Panagopoulos v. New York State Department of Transportation (172 F. Supp. 3d 597, 2016)

DECISION and ORDER

GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief United States District Judge

Currently before the Court, in this employment discrimination action filed by Celeste Panagopoulos (“Plaintiff’) against the New York State Department of Transportation (“DOT” or “Defendant”), is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. (Dkt. No. 24.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion is granted.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint

Generally, in her Complaint, Plaintiff, a 48 year-old female who began working for DOT in April 2001 and DOT’s only female Information Technology Manager, alleges that, starting at some point in 2008 and continuing to the present time, she has been discriminated against by DOT employee Patrick Bennison on the basis of her gender, and, after she filed grievances related to that discrimination, she was subjected to retaliatory discrimination. (Dkt. No. 1 [Plf.’s Compl.].) For example, Plaintiff alleges that: (1) Bennison “maliciously accused” her of stealing a parking sticker and directed employees to sit outside of her office to harass and annoy her, (2) she was abruptly reassigned to another position, placing her a greater risk of a layoff based upon a lack of seniority in her new role, and (3) after she filed a grievance, she was issued a notice of discipline and required to appear for an interrogation. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-25.) Because this Decision and Order is intended primarily for the review of the parties, the Court will not recite in detail the remaining factual allegations of Plaintiffs Complaint but will refer the reader to the Complaint. (Id.)

Based upon these factual allegations, Plaintiffs Complaint asserts three claims, set forth in two “Causes of Action”: (1) a claim of gender discrimination in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), New York Executive Law §§ 296 and 297; (2) a claim of retaliation in violation of New York Executive Law §§ 296 and 297 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; and (3) a claim that Defendant subjected her to a hostile work environment in violation of the NYSHRL and Title VII. (Id. at ¶¶ 27-36.)

B. Undisputed Material Facts

Except where otherwise noted, the following facts were asserted and supported by an accurate record citation by Defendant in its Rule 7.1 Statement and either expressly admitted or denied without an accurate record citation by Plaintiff in her Rule 7.1 Response. (Compare Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2 [Def.’s Rule 7.1 Statement] with Dkt. No, 32, Attach. 2 [Plf.’s Rule 7.1 Response].)

1. Plaintiffs Background with DOT

Plaintiff has worked for DOT since 2001. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 1.) In 2007, she was promoted to the position of Information Technology Specialist 3 (“ITS 3”), a position in which she was expected to supervise or perform a broad array of information technology (“IT”) support activities with regard to DOT’S network and database systems. (Id. at ¶¶2-3.) The same year, Plaintiff left DOT for six months and took a position in customer relations with the New York State Office for Technology. (Id. at ¶ 5.) She returned to DOT in early 2008, retaining the title of ITS 3. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-7.) Although her title remained the same, functionally Plaintiff assumed the role of Regional IT Manager, in which she oversaw IT operations in DOT’S Schenectady, New York regional office, known as “Region 1.” (Id. at ¶¶ 6-7.) In that role, Plaintiff was responsible for supervising Region 1 IT staff, coordinating resources, and handling remote IT support for approximately 35 to 40 sites. (Compare Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶8 [Def.’s Rule 7.1 Statement, supporting the above-listed factual assertion with an accurate record citation] with Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 2, at ¶ 8 [Plf.’s Rule 7.1 Response, admitting the fact asserted and purportin'g to deny a fact not expressly asserted or implied by Defendant without a specific citation to the record].) Regional IT Managers were also responsible for managing IT service tickets. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 10.) Plaintiff was one of eleven Regional IT Managers, and the only female. (Dkt. No. 33 at ¶ 4 [Plf.’s Aff.]; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 29, at 14 [attaching as “Exhibit K” Robert Lewis’s Depo. Tr.].)

2. IT Management Hierarchy

In 2008, Regional IT Managers reported to Robert Lewis, Manager of Information Technology Procurement and Regional IT. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 11.) Lewis, in turn, reported to Patrick Bennison, Director of Statewide Customer Support. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Bennison had previously held the position of Regional IT Manager for Region 1 for ten years, and, during that time, he developed strong professional relationships with the users situated in Region 1. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.) Bennison maintained those relationships and continued to receive email messages from Region,!, users regarding IT issues even after he left the position of Regional IT Manager. (Id. at ¶ 16.)

The position of Regional IT Manager for Region 1 was vacant for a period of time prior to Plaintiffs assignment to that position in 2008. (Compare Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 17 [Def.’s Rule 7.1 Statement, supporting the above-listed factual assertion with an accurate record citation] with Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 2, at ¶ 17 [Plf.’s Rule 7.1 Response, denying only a portion of the fact asserted and not supporting that denial with a specific citation to the record where the purported factual issue actually arises].) During that period of time, IT support was managed from the DOT main office, located at 50 Wolf Road in Albany, New York. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 18.) Moreover, in 2005, Region l’s data centers were relocated to the DOT main office. (Id., ¶ 19.)

3. Issues Following Plaintiffs Appointment as Regional IT Manager

At some point after Plaintiff was appointed to the position of Regional IT Manager, Bennison began receiving phone calls from customers who complained about the quality of IT services being provided to Region 1 users. (Compare Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶21 [Def.’s Rule 7.1 Statement, supporting the above-listed factual assertion with an accurate record citation] with Dkt. No., 32, Attach. 2, at II21 [Plf.’s Rule 7.1 Response, admitting that Bennison testified in accordance with the fact asserted, but denying the assertion “as Plaintiff has no knowledge as to whether .., Bennison received said phone calls,” and not supporting that denial with a specific citation to the record where a factual dispute actually arises].) Some complaints also, concerned users’ inability to locate or contact Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 23; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 29, at 46-47 [Attaching as “Exhibit K” Lewis’s, Depo. Tr.].) Finally, he also became concerned about the number of open service tickets in Region 1. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 30, at 26-27 [Attaching as “Exhibit L” Bennison’s Depo. Tr.].) ,

Meeting on August 25, 2008 ■

On August 25,2008, Bennison and Lewis met with Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶26.) At the meeting, Bennison informed Plaintiff that she should be spending the majority of her time at the regional office rather than at remote locations; Plaintiff responded that this- would not be conducive to Region 1 and the manner in which it was conducting business at the time, and that “things had changed” since Bennison’s tenure as Regional IT Manager, (Id. at ¶¶ 27-29; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 25, at 11 [Attaching as “Exhibit H” Plf.’s Resps. to Interrogs.].) Moreover, Bennison advised Plaintiff that “walk-in” customers seeking assistance were to be provided with service at the time ■ that they walked in; Plaintiff expressed concern that this would allow walk-in customers to “move to the front of the line.” (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2. at ¶¶ 30-31.) Bennison informed Plaintiff that he wanted Region 1 to begin holding “subject expert meetings”; Plaintiff responded that she needed to first seek approval from the DOT Regional Director. (Id. at ¶¶ 32-33.) In short, Plaintiff did not agree with solutions that Bennison proposed at the meeting. (Id. at ¶ 34.) Benni-son abruptly exited the meeting. (Id. at ¶ 36.) Plaintiff later referred to the August 2008 meeting as the “catalyst” for the future problems she allegedly experienced, inasmuch as she and Bennison had previously gotten along. (Id. at ¶ 149; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 27, at 114-15 [attaching as “Exhibit I” Pit’s Depo. Tr.].)

After the August 2008 meeting, Benni-son concluded that' IT service within the region had not improved because he continued to receive phone calls from customers concerning the low quality of IT support, (Compare Dkt. No, 24, Attach. 2, at ¶37 [Det’s Rule’7.1 Statement, supporting the above-listed factual assertion with an accurate record citation] with Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 2, at ¶ 37 [Pit’s Rule 7.1 Response, admitting that record,testimony supports the factual assertion and then purporting to deny the factual assertion because Plaintiff has “no knowledge” of its truth and providing no citation to the record]; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 30, at 37-40 [attaching as “Exhibit L” Bennison’s Depo. Tr.].) On September 19, 2008, Lewis informed Plaintiff that a Region 1 customer had complained about Plaintiffs absence from the Region 1 main office. (Compare Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 38 [Def.’s Rule 7.1 Statement, supporting the above-listed factual assertion with an accurate record citation] mth Dkt. No, 32, Attach. 2, at ¶ 38 [Plf.’s Rule 7.1 Response, admitting portion of the factual assertion, then purporting to deny assertion to the extent that she has “no knowledge” of the origins of the complaint and providing no citation to the record].) Lewis also reminded Plaintiff she should be spending the majority of her time at the regional office and instructed her that she was required to inform him by email message if she had to leave and for how long she éxpected to be out of the office. (Dkt. Nb. 24, Attach. 2; at ¶¶ 39-40.) Lewis suggested that Plaintiff leave a noté on her desk or wherever it might be seen by anyone looking for her. (Id. at ¶41.)

In November 2008, Plaintiff was informed that another complaint had been received from a Region 1 customer regarding Plaintiffs absence from the Region 1 office. (Compare Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 42 [Def.’s Rule 7.1 Statement, supporting the above-listed factual assertion with an accurate record citation] with Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 2, at ¶ 42 [Plf.’s, Rule 7.1 Response, admitting the fact asserted and then purporting to deny knowledge of an implied fact not expressly asserted without specific and accurate record citation],) On November 12, 2008, Plaintiff received an email message from Lewis (forwarding an earlier email message from Bennison to Lewis), noting that' there were an unacceptably high number of open or unresolved service tickets in Region 1 compared to other regions. (Id. at ¶ 43.) On December 16, 2008, Lewis informed Plaintiff by email message that more than 25% of the tickets in Region l’s “incident queue,” and nearly 40% of tickets in the “change queue,” had not been assigned. (Id. at ¶ 44.) Lewis directed Plaintiff to address the unassigned tickets and, in a subsequent email message sent on January 5, 2009, requested again that Plaintiff resolve the problem. (Id. at ¶¶ 45-46.) In the latter email message, Lewis also observed that “no tickets [were] assigned to” Plaintiffs name in the “incident queue.” (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 15, at 843 [attaching as part of “Exhibit F” email message, dated Jan. 5, 2009].) Lewis found this fact “particularly troubling in light of’ concerns that Plaintiff had previously conveyed to Lewis about staffing in Region 1; to' Lewis, the incident queue suggested that “either the region is actually over staffed or [Plaintiffs] time in particular is under-utilized.” (Id.)

In an email message sent on January 15, 2009, Bennison advised Plaintiff that she should have kept her supervisor (Lewis) “in the loop” regarding a particular IT service request made by a customer..(Dkt. No. 24, Attach. .2, at ¶ 47; Dkt. No. 24, Attach, 25, at 21- [attaching as “Exhibit H” Plf.’s Resps. to Interrogs.].) With regard to the difficulties that she felt she was having with Bennison, Plaintiff told Lewis that she “thought it would be helpful if [Lewis] did not respond as a puppet-but actually looked, into the merit of the stuff [she] was getting slammed with to determine if it was even valid.” (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 48; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 25, at 23 [attaching as ' “Exhibit H” Plf.’s Resps. to Interrogs.].) In ah email' message dated January 23, 2009, Lewis informed Plaintiff that someone (who was not identified) suggested to Lewis that he warn Plaintiff regarding .inappropriate comments that she had made to Lewis. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 15,.at. 850-51 [attaching as part of “Exhibit F” email message, dated Jan. 23, 2009].) Lewis acknowledged that he had previously told Plaintiff that she was “free to say whatever was on [her] mind” and thus invited'her frank remarks, and directed that, if future meetings became “contentious,” he and Plaintiff continue .their meeting outside the presence of third parties. • (Id. at 850-51.) However, Lewis stated that “[t]he only thing [he] thought was out of line” was “the comment about being a ‘puppet.’ ” (Id. at 849.) ■ '■

Counseling Session’of March 5; 2009

On or around March 5, 2009, Lewis counseled Plaintiff regarding two separate issues. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶¶ 49-50.) First, Lewis counseled Plaintiff regarding her failure to provide timely notifications to the main office about' the status 'of a technical issue relatéd to cellular telephones. (Id. át ¶'49; see also Dkt. No. 24, Attach, 16, at 869 [attaching as' part of “Exhibit F” email message-from Lewis to Plaintiff, dated Mar. 6, 2009, reiterating earlier discussion that Plaintiff “be more vigilant in getting important communications out to the various stakeholders on a timely basis” and noting that '“not overcoming [such situations] will lead to bigger problems later on down the road and I think neither one of us want that to happen”].) Second,- Lewis counseled Plaintiff regarding her failure to inform Lewis about a situation involving one of Plaintiffs employees, leaving Lewis “and the rest of ITD at a disadvantage because [they] didn’t know what was going on.” (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 50.)

2009 Performance Plan

' On or about July 21, 2009, Plaintiff re-peived from Lewis a “performance plan”— a plan identifying tasks and objectives of job duties and standards for measuring performance. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 53; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 13, at 582.) Plaintiff has reviewed the performance plans of two other Regional IT Managers, and has described her July 2009 performance plan as “similar” to her performance plan for the previous year and the performance plans, distributed to other Regional IT Managers. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶¶ 54-56.) However, unlike other performance plans, Plaintiffs performance plan did not contain tasks and standards related to the maintenance of backup and server functions. {Id. at ¶ 57.)

Use of State Vehicle

On August 28, 2009, Lewis sent an email message to Plaintiff, informing her that the-.New York State vehicle assigned to Region 1 was being considered as a candidate for transfer to another region in need of a vehicle because it was rarely used in Region 1. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 59; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 16, at 895 [attaching as part of “Exhibit F” email message from Lewis- to Plaintiff, dated Aug. 28, 2009].) At the direction of Bennison, Lewis asked Plaintiff to' generate a report regarding occasions on which she had used her personal vehicle for business when the State vehicle was not available. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 16, at 895.) On September 9, 2009, Bennison sent an email message to all Regional IT Manágers, discussing DOT’S policy concerning the usage of personal vehicles while making service calls. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶61; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 16, at 906 [attaching as part of “Exhibit F” email messagé from Bennison to Regional IT Managers, dated Sept. 9, 2009, noting that it is “department policy to use a state vehicle unless one is not available” or a service visit location was “on [the] way home”].)

Email Program Update

On December 18,2009, Bennison sent an email message to all Regional IT Managers, indicating that he wanted to spend a portion of a scheduled conference call addressing concerns about an impending update to the email program used by DOT staff. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 65.) In sending that email message, Bennison also forwarded an earlier email message he had sent to Plaintiff in which he advised her that she “need[ed] to keep up to date on” the “concerns” people had; those concerns “ha[d] been talked about at length at various [IT] manager con[ference] calls” and thus “should have been taken care of’ within Region 1. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 16, at 922 [attaching as part of “Exhibit F” email message from Bennison to Plaintiff, dated Dec. 18, 2009].) In a subsequent email message sent to Mary Ivey, the Regional Director of Region 1, Bennison explained some of the advantages of migrating to a new email program; in so doing, Bennison forwarded an earlier email message he had sent to two other Region 1 staff members in which he expressed that he was “disappointed that some of our [IT] managers have been failing to get the message out there” regarding the email program’s capabilities. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 66; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 16, at 920-21 [attaching as part of “Exhibit F” email message, dated Dec. 24, 2009].) Bennison also -requested that Plaintiff be provided “Outlook training and EHA trainingf.]” (Id. at 920.)

DOT Training Center IT Responsibilities

In December 2009, Plaintiff was informed that Region l’s IT Group would be assuming IT support responsibilities for the DOT Training Center located at the main office. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 64.) On March 31, 2010, Lewis informed Plaintiff about a complaint that had been received regarding a lack of IT support coverage at the Training Center. (Id. at ¶ 67.) Plaintiff explained that a member of the staff “was in and out of the training center all week,” and, Lewis responded that the complaint “was that ‘nobody from IT ever showed up.’ ” (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 16, at 927 [attaching as part of “Exhibit F” email messages dated Mar. 31, 2010].) Lewis observed that “[t]he complaints coming in, whether right or wrong, are coloring the opinion of the capabilities of IT in the region and the management thereof .... I think you’d be well advised to ensure that coverage there is a high priority at all times.” (Id.) In another exchange between Lewis and Plaintiff in April 2010, also concerning IT support coverage at the Training Center on particular dates, Lewis explained to Plaintiff that, “[a]s the manager for Region 1 IT, you should be coming up with a way to provide that coverage.” (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 16, at 936 [attaching as part of “Exhibit F” email messages dated Apr. 20, 2010].) Although he expressed an awareness that Plaintiff was displeased that she and her staff (as opposed to personnel located at the main office) were responsible for ensuring the Training Center’s IT needs were met, Lewis emphasized to Plaintiff that, “if [she] can take the bull by the horns and manage this ... [she will] be doing [her]self a favor and showing [her] ability to manage.” (Id.) In December 2010, Lewis questioned Plaintiff again about why no IT staff was present at the Training Center during a scheduled meeting; (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 76.) ;

Plaintiffs Use óf a DOT Parking Sticker

On November 22, 2010, Lewis informed Plaintiff that “complaints” had been received concerning Plaintiffs use of a reserved parking sticker and/or -reserved parking area located at the main office, and that any further such parking would require him to “write [her] up.” (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 71; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 16, at 942-43 [attaching as part of “Exhibit F” email messages dated Nov. 22, 2010].) Two days later, Bennison sent Plaintiff an email message in which he stated that he had “asked the Investigations Unit” to verify a photograph of the permit that Plaintiff provided to Lewis. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 16] at 945 [attaching as part of “Exhibit F” email message from Bennison to Plaintiff, dated Nov. 24, 2010].) Benni-son asserted that no record of the parking permit had been found, which indicated that it was assigned to an employee who was no longer in state service; he also noted that the permit sticker appeared to be “curled” due to “removal from the original person’s car that [it] was assigned to.” (Id.)

Plaintiff explained that she had received the parking permit in 2005 or 2006 as a reward for her work on the State Employee Federated Appeal campaign. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 72.) However, pursuant to DOT main office parking procedures, she had been required to return the permit when she had left the main office in January 2008. (Id. at ¶ 73.) Plaintiff had used the permit to park in restricted areas at the main office between 2008 and November 2010, but had not been subjected to disciplinary action as a result. (Id. at ¶¶ 74-75.)

On November 24, 2010, Plaintiff forwarded Bennison’s 'email to Lewis and asserted that she intended to file “a hostile work environment claim” against Benni-son. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 16, at 948 [attaching as part of “Exhibit F” email message dated Nov. 24, 2010].) Plaintiff stated that her “integrity has been questioned for the last time,” and that she found Benni-son’s behavior “degrading to the point that [she] had no choice” but to “step up to address” the issues in the hope of causing “DOT management to realize just what they’ve unleashed upon its staff.” (Id.)

In an November 29, 2010, email message to Richard Keefer (a member • of DOT’s Employee Relations Bureau), Plaintiff explained the basis upon which she received the parking sticker and noted that she “appreciate^]” Keefer’s assistance “with the ongoing issue [she has] had with Pat Bennison.” (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 16, at 949 [attaching as part of “Exhibit F” email message dated Nov. 29, 2010].) Plaintiff further stated that her “issues” with Ben-nison had “been ongoing for some time”, and ádvised that two other individuals— Jan Brown and Ivey — may “be able to validaté the ‘treatment’ ” ' she received from Bennison. (Id.) Plaintiff noted Benni-son had “quite vocally’ belittled” her in front of other DOT staff, including other Regional IT Managers, and “had tirades” in which he “called [her] names[.]” (Id.)

DOT Employee Cellular Phone Upgrade

In December 2010, DOT began the process of upgrading employees’ cellular phones. (Dkt. No.' 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 77.) During that process, a Region 1 customer’s telephone ■ contacts were lost because Plaintiff failed to follow procedures established before the upgrade. (Id. at ¶78.) There were no other -complaints or issues reported in any other region, and every other region followed the established upgrade process. (Id. at ¶ 79.) In an email message to Lewis and Plaintiff regarding this issue, Bennison stated, “This is unacceptable.” (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 17, at 972 [attaching as part of “Exhibit F” email messages, dated Dec. 10, 2010].) - In an email message in response, Plaintiff stated, “What it is, Pat, is a crock of poop. I would very much appreciate you reaching out to me to find out what'really happened versus assuming immediate guilt.” (Compare Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 80 [Def.’s Rule 7.1 Statement, supporting the above-listed factual assertion with an accurate record citation] with Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 2, ,at ¶80 [PE’s Rule '7.1 Response, asserting that Plaintiff “is unable to admit or' deny the allegation” with no further explanation and without any record citation].) Levis responded that. Plaintiffs email message was “out of line” and noted that Region 1 IT staff'“have an obligation tó do right by [its] customers ... who are .dissatisfied.” (Dkt. No. 24,'Attach. 17, at 974-75 [attaching as part of “Exhibit F" email message, dated Dec. 20, 2010].)

Counseling Session of February 18, 2011

.On or about February 17, 2011, Lewis informed Plaintiff by email message that he was “having a very difficult time seeing [Plaintiffs frequent failure to respond to his questions and directives] as anything short of open insubordination.” (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 82; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 17, at 986-87 [attaching as part of “Exhibit F” email message, dated Feb. 17, 2011].) Lewis stated that he. intended to commence a “formal counseling] session at [his] earliest convenience.” (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 17, at 987.) The counseling session was apparently scheduled for the following day, but Plaintiff failed to appear for the session or to inform Lewis that she would not be present. (Id. at 988.) In an email message to Lewis, sent after the scheduled time for the counseling session, Plaintiff explained that “she was not meeting with [Bennison] without [u]nion representation [or] someone from Employee Relations.” (Id. at 988.) Lewis responded that Benni-son had no intention of attending the meeting. (Id.)

On March 4, 2011, Plaintiff met with Amelia Dilella, DOT’s Director of Employee Relations, and David Harris, another member of the employee relations staff, to discuss her concerns regarding Bennison. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶¶84, 87.) At that meeting, Harris offered to attend future monthly meetings involving Plaintiff and DOT executive staff members (including Bennison), but Plaintiff declined the offer. (Id. at ¶ 88.) At the conclusion of the meeting, Plaintiff stated that she would provide Harris with' further documentation regarding her interactions with Bennison, but Plaintiff had no further contact with the employee relations bureau until August 2011. (Id. at ¶ 90.)

Monthly IT Meetings

From March 2011. through June 2011, monthly meetings were held between Ivey, Nancy Mulholland (DOT’s Chief Information Officer),. Bennison, Lewis, and Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 91; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 31, ,at 6 [attaching as “Exhibit M” Nancy Mulhol-land’s Depo. Tr].) During at least one of these meetings, Bennison became angry and left the room. (Compare Dkt.. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶95 [Def.’s Rule 7.1 Statement, supporting the above-listed factual assertion, with an accurate record, citation] with Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 2, -at ¶ 95 [Plf.’s Rule 7.1 Response, denying the fact asserted without a record citation]; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 29, at 58-59, 76 [attaching as “Exhibit K” Lewis’s Depo. Tr.].) Lewis recalled “an ugly interchange” and that Bennison “felt he was being argued with” by Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 29, at 59.) However, according to Lewis, “[t]here was never any outburst of yelling or fist pounding” at these meetings. (Compare Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 95 [Def.’s Rule 7.1 Statement, supporting the above-listed factual assertion with an accurate record citation] with Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 2, at ¶ 95 [Plf.’s Rule 7.1 Response, denying the fact asserted without citation to the record]; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 29, at SO.)

Cellular Phone Upgrade and Distribution

In early March 2011, Lewis advised Plaintiff that the completion of the regional employee cellular phone upgrade— which had begun in December 2010 — needed to.be treated, as “a high priority.” (Dkt. .No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 96.) On March 23, 2011, Lewis, emailed Plaintiff concerning the lack of progress in that upgrade process. (Id. at ¶ 97; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 17, at' 10,06 [attaching as part of “Exhibit F” email message, from Lewis to Plaintiff, dated Mar.. 23, 201Í, noting that, “nearly three weeks later ... there are still 50+ ■phoned left-to be distributed” to employees and that Lewis would not' “allow [him]self to be put into ‘harm’s way’ if [Plaintiff was] not following explicit directives”],) In light of Region l’s lack of progress — and the fact the other regions had already completed the cellular phone upgrade — Lewis instructed Plaintiff to complete the upgrade by April 1, 2011, and to provide daily status updates regarding the upgrade. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶¶ 98-99; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 17, át [1006].)'

Lewis’s Observation of Region l’s Operations and Employee Rotation

From March 2011 through May 2011, Lewis spent approximately two hours, on three or four separate occasions, observing IT operations in Region l. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 101.) During that period, in April 2011, Bennison and Lewis began rotating members of the Region 1 IT Group with IT staff from the main office. (Id. at ¶ 103.) This measure was taken, at least in part, to obtain a clearer understanding of the cause of problems with the delivery of IT support services in Region 1. ( Id. at ¶ 104; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 29,' at 63-64 [attaching as “Exhibit K” Lewis’s Dep'o, Tr.].) Simply stated, Lewis wanted to explore whether Region 1 had “overly whi-ney” customers, if Plaintiff was “not taking care of them properly,” or if there was “a combination” of those factors. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 29, at 63.) The rotation of employees was discussed at a Region 1 IT staff meeting in April 2011; on May 2, 2011, Bennison informed Plaintiff that he intended to rotate ■ a Region 1 staff member (Mike Fredette) into the main office, and keep Bisnett — who was still assisting Region 1 with its service ticket-backlog — in place. (Id. at ¶¶ 106-07.)

Plaintiffs Reassignment to the Main Office

In May or early June of 2011, Bennison and staff from the IT department and Employee Relations began discussing the possibility of reassigning Plaintiff to the main office to fill an operational need in the Information Security unit, which was managed by Charles Nagy. (Compare Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 108 [Def.’s Rule 7.1 Statement, supporting the above-listed factual assertion with an accurate record citation] with Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 2, at ¶ 108 [Pit’s Rule 7.1 Response, admitting that this factual assertion was consistent with Bennison’s statements in the record, then asserting that she cannot “admit or deny” the ■ statement and attempting to assert fact non-responsive to Defendant’s factual assertion].) On or about July 21, 2011, Lewis and Bennison met with Plaintiff to inform her that she was being temporarily reassigned to the main office to fill the heed in the Information Security unit. (Id. at ¶ 110.) The decision that Plaintiff would be reassigned was ultimately made by Mulholland. (Compare Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 115 [Def.’s Rule 7.Í Statement, supporting the above-listed factual assertion with an accurate record citation] with Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 2, at ¶ 115 [Plf.’s Rule 7.1 Response, denying the factual assertion without further explanation and not supporting that denial with an accurate citation to the record where the purported factual dispute actually arises].) During his deposition, Nagy testified that “there are occasions where folks are reassigned to different duties based on the need of the organization.” (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 28, at 29 [attaching as “Exhibit J” Charles Nagy’s Depo. Tr.].)

Plaintiffs poor management of the IT needs in Region 1 was also a factor in her reassignment to the DOT main office. CCompare Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 118 [Def.’s Rule 7.1 Statement, supporting the above-listed factual assertion with an accurate record citation] with Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 2, at ¶ 118 [Plf.’s Rule 7.1 Response, asserting that Plaintiff “cannot admit or deny the truth of this allegation” with no further explanation and without any record citation].) Lewis testified that the circumstances surrounding Plaintiffs reassignment, aside from operational need, included “many complaints” from users, “mounting issues,” “some clashing going on between [Plaintiff] and one of her staff,” and an “impending consolidation of the Region 1 offices from Schenectady to the main office,” which was “in the works” at the time. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 29, at 62 [attaching as “Exhibit K” Lewis’s Depo. Tr.].) The IT support duties in Region 1 were redistributed to the IT Group’s remaining employees,'and management responsibilities were absorbed by the main office and overseen by Kathy Charron (a female). (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 119.)

Plaintiff was originally told on July 21, 2011, that she had “a couple of hours” to clean out her office 'at Region 1 and to report to the main office; however, the following day, her start date was modified to August 11, 2011. (Id. at ¶¶ 121-22.) Her job title, salary, and benefits remained the same following her reassignment to the main office. (Id.' at ¶ 124.) In conjunction with her reassignment, Plaintiffs access to certain IT systems, used in her role as Regional IT Manager, were removed; several of those accesses were later restored. (Id. at ¶¶ 125-26.) Plaintiff did not report for work on- August 11, 2011, and the Blackberry device that she was assigned in relation to her Region 1 duties was remotely wiped for security reasons. (Id. at ¶ 127.) She was absent from that date until approximately September 19, 2011. (Id. at ¶ 129.) From July 2011 through September 2011, Plaintiff was trying to “burn up” her accrued personal time so that she did not lose it in the event that she .was laid off. (Id. at ¶ 130.)

Before she began her reassignment, Plaintiff was told that she would be sitting in an office cubicle, which she believed was “excessively small” given her pay grade and more appropriate for printer hardware or consultant staff, .{Id. at ¶ 131,) In any event, Plaintiff never actually ■ worked in that space. (Id. at ¶ 132.) During her .deposition, Plaintiff testified that, before she began, working at, the main office, she emailed Nagy to request a different seating location. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 27, at 240 [attaching as “Exhibit I” Pit’s Depo. Tr.].) Plaintiff was told that Bennison “approved getting [her] a more appropriately sized cubicle,” (Id.)

Nagy was initially uncertain what tasks Plaintiff would be performing in his group. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 134.) Nagy was informed that Plaintiff was being transferred “[t]o support the unit,” but because he was not given, advance notice of her arrival, “it took some reorganization to develop some job duties for her.” (Dkt. No, 24, Attach. 28, at 42 [attaching as “Exhibit J” Charles Nagy’s Depo. Tr.].) On the day Plaintiff was informed of her reassignment, Nagy provided her with reading materials in preparation. for her new role. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 135.) , -

Union Contract Grievances

On or about August 18, 2011, the New York State Public Employees Federation (“PEF”) filed two union contract grievances on Plaintiffs behalf. (Id. at ¶ 139.) One grievance alleged violations of Articles 33 and 36 of the union contract (“Discipline” and “No Discrimination”), respectively; the other alleged violation of Article 45 (“Benefits Guaranteed”), citing the Workplace Violence Act and DOT’S “Promoting a Positive Productive Workplace” policy. (Id. at ¶ 140.) These were the first such grievances Plaintiff filed against Ben-nison (or, for that matter, any DOT employee). (Compare Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 141 [Def.’s Rule 7.1 Statement, supporting the above-listed factual assertion with an accurate record citation] with Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 2, at ¶ 141 [Plf.’s Rule 7.1 Response, admitting the fact asserted and providing commentary with regard to a fact neither asserted nor implied and without a record citation].)

On October 5, 2011, and October 11, 2011, “Second Step” meetings were held in relation to the grievances. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ Í42.) At the meetings, C. Richard Gay, a member of DOT’S Employee Relations Bureau, heard testimony from Plaintiff, PEF Field Representative Susan Radosh, Lewis, and Nagy. (Id. at ¶ 143.) In support of the grievances, Plaintiff also submitted extensive written material, some of which contained details, and pertained to events, not discussed at the review meetings. (Id. at ¶¶ 144-45.) Gay conducted additional interviews with Mulholland and Bennison, and contacted Lewis and Nagy to obtain further information regarding Plaintiff s submissions. (Id. at ¶ 146.) By written decisions, Gay denied both grievances, finding no evidence of discrimination or workplace violence.- (Id. at ¶¶ 147-48,156.) - ■

Supervisors’ Views of Plaintiffs Work

Lewis described his working relationship with Plaintiff as “stressful at times[.]” (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 29, at 19 [attaching as “Exhibit K” Lewis’s Depo. Tr.]; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 150.) By- Lewis’s account, many of the problems in Region 1 were the result of Plaintiffs failure to complete tasks in the manner in which she had been directed to complete them. (Dkt, No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 151.) By comparison, Lewis rarely experienced “emergent issues” in relation to other regions during his time in management. (Id. at ¶ 152; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 29, at 24-25 [attaching as “Exhibit K” Lewis’s Depo. Tr.].) Lewis noted that he also sometimes had difficulty reaching Plaintiff during normal work hours at the Region 1 office or by cellular phone; this occurred “[frequently enough for it to be á problem.” (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶¶ 153-54; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 29, at 32.) Nagy also had difficulty managing Plaintiff, particularly with regard to her attendance and work product. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 155.)

Events Beginning in November 2011

Beginning in November 2011, a series of overlapping events with respect to DOT’s discipline of Plaintiff, and Plaintiffs efforts to vindicate the alleged discrimination to which she was subjected, occurred. On November 17, 2011, Plaintiff received notice from DOT’s Employee Relations Bureau that she was required to appear for ah interrogation meeting. (Id. at ¶ 157; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 9, at 247 [attaching as part of “Exhibit D” Memorandum to Plf,, dated Nov. 17, 2011, stating that the interrogation “concern[ed Plaintiffs] time and attendance and other matters pertaining to” her duties while working in Region 1].) Initially, the interrogation was deferred. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 158.)

On or about February 2, 2012, Plaintiffs reassignment to the main office became permanent. (Id. at ¶ 160.) The probability that Plaintiff would lose her job as a result of PEF ■ union contract negotiations remained the same as when she had been merely temporarily reassigned to the DOT main office. (Id. at ¶ 161.) '

On or about February 6, 2012, Plaintiff filed a verified complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights (“NYSDHR”), alleging violations of the NYSHRL. (Id. at ¶ 162; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 23, at 1622-31 [attaching as part of “Exhibit G” Elf.’s Verified Compl. to NYSDHR].) In her verified complaint, Plaintiff alleged she had been subjected to gender discrimination and retaliation since filing her union contract grievances. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 23, at 1622.) Plaintiff asserted -that she had been treated differently than her male counterparts on several bases, including being assigned to “an inappropriately sized cubicle for [her] grade level,” being accused of stealing a parking sticker, and being subjected to her direct supervisor (Lewis) sitting ’ outside her office to monitor her. (Id. at 1622-23.) Moreover, Plaintiff asserted that, since she was reassigned to the main office, Bennison “regularly walks past [her] desk, staring at [her], smirking and laughing.” (Id. at 1623.)

On March' 6, 2012, Nagy counseled Plaintiff regarding her attendance and work habits. (Dkt. No, 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 165.) At the meeting, Nagy informed Plaintiff that, since she was assigned to his group in August 2011, she had been absent nearly 60% of the time and that, on the days that she reported to work, she was frequently late and exhibited poor work habits. (Id. at ¶ 166.) The following day, Nagy provided Plaintiff with a counseling memorandum summarizing the issues that they had discussed. (Id. at ¶ 167.) .

The interrogation of which Plaintiff was notified in November 2011 was held on April 6, 2012, and was conducted by David Harris, DOT’s Labor Relations representative. (Id. at ¶ 168; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 8, at 149-60 [attaching as part of “Exhibit D” Interrogation Trans., dated Apr. 6, 2012].) Plaintiff was questioned about reported instances of absence and tardiness from May 2010 and forward. (I.d. at ¶ 169.) Those instances were based upon eyewitness reports from other DOT employees. (Id. at ¶ 170.)

On April 12, 2012, PEF filed a contract grievance on Plaintiffs behalf, alleging that Nagy’s March 6, 2012, counseling memorandum amounted to discipline. (Id. at ¶ 171.)

On April 25, 2012, in relation to the interrogation held on April 6, 2012, Plaintiff was issued a Notice of Discipline, which proposed to terminate her employment based upon findings that she offered a false instrument for filing and committed theft of services on four occasions in May and June of 2011 while employed as the Regional IT Manager of Region 1. (Id. at ¶¶ 172-73; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 8, at 166-67 [attaching as part of “Exhibit D” Notice of Discipline, dated Apr. 25, 2012].)

On June 7, 2012, Plaintiffs grievance with regard to Nagy’s counseling memorandum was denied. (Id. at ¶ 174.)

On June 20, 2012, Plaintiff filed an amended verified complaint with the NYSDHR, adding claims pursuant to Title VII. (Id. at ¶ 177; Dkt.' No. 24, Attach. 34 [attaching as “Exhibit P” Plf.’s Am. Verified Compl. to NYSDHR].) In her amended verified complaint, Plaintiff asserted that “[flederal [s]tatus has been added to this case” and authorized NYSDHR to accept the amended verified complaint on behalf of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 34, at 2.) On February 6, 2013, Plaintiff received a “Right to Sue” letter from the EEOC. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 179; Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 2 [“Right to Sue” Letter].)

On November 22, 2012, all IT positions within DOT-including Plaintiffs position-were transferred to the newly formed New York State Office of Information Technology Services. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 178.)

Dismissal of Plaintiffs Notice of Discipline

Plaintiffs Notice of Discipline was ultimately referred to arbitration and, on August 28, 2013, the arbitrator dismissed the charges on the basis that Plaintiff had not been provided with sufficient notice or a reasonable opportunity to address the allegation of theft of services. (Id, at ¶¶ 175-76; Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 33, at 7 [attaching as “Exhibit 0” Opinion and Award, dated Aug. 28, 2013].) The arbitrator reasoned that Plaintiff was unable to defend herself because DOT did not conduct its interrogation until ten months after Plaintiffs alleged absences and/or tardiness. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 33, at 7.) However, the arbitrator noted that his “decision should not be read as indicating that [Plaintiff] was without fault.” (Id. at 8.)

As of the date on which DOT filed its motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff remained employed as an ITS 3 with a salary of $85,000 per year and. state benefits. (Id. at ¶ 180.) Plaintiffs salary has continually increased since 2008. (Compare Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶ 181 [Def.’s Rule 7.1 Statement, supporting the above-listed factual assertion with- an accurate record citation] with Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 2, at ¶ 181 [Plf.’s Rule 7.1 Response, admitting the fact asserted and asserting additional fact neither expressly nor impliedly asserted or disputed by Defendant].)

C. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

1. Defendant’s Construction of Plaintiffs Complaint

Defendant has moved for summary judgment to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint. (Dkt. No. ,24.) Before more closely examining the arguments .asserted by Defendant on its motion, the Court must briefly address the claims asserted in Plaintiffs Complaint and the manner in which Defendant has construed Plaintiffs Complaint and framed its arguments on the present motion.

As is clear from a reading of its arguments in support of its motion, Defendant construes Plaintiffs Complaint as asserting three claims under Title VII: discrimination, retaliation, and hostile, work environment. (See generally Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 1 [Def.’s Memo, of Law].) Correspondingly, in opposition to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff argues that genuine issues of fact exist as to each of her claims, including whether she was subjected to discrimination (due to disparate treatment) under Title VII. (Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 1, at 19-21 [Plf.’s Opp’n Memo, of Law].) ...

However, in the Court’s view, Plaintiff has not asserted a Title VII discrimination claim. In her Complaint, Plaintiff expressly alleges, in her “First Cause of Action,” that Defendant discriminated against her based upon her gender “in violation of the New York Executive Law also known as the New York Human Rights Law” (i.e., that she was subjected to disparate treatment). (Dkt. No. 1 at 1HI2731.) Plaintiffs Complaint makes no reference to Title VII (or any other federal law) with regard to the “First Cause of Action.” .(Id.) In contrast, in her “Second Cause of Action,” Plaintiffs Complaint cites both Title VII and the NYSHRL and alleges two separate claims: (a) a claim that she was subjected to retaliation after she “fíl[ed] discrimination charges” and “voic[ed] her concerns”; and (b) a claim that Defendant created a hostile work environment “for the purpose or with the foreseeable effect of causing [her] to leave her employment.” (Id. at ¶¶ 32-36.)

Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs Complaint did not raise a Title VII discrimination claim until she filed her opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. As a result, the Court declines to reach any such claim. Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 843 (2d Cir.2013) (“Kwan’s complaint does not assert a claim for hostile work environment and Kwan did not raise the prospect of such a claim until her opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The District Court held that because the plaintiff had never asserted a claim of hostile work environment until her brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, it would not consider the claim. We agree with the District Court and will not address the merits of that late-asserted claim.”) (citing, inter alia, Syracuse Broad. Corp. v. Newhouse, 236 F.2d 522, 525 [2d Cir.1956] [holding that district court was “justified” in “brushing] aside” further argument not alleged in complaint but raised for first time in opposition to summary judgment]).

2. Parties’ Briefing on Defendant’s Motion

a. Defendant’s Memorandum of Law

With respect to Plaintiffs Title VII retaliation claim, Defendant asserts five arguments: (1) to the extent that this claim is based upon acts that took place before August 25, 2011 (i.e., more than' 300 days before she filed her amended verified complaint with NYSDHR/EEOC), that claim is time-barred and the continuing violation exception to the statute of limitations does not apply (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 1, at 14); (2) any claims related to incidents that occurred prior to her August 18, 2011, contract grievances did not involve protected activities (id. at 14-15); (3) Plaintiff has not suffered an employment action that was materially adverse; (4) Plaintiff is unable to establish a causal connection between any retaliatory acts and a protected activity (id. at 15-16); and (5) any actions taken by Defendant were supported by nonretaliatory reasons, specifically, her repeated failure to adequately perform her job responsibilities as an Regional IT Manager, her mismanagement which occasioned problems not experienced in other regions, and her failure to follow instructions from hqr supervisors (id, at 17r-18).

With respect to Plaintiffs Title VII hostile work environment claim, Defendant asserts two arguments: (1) the acts Plaintiff alleges were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to make out a prima facie- claim (id. at 20-22); and (2) Plaintiff has- not established that any of the actions taken by Defendant’s employees was the result of a discriminatory motive or purpose (id. at 22).

Finally, Defendant argues that, upon dismissal of her Title VII claims, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs -state law claims. (Id at 22-23.)

b. Plaintiffs Opposition Memorandum of Law

In opposition to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff asserts seven arguments: (1) her claims are timely because they are “based on the hostile work environment created against her as a result of her gender,” rather than a single discrete act (Dkt No, 32, Attach. 1 at 6-7) [Plf.’s Opp’n Memo, of Law]; (2) her complaints of harassment to her supervisors and her complaints communicated through the grievance procedures provided for in her union contract constituted protected activities (id. at 8 — 9); (3) she has suffered a materially adverse employment action in that she was (a) stripped of her position as Regional IT Manager and transferred to a position in an area in which she had “no experience or knowledge,” (b) assigned a small cubicle not commiserate with her grade and position, (c) subjected to the supervisor who transferred her (Bennison) “walking past her new cubicle to sneer and laugh at her,” (d) subjected to progressive discipline regarding “attendance and tardiness” that had occurred in the past, and (e) denied her requests to. “be transferred from her .current position” (id. at 8-12); (4) her disparate treatment as compared to- her male coworkers and the temporal proximity between her complaints of discrimination and her subsequent transfer, discipline, and attempted termination demonstrate a causal connection between her protected activity and the adverse' employment actions she suffered (id. at 12-13); (5) Defendant has not proffered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions toward Plaintiff and, to the extent that Defendant argues that Plaintiff was a poor and/or insubordinate employee, a question of material fact exists as to whether those reasons were pretextual (id. at 13-15); (6) she was subjected to a hostile work environment at the hands of Bennison (id. at 16 — 18); and (7) because Defendant’s motion for summary judgment should be denied, there is no basis on which to dismiss her NYSHRL claims on jurisdictional grounds (id. at 21-22). ,

c. Defendant’s Reply Memorandum of Law.

In its reply, Defendant asserts four arguments: (1) none of the actions allegedly taken by Defendant against Plaintiff, including her reassignment in July 2011, constituted an adverse employment action under the circumstances; -(2) Plaintiff has not established that any of Defendant’s alleged acts were undertaken with a retaliatory animus; (3) in any event, Defendant has offered valid, nondiscriminatory reasons for its alleged actions, including Plaintiffs inadequate job- performance in light of the specific needs of the Region 1 office and the commonplace nature of reassignments due to reorganisation of IT services statewide, as well as hiring and budgeting issues; and (4) Plaintiff has failed to address alternative explanations for her alleged treatment that she herself identified, including “mutual disagreements over work-related issues, complaints that Mr. Bennison had received about Plaintiffs •management of Region 1, work backlog and deadline issues in Region 1, and challenges Plaintiff had made to Mr. Benni-son’s authority.” (Dkt. No. 34 at 1-3 [Def.’s Reply Memo, of Law].)

II. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Standard Governing a Motion for Summary Judgment

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, summary judgment is warranted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment ás a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute of fact is “genuine” if “the [record] evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). As a result, “[c]onclusory allegations, conjecture and speculation ... are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact.” Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir.1998) (citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). As the Supreme Court has explained, “[the non-moving party] must do more than simply show that -there is some metaphysical doubt as- to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). As for the materiality requirement, a dispute of fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under .the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id.

In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact 'exists, the Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In addition, “[the moving party] bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the .. -. [record] which it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e). However, when the moving party has met this initial burden of establishing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing a genuine dispute of material fact for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c),. (e).

Under the above-stated burden-shifting standard, where the non-movant wilfully fails to deny the factual assertions contained in the movant’s Rule 7.1 Statement of Material Facts in matching numbered paragraphs supported by a citation to admissible record evidence (as required by Local Rule 7.1[a][3] of the Court’s Local Rules of Practice), the court has no duty to perform an independent review of the record to find proof of a factual dispute. However, in finding the facts asserted by mov-ant to be true, the court may not rely solely on the movant’s Rule 7.1 Statement; rather, the court must be satisfied that the citations to evidence in the record support the movant’s assertions. See Giannullo v. City of N.Y., 322 F.3d 139, 143, n.5 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that not verifying in the record the assertions in the motion for summary judgment “would derogate the truth-finding functions of the judicial process by substituting convenience for facts”).

Finally,- when a non-movant fails to oppose a legal argument asserted by a mov-ant, the movant’s burden with regard to that argument is lightened, such that, in order to succeed on that argument, the movant need only show that the argument possesses facial merit, which has appropriately been characterized as a “modest” burden. See N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(b)(3) (‘"Where a properly filed motion is unopposed and the Court determined that the moving party has met its burden to demonstrate entitlement to the relief requested therein _”); Rusyniak v. Gensini, 07-CV-0279, 2009 WL 3672105, at *1, n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2009) (Suddaby, J.) (collecting cases); Este-Green v. Astrue, 09-CV-0722, 2009 WL 2473509, at *2 & n.3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2009) (Suddaby, J.) (collecting cases).

B. Legal Standards Governing Plaintiff’s Claims

Because the parties to this action have demonstrated, in their memoranda of law, an accurate understanding of the relevant points of law contained in the general legal standards governing Plaintiffs claims in this action,. the Court will not incite, in their entirety, those legal standards in this Decision and Order, which is intended primarily for review by the parties. {See generally Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 1 [Defis. Memo, of Law]; Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 1 [Pit’s Opp’n Memo, of Law]; Dkt. No. 34 [Def.’s Reply Memo, of Law].) Rather, the Court will merely reference portions of those standards where necessary below in Part III of this Decision and Order.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Whether Plaintiffs Title YII Retaliation Claim Must Be Dismissed

After carefully considering the matter, the Court answers this question in the affirmative, in part for the reasons set forth in Defendant’s memoranda of law. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. T [Def.’s Memo, of Law]; Dkt. No. 34 [Def.’s Reply Memo, of Law].) More specifically, as discussed below, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that she engaged in a protected activity and that she has adduced admissible record evidence supporting a reasonable finding that her reassignment and notice of discipline were adverse employment actions. However, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff has failed to adduce admissible record evidence supporting a reasonable finding of the necessary causal connection between her protected activities and the adverse employment actions. Moreover, Defendant has presented legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment, actions it took. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 1, at 17-18; Dkt. No. 34 at 2.)

As an initial matter, Plaintiff correctly argues, and Defendant does not dispute, that she engaged in a protected activity when she filed contract grievances in August 2011. (Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 1, at 8-9 [Plf.’s Opp’n Memo, of Law]; Dkt. No. 24; Attach. 1 at 14-15 [Def.’s Memo, of Law].) Plaintiff also gave testimony and furnished documents in support of her contract grievances in October 2011. Moreover, filing a formal complaint with NYSDHR-a step taken by Plaintiff here in February 2012 and June 2012-also constitutes a protected activity. (Dkt. No. 24, Attach. 2, at ¶¶ 162, 177.) See, e.g., Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 208, 209 (2d Cir.1990).

With regard to the element of adverse action, for the reasons articulated in Plaintiffs memorandum of law, the Court concludes that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiffs reassignment from her position as the IT Regional Manager of Region 1 to the Information Security unit constituted a materially adverse employment action. (Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 1, at 11.) Plaintiff has proffered evidentiary support for her assertion that she was reassigned from her managerial position in Region 1, which carried supervisory responsibilities, to a position with which she had less (if any) familiarity and training. (See, e.g., Dkt, No. 33 at ¶ 33 [Plf.’s Aff.].) See also Kessler v. Westchester Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 209 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that “a transfer is an adverse employment action if it results in a change in responsibilities so significant as to constitute, a setback to the plaintiffs career,” where plaintiff “was transferred from an ‘elite’ unit to one that was ‘less prestigious,’ or where the transfer at issue “effected a ‘radical change in nature of the [plaintiffs] work’ ”) (citations omitted); Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 170 (2d Cir.2012) (collecting cases). That Plaintiff maintained the same salary is of little consequence because, “even where a plaintiff retains the same title and salary following a transfer, [s]he may demonstrate an adverse action by showing that [s]he has been de facto ‘stripped of [her job] responsibilities and not allowed to perform those functions.’” Torregiano v. Monroe Comm. College, 11-CV-6300, 2015 WL 6641784, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2015) (quoting Kessler, 461 F.3d at 209), Moreover, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that her April 2012 interrogation and subsequent notice of discipline, proposing to terminate her employment due to her theft of services from May and June 2011, could also constitute an adverse employment action. (Dkt. No. 21, Attach. 1, at 12.)

However, for the reasons set forth in Defendant’s ■ memorandum of law and reply memorandum of law, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to establish that a genuine i