Richardson v. Petasis (160 F. Supp. 3d 88, 2015)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge

Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Sharon D. Richardson, an African-American female, was an employee of Defendant The Johns Hopkins University (“JHU”) from April 2011 to January 2013. Ms. Richardson brings this civil action against JHU and four of its employees or former employees, Defendants George Pe-tasis, Shanna Hines, Deborah Grandval, and Myron Kunka (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”), for race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Title 2 of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act of 1977 (“DCHRA”). See Am. Compl., ECF No. 27. Ms. Richardson alleges that JHU, through the conduct of the Individual Defendants, discriminated against her with respect to the terms and conditions of her employment because of her race (Counts I — III), created a hostile work environment (Count VI), and retaliated against her for her complaints of race discrimination (Count V) and that the Individual Defendants aided and abetted the discriminatory and retaliatory conduct (Count IV). See id. ¶¶ 121-50.

Before the Court is Defendants’ motion seeking summary judgment on all counts of the Amended Complaint. See Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 40. Upon consideration of the parties’ arguments in support of and in opposition to the motion and the record before the Court, the Court will grant the motion in part and deny the motion in part for the reasons explained below.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

JHU’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (“SAIS”) is a global educational institution that maintains its primary campus in Washington, D.C. Its Office of Information Technology provides computing support for SAIS students, faculty, and staff, including computing and audio-visual support for SAIS events. See Defs.’ Stmt. Facts Not In Dispute (“Defs.’ SOF”) ¶ I,' ECF No. 40-2. Plaintiff Sharon Richardson began working for SAIS’s Office of Information Technology on April 11, 2011 and resigned on January 22, 2013. See id. ¶ 6.

A. JHU’s Hire of Ms. Richardson and Ms. Richardson’s Responsibilities

Ms. Richardson was hired as an Information Technology Manager with the title of Director of Operations and maintained this title throughout her employment. See Defs.’ Ex. 2, ECF No. 40-4. Defendant George Petasis, who was the Chief Information Officer (“CIO”) of SAIS and Ms. Richardson’s superior throughout her employment, interviewed both Ms. Richardson and Defendant Deborah Grandval, who is Caucasian, for the position. See Defs.’ SOF ¶¶ 4, 7; see also George Petasis Dep. Tr. at 9:11-18, Defs.’ Ex. 4 (“Petasis Dep. Tr.”), ECF No. 40-6. At the time, Mr. Petasis concluded that Ms. Richardson was more qualified for the position than Ms. Grandval due to the experience that Ms. Richardson described on her resume, and he selected Msi Richardson for the position. See Defs.’ SOF ¶¶ 7-9; see also Peta-sis Dep. Tr. at 9:21-10:1; id. 11:4-6. According to Ms. Richardson, Mr. Petasis told her during her interview for the position that “he did not need a technical person” and that she “could be trained later.” Aff. Sharon D. Richardson ¶ 7, Pl.’s Ex. 7 (“Richardson Aff.”), ECF No. 42-10.

As the Director of Operations, Ms. Richardson supervised approximately eight employees. See Defs.’ SOF ¶ ll. Her responsibilities included overseeing audio-visual events at SAIS, managing the Service Desk, which provides help to users with technology issues and requests for service, assisting SAIS faculty, staff, and students with their technology needs, managing the IT budget and staff, providing IT support for JHU’s Carey Business School, and assisting Mr. Petasis with IT initiatives. See id.; Defs.’ Ex. 2. The JHU Staff Handbook also states that all employees are responsible for “perform[ing] duties assigned by [their] supervisor even if not included in [their] job description.” Defs.’ Ex. 5 at JHU00454-55, ECF No. 40-7.

B. Beginning of Ms. Richardson’s Employment

The signs of a future strained relationship between Ms. Richardson and Mr. Pe-tasis were evident early in Ms. Richardson’s employment. When Ms. Richardson began working in April 2011, Mr. Petasis was out of the office on a two-week vacation, and when he returned to the office he and Ms. Richardson had a good and pleasant working relationship. See Defs.’ SOF ¶ 15.

On or about May 5, 2011, however, Mr. Petasis yelled at Ms. Richardson in front of Mohammad Elahi, one of Ms. Richardson’s staff members. See id. ¶ 16; Defs.’ Ex. 7, ECF No. 40-9 (handwritten note dated May 11, 2011 describing the incident). Ms. Richardson states that Mr. Petasis “yelled and screamed at me in a physically hostile manner” and was “so close that I could feel his breath and smell the coffee on his breath.” Richardson Aff. ¶ 11. Ms. Richardson testified that she confronted Mr. Petasis about his conduct soon afterwards and told him that she found it “offensive.” See Sharon Richardson Dep. Tr. at 222:8-223:21, Defs.’ Ex. 1-B (“Richardson Dep. Tr.”), ECF No. 41-2. She testified that their interaction was calm and that it ended by shaking hands. See id. Ms. Richardson also mentioned this incident to Defendant Shanna Hines, an African-American woman who was the Human Resources Manager during Ms. Richardson’s employment, shortly thereafter. See Defs.’ SOF ¶ 6; Richardson Dep. Tr. at 223:22-224:15. Ms. Richardson states, however, that Mr. Petasis frequently yelled and screamed at her and invaded her personal space throughout her employment. See Richardson Aff. ¶ 10. Nevertheless, Ms. Richardson testified that from May to September 2011, she and Mr. Petasis had a “good relationship” and treated each other with respect. See Richardson Dep. Tr. at 262:16-263:2, Defs.’ Ex. 1-C, ECF No. 41-3.

Mr. Petasis states that within the first few months of Ms. Richardson’s employment, he realized that Ms. Richardson’s “technical competence was not at the level [he] had understood it to be based on her resume and [his] interview of her.” Aff. George Petasis ¶ 4, Defs.’ Ex. 6 (“Petasis Aff.”), ECF No. 40-8. In July 2011, he hired Ms. Grandval as an IT Manager reporting directly to him with the title of IT Project Leader. See Defs.’ SOF ¶ 33; Aff. Shanna Hines ¶ 14, Defs.’ Ex. 3 (“Hines Aff.”), ECF No. 40-5; PL’s Ex. 12, ECF No. 42-15.

C. Physical Incident Involving Mr. Petasis and First Meeting with Human Resources

Ms. Richardson states that on or about September'27, 2011, Mr. Petasis touched her shoulder in a way that she felt was inappropriate. See Defs.’ SOF ¶ 18. During her deposition, Ms. Richardson testified that on that day, while she and Mr. Petasis were working in a “very tight,” small control room, Mr. Petasis, with his body in “very close proximity,” briefly squeezed and rubbed her shoulder. Richardson Dep. Tr. at 235:17-240:19. She testified that she found this physical contact offensive. See id. at 240:22-241:17. The next day, Ms. Richardson confronted Mr. Petasis about the incident, telling him that he had made her uncomfortable. See id. at 245:3-11. Mr. Petasis responded by telling her that he “respect[s] that” and that he “didn’t mean anything.” See id. at 245:16-18. Ms. Richardson felt satisfied with his response at the time, which she characterized as courteous. See id. at 246:19-20; id. at 248:4-5. Ms. Richardson does not attribute Mr. Petasis’s actions to racial discrimination. See Defs.’ SOF ¶ 21; Richardson Dep. Tr. at 248:8-11.

Two days later, on September 29, 2011, at her request, Ms. Richardson met with Ms. Hines and Defendant Myron Kunka, the Associate Dean for Finance and Administration at the time, who was responsible for overseeing Human Resources and the Office of Information Technology, to generally discuss her and her staffs concerns about Mr. Petasis. See Defs.’ SOF ¶ 22. After the meeting, Ms. Richardson created a “Memorandum For Record” memorializing her recollection of the conversation. See Defs.’ Ex. 8, ECF No. 40-10. According to Ms. Richardson’s memorandum, the purpose of the meeting was to, first, “[m]ake management formally aware” that the Office of Information Technology was a “hostile” environment and, second, to “share concerns expressed by my direct reports (staff/personnel) and myself.” Id. at SDR000992. Ms. Richardson stated that her staff had expressed concerns regarding Mr. Petasis’s “inappropriate and unprofessional behavior” and that she was doing her job “to project that information forward” by putting it “on record.” Id. She stated that her staff felt “threatened and bullied” by Mr. Petasis for a few different reasons. Id. She stated, for example, that she was informed that Mr. Petasis “has a history of volatile actions such as yelling, intimidation, harassment and even pounding his fist on the desk.” Id. at SDR000992-93. She also stated that her male staff had complained about Mr. Petasis grabbing their shoulders and shaking them. See id. at SDR000993.

Ms. Richardson also told Ms. Hines and Mr. Kunka that some of her male staff wanted Mr. Petasis to stop referring to them as “his boys.” Id. at SDR000992. She wrote in her memorandum: “They find this reference offensive and degrading, example: One staff is of [Philippians [sic] Origin] and another is [Ethiopian Nationality].” Id. (punctuation in original). During her deposition testimony, Ms. Richardson provided some clarification. She testified that the members of her staff that she referenced were Michael Berbano, who she said was of Filipino origin, and Mr. Elahi, who she said was of Iranian origin. See Richardson Dep. Tr. at 263:13-18; id. at 270:11-16. She stated that Mr. Berbano complained to her directly and that Mr. Petasis “referred to Moe Elahi in my presence, asking me, ‘How is your boy?”’ Id. at 263:14-18; id. at 272:8-274:18. She could not recall whether she informed Mr. Elahi that Mr. Petasis referred to him using the term “boy” or whether Mr. Elahi ever complained to her about it. See id. at 275:11-19. She testified that, as an African-American, she associates the term “boy” with slavery and found it racially offensive and discriminatory. See id. at 272:2-7. She said that Mr. Berbano did not express any feelings of racial discrimination in his complaint to her but that he told her that he felt it was derogatory because he is a “grown-ass man.” See id. at 273:13-274:7. Her memorandum does not reflect that she expressed the racial connotations she made with slavery to Ms. Hines and Mr. Kunka, and Ms. Richardson testified that the memorandum was, to her knowledge, a complete and accurate representation of what she discussed at the meeting. See Richardson Dep. Tr. at 275:20-276:5.

D. Incidents with Mr. Petasis and Ms. Grandval in January and February 2012

On January 24, 2012, Mr. Petasis had a heated discussion with Ms. Richardson in which she claims that he yelled at her regarding a meeting that Ms. Richardson had requested with Human Resources earlier that month. See Richardson Aff. ¶ 28; Pl.’s Ex. 11, ECF No. 42-14. Ms. Richardson summarized that discussion in a memorandum dated two days later and addressed to Mr. Petasis. See Pl.’s Ex. 11. According to the account provided in the memorandum, Ms. Richardson requested the meeting to discuss issues related to staffing and Mr. Petasis yelled at her regarding the need for the meeting and for the two hours’ notice that Ms. Richardson provided him in advance of the meeting. See id. at JHU00246. In the memorandum, Ms. Richardson wrote she “felt very uncomfortable and fearful to remain in the room with you” and referenced other purported instances of Mr. Petasis screaming at her and other employees. Id. She also asked, “Is this rough and harsh behavior because of my gender, race or ethnicity?” Id. She closed the memorandum by stating that she would request to meet with Mr. Petasis, his supervisor, and Human Resources. See id. at JHU00247.

On February 22, 2012, Ms. Richardson had an encounter with Ms. Grandval that Ms. Richardson characterizes as threatening. See, e.g., Richardson Dep. Tr. at 823:17-18, Defs.’ Ex. 1-D, ECF No. 41-4. According to Ms. Richardson’s testimony, Ms. Grandval came to her office to ask her a question, and, because Ms. Richardson was doing something else at the time, she did not respond. See id. at 322:6-9. Ms. Grandval then, according to Ms. Richardson’s testimony, yelled at her that she asked her a question and Ms. Richardson again did not respond. See id. at 322:8-12. Ms. Richardson testified that Ms. Grand-val then “lunged in my face, and her breath was on my breath,” yelling at her, “When I ask you something, you need to tell me.” Id. at 322:13-323:8. Ms. Richardson claims that shortly after this incident, Mr. Petasis removed her access to the calendar on Microsoft Outlook but that he did not remove Ms. Grandval’s access, which impeded her ability to perform her work. See Defs.’ SOF ¶ 28.

A week later, on February 29, 2012, Mr. Petasis wrote a memorandum to Ms. Richardson in response to her memorandum dated January 26, 2012 and in advance of a meeting that the two had with Ms. Hines that same day. See Pl.’s Ex. 22, ECF No. 42-23. Mr. Petasis disputed the factual account that Ms. Richardson provided in her memorandum, writing: “It was shocking to see things twisted around and styled in a way where you appear to be the victim; discussions taken out of context, and comments often distorted, in order to present me in the worst possible way.” _ Id. at JHU00235. He stated that he had been trying to accommodate Ms. Richardson’s “hostile attitude, body language and behavior at meetings, as well as emails, these past ten months,” and that he had attempted to address issues that she brought to him and “reassure you that nobody was out to get you and that we are all part of the same team.” Id. He also addressed the specific incidents that Ms. Richardson discussed in her memorandum. With respect to their meeting on January 24, 2012, he stated that “[i]f there was one person that raised their voice during this conversation it was you while you were trying to explain your earlier emails” and that he “was actually under the impression that the conversation went well,” given that Ms. Richardson thanked him at its conclusion and appeared to be in a “much better mood.” Id. at JHU00236. He stated that he was therefore surprised when he saw his words “twisted and warped in your email and you quoting me out of context.” Id.

Mr. Petasis also addressed what he characterized as Ms. Richardson’s unprofessional behavior and need for improvement, writing, in part: “[TJhings need to change going forward and beyond your body language, the tone in your voice, and the way you deal with your peers, you need to also address the manner in which your [sic] write some of your emails where at times you make me feel that I’m the one working for you and not the other way around ....” Id. at JHU00238. He encouraged Ms. Richardson to “come see me if you’re not getting the kind of response you are expecting” and told her that she should “stop feeling insecure about [her] job.” Id. He stated that he would discuss these issues during their upcoming meeting with Human Resources. See id. Ms. Hines submits an affidavit characterizing Mr. Petasis’s memorandum as “counseling [Ms. Richardson] on ways she needed to improve her work performance.” Hines Aff. ¶ 3. See also Petasis Dep. Tr. at 36:21-37:3 (testifying that this portion of the memorandum “was guidance that, in my mind, was — was prescribing the course of action she had to take, corrective action she had to take”).

Ms. Richardson met with Mr. Petasis and Ms. Hines on the same day as Mr. Petasis’s memorandum. Ms. Hines states that she met with the two of them “to try •to help them resolve their conflict” and that during this meeting, Ms. Richardson “cited as a source of conflict the fact that Petasis had yelled at her in May 2011.” Hines Aff. ¶ 4. Ms. Richardson also discussed her encounter with Ms. Grandval on February 22. In an e-mail that Ms. Richardson sent to Ms. Hines on March 1, 2012 following up on their meeting, she summarized the incident with Ms. Grand-val, referring to her “advancing] toward my face” and stating that she “felt this behavior was unacceptable in the work environment, unprofessional more, importantly, threatening.” Defs.’ Ex. 11, EOF No. 40-13 (emphasis omitted). Ms. Richardson’s account does not indicate that she raised any concerns regarding race discrimination by either Mr. Petasis or Ms. Grandval to Ms. Hines or Mr. Petasis.

E. Incident with Ms. Grandval in May 2012

According to Ms. Richardson, she had another, more serious encounter with Ms. Grandval on May 9, 2012. Ms. Richardson testified during her deposition that on that day Ms. Grandval came into her office following a meeting with Mr. Petasis, closed the door, leaned over, and said to her, “I know exactly where you park your car, and I am going to hurt you, and I will get your job. ... And nobody will believe you.” Richardson Dep. Tr. at 336:3-9. See also id. at 334:8-341:3 (discussing the incident). In a contemporaneous e-mail that Ms, Richardson sent to Mr. Petasis and Ms. Hines the same day, she provided another description. See Defs.’ Ex. 12, EOF No. 40-14. She wrote:

Debbie G. came into my office and closed my door-and proceeded with the same discussion about “why I sent the email”? She was antagonistic and badgering.The purpose of our previous meeting was to bring closure ... .why did she need to badger me again? I’m not comfortable with her behind closed doors, because, of the last episode where she lunged over my desk in my face.So I opened the door — She and I disagreed and I told her I was not going to engage any further in this confrontational discussion.... I asked “what she needed or how may I assist her”? She continued to badger me about the email and Sais Store, and etc. Why would she continue to pursue and badger me about the very discussion you advised in your office 10 minutes prior to terminate? I heard her acknowledge she understood in your office.

Id. (ellipses in original). Ms. Richardson requested that Mr. Petasis “advise Debbie Grandval to confront me as a professional colleague with respect” and informed him that she was leaving work early because she did not feel well and could not “successfully function” “[d]ue to the stress and hostile environment today.” Id. Ms. Richardson made no mention of any threats of physical violence or racial animus.

Ms. Richardson met with Mr. Petasis the next day, May 10, 2012, to discuss the incident with Ms. Grandval, and Ms. Richardson created a “Memorandum For Record” purporting to summarize her account of their conversation. See Defs.’ Ex. 13, EOF No. 40-15. According to this memorandum, Ms. Richardson informed Ms. Pe-tasis that Ms. Grandval “badger[ed]” her, repeatedly asking “why did you send the email?” and was “antagonistic and threatening me.” Id. at SDR000214. She stated that she “felt uncomfortable, harassed, and insulted.” Id. She also wrote: “Debbie turns around and does what she feels like doing to Sharon. Debbie can shoot Sharon. ... She can hurt Sharon. She can do whatever she wants to Sharon and there’s no recourse, no consequences.” Id. She also stated that she would be locking her door after hours and that she did not “feel safe or comfortable.” Id. She also wrote that she told Mr. Petasis that she “know[s] what to do the next time” and that when Mr. Petasis asked her what she would do, she responded by stating, “It will be a surprise. I know how to handle it,” and “You’ll see.” Id. at SDR000215. While the memorandum states that Ms. Grandval was “threatening” Ms. Richardson during the encounter, it does not state or otherwise indicate that Ms. Grandval explicitly threatened physical violence. The memorandum also contains no mention of potential racial animus.

F. Incident with Mr. Petasis and Ms. Grandval and Medical Leave in the Summer of 2012

On June 4, 2012, according to Ms. Richardson, Mr. Petasis excluded her from a meeting with SAIS’s campus in Bologna, Italy regarding IT Operations but allowed Ms. Grandval to attend. See Richardson Aff. ¶¶ 50-52; Defs.’ SOF ¶ 29. Ms. Richardson states that, on the same day, Mr. Petasis “yelled and screamed” at her in his •office. Richardson Aff. ¶ 54. Ms. Richardson states that Mr. Petasis “invited Defendant Grandval to join in his interrogation of me during this meeting and she did.” Id. ¶ 55. Ms. Richardson states that during the meeting Ms. Grandval “lodged a complaint regarding my alleged use of abusive language towards her” but that neither Mr. Petasis nor Ms. Grandval told her what she was accused of saying, though they stated that they would take Ms. Grandval’s complaint to Human Resources. See id. ¶¶ 57-59. Ms. Richardson states that, following this meeting, she “felt like [she] was having a heart attack,” fell to the floor, temporarily lost consciousness, and asked one of her staff members to call 911. Id. ¶ 62. She was taken to a hospital in an ambulance where she underwent medical tests. See id.

Documents indicate that Ms. Richardson was out of the office for at least a short period following the incident on June 4, 2012. See Defs.’ Ex. 29-A at JHU00189-90, EOF No. 41-5. While she was out of the office, Mr. Petasis asked one of Ms. Richardson’s staff members to remove her from an e-mail distribution list and put her back on the list upon her return to the office. See id. Ms. Richardson states that this removal would have “disengage[d] [her] access to the staff, service desk activity, staff communication, and etc.” Richardson Aff. ¶ 154. When Ms. Richardson requested to be put back on the list, Mr. Petasis responded that he would “rather you stay off work while you’re on sick leave” and said that she would be added upon her return. Defs.’ Ex. 29-A at JHU00189. After Ms. Richardson reiterated her request to be added back to the list immediately, Mr. Petasis agreed to do so. See id. Ms. Richardson states that she raised this issue to Ms. Hines, who told her that “George is just being petty.” Richardson Aff. ¶ 154.

According to Ms. Hines, on or about June 22, 2012, Mr. Petasis asked her for advice “on how to discipline Richardson given the ongoing work performance and insubordination problems,” and, on June 26, 2012, Ms. Hines advised Mr. Petasis to prepare a Final Written Warning. Hines Aff. ¶ 5. Ms. Richardson began receiving mental health treatment and, on her physician’s recommendation, took Family Medical Leave from her employment from July 9, 2012 to August 13, 2012. See Richardson Aff. ¶¶ 63-65. Upon her return to work on August 13, she filed her first charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), as well as a complaint with JHU’s Office of Institutional Equity at or around the same time. See Defs.’ SOF ¶ 67; Richardson Aff. ¶ 66. Documents indicate that Ms. Richardson informed at least Ms. Hines of her filing upon her return to work. See PL’s Ex. 9 at JHU00514, ECF No. 42-12 (“Ms. Hines said that when Ms. Richardson was on medical leave she filed her first EEOC complaint and that she notified Ms. Hines she had filed the EEOC complaint upon her return to work.”).

G. Alleged Removal of Supervisory Duties, Final Written Warning, and Alleged Reassignment in September 2012

Documents reflect that Ms. Richardson’s relationship with Mr. Petasis and Ms. Grandval continued to deteriorate following her return from medical leave and her filing with the EEOC. For example, on the day she returned, Ms. Richardson wrote to Mr. Petasis and Ms. Grandval regarding a binder that she said was in her office prior to her medical leave but could not find upon her return: “My ‘shredding’ information is missing!!!! That would have been helpful in writing procedures... .Oh well.. ..It walked away!!!!!!” Defs.’ Ex. 27 at JHU00385 (ellipses in original). Mr. Petasis responded by writing to Ms. Richardson that “insinuating that one of your colleagues has walked away with your binder without any kind of proof is both unacceptable and unprofessional — please refrain from doing so in the future.” Id. at JHU00384. Similar e-mail exchanges occurred over the next several weeks. Also, according to a memorandum authored by Ms. Richardson and addressed to Mr. Pe-tasis, he and Ms. Grandval told Ms. Richardson on September 4, 2012 that they would be “taking me to Human Resources.” Defs.’ Ex. 29-A at JHU00184.

On September 11, 2012, according to Ms. Richardson, Ms. Grandval announced during a meeting with the IT Operations staff that Mr. Petasis “granted her decision making authority in IT Operations” and that, though Ms. Richardson maintained her title as Director of Operations, she was “demoted with no authority.” Richardson Aff. ¶¶ 67-68. She states that, as a result of this announcement, she was “forced to ask permission from Grandval when utilizing my staff.” Id. ¶ 71. See also Richardson Dep. Tr. 343:7-11 (“[S]he held a meeting with my staff and myself and indicated that she would be making decisions on behalf of the director of IT operations.”). Ms. Richardson also testified that, during the meeting, Ms. Grandval “removed” a member of her staff. Richardson Dep. Tr. at 343:12-17. Ms. Richardson e-mailed a summary of this meeting to herself on October 1, 2012. See Defs.’ Ex. 19.

On September 13, 2012, Mr. Petasis issued Ms. Richardson a formal Final Written Warning regarding her “[u]naceeptable behavior.” Defs.’ Ex. 27. The Final Written Warning stated that since Mr. Petasis’s February 29, 2012 memorandum and their meeting with Human Resources on that day, Ms. Richardson’s behavior had “deteriorated to the point that formal action is once again required.” Id. at JHU00374. The memorandum then provided Mr. Peta-sis’s descriptions of a variety of specific incidents and behavior that he believed were unacceptable and unprofessional, including: (1) raising her voice in the office or in meetings; (2) glaring at others in an intimidating or threatening manner; (3) walking out of meetings that had not officially ended; (4) sending harshly worded and unprofessional e-mails to Mr. Petasis and others; (5) making unfounded accusations that others had taken things from her office; (6) refusing to meet to discuss IT Operations matters; and (7) publicly undermining Mr. Petasis and questioning his decisions. See id. at JHU00374-75. Mr. Petasis also attached documentation to support his statements. See id. at JHU00378-405. He provided Ms. Richardson with a list of eight actions or performance improvements that were required and informed her that her “continued employment in the position of Director of IT Operations (classified title is IT Manager) is in jeopardy” and that “[flailure to correct immediately and sustain an acceptable level of work performance and appropriate, professional and courteous behavior to all clients (internal and external to SAIS), including your manager and colleagues, will lead to your termination.” Id. at JHU00376-76.

Around this time, though it is unclear whether it occurred before, after, or at the same time as the Final Written Warning, Mr. Petasis also assigned Ms. Richardson to work at the Service Desk. Ms. Richardson claims that she was “permanently reassigned” to work there, which effectively constituted a demotion. See Richardson Aff. ¶ 80 (alleging that Mr. Petasis “permanently placed my [sic] at the help desk”); id. ¶ 161 (“I was working at the help desk as directed by Mr. Petasis and Ms. Grandval, not as a supervisor, but, a help desk associate, because I was demoted to the help desk.”). She further claims that she was forced to work at the Service Desk “alone or with minimal assistance,” stating that Mr. Petasis removed assisting staff members from the Service Desk, and she provides dates and times that she worked at the Service Desk for long periods. See id. ¶ 81. She also states that the Service Desk was located in another building and “interfered with [her] ability to manage Operations” and “impacted [her] job” in several specific ways. See id. ¶¶ 82-106. Defendants, however, claim that Ms. Richardson was not assigned to work at the Service Desk full-time and that working at the Service Desk fell within the scope of her duties as the Director of Operations.

H. Appeal to Mr. Kunka and Second EEOC Filing in October 2012

On October 9, 2012, Ms. Richardson appealed the Final Written Warning in accordance with JHU’s internal procedures to Mr. Kunka. See Defs.’ Ex. 29. In her appeal letter to Mr. Kunka, Ms. Richardson asserted that “Management knew” that her supervisor “habitually shouted at employees” and “habitually intimidated, abused and discriminated against employees.” Id. at JHU00155. See also Defs.’ SOF ¶ 72. Ms. Richardson also responded to the various incidents described by Mr. Petasis in the Final Written Warning one-by-one, and, by her own admission in response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the only allegations she specifically denied were that she refused to meet with Mr. Petasis and that she walked out of a meeting before it had ended. See Defs.’ Ex. 29 at JHU00156-60; Defs.’ SOF ¶ 72; PL’s Stmt. Facts In Dispute ¶ 72, ECF No. 42-2. In the remainder of her letter, Ms. Richardson attempted to justify her conduct and accused Mr. Petasis of engaging in equally unprofessional conduct with her. See Defs.’ Ex. 29 at JHU00157-58; Defs.’ SOF ¶ 72; Pl.’s Stmt. Facts In Dispute ¶ 72. On October 24, 2012, Mr. Kunka upheld the Final Written Warning and explained his reasons in a 23-page letter, providing excerpts from e-mail exchanges in support. See Defs.’ Ex. 30, ECF No. 40-31.

On October 17, 2012, before Mr. Kunka’s decision to uphold the Final Written Warning, Ms. Richardson filed a retaliation charge with the EEOC. See Richardson Aff. ¶ 110.

I. Roger Daniel, Paid Administrative Leave, and Resignation

From December 2012 to February 2013, an African-American man named Roger Daniel worked in SAIS’s Office of Information Technology and reported to Ms. Richardson. See Aff. Roger Daniel ¶¶ 1, 2, 8 (“Daniel Aff.”), PL’s Ex. 8, ECF No. 42-11. Ms. Richardson, among others, interviewed Mr. Daniel for his position, and Mr. Petasis, in part based on her recommendation, as well as his own interview and others’ recommendations, hired him. See Richardson Aff. ¶¶ 114-15. In her affidavit submitted in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Ms. Richardson claims that Mr. Petasis continued to refer to staff members as “boy,” specifically citing the example of Mr. Daniel. She states that “[o]n several occasions Mr. Roger Daniel who is African-American complained to me regarding Defendant Pe-tasis referring to him as a ‘boy.’” Richardson Aff. ¶ 15. She also provides an affidavit from Mr. Daniel confirming her account. See generally Daniel Aff. He states that he complained to Ms. Richardson that Mr. Petasis referred to him as a “boy” and that, as an African-American, he “found that to be racist and very offensive.” Id. ¶¶ 10-11. He also states that he “never heard Mr. Petasis refer to any Caucasians as ‘boy.’” Id. ¶ 12. Mr. Daniel also states that Mr. Petasis “struck” him on “several occasions,” including one in which he “nearly lost [his] balance.” Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. He states that Ms. Richardson witnessed this incident and that he reported other incidents to her. See id. ¶¶ 7, 9. Ms. Richardson states that on December 18, 2012, she spoke With Mr. Petasis about hitting Mr. Daniel. See Richardson Aff. ¶ 124.

On December 21, 2012, JHU placed Ms. Richardson on “paid administrative leave” (which can also be appropriately referred to as a suspension) through January 29, 2013 with full salary and benefits. Defs.’ SOF ¶ 78; Defs.’ Ex. 32, ECF No. 40-33. Ms. Hines informed Ms. Richardson of the disciplinary action by letter dated the same day. See Defs.’ Ex. 32. In the letter, Ms. Hines referenced her meeting with Ms. Richardson and Ms. Petasis in February 2012 and the Final Written Warning in September 2012. See id. at JHU00581. The letter stated that, since the Final Written Warning, there had been “no resolution to the performance concerns identified” and that Ms. Richardson had “failed to meet, fully, partially and/or consistently, corrective actions and performance improvements as outline [sic] in the Final Written Warning.” Id.

The letter stated that “[a]s a condition” of Ms.- Richardson’s return, she was required to complete two tasks for Mr. Peta-sis: first, an assignment that Mr. Petasis had given her previously but found to be insufficiently completed; and second, a memorandum explaining how she would meet the expectations described in the' Final Written Warning, along with a “plan for fulfilling” all of her listed job duties. See id. at JHU00582. The letter stated that these tasks were “part of your return to work and without them you will not have met the criteria to return to work” and that “[fjailure by you to meet expectations will result in termination.” Id. The letter also stated, however, that during her administrative leave, Ms. Richardson “should not report to work, nor perform any managerial, supervisory or operational work duties.” Id. It also stated that she should set up an auto reply message on her e-mail account indicating that she was on leave and directing individuals to contact Mr. Petasis or her designee regarding work-related matters. See id. Finally, the letter stated that Ms. Richardson would “need to obtain permission to be on the JHU/SAIS campus unless you have prearranged meetings with the SAIS or Home-wood Human Resources Office, JHU Faculty and Staff Assistance Program and/or medical appointments.” Id.

Ms. Richardson did not complete either of the tasks required as a condition for her return. See Defs.’ SOF ¶ 78; PL’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 78. Ms. Richardson states that she attempted to complete the first task but could not do so because, without access to certain SAIS systems, she was unable to obtain necessary data and other information. See Richardson Aff. ¶¶ 139-40. According to Ms. Richardson, she asked Mr. Elahi about her lack of access, and he responded that “the staff was directed not to help you.” Id. ¶ 139. She states that she then contacted another staff member, Pedro Matías, and asked him to run and email her a report that she needed to complete the assignment since she did not have access, and Mr. Matías told her that “George told us not to help you” and “you know what George would do if he found out.” Id.

On January 22, 2013, Ms. Richardson submitted a letter of resignation. See Hines Aff. Ex. E, ECF No. 40-5. In her letter, Ms. Richardson stated that her “complaints of race-and sexual discrimination have fallen on deaf ears” and that she could “no longer tolerate the working conditions under discrimination, harassment and retaliation I reported several times previously.” Id. at JHU00326. She also wrote that her lack of “access to the necessary system and inability to communicate with staff that have been directed ‘not to help or communicate with Sharon’ is a ‘NO WIN’ situation.” Id. She stated that JHU had therefore forced her to resign. See id.

J. Final Internal Appeal and the Present Action

Ms. Richardson also appealed Mr. Kun-ka’s decision to uphold the Final Written Warning in accordance with JHU’s internal procedures and denied additional factual allegations. See Defs.’ SOF ¶ 77. On March 8, 2013, after Ms. Richardson had resigned, JHU’s Vice President for Human Resources accepted the recommendation of JHU’s Appeal Panel and amended the Final Written Warning to delete the reference to it being a “Final” Written Warning. See Defs.’ Ex. 31, ECF No. 40-32. The Appeal Panel found that Mr. Petasis’s February 2012 memorandum made “no reference to it being a discipline” and that, therefore, the Final Written Warning was “the first discipline she received.” Id. at SDR001058. As a result, the Appeal Panel stated that the written warning “should not have been elevated to a final warning.” Id. The Appeal Panel also found, however, that based upon its review of the documents provided in the Final Written Warning, Ms. Richardson “failed to meet expectations stated in the February 29, 2012, memorandum” and was “accountable for her communication.” Id.

On June 3, 2013, Ms. Richardson commenced the present action.

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on all counts of the Amended Complaint. See Mem. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 1, ECF No. 40-1. The Court begins its analysis by setting forth the legal standard for resolving motions for summary judgment. The Court then addresses whether JHU is entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Richardson’s various claims of discrimination and retaliation before turning to Ms. Richardson’s claims against each of the Individual Defendants for aiding and abetting the alleged discrimination and retaliation.

A. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must grant summary judgment if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “material” fact is one capable of affecting the substantive outcome of the litigation. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” if there is enough evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-movant. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). The inquiry under Rule 56 is essentially “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The principal purpose of summary judgment is to streamline litigation by disposing of factually unsupported claims or defenses and determining whether there is a genuine need for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant bears the initial burden of identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2648. In response, the non-movant must point to specific facts in the record that reveal a genuine issue that is suitable for trial. See id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must “eschew making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence,” Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C.Cir.2007), and all underlying facts and inferences must be analyzed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Nevertheless, conclusory assertions offered without any evidentiary support do not establish a genuine issue for trial. See Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Cir.1999).

B. Discrete Discriminatory Actions

Ms. Richardson brings claims against JHU for discrete racially discriminatory employment actions on the basis of disparate treatment through Counts I, II, and III of her Amended Complaint. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 121-32. Count I is brought under Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See id. ¶¶ 121-24. Count II is brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. See id. ¶¶ 125-28. Count III is brought under the DCHRA. See id. ¶¶ 129-32. “Where, as here, the plaintiff has proffered no direct evidence of intentional discrimination, race discrimination claims under both the DCHRA and Section 1981 are evaluated using the same framework as claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2000).” Lemmons v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 431 F.Supp.2d 76, 86 (D.D.C.2006) (citing Mungin v. Rotten Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d 1549, 1553 (D.C.Cir.1997)).

If a Title VII plaintiff proffers only indirect evidence of discrimination at summary judgment, courts apply the three-part burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1292 (D.C.Cir.2003). Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination.” Czekalski, 475 F.3d at 364 (internal quotation omitted). “The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.” Texas Dep’t Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). See also St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (describing the requirements for establishing a prima facie case as “minimal”); Pope v. ESA Servs., Inc., 406 F.3d 1001, 1007 (8th Cir.2005) (“A minimal evidentiary showing will satisfy this burden of production.”).

Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action; and finally, if the employer meets that burden, then the plaintiff must show that the employer’s asserted reason was a pretextual cover for discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817. If, however, .the plaintiff has suffered an adverse employment action and her employer asserts a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the action, then the Court must forgo the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C.Cir.2008). Instead, the Court “must resolve one central question: Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of race ....?"ld.

Here, Ms. Richardson claims that she suffered three separate tangible adverse employment actions: (1) removal of her supervisory duties in September 2012; (2) permanent reassignment to the Service Desk in September 2012; and (3) her administrative suspension from December 2012 to January 2013. See Pl.’s Opp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 19-22, ECF No. 42. Defendants argue that none of these events constitute an adverse employment action and that Ms. Richardson cannot show an inference of discrimination necessary to establish a prima facie case. Defendants also proffer two legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Ms. Richardson’s administrative suspension. The Court applies the legal framework to each of these purported actions separately.

1. Removal of Supervisory Duties in September 2012

Ms. Richardson claims that she suffered her first discriminatory adverse employment action when Ms. Grandval announced during a meeting with the IT Operations staff on September 11, 2012 that Mr. Peta-sis “granted her decision making authority in IT Operations,” Richardson Aff. ¶ 67, and that, as a result, she was forced to seek Ms. Grandval’s permission when utilizing her staff members. See Richardson Aff. ¶¶ 67-71. Because Defendants do not proffer any legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the alleged action, the Court considers only whether Ms. Richardson has made the minimal evidentiary showing to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination.

a. Adverse Employment Action

Defendants challenge Ms. Richardson’s claim that her supervisory duties were removed in September 2012 as “unfounded” and argue that, even if true, it would not constitute an adverse employment action. See Defs.’ Reply Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Reply”) at 16-17, ECF No. 46. The Court disagrees on both of these issues.

First, the Court finds that Defendants fail to establish the absence of a genuine dispute as to whether Ms. Grand-val assumed Ms. Richardson’s supervisory duties on September 11, 2012 with Mr. Petasis’s authorization. Defendants argue that Ms. Richardson’s factual claim is undermined by an e-mail that Mr. Petasis sent to Ms. Richardson and Ms. Grandval on the same day in which he referred to Ms. Richardson having a “management responsibility” to oversee the Service Desk. See Defs.’ Ex. 38, ECF No. 46-2. But this e-mail does not put Ms. Richardson’s claim beyond dispute. The e-mail primarily concerns Ms. Richardson’s second alleged adverse action, her purported permanent reassignment to the Service Desk, and does not appear to directly concern Ms. Grandval’s alleged announcement or Mr. Petasis’s alleged authorization. Defendants do not provide any other evidence in their effort to disprove Ms. Richardson’s factual claim. They do not, for example, provide the Court with any testimony from Mr. Petasis or Ms. Grandval on this issue..Nor do they provide testimony from any of Ms. Richardson’s staff members who were allegedly present at the meeting, were the audience of the announcement, and worked with Ms. Richardson and Ms. Grandval following the alleged announcement. Defendants do, however, provide the Court with Ms. Richardson’s testimony on this issue, as well as an e-mail that she sent to herself summarizing this meeting, which support her claim. See ' Richardson Dep. Tr. 343:7-20; Defs.’ Ex. 19. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Richardson, the Court concludes that a reasonable juror could find that Ms. Grandval assumed Ms. Richardson’s supervisory duties in September 2012 with the authorization of Mr. Petasis.

The Court next considers whether, if true, Ms. Grandval’s assumption of Ms. Richardson’s supervisory duties with Mr. Petasis’s authorization would constitute an adverse employment action, the second prong of the prima facie analysis. “An ‘adverse employment action’ is ‘a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in benefits.’” Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C.Cir.2009) (quoting Taylor, 350 F.3d at 1293)). The employee must “experience[ ] materially adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or future employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could find objectively tangible harm.” Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127, 1131 (D.C.Cir.2002). The D.C. Circuit has stated that, among other things, “withdrawing an employee’s supervisory duties constitutes an adverse employment action.” Stewart v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 422, 427 (D.C.Cir.2003) (citing Burke v. Gould, 286 F.3d 513, 522 (D.C.Cir.2002)).

Defendants argue that Ms. Grandval’s announcement cannot serve as an adverse employment action because Ms. Grandval was Ms. Richardson’s co-worker and “did not have supervisory authority over or the authority to hire, fire, promote or demote Richardson.” Defs.’ Reply at 16. Defendants misconstrue Ms. Richardson’s claim. Ms. Richardson alleges that Mr. Petasis, who indisputably had supervisory authority over Ms. Richardson, authorized Ms. Grandval’s assumption of her supervisory duties. See Richardson Aff. ¶¶ 67-71; id. ¶ 161; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 82-84; Defs.’ SOF ¶ 45. If Mr. Petasis authorized Ms. Grand-val to assume Ms. Richardson’s supervisory duties and make decisions on behalf of Operations, as Ms. Richardson alleges and a reasonable juror could conclude on the record before the Court, then that would constitute an adverse employment action.

b. Inference of Discrimination

Turning to the final prong of the prima facie analysis, the Court considers whether Ms. Richardson has established that the alleged removal of her supervisory duties gives rise to an inference of discrimination. In her. opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Ms. Richardson offers a myriad of evidence in an effort to satisfy this burden. The Court finds that, although most of this evidence is ineffective, Ms. Richardson presents evidence sufficient to create an inference of discrimination.

Ms. Richardson opens the “Statement of Facts” section of her opposition with the following statement: “Defendant George Petasis does not like strong Black women.” Pl.’s Opp. at 3 (citing Pl.’s Ex. 6, EOF No. 42-9). Her sole citation for this dramatic statement is what appears to be an incomplete and undated photocopied printout of an unidentified website (with the URL partially obscured) containing an anonymous post providing an opinion regarding employment at a company called “Advanced Technology Associates.” See Pl.’s Ex. 6. In one of the reviews, the anonymous author writes, regarding a person named George Petasis: “And George does not like women, particularly black women — who excel or have the potential to excel beyond him.” Id. As Defendants observe, the exhibit provides no identifying information for either the author of the statement or the web site itself, and Ms. Richardson does not offer any such evidence. See id. Ms. Richardson does not even provide any evidence demonstrating that the person referenced in the review is the same George Petasis that is a defendant in this action. As Ms. Richardson clearly attempts to use the anonymous post for the truth of the matter asserted, it is, as Defendants argue, pure hearsay, and it has no value. See Greer v. Paulson, 505 F.3d 1306, 1315 (D.C.Cir.2007) (“[S]heer hearsay ... counts for nothing on summary judgment.” (internal quotation omitted)).

Ms. Richardson next points to Mr. Peta-sis’s use of the term “boys” to refer to male staff members as “independent evidence of discriminatory statements or attitudes on the part of the employer.” Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C.Cir.1998). The Supreme Court has stated that “[a]lthough it is true that the [word ‘boy’] will not always be evidence of racial animus, it does not follow that the term, standing alone, is always benign. The speaker’s meaning may depend on various factors including context, inflection, tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage.” Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456, 126 S.Ct. 1195, 163 L.Ed.2d 1053 (2006). To show context, Ms. Richardson cites Mr. Daniel’s statements that, during his very brief employment, Mr. Daniel never heard Mr. Petasis refer to any Caucasians as “boys.” Daniel Aff. ¶¶ 12-13.

Ms. Richardson’s own account, however, provides further context that cuts against her position. She testified that Mr. Petasis referred to an employee of Filipino origin and an employee of Iranian origin as “his boys” or asked her, “How is your boy?” Richardson Dep. Tr. at 263:14-18; id. at 270:14-18; id. at 272:8-274:18. This usage of the term is common and innocuous, and, given that Mr. Petasis appears to have used the term primarily to refer to non-African-Américans, he does not appear to have used it with any racial connotation. Even to the extent that this evidence could be reasonably interpreted to suggest that Mr. Petasis had some generalized racial prejudices, it would be insufficient to establish a prima facie case, because Mr. Petasis’s alleged statements did not pertain to Ms. Richardson and were entirely disconnected from the decision-making process concerning the alleged removal of her supervisory duties. See Price Water-house v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that neither “stray remarks in the workplace” nor “statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself, [can] suffice to satisfy plaintiffs burden”); Straughn v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 250 F.3d 23, 36 (1st Cir.2001) (stating that the “probativeness” of discriminatory stray remarks “is circumscribed if they were made in a situation temporally remote from the date of the employment decision or ... were not related to the employment decision in question” (internal quotation omitted) (ellipses in original)); Nesbit v. Pepsico, Inc., 994 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir.1993) (holding in an age-discrimination case that a decision-maker’s statement to plaintiff that “[we] don’t necessarily like grey hair,” unconnected to plaintiffs termination, was a stray remark insufficient to defeat summary judgment for the employer).

Ms. Richardson similarly points to Mr. Petasis’s alleged battery of Mr. Daniel as independent evidence of a discriminatory attitude. Specifically, Mr. Daniel states that he never witnessed Mr. Petasis strike any Caucasians “with the same force or frequency” that he struck him. Daniel Aff. ¶ 13. There is no other evidence to suggest that Mr. Petasis’s alleged battery of Mr. Daniel was motivated by racial discrimination, as, for example, neither Mr. Daniel nor Ms. Richardson provide evidence indicating a connection between Mr. Petasis’s use of the term “boy” and his alleged battery of Mr. Daniel. Moreover, as with Mr. Petasis’s use of the term “boy,” even to the extent that his alleged battery of Mr. Daniel could be probative of whether he harbored general racial prejudices, it is insufficient to establish Ms. Richardson’s prima facie case, because the alleged battery bears no connection to the decision-making process concerning the alleged removal of Ms. Richardson’s supervisory duties, or any other relevant decision made with respect to Ms. Richardson.

Ms. Richardson’s evidence of Mr. Petasis’s disparate treatment of Ms. Grandval, who is outside Ms. Richardson’s protected class, is much more effective at creating an inference of discrimination. See Pl.’s Opp. at 13. “A plaintiff can establish an inference of discrimination ‘by demonstrating that she was treated differently from similarly situated employees who are not part of the protected class.’” Augustus v. Locke, 934 F.Supp.2d 220, 232 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 412 (D.C.Cir.2005)). “‘[T]o be deemed ‘similarly-situated,’ the individuals with whom the plaintiff seeks to compare his/ her treatment must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it.’” Phillips v. Holladay Prop. Servs., Inc., 937 F.Supp. 32, 37 (D.D.C.1996) (quoting Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir.1992)).

Ms. Richardson’s attempt in her opposition brief to establish that she and Ms. Grandval were similarly situated employees is admittedly limited: “Plaintiff and Defendant Grandval both were supervised by Defendant Petasis. Since hired around the same time [sic] they both served under the same standards. They were on the same level.” Pl.’s Opp. at 12. Her only citation to the record is to an exhibit containing excerpted portions of Ms. Hines’s deposition testimony. See id. (citing Pl.’s Ex. 5, ECF No. 42-8). Nothing in the excerpted portions of Ms. Hines’s testimony, however, indicates that Ms. Richardson and Ms. Hines were similarly situated employees. See Pl.’s Ex. 5. Despite Ms. Richardson’s weak effort to demonstrate that she and Ms. Grandval were similarly situated, however, Defendants, for their part, wholly fail to address the argument. The Court therefore finds that, analyzing all underlying facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Ms. Richardson, Ms. Richardson and Ms. Grandval were similarly situated employees. This finding is supported by the record before the Court, notwithstanding Ms. Richardson’s failure to cite it. For example, it is undisputed that she and Ms. Grandval both reported to Mr. Petasis during the relevant time period, and documentary evidence indicates that the two were considered to be on the same level in terms of the hierarchy for SAIS’s Office of Information Technology. See, e.g., Pl.’s Ex. 14, ECF No. 42-17 (organizational chart for SAIS’s Office of Information Technology showing Ms. Richardson and Ms. Grandval on a parallel level below Mr. Petasis).

It is also clear from the record — and Defendants do not argue otherwise — that Mr. Petasis treated Ms. Grandval more favorably than he treated Ms. Richardson. As discussed, supra, a reasonable juror could find, based on the record before the Court, that Mr. Petasis authorized Ms. Grandval to assume Ms. Richardson’s supervisory duties. Many of Ms. Richardson’s other allegations of disparate treatment are unchallenged and unexplained. For example, Ms. Richardson alleges that, a few months before shifting her supervisory duties to Ms. Grandval, Mr. Petasis removed her access to the shared Microsoft Outlook calendar while maintaining Ms. Grandval’s access. See Richardson Aff. ¶ 153. Similarly, she alleges that Mr. Peta-sis frequently excluded her from meetings that were important to her job function but included Ms. Grandval. See, e.g., Richardson Aff. ¶¶ 45-52; Defs.’ SOF ¶ 29. Ms. Richardson also alleges that when she brought complaints about Ms. Grandval’s conduct to Mr. Petasis, he did not take action but that when Ms. Grandval brought him complaints about her, he did take action. See Richardson Aff. ¶¶ 87-40; id. ¶¶ 57-59.

Ordinarily, this type of uncontroverted evidence would unquestionably give rise to an inference of discrimination. In this case, the inquiry is somewhat muddied by the undisputed fact that Mr. Petasis originally selected Ms. Richardson over Ms. Grandval for her position, which potentially implicates the so-called “same actor inference.” In an employment discrimination case in which a plaintiff challenges her termination and “‘the person who made the decision to fire [the plaintiff] was the same person who made the decision to hire’” — a type of case not too dissimilar from Ms. Richardson’s claims in this case — the D.C. Circuit has recognized that ‘“it is difficult to impute to [that person] an invidious motivation that would be inconsistent with the decision to hire,’ especially ‘when the firing has occurred only a short time after the hiring.’” Vatel v. Alliance of Auto. Mfrs., 627 F.3d 1245, 1247 (D.C.Cir.2011) (quoting Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 996 (D.C.Cir.2002) (alteration in original)).

For several reasons, however, the Court is unable to find that JHU is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the same actor inference. First and foremost, Defendants do not even reference the same actor inference in their motion for summary judgment, let alone rely upon it. Second, courts have recognized that the same actor inference is “just that, an inference, which cannot immunize the defendant from liability for subsequent discrimination.” Ragsdale v. Holder, 668 F.Supp.2d 7, 23 (D.D.C.2009) (internal quotation omitted). It does not alone suffice for summary judgment, and it is simply “probative evidence” against a finding of discrimination. See Vatel, 627 F.3d at 1247. Third, as the D.C. Circuit stated in Vatel, the inference is particularly appropriate to apply when the alleged discriminatory action occurred “only a short time after the hiring.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). Here, by contrast, over a year passed between the time that Mr. Petasis hired Ms. Richardson and the time that he allegedly removed her supervisory duties. Finally, courts that have employed the inference have generally done so at the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis following proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the conduct at issue. See, e.g., Vatel, 627 F.3d at 1246-49; Waterhouse, 298 F.3d at 993-97. Here, Defendants have not proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the alleged removal of Ms. Richardson’s supervisory duties (or any other alleged instance of Mr. Petasis treating Ms. Grandval more favorably than Ms. Richardson) and Ms. Richardson theref