Kline v. Mortgage Electronic Security Systems (154 F. Supp. 3d 567, 2015)

DECISION AND ENTRY SUSTAINING THE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED BY ALL DEFENDANTS (DOC. #414, #416, #417, #418, & #419), OVERRULING ‘ AS MOOT. DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS IN LIMINE (DOC. #456, #457, #458, #459, #460, & #461), AND OVERRULING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (DOC. #472); JUDGMENT TO ENTER IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS ON..ALL OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS; TERMINATION ENTRY.

WALTER H. RICE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In-this case, a number of individuals set forth claims against eleven defendants, seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief based on claims alleging misconduct in mortgage servicing, ■ misrepresentation in foreclosure filings, and the charging and collecting of improper and excessive fees from borrowers. At this time, the only remaining Plaintiff is Eugene Kline (“Kline”), and only his claims against the following Defendants remain viable: Defendants Mortgage - Electronic . Security Systems (“MERS”); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”); Reimer, Arnovitz, Chernek & Jeffrey Co. L.P.A., (f.k.a. Defendant Reimer,. Lorber & Arnovitz Co., L.P.A.) (the “Reimer Firm”); Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss (the “Lerner Firm”); and Barclays Capital Real Estate, Inc. (“Barclays”). His claims arise under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(l); the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1666d; the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“OCSPA”), Ohio Revised Code § 1345.01; and claims for unjust enrichment and breach of contract under the common law of Ohio. The Court’s jurisdiction is based on federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Pending before the Court are Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment. Doc. #414, #416, #417, #418, & #419. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs remaining claims. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motions are SUSTAINED. This ruling moots Defendants’ Motions in Limine filed in anticipation of trial, and said motions are therefore OVERRULED. Furthermore, because the Court has determined that Plaintiffs’ claims all fail as a matter of law, his Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. #472) of the Court’s dismissal of his class claims is moot, and is therefore OVERRULED.

As a preliminary matter, Kline’s Memorandum in Opposition to Wells Fargo’s Motion for Summary Judgment did not address its arguments directed against his TILA claim. Doc. #466. The Sixth Circuit’s “jurisprudence on abandonment of claims is clear: a plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned a claim when a plaintiff fails to address it in response to a motion for summary judgment.” Brown v. VHS of Michigan, Inc., 545 Fed.Appx. 368, 372 (6th Cir.2013) (collecting Sixth Circuit eases affirming grants of summary judgment when non-movant fails to defend a claim in response to summary judgment motion). Kline’s failure to address the TILA claim constitutes its abandonment, and it will therefore be dismissed with prejudice.

A second preliminary matter concerns, the Court’s jurisdiction over Kline’s state law claims. As explained more fully below, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the remaining federal claims in this action: the two FDCPA claims brought against the Reimer Firm and the Lerner Firm. Under 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3), a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over” a state law claim if it has “dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Thus, the statute gives the Court the power to, at its discretion, dismiss Kline’s state law claims against the Defendants, based on the dismissal of the FDCPA claims over which it had original jurisdiction. However, “[t]hat power need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to exist.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). In the absence of a federal claim, the “justification” for continuing to exercise jurisdiction over a plaintiffs state law claims “lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if these are not present[,] a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims.” Id. In this case, such considerations weigh heavily in favor of the Court continuing to exercise jurisdiction over Kline’s state law claims. It would ill-serve considerations of judicial economy for a state court, unfamiliar with Kline’s claims and the evidence the parties have amassed, to have to take them up at this late date. Furthermore, due to the length and complexity of this litigation, it would be. unfair, and inconvenient to all parties to dismiss Kline’s state law claims without resolving them. For these reasons, the Court will exercise its. jurisdiction over Kline’s state law claims, even in the absence of the federal claims that gave rise to its original jurisdiction over this action.

I. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Unless noted, the following facts are undisputed by the parties.

A. The loan Transactions

On June 18, 2004, Kline entered into two loan transactions with WMC Mortgage Corporation (“WMC”). He signed a promissory note with an adjustable interest'rate in the amount of $160,000 (“Adjustable Rate Note”), accompanied by a mortgage that placed a primary lien on his home (the “First Mortgage”). The second note’, in the amount of $30,000, required payment of any unpaid principal' and interest at its maturity (“Balloon Note”), and was secured by a second mortgage on Kline’s home (“Second Mortgage”). Wells Fargo Mot. Summ. J.. Ex. A, 8, C, & D (Docs. #417-2, #417-3, #417-4 & #417-5).

B. Securitization of Kline’s Loans

On an' unknown date thereafter, WMC assigned or sold ■ Kline’s loans to Merrill' Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc., an entity that acted as a “depositor” of notes and mortgages into trusts of residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBSs”). Kline’s loans were deposited into an RMBS bearing the name “Merrill Lynch Investors Trust, Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2004-WMC5” (hereinafter, “Trust”), which was created pursuant to a Pooling and Services Agreement (“PSA”) dated October 1, 2004. The PSA identified Wells Fargo as the trustee and HomEq. as the servicer of the mortgage loans held in' the Trust; Doc. #417-6.

C. The 2005 Foreclosure

Kline fell behind on the payments on the Adjustable Rate Note. Am. Compl, ¶26 (Doc. #157 at 8). On August 17, 2005, the Reimer Firm filed a foreclosure action against Kline. The complaint identified the plaintiff as “Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., c/o HomEq Servicing Corporation,” Doc. #465-5 at 2. On December 6, 2005, the Reimer Firm sent Kline a letter stating that the total amount required to reinstate his. loan would be $10,001.47, with an attachment itemizing the individual fees and costs. Doc. #465-6 at 2-3. These included attorney fees of $1100 and various court costs. Id, Kline cured the default and HomEq reinstated the mortgage, leading to the dismissal of the foreclosure action. Compl. ¶30 (Doc. #157 at 8).

On November 1, 2006, Wachovia Bank, N.A., sold HomEq to Barclays, which assumed the servicing of Kline’s loans after that date. Beck Aff. (Doc. #30-1).

Í). Kline’s First Federal Court Action

On March 6,' 2007, Kline filed ■ suit against HomEq and the Reimer Firm in this Court, asserting claims arising under the FDCPA .and the OCSPA, as well as Ohio common law claims for unjust enrichment and breach of contract. Kline alleged that HomEq and Reimer had illegally and improperly charged him for “broker price opinions,” title reports, post-acceleration late fees, amounts that were not owed, and “excessive costs- for service of process.” The allegations stated that the itemization of fees and costs provided had béen inaccurate, but had nevertheless been paid. Case No. 3:07-cv-84, Doc. #1.

The casé was assigned to Judge Rosé, who dismissed the case on January 28, 2008. He rilled that the FDCPA claim was barred by 'the statute of limitations, and he dismissed the supplemental' state law claims without prejudice. Case No. 3:07-cv-84, Doc. #33.

E. The 2007 Foreclosure

Kline again fell behind on his payments, and a second foreclosure action was filed in state court on March 16, 2007. The second foreclosure action was again filed by the Reimer Firm, and the plaintiff was identified as .“Wells Fargo, N.A. as Trustee c/o HomEq Servicing Corporation.” In the complaint, Wells Fargo alleged that it was “the owner and holder” of the Adjustable Rate Note. Doc. #465-7.

. Ten days after the. second foreclosure action was filed, on March 26, 2007, MERS assigned the mortgage on Kline’s home and the -Adjustable Rate Note to Wells Fargo. The assignment identified MERS as the “nominee for WMC Mortgage Corp.” and Wells Fargo, as the assignee. The assignment was executed by John Dunnery, who was identified as a Vice President of MERS. Doc. #465-8.

On May 14, 2007, the Lemer Firm filed an answer on behalf of MERS, “as nominee for WMC Mortgage Corporation,” asserting an interest in the Balloon Note that was secured by the Second Mortgage. Doc. #465-9. The answer alleged that Kline owed $28,858.40 on. the Balloon Note, as well-as interest and costs, and identified the specific number of the recorded “valid mortgage lien” held by MERS.

On August 16, 2007, the Reimer Firm sent Kenneth E. Wegner, the attorney representing Kline, a letter that provided “payoff and reinstatement quotes” for both mortgage loans. Doc. #414-9. The letter stated that “the amount to PAYOFF the first mortgage loan through August 30, 2007, is $171, 577. 27. The amount to PAYOFF the second mortgage through August 30, 2007, is $31,357.17.” Id.

On October 30, 2007, Kenneth E. Weg-ner, the attorney representing Kline in the foreclosure action, sent letters to the Reimer Firm and the Lerner Firm requesting payoff amounts for the mortgage loans. Doc. #310-5.

On November 15, 2007, the Reimer Firm responded in a letter that detailed the payoff required to satisfy the Adjustable Rate Note. The letter stated:

This will confirm .that the amount to PAYOFF this loan through December 9, 2007, is $176,332.28. This does not include any attorney fees.

The above figure includes an estimate of court costs. When PAYOFF is made, an adjustment will be made and any amounts collected in excess of the actual court costs will be refunded to you .... Also, the present court cost bill may not be accurate since additional costs may .be incurred since we do not stop pro-' ceedings until funds are actually received.

Doc. #414-11 at 1.

An attachment prepared by HomEq itemized ' the “Projected Payoff Breakdown” for the Adjustable Rate Note as follows:

Unpaid principal balance: ' $ 155,515.98

Interest accrued 10/01/2006-12/09/2007: ■$ 14,821,28

Accrued Late Charges to date: $ 178.90

Projected Late Charge(s) : $ 0.0

Plus Escrow Advance: $ 3,406.12

0.0 Less Escrow Balance: would be time-barred, and urges the Court to disregard the improperly authenticated documents attached to the affidavit submitted with Kline’s Memorandum in Opposition. Id. at 15-17. Furthermore, it points out that Kline failed to demonstrate how he would prove his unjust enrichment claim, and instead has only argued that an exception to the defense of voluntary payment applies. Id. at 17.

In the Sur-Reply that the Court granted Kline leave to file, Kline argues that -he has the right to present evidence related to the 2005 Foreclosure because the Court previously stated that he could use deposition references to it made by Patrick Gor-rien, a Wells Fargo representative, when responding to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment. Doc. #487 at 9. He also argues that, under the Sixth Circuit’s “course of proceedings” test, Defendants have had “ample notice” that he is challenging the fees and expenses charged to him during the 2005 Foreclosure. Id. at 9-10. Furthermore, he claims, that the pleadings do not contain specific allegations, regarding the attorneys’ fees charged to him during the 2005 Foreclosure because “Wells Fargo and MERS concealed critical evidence relating to those claims during discovery.” Id. at 11.

Unjust enrichment occurs “whén a benefit is conferred and it would be inequitable to permit the benefiting party to retain the benefit without compensating the conferring party.” Meyer v. Chieffo, 193 Ohio App.3d 51, 950 N.E.2d 1027, 1034 (2011). According to the Ohio Supreme Court, a plaintiff must demonstrate the following three elements to prove a claim , of unjust enrichment: “(1) a benefit conferred by a plaintiff upon a defendant; (2) knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and (3) retention’ of the benefit by the defendant under circumstances where it would be unjust to do so without payment (‘unjust enrichment’).” Johnson v. Microsoft Corp., 106 Ohio St.3d 278, 834 N.E.2d 791, 799 (2005) (quoting Hambleton v. R.G. Barry Corp., 12 Ohio St.3d 179, 465 N.E.2d 1298 (1984)).

On September 5, 2014, the Court overruled the Reimer Firm’s Motion for Judgment; on the Pleadings, based on factual allegations in the pleadings that it construed in Kline’s favor, finding that Kline had sufficiently pled a claim for unjust enrichment against the firm. Doc. #366. Specifically, the Court pointed to the allegations that the fees Kline paid for the preliminary and final judicial reports were unnecessary and were charged to him through an alleged alter ego of the Reimer Firm, the Nova Title Agency, but were ultimately retained byy and for the benefit of, the Reimer Firm itself. Id. at 13-15.

However, the Reimer Firm now presents undisputed evidence that charging Kline for these reports was a necessary expense, and it did not retain any benefit from their collection. First, as noted whén discussing the FDCPA claim, such reports are required by Ohio law when a plaintiff files a foreclosure action. Ohio Rev. Code § 2329.191. Second, the affidavit of Dennis Reimer, a principal of the Reimer Firm, states the following:

The Reimer Firm did not retain any portion of the expenses paid by Mr. Kline when he paid off the first and second mortgage on the property in November, 2007. Specifically, the firm did not receive or retain any portion of the costs Mr. Kline paid for the preliminary judicial report, final judicial report, service of process charge, court costs or late charges. The Reimer Firm did not receive any benefit with respect to the costs and expenses paid by Mr. Kline.

Reimer Áff., ¶ 4 (Doc. #414-18 at 1-2).

Mr. Reimer also provided-testimony that undermines Kline’s allegation - that Nova Title Agency, Inc., was an alter ego collecting fees on behalf of his firm:

Nova Title Agency Inc. (“Nova Title”) and Reimer, Lorber & Arnovitz Co., L.P.A. and Reimer Arnovitz, Chernek & •Jeffrey are, and have always been separate and distinct entities. Nova Title was not and has never been owned or controlled by Reimer Arnovitz, Chemet & Jeffrey f/k/a/ Reimer, Lorber & Arnovitz Co., L.P.A None of the costs paid by Eugene Kline for services provided by Nova Title was shared with, passed on to or retained by Reimer, Lorber & Arnovitz Co., L.P.A.

Id. ¶ 5 (Doc. #414-18 at 2).

Kline has pointed to no ’ evidence that creates a genuine issue of fact regarding Mr. Reimer’s statements, which are all material to ’his unjust enrichment claim. Moreover,' he has not addressed the fees associated with thé Nova Title Agency expenses with his unjust enrichment claim, and has apparently abandoned them as a basis for it.

Instead, his arguments concentrate on the attorneys’ fees he paid to the Reimer Firm for the reinstatement of his loan during the. 2005 Foreclosure and his allegation that the firm collected attorneys’ fees from him during the 2007 Foreclosure, However, as the Court previously observed when ruling on the Reimer Firm’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, the Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegations to support a claim of unjust enrichment arising out of the 2005 Foreclosure. The sole mention of the foreclosure proceeding itself is in the following sentences:

28.After the plaintiffs’ default, HomEq contacted the Reimer law firm, and requested that they commence foreclosure proceedings against the plaintiffs on behalf of HomEq and WMC Mortgage Company.

29. In August, 2005, Reimer commenced foreclosure proceedings against the plaintiffs.

30. Those foreclosure proceedings were later dismissed as á result of a reinstatement of mortgage.

Am. Comp. ¶¶ 29-30. (Doc. #157 at 8).

The attorneys’ fees he paid as a portion of the reinstatement costs of his mortgage loan in 2005 were clearly within his knowledge when he filed this action on Novém-ber 10, 2008, and when the Amended Complaint was filed on April 14, 2010. Furthermore, as explained in the Court’s analysis of the FDCPA claim, Kline never alleged that the Reimer Firm collected attorneys’ fees from. him in connection with the 2007 Foreclosure. Even if he had made the allegation, his deemed admissions on the matter and the undisputed evidence previously discussed demonstrate that no -such fees were collected.

Third, citing Carter v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.3d 562 (6th Cir.2009), Kline argues in his Sur-Reply that the Sixth Circuit uses a “course of proceedings” test to determine the scope of a plaintiffs claims “despite the failure to specifically allege such claims in the Complaint.” Doc. #487 at 9. This statement is not representative of the test, which is not an incantatory device that allows a. litigant to conjure' a new claim from whole cloth.'In Carter, the Sixth Circuit defined it as follows: “where language' in a complaint is ambiguous, this Court has used a ‘course of the proceedings test’ to determine whether defendants have received notice of the plaintiffs claims.” Id. at 566 (emphasis added). Kline’s factual allegations were not ambiguous. ■ Rather, they were silent as to any allegations of wrongdoing -arising out of the 2005 Foreclosure, and any allegation that the Reimer Firm, charged him attorneys’ fees during the 2007 Foreclosure. Moreover, over a year ago, the Court clearly stated that “the 2005 Foreclosure ... is not the subject of this action,” and that “[t]he allegations of the Amended Complaint and the record before the Court demonstrate that Kline’s viable unjust enrichment claim arises from the fees Reimer collected in the 2007 foreclosure case.” Doc. #366 at 15. Faced with a statement that contradicts his own understanding of the scope of a claim he is in the process of litigating, it is incumbent on a party not to passively assume that the “course of proceedings” will provide notice to the Court and opposing counsel of the factual basis for his claim.

Finally, Kline claims that discovery documents belatedly produced by Wells Fargo in June, 2015, “demonstrate that MERS did not ‘own’ or ‘hold’ plaintiffs first mortgage ... at the time of the 2005 foreclosure action, and thus neither Reimer nor MERS had the right to bring or maintain that action.” Doc. #487 at 11. This statement is followed by no citation to any document in the record to support these assertions, and is therefore accorded no weight.

In conclusion, there is no evidence in the record to support Kline’s unjust enrichment claim against the Reimer Firm. The undisputed evidence shows that the firm did not benefit from any of the fees that it charged to him, which were collected on behalf of expenses properly accrued to prosecute the foreclosure action. Because Kline cannot prove such a claim, it is unnecessary for the Court to consider the parties’ arguments regarding the defense of voluntary payment. For the reasons discussed above, the Court sustains the Reimer Firm’s Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety, and dismisses both the FDCPA claim and the unjust enrichment claim against said Defendant with prejudice.

IV. THE LERNER FIRM’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. #416).

Kline’s remaining claims against the Lerner Firm, a claim under the FDCPA and an Ohio common law claim of unjust enrichment, are based on the firm’s collection of attorneys’ fees and other costs in connection with the Balloon Note and the Second Mortgage. Am. Comp. ¶¶ 62-76 (Doc. #157 at 13-16). The Amended Complaint alleges that the Balloon Note and the Second Mortgage were held by MERS, as nominee for the original lender, WMC Mortgage, and that Kline contacted the Lemer Firm to obtain a “formal payoff quote” for this debt. Id. ¶ 62 (Doc. #157 at 14). In addition to the payoff amount, the Lerner Firm collected $225 in “Previous Service Costs” it had paid to 3 Arch Trustee Services for “monitoring of the lawsuit” and $350 in attorneys’ fees from Kline. Id. at 64 (Doc. #157 at 14). These charges were prohibited by Ohio law, according to Kline, and therefore violated the FDCPA. Id. ¶¶ 69-71, 73-76, 134 (Doc. #157 at 15-16, 25). He further alleges that the Lerner Firm was unjustly enriched by the collection of these amounts. Id. ¶¶ 151-153 (Doc. #157 at 28).

The Lerner Firm has filed for summary judgment on both the FDCPA claim and the unjust enrichment claim. The Court will address each in turn.

A. Kline’s FDCPA Claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(l) against the Lerner Firm

The Lerner Firm attacks Kline’s FDCPA claim on several fronts. First, it argues that the conduct in question, which it describes as merely “participating in the 2007 Foreclosure in protection of the position of junior mortgagee” and “responding to an inquiry from Kline’s counsel” with a payoff quote, do not amount to actionable activity under the FDCPA. Doc. #416 at 11-13. Second, the Lemer Firm argues that because the actions on which Kline’s dismissed FDCPA claim under Section 1692e and his still-viable claim under Section 1692f(l) are “identical,” as a matter of law, a freestanding Section 1692f(l) claim is not cognizable. Id. at 13-14. Finally, even if considered on its merits, the Lerner Firm argues that Kline’s Section 1692f(l) claim fails because he has admitted that the attorneys’ fees were reasonable by not responding to its Requests for Admission, the undisputed evidence shows that the attorneys’ fees and costs were reasonable, and none of them was prohibited by applicable law. Id. at 14-18.

In Kline’s Memorandum in Opposition, he counters the Lerner Firm’s arguments with-the following points First, Ohio law clearly prohibits the attorneys’ fees-collected from Kline Doc. #468 at 7-8. Second, the collection of attorneys’ fees was also improper because Wells Fargo actually held the Balloon Note and the Second Mortgage, not MERS, and the attorneys’ fees were therefore collected for the defense of a party “in a lawsuit brought by itself.” Id.- at 8-9. Third,- for the- same reason, neither the attorneys’ fees nor the costs paid to 3 Arch Trustee Services were “reasonable” or “necessary,” as authorized by the Balloon Note. Id-, at 9. Fourth; the Lemer Firm’s representative testifíéd that 3 Arch Trustee Services referred the matter to the firm, and referral fees are prohibited by the Fannie Mae Guidelines and the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. at 10.

The Lerner Firm replies as follows. First, the declaration that Kline’s attorney submitted- with the Memorandum in Opposition does not fulfill the requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) that it must be based on personal khowledge, or otherwise demonstrate his competency to testify on the matters stated therein, and should therefore be disregarded. Doc. #473. Second, the Lemer Firm elaborates on its argument that the Section 1692f(l) claim is not cognizable because its factual predicate is identical to the dismissed Section 1692e claim, and points out that Kline has not responded to this argument. Third, the Lemer Firm’s belief that the law is unsettled in Ohio regarding the propriety of a junior lienholder charging attorneys’ fees to a debtor undercuts Kline’s argument that the fees and costs were improper. Fourth, the fact that Kline’s loans were all part of the same trust does not mean that the charges were improper, because MERS was the holder of record and was therefore a proper party Fifth, Kline has pointed to no evidence that the Balloon Note was subject to Fannie Mae Guidelines or that a servicer’s failure to follow them is in any way actionable Finally, the Lerner Firm’s representative, Sara M. Pet'ersmann, stated in an affidavit that the firm paid no referral fees to 3 Arch Trustee Services, and Kline has pointed to no evidence to the contrary. Thus, there is no evidence to support his claim that the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct were violated.

As'an initial matter, the Court agrees with the Lemer Firm that the declaration of Kline’s attorney does not conform to the standard required by Rule 56(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The rale states: “An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show -that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” The Declaration of Paul Grobman merely states that he “says under penalty of perjury” that he represents Kline, and “submit[s] this Declaration in opposition to the motions for summary judgment filed by each of the defendants in this action.” Doc. #465 at 1. The remainder of the Declaration simply lists the attached exhibits cited in the Memorandum in Opposition. However, the Court declines to disregard the Declaration or the attached exhibits because the Lerner Firm has not pointed to a single exhibit that does not exist somewhere else in the record of this case. The exhibits are records of the state court proceedings, the correspondence between the parties’ attorneys’ at that time, and copied of the loan agreements, all of which have been presented to the Court On multiple occasions. The remaining exhibits are deposition transcripts of Defendants’ representatives. Although the Declaration lacks the specific language of Rule 56(c)(4), it would prioritize form over substance to disregard the attached evidence on' that basis. "

Several of the Lerner Firm’s legal arguments .create a sense of déjá vu. The Court has previously ruled — repeatedly— that Kline’s remaining FDCPA claim arises under Section 1692f(l), and is premised on that provision’s prohibition on the “collection of any amount” that is not “expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(l). The Court has also previously discussed the inapplicability the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Grden v. Leikin Ingber & Winters PC, 643 F.3d 169 (6th Cir.2011), to Kline’s Section 1692f(l)claim, yet the Lerner Firm again argues