised as a defense in a' collection action, the burden is oh AHAC to both plead arid demonstrate it was-prejudiced. See Great Am. I, 35 CIT at -, 791 F.Supp.2d at 1355. “Whether an error is prejudicial or harmless depends on the facts of a given case.” AHAC I, 35 CIT at-, Slip Op. 11-57; at 1A

With respect to the claims of prejudice, the Government contends AHAC has not provided any evidence that, if-the company received notice, it would have, or for that matter could have, taken any action to decrease its risks under the bonds. Pl.’s Br. 16-20. AHÁC, however, maintains it has produced ample evidence that it could and would have acted, and urges the court to dismiss the Government’s claims on account of the prejudice caused by the lack of notice. See Defi’s Br. 30-35. In other words, AHAC seeks to have its duties and obligations under both the single transaction and continuous bonds discharged as a result of the prejudice suffered by the Government’s failure to provide the statutorily-required notice that liquidation had been suspended. See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(c).

Importantly, if a claim of prejudice is based on the failure of a government entity to perform an act, the resulting harm must be of the sort the required action was designed to prevent. See Intercargo Ins. Co. v. United States, 83 F.3d 391, 396 (Fed.Cir.1996) (“Prejudice, as used in this setting, means injury to an interest that the statute, regulation, or rule in question was designed to protect.”). The Federal Circuit recently indicated that the party seeking relief from its obligations under a bond must demonstrate concrete, cognizable, “substantial prejudice.” Great Am. II, 738 F.3d at 1330. This standard is in line' with much' 'of.the law of insurance. Notably, “[t]he' theory of discharge began as a state law- defense that a surety could assert to avoid enforcement of its bond obligation on the grounds that the obligee ■ (the beneficiary of the bond) had taken improper, actions which prejudiced the surety by increasing its financial risk.” Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. United States, 654 F.3d 1305, 1313 (Fed. Cir.2011); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 772 F.3d 1281, 1288 (Fed. Cir.2014) (quoting Great Am. II, 738 F.3d at 1332). In such cases, prejudice must be established by a preponderancé of the evidence at trial. Fabil Mfg. Co. v. United States, 237 F.3d 1335, 1340-41 (Fed.Cir. 2001).

Courts have generally found that the burden placed on an insurer to prove it suffered prejudice by reason of a breach of a notice provision is a substantial' one. Intercargo, 83 F.3d at 396 (“A party is not ‘prejudiced’ by a technical defect simply because that party will, lose its case if the defect is disregarded. Prejudice, as used in this setting, means injury to an interest that the statute, regulation, or rule in question was designed to protect.”); Great Am. I, 35 CIT at-, 791 F.Supp.2d at 1359 (“Without a fact-specific demonstration of injury to an interest that the notice provisions were designed to protect, the court cannot conclude that [the surety] has pled with'particularity the prejudice suffered by the lack of notice.’’). For example, courts have required that, to create a triable issue of fact with respect to the issue 'of prejudice due to late notice, an insurer must demonstrate with competent evidence that it suffered a change in position adverse to its interests. That is, the insurer must show a substantial likelihood that it could have defeated the underlying claim against the insured, settled the case for a smaller sum than, that for. which it was ultimately settled, suffered tangible economic injury, or irretrievably lost a substantial right or the ability to mount a defense. See Goodstein v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 509 F.3d 1042, 1058 (9th Cir.2007); British Ins. Co. of Cayman v. Safety Nat’l Cas., 335 F.3d 205, 212 (3d Cir.2003); In re Texas E. Transmission Corp. PCB Contamination Ins. Coverage Litig., 15 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (3d Cir.1994); Ins. Co. of Pa. v. Associated Int’l Ins. Co., 922 F.2d 516, 524 (9th Cir.1991); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. N. River Ins. Co., 4 F.3d 1049, 1068-69 (2d Cir.1993); Granite State Ins. Co. v. Clearwater Ins. Co., No. 09 Civ. 10607, 2014 WL 12855Ó7, at *20-21 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014) (“[0]ne method to defeat liability under contracts for reinsurance is for the reinsurer to prove that the delay was ‘material or demonstrably prejudicial’”. (citation omitted)). Finally, the claimed prejudice must relate to particular bonds, not to a surety’s business in general. See Great Am. II, 738 F.3d at 1330.

Therefore, in order to be released from its' contractual obligations by reason of having suffered prejudice, AHAC must demonstrate: (1) Customs failed to provide the required statutory notice that liquidation had been suspended; (2) the purpose of the notice provision is to protect AHAC from injury to its interest with respect to being liable on the bonds; and (3) AHAC suffered actual prejudice with respect to its obligations on the bond due to Commerce’s failure to provide the required notice of suspension. Moreover, to establish prejudice, “courts ‘reject speculation, and require evidence of concrete detriment resulting from delay, together with some specific harm to the insurer caused thereby.’ ” Goodstein, 509 F.3d at 1058 (quoting Canron, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 82 Wash.App. 480, 918 P.2d 937, 941 (1996)).

First, as to the notice provision, it is evident that Customs failed to provide the notice required by § 1504(c). Def.’s Statement ¶¶ 114-17. The Government asserts it provided AHAC with actual notice because Customs sent notice to AHAC’s former agent, Shea. Pl.’s Br. 16-18; PL’s Resp. Br. 4. The Government also appears to claim that AHAC had actual notice, or at' least' knowledge, that its bonds secured entries subject to antidump-ing duties. PL’s Br. 19. These arguments, however, simply do not take the place of the notice Congress directed Customs to give, the purpose of which was to protect sureties. The Government’s assertion that notice to a stranger to the contracts of insurance, an agent that had been fired by AHAC and which never informed AHAC of the notice, could be said to constitute actual notice is too much of' a stretch to be seriously considered. In addition, the Government has produced no evidence that any AHAC employee ever saw any of the publications in the Federal Register, that the company was under any statutory duty to monitor such publications, or that notice-to a surety by publication was authorized.

Accordingly, the court finds the alleged service on AHAC’s previous agent, Shea, instead of GSIS, the actual agent and underwriter of the bonds, does not satisfy the notice requirements of § 1504(c). See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(c) (“If the liquidation of any entry is suspended, the Secretary shall by regulation require that notice of the suspension be provided, in such manner as the Secretary considers appropriate, to the importer of record or drawback claimant, as the case may be, and to any authorized agent and surety of such importer of record or drawback claimant.” (emphasis added)). Moreover, the statute requires that both the authorized agent and the surety itself be given notice. Even if there could be some argument that service on Shea was sufficient, there is no factual dispute as to whether AHAC received notice. The Government has not submitted evidence sufficient to meet its burden- on summary judgment as to whether it sent the required- statutory notice to AHAC. That is, -the Government’s claim that it served Shea, and its proffer-of a “screen shot” dated in 2010, without more, is insufficient' for a- reasonable jury to conclude AHAC received actual - or constructive notice... - "

Second, the legislative history of §. 1504(c) demonstrates an intent to protect sureties from greater risk under bonds. H.R.Rep. No. 95-621, at 25 (1977) (“The addition of this subsection gives notice to the sure[t]y companies and other third parties that there is a potential for loss. Thus, the sureties can take appropriate measures upon receiving this notice- to make sure that at least as to continuing activitiés, the risk of loss will be minimized.”). Also, it is clear that Congress, by enacting the amendments surrounding § ■ 1504(c), endeavored to protect “[s]urety companies, which are jointly liable with importers for additional duties, [so they] would be better able to control their liabilities. Sureties would -also be better protected against- losses resulting from the dissolution of -their principals in instances where there has been undue delay in liquidating entries.” Id. at 4.

In support of AHAC’s argument that it suffered injury as a .result of Customs’ failure to provide notice, the company insists that the required notice “would have alerted AHAC to increased risk of loss on its bonds, which could have led AHAC to take remedial measures.” Def.’s Br. 31. AHAC maintains, moreover, that its financial risks were increased by Commerce’s failure to provide notice of the suspended liquidation, principally because, had it received notice, it could have.(l) demanded more collateral, (2) terminated the bonds, or (3) taken other actions to protect its import duty bond business generally. See Defi’s Br. 32-35; Def.’s Resp. Br. 7-8.

The court’s inquiry now turns to the question of whether AHAC has presented sufficient evidence of prejudice to be entitled to summary judgment on its defense or to create a triable issue of fact regarding its liability on the bonds. See AHAC I, 35 CIT at-, Slip Op. 11-57,..at 13-14. Here, there are two types of bonds at issue, and the court will discuss AHAC’s claims with respect to each separately.

B. Single Transaction Bonds

As to the single transaction bonds, the court finds AHAC has not shown prejudicial harm from Commerce’s failure to provide it with notice of suspension as required by 19 U.S.C. § 1504(c) to prevail on summary judgment.

First, AHAC claims it could have demanded additional collateral from the importers if it was aware that liquidation had been suspended. ■ Def.’s Br. ¡34. Defendant, however, has not established any basis on which it could have demanded more collateral after the single transaction bonds were executed. As a surety, AHAC’s duties and obligations under the single transaction bonds attached when each bond was executed and each individual entry was made. See Great Am. II, 738 F.3d at 1330. AHAC has failed to provide any contractual basis by which a post-execution demand for additional collateral from the importer would have amounted to more than a unilateral attempt to modify its preexisting contract without offering any consideration in return. In addition, AHAC has provided no practical reason why any of its importers would have felt compelled to provide additional collateral. That' is, because the agreement to act as a surety for the importer was complete once the single transaction bonds were executed, the importers had no reason to put up more collateral. This holding is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s ruling in Great American II, where the Court rejected similar arguments, noting that, under a single transaction bond, a surety’s obligations have already attached and it would therefore be unable to alter its liability on the bond. Id.

AHAC’s argument that it could have obtained, at an earlier date, experienced counsel to investigate its liability exposure and alter future business policies accordingly, are equally unavailing because this is irrelevant to the single transaction bonds. See id. (“Great American argues that the [Government's failure to send it a separate notice of suspension injured it because, had it gotten such a notice, it could have sought reinsurance, ceased doing business with the importer to limit its future risk, or attehipted to minimize its loss on these bonds by participating in the administrative review of the duties at issue and arguing for a lower rate for the entries covered by the bonds. But the trial court correctly recognized that certain of the identified possible actions are irrelevant to the single-transaction bonds at issue here, because altering future.business policies could not limit the risk Great American had already incurred under the bonds in question.”). Thus, obtaining experienced counsel would not have helped AHAC to mitigate its losses; nor would termination of any of the single transaction bonds have been possible for AHAC. See Great Am. I, 35 CIT at -, 791 F.Supp.2d at 1356 (“Termination is not a legal option for [a single transaction bond] surety.”).

Further, the court