Whipple v. Taylor University, Inc. (162 F. Supp. 3d 815, 2016)

United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana 2016-02-10

Citations

Full opinion text

OPINION AND ORDER

William C. Lee, Judge, United States District Court

This matter is before the court for resolution of several pending motions. The Defendant, Taylor University, filed a motion for summary judgment and supporting memorandum (DE 41, 42). The Plaintiff, Shederick Whipple, filed a response and supporting memorandum in opposition to the motion (DE 56, 57), and Taylor filed a reply brief (DE 62). After seeking leave of court to do so, Whipple filed a sur-re-sponse (DE 73) and Taylor filed a sur-reply (DE 75). In addition, Whipple filed two motions to strike (DE 58, 67) and Taylor filed one motion to strike (DE 61). For the reasons discussed below, the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (DE 41) is: DENIED as to the issue of the timeliness of the Plaintiffs claims; GRANTED as to the Plaintiffs race discrimination claim; and DENIED as to the Plaintiffs retaliation claim. The Plaintiffs first motion to strike (DE 58) is MOOT; the Defendant’s motion to strike (DE 61) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; and the Plaintiffs second motion to strike (DE 67) is MOOT.

BACKGROUND

Shederick Whipple began working at Taylor University in- August 2006 as an Assistant Professor of Music. Complaint (DE 1), p. 2, ¶ 9. "Whipple’s professorship was a seven-year tenure track position. Id. In his Complaint, Whipple, an African-American, alleges that he experienced “a continuing pattern of severe and pervasive harassment on the basis of his race .... ” Id., ¶ 11. For example, "Whipple claims that while he was visiting the campus in April 2006, another professor told him that “the blacks who move here don’t get involved in the culture, they don’t like it and they leave and it’s their fault.” Id., ¶ 12. During that same visit, Whipple claims, another faculty member asked him “what would make you want to come here and be with all these white people?” Id. "Whipple also alleges that he “began experiencing problems with Dr. Patricia Robertson, a colleague in the Music Department, during [Whipple’s] first semester with the University.” Id., ¶ 13. Whipple states that he felt “underutilized” in his job and that Robertson told him that the only reason he was hired by the University was because he was black. Id. "Whipple alleges that Robertson told students that the only reason Whipple was on the faculty was because of his race. Id., ¶ 14. On October 15, 2010, Whipple applied for promotion from Assistant Professor to Associate Professor. Id., ¶ 16. A few weeks later, “[o]n November 5, 2010, Dr. Whipple filed a written complaint of race harassment against Dr. Robertson.” Id., ¶ 17. On February 21, 2011, his application for promotion was denied “citing issues of collegiality related to [his] complaints regarding race based issues with Dr. Robertson and others.” Id., ¶ 17. Whipple “successfully appealed the denial of his promotion; however, he experienced retaliation and continued race related issues throughout the year.” Id., ¶ 18. On October 7, 2011, Whipple filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, “alleging race discrimination and retaliation based on the foregoing acts.” Id., ¶ 19. Whipple claims that “on ... January 17, 2012, Dr. [Albert] Harrison, Music Department Chair, ... noted that Dr. Whipple was entering the year in which his tenure application process would occur. Dr. Harrison noted several issues that would need to be addressed in the tenure review pro-eess[.]” and that “[a]mong the items to be addressed were Dr. Whipple’s ‘feelings about Taylor related to racism[.]’ ” Id., ¶ 21. Whipple’s application for tenure was denied on July 30, 2012, and he contends it was “because of his race and/or his previous complaints of race discrimination.” Id., ¶ 22. It is undisputed that “[i]n conjunction with denial of tenure, the University did not renew Dr. Whipple’s contract thereby ending his employment at the conclusion of the 2012-2013 academic year.” Id., ¶23. Whipple brought this action alleging that Taylor discriminated against him, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., on the basis of his race and in retaliation for his complaints about discrimination. Additional background facts will be discussed as they become relevant to the court’s discussion and analysis.

In its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, Taylor contends that “in the eyes of Taylor, Whipple failed to appropriately address his collegiality and student conflict resolution issues by the time of his tenure application and as a result Taylor denied Whipple’s tenure application. Taylor’s decisions with respect to Whipple’s employment were based on legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons and were in response to Whipple’s history of conflicts with students and colleagues, his refusal to humbly admit mistakes, and his failure to adhere to the principles of Taylor’s Life Together Covenant, i.e., his lack of collegiality.” Defendant’s Memorandum, p. 1. Taylor argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because 1) “[m]any of the actions about which Whipple now complains are untimely ...” and 2) Whipple fails to present sufficient admissible evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. Id., generally.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of lav?.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Disputes concerning material facts are genuine where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In deciding whether genuine issues of material fact exist, the court construes all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, neither the “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties,” id., 477 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, nor the existence of “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), will defeat a motion for summary judgment. Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir.2000).

Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits nor is it a vehicle for resolving factual disputes. Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir.1994). Therefore, after drawing all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the non-movant, if genuine doubts remain and a reasonable fact-finder could find for the party opposing the motion, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Shields Enterprises, Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir.1992); Wolf v. City of Fitchburg, 870 F.2d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir.1989). If it is clear that a plaintiff will be unable to satisfy the legal requirements necessary to establish his or her case, summary judgment is not only appropriate, but mandated. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Ziliak v. AstraZeneca LP, 324 F.3d 518, 520 (7th Cir.2003).

Courts must also be mindful “that employment discrimination cases typically involve questions of intent and credibility,” and resolution of those issues is the sole province of the jury. Alexander v. Wisc. Dep’t of Health and Family Svcs., 263 F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir.2001). Weighing evidence and making credibility decisions are jury functions, and it is not appropriate for a judge to assume those functions when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Accordingly, the court “’appl[ies] the summary judgment standard with special scrutiny to employment discrimination cases, which often turn on issues of intent and credibility.’” Bob-Maunuel v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 10 F.Supp.3d 854, 873 (N.D.I11.2014) (quoting Krchnavy v. Lima-grain Genetics Corp., 294 F.3d 871, 875 (7th Cir.2002)).

DISCUSSION

I. Motions to Strike.

A. Plaintiffs first motion to strike (DE 58).

Before turning to the merits of Taylor’s motion for summary judgment, the court must address the disputes raised in the three motions to strike, which are legion. In the first such motion, Whipple seeks to exclude the following evidence submitted by Taylor:

1)paragraph three of the affidavit of Eugene Habecker, the President of Taylor University (see Defendant’s Exhibit 1 (DE 42-3, p. 2)), which Whipple argues- contains irrelevant hearsay evidence (and which contains a description of Taylor’s efforts over the years to increase diversity at the University);

2) paragraph 4(a) of Habecker’s affidavit, which Whipple claims is irrelevant (and which contains a summary of Habecker’s personal history of supporting diversity in academia);

3) paragraph 4(c) of Habecker’s affidavit on the grounds that it is inadmissible hearsay (and which contains more about Ha-becker’s professional efforts to encourage diversity);

4) paragraph 1 of Defendant’s Exhibit 1(b) (DE 42-5, pp. 23-24), which Whipple-claims is irrelevant (and which is a portion of the Taylor Faculty Handbook section pertaining to tenure procedures);

5) “[a]ny statements in the Defendant’s exhibits or brief, that repeat what Dr. [Stephen] Bedi claims Pastor [Tom] Ballard told him ...” because these statements are “inadmissible double hearsay[ ]” (which statements concern an incident that occurred off campus on September 13, 2011, during which Whipple allegedly threatened a female student);

6) the Defendant’s document 42-5, p. 350, which Whipple contends is inadmissible hearsay (and which contains an unsigned, undated statement claiming that several other professors allegedly had conflicts with Robertson due to her “overbearing nature”); and,

7) paragraphs three, 16 and 17 of the affidavit of Stephen Bedi, Professor of Higher Education and Provost Emeritus of Taylor University, which Whipple claims contain inadmissible hearsay (and which summarize those third-party statements made to Bedi regarding the incident between Whipple and the student).

Plaintiffs motion to strike, pp. 1-4.

All of the evidence Whipple seeks to exclude by way of this motion is evidence related to the racial make-up of Taylor’s student body and faculty, evidence of Taylor’s purported efforts to increase that diversity, and statements made about Whipple that pertain to his alleged lack of collegiality (such as the statements memorialized in Bedi’s affidavit and report). According to Taylor, the evidence at issue was submitted — and is admissible — because it demonstrates that the University had no racial animus when it denied Whipple’s tenure application and refused to renew his contract. Taylor also opposes Whipple’s motion by arguing that many of the statements he seeks to exclude are not hearsay because they are not being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. For example, with regard to the statements about the off-campus confrontation, Taylor points out that Pastor Ballard reported the allegations to Habecker, who instructed Bedi to investigate. See Bedi Affidavit (DE 42-7), ¶ 16. Taylor contends that the fact that Ballard reported the allegations, thereby triggering an investigation and report, is not being offered to prove the truth of those allegations, but rather as evidence of Taylor’s “state of mind” when it made employment related decisions concerning Whipple. Defendant’s Response (DE 59), p. 5. This is just one example of the many, very specific items of evidence that the parties are battling over in their motions to strike.

As to items 1-3 above, Whipple argued in his brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment that “[tjhere is evidence that the Defendant’s decision to deny Whipple tenure was part of an ongoing discriminatory pattern and practice at the Upland, Indiana campus. During Dr. Whipple’s employment, the University employed an extremely low percentage of blacks compared to non-black/non-African American individuals.” Plaintiffs Response, p 10. Taylor retorts by presenting the statistical evidence that Whipple seeks to preclude. Defendant’s Reply, pp. 1-2. Taylor states that “[t]he racial make-up of Upland, Indiana, is 1.6% Black[.]” and that during the “2012-13 academic year: Taylor’s employees and academic faculty were 2.2% Black and 5.2% minority!.]” Id., p. 1. Taylor then presents the additional statistical and anecdotal evidence in Habecker’s affidavit to demonstrate Habecker’s efforts over the years, at Taylor and other institutions, to increase diversity. Habecker Aff., generally. Finally, Whipple argues that the evidence Taylor submitted to refute Whipple’s allegation that there was a pattern and practice of racial animus at Taylor should be stricken because it “fails to distinguish or even address whether this increase involved increased enrollment by people within Dr. Whipple’s racial category (Black/African-American) as opposed to only members of other racial minorities that historically have not been discriminated against as severely or as for as long as [sic] African-Americans in this country.” Plaintiffs First Motion to Strike, p. 1. In further support of his argument to strike Taylor’s rebuttal evidence on this issue, Whipple provides a commentary about the history of racial discrimination in America. Whipple states as follows:

The Civil War, for example, was not fought in part to free Hispanics or Asians from slavery, but Black/African-Americans. Jim Crow laws, for example, were enacted to limit and minimize the rights of primarily Black/African-Americans, not Hispanics or Asians. Even as recently as the 50s [sic], it was not Asians and Hispanics that had to protest being required to ride on the back of busses, but Blacks/African-Americans. The uncorroborated and unverifiable statistical reference by Habecker should therefore be stricken from the record.

Id., pp. 1-2. It is at this point that the argument over the racial make-up of Taylor’s student body and faculty flies off the rails. Obviously, Whipple is implying that the low percentage of black students and faculty members at Taylor supports his race claim, since it reveals what he concludes is a pattern of racial animus towards blacks. Whipple claims the statistical data presented by Taylor in response to his allegations about the racial make-up of the University, is “uncorroborated and unverifiable” and should be stricken for those reasons. He supports his own argument not with corroborated, verified statistical evidence of his own, but rather with the above one-paragraph history lesson about the Civil Rights movement in the United States. In short, Whipple observes that the number of African-American students and faculty members at Taylor is low, which he apparently believes forms a basis on which the court can draw an inference of discriminatory intent. Then, when Taylor responds by presenting evidence of its efforts (and Habecker’s) to increase diversity, Whipple wants the court to ignore it. Unfortunately, the issues raised in Whipple’s motion to strike are taking us down a dirt road when we should be on the interstate.

Evidence of the racial make-up of a defendant employer is generally only relevant (and, in fact, is part of a prima facie case) in disparate treatment cases. See, e.g., Armstrong v. City of Milwaukee, 2005 WL 3088445, at *4 (E.D.Wis.2005) (“In a pattern and practice disparate treatment case, statistical evidence constitutes the core of a plaintiffs prima facie ease.”) (citing Bell v. E.P.A., 232 F.3d 546, 553 (7th Cir.2000)). That said, statistical evidence can also be used in harassment cases as evidence of pretext, which is the reason Whipple is attempting to use such evidence. See id., 2005 WL 3088445, at *4 (“evidence of ‘systemic disparate treatment is relevant to and probative of the issue of pretext even when it is insufficient to support a pattern and practice disparate treatment case.’ ”) (quoting Bell, 232 F.3d at 553). The plaintiff in Armstrong did the same thing, presenting statistical evidence demonstrating that there was a low percentage of African-Americans employed by the defendant, and alleging that this fact was “clear evidence of discriminatory practices, conscious or unconscious, and of disparate impact against African Americans.” Id. The court rejected Armstrong’s attempt to use such evidence, explaining as follows:

Somewhat analogous evidence was discussed in Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir.2002). In Millbrook, a failure-to-promote case that went to trial, the court of appeals discussed the plaintiffs attempt to establish pretext by pointing out that no African Americans were hired during a two-year time frame. 280 F.3d at 1177. The court stated that such evidence was “at best anecdotal,” and it had held that it could not find discrimination on such a “thin basis.” Id. (quoting Kuhn v. Ball State Univ., 78 F.3d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1996)). The court stated that its “opinions emphasize the need to get beyond a few comparison cases” and that “what a plaintiff ... in [such a] position has to do is subject all of the employer’s decisions to statistical analysis to find out whether race makes a difference.” Id. Here, Armstrong has not presented a statistical analysis or proffered expert analysis of statistics. Rather, he simply identifies the percentage of African American [employees] working [for the Defendant] at a given time. Absent context, these percentages and numbers have little import... .The percentages of African American [employees], absent more, fails to create a reasonable inference that [the Defendant’s] reasons for promoting other candidates are fabricated or pretextual. See Id.

Id. The court in Armstrong went on to explain that when presenting statistical evidence to support allegations of discrimination (or to raise an issue about pretext), “the plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the employment practice and the statistical disparity, offering ‘statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotion because of their membership in a protected group.’ ” Id., n.4 (quoting Vitug v. Multistate Tax Com’n, 88 F.3d 506, 513 (7th Cir.1996)). Whipple’s attempt to raise the specter of systemic discrimination at Taylor based on anecdotal evidence about the percentage of African-American professors and students fails for two reasons. First, since the court concludes that Whipple fails to establish a prima facie case of hostile environment race discrimination, the issue of pretext need not even be addressed. Second, Whipple does not present his “statistical” evidence in any proper context, which means it has little to no probative value. Since the court need not reach the pretext issue in this case, and since the anecdotal and statistical evidence submitted by either party is not probative and will not be considered by the court in assessing the pending summary judgment motion, Whipple’s motion to strike Taylor’s statistical evidence is moot.

As to item four above, Whipple objects to Taylor’s inclusion of a specific paragraph contained in the Taylor Faculty Handbook, because, he says, that particular paragraph “address[es] faculty tenure, but only those hired [sic] before February 10,1989. The Plaintiff was not hired by the Defendant until 2006. This portion of Defendant’s document, therefore, is irrelevant.” Plaintiffs First Motion to Strike, p. 3. Taylor readily concedes, however, that the “Faculty Tenure process/standard for faculty hired after February 1, 1989[,] applies to Plaintiff[,]” and that “Taylor included the entire ... Faculty Handbook under the rule of completeness so as to not mislead the Court. Therefore, it is admissible.” Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs First Motion to Strike, p. 5. This matter is not an issue at all and it is unfortunate that the court must spend time addressing it. The paragraph Whipple seeks to strike is the first paragraph under Section 9 of the Taylor Faculty Handbook, which section is titled “Faculty Tenure.” (DE 42-3, p. 23.) The next line under that heading reads: “(Applies to faculty hired before February 10, 1989).” Id. (parentheses in original, quotation marks added). That notation is followed by the paragraph that Whipple argues is irrelevant and should be stricken. Then, immediately following the challenged paragraph, there is a second notation that indicates that the remainder of the section “(Applies to faculty hired after February 10, 1989).” Id. In other words, the paragraph Whipple challenges is not even in the game here, as Taylor readily concedes. Whipple could just as easily have objected to the first paragraph of page 17 of the exhibit, which discusses Taylor’s faculty orientation program, and which has no relevance at all to this case; or, he could have raised the same relevance objection to a paragraph on the next page that summarizes the requirements for class field trips. The point is, the vast majority of the Faculty Handbook has no relevance to this case. In any event, the court did not consider the challenged text and neither party disputes the tenure procedure that applied to Wdiipple, so this argument is also moot.

As to items five and seven above, Whipple’s argument that the court should strike any statements or comments made by Pastor Ballard or others to Bedi while Bedi was investigating allegations that Whipple had a physical confrontation with a student off campus is also moot. Yes, the statements are hearsay and, yes, Taylor might still be able to present it to a jury based on a hearsay exception argument. If determined to be admissible, these statements could serve as evidence supporting Taylor’s proffered, nondiscriminatory explana-’ tion for denying tenure (i.e., it is evidence of Whipple’s alleged “collegiality” problems). But once again, none of this evidence was relevant to the court’s assessment of Taylor’s motion for summary judgment, as will become clear when the court is finally able to get to that assessment. Whipple’s motion to strike this evidence is moot.

Finally, there is item six on Whipple’s list. Whipple objects to the inclusion of an undated, unsigned statement wherein the author claims that several other professors in the music department experienced difficulties working with Robertson. Whipple argues that “[tjhere is no evidence the document is based upon the firsthand knowledge of the author, and therefore it is inadmissible hearsay!.]” Plaintiffs Reply in Support of First Motion to Strike, p. 4. The dirt road metaphor doesn’t even apply here — this is more akin to a footpath. It turns out, as Taylor points out, that the document in question was apparently written by none other than Whipple himself. The document was presented as an exhibit during Whipple’s deposition and, as Taylor explains, it “finds its foundation and basis in personal knowledge in ... deposition testimony by Plaintiff .... ” Defendant’s Sur-Reply (DE 77), p. 1. Whipple testified that he wrote at least the portion of the document that appears as Defendant’s exhibit (the rest of it was apparently redacted). Whipple Deposition (DE 42-5), pp. 136-137. In light of this, Whipple’s objection to the document on the grounds that it is inadmissible hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge of the author is absurd and yet another example of the sloppy briefing and argument in this case. In any event, this document is not relevant to the court’s ruling pn the motion for summary judgment, and the debate about its admissibility is moot.

B. Defendant’s motion to strike (DE 61).

The. battle gets even messier with the Defendant’s motion to strike. In that motion, Taylor seeks to exclude countless statements presented by Whipple (maybe even several dozen — the court lost count while reading the motion). Defendant’s Motion to Strike (DE 61), generally. Taylor’s motion is 21 pages long and seeks to strike statements included in Whipple’s briefs, statements made during Whipple’s deposition, affidavits submitted by Whipple in opposition to summary judgment, and even specific words or phrases contained within specific sentences in specific paragraphs in Whipple’s pleadings. For example, in his Statement of Genuine Issues Whipple includes the following statement: “Whipple protested being denied tenure, which he identifies as being the result of Dr. Harrison’s and Dr. Jones’ use of their influence to retaliate against Whipple for his prior grievance against Robertson for racially motivated harassment!.]” Plaintiffs Statement of Genuine Issues (DE 56-1), p. 12. In its motion to strike, Taylor placed the words “he identifies” in boldface italics and then argued that “[t]he empha sized text above stands as inadmissible conclusory declarations by Whipple[]” and therefore is inadmissible. Defendant’s Motion to Strike, pp. 16-17 (boldface and italics in original, apparently so as to drive home the point). Actually, it is unclear (not surprisingly) whether Taylor is seeking to strike just the words “he identifies,” or if it is arguing that the entire paragraph should be stricken due to its conclusory nature. In another part of its motion to strike, Taylor quotes a passage, again from Whipple’s Statement of Genuine Issues, and imbeds within that passage bracketed phrases pointing out why portions of the paragraph should be stricken because they are “inadmissible conclusory deelaration[s]” or “inadmissible hearsay statement[s]” or “inadmissible hearsay evidence” or “unsupported conclusion^] ” or “inadmissible conclusory declaration^].” Id., pp. 15-16. With regard to that single paragraph from Whipple’s Statement of Genuine Issues, Taylor raises nine objections.

It gets better. Taylor also seeks to strike “[a]ll references to Plaintiffs Complaint ... because the same does not stand as admissible evidence. In opposing a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party ’may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but ... must set forth facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id., p. 18 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). Taylor’s theory here appears to be that since Whipple’s Complaint contains some self-serving allegations and conclusory statements (are there Complaints that don’t?), any reference to that Complaint in Whipple’s briefs should be stricken and not considered by the court. This argument would have some legitimacy if Whipple was in fact relying solely “upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading[s]” to oppose Taylor’s motion for summary judgment. But he isn’t — he presents evidence in support of his opposition (even if Taylor believes that all of that evidence should be stricken). Taylor’s reasoning here is flawed. Taylor characterizes Whipple’s Complaint as nothing more than a compilation of unfounded allegations and conclusory statements, quotes part of the holding from Anderson, and then argues that Whipple cannot survive the motion for summary judgment because he is relying solely on “mere allegations” to oppose it. When litigants take the “kitchen sink” approach to pleading, their briefs are bound to include red herrings, whether intentional or unintentional. The court will revisit Taylor’s motion to strike shortly.

C. Plaintiffs second motion to strike (DE 67).

Finally, there is Whipple’s second motion to strike. In this motion the Plaintiff asks the court to strike “Defendant’s Exhibit 1, ’Second Affidavit of Thomas Jones,’ with attachments A-L.” This affidavit and its attachments were filed with Taylor’s reply brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, and Whipple argues that they are thus untimely “because the Defendant failed to file them with the Defendant’s by [sic] its dispositive motion deadline or with its motion for summary judgement [sic].” Plaintiffs Second Motion to Strike, p. 1. Taylor opposes this motion because, it argues, it “found itself compelled to file the 2nd [sic] Jones Aff. [sic] because Dr. Muchiri continues to be confused regarding her tenure review process.” Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs Second Motion to Strike, p. 1. Dr. [Mary] Muchiri’s affidavit, submitted by Whipple, is one of the items Taylor seeks to exclude by way of its own motion to strike (see DE 61, pp. 20-21). That notwithstanding, Taylor filed a second affidavit from Jones, along with attachments, not “to gain a tactical or procedural advantage ...” but rather “to clarify the record” with regard to statements made by Dr. Muchiri in her affidavit. Id., p. 2. Without going into unnecessary detail at this point, Whipple argues that his tenure review process was irregular in structure (in that he was subjected to four interviews with the Faculty Personnel Committee as opposed to the standard one interview). He presents the affidavit of Muchiri, another African-American professor at Taylor, who states that she was denied tenure twice, in 2006 and 2007, before being granted tenure after her third application in 2009. (DE 56-46.) Muchiri doesn’t explain why she was denied tenure on her first two attempts, but she does state that “[t]he individuals who were in the group reviewing my tenure application each time were all Caucasian.” Id., ¶ 8. The implication, of course, is that African-American professors were treated less favorably than professors who were not members of that protected class. It was in response to Muchiri’s affidavit that Taylor presented the second Jones affidavit, in which the dean claims that Muchiri was mistaken about the tenure process. Jones states that “Muchiri’s confusion is that she does not realize or understand that an application for tenure is not a formal application until it goes to the Faculty Personnel Committee[.]” and that Muchiri’s first two applications never made it that far, meaning that she “did not formally apply for tenure with the FPC until January 2009.” (DE 62-1, p. 1, ¶¶ 4, 6.) Other than noting that the people who reviewed her tenure application were all Caucasian, Muchiri does not expressly state that her tenure review process was tainted by racial animus. Still, Whipple presents her affidavit in an attempt to show that he and Muchiri were treated differently during the tenure review process. While conceding that “ ‘[Ejvidence of a defendant’s behavior toward ... other employees in the [same] protected group as the plaintiffs is relevant circumstantial evidence^]’ ” Taylor argues that Muchiri’s affidavit “is irrelevant and inadmissible ‘me too’ evidence. Although Muchiri takes issue with her tenure review and promotion processes, she fails to articulate any facts that her treatment was because of race or that she was racially harassed or retaliated against because of her race.” Defendant’s Motion to Strike, pp. 20-21 (quoting Jones v. National Council of YMCA of U.S., 48 F.Supp.3d 1054, 1102-03 (N.D.Ill.2004)). Once again, however, this issue is moot. Even if Muchiri’s affidavit is considered as part of the mosaic of evidence Whipple is attempting to present to support his race claim, it does not change the court’s conclusion regarding the merits of that claim, which is that Whipple’s evidence falls woefully short of establishing a prima facie case of a racially hostile work environment claim. The second Jones affidavit doesn’t change any of this. Even accepting the fact that Whipple and Mu-chiri, both African-Americans, were subjected to a tenure review process that differed from the norm (a disputed fact, at least as to Muchiri, but not a material one), this piece of Whipple’s factual mosaic does not save his race claim, and so the motion to strike Jones’s second affidavit is moot.

Taylor claims it submitted the second Jones affidavit in order to “to clarify the record’ — an ironic assertion. It is too late for either party to “clarity the record” at this point — they have both muddied the waters with poorly constructed and, to an unfortunate degree, poorly reasoned motions to strike. Whipple seeks to exclude almost every bit of evidence Taylor presents that raises questions about his conduct (i.e., his collegiality) while employed at the University, and Taylor seeks to exclude seemingly every statement Whipple makes in any of his pleadings, including his Complaint, and the majority of other evidence (such as affidavits) that he filed in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Mindful of the fact that both sides expended a great deal of effort to turn these evidentiary disputes into a needlessly over-complicated bucket of worms (although Taylor wins the gold star in that regard for its brief in support of its motion to strike), the court will endeavor to clear some of the trees so the forest once again becomes visible.

There is really a single overriding theme presented in the motions to strike, to wit: neither side wants the court to consider what it characterizes as hearsay, or statements that are “eonelusory,” “self-serving,” or “irrelevant.” That is fair enough, on its face. The problem is that the parties use those terms so loosely and apply them so broadly that they end up essentially challenging every bit of evidence the other side has submitted. Fortunately, there is a simple way out of this quagmire. The parties’ premise is correct in that “[ajdmissi-bility is the threshold question because a court may consider only admissible evidence in assessing a motion for summary judgment.” Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 985 (7th Cir.2009) (citing Haywood v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 323 F.3d 524, 533 (7th Cir.2003) (inadmissible evidence will not overcome a motion for summary judgment)). It is also true, however, that “[tjhere is of course nothing wrong with relying on self-serving statements to defeat summary judgment[,]” as long as those statements are based on admissible evidence. Thomas v. City of Michigan City, 151 F.Supp.3d 869, 873, 2015 WL 9239828, at *3 (N.D.Ind. Dec. 16, 2015) (citations omitted). The parties fail to acknowledge this distinction, which admittedly can be a fine one, and that failure renders many of their arguments toothless. Again, this is especially true of Taylor’s motion to strike. Granted, there are many instances in the record, as in Whipple’s Complaint and his pleadings in opposition to summary judgment, where he makes obvious eonelusory, speculative, or self-serving statements (the one mentioned above, where “he identifies” retaliation as a motivating factor in his termination, is just one example). But Taylor’s unnecessarily complicated and messy motion to strike doesn’t accomplish what should be its goal — to assist the court in identifying those specific, material admissibility issues that must be resolved before the merits of the motion for summary judgment can be addressed. Instead, it paints with such a broad brush that it ends up challenging almost every statement Whipple makes, as illustrated by Taylor’s nine objections to a single paragraph of WThipple’s opposing materials.

The kicker in all this is that the court has no intention of considering inadmissible evidence, be it hearsay or eonelusory statements or those scary sounding “inadmissible conclusory declaration and hearsay statements” (Defendant’s Motion to Strike, p. 15). The court will do its best to assess the merits of Taylor’s motion for summary judgment according to the proper standard, which includes considering all relevant evidence submitted by both sides, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Whipple as the nonmovant, and determining whether Taylor is entitled to judgment in its favor or whether Whipple has presented sufficient evidence demonstrating that there are genuine material issues that can only be resolved by a jury.

All of this is not to say that the parties don’t have some legitimate beefs tucked away in the morass of arguments they present in their motions to strike (as opposed “kitchen sink” issues that are inconsequential or irrelevant — and there are a lot of those). But addressing every one of the evidentiary “issues” presented on an item by item or line by line basis, which the motions to strike (especially Taylor’s) invite the court to do, would be extremely inefficient and, more importantly, distract from the ultimate task at hand — determining whether Whipple has presented sufficient admissible evidence to survive summary judgment. It is sufficient to hold that Taylor’s motion to strike is granted in part, to the extent that it raises valid and relevant evidentiary issues, and denied in part, to the extent that many (probably most) of the issues are irrelevant or immaterial.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment.

A. Timeliness of the Plaintiffs Claims.

Taylor argues that “[mjany of the actions about which Whipple now complains are untimely[.]” Defendant’s Memorandum, p. 3. (What Taylor means, of course, is that Whipple’s complaints were untime-ly.) Taylor correctly states that an individual alleging discrimination under Title VII “must file a Charge [of Discrimination] with the EEOC within 180 days of the complained-of employment action ....” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)). Taylor also concedes that Indiana is a “deferral” state, meaning that if an individual files his charge of discrimination with a state or local agency (such as the Indiana Civil Rights Commission, for example), “ ‘the time limit for filing with the EEOC is extended to 300 days.’ ” Id. (quoting EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 110, 108 S.Ct. 1666, 100 L.Ed.2d 96 (1988)). Since it is undisputed that Whipple did not file his first charge of discrimination with a state or local agency before he filed it with the EEOC, Taylor contends that the 180-day limitations period applies in this case. Accordingly, “Whipple’s claims in this lawsuit are limited to alleged incidents which occurred after April 10, 2011, as Charge 1 was file-stamped by the EEOC on October 7, 2011.” Id. Taylor argues that “[pjursuant to the 180-day statute of limitations, the following incidents about which Whipple complains are time-barred under Title VII: (1) the' 2006/2007 recommendation from the University that he pursue.singing lessons; (2) the 2006 alleged comment by Robertson that Taylor hired Whipple because of his race; and, (3) all other incidents prior to April 10, 2011.” 'Id., pp. 3-4.

Whipple claims that Taylor “is wrong in its claim that it cannot be held liable under Title VII for discriminatory actions that occurred more than 180 days prior to the filing [of] either of Dr. Whipple’s Charges, because they ignore current Indiana law.” Plaintiffs Response, pp. 2-3. Whipple maintains that under Indiana law, a complainant can file a charge of discrimination with either the EEOC or a state or local agency, and that the 300-day limitations period applies in either instance. Id. (citing Allen v. International Truck and Engine Corp., 2013 WL 1332071, *1 (S.D.Ind. March 29, 2013)). Whipple states that because the State of Indiana has “a work sharing agreement” with the EEOC, aggrieved individuals can file complaints with either the EEOC or a state agency and the 300-day limitation period applies to those complaints. Id. (citing Koch v. CGM Group, Inc., 2001 WL 392523 (S.D.Ind. Apr. 3, 2001)). Therefore, claims Whipple, his complaints about “unlawful discriminatory and retaliatory actions taking place as far back as December 10, 2010[,] are actionable.” Id., p. 4.

Whipple goes even farther, contending that “[t]he temporal scope of actionable events covered by Dr. Whipple’s Complaint extends back even past December 10, 2010, to cover unlawful discrimination that occurred as far back as 2006, under the continuing violation doctrine.” Id. (citing Lee v. Aaron’s Sales & Leasing, 2009 WL 3111357 *6 (N.D.Ind. Sept. 24, 2009)) (“in some circumstances, the continuing violation theory may apply to allow plaintiffs to recover for discriminatory acts that would otherwise be barred by the applicable statute of limitations.”). Whipple points out that “as noted on both of his Charges, the discrimination and unlawful retaliation was part of an ongoing continuing action.” Id., p. 5. In addition to checking the box on both of his Charge forms indicating that he was complaining of “continuing action” violations, his “2011 Charge also stated ‘[Complaining Party] alleges a pattern of continuing conduct related to race discrimination,’ and ‘the problems began in October 2006.’” Id., p. 6; see Charge of Discrimination, Oct. 7, 2011, (DE 56-4) Plaintiffs Exhibit C, pp. 1-2, and Charge of Discrimination, Nov. 9, 2012, Id., p. 3. Whipple argues, then, that “[t]hese facts, added to the nature of Dr. Whipple’s allegations pertaining to his hostile working environment claim, demonstrate that he has asserted a continuing violation by the Defendant, which extends the Defendant’s liability for any racially harassing and discriminatory actions back in time by more than five (5) years prior to the filing of his first Charge of Discrimination.” Id.

In its reply brief, Taylor cites Helm v. Ancilla Domini College, 2012 WL 33018 (N.D.Ind. Jan. 5, 2012), and argues that it is Whipple who is misinterpreting the law. Defendant’s Reply, pp. 3-4. In Helm, this court (Judge DeGuilio), addressing the issue of a 180-day limitation period versus a 300-day period, stated as follows:

Our circuit’s case law on the Title VII filing deadline is in conflict. See, e.g., Chaudhry v. Nucor Steel-Indiana, 546 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir.2008) (“[An EEOC] charge must be filed within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or else the employee may not challenge the practice in court”); but see Williamson v. Indiana University, 345 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 2003) (“A claimant may file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within a 180-day window permitted under Title VII”). The statute itself reads:

A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of the charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice) shall be served upon the person against whom such charge is made within ten days thereafter, except that in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier, and a copy of such charge shall be filed by the Commission with the State or local agency.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). A plain reading indicates that more is required to trigger the extended 300-day limitations period than the bare fact that this suit arose in a “deferral state.” Under the terms of the statute, it seems that a plaintiff must actually file with the Indiana Civil Rights Commission (“ICRC”) in order to extend her EEOC filing deadline.

Helm v. Ancilla Domini College, 2012 WL 33018, at *10, n. 7 (N.D.Ind. Jan. 5, 2012). It is an unsettled question in this circuit whether a complainant must file with a state or local agency first (dr simultaneously with the EEOC) to trigger the 300-day period. Again, Whipple cites several cases that he claims hold the opposite — that the 300-day period applies even if a complainant does not initiate his charge with a state agency. Plaintiffs Response, pp. 3-4. These include the aforementioned Allen, 2013 WL 1332071, *1 (complainant exhausts administrative remedies “by filing a charge of discrimination with the ... EEOC, or comparable cooperating state agency, within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory conduct.”) (italics added); and Koch, 2001 WL 392523, *4 (employee did not file charge with both EEOC and state agency, but 300-day limitation period applied). The cases cited by Whipple imply that the 300-day period applies in Indiana regardless of whether a claim is initiated with a state agency or the EEOC, although only the Koch case arguably makes that express holding. On the other hand, Judge DeGuilio’s discussion of this issue — which he includes in a footnote — is dicta, since he concluded that the issue was not a dispositive one in that case. Neither party provides, nor was the court able to find, any conclusive precedent on this issue. This court, however, need not resolve this issue in this case, since Whipple’s “continuing violation” argument carries the day anyway.

The Seventh Circuit recently addressed the applicability of the continuing violation doctrine, writing as follows:

The limitations period for a Title VII claim runs from the date the unlawful employment practice occurred, and the Supreme Court has held that for claims based on “discrete acts” of retaliation or discrimination, the “discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act ‘occurred’ on the day that it ‘happened.’ ” Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). This rule applies even if an old, unchallenged discriminatory act has a present effect on an employee’s status in a seniority system, a progressive discipline systeip, or some other dynamic employment scheme. “A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge ... is merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal consequences.” United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977) (emphasis added). So the “discrete act” that starts the Title VII limitations clock is the discriminatory decision itself, not the “consequences of the act[ ]” that may materialize down the road. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (citation omitted).

There is an exception to this general rule. Under the “continuing violation” doctrine, a Title VII plaintiff may recover for otherwise time-barred conduct that is part of a single, ongoing unlawful employment practice if at least one related act occurs during the limitations period. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 116-18, 122 S.Ct. 2061. As the Supreme Court clarified in Morgan, however, this doctrine is limited to claims of hostile work environment. “Hostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete acts. Their very nature involves repeated conduct.” Id. at 115, 122 S.Ct. 2061. “[T]he theory is that ‘[a] hostile work environment claim is composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice.’” Swanson v. Village of Flossmoor, 794 F.3d 820, 826 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117, 122 S.Ct. 2061). As such, a Title VII claim for hostile work environment is timely “as long as ‘any act falls within the statutory time period,’ even if the [claim] encompasses events occurring prior to the statutory time period.” Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 730 (7th Cir.2014) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 120, 122 S.Ct. 2061).

Barrett v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 803 F.3d 893, 898-99 (7th Cir.2015). As another district court recently explained:

Claims of hostile work environment are different in kind from discrimination because they involve repeated conduct that does not fully manifest itself on any particular day. Therefore, a hostile work environment claim is timely so long as one of the acts contributing to the hostile work environment occurred within the 300-day filing period. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 116-117, 122 S.Ct. 2061. The continuing violations doctrine, therefore, links a time-barred act with an act that occurred within the 300-day limitations period by treating the separate claims as one continuous act. See Selan v. Kiley, 969 F.2d 560, 564 (7th Cir.1992).

Harris v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 2015 WL 5693523, at *9 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 28, 2015). Under the doctrine, “a plaintiff can ‘delay suing until a series of wrongful acts blossoms into an injury on which suit can be brought.’” Slaughter v. Winston & Strawn LLP, 2015 WL 7077331, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 13, 2015) (quoting Bass v. Joliet Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 86, 746 F.3d 835, 839 (7th Cir.2014)). A “continuing violation is one that could not reasonably have been expected to be made the subject of a lawsuit when it first occurred because its character as a violation did not become clear until it was repeated during the limitations period.” Dasgupta v. Univ. of Wisconsin Bd. of Regents, 121 F.3d 1138, 1139 (7th Cir.1997).

In his Complaint, Whipple makes clear that he “alleges a continuing pattern of severe and pervasive harassment on the basis of his race that created a hostile work environment and affected the terms and conditions of his continued employment at [Taylor].” Complaint, ¶ 11. He asserts that this racially based harassment manifested itself in myriad ways throughout his employment with Taylor. Id. generally. By way of example, Whipple makes the following contentions:

1) In April 2006 while he was visiting the Taylor campus, two other faculty members allegedly made remarks to Whipple that the environment at the University was not one in which an African-American professor would feel comfortable. (Id., ¶ 12);

2) Beginning in his first semester of employment, Whipple felt “underutilized” and “had very little input into what he was doing.” He met with Robertson to discuss his concerns and during one such meeting he claims she told him that the only reason he was hired was “because you are black.” (Id., ¶ 13);

3) During the 2010-11 academic year, Whipple became eligible for promotion from assistant professor to associate professor, and applied for this promotion on October 15, 2010. He claims that “[i]n the Fall of 2010, Dr. Robertson began to talk to [him] about other jobs. On the day before Dr. Whipple’s promotion hearing, Dr. Robertson entered Dr. Whipple’s classroom between classes and wrote ‘Samford University’ on the board and suggested to Dr. Whipple that he apply there.” (Id., ¶ 15);

4) On November 5, 2010, Whipple filed a complaint with the University in which he complained about what he perceived as “race harassment by Dr. Robertson.” University Provost Bedi instructed Whipple and Robertson to meet with “a specialist in racial conciliation.” (Id., ¶ 17);

5) “On February 21, 2011, Dr. Whipple’s application for promotion was denied citing issues of collegiality related to Dr. Whipple’s complaints regarding race based issues with Dr. Robertson and others.” (Id., ¶ 17);

6) Whipple successfully appealed the denial of his promotion but alleges that “he experienced retaliation and continued race related issues throughout the year.” These issues, according to Whipple, included an increased workload “without a corresponding increase in compensation and ... lower levels of administrative support.” (Id., ¶ 18);

7) Whipple became eligible for tenure in 2012. During Whipple’s tenure application process, Harrison noted that there were “several issues that would need to be addressed in the tenure review process[.]” and that “[a]mong the items to be addressed were Dr. Whipple’s ‘feelings about Taylor related to racism[.]’ ” (Id., ¶ 21);

8) Whipple’s application for tenure was denied on July 30, 2012, and “[i]n conjunction with denial of tenure, the University did not renew Dr. Whipple’s contract thereby ending his employment at the conclusion of the 2012-2013 academic year.” (Id., ¶¶ 22-23).

Whipple filed his first charge of discrimination on Oct. 7, 2011. (DE 56-4, pp. 1-2.) In that charge, Whipple made the following pertinent statements and allegations:

1) He indicates that he is filing the charge based on race discrimination and retaliation. (Id., p. 1);

2) He claims the alleged discriminatory conduct took place between “8/2006 to present.” Id.)-,

3) He “alleges a pattern of continuing conduct related to race discrimination.” (Id.);

4) He states that “[t]he problems began in October 2006[.]” (Id.);

5) He recounts incidents of alleged harassment and retaliation (most all of which are set forth above) that he says occurred between 2006 and 2011. (Id.)

Whipple filed his second charge of discrimination on Nov. 9, 2012. (DE 56-4; Plaintiffs Exhibit C, p. 3.) In that charge, Whipple made the following pertinent statements and allegations:

1) He indicates that he is filing the charge based on race discrimination and retaliation. (Id.);

2) He states that the alleged discriminatory conduct described in the charge took place between “10-03-2011 and 10-16-2012.” (Id.)

3) He charges that the discriminatory acts of which he complains are a “continuing action.” (Id.);

4) He recounts incidents of alleged racially based harassment and retaliation (including the denial of his tenure application and the termination of his contract). (Id.) Based on all of the above, Whipple contends that he has pleaded a hostile environment claim, is entitled to invoke the continuing violation doctrine due to the recurring nature of the discrimination he alleges he suffered, and the debate about a 180-day limitation period versus a 300-day period is therefore much ado about nothing. The court agrees. The allegations included in Whipple’s charges of discrimination and in his Complaint make it clear that he has pled a hostile environment claim against Taylor and invoked the continuing violation doctrine.

Taylor, however, argues that the doctrine is not applicable in this case. Defendant’s Reply, p. 4. Taylor devotes only one page of its reply brief to this issue. The University claims that a plaintiff invoking the doctrine must show that: 1) he is complaining about a pattern of conduct; and 2) that he “ ‘was reasonable not to perceive working conditions as intolerable until the acts of harassment had, through repetition or [accumulation], reached the requisite level of severity.’ ” Id., p. 5 (quoting Russell v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill. at Chicago, 243 F.3d 336, 343 (7th Cir. 2001)). Taylor then argues that “Whipple asserts that Taylor subjected him to discrimination, retaliation and harassment since 2006 and that he constantly complained to Dr. Harrison, starting in 2008... .According to Whipple’s own summary of the facts, there exists no reason for Whipple’s delayed filing of the charges. Therefore, any claims pre-April 10, 2011, stand time-barred.” Id., p. 5. It is true that a plaintiff cannot invoke the continuing violation doctrine in order to excuse the tardy filing of charges of discrimination. See, e.g., Evans v. Gloucester Township, 124 F.Supp.3d 340, 350, 2015 WL 5012593, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2015) (“the doctrine does not permit.. .the aggregation of discrete discriminatory acts for the purpose of reviving an untimely act of discrimination that the victim- knew or should have known was actionable.”). Taylor says that Whipple obviously believed that illegal discrimination was afoot as early as 2008, when he began complaining to Dr. Harrison about alleged racial harassment, but he failed to file his first charge until October 2011. Accordingly, argues Taylor, he cannot invoke the continuing violation doctrine in order to base claims on, or even present evidence about, any act that took place before April 10, 2011.

The resolution of this issue turns on the reasonableness of Whipple’s delay in filing his first charge of discrimination. Put another way, were the acts of alleged harassment to which Whipple claims he was subjected sufficiently severe or intolerable that he should have filed a charge of discrimination before October 2011 (Taylor says yes, and therefore the continuing violation doctrine does not apply) or was he justified in filing when he did (since, after all, a plaintiff is within his rights to ‘“delay suing until a series of wrongful acts blossoms into an injury on which suit can be brought.’” Slaughter, 2015 WL 7077331, at *2)? If a plaintiffs delay in filing a charge is reasonable, based on the ongoing nature of the events giving rise to it, then a Title VII claim for hostile work environment is timely “as long as ‘any act falls within the statutory time period,’ even if the [claim] encompasses events occurring prior to the statutory time period.” Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d at 730 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 120, 122 S.Ct. 2061).

The court concludes that Whipple has demonstrated that his decision to file his first charge with the EEOC in October 2011 was reasonable under the facts of this case and, consequently, that the continuing violation doctrine applies. From the time he filed his first EEOC charge Whipple maintained that he was subjected to continuing incidents of discriminatory treatment and that “[t]he problems began in October 2006[.]” (First Charge of Discrimination, DE 56-4, p. 1.) In that first charge, he recounts his problems with Robertson beginning in the 2006-2007 academic year; Provost Stephen Bedi’s December 15, 2010, written directive that Whipple and Robertson engage in a “racial reconciliation” session; the denial of his promotion in February 2011 and his successful appeal of that denial; and, an alleged incident on April 13, 2011, during which he claims Robertson “verbally attacked” him while they were attending the reconciliation session — an incident he claims went unaddressed by the administration after he reported it. Id., pp. 1-2. Obviously, several of these “acts” occurred within 300 days, and even 180 days from the date of Whipple’s first charge, even though the charge “encompasses events occurring prior” to either limitation period. For these reasons, the court rejects Taylor’s argument that Whipple’s claims, in part, are time-barred and summary judgment on that issue is denied.

B. Plaintiffs Prima Facie Case of Race Discrimination.

Whipple’s victory on the issue of the continuing violation doctrine is pyrrhic, since the court concludes that he fails to adduce sufficient admissible evidence to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, even if all of his factual assertions are considered.

A plaintiff alleging employment discrimination can establish a prima facie case by utilizing either the direct or indirect method of proof. Bisluk v. Hamer, 800 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir.2015). Under the direct method, a plaintiff must show that his employer made an adverse employment decision “on an impermissible discriminatory basis.” Andrews v. CBOCS West, Inc., 743 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 2014). Under the indirect method of proof, a plaintiff meets his initial burden by showing that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was meeting his employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected class were treated more favorably. Id. (citing Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691, 696 (7th Cir.2006)). If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the employer must “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, at which point the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to submit evidence that the employer’s explanation is pretextual.” Id.

However, as the Seventh Circuit has explained, the terms “direct” and “indirect” are “somewhat misleading,” and “[t]he distinction between the two avenues of proof is ‘vague.’ ” Luks v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 467 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir.2006) (quoting Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Villages Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 902-03 (7th Cir.2006)). In A