Citations
- 153 F. Supp. 3d 894
Full opinion text
ORDER & REASONS
CARL J. BARBIER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is a First Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Vacating the U.S. Army Corps’ Permit (Rec. Doc. 18) filed by Plaintiff, the Town of Abita Springs (“Abita Springs” or the “Town”); an opposition thereto (Rec. Doc. 35) filed by Defendants, United States Army Corps of Engineers, Lieutenant General Thomas P. Bostick, John M. McHugh, and Martin S. Mayer (collectively, the “Corps”); an opposition thereto (Rec. Doc. 67) filed by Intervenor Defendant, Helis Oil & Gas Company, L.L.C, (“Helis”); Plaintiffs Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment Vacating the U.S. Army Corps’ Permit (Rec. Doc. 70); Helis’s opposition thereto (Rec. Doc. 71); Abita Springs’ reply thereto (Rec. Doc. 82); the Corps’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 76); and Abita Springs’ opposition thereto (Rec. Doc. 78). The motions were set for hearing, with oral argument, on December 2, 2015. Having considered the motions, legal memoranda, and arguments-of counsel; the record; and the applicable law, the Court finds that Abita Springs’ motions should be DENIED and the Corps’ cross-motion should be GRANTED for the reasons set forth more fully below.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This dispute derives from the Corps’ decision to grant Helis a permit to dredge and fill wetlands under section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344. Helis has proposed an exploration and production project that will be conducted in two separate phases, referred to as “Phase 1” and “Phase 2” respectively. AR 809. Phase 1 comprises the development of a site for the drilling of a vertical well in order for Helis to obtain information regarding the production potential of a subsurface geologic formation over two miles below the land surface from which Helis plans to extract oil and gas. Id. If the data collected from the vertical well confirms the potential for economically viable mineral production from the target zone, Helis intends to implement Phase 2, which will consist of the development of a site to support the drilling of a horizontal well advanced from the vertical well drilled in Phase 1. Id.
Helis initially sought a permit that would cover both phases of its proposed project. On April 14, 2014, the Corps published a public notice of Helis’s original permit application to construct a drill-site well pad, approximately 10.55 acres in size, that would accommodate an oil and gas exploration well and multiple hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) wells. AR 4857. Due to public interest, the Corps granted two time extensions to the comment period, which ended on June 16, 2014. AR 4950. On July 29, 2014, a Geologic Review meeting coordinated by the Corps and facilitated by the Louisiana Geological Survey (“LGS”) was held to discuss the geological aspects associated with the proposal. Id. In attendance were representatives from the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (“LDWF”), Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (“LDEQ”), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), along with representatives for Helis and the Corps. AR 400. After reviewing the information presented by Helis, John E. Johnston III of the LGS, the consulting geologist at the Geologic Review meeting, concluded that there existed “[n]o less damaging feasible alternatives” to the location selected by Helis for its proposed project. AR 358. However, Johnston determined that the site had no more than a fifty percent chance of becoming a viable production site. AR 400. As a result, Johnston recommended that a single exploratory well be constructed to obtain better data to assess the viability of producing oil and gas at the site. Id. He also recommended that Helis reduce the size of its fill for the well pad from approximately 9.46 acres to 3.2 acres. AR 400-01. The LDWF, LDEQ, EPA, and the Corps agreed with the recommendations, and the Corps suggested that Helis submit revised plans proposing a single exploratory well with a maximum 3.2 acres of fill, “based on a revised purpose to obtain additional data/information to evaluate the viability of producing fossil fuels in this specific geographical area.” AR 4951; accord AR 400-01.
On October 3, 2014, Helis submitted an amended permit application that reduced the scope and footprint of the proposed work. As requested by the Corps, Helis amended its initial permit application to encompass the surface development required for Phase 1 of the project only, i.e., the drilling of the vertical well, and reduced the size of the well pad. AR 524-25. The Corps determined that the application was complete and issued a public notice on October 14, 2014. AR 512. The public notice indicated that the Corps and LDEQ were soliciting public comments for a period of thirty days. AR 513. Accordingly, the period ended on November 13, 2014. During the public comment period, the Corps received over 100 comments from individuals and organizations. (Rec. Doc. 35-1, at 3.) After the comment period closed, the Corps received more than eighty additional comments from the public. Id. According to the Corps, all comments received, including those submitted by Abita Springs after the close of the comment period, were considered in the Corps’ decision-making process. (Rec. Doc. 76-1, at 10.)
After the close of the comment period, the Corps sent two letters to Helis. On December 2, 2014, the Corps sent Helis a letter asking for its response to comments received from the public. AR 2962. In addition, the Corps sent Helis a letter on December 4, 2014, requesting Helis’s response to the EPA’s and the Corps’ comments. AR 2968. In particular, the Corps requested that Helis respond to the EPA’s concerns that Helis had not considered alternative non-wetland sites for its project. Id. The Corps also asked Helis to respond to the EPA’s request that Helis examine opportunities to minimize wetland impacts by reducing or reconfiguring the project’s footprint. Id. Further, the Corps asked Helis to respond to its own concerns about whether Helis had developed contingency plans and best management practices in order to prevent pollution in the event of flooding. AR 2968-69.
On January 2, 2015, Helis provided the Corps with a detailed twenty-five page response to comments and requests for information, along with twenty-one attached exhibits. AR 3609. In total, Helis’s response and exhibits amount to over 500 pages. AR 3609-4115. Despite Abita Springs’ request, the Corps failed to reopen the public comment period after Helis submitted the additional information. AR 4239. On February 25, 2015, after reviewing Helis’s response, the EPA advised the Corps that it did not object to the proposed project. AR 4515. On March 19, 2015, the LDEQ concluded “the discharge of fill material for the construction of a well pad and an exploratory vertical well to obtain geologic data to confirm the production potential of a very specific subsurface geologic zone will not violate water quality standards” and issued Helis a Water Quality Certification. AR 4611. In May 2015, Brad Laborde, the Corps project manager assigned to the permit, communicated with John Johnston to ask for additional information 'concerning less damaging alternatives. AR 4826. Johnston reiterated that “[a]ll of the locations were reviewed and the least damaging feasible location was selected.” AR. 4830.
The Corps prepared a Memorandum for Record approving the permit application on June 5, 2015. AR 4950. The Memorandum for Record addressed all substantive issues raised by the public comments received and contained the Corps’ analysis required by the Clean Water Act and National Environmental Policy -Act, including the Corps’ “Environmental Assessment,” “404(b)(1) Guidelines Evaluation,” “Public Interest Review,” and “Statement of Findings.” AR 4950-5048. The Corps found that “the proposed action would not have a significant impact on aquatic resources and/or quality of the human environment; therefore, an Environmental Impact Statement [was not] required.” AR 4984.'
On June 8, 2015, the Corps issued Helis the permit. AR 5295. Specifically, the permit authorizes Helis to “[c]lear,‘ grade, excavate, and deposit fill for a guard facility, three bypass roads, a well pad, and appurtenances to install and service a vertical exploratory test well.” AR 5295. The proposed work will impact a total of 3.13 acres of wetlands. AR 4951.
The claims in this case arise under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C, § 551 et seq.; the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.; and the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. Abita Springs filed its initial complaint and commenced this action on February 12, 2015, although the Corps had not yet issued the permit. (Rec. Doc. 1.) On June 26, 2015, Abita Springs filed its First Amended Complaint, challenging the newly-issued permit. (Rec. Doc. 15.) In its First Amended Complaint, Abita Springs claims that the Corps followed unlawful procedures, failing to allow for public comment on more than 500 pages of documentation submitted by Helis to complete its application after the close of the public comment period. Id. at 2. Abita Springs also claims that the Corps issued the permit in violation of regulations that prohibit the Corps from authorizing destruction of wetlands unless the Corps reasonably concludes that there is no “practical alternative” that would have a less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem and that the Corps failed to conduct a lawful analysis of alternatives. Id. at 1-2.
On July 9, 2015, Abita Springs filed its First Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Vacating the U.S. Army Corps’ Permit (Rec. Doc. 18), originally set for hearing with oral argument on July 29, 2015. The Corps filed a Motion to Continue Plaintiffs First Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, arguing that Abita Springs’ motion was premature because the administrative record had not yet been compiled and lodged. (Rec. Doc. 28-1, at 2.) The Court granted the Corps’ motion on July 22, 2015, and continued the hearing on Abita Springs’ motion until October 23, 2015. (Rec. Doc. 39.) In addition, the Court ordered the Corps to file the administrative record on or before September 20, 2015. Id. at 2.
On September 4, 2015, the Corps filed a Motion to Continue Administrative Record Due Date and Further Proceedings. (Rec. Doc. 59.) The Court granted the motion in part on September 16, 2015, and extended the Corps’ deadline for filing the administrative record until October 20, 2015. (Rec. Doc. 64, at 7.) Further, the Court continued the hearing on Abita Springs’ motion until December 2, 2015, and ordered Abita Springs to file any supplement to its motion by November 4, 2015, and Defendants to file any response to Abita Springs’ motion by November 16, 2015. Id.
Abita Springs filed the instant Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment Vacating the U.S. Army Corps’ Permit (Rec. Doc. 70) on November 4, 2015; Helis opposed the motion on November 16, 2015. The Corps filed its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 76) and brief in opposition to Abita Springs’ supplemental motion on November 18, 2015. Abita Springs opposed the Corps’ cross-motion on November 24, 2015. In addition, the Court granted Abita Springs leave to file a reply in support of its supplemental motion on December 2, 2015.
LEGAL STANDARD
When presented with a motion for summary judgment, a court normally considers whether the record, “viewed-in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” evinces a genuine issue of material fact. Tex. Comm. on Nat. Res. v. Van Winkle, 197 F.Supp.2d 586, 595 (N.D.Tex.2002) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Hill v. London, Stetelman, & Kirkwood, Inc., 906 F.2d 204, 207 (5th Cir.1990)). Only if the court answers the inquiry in--the negative will the moving party be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. This formula adjusts, however, when it arises in:the context of judicial review of an administrative agency’s decision.’ Id. In such cases, the “motion for summary judgment Stands in a somewhat unusual light, in that the administrative record proves the complete factual predicate for the court’s review.” Id. (citing Piedmont Envtl. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 159 F.Supp.2d 260, 268 (W.D.Va.2001)). The movant’s burden is therefore “similar to his ultimate burden on the merits.” Id.
Despite these necessary alterations to the usual analysis under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts have held that summary judgment remains “an appropriate procedure for resolving a challenge to a federal agency’s administrative decision when review is based on the administrative record.” Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F.Supp. 96, 105 (D.D.C.1995). When reviewing an administrative agency’s decision, the district court must “determine whether as a matter of law, evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did, and summary judgment is an appropriate mechanism for deciding the legal question of whether an agency could reasonably have found the facts as it did.” Sierra Club v. Dombeck, 161 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1064 (D.Ariz.2001); see also City of San Francisco v. United States, 130 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir.1997).
A court will set aside or otherwise disturb 'nonadjudicatory agency action if the party pursuing judicial review shows that, the agency “action, findings, and con-elusions” are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” or if they were made “without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). “To make this finding the court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) (citations omitted); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). “The burden of proving that an agency decision was arbitrary or capricious [or made without proper procedures] rests with the party seeking to overturn the agency decision.” Van Winkle, 197 F.Supp.2d at 596.
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Standing
1. Parties’ Arguments
Abita Springs contends that it satisfies the requirements for standing as set forth in Article III of the United States Constitution. First, Abita Springs claims that it has suffered concrete economic and aesthetic injuries because “[t]he Corps’ violations in failing to provide a meaningful opportunity for notice and comment and failing to analyze non-wetland alternatives threaten Abita Springs’ concrete interests.” (Rec. Doc. 70-1, at 21.) In particular, Abita Springs argues the permit at issue “threatens the Town’s environmental amenities, reputation, and value as a place to live, visit, and open a business.” Id. at 1. In support of this contention, the attached declaration of Greg Lemons, Mayor of Abi-ta Springs, provides that Helis’s project has already damaged the Town’s “image” and “brand” and will continue to do so if the vertical well is drilled. (Rec. Doc. 70-3, at 2-4.) Because this brand is Abita Springs’ primary draw for tourists, current residents, and future residents, Abita Springs argues that harm to its brand threatens not only the Town’s aesthetic interest but this translates into an economic injury as well. (Rec. Doc. 70-1, at 22.) In addition, Abita Springs argues that the Helis project could lead to contamination of the Southern Hills Aquifer, the Town’s water supply. Id. at 23. Second, Abita Springs claims that its injuries are fairly traceable to the Corps’ actions because its injuries are caused by the Helis operation approved by the Corps’ permit. Id. Lastly, Abita Springs claims that the procedural remedy it requests, that the Court vacate the permit and remand to the Corps to provide for meaningful notice and comment and for a proper alternatives analysis, may redress its injuries. Id. at 24.
In its opposition, Helis contends that Abita Springs lacks standing to bring this suit. (Rec. Doc. 71, at 7.) As an initial matter, Helis argues that the Town must establish that the Corps’ alleged procedural failings have caused harm directly to the municipality itself, as opposed to its residents. Id. at 8. Moreover, because Abita Springs alleges violations of environmental protection statutes, Helis argues that Abi-ta Springs must demonstrate that its injury is environmental in nature. Id. at 9. According to Helis, “the conclusory, unsupported, hearsay allegations of Mayor Lemons are not sufficient to establish the facts necessary for Plaintiff to carry its burden to demonstrate that it has standing.” Id. at 11. Helis argues that Abita Springs’ alleged injury is hypothetical and based ón an incorrect perception regarding the Phase 1 activity approved by the Corps’ permit. Id. at 18. For instance, Lemons’s declaration references' fracking despite the fact that no fracking activity is authorized by the permit at issue. Id. at 15. Furthermore, Helis points out that Abita Springs has submitted no evidence that the activities conducted pursuant to the permit at issue will pollute the groundwater. Id. at 12. Next, Helis argues that Abita Springs has offered no evidence that the alleged harm is fairly traceable to the Corps’ actions. Rather, Helis argues the cause of Abita Springs’ injury “is the incorrect and unsubstantiated guess allegedly held by an unquantified number of unnamed individuals” that Helis’s Phase 1 operations will pollute the groundwater. Id. at 14.
The Corps provides similar arguments in opposition in its cross-motion for summary judgment. (Rec. Doc. 76-1, at 11-15.) According to the Corps, Abita Springs lacks standing because it fails to establish that it will suffer an injury from the permit at issue or that any such injury is fairly traceable to the Corps’ decision to grant the permit. Id. at 12. The Corps argues that the Town’s alleged harms are “tied almost exclusively to a definition of ‘project’ that conflates both the exploratory well at issue here and a second project for a fracking well that has not been applied for, much less permitted.” Id. at 18. According to the Corps, such speculation regarding future harms from a different project provides no basis for standing. Id. at 1344. Further, the Corps argues that the testimony provided by Abita Springs is not sufficiently particularized to support standing. For example, the Corps contends that Abita Springs does not establish how “the filling of 3.2 acres of wetlands several miles from [its] borders ‘adversely impacts Abita Springs’ aesthetic appeal.’” Id. at 14. In addition, the Corps argues that Abi-ta Springs’ allegations fail to establish standing because they are based upon the actions of third parties. Id. at 15 (“Plaintiff seems to base its allegations of injury on the independent ‘perceptions’ of residents or decisions of ‘a number of people that have not come to Abita Springs.’”). In sum, while Abita Springs might have standing to challenge a subsequent permit related to fracking activities, the Corps contends that the Town lacks standing to challenge the exploratory permit at issue.
Abita Springs responds to the Corps’ arguments in its opposition to the Corps’ cross-motion. (Rec. Doc. 78, at 13.) First, Abita Springs argues that its injuries do not rely on the fracking aspect of the project. Id. at 13- According to Abita Springs, the permit authorizes a drilling project and this alone injures its brand. Further, Abita Springs argues that the defendant’s actions need not be the very last step in the chain of causation; therefore, to the extent that some of its injuries are tied to the fracking phase, this permit injures those interests. Id. at 14. Next, Abita Springs argues that damage to its brand is concrete and particularized. For example, the Town claims it will suffer aesthetically and Town life will be less enjoyable if the area of the project site becomes environmentally degraded. Id. at 16. Further, Abita Springs maintains that “aesthetic and environmental well-being are not only important ingredients in society in general, [but are] -of paramount importance to Abita Springs and its residents.” Id.
Abita Springs also maintains that it satisfies the prudential requirements for standing. (Rec. Doc. 70-1, at 24.) According to Abita Springs, its interests articulated in Lemons’s declaration fall squarely within the “zone of interests” designed to be protected by the Clean Water Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. Id. Further, in its reply, Abita Springs argues that actual environmental injury is not required and that it is not required to prove its concerns will become a reality. (Rec. Doc. 82, at 8.)
2. Discussion
Before reaching the merits of the instant motions for summary judgment, the Court must first determine whether Abita Springs has standing to challenge the permit at issue. Whether á plaintiff has standing to sue is a threshold jurisdictional question. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 101—02, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). To satisfy Article III’s standing requirements, a plaintiff must show “(1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the- defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). In a procedural rights case, the plaintiff need not show that the procedural remedy he is requesting will in fact redress his injury. Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606, 613 (5th Cir.1998). “When a litigant is vested with a procedural right, that litigant has standing if there is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant.” Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 748 (5th Cir.2015). In order to make this showing, the plaintiff must show that “the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of [its] that is the ultimate basis of [its] standing.” Glickman, 156 F.3d at 613 (alterations in original) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)).
As a municipality, Abita Springs may not simply assert the particularized injuries to the “concrete interests” of its citizens on their behalf. City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir.2004); City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 268 (D.C.Cir.2002); City of Safety Harbor v. Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251, 1256 n. 7 (5th Cir.1976). Rather, as a municipality, Abita Springs may sue to protect its own “proprietary interests,” which might be congruent with those of its citizens. City of Sausalito, 386 F.3d at 1197. For example, courts have recognized that a municipality has an interest in its ability to enforce land-use and health regulations, its powers-of revenue collection and taxation, its aesthetic appeal, and in protecting its natural resources from harm. Id. at 1198. Thus, in order to establish standing, Abita Springs must show that the Corps’ actions caused harm to the Town itself, as opposed to its citizens.
In other circuits, courts have found standing for a municipality when concrete harm to its aesthetic or economic interests have been alleged. For example, in City of Sausalito v. O’Neil, the Ninth Circuit held that the city adequately alleged an Article III injury where it alleged that a National Park Service proposal would result in a detrimental increase in traffic and crowds in the city’s downtown area, affecting the city’s management and public safety functions. Id. at 1198-99. Furthermore, the court held that the city asserted an injury to its aesthetic appeal because the congestion accompanying the proposal would “destroy the City’s quiet, beauty, serenity and quaint and historic village character and attributes.” Id. Because the city alleged that the aesthetic damage would erode its tax revenue, the injury was cognizable as both and aesthetic injury and an economic injury. Id. Similarly, in City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, although it was “a close question,” the District of Columbia Circuit held that a city located two miles from an airport satisfied Article Ill’s injury requirement by alleging harm to its own economic interests based on the environmental impacts of an approved airport reconstruction project. 292 F.3d at 268.
In the instant case, Abita Springs uses the declaration of Mayor Lemons to provide facts in support of its standing arguments. As an initial matter, Helis and the Corps challenge the admissibility of several portions of Lemons’s declaration on the grounds of lack of foundation and hearsáy. (Rec. Docs. 71, at 11; 76-1, at 15 n.18.) “[O]n a motion for summary judgment, the evidence proffered by the plaintiff to satisfy his burden of proof must' be competent and admissible at trial.” Bellard v. Gautreaux, 675 F.3d 454, 460 (5th Cir.2012); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (“An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be madA on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.”). The Federal Rules of Evidence define “hearsay” as “a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while testifying,at the current' trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Fed. R. Evid, 801(c). Hearsay is inadmissible unless an exception applies. Fed. R. Evid. 802. Furthermore, under Federal Rule of Evidence 602, a witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has “personal knowledge” of the matter. Fed. R. Evid. 602. Thus, while a witness may testify about his or her own perceptions, such testimony may not relate to the perceptions of others. See Fed. R. Evid. 602, 801(c), 802.
Helis and the Corps object to the portions of Lemons’s declaration discussing the perceptions and decisions of unnamed Abita Springs residents. (See Rec. Doc. 70-3, at 4.) For example, Lemons testified that, with Helis’s project imminent, “Abita Springs’ residents and potential future residents perceive that they are not living in a pristine area but that, rather, they are living near ‘oil city.’” Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, Lemons testified that “Abita Springs’ residents and potential future residents and businesses perceive that the Helis Oil .project could lead to contamination of the’Southern Hills Aquifer.” Id. (emphasis added). As the Corps and Helis argue, these portions of Lemons’s declaration are inadmissible hearsay and lack the required showing of personal knowledge. Abita Springs simply responds, without explanation, that “the Mayor’s discussion about what the Town’s citizens perceive is based on his personal knowledge.” (Rec. Doc. 78, at 18.) However, it is unclear how Lemons could have personal knowledge of what others perceive or will potentially perceive in the future. Moreover, Abita Springs does not argue that an exception to the rule against hearsay applies.
Abita Springs has also offered evidence that some of its residents have already moved from the Town and potential visitors have refrained from coming to the Town because of the pending drilling project. (Rec. Doc. 70-3, at 4.) Specifically, Lemons testified, “We have had a number of people that have not come to Abita Springs because the pending drilling project is not something that they want to be around. We have also had folks move out or sell property already in part because of the Helis pending drilling project.” Id. None of the residents who have moved away from Abita Springs or any of the people who decided not to travel to Abita Springs have provided declarations in this matter. Even assuming that Lemons has personal knowledge that an unspecified number of people have not come to Abita Springs or that some residents have moved away from the Town, there is no evidence sufficient to support a finding that Lemons has personal knowledge of their motives. Of course, even if these people told Lemons that they decided to move away or not to visit Abita Springs because of the Helis project, such statements would be hearsay unless Abita Springs establishes that an exception applies.
Now the Court considers whether the remaining portions of Lemons’s declaration support a finding that Abita Springs has standing to challenge the permit at issue. As testified to in Lemons’s declaration, “One of Abita Springs’ core assets is its clean water, clean air, and healthy living.” (Rec. Doc. 70-3, at 2.) Additionally, Lemons stated that one of his main projects as mayor has been to turn this asset into Abita Springs’ “brand.” Id. Indeed, Abita Springs has expended resources developing and promoting this brand. Id. According to Lemons, the Helis project adversely impacts Abita Springs’ brand because it adversely impacts the Abita Springs image. Id. at 4. If Phase 1 of the Helis project proceeds, Lemons believes Abita Springs’ brand will continue to be adversely impacted. Id. Similarly, Lemons testified that the Helis project adversely impacts Abita Springs’ aesthetic appeal, which, in turn, adversely affects Abita Springs’ tax revenue from property taxes. Id. at 3. Moreover, Lemons is “concerned about the risk of the Helis project causing contamination of the water in the Southern Hills Aquifer ... because each time you drill a hole through the aquifer, it is a potential point of failure.” Id. at 5. The Town sells water from the aquifer; therefore, contamination would result in an economic injury. Id. In short, Abita Springs alleges that any activity associated with Helis’s proposed oil exploration project, whether it be the development of a drill site for the drilling of a vertical exploratory well in Phase 1 or the drilling of a horizontal fracking well in Phase 2,. adversely affects its brand and reputation as a place for healthy living, pristine water, and clean air.
Though Abita Springs may have a proprietary interest in its brand, aesthetic appeal, and natural resources, it must allege sufficient harm to its proprietary interest caused by the approved Helis project. As mentioned above, the alleged injuries must be “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,” and fairly traceable to the Corps’ action in issuing Helis the permit at issue. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180, 120 S.Ct. 693. Thus, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reiterated that “‘threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact,’ and that ‘[a]llegations of possible future injury’ are not sufficient.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1147, 185 L.Ed.2d 264 (2013). In City of Sausalito, it was undisputed that the implementation of the National Park Service’s plan would result in an increase in local traffic, an increase in air pollutant emissions, and an incremental contribution to the cumulative noise environment. 386 F.3d at 1199. The court therefore found that implementation of the plan would result in known, predictable consequences that the city identified as concrete injury. Id. Here, by contrast, the alleged injuries to Abita Springs’ brand, aesthetic appeal, and natural resources are much less clear. Abita Springs has not provided much evidence in support of its arguments for standing. Even taking a generous reading of Abita Springs’ materials, the alleged harm to its aesthetic, and economic interests could- be characterized as hypothetical or conjectural. Assuming Abita Springs meets it burden to prove standing, the Court nevertheless concludes that the Corps’ decision to issue the permit was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the law, for the reasons discussed below.
B. Adequacy of Public Notice
1. Parties’ Arguments
Abita Springs contends that the Helis permit should be vacated because the Corps denied Abita Springs the right to meaningfully comment on the permit proposal. (Rec. Doc. 70-1, at 4.) Abita Springs alleges that the Corps issued the permit based on “critical information that was not available to the public during the comment period.” Id. at 2. In other words, the Town argues that the Corps’ notice did not include enough information to generate meaningful comment. Id. at 6. In particular, Abita Springs claims that the public notice did not include information necessary to evaluate the availability of practicable alternatives. Id. at 9. Without an alternatives analysis, Abita Springs argues public notice is insufficient to allow for meaningful comment. Id.
First, Abita .Springs asserts that the alternatives evaluation was absent from the public notice because the Corps issued its public notice on an incomplete application. Id. at 7. According to Abita Springs, when the Corps noticed the Helis permit proposal for public comment, Helis had not provided an analysis of alternatives sufficient to rebut the presumption that non-wetland sites are available for its project. Id. at 8. In support of this argument, the Town cites the letter the Corps sent to Helis on December 4, 2014, asking Helis to respond to concerns that Helis had not considered alternative, non-wetland sites. Id. (citing AR 2968-70). Abita Springs claims this letter is evidence that additional information was required to complete the application. Id. Thus, Abita Springs argues that the Corps issued its public notice on an incomplete application. Id.
Second, Abita Springs alleges that the Corps relied on key information received after the public comment period closed. Id. at 9. Specifically, the Town argues that the Corps’ analysis of alternatives 'was based on “more than 500 pages of additional information” that Helis' provided on January 2, 2015. Id. at 9-10. Abita Springs claims that the Corps’ explanation of why other sites are not practicable includes a detailed discussion about’ geologic information provided by control wells in the area of Helis’s chosen site. Id. at 11 (citing AR 5338-39, 5341-42). The Town admits that Helis generally mentioned the existence of these control wells in its revised application; however, “none of the detailed information relied on by the Corps in its [Memorandum for Record] was included in Helis’s application materials.” Id. Moreover, while Helis apparently included a map with the location of these control wells in its revised application, Abita Springs claims that the Corps did not include the map in the information it made available to the public. Id. at 11. n.3 (citing AR 556-67, 571-93). According to Abita Springs, the Corps identified these control wells for the first time in two maps attached as exhibits to its Memorandum for Record. Id. at 10 (citing AR 5412-13).
In addition, Abita Springs identifies two other sources of non-public information on which it claims the Corps improperly relied. One is the statement of Paul Lawless, Helis’s Geological Manager for Unconventional Resources, which Helis submitted as Exhibit 11 to its response- to the Corps’ December 4 letter. Id. (citing AR 3558-59). Another source of non-public information on which Abita Springs claims the Corps relied is the Geologic Review meeting held oh July 29, 2014. Id. at 12. (citing AR 358-59, 400-05). The Town argues that the Corps makes clear that it relied on this information in its Memorandum for Record, in which it referenced the conclusion of a “consulting geologist” at the Geologic Review that no less damaging alternatives were available; Id. (citing 5340). In sum, Abita Springs maintains that the Corps’ issuance of the Helis permit without providing an opportunity for public comment on information about alternatives violated the Clean Water" Act and the National Environmental Policy Act.
In its cross-motion in opposition, the Corps contends that it properly determined that Helis’s application was complete and published sufficient details of the project for public notice and comment. (Rec. Doc. 76-1, at 15.) First, the Corps argues that Helis’s permit application included detailed information, including maps and project drawings, which described the nature, location, and purpose of its proposed project; the amount and nature of discharge to wetlands; and the reasons for these discharges. Id. at 16 (citing AR 526-28). According to the Corps, the application also described the process and criteria Helis used to select the site and to evaluate other alternative sites, and it described its efforts to avoid and to minimize wetland and other impacts at the site. Id. (citing AR 588-40).
Second, the Corps asserts that the public notice provided sufficient information to give a clear' understanding of the nature and magnitude of the activity to generate meaningful comment, as required by the Corps’ regulations. Id. at 16-17 (citing AR 512-23). In addition, the Corps points out that it published Helis’s permit application on its website and circulated to the media a press release concerning the project, which provided a link to the public notice and Helis’s permit application. Id. at 17. Thus, the Corps maintains that it provided the public with more than sufficient information to generate meaningful comments, which is all that is required.
Third, the Corps claims that it asked Helis to respond to comments and concerns raised, by the public about its application, as contemplated by the Corps’ regulations. Id. According to the Corps, its request for Helis’s response to these public comments is “precisely the type of information request that the Corps is authorized to make after the close of the public comment period.” Id. (citing 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(a)(3)). Contrary to Abita Springs’ argument, the Corps argues that its regulations do not require it to reopen the comment period upon receiving Helis’s responses to the public comments. Id. Rather, the Corps explains that the district engineer has discretion to issue a supplemental, revised, or corrected public notice “if in his view there is a change in the application data that would affect the public’s review of the proposal.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(a)(2)). The Corps argues that it was not required to reopen public comment in this case because Helis’s response on January 2, 2015, “simply provided more detailed background information” about Helis’s consideration of topics discussed in its permit application. Id. at 18-19 (citing AR 538-40, 3623-27). Moreover, the Corps notes that it published Helis’s responses on its public website. Id. at 19. Therefore, the Corps contends that it did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to reopen the public comment period after Helis. responded to the public comments.
In its opposition to the Corps’ cross-motion, Abita Springs claims that the Corps’ argument that its notice and comment was sufficient does not address its reliance on critical information not available for public comment. (Rec. Doc. 78, at 10-11.) Ab'ita Springs insists that the Corps was of the view that Helis had not yet rebutted the presumption that there are less damaging, practicable alternatives available when it sent the letter to Helis on December 4, 2014. Id. at 11-12. Because the Corps changed its mind after receiving Helis’s response in January 2015, Abita Springs argues the additional information “[cjlearly ... affected the Corps’ view of the proposal in a significant way.” Id. at 12. For this reason,' Abita Springs asserts that the Corps’ determination that the information would not affect the public’s view is arbitrary. Id.
In addition, Abita Springs argues that the Corps’ publication of Helis’s supplemental material on its website did not cure the notice and comment -violation. Id. First, Abita Springs points out that the record does not reflect that the public was given notice as to the publication of this new information. Id. Second, the Corps did not officially provide for a comment period on these materials. Id. Even if the Corps accepted and considered late comments, Abita Springs argues that the public had no way to know that a late comment would be accepted. Id. at 13. Thus, Abita Springs maintains that the public was not provided with a meaningful opportunity to comment on key information on which the Corps ■relied before ultimately granting Helis’s permit.
2. Discussion
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act authorizes the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Corps, to issue a permit for the discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters “after notice and opportunity for public hearings.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). The Corps must publish notice soliciting public comment within fifteen days after receipt of a complete application. 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(a)(2); 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). If the application is incomplete, the Corps must request from the applicant any additional information necessary for a complete application. 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(a)(1). Generally, an application “must include a complete description of the proposed activity including necessary drawings, sketches, or plans sufficient; for public notice.” Id. § 325.1(d)(1). Detailed engineering plans and specifications are not required; however, the application must describe “the location, purpose and need for the proposed activity; scheduling of the activity; the names and addresses of adjoining property owners; the location and dimensions of adjacent structures; and a list of authorizations required by other federal, interstate, state, or local agencies ... including all approvals received or denials already made.” Id. In short, a complete application is defined in terms of the sufficiency of the submitted materials to issue public notice. Id.. 325 1(d)(10) (“An application will be determined to be complete' when sufficient information, is received to issue public notice.”).
Because completion is defined by the sufficiency of the submitted materials to warrant public notice, it is controlled by Corps’ regulation that govern the content of a public notice. See id. § 325.3(a). Public notice serves as “the primary method of advising all interested parties of the proposed activity for which a permit is sought and of s'oliciting comments and information necessary to evaluate the probable impact on thé public interest.”' Id. Accordingly, “[tjhe notice must ... include sufficient informátion to give a clear understanding of the nature and magnitude of the activity to generate meaningful comment.” Id. Further, the regulationlists'items of information 'that should be incorporated into the notice, including in relevant part “[a]ny other available information which may assist interested parties in evaluating the likely impact of the proposed activity, if any, on factors affecting the public interest.” Id. § 325.3(a)(13). However, “[t]he issuance of a public notice will not be delayed to obtain information ne'cessary to evaluate an application.” Id. § 325.1(d)(10).
In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges that the Corps issued public notice before Hel-is’s application was complete, and therefore the public notice was insufficient. As discussed above, completion and public notice are inextrifcably linked. In order to determine whether the. public notice was sufficient, the Court must consider whether the Corps’ conclusion that Helis’s permit application was complete at the time of issuance complies with the law.-Yet, if the public notice was sufficient, then Helis’s permit application must have been complete. See id. § 325.1(d)(10). Therefore, the Court will first consider whether the public notice issued by the Corps contained sufficient information to allow the public to meaningfully comment.
The Corps properly determined that Helis’s application was complete and published sufficient notice for public comment. The Corps issued a Joint Public Notice on October 14, 2014. AR 512-23. As required by section 325.3(a), the notice included the following information: (1) the applicable statutory authorities for the application, AR 512; (2) name and address of the applicant, id.) (3) the contact information for the Corps employee who could provide additional information, id.) (4) the location of Helis’s proposed project, id.) (5) a brief description of the proposed project, its purpose, and intended use, including a description of the types of structures that would be erected, AR 512-23; (6) drawings and plans showing the general and specific site location and character of all proposed activities, AR 516-23; (7) a statement of the Corps’ knowledge on historic properties that could be affected by the project, AR 514; (8) a statement of the Corps’ knowledge on endangered species that could be affected by the project, id.; (9) a statement on the Corps’ evaluation factors, id.) (10) the comment period, AR 513; (11) and a statement that any person may request, in writing, within the comment period specified in the notice, that a public hearing be held to consider the application, AR 515. Thus, the notice contained the required items of information listed in section 325.3(a).
Abita Springs does not dispute that the notice satisfied the above-mentioned requirements. The Town argues, however, that the notice was deficient because it failed to include an adequate analysis of alternatives that encompassed other available sites regionally located. Although not explicitly required by section 325.3(a), such information would be required if it “may assist interested parties in evaluating the likely impact of the proposed activity.. .on factors affecting public interest.” 33 C.F.R. § 325.3(a)(13). In support of this argument, Abita Springs cites Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 674 F.Supp.2d 783 (S.D.W.Va.2009). In Ohio Valley, the court held that the Corps unreasonably found that the applications were complete and issued public notices that “plainly did not contain sufficient information to allow for meaningful public comment.” Id. at 801-02. In that case, the applicants did not submit information concerning proposed mitigation until after the public notices were issued and the comment periods closed. Id. at 794. Therefore, the notices contained no information on proposed compensatory mitigation, which was “the single most important” material issue for the Corps’ determination. Id. at 804. For this reason, the court concluded that the public notices failed to provide an adequate opportunity for the public to comment. Id. at 807. However, the court declined to hold that the detailed information on mitigation submitted to the Corps after the close of the comment period was required to be released for public comment. Id. Rather, “the Corps was required to release some project-specific information on mitigation for public review and comment.” Id. (emphasis added).
Here, the Corps released sufficient project-specific information on alternatives for public review and comment. In addition to the Joint Public Notice, the Corps published Helis’s revised permit application on its website and circulated to the .media a press release concerning the project. Abi-ta Springs reviewed Helis’s revised application and referenced the application in comments it provided to the Corps. AR 2145-64. Helis’s application stated that Helis will use the proposed vertical well “to obtain geologic data to confirm' the production potential of a very specific subsurface geological zone.” AR 538. Further, Helis explained that it sought to locate its proposed well site in an area where “information obtained from several previously drilled wells on the edge of the prospect (the ‘control wells’)” would be of the most benefit. AR 538-39. Accordingly, one of the factors Helis used in selecting the proposed site was “its proximity to the control wells.” AR 539. However, “[bjecause the control well area is so interspersed with jurisdictional wetlands[,] Helis could not identify a suitable drill site location within this area that did not encompass wetlands.” Id. Therefore, Helis sought to select a site that would minimize the number of wetland acres impacted and that would meet its other site selection criteria. Id. Although the map attached as Attachment 1 to Helis’s application was not included in the materials published by the Corps, the information- released to the public was sufficient to allow for meaningful public comment. See 33 C.F.R. § 325.1(d)(1) (stating “detailed engineering plans and specifications are not required” to be included in a public notice); Ohio Valley, 674 F.Supp.2d at 807 (declining to hold that detailed information was required to be released for public review and comment). Notably, the regulations. dp not require the Corps to include in the public notice all information necessary to evaluate the application. 33 C.F.R. § 325.1(d)(10) (“The issuance of a public notice will not be delayed to obtain information necessary to evaluate an application,”). Therefore, the Corps’ determination that Helis’s application was complete at the time it issued public notice was not unreasonable, and the Corps provided the public an adequate opportunity to comment.
Abita Springs’ argument that the Corps’ violated the CWA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by failing to provide, adequate notice and opportunity for comment on the additional information submitted by Helis after the close of the comment period also lacks merit. After the application is deemed complete and public notice is issued, the Corps considérs the comments received in response to the public notice. Id. § 325.2(a)(3). 'Substantive comments are furnished to the permit applicant, and the applicant is -allowed an opportunity to submit any further views it may wish to offer. Id. The district engineer' is authorized to request that the applicant furnish its views on a particular issue if the district engineer determines, based on the comments received, that he must have the applicant’s views in order to make a public interest determination. Id. The district engineer will issue a -supplemental, revised, or corrected public notice if in his view there is a change in the application data that would affect the public’s review of the proposal. Id. § 325.2(a)(2).
“[N]othing in the CWA or the implementing regulations requires that the Army Corps allow an opportunity for the public to comment on an applicant’s response to the original public comments.” Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 450 F.Supp.2d 503, 535 (D.N.J.2006) vacated on other grounds, 277 Fed.Appx. 170 (3d Cir.2008); accord Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 545 (11th Cir.1996); B&B P’ship v. United States, 133 F.3d 913, 1997 WL 787145, at *6-7 (4th Cir.1997); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 935 F.Supp. 1556, 1581 (S.D.Ala.1996). Instead, as indicated above, the Corps’ regulations relegate the decision whether. to provide supplemental notice and opportunity for comment to the discretion of the district engineer,' “if in his view there is a change in the application data that would affect the public’s review of the proposal.” 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(a)(2). “Otherwise, the comment period could continue in a never-ending circle.” Sierra Club, 450 F.Supp.2d at 535.
Decisions made pursuant to an agency’s discretionary authority are afforded substantial deference, especially if those decisions are based upon an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. Belt v. EmCare, Inc., 444 F.3d 403, 408 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997)). As a result, several courts considering this issue have concluded that the Corps’ decision not to open a supplemental notice and comment period following the submission of additional information was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. See, e.g., Fund for Animals, 85 F.3d at 545 (upholding Corps’ decisión not to reopen comment period after applicant added 2.5 mile access road to project that required filling additional wetlands after the close of the comment period); B&B P’ship, 1997 WL 787145, at *6-7 (upholding Corps’ decision not to issue supplemental notice and- solicit additional comments on materials submitted by applicant after close of the comment period); Sierra Club, 450 F.Supp.2d at 535 (upholding Corps’ decision not to open a supplemental notice and comment period after applicant’s submission of materials- that reflected only additional information rather than any appreciable change in data); Galveston Beach to Bay Pres. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. G-07-0549, 2009 WL 689884, at *14 (S.D.Tex. Mar. 11, 2009) (upholding Corps’ decision not to issue public notice on amended application where change to proposed design involved constructing a project smaller in scope and the public had already commented extensively on the original permit application); Sierra Club, 935 F.Supp. at 1581 (upholding Corps’ decision not to issue supplemental public notice following applicant’s, submission of its third proposal because additional comments would not provide information to the Corps that would assist in determining whether, to grant or deny the permit application); see also Friends of the Payette v. Horseshoe Bend Hydroelectric Co., 988 F.2d 989, 996-97 (9th Cir.1993) (upholding Corps’ decision denying requests for a public hearing where Corps had provided adequate notice of permit application and Corps was aware of public sentiment on both sides of the issue).
Courts have determined that the Corps violated the requirement for public comment when the Corps relied on non-public information that differed substantially from the information released to the public. For example, in National Wildlife Federation v. Marsh, the court found that, because the Corps relied on information that was not released to the public for comment, and because the analysis and reasoning provided in that non-public information differed substantially from the information previously released for comment, the information ultimately released did not properly apprise the public of the rationale behind the Corps’ decision. 568 F.Supp. 985, 994-96 (D.D.C.1983); see also Ohio Valley, 674 F.Supp.2d at 805-06 (finding that Corps violated CWA where information constituting the “rationale and pivotal data underlying the Corps’ decision” was not released to the public for comment).
The Court concludes that Abita Springs fails to meet its burden of demonstrating that the Corps’ decision not to issue a supplemental notice and comment period following Helis’s submission of additional information was arbitrary or capricious. The materials submitted by Helis on January 2, 2015, respond to a number of comments and requests for information from the public, the EPA, and the Corps. The portion of Helis’s response regarding its analysis of alternatives comprises less than three pages and refers to twenty-two pages of exhibits. See AR 3624-26, 3618, 3816, 3821, 4095-107, 4109-113. Thus, Helis may have submitted more than 500 pages, but the relevant portion of those materials amounts to only twenty-five pages. The record does not indicate that the documents complained of rose to the level of “a change in the application data that would affect the public’s review of the proposal.” 33 C.F.R. § 325.2(a)(2).
As discussed above, Helis’s revised permit application discussed its consideration of alternative sites for the project and its efforts to avoid and to minimize wetland impacts at the site. AR 538-40. Helis’s response reflects only additional, more detailed information about Helis’s consideration of these topics. AR 3623-26. Nothing in Helis’s response differed substantially from the information previously provided in its permit application. Compare AR 538-40, with AR 3623-27. Unlike the nonpublic information in Marsh, which differed substantially from the information released to the public, 568 F.Supp. at 994-96; here, Helis’s response simply provided more detailed information. Further, unlike the decision document in Ohio Valley, which incorporated the entirety of the supplemental materials by reference and contained a twenty page discussion of the supplemental materials, 674 F.Supp.2d at 795; here, the Corps’ Memorandum for Record does not indicate that information included in Helis’s response was central to the Corps’ determination. Accordingly, the Corps’ decision not to reopen the comment period was reasonable and does not reflect an abuse of discretion.
The Court also rejects Abita Springs’ argument that the Corps’ letter of December 4, 2014, demonstrates that the Corps considered Helis’s application to be incomplete. In the letter, the Corps asked Helis to respond to concerns expressed by the EPA. AR 2968 (“The EPA is concerned that alternative non-wetland sites may exist that have not been considered by the applicant_”). In addition, the Corps recited the applicable law: “For non-water dependent fill there is a presumption that less damaging alternative sites exist.” AR 2969. The Corps stated it “presumes that there may be other available sites in this geographical area that would accommodate the applicant’s desired goals for exploration of the Tuscaloosa Shale Play that would be environmentally less damaging.” Id. Similarly, the Corps advised Helis that it cannot examine minimization and compensatory mitigation until the presumption is successfully rebutted. Id. In conclusion, the Corps requested that Helis provide a “detailed discussion about how the parameters for [its] alternative site search was established.” Id. In other words, the Corps asked Helis to respond to public comments and requested additional information that it “deem[ed] essential, to make a public interest determination ... of compliance with the section 404(b091) guidelines.” 33 C.F.R. § 325.1. The Corps’ regulations authorize such a request for information and mandate that the issuance of public notice not be delayed to obtain such information. Id. § 325.1(d)(10). Accordingly, the Corps’ request for additional information on December 4, 2014, was proper.
Abita Springs also alleges that the public notice and comment period violated the requirements of NEPA. Although NEPA does not contain specific public comment and review procedures, public involvement lies at the heart of NEPA’s procedural requirements. See Hodges v. Abraham, 300 F.3d 432, 438 (4th Cir.2002); California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 770-71 (9th Cir.1982). The significant role of public involvement is reflected in the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) Guidelines. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (“Accurate scientific analysis, expert agency comments, and public scrutiny are essential to implementing NEPA.”). The CEQ Guidelines provide that “NEPA procedures must insure that environmental information is available to public officials and citizens before decisions are made and before actions are taken” and that the information must be of “high quality.” 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b). Moreover, NEPA requires that an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) include a discussion of alternatives and an analysis of environmental impacts of the proposal and alter