In re Rust-Oleum Restore Marketing, Sales Practices & Products Liability Litigation (155 F. Supp. 3d 772, 2016)

Citations

155 F. Supp. 3d 772

Full opinion text

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:

In this consolidated, multi-district litigation (“MDL”), Plaintiffs are purchasers and users of a paint product called “Deck & Concrete Restore” or “Restore 10X” (collectively “Restore”), manufactured by Defendant Rust-Oleum Corporation (“Rust-Oleum”). Plaintiffs allege that Restore contains latent defects that result in premature degradation upon application. Plaintiffs contend that Rust-Oleum knew that Restore was defective prior to and during its marketing, selling, and warranting the product to Plaintiffs. Before the Court is Rust-Oleum’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (See R.30.) For the reasons discussed in detail below, the Court grants the motion in part, grants the motion in part without prejudice, and denies the motion in part.

BACKGROUND

On February 6, 2015, the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (the “MDL Panel”) transferred this MDL litigation to the undersigned, with the parties’ unanimous support. (See R.l.) At that time, the litigation consisted of individual actions pending in this District, the District of Maryland, the Southern District of New York, the Eastern District of North Carolina, and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The MDL Panel found that:

[T]hese actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of this litigation. These actions share factual questions arising out of allegations that the deck and concrete resurfacing paint products manufactured and sold by the Rust Oleum Corporation under the Restore brand name are defective because they allegedly bubble, flake, chip, peel, or otherwise degrade prematurely, contrary to the representations in defendant’s marketing, labeling, and product warranty. Plaintiffs in all actions further allege that defendants knew or should have known of the purported defects. The common questions of fact will include the design, manufacture, and testing of Restore products; the representations in the products’ marketing and labeling; Rust-Oleum’s policies and practices with respect to the warranties; and the measure of damages.

(R.l, at 1.)

I. The Complaint & Rust-Oleum’s Motion to Dismiss

On April 7, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint (the “Complaint”) naming 40 Plaintiffs from 27 states alleging that sometime between 2010 and 2015 they each purchased and applied to a deck or other surface, a paint product called “Deck & Concrete Restore” or “Restore 10X” (collectively “Restore”) that Rust-Oleum has manufactured since September 2012. (See, e.g., R.16, ¶¶ 3, 9-51, 56-58, 116-268.) Plaintiffs further allege that, sometime after applying Restore, the product began to prematurely fail by chipping, peeling, or otherwise deteriorating. (Id,., ¶¶ 4, 116-268.) According to Plaintiffs, those alleged results directly conflict with marketing and warranty promises made in connection with Restore’s sales. (Id., ¶¶ 59-73.) Plaintiffs further assert that Rust-Oleum knew or should have known that Restore would not live up to those promises. (Id., ¶¶ 82-92.)

Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs bring a putative class action against Rust-Oleum on behalf of all individuals and entities that purchased Restore, not for resale, “in the territories of the United States.” (Id., ¶¶ 101-02.) Plaintiffs’ ten-count Complaint asserts various claims under the laws of all 50 states and the District of Columbia in addition to individual state law claims. Count I seeks declaratory, in-junctive, or equitable relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act. (Id., ¶¶ 269-73.) Count II alleges a failure to comply with obligations under written and implied warranties, in violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. (Id., ¶¶ 274-84.) Count III alleges breach of express warranties under the laws of every state. (Id., ¶¶ 285-92.) Counts IV and V allege breaches of the implied warranty of merchantability and the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under the laws of every state. (Id., ¶¶ 293-313.) Count VI asserts violations of various state consumer-fraud statutes. (Id., ¶¶ 314-22.) Count VII claims violations of the false-advertising statutes of four states. (Id., ¶¶ 323-30.) Count VIII claims a violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act. (Id., ¶¶ 331-38.) Count IX alleges negligent misrepresentation. (Id., ¶¶ 339-45.) Lastly, Count X claims fraudulent concealment. (Id., ¶¶ 346-51.)

Rust-Oleum argues that Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to state a claim for relief under each of the alleged bases and that dismissal of each claim asserted by each Plaintiff is warranted here. (See R.32, at 2; R.32-1, Ex. A, Summary of Plaintiffs’ Claims and Alleged Grounds for Dismissal.) Specifically, Rust-Oleum argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory, injunctive, or equitable relief in Count I because it is a request for relief rather than an independent cause of action. (R.21, Part III.) Rust-Oleum also argues that the breach of warranty claims in Counts II-V, depending on the plaintiff and the claim, are barred by the written warranties’ exclusive-remedy provision, the warranties’ consequential-damages exclusion, a lack of proper pre-suit notice, the failure to plead a particular purpose for Restore, a lack of privity with Rust-Oleum, or the failure to plead reliance. (R.32, Part I.) In addition, Rust-Oleum argues that Plaintiffs’ misrepresentation and omission claims in Counts VI through X do not plead fraud with the requisite particularity, nor do they adequately plead causation, reliance, knowledge, or actionable misrepresentations or omissions. (Id., Part II.) Rust-Oleum further argues that various state-specific requirements and defenses also bar those claims, depending on the plaintiff. (Id., Part II.) Applicable to all claims, Rust-Oleum asserts that Plaintiffs cannot base any claims on conduct before Rust-Oleum began manufacturing Restore in September 2012. (Id., Part IV.) Finally, as to state specific issues, Rust-Oleum argues that the New Jersey and Ohio product liability statutes preempt most of Plaintiffs’ claims and that the laws of the 24 states in which no Plaintiff either resides or purchased Rust-Oleum have no extraterritorial effect that could support any of Plaintiffs’ claims. (Id., Parts V & VI.)

II. Facts Alleged

Rust-Oleum sells do-it-yourself products for the consumer home improvement market. In particular, Rust-Oleum manufactures, markets, advertises, warrants, and sells a variety of deck coatings, including paints, stains, and resurfacers. (R.16, ¶ 56.) In September 2012, Rust-Oleum’s parent company, RPM International, Inc., acquired Synta, Inc. (“Synta”), a producer of wooden deck and concrete coatings. (Id., ¶ 57.) Synta’s primary product line, which Rust-Oleum took over upon acquisition, included a deck resurfacer developed by Synta and marketed as “Restore” to protect and restore weathered outdoor decks and concrete surfaces. (Id., ¶ 58.) Rust-Oleum sells Restore to consumers through retail home improvement stores which generally sell Restore without making any changes to its marketing materials or warranties. (Id., ¶ 59.)

A. Warranty

Restore’s packaging contains a “Limited Lifetime Warranty” which states:

LIMITED LIFETIME WARRANTY: Rust-Oleum Corporation guarantees product performance for the product in this can only as long as you own or reside in your home when our product was applied according to the label directions. You will receive as your exclusive remedy either a refund of the original purchase price or replacement with a product of equal value. We do not guarantee the product against factors beyond our control, such as damage to the product by others, poor condition of the substrate, structural defects, improper application, etc. We will not be responsible for labor or the cost of labor for removal or application of any product, or replacement of any wood structure.

(R.16, ¶¶ 63, 95, 96, 280, Exs. 1, 2.) The packaging and labeling surrounding the buckets or cans of Restore sold to Plaintiffs also allegedly includes a “LIMITED LIFETIME WARRANTY” which states:

LIMITED LIFETIME WARRANTY Rust-Oleum Corporation warrants your complete satisfaction with the performance of this product for as long as you own or reside in your home when our product has been applied to the label directions. We do not warrant problems with the product which are caused by factors beyond our control, such as damage to the product by others, poor condition of the substrate, structural defects, improper application, etc. If not satisfied as warranted, return any unused portion along with sales receipt to place of purchase. You will receive as your exclusive remedy either a refund of the original purchase price or replacement with a product of equal value. THIS WARRANTY SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDES LABOR OR COST OF LABOR FOR THE APPLICATION OF ANY PAINT AND CONSEQUENTIAL, INCIDENTAL DAMAGES. Some states do not allow the exclusion of incidental or consequential damages, so the limitation or exclusion contained in the above warranty may not apply to you. This warranty gives you specific legal rights and you may also have other rights which vary from state to state.

(R.16, ¶¶ 63, 95, 96, 280; id., attached to Compl. as Ex. 2.)

B. Alleged Misrepresentations

In marketing and selling Restore, Plaintiffs allege that Rust-Oleum made numerous misrepresentations to consumers about Restore’s purported qualities on product labels and packaging, including, for example: “repairs decking”, “the smart alternative to deck and concrete replacement”, “locks down wood splinters”, “revives wood and broom swept concrete”, “lasting moisture protection”, and “liquid armor resur-facer”. (R.16, ¶ 61.) Rust-Oleum also provides information about Restore on its website and in other advertising and promotional materials that Plaintiffs allege constitute misrepresentations that Restore:

• “lasts 10 to 12 years and in fact it comes with a life time warrantee”;

• “lasts 3x longer than deck stain with less maintenance”; .

• is a “low-maintenance, long-lasting alternative to the endless cycle of repairing and repainting”;

• is “tough, resilient coating over existing decking” which “lasts for years with less maintenance than deck paints or stains! Satisfaction guaranteed”;

• “last[s] for years with little maintenance”;

• “extend[s] the life” of a deck by providing a “tough, durable coating”;

• “tested tough for 12 + years”;

• “provide[s] lasting protection against moisture and the damaging effects of the sun”;

• provides a “protective barrier from Mother Nature’s harsh elements”;

• has “superior weather resistance” and “ultimate water repellency”; and

• “is an easy to apply repair coating that revives the surface while offering maximum protection to preserve the deck for years to come.”

(R.16, ¶ 67; see also id., ¶¶ 68-71.)

C. Restore’s Performance

According to Plaintiffs, Restore does not perform as warranted, and Rust-Oleum’s representations are false, misleading and fail to disclose material information. (R.16, ¶ 72.) Plaintiffs allege that Rust-Oleum failed to disclose that Restore (1) separates, cracks, peels, bubbles, flakes, puckers, chips, and otherwise prematurely fails shortly after application; (2) is not a superior product to ordinary deck paint or stain; (3) does not repair or restore decking long-term; (4) cannot withstand harsh weather; (5) is the subject of numerous consumer complaints; and (6) will ultimately have to be removed from the deck. (R.16, ¶ 73; see also id., ¶¶ 74, 76-79.) Customers voiced complaints online indicating that they “[w]ould never recommend Restore” and to “STAY AWAY” and that the product left them “So Disappointed” and feeling as if they ‘Wasted $200 + ”. (See R.16, ¶ 80; see also id., ¶¶ 81, 88.) Plaintiffs allege that Rust-Oleum knew about Restore’s defective performance based on various methods, including pre- and post-sale audits, field testing, online complaints, direct complaints about Rust-Oleum and Synta. (R.16, ¶¶ 83-87.) Despite this knowledge, according to Plaintiffs, Restore continued to market and sell its product based on misrepresentations of its performance. (R.16, ¶ 89.) Plaintiffs further allege that they could not have reasonably discovered the issues and problems with Restore prior to purchasing and using the product. (R.16, ¶ 90.)

LEGAL STANDARD

“A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the viability of a complaint by arguing that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Camasta v. Jos. A Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir.2014). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiffs “[factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Put differently, a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). A district court’s analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) “rests on the complaint, and [the court] eonstrue[s] it in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts alleged and drawing all permissible inferences in their favor.” Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 763 F.3d 696, 700 (7th Cir.2014); see also Teamsters Local Union No. 705 v. Burlington N. Santa Fe, LLC, 741 F.3d 819, 823 (7th Cir.2014); Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 665-66 (7th Cir.2013). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts may consider evidence incorporated by reference in the complaint. See, e.g., 188 LLC v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 300 F.3d 730, 735 (7th Cir.2002); Rosenblum v. Travelbyus.com Ltd., 299 F.3d 657, 661 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that the court may consider “documents attached to a motion to dismiss... [as] part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiffs complaint and are central to his claim”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement under Rule 8(a)(2) must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted). “[T]he complaint must supply ‘enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’ supporting the plaintiffs allegations.” Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir.2012) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “A claim must be plausible rather than merely conceivable or speculative, meaning that the plaintiff must include ‘enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together.’” Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 826-27 (7th Cir.2014) (citations omitted). A plaintiffs pleading burden “should be commensurate with the amount of information available” to him. Olson v. Champaign Cnty., Ill, 784 F.3d 1093, 1100 (7th Cir.2015).

Under Rule 9(b), a party pleading fraud must “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Moreover, in pleading fraud in federal court, Rule 9(b) imposes a higher pleading standard than that required under Rule 8(a)(2). See Bank of America, N.A. v. Knight, 725 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir.2013); see also Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 446 (7th Cir.2011). Thus, “[t]he requirement of pleading fraud with particularity includes pleading facts that make the allegation of fraud plausible.” U.S. ex rel. Grenadyor v. Ukrainian Vill. Pharmacy, Inc., 772 F.3d 1102, 1106 (7th Cir.2014). Specifically, Rule 9(b) requires a pleading to state with particularity: “the identity of the person making the misrepresentation, the time, place, and content of the misrepresentation, and the method by which the misrepresentation was communicated to the plaintiff.” Id. (citations omitted). “[T]he particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) is designed to discourage a ‘sue first, ask questions later’ philosophy.” Pirelli, 631 F.3d at 441 (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts various claims under the laws of all 50 states and the District of Columbia in addition to individual state law claims. Count I seeks declaratory, injunctive, or equitable relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act. (R.16, ¶¶ 269-73.) Count II alleges a failure to comply with obligations under written and implied warranties, in supposed violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. (Id., ¶¶ 274-84.) Count III alleges breach of express warranties under the laws of every state. (Id., ¶¶ 285-92.) Counts IV and V allege breaches of the implied warranty of merchantability and the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under the laws of every state. (Id., ¶¶ 293-313.) Count VI asserts violations of various state consumer-fraud statutes. (Id., ¶¶ 314-22.) Count VII claims violations of the false-advertising statutes of four states. (Id., ¶¶ 323-30.) Count VIII claims a violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act. (Id., ¶¶ 331-38.) Count IX alleges negligent misrepresentation. (Id., ¶¶ 339-45.) Lastly, Count X claims fraudulent concealment. (Id., ¶¶ 346-51.) The Court addresses each count in turn.

I. Rust-Oleum’s Challenge to Count I is Premature

In Count I, Plaintiffs assert a claim for “declaratory and injunctive and/or equitable relief.” (R.16, ¶¶ 269-273.) Rust-Oleum argues that Plaintiffs’ claim fails as a matter of law because declaratory, injunctive, and equitable relief are remedies, not independent causes of action and that the claim is duplicative of its prayer for relief. Plaintiffs respond that Rule 23 authorizes a nationwide class to seek declaratory, in-junctive relief and/or equitable relief where the defendant “has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).

The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”) provides that, subject to certain exceptions, “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201; (see R.16, ¶ 271). “The goal of the [DJA] is to allow for the efficient resolution of disputes by an early adjudication of the rights of the parties.” Med. Assur. Co., Inc. v. Hellman, 610 F.3d 371, 377 (7th Cir.2010). “[District courts possess discretion in determining whether and when to entertain an action under the [DJA], even when the suit otherwise satisfies subject matter jurisdictional prerequisites.” Id. (quoting Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 2140, 132 L.Ed.2d 214 (1995)).

Plaintiffs allege Count I on behalf of a putative class: residents of the United States and its Territories. (See R.16, ¶¶ 269-273.) Plaintiffs further indicate that they seek to represent a multistate class composed of residents of all 50 states and the District of Columbia. (See R.66, at 62.) Indeed, the allegations in Count I state that “[t]he requested relief will generate common answers that will resolve controversies that lie at the heart of this litigation and will allow Plaintiffs to obtain relief that directly redresses the injury suffered. Resolving these issues will eliminate the need for continued and repeated litigation.” (R.16, ¶ 273.) The injunctive relief sought in Count I is not identical to the relief sought in Plaintiffs’ Prayer for Relief because the relief in Count I is broader and more specific. While the Prayer for Relief, for example, echoes the requests in Count I that the Court declare the Rust-Oleum warranty limits unconscionable, that Restore has a propensity to prematurely fail, and that Rust-Oleum knew and/or should have known that Restore had a propensity to prematurely fail, the injunctive relief in Count I further seeks a declaration that Rust-Oleum is required to disclose to consumers that Restore’s propensity to prematurely fail causes damage, including to other property. (See R.16, ¶ 276.) As such, Plaintiffs’ Prayer for Relief and claim for injunctive relief are not strictly duplicative.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ claim for injunc-tive relief is sought on behalf of a putative class. The Seventh Circuit teaches that “[b]y virtue of its requirement that the plaintiffs seek to redress a common injury properly addressed by a class-wide injunc-tive or declaratory remedy, Rule 23(b)(2) operates under the presumption that the interests of the class members are cohesive and homogeneous such that the case will not depend on adjudication of facts particular to any subset of the class nor require a remedy that differentiates materially among class members.” Lemon v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local No. 139, AFL-CIO, 216 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir.2000). Rule 23(b)(2) provides that “[a] class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: ... (2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); Warnell v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.R.D. 383, 386 (N.D.Ill.1999) (citing Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1194 (7th Cir.1996)) (explaining that the district court “certified the case as a class action ‘for purposes of injunctive relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)”); Yu v. Int’l Bus. Machines, Inc., No. 98 C 8241, 1999 WL 104159, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 24, 1999) (citing In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation, 123 F.3d 599, 610 (7th Cir.1997)) (“The Seventh Circuit has held that, in a class action seeking injunctive relief, the defendant ‘is deemed to face multiple claims for injunctive relief, each of which must be separately evaluated’ ”); see also Webb v. Carter’s Inc., 272 F.R.D. 489, 501 (C.D.Cal.2011) (“[pjlaintiffs also seek certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), which allows class actions for claims for injunctive relief’).

The Court, therefore, finds Rust-Ole-um’s arguments premature at this stage as it has not raised an issue of standing and the proper inclusion and scope of injunc-tive relief for a class action is more appropriately addressed in regard to class certification — including a determination of whether Count I, as alleged, redresses a common injury and is the predominate form of relief sought. See, e.g., Santiago v. RadioShack Corp., No. 11 C 3508, 2012 WL 934524, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 10, 2012) (denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief in a class action where the named plaintiffs, former employees, had standing to maintain their suit and the class, once defined, would likely include current employees entitled to injunctive relief); see also Kartman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 634 F.3d 883, 892 (7th Cir.2011) (addressing the requirements for certification of an injunction class under Rule 23(b)(2)); Lewis v. Washington, 197 F.R.D. 611, 613 (N.D.Ill.2000) (certifying the class based on the requirements of Rule 23 as one in which “injunctive and declaratory relief is clearly the predominant form of relief sought”). Indeed, Plaintiffs’ response to Rust-Oleum’s motion characterizes the issues similarly, arguing “there are no ... other obstacles to certification of the proposed nationwide declaratory and injunc-tive relief class.” (R.66, at 63.) Accordingly, the Court denies Rust-Oleum’s motion to dismiss Count I without prejudice as premature.

II. Counts II-V: Breach of Warranty Claims

Counts II through V assert a series of breach of warranty claims. Count II alleges breaches of written and implied warranties under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (“MMWA”). Count III alleges breaches of written and other express warranties under Section 2-313 of the U.C.C., as variously adopted by all 50 states and the District of Columbia. For those same jurisdictions, Counts IV and V allege breaches of the implied warranty of merchantability under U.C.C. § 2-314 and the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under U.C.C. § 2-315, with Count IV covering states that allegedly do not require privity and Count V covering those states that do.

A. MMWA & State Law Claims for Breach of Warranty

State law governs the U.C.C. claims and, with narrow exceptions, also governs the MMWA claim. (See R.16, ¶¶ 289, 299, 310); see, e.g., Illinois Wholesale Cash Register, Inc. v. PCG Trading Inc., No. 08 C 368, 2008 WL 4924817, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 13, 2008) (analyzing claims based on the U.C.C. under state law because the relevant states — Illinois and Massachusetts — both adopted Article 2 of the U.C.C.); Schimmer v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 384 F.3d 402, 405 (7th Cir.2004) (explaining that the MMWA “allows consumers to enforce written and implied warranties in federal court, borrowing state law causes of action”). In addition, under Illinois choice-of-law rules, the place of purchase and injury governs breach of warranty claims. See, e.g., Gray v. Abbott Labs., Inc., No. 10 cv 6377, 2011 WL 3022274, at *3, *6 (N.D.Ill. July 22, 2011).

Rust-Oleum contends that under the various state laws that apply to Plaintiffs’ individual breach of warranty claims, roughly six grounds for dismissal exist that to varying degrees cut across the four relevant counts and collectively require dismissal of each breach of warranty claim asserted by each Plaintiff. The Court addresses each argument below and notes a common thread weaved into its analysis: the issues Rust-Oleum argues are fact intensive and generally not appropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs allege two warranties relating to Rust-Oleum’s Restore products. Specifically, the Restore Instructions included a “Limited Lifetime Warranty” which states:

(R.16, ¶¶ 63, 95, 96, 280; R.16, attached to Compl. as Ex. I.) The packaging and labeling surrounding the buckets or cans of Restore sold to Plaintiffs also allegedly included a “LIMITED LIFETIME WARRANTY” which states:

(R.16, ¶¶ 63, 95, 96, 280; id., attached to Compl. as Ex. 2.)

According to Rust-Oleum, each bucket or can of Restore sold to Plaintiffs came with this written warranty that includes two independent limitations on the relief available with respect to any breach of warranty claim. First, the written warranty contains an exclusive-remedy provision that Rust-Oleum argues limits any unsatisfied Restore customer to “either a refund of the original purchase price or replacement with a product of equal value.” (R.32, at 5 (citing R.16, Exs. 1, 2).) Rust-Oleum contends that the Court should dismiss the breach of warranty claims for the 25 Plaintiffs who either received or were offered a refund based on the exclusive-remedy provision. Second, the written warranty also contains a consequential-damages exclusion, which differs in the two warranties attached to the complaint, but either of which, Defendant argues, separately precludes recovery of consequential damages such as the costs of applying or removing any product or replacing any structure. (Id.) This exclusion, Rust-Oleum argues, requires the Court to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ breach of warranty claims seeking consequential damages.

Plaintiffs respond that Rust-Oleum’s argument based on the exclusive-remedy provision does not overcome Plaintiffs’ allegations that those remedies fail of their essential purpose and that this defense turns on a question of fact that is inappropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss. (See R.66, at 7.) Plaintiffs further argue that Rust-Oleum’s argument regarding the consequential-damages exclusion is similarly deficient because Plaintiffs’ damages are direct, the exclusion clause is not conspicuous, and the limits on any consequential damages are unconscionable. (Id.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs reiterate that these issues are premature in the absence of a factual record.

1. Breach of Warranty Claim

An explicit promise by the seller with respect to the quality of the goods and that is part of the bargain between the parties creates an express warranty “that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.” U.C.C. § 2-313. “To state a breach of express warranty claim, a plaintiff ‘must allege the terms of the warranty, the failure of some warranted part, a demand upon the defendant to perform under the warranty’s terms, a failure by the defendant to do so, compliance with the terms of the warranty by the plaintiff, and damages measured by the terms of the warranty.’ ” Disher v. Tamko Bldg. Products, Inc., No. 14-CV-740-SMY-SCW, 2015 WL 4609980, at *3 (S.D.Ill. July 31, 2015) (citing Evitts v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Corp., 359 Ill.App.3d 504, 296 Ill.Dec. 137, 834 N.E.2d 942, 949 (2005)); see also Stearns v. Select Comfort Retail Corp., No. 08-2746 JF, 2009 WL 1635931, at *4 (N.D.Cal. June 5, 2009) (citations omitted) (“To plead a claim for breach of express warranty, the buyer must allege that the seller ‘(1) made an affirmation of fact of promise or provided a description of its goods; (2) the promise or description formed part of the basis of the bargain; (3) the express warranty was breached; and (4) the breach caused injury to the plaintiff ”). In at least some states, e.g., California, and Colorado, the buyer must also plead “that notice of the alleged breach was provided to the seller within a reasonable time after discovering the breach.” Stearns v. Select Comfort Retail Corp., 2009 WL 4723366, at *4 (N.D.Cal.2009) (citing U.C.C. § 2-607(3)); see also Scott v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., No. 14-CV-00157-PAB-MJW, 2015 WL 1517527, at *3 (D.Colo. Mar. 30, 2015) (citations omitted) (“To state a claim for breach of express warranty, the plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a warranty, (2) breach of the warranty, (3) the breach proximately caused the losses claims as damages, and (4) defendant received timely notice of the breach”).

Plaintiffs sufficiently plead a claim for breach of warranty. Plaintiffs allege that Rust-Oleum made several express warranties and representations regarding Restore that became part of the basis of the bargain between the parties, including various statements on the product labels, online, and in advertising. (See R.16, ¶¶ 286, 287.) Plaintiffs further allege that Rust-Oleum breached the express warranty by providing Restore in a condition that did not satisfy the warranty obligations of e.g., “guarantee[d] product performance ... when our product was applied according to label directions”, “low maintenance, long-lasting”, “lasts for years ... ”, “tested tough for 12 + years”, and “provide lasting protection ...” (Id., ¶¶ 286, 288.) Plaintiffs also allege that they have complied with the warranty obligations, including application instructions, but that Rust-Ole-um has failed to comply with the warranty terms, after receiving notice of the problems. (Id., ¶ 290.) Further, Plaintiffs allege that after applying Restore “to decking surfaces, it will prematurely crack, peel, flake, chip, bubble, pucker, separate, dela-minate, discolor, and generally degrade, and it has the propensity to cause damage to decks and other property of the class.” (Id., ¶ 76.) Lastly, Plaintiffs allege that Rust-Oleum has known about consumer complaints for years, at least through its online complaints and photos posted on its Facebook pages in addition to the internal systems Plaintiffs allege Rust-Oleum uses to monitor product performance and consumer complaints. (See id., ¶¶ 76-78, 82-92.)

Rust-Oleum does not challenge Plaintiffs’ breach of warranty claims based on the above allegations, but instead challenges Plaintiffs’ allegations as deficient based on their failure to overcome the limitations placed on their remedies by two provisions in the express warranty: the exclusive-remedy provision and the consequential-damages exclusion provision.

2. Plaintiffs Have Sufficiently Pled a Breach of Warranty Claim Despite the Lifetime Warranty’s Exclusive-Remedy Provision

The U.C.C., as adopted in each of the Plaintiffs’ home states, expressly provides that a warranty can “limit[ ] the buyer’s remedies to return of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of nonconforming goods or parts” by describing the limited remedy as “exclusive.” See U.C.C. § 2-719. Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that Rust-Oleum “ha[s] not fully reimbursed” 25 Plaintiffs, “has not reimbursed” another 5 Plaintiffs, and is silent as to the remaining 10 Plaintiffs. (See, e.g., R.16, ¶¶ 119, 126, 130,134, 138, 142, 151, 158, 162, 165, 169, 173, 177, 181, 185, 192, 196, 206, 213, 220, 224, 228, 232, 236, 242, 245, 249, 252, 255, 259, 265, 268; R.32, at 7.) Rust-Oleum argues that the only reasonable inference is that Rust-Ole-um provided or offered full refunds to, at a minimum, those Plaintiffs who allegedly were “not fully reimbursed.” (R.32, at 7.) The Court disagrees that this is the only reasonable inference, especially at this stage where all reasonable inferences must be taken in favor of Plaintiffs. Indeed, the inquiry becomes a factual determination as to what Rust-Oleum offered each Plaintiff, whether Rust-Oleum offered partial reimbursement or a replacement product, and the level of reimbursement, if any, received. These factual issues preclude a determination at this early stage of the litigation.

Furthermore, Rust-Oleum asserts that the breach of warranty claims (Count II-V) asserted by various Plaintiffs “must be dismissed so long as the exclusive-remedy provision is valid and enforceable. Which it is.” (R.32, at 7-8.) Rust-Oleum proceeds to address — under the relevant state’s laws'— the validity of the exclusive-remedy provision, arguing that it does not fail of its essential purpose. (Id. at 8-14.) Plaintiffs respond substantively, but also assert that the inquiry of whether an exclusive-remedy provision fails of its essential purpose is fact-driven and inappropriate for resolution at this stage. The Court agrees. Courts in many of the relevant states have routinely characterized a determination of whether an exclusive-remedy provision fails of its essential purpose as a question of fact. See, e.g., Demorato v. Carver Boat Corp., 304 Fed.Appx. 100, 102 (3d Cir.2008) (citing Roneker v. Kenworth Truck Co., 944 F.Supp. 179 (W.D.N.Y.1996) (applying New York law) (noting that whether a remedy failed of its essential purpose is “typically a question of fact for the jury”)); see also Delhomme Indus., Inc. v. Houston Beechcraft, Inc., 669 F.2d 1049, 1063 (5th Cir.1982) (“the question whether the circumstances in this case justify a [state analogous section 2719] action.. .is a question of fact”); Rothbaum v. Samsung Telecomms. Am., LLC, 52 F.Supp.3d 185, 205 (D.Mass.2014) (citations omitted) (“[w]hether a remedy has failed of its essential purpose is a question of fact”); Lincoln Elec. Co. v. Technitrol, Inc., No. 1:08 CV 2346, 2010 WL 2219341, at *4 (N.D.Ohio June 2, 2010) (“Whether a limited remedy has failed of its essential purpose is a question of fact”); Xerox Corp. v. Graphic Mgmt. Servs. Inc., 959 F.Supp.2d 311, 320 (W.D.N.Y.2013) (noting that whether a remedy has failed of its essential purpose is “generally” a question of fact for the jury); accord, Howard Foss, When to Apply the Doctrine of Failure of Essential Purpose to an Exclusion of Consequential Damages, 25 Duq. L. Rev.. 551, 575 (1987) (motion to dismiss is inappropriate to decide “the fate of an exclusion of consequential damages upon a failure of a limited remedy”).

Indeed, factual inquiries — such as whether Restore had any latent defects present — will not be adequately determined absent discovery, and underlie the determination of whether an express warranty failed of its essential purpose. As alleged, Plaintiffs’ Complaint supplies “enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting the allegations of a latent defect. See Indep. Trust Corp., 665 F.3d at 935; see also e.g., Scott, 2015 WL 1517527, at *7 (citing Advanced Tubular Prods., Inc. v. Solar Atmospheres, Inc., 149 Fed.Appx. 81, 85 (3d Cir.2005) (unpublished) (collecting cases)) (“courts typically consider whether latent defects cause a remedy’s essential purpose to fail when the limited remedy provides for a refund of the purchase price ... ”); Lincoln Elec., 2010 WL 2219341, at *4 (“A purchaser can be deprived of the value of its bargain where the goods purchased under the contract contain latent defects, which are defects that are “not detectable until it is impractical to effectuate the exclusive remedy”); PDC Labs., Inc. v. Hack Co., No. 09-1110, 2009 WL 2605270, at *12 (C.D.Ill. Aug. 24, 2009) (“[W]hen a contract limits remedy to return of the purchase price, the limited remedy fails of its essential purpose ‘when goods have latent defects which are not discoverable upon receipt and reasonable inspection.’ ” (applying Colorado law)); Petri Paint Co. v. OMG Ams., Inc., 595 F.Supp.2d 416, 423-425 (D.N.J.2008) (applying case law pertaining to latent seed defects to a chemical products suit in which chemical defects were not readily discoverable); Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 294 F.Supp. 649, 655 (W.D.Pa.1968) (“[A] time limitation of a few days after receipt of shipment renders any warranties ineffective as to defects not discoverable on ordinary inspection.... Such limitations on time and damages, when the defect is latent, are illusory and under the circumstances of this ease represent no remedy at all”). Indeed, as Rust-Oleum notes, although “there is no blanket rule”, there are “a handful of cases from a few states concluding that a refund remedy failed its essential purpose where the alleged defect was latent.” (R.77, at 3.) In particular, as noted by the district court in Petri Paint, while there may be a trend to enforce limitations clauses in contracts for machinery, “the process of applying such legal reasoning to facts of the instant case is awkward, at best. While a mechanical part can be replaced or repaired, and reinserted into a machine, chemicals, once introduced into another substance or chemical process, cannot readily be extracted for easy replacement or repair.” 595 F.Supp.2d at 423. The Court agrees and finds that based on Plaintiffs’ allegations, they have satisfied the pleading standard for their claim that the Limited Lifetime Warranty failed of its essential purpose.

Rust-Oleum argues that once a determination of latency is made, the Court must also look at any unanticipated circumstances because “it may be that the parties bargained for. an allocation of risk relating to latent defects.” (Id. at 4.) The Court does not need to make a determination at this stage, however, as to whether this additional step in its analysis is required, but merely notes that if it is, it only serves to weaken Rust-Oleum’s position in its motion to dismiss, as such a determination relies on additional factual inquiries relevant to the relationship of the parties and the anticipated circumstances surrounding use of the product to determine whether the exclusive-remedy provision had a pre-clusive effect on Plaintiffs’ breach of express warranty claim.

Because of the presence of numerous factual issues surrounding Rust-Oleum’s breach of warranty argument based on its exclusive-remedy provision, the Court finds that a decision at this early stage of the litigation is inappropriate. Accordingly, the Court denies Rust-Oleum’s motion to dismiss Counts II and III based on the exclusive-remedy provision.

3. Plaintiffs Have Sufficiently Pled a Breach of Warranty Claim, Despite the Warranty’s Consequential-Damages Exclusion Provision

Rust-Oleum contends that even if the exclusive-remedy provision is enforceable, the separate provision in its Restore express warranty excluding consequential damages independently requires dismissal of all of Plaintiffs’ claims for consequential damages under Counts II-V. (R.32, at 15.) Specifically, Rust-Oleum argues that Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not adequately plead which warranty — of the two versions attached to the complaint — each Plaintiff received, but that regardless, the plain language of either version precludes recovery for the costs of removing Restore from structures to which it is applied and the costs of repairing or replacing those structures. (See id.) Plaintiffs reply that a determination as to whether Plaintiffs’ damages are direct or consequential is premature for' the same reason that the issue of whether the remedy fails of its essential purpose is premature — because it is a factual determination that requires development of the factual record and the allegations presented raise a reasonable expectation that’discovery will reveal supporting evidence. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that a determination as to the foreseeability of the damages must'be conducted first, and such a determination requires an understanding of Rust-Oleum’s representations, .promises, and warranties, as well as the degree to which Plaintiffs’ needs are incorporated into such promised performance — inquiries that require a sufficient factual record that does not yet exist. In addition, Plaintiffs argue that even if the damages are consequential, the consequential-damages exclusion is unenforceable because it is unconscionable.

a. Direct vs. Consequential Damages

“Contract law distinguishes between direct and consequential damages, the difference lying in the degree to which the damages are a foreseeable (that is, a highly probable) consequence of a breach.” Rexnord Corp. v. DeWolff Boberg Assocs., 286 F.3d 1001, 1004 (7th Cir.2002) (eollect-ing cases). Damages are awarded upon proof of a breach as direct damages where they were “utterly foreseeable, indeed certain,” id. and as consequential damages when they were “reasonably foreseeable”. Linc Equip. Scvs., Inc. v. Signal Med. Svcs., Inc., 319 F.3d 288, 289 (7th Cir.2003). The distinction between damages as direct or consequential “is relative not absolute.” IMI Norgren Inc. v. D&D Tooling & Mfg., Inc., 247 F.Supp.2d 966, 970-71 (N.D.Ill.2002); see also U.S. Plastic Lumber, Ltd. v. Strandex Corp., No. 02-0-211-C, 2003 WL 23144861, at *12 (W.D.Wis. Feb. 7, 2003) (applying Wisconsin law on summary judgment regarding the distinction between direct and consequential damage).

Section 2-715(2) of the U.C.C. defines “consequential damages” to include “(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and (b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.” U.C.C. § 2-715(2). Section 2-714(2) of the U.C.C. defines direct damages more narrowly as “[t]he measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.” The definitions are not alone definitive, however, as “[djamages that might be consequential under one contract can be direct or ordinary under another.” Biovail Pharms, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 5:01-CV-352-BO(3), 2003 WL 25901513, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 28, 2003) (citing U.C.C. (4th ed.) § 10-4 at 573-74). In addition, “among the circumstances most relevant to the classification is the scope of the broken promise itself. If the requirements or needs of the buyer are explicitly incorporated into the subject matter of the promised performance, then at least the immediate damages from the breach will be direct because they flow in the ordinary course of events from the breach.” Id. In practice, despite some variation among jurisdictions, courts generally treat “damages that would follow any breach of similar character in the usual course of events” as direct damages, but treat “damages that, although not an invariable result of every breach of this sort, were reasonably foreseeable or contemplated by the parties” as consequential damages. Wartsila NSD N. Am., Inc. v. Hill Int’l, Inc., 530 F.3d 269, 277 (3d Cir.2008).

Rust-Oleum argues that the allegations make clear that the removal, replacement, and repair costs Plaintiffs seek qualify as consequential damages. First, Rust-Oleum contends that Plaintiffs expressly plead that the alleged compensatory damages beyond a refund are consequential damages, e.g., costs of removing Restore, replacing it with another product, and repairing any damage to decks. In particular, Rust-Oleum points to Plaintiffs’ Complaint that alleges they incurred “significant consequential damages” ... “above and beyond the ‘limited’ warranty”. (R.16, ¶ 98; see also id., ¶¶ 320, 330 (requesting repair costs, replacement costs, and “other consequential and incidental damages”).) Plaintiffs’ Complaint also, however, “seek[s] to recover damages caused as a direct result of Defendant’s breach of its written and implied warranties and its deceitful and unlawful conduct. Damages include, inter alia, labor and other costs associated with removing Restore and replacing decking structures and similar structures.” (Id., ¶ 282; id., ¶ 292 (“[a]s a direct and proximate result of the breach of the express warranty, Plaintiffs have suffered damages, injury in fact and/or ascertainable loss in an amount to be determined at trial, including repair and replacement costs and/or damages to other property”); accord id., ¶¶ 301, 312, 320, 329, 330, 337, 345, 350.) As such, Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not dictate a characterization of damages in this case as direct or consequential.

Rust-Oleum further asserts that Plaintiffs’ damages are not direct because the costs depend entirely on each Plaintiffs individual deck materials, deck conditions, product application, weather conditions, and product degradation, and thus would not follow every breach in the ordinary course. (See R.77, at 7.) Rust-Oleum further notes that based on the presence of individual factors such as these, courts have repeatedly held that similar demands for removal, replacement, and repair costs seek consequential, not direct, damages. (Id.) As with many other cases upon which Rust-Oleum relies, these cases dealt with consequential damages on summary judgment and/or did not address the distinction between direct or consequential damages. In addition, many of these cases also addressed issues of unconscionability, which as discussed infra, present factual inquiries rendering resolution on a motion to dismiss inappropriate. See, e.g., Farrar & Farrar Farms v. Miller-St. Nazianz, Inc., 477 Fed.Appx. 981, 988-89 (4th Cir.2012) (unpublished) (not addressing a distinction between alleged damages as direct or consequential and finding on summary judgment that the defendant’s disclaimer for payment of consequential damages valid, in part, because it was not unconscionable); Stearns, 2009 WL 4723366, at *9-10 (finding damages of replacement consequential and that the warranty excluded such costs because it was not unconscionable); Am. Abrasive Metals Co. v. Assoc. Paint & Supply Co., Inc., No. 86-531 (CSF), 1987 WL 27921, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 1987) (not addressing a distinction between alleged damages as direct or consequential in granting motion for summary judgment to preclude claim for loss profits or for costs incurred “in connection with warranty and/or repair work”).

Similarly, Rust-Oleum’s argument that the plain language of the provision itself makes clear that the damages are consequential is not persuasive. The warranty excludes payment for “labor or costs of labor for removal or application of any product, or replacement of any wood structure” or “labor or cost of labor for the application of any paint and consequential, incidental damages”. (R.16, Exs. 1 & 2.) Indeed, taking the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, this language does not show an intent to treat removal, replacement and repair costs as consequential damages be-, cause it lists consequential and incidental damages separately, in addition to labor or cost of labor for removal or application of the product or replacement of the wood structure. This differs from the language used in the cases upon which Rust-Oleum relies. See City of New York v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. 13 CV 6848(RJD)(SMG), 2015 WL 3767241, at *3, *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2015) (noting warranties at issue disclaimed consequential and incidental damages “including without limitation, damage to the helicopter or other property”); McNally Wellman Co., a Div. of Boliden Allis v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 63 F.3d 1188, 1193 (2d Cir.1995) (warranty provision stated “[cjontractor shall not be liable for all or any part of any of the following, no matter how claimed ...: loss of profit or revenue, ... cost of capital,... loss or reduction of use or value of any facilities ... or increased costs of operations or maintenance”); Farrar & Farrar Farms, 477 Fed.Appx. at 983 (warranty provision stated that the defendant “maintains no obligations or liabilities for consequential damages arising out of, or in connection with[,] use of this product, including but not limited to inconvenience, loss of profit, commercial use, food loss of any type, or costs o[f] removal, installation or reinstallation”).

Plaintiffs have alleged that the express warranty promised that Rust-Oleum “guarantees product performance for the product in this can only as long as you own or reside in your home when our product was applied according to the label directions.” (See R.16, ¶ 95; id, Exs. 1, 2.) Plaintiffs have also alleged that Plaintiffs and many of those authoring consumer complaints applied Restore “in accordance with the instructions provided by Defendant”. (See, e.g., R.16, ¶¶ 80, 81, 116, 117, 121, 124, 128, 132, 136, 140, 144, 147, 150, 153, 156, 160, 164, 167, 171, 175, 179, 183, ■187, 290.) Taking all the reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, they have alleged factual support for a finding that the damages resulting from application of Restore to surfaces following the instructions, constitute direct damages which were bargained for as expressly embodied in Rust-Oleum’s own warranty provision. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a factual basis supporting a finding of direct damages which precludes dismissal of their claim at this early stage. See, e.g., JPS Elastomerics Corp. v. Indus. Tools Inc., 65 F.Supp.2d 376, 381 (W.D.Va.1998) (finding that when construing the language most favorably to the plaintiff, “a reasonable person could find that modifications made to [the plaintiffs] machine at [the defendant’s] direction constitute direct damages which were bargained for as expressly embodied in [the defendant’s] own warranty provisions).”

b. Unconscionability

Even if the Court treated Plaintiffs’ damages as consequential, however, the Court must still assess whether the consequential-damages exclusion provision is unconscionable, as Plaintiffs also allege. Factual issues exist including the parties’ relationship, the adequacy of the bargaining position, and the existence of meaningful alternatives available, that preclude a determination at this stage as to whether Rust-Oleum’s express warranty is unconscionable.

“Under the UCC, a contract term limiting parties’ ability to recover consequential damages is enforceable unless the provision is unconscionable.” Scott, 2015 WL 1517527, at *7 (citing § 4-2-719(3)); see also e.g., Pig Imp. Co., Inc. v. Middle States Holding Co., 943 F.Supp. 392, 401-02 (D.Del.1996); Pizel v. Monaco Coach Corp., 364 F.Supp.2d 790, 796 (N.D.Ind.2005). Resolution of whether an express warranty is unconscionable may involve issues of fact which preclude resolution on a motion to dismiss. See Bennett v. Skyline Corp., 52 F.Supp.3d 796, 809 (N.D.W.Va.2014) (citing Hager v. Am. General Fin., Inc., 37 F.Supp.2d 778, 787 (S.D.W.Va.1999)) (explaining that dismissal is improper if questions of fact exist regarding “whether the parties’ bargaining power was grossly unequal so as to render the transactions between the plaintiffs and defendants unconscionable’ ”); accord Gonzalez v. FMS, Inc., No. 14 C 9424, 2015 WL 4100292, at *3 (N.D.Ill. July 6, 2015) (citing McMillan v. Collection Prof'ls Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 759-60 (7th Cir.2006)) (explaining that whether a particular practice is unconscionable in the eyes of an unsophisticated consumer “is often a question of fact and thus ‘district courts must act with great restraint when asked to rule in this context on a motion to dismiss’”).

Here, factual inquiries exist as to the relationships between and relative positions of the parties, the adequacy of the bargaining position, and the existence of meaningful alternatives available to Plaintiffs. See, e.g., Bennett, 52 F.Supp.3d at 809; In re Samsung DLP Television Class Action Litig., Civ. 07-2141(GEB), 2009 WL 3584352, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2009) (finding that the plaintiffs adequately alleged procedural and substantive uncon-scionability where the defendant knew of defect at time of sale, consumers had no meaningful choice in time limitations of warranty, and a significant disparity in bargaining power existed); Payne v. Fuji-film U.S.A., Inc., Civ. 07-385(JAG), 2007 WL 4591281, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2007) (nothing that the plaintiff specifically alleged that the defendant knew, or should have known, of the alleged defect in the product and defendant failed to disclose same to members of the class). In addition, factual inquiries exist surrounding Restore’s alleged latent defect and whether the consequential-damages exclusion provision, in light of that defect, is unconscionable. See, e.g., Majors v. Kalo Labs., Inc., 407 F.Supp. 20, 22-23 (M.D.Ala.1975) (citing U.C.C. § 2-719(2)) (finding a limitation in the remedy clause unconscionable where the purchased product, a soybean inocu-lant, had a latent defect which could not be detected until the soybean crop had been cultivated, planted and harvested); Trinkle v. Schumacher Co., 100 Wis.2d 13, 301 N.W.2d 255, 259 (1980) (finding limited remedy provision unconscionable under § 2-719(2) where defect in fabric not discoverable until after time limitation of sales contract expired); Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 244 N.E.2d 685, 688 (1968) (finding limited remedy inadequate under § 2-719(2) where defect in yarn not discoverable until after time limitation of sales contract expired); accord Pig Imp., 943 F.Supp. at 401-02 (distinguishing case law finding a latent defect as a basis for unconscionability on the basis that the plaintiff had the means to discover the defect at the time of delivery and had a reason to be looking for the defect). The presence of such factual issues, taken along with Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded Complaint, preclude dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim at this stage.

In addition, Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to satisfy the pleading standard to allow a reasonable inference that Rust-Oleum had knowledge of the alleged latent defect during the relevant time period of the present action, where the Complaint specifically alleges that customers voiced complaints against the product at least as early as 2011 when consumers complained about Synta’s Restore product peeling and pulling away from the surface three months after application. (See, e.g., R.16, ¶ 88.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that after Rust-Oleum purchased Synta, it had access to Synta’s customer complaint files and could review numerous online complaints about Synta’s Restore product. (R.16, ¶ 87.)

Accordingly, taking the allegations and facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court denies Rust-Oleum’s motion to dismiss the breach of express warranty claims based on the consequential-damages exclusion provision.

B. Plaintiffs’ Allegations Fail to State a Claim that Restore’s Limited Lifetime Warranty is Unenforceable as Conspicuous

Plaintiffs allege that the Restore written warranty’s “limitations are not sufficiently set apart by underlining or highlighting,” resulting in a “lack of conspicuousness” that they allege violates §§ 2302(a), 2304(a)(3), 2308(a), and 2308(c) of the MMWA. (See R.16, ¶ 280.) Plaintiffs further allege that under state law, Rust-Oleum “has not sufficiently disclaimed the implied warranty of merchantability (specifically and conspicuously) or the implied warranty of fitness (in writing and conspicuously).” (R.16, ¶¶ 298, 308.) Rust-Oleum argues that Restore’s Lifetime Limited Warranty is sufficiently conspicuous as required by state law. Namely, Rust-Oleum contends that the MMWA contains no requirements- for consequential-damages exclusions or limitations to appear conspicuously on a limited warranty (as opposed to a full warranty). In addition, Rust-Oleum argues that the consequential-damages exclusion does not disclaim or modify an implied warranty, but instead restricts the available relief for breach of warranty and that Plaintiffs have failed to allege warranties that are inconspicuous under the U.C.C. where the Limited Lifetime Warranty includes a bold and capitalized title. (See R.32, at 21-25; R.77, at 8-10.) Plaintiffs respond that “[i]n order to be